The case, Viswanathan Krishna Murthy & Ors. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., involved a complaint by Pokala Sabhana, a 24-year-old trans woman. She alleged that her husband, Viswanathan Krishna Murthy, and his family had subjected her to cruelty and harassment. She filed her complaint under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), a law designed to protect wives from abuse by their husbands and in-laws.

This led the court to consider two key questions: first, whether a Trans woman could be considered a ‘woman’ under this law, and second, whether the allegations were sufficient to warrant a criminal trial. The court’s answer to the first was a clear “yes,” but its answer to the second was a firm “no”.

A Trans Woman is a ‘Woman’ Under the Law

The husband and his family argued that Sabhana could not be considered a ‘woman’ under Section 498-A, because she cannot bear children and therefore was not a woman in the “complete sense”.

Dr. Justice Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa rejected this argument, calling it “deeply flawed and legally impermissible”. The court’s reasoning was built on established legal principles:

• Womanhood is not defined by reproductive ability: The court stated that linking womanhood to the capacity to have children “undermines the very spirit of the Constitution, which upholds dignity, identity, and equality for all individuals”.
• Right to Self-Identify Gender: The judgment relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 2014 National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) v. Union of India The NALSA case established that every individual has the fundamental right to self-identify their gender, and the state must legally recognize it.
• Right to Marry: The court also cited the Supreme Court’s 2023 marriage equality case, Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India. While that case did not legalize same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court was unanimous in holding that “transgender persons in heterosexual relationships have the right to marry under existing law”.
• Constitutional Protections: Since Sabhana and Murthy’s marriage was legally valid, denying her the protections of Section 498-A would violate her fundamental rights to equality (Article 14), non-discrimination (Article 15), and life with dignity (Article 21).

Based on this, the court concluded that a Trans woman in a heterosexual marriage is entitled to protection under Section 498-A of the IPC.

Why the Case Was Dismissed

Despite this landmark finding, the court quashed the criminal proceedings against Murthy and his family. The reason was purely procedural: Sabhana’s complaint lacked the specific details required to sustain a charge of cruelty under Section 498-A.

The court found the allegations to be “bald and omnibus,” meaning that they are too vague and general to be the basis for a criminal case. The specific deficiencies noted were:

• Against the husband: The complaint stated that he left her less than two months after they started living together and that she later received a threatening message from his phone. However, it did not describe any specific acts of physical or mental cruelty that occurred while they were together.
• Against the in-laws: Sabhana stated in her complaint that her in-laws maintained “cordial relations” with her. The only negative claim was that they were trying to send their son abroad, which is not a criminal offense.
• Against another relative: A fourth person was accused with a single sentence claiming he was directing the others, with no supporting details.

The court pointed to a long line of Supreme Court rulings that caution against the misuse of Section 498-A. To prevent the law from being used to settle personal scores, courts require complaints to contain clear and specific allegations against each accused person. Because Sabhana’s complaint did not meet this standard, the court ruled that allowing the case to continue would be an “abuse of process of law”.

The judgment in Viswanathan Krishna Murthy is a significant step forward for the legal recognition of transgender rights in India. It establishes a clear precedent that the protections against domestic cruelty apply to Trans women in heterosexual marriages.

Jurisdictions like the UK and the US are seeing radical Trans exclusionary policies and establishments with figures like JK Rowling and Donald Trump respectively. For example, in a recent case, the UK Supreme Court has ruled that legal definition of woman is based on biological sex.[1] Therefore, judgements like these highlight the nuanced discourse that is emerging India with contributions from a powerful judiciary. However, it is important to note that judicial pronouncements cannot and will not satisfy the need for a comprehensive law that recognises queer marriage. Only a democratic and transparent legislative process will cover that gap.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16

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Indian women, transgender and non-binary persons in science: A 21st Century calendar by TLoS

Transgender rights in India: stalled progress and a frustrated community

The post Andhra Pradesh High Court rules Trans woman is a ‘woman’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Read: 60 Years Of Constitutional Rights Denied To 20 Millions Indian Dalit Christians | SabrangIndia

Can a Dalit not be a Christian or Muslim? Conversely, even after conversion out of caste-ridden Hinduism, is the discrimination suffered by caste be suffered by one who opts otherwise for Christianity or Islam?

Despite several attempts by the executive through Orders and Commissions to overturn once and for all, the discriminatory Presidential Order of 1950, Courts continue to affirm its limited understanding.

The recent, Akkala Rami Reddy judgement delivered by the AP high court spotlights this enduring debate on SC status for religious converts. The Andhra Pradesh High Court’s decision in Akkala Rami Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh has reignited a critical legal and social debate: Should Scheduled Caste (SC) status, with its attendant protections and affirmative action benefits, be denied to individuals solely based on their conversion to religions like Christianity or Islam, even if they continue to face caste-based discrimination? Overwhelming social scientific evidence and testimony led to the official admission in the Ranganath Mishra Commission Report (2007) that Christian and Muslim Dalits suffer the same forms of discrimination as their Hindu counterparts.

The judgment, which quashed SC/ST Act proceedings against the petitioners based on the complainant Pastor’s conversion to Christianity, underscores the judiciary’s current adherence to the 1950 Presidential Order.[1]

What is the 1950 Presidential Order?

The Presidential Orders regarding the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. These orders were issued by the President of India under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India, which define who would be Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes with respect to any State or Union Territory. More about the detailed process can be read here.

So, for a caste to be claiming the SC status, it has to be included the Constitution Order, 1950. The order states as follows in Paragraph 3:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph 2, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.”

This means, only people from the religions of Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs can be members of scheduled castes.

The Akkala Rami Reddy ruling: Conversion and ineligibility under SC/ST Act

In Akkala Rami Reddy, the AP High Court, on April 30, 2025, declared that the complainant, who had been working as a Pastor for approximately ten years, could not invoke the provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The Court reasoned that the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, explicitly states that no person professing a religion different from Hinduism (later amended to include Sikhism and Buddhism) shall be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste. The Court held that an individual converted to Christianity ceases to be a member of a Scheduled Caste and thus cannot claim the protections of the SC/ST Act. “The 2nd respondent has ceased to be a Member of the Scheduled Caste Community, the day he had converted into Christianity,” the judgment firmly stated.

The 1950 Order: A discriminatory relic?

At the heart of this recurring issue is Paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. Initially restricting SC status to Hindus, it was later amended to include Sikhs (1956) and Buddhists (1990).

The judgement presumes that caste discrimination vanishes upon conversion to egalitarian religions like Christianity or Islam. This exclusion establishes religion as the primary determinant for SC status, overlooking the socio-economic realities of continued caste-based oppression.

Judgement not a deviation but a rule

While the social realities of India would make one see the caste discrimination faced by people belonging to religions other than Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist—the courts have consistently taken a position that adheres to the literal law i.e., the Constitutional Order, 1950.

In one of the earlier cases, the Madras High Court in G. Michael v. S. Venkateswaran (1951), noted that while Christianity and Islam do not recognize caste systems, there were exceptions, particularly in South India, where members of lower castes converted to Christianity but were still considered members of their original caste by other caste members. However, the general rule established was that conversion operates as an expulsion from the caste, meaning a convert ceases to have any caste.[2]

Building on this, in S. Rajagopal v. C. M. Armugam (1968), the Supreme Court held that a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste (Adi Dravida Hindu in this case) who converted to Christianity lost their caste membership.[3] The Court found that the Christian religion does not recognize caste classifications, treating all Christians as equals. While the appellant claimed to have later reconverted to Hinduism and was professing Hindu religion by the time of the election, the Court stated that mere reconversion is not sufficient to automatically resume membership of the previous caste. It emphasized that acceptance by the caste in general as a member after reconversion is required, based on the principle that the caste itself is the supreme judge in matters affecting its composition.[4] Since the appellant had not provided evidence of such acceptance, his claim to SC status was rejected.

The principles from S. Rajagopal were considered in Principal, Guntur Medical College, v. Y. Mohan Rao (1976). This case involved a person born to parents who had converted from Hindu SC to Christianity, who later reconverted to Hinduism. The Supreme Court clarified that the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, required a person to profess Hindu or Sikh religion at the relevant time to be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste, not necessarily to be born into it. Regarding reconversion, the Court reasoned that a person born of Christian converts could become a member of the caste their parents belonged to before conversion if the members of that caste accept him as a member and admit him within the fold.[5] The caste’s acceptance is the key requirement.

Further developing the legal position, Kailash Sonkar v. Smt. Maya Devi (1983) extensively examined the effect of conversion and reconversion on caste status. The Supreme Court stated that conversion to Christianity or Islam involves loss of caste unless the new religion is liberal enough to permit the convertee to retain their caste or family laws. However, where the new religion does not accept the caste system, the loss of caste is complete. Introducing the doctrine of eclipse, the Court opined that when a person converts, the original caste remains under eclipse and automatically revives upon reconversion to the original religion during their lifetime. While acknowledging that acceptance by the community of the old order was previously considered a norm, the Court noted the difficulty and potential for exploitation in strictly insisting on this second condition in modern society.[6] It suggested that revival might occur by applying the doctrine of eclipse, though added a rider that this might be difficult if the conversion occurred several generations ago.[7]

Despite these verdicts, this one held to the contrary.
In 1984, The Supreme Court of India in the case of S. Anbalagan Vs. Devarajan AIR 1984 SC 411, said that “the practice of caste however irrational it may appear to our reason and however are repugnant it may appear to our moral and social sense, it so deep rooted in the India people that its mark does not seem to disappear on conversion to a different religion.”

However, more recently, in C. Selvarani v The Special Secretary Cum District (2024), the appellant, born Christian, claimed SC status based on her father’s background and her profession of Hinduism. The court noted evidence of her baptism shortly after birth, concluding she was a born Christian. It held that a person born Christian cannot be associated with any caste.[8] Further, upon conversion to Christianity, one loses her caste. While the appellant claimed to profess Hinduism, the court found the claim of reconversion disputed and noted the lack of positive acts or public declaration to evince such conversion, concluding she did not profess Hinduism. Therefore, in terms of the S.C. Order, 1964(The order for the Union Territory of Puducherry), she was not entitled to the Scheduled Caste community certificate as she did not profess Hinduism, Sikhism, or Buddhism.

In summary, the courts have consistently held that professing Hinduism, Sikhism, or Buddhism is a mandatory condition for being deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste under the relevant Presidential Orders. Conversion to other religions like Christianity or Islam generally results in the loss of the original caste status. While reconversion to Hinduism may allow for the regaining of caste membership, this often depends on acceptance by the caste community, although the doctrine of eclipse discussed in Kailash Sonkar suggests a potential revival upon genuine reconversion, noting the practical difficulties of insisting on community acceptance. Being born to Christian parents and subsequently claiming SC status after converting to Hinduism also hinges upon acceptance by the original caste group. Furthermore, proof of genuinely professing the specified religion and undertaking positive acts of conversion/reconversion can be crucial.

What runs contrary to this however is several Orders by the GOI’s Social Welfare Ministry and also Commissions appointed by successive governments at the Centre. Details of these may be read here.

The Issue with this judicial approach

This judicial stance, rooted in the interpretation and application of the 1950 Presidential Order, operates under the premise that caste, as a phenomenon warranting the specific provisions of Scheduled Caste status, is intrinsically linked to Hinduism (and later, Sikhism and Buddhism) and is shed upon conversion to faiths perceived as egalitarian, such as Christianity and Islam. However, a comprehensive understanding necessitates looking beyond this legally constructed silo to the complex sociological realities of caste and discrimination as they manifest across religious communities in India.

Contrary to the assumption embedded within the 1950 Order and upheld by the courts, historical and sociological research demonstrates that caste, or caste-like social stratification and discrimination, persists among Indian Christians and Muslims. While the nature and religious sanction of caste may differ significantly from its scripturally embedded form in Hinduism, its practical social manifestations – particularly the division between Dalits (formerly known as untouchables) and non-Dalits, and practices like endogamy – are not confined by religious boundaries.

As B.R. Ambedkar incisively argued, while caste among Mohammedans and Sikhs might lack the conscious, religiously consecrated ties that bind Hindu castes, and breach of caste rules might not lead to formal excommunication in the same way, caste nonetheless exists as a social practice or “survival” within these communities. Its significance might not be as profound as in Hinduism where it is a sacred institution compelling segregation, yet its presence cannot be dismissed. The crucial distinction Ambedkar makes is the absence of religious dogma compelling isolation in non-Hindu faiths, unlike in Hinduism.^[9] However, the implication that caste is non-existent or irrelevant among converts is not what Ambedkar suggests; rather, its role and basis are different.

Expanding on this, scholar Rupa Viswanath highlights that conversion has historically not guaranteed freedom from caste identity or discrimination for Dalits. The fundamental distinction between Dalits and non-Dalits, rooted in historical hierarchies and social power dynamics, transcends religious identity in India.^[10] While acknowledging Hinduism’s unique theological rationale for caste, Viswanath argues that focusing solely on this theological difference is misplaced when analysing the persistence of caste structures. The practice of endogamy, a cornerstone of caste, is observed across religious lines. Furthermore, the social division and discrimination faced by Dalits often continue regardless of their conversion, perpetuated by both co-religionists (who may retain caste consciousness or practices) and members of other communities.

Historically, within Indian Christianity, debates among missionaries and Indian converts themselves reveal the complex relationship with caste. While some Protestant missionaries, according to Vishwanath, advocated for the immediate abandonment of caste upon conversion due to its perceived link to Hinduism, others, including many high-caste Indian Christians, viewed caste as a purely civil or social distinction separable from religion, thus justifying its continuation within the Christian fold. This perspective often framed caste as a historical division of labour or social rank, seen as natural or even moral to observe, stripped of its overt “heathenish” religious justification from Hinduism.[11] Catholic missions, in some instances, were even more accommodating of existing caste structures, as seen in the approach of figures like Robert de Nobili, according to Ashok Mocherla.[12] These historical dynamics illustrate that conversion to Christianity, in practice, did not necessarily translate into the erasure of caste identity or cessation of caste-based social stratification and discrimination.

Similarly, while Islam conceptually emphasizes equality among believers, the social history of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent includes the development of hierarchical structures akin to caste, often reflected in divisions like Ashraf (those claiming foreign ancestry), Ajlaf (indigenous converts from privileged Hindu castes), and Arzal (converts from marginalised Hindu castes, including Dalits), with social interaction and marriage patterns often following these lines.[13]

Therefore, the legal position, as reinforced by judgments like Akkala Rami Reddy, rests on an incomplete and perhaps Orientalist understanding that segregates caste primarily as a “Hindu problem” that is resolved through conversion to religions deemed inherently egalitarian. This perspective fails to acknowledge the socio-economic realities and persistent discrimination faced by Dalit converts, whose historical location within the caste hierarchy continues to shape their experiences regardless of their faith. A more comprehensive understanding would recognize caste not merely as a theological construct limited to Hinduism, but as a deeply entrenched social structure of hierarchy, discrimination, and exclusion that has adapted and manifested within various religious communities in India. Consequently, linking Scheduled Caste status eligibility solely to the profession of specific religions, while ignoring the lived reality of continued caste-based disadvantage among converts to others, appears fundamentally inconsistent with the affirmative action principles intended to address historical injustices rooted in caste. It creates a paradox where individuals continue to suffer caste discrimination but are legally denied the means to address it based on their religious identity, highlighting the critical need for a religion-neutral approach to defining and addressing the Scheduled Castes.

One of the major unresolved issues lies in the Ghazi Saaduddin v. State of Maharashtra case, stalled since 2004. It challenges the constitutional legitimacy of the 1950 Presidential Order. In April 2024, the Supreme Court postponed hearing the matter, pointing to an ongoing inquiry by a commission headed by former Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan. The commission’s findings are now due in October 2025.

The core question remains whether the Indian legal system will evolve to recognize the lived reality of caste discrimination beyond specified religious confines, thereby ensuring that the constitutional promise of equality and social justice truly extends to all its Dalit citizens.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation).

[1] [1] CRIMINAL PETITION No.7114 OF 2022

[2] Para 17, AIR 1952 MADRAS 474

[3] Page 12, AIR 1969 SUPREME COURT 101

[4] Ibid page 14.

[5] Page 6, AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 1904

[6] Page 14, AIR 1984 SUPREME COURT 600

[7] Ibid

[8] Para 12, 2024 INSC 920

^[9] Dr.Bhimrao Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste (1936), ch.19, Para 7.

^[10] Rupa Vishwanath, The Pariah Problem: Caste, Religion, and the Social in Modern India (2014), p.313, Columbia University Press.

[11] Ibid p.75

[12] Ashok Kumar Mocherla, Dalit Christians in South India (2021), pp. 107-108

[13] Sobin George & Shrinidhi Adiga, ‘Caste’ Among Muslims: Ethnographic Account from a Karnataka Village(2017), p.1

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No SC quota for Dalits converting to Islam & Christianity to contest elections: Centre to RS

Beyond “Rice Bag” Christians: Examining the case of Indigenous Christianity in India

The post No to Dalits who are Christian, Muslim, how the AP HC limits its understanding of caste and faith appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court has reiterated that merely because a law is challenged before a court, it does not take away the right to protest it. The division bench of Justices Ahsanudiin Amanullah and BS Bhanumathi held, “Approaching a constitutional court for redressal of grievances ipso facto would not disentitle a citizen from protesting in relation to the same subject-matter.”

The agitation was on a grievance towards pay scale which was pending before the High court. The Advocate General on behalf of the State submitted that when the Court was already apprised of the matter by way of the petition it was not proper for the employees to give a call for, or proceed on strike, which could bring the State’s administrative machinery to a grinding halt.

The court cited Ramlila Maidan Incident, In Re, (2012) 5 SCC 1, whereby the apex court held that “freedom of speech is the bulwark of democratic Government. This freedom is essential for the appropriate functioning of the democratic process. The freedom of speech and expression is regarded as the first condition of liberty in the hierarchy of liberties granted under our constitutional mandate.”

The court also cited Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324, whereby the  court held,

“Undoubtedly, holding peaceful demonstrations by the citizenry in order to air its grievances and to ensure that these grievances are heard in the relevant quarters, is its fundamental right. This right is specifically enshrined under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. Article 19(1)(a) confers a very valuable right on the citizens, namely, right of free speech. Likewise, Article 19(1)(b) gives the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Together, both these rights ensure that the people of this country have the right to assemble peacefully and protest against any of the actions or the decisions taken by the Government or other governmental authorities which are not to the liking. Legitimate dissent is a distinguishable feature of any democracy. Question is not as to whether the issue raised by the protestors is right or wrong or it is justified or unjustified. The fundamental aspect is the right which is conferred upon the affected people in a democracy to voice their grievances.

54. The right to protest is, thus, recognised as a fundamental right under the Constitution. This right is crucial in a democracy which rests on participation of an informed citizenry in governance. This right is also crucial since it strengthens representative democracy by enabling direct participation in public affairs where individuals and groups are able to express dissent and grievances, expose the flaws in governance and demand accountability from the State authorities as well as powerful entities. This right is crucial in a vibrant democracy like India but more so in the Indian context to aid in the assertion of the rights of the marginalised and poorly represented minorities.”

Further, in Amit Sahni v Commissioner of Police, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 853, the court held that even if a law has been challenged before the court “that by itself will not take away the right to protest of the persons who feel aggrieved by the legislation.”

The high court thus held, “Approaching a constitutional court for redressal of grievances ipso facto would not disentitle a citizen from protesting in relation to the same subject-matter.”

The court clarified that it will look at the dispute only from a legal lens, based upon settled parameters of adjudication and stated that the purpose of the protest was to draw the government’s attention to an issue.

The court held thus,

“We cannot be at one with the general proposition that approaching a Court would prohibit the person in question from protesting in a legally permissible manner, subject to the caveat being the extant rules and regulations guiding the person concerned, inclusive of his status, if so, as a government employee.”

Right to protest in subjudice matters

Even though the apex court had clearly pronounced in the Amit Sahni case in 2020 that a matter being subjudice before a court of law does not take away the right to protest of the aggrieved, another bench, in October 2021 raised and pondered over a similar question. In October 2021 a two-judge bench of Justices A.M. Khanwilkar and C.T. Ravikumar said that it would decide whether the right to protest was absolute and whether the party that was before it, challenging the law, could still protest it. The petition before the court was filed by the Kisan Mahapanchayat seeking the court’s permission to hold protests at Delhi’s Jantar mantar against the farm laws (which have now been revoked).

It is surprising that the bench would raise such a question when the same has been upheld by the court a few times before. Apart from the cases mentioned hereinabove, in the Shaheen Bagh protest case, the Supreme Court had recognised that even if the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) was being challenged before the court, it would not take away the people’s right to protest against it

In Himat Lal K. Shah vs. Commr. of Police (1972), the Supreme Court said the State can only make regulations in aid of the right of assembly of each citizen, and can only impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order.

Senior Advocate Mohan Katarki, while speaking to The Leaflet made a juridical distinction between legality and desirability of legislation. He said, “The legality or constitutionality of the law is tested by the Supreme Court or the High Court. However, the desirability or necessity of a law is a separate policy matter.  It’s for the Parliament to decide on the making or unmaking of the law. Hence, the farmers fundamental right to protest in a peaceful manner seeking the repeal of three farm laws despite the pendency of challenges in the Supreme Court or even after the constitutionality is upheld (if upheld), remains unaffected.”

The High Court order may be read here:

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How a state suffocated by Saffron got a new breath from Blue

The post Right to protest not taken away if law is challenged before court: Andhra HC appeared first on SabrangIndia.

After the High-Powered Committee submitted its recommendations, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has recently directed the release of all convicts and undertrial prisoners on interim bail of 90 days, who were asked to surrender this year after their release on interim bail last year, amid Covid-19.

A Division Bench of Justices C Praveen Kumar and Lalitha Kanneganti said, “Taking into consideration of the recommendations made by the High Power Committee in its meeting on 12.05.2021 and the order passed by the Division Bench, we not only direct the Principal Secretary, Home Department, to issue directions to the Director General of Police and to Station House Officers of State of Andhra Pradesh to scrupulously follow the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar referred to above while arresting offenders in relation to the offences punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend up to 7 years or less but also direct release on interim bail all convicts and undertrial prisoners who have been released on interim bail pursuant to resolution of the HPC on 26.03.2020 and 28.03.2020 and have been re admitted to the prison, unless otherwise they are disqualified.”

They have also directed the release of other convicts and undertrial prisoners who are in custody in connection with offences punishable for a term which may extend up to 7 years or less, and qualified for such release as per the resolutions of the HPC, except those who are either second time offenders or convicted or facing trial for the offence of rape.  

“We further direct that the interim bail granted pursuant to this order, shall be for a period of 90 days”, said the Bench. Further, the court held that an undertaking shall be taken before the release of the convict or undertrial prisoner that he/she shall remain in home quarantine, for a period of 14 days under the surveillance of a doctor or the Police, as the case may be, and in case of any violation, the interim bail granted will be cancelled.

The Bench has also requested the Principal Secretary, Home, and the Director General of Prisons to ensure adequate transport facilities to the convicts released, enabling them to return to their respective native places considering the Covid guidelines and the restrictions imposed on the movement by the Government.

The High Court has instructed the Director General of Prisons to upload the prison capacity and occupancy in all the jails in the State of Andhra Pradesh on the website of the Jail Department and to share the data with the Andhra Pradesh State Legal Services Authority (APSLSA) and such data shall also be uploaded on the websites of the APSLSA and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

The court has also kept the option open for prisoners who don’t want to be released fearing the virus. “In case of prisoners who are not willing to get themselves released, having regard to the social background and fear of becoming victims of virus, the jail authorities are directed to ensure that proper medical facilities are provided to all prisoners in case of them getting infected with covid”, noted the Bench.

These directions are to remain in force for the next 8 weeks and the matter will be heard after 6 weeks.

The order may be read here: 

Related:

Maharashtra: HPC directs re-release of prisoners amid Covid-19
SC orders re-release of prisoners from jail amid Covid-19 surge

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