The Rules of 2017 and the Falling Prices of Cattle
Though cow slaughter bans have been in place in several states, especially since the Modi government came to power, but this is the first time that the central government has taken the plunge to impose a slaughter ban through the backdoor. The notified rules clearly state in section 22 of the notification that all purchasers of cattle will give an undertaking to certify that the sale of animals is for ‘agricultural purposes and not for slaughter’. Further the rules put a moratorium on the resale of the cattle for six months and also on inter-state sale of cattle. This will effectively ensure that there are no suppliers of cattle to even exporters. Once the livestock market rules are applied, farmers will no longer sell in competitive market places but at the farm gate at much lower prices, lowering the bargaining power of the farmer vis-à-vis the trader who supplies cattle to the companies.

Experience from states where the ban has been operational before the formulation of these rules, shows that the prices of unfit cattle have plummeted once the slaughter ban has come into force. As SP Sabherwal, general secretary of The Meat and Livestock Exporters Association explains, “This (the ban) is a major change that will hit farmers more than meat exporters, who will also be hit. Currently, we buy buffaloes that are unable to produce milk and are too old to breed through middlemen who bid for these animals at cattle markets. These sell for about Rs 20,000-25,000 a buffalo. If farmers sell at the farm gate, he will sell at whatever is paid to him, and it will certainly be lower than the rate discovered after bidding at a market”. In keeping with this analysis, the price of unfit cattle has plummeted with the ban in states like Maharashtra. As a study records, the price of milch cows fell from around Rs 65,000 to Rs 50,000 per animal and those of male calves, bulls and old cows from Rs 18,000-19,000 to Rs 15,000-16,000. The cycle of selling old and unusable animals, and replacing these with new animals, has been completely disrupted, creating utter havoc.

But, such havoc is not only linked to the lack of buyers of ‘unfit cattle’. It is linked to the specific links between the milk and the meat producing industry. As is explained by many analysts, there are no separate cattle breeding programmes for meat and milk within Indian markets. The suppliers of cattle for the meat industry are the same farmers who initially rear their cattle for milk production. It is only once these cows become unproductive in terms of milk production that they are sold for meat production. Hence, unlike in many other countries of the world such as Australia and the US, there is no specialised breeding for meat production. But in the event that cattle can be only sold for agricultural purposes farmers will be forced to do distress sales of low productive cattle. These instances have come to light in places where the ban is already in force. For example, a report from Maharashtra showed that cows producing 20 litres a day are currently fetching roughly Rs 45,000 at the weekly cattle market, the largest in northern Maharashtra. A year ago, these rates averaged Rs 80,000 per animal. The same goes for bulls: prices of four-year-old animals in good health have fallen from Rs 50,000 to Rs 30,000 in the last one year. Similarly another cattle trader explained that earlier he used to sell ten cows a day but now he is barely able to sell two cows a day. Another farmer reported that he sold his young cows for Rs 20,000 each after the ban, whereas ordinarily they would have fetched Rs 60,000 each. This type of distress sale is likely to increase and impact on the farmer’s income as sale of cattle constitutes an important supplementary income, especially since the notification also includes buffaloes within its ambit. It is well known that India is one of the foremost exporters of buffalo meat, so the cost of buffaloes would also be impacted.

Potential for Reorganising the Meat Supply Chain
In this context, it is interesting that most of the meat exporting industry has only termed the ban as ‘anti-farmer’ and acknowledged that the ban may not impact its own interests much. This is largely because the cattle sale ban is likely to force a change in the supply dynamics of the industry. It would not be surprising if the government comes up with a subsidised breeding programme under the PPP model. The operational guidelines of the National Livestock Mission which were revised in 2015-16 have targeted the salvaging and rearing of young buffalos as one of the main employment generation programmes. Though this scheme is not a new one it got a fresh thrust with increased allocations to the livestock mission in the last budget. The components of the scheme are three fold: setting up individual units (mostly for dalits, adivasis and women); commercial units and industrial units. It is pertinent to note that this scheme is not only open to farmers or youth, but also to companies, partnerships and corporations. Since the entire scheme is based on credit lines from NABARD, beneficiaries will have to ensure that they have a market for their buffalos, and this where they will be forced to tie up with the corporation. Hence the main thrust of the scheme is the preparation of raw materials for the leather and meat exporting industries. The cattle sale ban for slaughter seems to be aimed at squeezing the cattle market so that the farmer is forced to make distress sales to large slaughter houses. Under the current situation, the National Livestock Mission will only aid this process.

Given this scenario, it is also obvious that slaughter houses serving the domestic meat markets will suffer. And it is here that the government has used the backdoor method of introducing a measure that will make access to beef virtually impossible for the local consumer. This aspect has especially been highlighted in the Kerala government’s prompt response to the slaughter ban. Further, even if there is no ‘official ban’ on beef eating, consumers will be forced to buy beef from super markets that will form one end of the domestic supply chain. This is likely to result in closing down of small meat retailers. If they are to survive in the market, they will have to arrive at market arrangements with the corporate meat producers, or even become franchises of business houses who can afford to access cattle at the farm gate.  Hence the cattle sale ban is not just a cultural move, but its economic logic is grounded soundly in support for corporate capitalism. Or rather, it is the best example of Modi government’s corporate Hindutva which attempts to impose its cultural hegemony and at the same time protect the interests of corporate players.

Courtesy: Newsclick
 
 

The post Modi Sarkar’s Corporate Plans: Ban on Cattle Sale for Slaughter Its First Step? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Representation Image

his article ‘Not an Imagined Community ’ the RSS ideologue Rakesh Sinha claims that the Sangh’s conception of nationalism is not invented but is a historical fact which is based on culturally inclusive development of the Indian civilisation. This article (and especially its title) is a direct critique of the idea of the ‘nation’ as an ‘imagined’ political community which was potently described in Benedict Anderson’s seminal text ‘Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism’. Anderson powerfully argues that dominant ideas of nationhood are cultural inventions of the ruling classes which act as hegemonic ideological tools to hide the oppressive practices of the rulers. The critiques of the idea of the Hindu Rashtra have also been following this line of argument, thus seeing the use of Hindu Rashtra as a political tool for communal polarisation. Responding to these criticisms, Sinha’s article argues that those who oppose the ‘Hindu Rashtra’ in fact confuse religion with culture. The main argument quotes from prominent Sangh founders and explains that the “RSS concept of the Hindu Rashtra defines India’s nationalism in civilisational and cultural contexts. Our nationalism is not political, it is based on the progressive continuation of civilisation, and therefore, is a civilisational nation-state”. Given that the RSS is firmly in control of political power through the Bharatiya Janata Party, Rakesh Sinha’s article can be seen as forming an important part of the ideological hegemony of the contemporary ruling classes. Hence, it is important to both demystify and counter the powerful idea of an inclusive civilisational heritage that forms the foundation of the conception of the Hindu Rashtra.

BIRTH OF HINDUISM AS A RELIGION OF DOMINANT CLASSES
One of the main arguments made by Sinha is that the progress of Indian civilisation has resulted in the birth of a shared tolerant culture which is inclusive in its essence. Hence Hinduism is not a religion but a spiritual philosophy that is to be counter posed to organised religions such as Islam and Christianity. Supporting this contention, Sinha argues that “Our civilisational trajectory shows that India has been privileged with spiritual democracy through the ages. The bone of contention in India has not been the freedom of religion, or new religions, but organised and systematic religious expansionism, responsible for crippling our heritage and traditions of secularism. In our case, philosophies and culture are symbiotically linked with spiritualism”. However this contention is a gross misinterpretation of a well documented history which links the growth of organised Hinduism with the political project of establishing a dominant and oppressive State from the ancient period itself. This need for the formation of a State was also linked to the growth of classes and the birth of private property.

As the iconic historian of ancient India DD Kosambi explains that the extraction of food surplus in the Indus civilisation was done not by force, but through religion where grain would be collected and distributed by the temple. The control of surplus food was itself an indication of how the ideological force of religion was used to main inequalities. Hinduism as a hegemonic ideology was also used to establish and justify the emerging caste system. The caste system formed the foundation of the oppressive division of labour in India, which continues even to this date. The first stark articulation of this tendency is seen with the rise of the Magadha rulers, where the institutionalisation of a strong State was simultaneous with the installation of Brahmanical religion as an instrument of control by the ruling classes. From this period onwards Hinduism began to be used as a political force with the explicit objective of ensuring “rule by consent”.

Hinduva intellectuals particularly Savarkar, in his Six Glorious Epochs of Indian History, portray the era of Chandragupta Maurya as the first epoch of the “glorious Indian civilisation”. In contrast to Kosambi’s analysis, this interpretation provides a legitimisation of the Hindutva political agenda. In this analysis, the role of ‘Hindu’ kingdoms is seen as opposing foreign ‘invaders’ the Greeks, Muslims and Christians. Thus there is a definite attempt to construct the divide between “Hindus” and “others” or the foreigners. This serves the political purpose of propping up the idea of a united Hindu society against the others, in order to establish the rationale for a Hindu Rashtra. The idea of tolerance versus fundamentalist expansionism, as propagated by Sinha’s article, fits into this analysis. It recreates the divide in the garb of spiritualism thereby obfuscating the real purpose of promoting the notion of a Hindu Rashtra.

RULING CLASSES AND HINDUISM
As argued above, organised ‘Hinduism’ was an ideology and religion of the great empires who sought to consolidate their power through Brahmanical hegemony. The Kshatriya rulers built strong alliances with the Brahmins by allowing them to develop their symbolic authority; which ultimately helped them to extract surplus and military service from oppressed masses. In this sense the idea of the ‘Hindu Rashtra’ is itself based on an alliance between the rulers and their ideological supporters. The domination of these forces was maintained by eliminating any form of dissent and opposition.  Organised political Hinduism also suppressed popular culture and folk religions. Movements like Bhakti, Sufi and others were suppressed ruthlessly for opposing the dominant caste system. The oppressors were both Brahmin and Muslim fundamentalists who formed the dominant classes of different periods. Even today the rationalists, dalits, socialists and communists who oppose the caste system and offer an alternative to the hegemony of organised Hindutva forces are being eliminated through the use of force. 

Sinha’s article provides a rationale for the Hindutva’s continued aggression against the rationalists and secularists when he uses Hegdewar’s idea of uniting all castes under the banner of “Hindu Rashtra”. The agenda of the Sangh is based on the idea of the dominant and the oppressed castes arriving at a compromise without changing the oppressive division of labour. The current Sangh’s work amongst women, dalits and adivasis is very much reflective of this approach. For example, while the Sangh has been flexible enough to incorporate some of the deities of adivasi life, it has used its influence over the adivasis to open up adivasi regions to corporate influence. This is particularly true of the BJP ruled states where dalits and adivasis face extreme deprivation despite the Sangh organisations and Sinha’s boastful praise of their work. The core social base of the Sangh is situated in castes and classes that are the ultimate oppressors of the adivasis. Sinha’s article is only one example of a chimera that is being created by the Sangh to aid the Modi government’s policies favouring corporate capitalism. By creating a myth of ‘cultural oneness’ and ‘unity of culture’ Sinha’s article cannot refute Benedict Andersons Imagined Communities. Rather it provides a good example of how the myth and ideology of Hindu Rashtra continues to be invented by Sangh intellectuals. Sinha’s article is a misrepresentation of history and a complete travesty of truth as we know. Hence it is imperative that the democratic forces unite to build a consciousness that will effectively counter such a hegemonic and invented idea of the Hindu Rashtra.

Courtesy: People's Democracy

The post Hindutva’s Hegemony an Ideology of Political Domination: A Counter to Rakesh Sinha appeared first on SabrangIndia.

‘Laal Salaam, Jai Bhim’, ‘Jai Bhim, Lal Salaam’: This is a slogan that rents the air amongst the protestors in Hyderabad Central and Jawaharlal Nehru Universities. As we know, the students and the teachers of these universities have been putting up a stiff united resistance against vicious attacks unleashed by the Sangh Parivar and its government. This resistance has thrown up many questions about the future course of action and the possibilities for alliances between Dalit groups and Left and other democratic struggles. This article is written with the perspective of exploring the ways in which such an alliance can be built in the context of a concrete political and material reality.

Ambedkar and the Marxists

Broadly speaking, the ideological and strategic difference between class and caste based political mobilisations can be summarised in the emphasis of Dalit politics on the question of representation. Since their inception the Ambedkarites have used the tool of Representation to press for social reform. It has been assumed that ‘only a Dalit’ can represent the interests of another ‘Dalit’ and all the others who advocate for Dalit rights are largely ‘Brahmanical’ social reformers. In fact, Ambedkar himself put Gandhiji in this category as he argued that the source of discrimination was Hinduism, and Gandhiji, far from opposing it, just wanted to reform it to make it “tolerable”.[1] 

But this was not a viable project since the social structures associated with Hinduism needed to be opposed in totality and this could only be done if Hindu religion was rejected by all Dalits. Instead Ambedkar advocated the path of Buddhism. In his book ‘Buddha and Marx’ he writes that the best way of achieving the goal of Communism was through the Rule of Righteousness and not the Rule of Law. Ambedkar in fact argues for the moral superiority of Buddhism as a pathway to Communism.

As Ambedkar writes in his critique of Lenin’s conception of revolution: “The Russians are proud of their Communism. But they forget that the wonder of all wonders is that the Buddha established Communism so far as the Sangh was concerned without dictatorship. It may be that it was a communism on a very small scale but it was communism, without dictatorship a miracle which Lenin failed to do”. [2]

This Buddhist version of communism is characterised by austerity and the redistribution of wealth through a change of heart. Once again Ambedkar writes with regard to the question of private property that the rules imposed by Buddha were far more stringent than those of the Communists.In the context of this overall framework, Ambedkar in fact lays down his own theory of caste when he argues that caste is in fact enclosed class, and all classes are turning themselves into castes through practices of endogamy and excommunication. The occupational and economic difference forms a basis and sustains itself through such enclosures.[3]

Hence Ambedkarites consider ‘caste’ as the primary contradiction of Indian society, and it is on this basis that the Satyashodhak Communist Party was formed. Advocating a dialectic between caste and class, Sharad Patil, the founder of the party, gives primacy to caste contradiction and subsumes within it the issue of class struggle.[4]Ambedkar himself wrote to this effect that: “Class-consciousness, class struggle and class wars are supposed to be ideologies, which came into vogue from the writings of Karl Marx. This is a complete mistake. India is the land, which has experienced class-consciousness, class struggle. Indeed, India is the land where there has been fought a class war between Brahmans and Kshatriyas (sic) which lasted for several generations and which was fought so hard and with such virulence that it turned out to be a war of extermination.”[5] 

While it is true that representation of Dalits in the political sphere broadens the social basis of the democratic structure, it does not necessarily alter or improve the material conditions of the Dalits.

Class struggle and class war are interpreted in terms of the conflicts between castes. In this sense caste and class are conflated with each other and it is believed that class differences may be erased but caste will prevail. For Ambedkar and the Ambedkarites, the representation within institutions of power would be the first step towards empowering themselves to bring about social transformation through the annihilation of caste.  This became the focus of most of Ambedkarite politics whose programme was quite different from that of the Justice Party, which also asked for the annihilation of caste but added land reforms and minimum wages to their programme.[6]

Such politics has also been continuously challenged by the emergence of the new Dalit organisations like the Panther Republicans in the 1970s and 1980s, especially after the emergence of a strong OBC political lobby.[7]In contrast, from a communist perspective, the question of class unity was central to the mobilisation of the Dalits, and it was soon realised in communist practice that no major movement could be launched without an anti-caste component. A good example of this is the preparatory phase before the Telangana movement where the caste question and discrimination with agricultural work became one of the major ways of building a movement of agricultural workers. In this phase the aim was to create a democratic consciousness within the Dalit agricultural worker and also a democratic anti-discrimination consciousness amongst the non-Dalit worker. Hence the project of ‘class struggle’ was firmly linked to the opposition and oppression of the Dalits. The communist led anti slavery movements were firmly embedded in this perspective.[8] 

The relationship between the politics of representation and class formation has been a severely under-analysed theme in both Dalit studies as well as Marxist analysis.

But despite these examples the persistence of caste has been seen as a challenge to Marxist theory within the country. It has been argued that prominent ideologues have seldom taken note of caste in their political discourse. This understanding is however a misrepresentation of the theory and practice of democratic Dalit politics in India.  Since the early days of its inception the communist movement has been forced to recognise the existence of caste and interpret it in its own material context.

One of the earliest theorists to do so was D.D. Kosambi who argued that the transition from ‘tribe’ to ‘caste’ was a hegemonic process to deprive the oppressed people from their legitimate rights. As Kosambi writes, “Caste is class at a primitive level of production, a religious method of forming social consciousness in such a manner that the primary producer is deprived of his surplus with the minimum coercion.[9]  This classical statement shows that Kosambi used the method of the Marxist anthropologists to show how religious and ethnic ideologies became the legitimating force of oppressive relations. Religious and caste consciousness are thus both tools of hegemony, and as E.M.S Namboodripad was to write later, the movements for reservation and lower caste upsurge (especially in the context of Kerala) could be seen as a form of a democratic upsurge. However the class unity between the oppressed people of the upper castes and the Dalits was essential if any further movement was to be made on the question of opposing both social and economic oppression.[10] 

This understanding has been further strengthened by the later analysis that argued for a sympathetic look at the opening up of democratic spaces by lower caste resistance.[11] Hence the ‘Dalit’ is interpreted as a ‘political identity’ which has come up against the oppression of ruling class politics, which is characterised by affirmative action without social transformation. The limit of such politics is seen in the emerging scenario and inequity within the scheduled castes.

Class Formation and Inequities amongst the ‘Scheduled Castes

The relationship between the politics of representation and class formation has been a severely under-analysed theme in both Dalit studies as well as Marxist analysis. This lack of focus is largely because the co-evolution of the Dalit political identity and working class formation have not been understood as simultaneous developments which structure all kinds of Dalit and working class resistance.

In post-Independent India, this phenomenon is largely true because while affirmative action has created a strong Dalit leadership, its representation in the public sphere has not in fact solved the problem of growing disparities within the social groups. The analysis below looks at the question of class formation in selected states which have historically been important for both Dalit and left politics. It analyses the trends in Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh (important centres of Ambedkarite politics), Tamil Nadu (which has pioneering movements in radical Dalit politics like Panthers) and West Bengal and Kerala (important centres of left politics). Through such an analysis in an all India context, an attempt is made to correlate the problem of disparities within the Dalits with the trends in Dalit and left movements.

Inequalities due to Access to Land

According to recently available data (2013) the disparities amongst the Scheduled Castes is highest than amongst any other social group in India.[12] The pattern of land holdings as it has emerged in 2013 shows that 54.9 percent of the Scheduled Castes have only homestead lands and out of this 4.4 percent do not even own homesteads. About 84.1 percent of the Scheduled Castes own less than 0.2 hectares of land other than the homestead lands. Of these 21.2 percent have no access to any land apart from their hutments. The rest of the 62.9 percent are virtually (or in effect) landless as they largely depend on labour for their livelihood.[13] Thus the first disparity that exists within the ‘Dalits’ is between those who possess land for purposes other than homesteads (which is about 7.2 percent with land over one hectare), and those who are landless and virtually landless.

This pattern is reflected at the state level also where the rising landlessness amongst the Dalits has created a differentiation between land losers and those who possess some cultivable land. The data for selected states (chosen on the basis of states with important and significant history of Dalit politics) show the following:

Decadal  Change in Ownership of Cultivated Land in Selected States, 1999-2011 

Source: Calculated from NSSO data from different years.
 
The table shows that land deprivation is one of the main problems faced by the Dalits in almost all states. It is interesting to note that at the All India level there is a growing landlessness amongst the Dalits with access to all other categories of land showing a decline. Though the percentage growth in landlessness is the lowest in Gujarat the rise in middle and large land holdings indicates that a consolidation of land holdings amongst the Dalits is taking place in the state.

States with strong Ambedkarite politics like Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra have increasing landlessness in terms of ownership of land holdings and more than 80 percent of the Dalits are landless in these two states. States with strong left politics like Kerala and West Bengal also show a rise in landlessness in terms of ownership of land, but the land disparities are the lowest in these states. In Tamil Nadu, another state with radical Dalit politics, 91.1 percent Dalits are landless. This proportion is much higher than Bengal and Kerala.

But disparities in land do not tell the entire story about land based inequalities. The landless Dalits still depend on agriculture through lease agreements. Since evictions are not permissible under the land laws, recorded leased-in rights in land reform states are instrumental in creating secure agricultural employment. The available NSSO data (2013) shows that in states like Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh with strong Ambedkarite politics but no land reforms, the lease-in tenancy arrangements are varied over two cropping seasons.

For example in Uttar Pradesh the average size of leased-in land varies from 0.277 hectares to 0 0.321 hectares over two seasons, and seasonal landlessness (i.e. Dalits with no access to cultivable land in one season) varies by about 4 per cent, whereas in Maharashtra the average size of leased-in land varies from 0.13 to 0.5 hectares and seasonal landlessness varies by 3 percent. Even in a state like Tamil Nadu with radical Dalit Panther politics, the size of lands leased-in remains relatively small, however seasonal landlessness varies by 6 percent.

In West Bengal and Kerala, the states with strong left politics, the size of land holdings leased-in by Dalits remains stable and so does the tenure of land holdings.[14] This is largely because these are land reform states and here leased-in rights are recorded, permanent and inheritable. Hence states with strong class based mobilisations give greater land based livelihood security to Dalits than states whose Dalit politics is largely based on question of representation.

Inequalities Arising from Income

Income inequality, measured through data on expenditure is another aspect of inequality which reveals how the character of the proletarianisation of Dalits has impacted the disparities within this social group. It is particularly interesting to note the disparity index within social groups across time. Using the available NSSO data, a recent study shows the following results:

Economic Disparity Ratio by Social Group

Source: Extracted from Ashish Singh, Kaushalendra Kumar and Abhishek Singh, ‘Exclusion within Excluded: The Economic Divide within Scheduled Castes and Tribes Economic and Political Weekly Volume 50 Number 42, October 17, 2015, Tables 4and 5.
 
The table above shows that the disparities amongst all social groups are increasing in the post- economic reforms period. It is also evident that the period of the late 1980s is also the time when the inequalities amongst the Dalits reduced. This reduction in inequities could be attributed to some of the measures undertaken by the state under pressure from the emergence of a new wave of Dalit, Adivasi and left politics that emerged from the late 1970s onwards.

As the figures from Kerala and West Bengal show, the disparities amongst Dalits seem to have reduced as a result of the land reforms project. This is in stark contrast to the disparities within ‘Others’ which seem to have increased in the same period. But this process seems to have reversed in the post-reforms period, when the inequities within ‘Others’ has decreased and those within vulnerable social groups, especially the SCs, has increased. This trend is especially true of the states with Left dominated politics and not for regions with strong Dalit identity politics.In the states dominated by Ambedkarite Dalit politics like Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh, the increasing disparities within the Dalits have grown at a very high rate. This is also true of Tamil Nadu where the Panthers attempted to raise the class question within Dalit politics. Coincidentally the rate of growth of Dalit disparity is lower in those areas where class based mobilisations are stronger than Dalit identity movements.

Political Implications of the Concrete Reality

These trends raise the fundamental question of whether the strengthening of class based mobilisation is important to address the basic problems of Dalits and what type of democratised Dalit political identities should be shaped to combat non-transformative ruling class ‘Dalit politics’. One of the assumptions of ‘Dalit activists’ is that Dalit representation in all forms is inherently transformative. Thus the very presence of ‘Dalits’ will lead to the transformations of the lives of people belonging to the most vulnerable and historically discriminated group.

This assumption lies behind the fundamental question asked by several progressive activists and scholars: how many Dalits are in the leadership of the communist party?  However, such a question also begs a counter question: has Dalit politics in fact led to the transformation in Dalit lives?

This questioning and counter questioning raises important issues on the relationship between representational politics and social transformation. History has shown that whenever and wherever the communists worked and organised the Dalits, the Dalits accepted and supported them as ‘natural allies’ irrespective of the social origins or caste of their leaders.

Simultaneously, the very organising of Dalits on their everyday issues often yielded a democratic Dalit leadership. The political identity of this leadership was however not based on an ‘exclusivist’ position (that only a Dalit can work amongst Dalits) but on the belief that the annihilation of caste was an important component of building a classless society or even a People’s Democracy.

These trends raise the fundamental question of whether the strengthening of class based mobilisation is important to address the basic problems of Dalits and what type of democratised Dalit political identities should be shaped to combat non-transformative ruling class ‘Dalit politics’.

Such a political position has the potential for developing a ‘working class Dalit politics’ whose import and thrust is quite different from ruling class or class insensitive Dalit politics. The challenge of building such politics is however twofold. First the problem of combating the discrimination of Dalit workers by non-Dalit workers has to be squarely addressed by working class politics. To an extent, this may need the transformation of the political practice of present day communist activists themselves, who may believe in an anti-caste ideology but are unable to put it into political practice in their own neighbourhoods.

Second, the acknowledgement of class contradictions within the Dalits needs to be translated into the mobilisation of the most vulnerable within the Dalits. In other words a transformed working class consciousness can form the basis of a democratic Dalit politics. But such a challenge can only be met if class based politics is strengthened and expanded amongst the Dalits and Dalit dominated regions.As far as the potential of non-class Dalit politics is concerned, it may be noted that our discussion of the concrete material conditions has shown that Ambedkarite politics has a limited counter hegemonic potential. While it is true that representation of Dalits in the political sphere broadens the social basis of the democratic structure, it does not necessarily alter or improve the material conditions of the Dalits.

A glance at the political sphere in fact shows that the beneficiaries of representation in the political sphere possess a ruling class consciousness and therefore fail to have a vision for social transformation which will form the basis of the annihilation of caste. However, at present, non-class based Dalit political movements are crucial political allies in stopping the rightwing Sangh Parivar from spreading its tentacles within historically vulnerable social groups and the working classes. This emerging potent combination of the left-Dalits in Indian universities (for example the support for Ambedkar study circle by the Students Federation of India in IIT Madras and Hyderabad) has threatened the hegemony of the Modi led rightwing developmental discourse.

In this sense ‘Jai Bhim, Lal Salaam’ may be a slogan that is relevant and necessary in the context of an immediate political reality. But the project of social transformation needs to go both beyond just this slogan. Ambedkarites need to firmly address the class dimension of the Dalit question if they are to in fact bring about the fundamental social transformation they seek.At the same time the slogan of ‘Lal Salaam Jai Bhim’ by communist activists is an important recognition by democratic working class politics of the challenges it faces in bringing about fundamental social transformations under contemporary Hindutva led capitalism.

The post ‘Jai Bhim’ and ‘Lal Salaam’ and How the Twain Shall Meet appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As the juggernaut of the Modi Government’s unfettered Hindutva led corporate capitalism rolls, the adivasis of the country are feeling its intense impact. The adivasis form about 8.8% of India’s population and a large majority of the adivasi population is concentrated in the Central Indian region which has been a stronghold of the sangh parivar and the BJP. Even in states like Jharkhand and Odisha where the BJP has not been in government for many years, the grassroots presence of the sangh parivar in adivasi-dominated regions cannot be denied. Through long years of the work the sangh has established a base and also achieved limited success in the objective of polarizing adivasis along religious lines. The participation of the adivasis in the 2002 Gujarat riots, the Kandhamal riots of 2008 and the concerted campaign of the Bodo community against Assamese Muslims reflects the long term impact of the penetration of the sangh parivar in these regions.

But this is not the only impact of the BJP on adivasi societies. The natural alliance between the sangh organisations and main oppressors of adivasi people, i.e., the big traders and corporates has created an atmosphere of confrontation and perpetual conflict in the adivasi regions. The long-term and historical relative backwardness of these regions was used by the sangh parivar to establish its strong presence. The parivar used a combination of ideological indoctrination and constructive work to develop and expand its social base in order to build up an RSS and BJP cadre in these areas. However, the promises of integrated and equitable development that the BJP has been making to the adivasis have been broken and remain unfulfilled. Ever since the NDA II has come to power, the neo-liberal assault on adivasis has only intensified and expenditures on the welfare of backward classes have been slashed ever since the Modi government came to power. This trend and its impact needs to be understood if people are to be mobilised against the march of Hindutva amongst the adivasi people of Central and Eastern India.

Public expenditure on Dalit and Adivasi development cut
An analysis of the trends of the last four years shows that there has been a steady decline in the public expenditure for the welfare of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward classes. The budget figures show that in 2012-13 the public expenditure for the welfare of these classes was 3.06% of the total expenditure which went up to 3.48% in the next year i.e., 2013-14. This was also the last year of the UPA government and it is possible that the government tried to show that it was increasing the expenditure for the welfare of historically oppressed classes. However during the last two years, i.e. the first and second budgets of the present Modi led government, the public expenditure on the welfare of these classes decreased substantially to 2.98% of total expenditure in 2014-15 and to 2.88% in the budget estimates of 2015-16. As far as the tribal sub plan is concerned, the following picture emerges in the last three years. The tribal sub-plan is meant to allocate resources in proportion to the percentage of schedule tribes in the entire country, i.e. 8.8% of the total population. Yet the allocations show an abysmal picture with an allotment of 4.8% of the planned expenditure in 2013-14. This ratio has come further down under Modi’s regime to 4.3% of the planned expenditure in 2014-15 and 4.2% of the planned expenditure in 2015-16.

The main argument of the Modi government is that Central allocations have declined because it has transferred resources to the state governments in the name of “cooperative federalism. However the figures of state public expenditure show that the track record of BJP ruled governments  (especially in Gujarat, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh where the BJP has been in been in power for more than a decade) is not very good. In each of the long-term BJP ruled states the expenditure on the welfare of scheduled tribes, castes and backward classes had been in a decline even before the Modi Government came into power in the center. This decline shows the lack of commitment of these BJP governments towards removing historical inequities. This has had its own long-term impacts. The table below explains the patterns of public expenditure on the welfare of scheduled tribes, castes and backward classes in BJP ruled states:

Source, State Finances: An Analysis of Budget, RBI 2015.
 
Adivasis and Landlessness in BJP Ruled States
The lack of public spending in social services has been accompanied by pro-corporate policies in the resource rich regions that have led to the displacement of adivasis from their own lands. An analysis of the percentage changes in access to cultivated land for scheduled tribes between 2004-2010 shows a bleak picture. While the increase in landlessness for scheduled tribes is lower than the national average in all long-term BJP ruled states except Gujarat, the percentage of marginal holdings below one hectare has registered a significant rise in both Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. This clearly indicates that although the loss of land amongst the adivasis may not be absolute in its character, medium size land holdings are getting fragmented. Adivasis with larger land holdings are loosing a significant part of their land but not all their land so as to be classed Landless. Chhattisgarh is especially significant in this regard since there seems to be an unusual increase in medium adivasi land holders, a phenomena that has possibly arisen out of the Chhattisgarh government's contract farming initiative where adivasi peasants are directly linked to corporate houses. This rise in marginal and medium land holdings at the same time indicates a fundamental change within the class structure of the Chhattisgarh adivasis and can explain the spurt in urban growth rates of adivasis in the state. The unusually high rise in landlessness in Gujarat shows the growing dispossession amongst the adivasis in the state. The growing inequities within the adivasis are visible from the fact that the number of marginal land holdings registered a significant decline whereas the decline in large and medium size holdings was negligible. Small and marginal farmers in Gujarat are being rendered landless.

Percentage Changes in Access to Cultivated Land by Scheduled Tribes, 2004-2010

Calculated from NSSO Report 516, 2004-05,  p.70 and NSSO Report 543, 2010-2011,  p.74.

Impact on the Adivasi occupational structure in BJP rules states
The secular rise in marginal land holdings has to be seen as a part of the larger proletarisation of the adivasi people. While it is true that land has been a prized possession of the adivasis, the marginal adivasi peasant has always been forced to work on the lands of larger landowners in order to fulfill their subsistence requirements. In this situation some part of adivasi livelihood has always depended on agricultural and migrant casual labour for meeting a significant part of their subsistence. The class position of the adivasi as a rural worker rather than as a peasant has been further reinforced since the green revolution period. But today, most adivasis are unable to find gainful employment opportunities in agriculture. This is also accompanied by the falling rates of scheduled tribe employment in MNREGS. The labour force participation of rural adivasis has declined by almost 8% in the last decade. By contrast the urban labour force participation rate of adivasis has increased by 0.5% in the same period. Paid work in urban areas for adivasi women increased by 8.4% in the period between 2007-2010 alone.

An analysis of data from the Census of India for the years 2001 to 2011 shows a secular decline in the number of main workers (workers getting more than 180 days of regular work in one year) in all three long-term BJP ruled states while there is only a marginal decline in the total work participation rates.[i] The reason why the full magnitude of the decline in main workers or workers with regular work is not reflected in the total work participation rates is a secular increase in marginal adivasi workforce (people working for less than six months a year). However, both the decrease in the main workforce and the increase in the marginal workforce are much higher in the rural regions than in the urban regions. This trend indicates that increasing number of rural adivasi workers have less work available during the year. This is reflective of the larger rural crisis that has fundamentally impacted adivasi livelihoods. Another trend that emerges from the data is that while there is decline in the main male urban workforce, there is a generalised increase in the main female urban workforce in all states except Chhattisgarh[si1] . This trend highlights the gendered nature of the changes in the occupational structure. Significantly the decline in marginal female urban workers is replaced by a corresponding increase in the main female urban workers. Once again this indicates that schedule tribe women are shouldering greater responsibility to meet the daily needs of urban survival. ​
 
This picture contrasts with the decedal changes in the character of marginal work. The data shows that though the number of tribal marginal other workers have gone up in both urban and rural areas the increase is much higher in the case of male worker participation rates (7.33%) as compared with female work participation rates (0.69%). The pattern of this trend is more evident in the rural areas where work participation rates of marginal work have increased by 4.72% overall and for male workers they have risen by 8.02%. In two out of the three states under consideration the rural marginal work for male workers has risen more than the national average (8%). In Chhattisgarh the increase is more than 10% and in Madhya Pradesh it is close to 10 percent. In the case of Gujarat there has been a rise in all types of marginal employment highlighting the jobless growth in the state. This reflected in the fact that there is there is a decrease in urban main work and increase in marginal work for male workers resulting in a total decrease in work participation rates. This decrease in work participation rate is largely due to growth in unemployment and decrease in main workers.​ In contrast there is an increase in female urban main work force and decrease in the marginal workforce. This clearly indicates that women are being pushed out of agriculture and are forced to migrate for low paid wage labour in peri-urban and urban areas.

The experience of the BJP ruled states also shows that programmes of conversion, reconversions and the inculcation of caste Hindu values go hand in hand with the process of proletarianisation of adivasis.

This shows that the much-touted BJP record of development is a false propaganda and needs to be demystified.

Adivasi cultivators on the decline
In this context a further probe into the nature of occupational changes reveals a rather interesting scenario of working class formation and consolidation amongst the adivasis. The decedal changes in the industrial classification of main workers reflect the land dispossession that is taking place amongst the tribals. Given the figures for increasing landlessness amongst this social group, it is not surprising that the number of adivasi cultivators or peasants have declined by more than 10% in all least developed states except for Odisha where the rate of decline is less than the all India average of 10.31%. As expected most of this decline is amongst the tribal farmers of rural areas, but this decrease is also gendered in its character. The rate of decline in female cultivators is higher than that of male cultivators in the rural regions indicating that female farmers and female-headed households face a greater degree of vulnerability. An interesting aspect of changes in work patterns relate to the category of "other workers".  In this category the rate of increase in female work participation rate is higher than that in male work participation rate. Although there is a secular decline in the category of “other workers” in urban areas, the female urban work participation rates in the decade under consideration (2001-2011)  seem to be increasing nationally as well as in at least two of the four least developed states. However the case of Gujarat is a little different where the rise in employment is largely in marginal agricultural work because of the penetration of contract farming in adivasi regions. Typically adivasi women are impacted by it much more than men. Hence the proletarianisation of adivasis is driven by transformations in the female workforce.

The BJP’s model of adivasi development shows that the adivasis are becoming a part of a large reserve army of mobile labour which is sustaining the current corporate capitalist system. Such a system brings about adverse inclusion of the adivasi people into the labour market which in turn is structured by the regional integration of the ‘least developed states’ into the larger political economy. Such a phenomena is epitomised by the policies of the regional ruling classes who think that neoliberalism is the best answer to their problems. In return they hope to perpetuate themselves and get a share of the corporate profits. They also support the weakening of social protection and welfare spending by the state. In this situation the adivasi worker’s consciousness needs to be built around complex demands for access to productive forces and social protection which promote class unity amongst all workers and petty producers. Hence the democratic movement faces the challenge of expanding its social base amongst the adivasis by focusing on their sectional interests through class based mass organisations and strategically linking them to the fight against contemporary corporate capitalism. The experience of the BJP ruled states also shows that programmes of conversion, reconversions and the inculcation of caste Hindu values go hand in hand with the process of proletarianisation of adivasis. Hence any effort to mobilise against the RSS in adivasi regions must be accompanied by the demystification of Modi and BJP model of adivasi development.

(The author is professor and chairperson, Centre for Informal Sector and Labour Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)
 
 
Appendix 1
Decedal Changes in Adivasi Work Participation Rates, 2001-2011

Data Computed from  Census of India, 2001 ST01 and ST02; Census of India, 2011, ST Tables Online data.
Appendix 2
Table 2: Decadal Changes in Industrial Classification of Main Adivasi Workers, 2001-2011

Source: Calculated from the Census of India 2001, ST01 and STO2 and Census of India, 2011
 

The post Adivasi impoverishment accelerates under NDA II appeared first on SabrangIndia.