On June 15, Praful Vaniya, Superintendent of Police (Intelligence) in the Gujarat State Police Service (SPS), issued a notice announcing the arrival of the new Anti-Radicalisation Cell (ARC). The notice also provides a step-by-step identification, prevention, detection, intervention and re-integration checklist that the police has in mind.

The SOP for Gujarat’s newly operationalised ARC claims to lay down ways to assess and decode behavioural indicators for identifying ‘radicalised’ individuals – but the details listed seem exclusively focused on Muslim radicals, conflate Muslim religious practices with security threats, and are silent on any markers of Hindu radicalism of the kind the state witnessed in 2002 and after or the rest of India has witnessed over the past decade.

From monitoring beards and niqabs to seeing Middle East travels as suspicious, from questioning the use of Signal for messaging to watching those supporting Muslim rights on social media, the SOP appears designed to penalise common Muslims – and is silent on the violent activities of cow vigilantes and the calls by Hindutva radicals for the boycott and even killing of Muslims.

Who is a ‘radicalised person’?

“A radicalised person refers to an individual affecting law and order in the State who, driven by extremist (‘kattarpant’) ideologies, engages in anti-national activities to harm the unity and integrity of the nation, creates an atmosphere of fear among the people, and try to manipulate a sane/rational person to get them to convert their religion” – these are the exact words of the notice, seen by The Wire.

Further, the notice flags “Suddenly keeping a beard, wearing a niqab, frequent use of Arabic words, reducing contact with friends and family, expressing intense protest/resentment against events happening to the Muslim community globally, praising terrorists, or showing a change in behaviour after traveling abroad (e.g., Afghanistan, Middle East)”. Next, the notice asks officers to trace purchase activity of ‘radicalised indviduals’ – “Purchasing fertilisers containing potassium nitrate, sulphur, or ammonium nitrate; acquiring LPG cylinders; making frequent visits to forest-like areas; making frequent contact with individuals residing in the Gulf, PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), or Afghanistan through encrypted apps; or withdrawing large amounts of cash”, the notice says, .

Even downloading VPN apps or using Signal or Element messengers have been listed as signs to watch out for. Other listed criteria includes ‘being members of extremist Telegram groups; following ISIS/AQ (Al-Qaeda) accounts, sharing Nasheeds, Dabiq/Rumiyah magazines; or using cryptocurrency (especially Monero) without any apparent source of income’.

Those ‘visiting extremist networks or Arabic colleges/madrasas’, performing a religious ritual like Itikaf (seclusion in a mosque) before planned activities, ‘suddenly leaving their education or employment citing Islamic duty’, or ‘visiting ‘kattarvad’ leaders after being released from prison’ are also flagged as potentially radicalised. It also orders officers to obtain complete details of maulanas teaching in madrasas, prepare a directory, and gather information/records on ‘whether they maintain contact with organisations holding extremist ideologies’.

The SOP recommends the monitoring of ‘extremist preachers, communal organisations, radicalised individuals who are or have been in prisons’, and specifically names those belonging to Salafi and Wahhabi school of Islamic thought within Sunni Islam.

Under the SOP’s ‘Intervention – Counselling and Guidance’ stage, the ARC is directed to identify and verify influential community leaders, social media influencers, NGOs, religious scholars, psychologists and educational experts who can assist in de-radicalisation efforts. It calls for counselling sessions involving family members, religious experts and psychiatrists, while requiring that the identity of individuals undergoing counselling be kept confidential. The SOP also instructs authorities to help such individuals reintegrate into education and employment and maintain regular contact with them. However, it states that if an individual commits or prepares to commit a cognisable offence after undergoing counselling, legal action should be initiated under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, with all such actions reported to the state headquarters.

While the Gujarat ARC has formally taken shape only this year, its origins date back over a decade. The idea of a dedicated deradicalisation mechanism first gained traction in 2015, at a Directors General and Inspectors General of Police conference in Gujarat’s Rann of Kutch, where the Telangana Police’s deradicalisation model was presented as a template for states grappling with online radicalisation.

In 2020, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Union home minister Amit Shah at the annual conference of DGPs and IGPs, recommended the idea of this cell.

The BJP subsequently promised to establish an ARC in its 2022 Gujarat assembly election manifesto, and began operationalising the proposal. Following the recommendations, a task force including a faculty head of the Gandhinagar-based Rashtriya Raksha University and police officials of the state Anti-Terrorism Squad, Crime Branch and Ahmedabad Central Jail was set up. But the project reportedly could not take off because of “lack of funds”.

On June 15, the SOP was circulated to district and commissionerate offices and laid out the ARC’s functioning – from identifying individuals deemed vulnerable to radicalisation and maintaining dossiers on them to counselling, rehabilitation and post-intervention monitoring. The SOP states that the ARC will function in coordination with district police units, the Special Operations Group (SOG), prison authorities and state Intelligence Bureau officers.

Communally targeted policing

Barrister Arif Ansari believes that this SOP is an open violation of the very basic fundamentals of the Constitution. “Article 14, 19, 21, 25, all are being buried under the kind of surveillance the state wants to impose on Muslims. This is state-sanctioned stereotyping and appears to be clearly motivated for electoral gains. India’s founding fathers made sure that all religions had equal respect and rights, but for Muslims, the morning begins with demolitions and evening ends with law being deployed against us,” Ansari told The Wire.

“After the 1980s, Gujarat became the laboratory of communal fascism. And the manufacturers of this policy were successful in planting this ideology in the state. Then we saw 2002, and the same politicians would be elected again and again,” Hiren Gandhi, a social activist, told The Wire.

While Gandhi recalls how post the 1980s, anti-Muslim leaders, policies and politics became the norm in Gujarat, he believes that the ARC should be placed in the broader context of how politics and sentiments have evolved in the BJP-run state.

“This kind of a mechanism is absolutely wrong but understand that it is nothing new. This is happening in ways and methods across India. During Covid-19, the same kind of radicalism rhetoric was peddled against the Tablighi Jamaat, they were dehumanised using their religion. This is a disgusting kind of politics killing democratic rights,” Gandhi said.

The SOP has also drawn political criticism. In a July 14 letter to Gujarat chief minister Bhupendra Patel, CPI(M) Rajya Sabha MP John Brittas urged the state government to keep its implementation in abeyance pending an independent review, arguing that several of its reported provisions risk conflating ordinary manifestations of Muslim religious identity with indicators of radicalisation.

“While intelligence agencies may legitimately monitor unlawful activities based on credible information, any framework that enables surveillance or profiling primarily on the basis of religion, appearance, language, dress or religious observance would raise profound constitutional concerns. Such measures, if undertaken without clearly defined legal thresholds, objective safeguards and judicial oversight, would be inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of equality before law, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, dignity and privacy,” Brittas writes.

“Our constitutional jurisprudence has emphasised that the State cannot proceed on the basis of stereotypes or collective suspicion. Equality before law requires that every citizen be assessed on the basis of credible evidence of unlawful conduct, not on the basis of faith, cultural identity, attire, language, appearance or lawful religious practices. Any institutional framework that creates an impression of profiling a particular community would be inconsistent with the constitutional promise of equal protection of laws. Effective intelligence depends upon trust between citizens and law-enforcement agencies. Policies that appear to stigmatise an entire community undermine that trust, discourage cooperation with investigative agencies, and risk alienating precisely those citizens whose partnership is indispensable in combating extremism,” he continues.

Human rights campaigner Shabnam Hashmi asked why other kinds of radicalisation – often openly visible in today’s India – find no place in the SOP. “See, I will not dispute the fact that radicalisation is happening in different communities. But this opens up the gates to harass and pick up anyone they want to, and mainly people who have dissenting voices. That is that is what it will be used for. Secondly, if we are talking of radicalisation, what about the Hindu radicalisation? What about the threats which are being distributed openly? What about the Dharam Sansads, which are giving open calls to kill Muslims, to make India Islam-free, is that no radicalisation? This is very selective profiling of the Muslim community,” she told The Wire.

Hashmi added that while today, this Cell is targeting Muslims, “Tomorrow, it’ll target maybe Dalits, or Adivasi, or Christians.”

Former Chhattisgarh Special DGP R.K. Vij said that while radicalism is defined very widely in the SOP, the sub steps with regard to one community seem to be mentioned as an example. “This may also be understood whether Gujarat Police is mentioning the community owing to their past experience in the field,” Vij said.

The Wire reached out to Gujarat’s Deputy Inspector General of Police, Dr Sudhirkumar J. Desai, to ask about the phrasing used in the SOP and allegations of it being communally motivated. This article will be updated when a response is received.

With inputs from Sharmita Kar.

Tarushi Aswani is an independent journalist.

Courtesy: The Wire

The post For Gujarat Police, Beard, Niqab Make ‘Radicalisation’ Checklist, Cow Vigilantism Doesn’t appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In several cases across India especially over the last two years, police investigations and subsequent reporting have uncovered allegations that were not merely inaccurate but allegedly deliberately manufactured to implicate Muslims. These were not instances of mistaken identity or hurried conclusions. According to investigators, they involved conscious attempts to create communal flashpoints by exploiting existing prejudices around issues such as “love jihad”, Pakistan, cow slaughter, religious conversion and temple desecration. By the time the cycle is closed –deliberate dissemination and outrage, followed by investigation, the damage has been done.

What makes these incidents particularly significant is that each relied upon narratives that have become deeply embedded in India’s contemporary communal discourse. The allegations were believable not because they were supported by evidence, but because they echoed stereotypes that had already been normalised through decades of uncontested political rhetoric, misinformation and communal propaganda. This draws attention to the urgent need for social and political forces to immediately and systematically bust this rhetoric, one myth at a time.

Viewed individually, each incident may appear to be an isolated “conspiracy or local criminal act”. Viewed together, however, they reveal a disturbing pattern in which religion itself becomes a political weapon, with fabricated allegations serving as instruments to deepen suspicion, reinforce prejudice and fracture relations between communities.

2026: Manufacturing communal hatred through false allegations, staged incidents and misinformation

• A 12-year-old allegedly used to manufacture a communal controversy

On June 21, 2026, thousands gathered in Bareilly district for the traditional Muharram Tazia procession, one of the most significant observances in the Islamic calendar. Amid the procession, a short video suddenly began circulating across WhatsApp groups and social media platforms. The clip appeared to show a 12-year-old boy shouting “Pakistan Zindabad.” The implication was immediate and inflammatory: that pro-Pakistan slogans had been raised during a Muslim religious procession.

Given the charged political atmosphere surrounding such allegations, the video quickly acquired communal overtones. Similar allegations in the past have often been invoked to portray Indian Muslims as anti-national, resulting in criminal cases, public outrage and demands for punitive action. But the investigation reportedly uncovered an altogether different narrative.

According to police findings reported by Deccan Herald, the child had allegedly not acted on his own. Investigators found that two adult men had encouraged and instructed the boy to raise the slogan while ensuring that the incident was recorded on video. The purpose, investigators alleged, was to create precisely the kind of viral content that would portray the Muslim procession in a communal light and provoke public anger.

The incident illustrates how communal narratives can now be so easily manufactured with extraordinary simplicity. A child, a mobile phone and a few seconds of video were allegedly enough to produce material capable of triggering nationwide outrage before investigators could establish the facts.

Had the police accepted the viral clip at face value, the episode might simply have entered the long list of alleged instances used to stigmatise an entire community. Instead, the investigation reportedly suggested that the controversy itself had been orchestrated.

• A fabricated ‘Love Jihad’ case unravels in Uttar Pradesh

Barely three weeks earlier, another investigation exposed what may be one of the clearest examples of how communal narratives themselves can allegedly be weaponised. On June 2, 2026, police in Uttar Pradesh booked a Vishwa Hindu Parishad supporter, Nakul Gurjar, after an investigation into what initially appeared to be a routine “love jihad” complaint took an unexpected turn.

According to The Siasat Daily, a woman named Bhawna allegedly told investigators that Gurjar had approached her with a proposal: she would falsely implicate two Muslim men in a “love jihad” case. In return, she was allegedly promised employment and financial compensation. Investigators further alleged that the plan involved extorting ₹10 lakh from the two Muslim men after trapping them in fabricated criminal allegations. Notably, the incident took place on May 30 in Meerut’s Jagriti Vihar Extension area, and within five hours of questioning by the Meerut police, they realised that it was a trap.

The case was particularly significant because “love jihad” allegations have frequently been invoked in political speeches, criminal prosecutions and public campaigns across several states. Such allegations often generate immediate public outrage, long before investigations establish whether any criminal offence has occurred. Here, however, police alleged that the conspiracy was not the crime supposedly committed by Muslim men—but the creation of the allegation itself.

The investigation therefore exposed how one of the country’s most politically potent communal narratives could allegedly be manipulated for extortion, criminal intimidation and communal mobilisation.

• Police allege a cow slaughter case was staged to implicate a Muslim man

Few allegations inflame communal passions in India as rapidly as accusations involving cow slaughter. Against that backdrop, the investigation conducted in Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh, assumed extraordinary significance.

According to The Print, Uttar Pradesh Police alleged that a man named Jagpal had orchestrated a cow slaughter incident with the intention of falsely implicating a Muslim resident. Three people, including a village head here, were arrested for allegedly conspiring to get a calf slaughtered to falsely implicate a potential rival in the upcoming gram pradhan election. Initial allegations were being levelled against one Hasan and his associates in connection with the incident. However, acting on a tip-off, police arrested Faizan following an encounter. During questioning, he allegedly revealed that he and his associates had carried out the act at the behest of incumbent village pradhan Jagpal and his brother Kiranpal. Notably, Additional Superintendent of Police (Rural) Prakash Kumar said parts of a bovine calf were found in a field in Changipur village under Noorpur police station limits on June 18. The arrest took place on June 21.

The alleged conspiracy reversed the assumptions that typically accompany such cases. Ordinarily, public discourse begins with the presumption that a cow has been slaughtered and investigators are searching for the guilty party. In this instance, investigators instead alleged that the incident itself had been engineered to ensure suspicion immediately fell upon a Muslim individual.

The implications extend well beyond this single case. Across northern India, allegations of cow slaughter have repeatedly resulted in mob violence, social boycotts, arrests and, in several instances, lynchings. Where such allegations are themselves fabricated, the accusation becomes a weapon capable of unleashing consequences that far outlast the eventual investigation.

The Bijnor case therefore demonstrates how communal stereotypes can allegedly be converted into instruments of criminal conspiracy, relying on the expectation that public suspicion would naturally gravitate towards Muslims before evidence had even been examined.

When fabricated allegations become political capital

These incidents also reveal another important characteristic of communal misinformation. False allegations rarely remain confined to social media. Once they begin circulating, they often find their way into public speeches, neighbourhood conversations, local protests and political campaigns. Each viral post becomes another anecdote supporting larger claims that Muslims are systematically threatening Hindu society.

Even after police investigations or independent fact-checks expose the fabrication, the original allegation often continues to circulate, detached from the correction. This asymmetry gives false communal narratives extraordinary power. The accusation spreads nationally, while the correction remains local. The allegation reinforces prejudice, however the investigation receives comparatively little attention.

Old Videos, New Hatred: How misinformation was used to manufacture communal flashpoints

If the Bareilly, Bijnor and “love jihad” conspiracies demonstrated how criminal allegations could allegedly be fabricated to implicate Muslims, another set of incidents from 2026 revealed an equally dangerous strategy: the deliberate communalisation of unrelated videos and events.

In an era where a thirty-second clip can reach millions before fact-checkers or investigators intervene, misinformation has become one of the most effective tools for manufacturing communal outrage. Images stripped of context, unrelated incidents relabelled as religious conflict, and fabricated narratives built around genuine videos have repeatedly been used to reinforce the perception that Muslims are engaged in organised attacks on Hindus.

Investigations into several such incidents in 2026 exposed how communal narratives were constructed not through evidence but through strategic distortion.

• Temple brawl falsely portrayed as violence by Muslims during Eid celebrations

In early June 2026, social media users began circulating a video purportedly showing Muslims attacking Hindus during Eid celebrations. The footage, which rapidly spread across multiple platforms, was accompanied by captions alleging that Muslims had entered a temple premises and violently assaulted devotees during the festival.

The claims carried all the ingredients of a communal flashpoint. Shared without context, the video appeared to confirm a narrative frequently promoted online—that Hindu religious spaces were increasingly under attack from Muslims. However, an investigation by AFP Fact Check dismantled the viral claim. Notably, the video had been posted on May 23, while it was only on May 29 that a local assistant police inspector at the Kodoli police station, Chetan Masutage, confirmed to AFP that “no Muslims were involved” in the clash.

The fact-check found that the footage had absolutely no connection with Eid celebrations or communal violence. Instead, it depicted a local altercation at an Indian temple involving individuals from the same community, with no evidence whatsoever that Muslims had participated in the incident. The communal captions accompanying the video had been entirely fabricated after the fact. By changing only the accompanying text—not the video itself—those circulating the clip transformed an ordinary local dispute into what appeared to be evidence of organised communal aggression.

The episode highlighted one of the defining characteristics of modern misinformation campaigns: authenticity of footage is often less important than authenticity of context. A genuine video can become a powerful vehicle for falsehood once stripped of its original circumstances. For many viewers, the correction never travelled as far as the original allegation.

• A scripted entertainment video recast as evidence of ‘Love Jihad’

During December 2025, another misleading video spread rapidly across social media. This time, the clip appeared to show a Muslim man pretending to be Hindu in order to trap a Hindu woman, reinforcing familiar “love jihad” narratives that have become central to communal campaigns across several states. The video was uploaded by a user named ‘monty_deepak_sharma’ on December 3, 2025, with Factly busting the myth on December 15, 2025.

The accompanying captions claimed that the footage was genuine evidence exposing the tactics allegedly employed by Muslim men to deceive Hindu women by concealing their identities. The claims were false. An investigation by Factly established that the video was not a real incident at all. It had been created as scripted entertainment content, with actors performing fictional roles for online audiences. There was no criminal offence, no deception, and no evidence that the events portrayed had occurred.

Yet once detached from its original context, the fictional performance acquired an entirely different political meaning. The transformation was revealing. Rather than creating fabricated evidence from scratch, misinformation networks increasingly repurpose existing content—films, comedy sketches, staged performances or old recordings—and present them as documentary proof of communal conspiracies.

The objective is not merely to deceive viewers about a single incident but to reinforce broader stereotypes already circulating within public discourse. By the time the video was debunked, thousands had already viewed it as confirmation that “love jihad” was an organised and continuing phenomenon.

The mechanics of communal misinformation

The two episodes shared a striking similarity. Neither required forged documents, or sophisticated digital manipulation. Both relied upon something much simpler: removing context. A temple dispute became an alleged Muslim attack, and a scripted performance became evidence of organised religious conspiracy. The resulting narratives fit seamlessly into pre-existing communal stereotypes, making them both believable and highly shareable.

When it comes to misinformation, it has been repeatedly observed that false communal claims succeed not merely because they are dramatic but because they resonate with narratives audiences have already encountered. Once those narratives become familiar, new allegations require remarkably little evidence to appear credible. The incidents from June 2026 illustrate precisely this dynamic.

Rather than inventing entirely new stories, those spreading the misinformation borrowed ordinary events and inserted them into a communal framework that portrayed Muslims as aggressors. The factual details became secondary; the communal message remained central.

2025: Fabricated evidence, fake identities and manufactured communal narratives

If the cases from 2026 demonstrated how communal narratives could be manufactured through staged incidents and misinformation, the events that unfolded across India in 2025 revealed an even broader phenomenon. Investigations that year uncovered allegations ranging from fake terror threats and fabricated “love jihad” claims to staged temple vandalism and the deliberate assumption of Muslim identities to commit crimes.

Taken together, these incidents exposed how communal stereotypes themselves had become tools that could be exploited for political mobilisation, extortion, personal vendettas and public incitement. In each case, the initial accusation targeted Muslims; only later did investigations reveal a very different story.

• Temple walls defaced to falsely implicate Muslims

Few incidents generated as much outrage in 2025 as the discovery of provocative graffiti on the walls of several temples in Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh.

In late October, devotees arriving at the temples found messages reading “I Love Muhammad” scrawled across the walls. Photographs of the vandalised temples spread rapidly across social media, accompanied by claims that Muslims had deliberately desecrated Hindu places of worship to provoke communal unrest.

Given the emotionally charged nature of the incident, outrage followed almost immediately. The graffiti was widely projected as another instance of religious provocation by Muslims, reinforcing existing narratives that Hindu religious spaces were under deliberate attack.

The police investigation, however, fundamentally altered the narrative. According to a report of Times of India, the vandalism had not been carried out by Muslims at all. Instead, police registered an FIR against five individuals, alleging that they had deliberately written the slogans on temple walls to frame local Muslim residents and inflame communal tensions. Reports further noted that the investigation was aided by the fact that the slogan itself had been misspelled—a detail that contributed to unravelling the conspiracy and identifying the accused. Four persons were subsequently arrested in connection with the case. Police said the slogans were found scribbled on four shrines on October 25, with the police discovering the truth on October 31, 2025.

The incident was remarkable because it inverted the assumptions surrounding communal vandalism. What initially appeared to be an act of religious desecration by Muslims was instead alleged to have been an attempt to manufacture precisely that perception. Rather than responding to communal hostility, investigators suggested that the hostility itself was being consciously engineered. Had the conspiracy not been uncovered, the graffiti would likely have entered public memory as yet another example of alleged Muslim aggression against Hindu religious sites. Instead, it became evidence of how easily religious symbols can be manipulated to produce communal suspicion.

• A fake terror threat designed to implicate Muslims

Another investigation in 2025 demonstrated how even national security concerns could be exploited to create communal suspicion. In September 2025, police investigating a terror threat directed at Mumbai initially appeared to be dealing with a potentially serious security matter. Threat messages had created alarm and naturally attracted attention because of their apparent association with terrorism. The investigation eventually revealed something far less ideological but equally revealing.

According to police, as per the report of Times of India, the accused had allegedly fabricated the threat to settle a personal dispute with a former friend. The case exposed how terror allegations—particularly when associated with Muslim identities—could be weaponised to give greater credibility to personal vendettas and amplify public fear.  Although the motive was reportedly personal rather than communal, the incident reflected a broader pattern observed across several cases: exploiting prevailing public assumptions about Muslims and terrorism to make fabricated allegations appear instantly believable. Notably, the issue had come to the forefront on September 4, with police uncovering the truth on September 6.

• The Nishikant Dubey death threat case where a Hindu man allegedly posed as a Muslim

One of the most politically significant cases of the year involved BJP Member of Parliament Nishikant Dubey. In September 2025, Scroll reported, Dubey withdrew a complaint filed ragainst the death threats received by him allegedly from a Muslim individual after it was revealed that the person behind the same was a Hindu. The narrative changed dramatically after the police investigation.

According to reports, investigators found that the person responsible was not a Muslim at all but a Hindu man who had allegedly assumed a Muslim identity while issuing the threats. Following the findings, Dubey withdrew his complaint.  The case underscored the ease with which communal assumptions could shape public perception. In July 2018, the Delhi Police had filed the case based on a complaint by the Godda MP, who had alleged that a prisoner in Jharkhand’s Sahibganj jail had threatened to kill him, according to The New Indian Express. On September 3, Dubey said on social media that the investigation into the case had found that a resident of Godda district’s Kumardih village, Kundan Kumar Das, had threatened him and “conspired to frame some Muslim boys” in the case.

Simply attributing the threats to a Muslim identity was sufficient to generate widespread political attention. The subsequent revelation that the accused had allegedly fabricated that identity received comparatively limited public discussion.

From individual conspiracies to a recurring pattern

The episode illustrated how communal identities themselves can become instruments of deception, allowing fabricated allegations to acquire immediate credibility because they align with existing prejudices. The Dubey incident was not an isolated example. Throughout 2025, multiple reports documented instances where individuals deliberately assumed Muslim names or identities while committing crimes, fully aware that such identities would immediately invite suspicion or reinforce communal stereotypes. An analysis published by The Quint examined this emerging phenomenon, documenting several cases in which accused persons allegedly used fake Muslim names to commit offences ranging from fraud to harassment. Investigators in these cases found that the perpetrators were not Muslims but individuals exploiting communal biases to misdirect investigations or inflame religious tensions.  The significance of this pattern lies beyond individual criminality. A fake Muslim identity is effective only because it taps into an existing social expectation—that crimes attributed to Muslims are more readily believed, more likely to provoke outrage, and more easily woven into larger communal narratives. In this sense, prejudice itself becomes an operational tool for deception.

The events of 2025 reveal an important shift. These were no longer simply false rumours circulating on anonymous social media accounts. Investigations uncovered planned acts of vandalism, fabricated criminal complaints, assumed religious identities, and manufactured evidence, all allegedly designed to ensure that suspicion would immediately fall upon Muslims. Whether the objective was extortion, personal revenge, political mobilisation or communal provocation, the method remained strikingly consistent.

The accusation came first, public outrage followed, with the truth emerging only later. By then, the communal narrative had often already achieved its purpose.

From Manufactured Narratives to Public Mobilisation

The cases discussed thus far reveal how fabricated allegations can be used to falsely implicate Muslims in individual criminal incidents. But the consequences of these narratives do not end with police complaints or viral social media posts. Once a false claim enters public discourse, it often acquires a life of its own. Political speeches, protest gatherings, neighbourhood meetings and organised campaigns begin invoking these allegations as proof of a broader conspiracy. Individual incidents—whether verified or entirely fabricated—are woven together to portray Muslims as a collective threat.

Several incidents from 2025 illustrate precisely how unverified or demonstrably false allegations were invoked to justify communal mobilisation and discrimination.

• A double murder transformed into a speech about ‘jihadis’

On April 20, 2025, members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal organised a protest in Karol Bagh, Delhi, following the murders of Karan and Rakesh Sood. The murders themselves were reportedly being investigated as arising from a monetary dispute. Yet during the protest, speakers shifted the focus away from the facts of the case and instead sought to place the incident within a much larger communal narrative.

According to documentation by Hindutva Watch, one speaker described Muslims as people with a “jihadi mentality”, claiming that they were those who “sell drugs” and “fix punctures” before alleging that they routinely targeted Hindu society through organised conspiracies. Rather than discussing the evidence surrounding the murders, the speakers repeatedly referred to “jihadis,” portraying the crime as part of a broader communal campaign.  The speech then moved beyond the Delhi murders altogether.

One of the speakers invoked a controversy involving Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) in Nashik, claiming that 188 Hindu women had been subjected to a “collective sexual assault” by Muslim employees as part of a “love jihad” conspiracy. This allegation had already circulated widely across social media.

Despite their being no concrete evidence whatsoever supporting the extraordinary claim that 188 Hindu women had been sexually assaulted or forcibly converted by Muslim employees working at TCS. Despite the absence of evidence, the allegation was presented before a public gathering as an established fact.

Read detailed report here.

The speaker proceeded to claim that Muslims working in multinational companies deliberately identify vulnerable Hindu women during job interviews, lure them into relationships, compel them to wear hijabs and burqas, invite them to iftar gatherings, secretly record intimate encounters, and later blackmail them into religious conversion. None of these sweeping allegations was supported by evidence during the speech. Instead, a series of unverified and previously debunked claims was woven together into a single narrative portraying Muslim professionals as participants in a nationwide conspiracy against Hindu women.  The significance of the Karol Bagh speech lies not merely in its rhetoric but in its method.

Rather than introducing entirely new allegations, the speaker recycled existing misinformation, presenting previously discredited claims as factual proof before a politically charged audience. The result was the transformation of an unrelated criminal investigation into another platform for communal mobilisation.

• When misinformation becomes the basis for discrimination

The consequences of such narratives extend beyond speeches. Throughout 2025, allegations of “love jihad”—many of them unsupported or later disproved—continued to influence everyday interactions between communities. One striking example emerged from Indore, Madhya Pradesh, where reports documented how Muslim traders and workers were pushed out of a local market after rumours and allegations surrounding “love jihad” gained traction.

According to reporting by Religion Unplugged, Muslim shopkeepers and workers found themselves increasingly excluded from commercial activity as suspicion fuelled by communal narratives translated into social and economic discrimination. Businesses that had operated in the market for years suddenly faced hostility because of collective allegations directed at Muslims rather than any proven misconduct by individual traders.

The episode demonstrates how misinformation rarely remains confined to the digital sphere. False narratives eventually reshape real lives, employment opportunities disappear, businesses suffer, neighbourhood relationships deteriorate and entire communities become suspect.

The cumulative effect of repeated falsehoods

The significance of these incidents lies not only in the fact that individual allegations were eventually disproved, but also in the cumulative effect they have on public discourse. In many cases, police investigations exposed fabricated complaints, independent fact-checks debunked misleading videos, and courts rejected prosecutions that lacked credible evidence. However, by the time these findings emerged, the original allegations had often already reached a much wider audience.

False communal narratives rarely operate in isolation. Instead, each new allegation builds upon earlier ones, creating a larger body of stories that appear to reinforce one another. A fabricated “love jihad” allegation strengthens existing perceptions shaped by previous claims. A staged Pakistan slogan is viewed alongside earlier allegations of anti-national activity. Acts of vandalism falsely attributed to Muslims are cited as further proof of an already accepted narrative. As these incidents accumulate, repetition begins to substitute for evidence.

This creates an environment in which suspicion becomes normalised. Allegations against Muslims are more readily accepted because they resemble stories that have circulated before, regardless of whether those earlier claims were ever substantiated. Even after investigations disprove individual incidents, the broader narrative often survives, continuing to shape public perceptions long after the facts have been established.

When investigations expose the truth

Another striking feature of many of the incidents discussed in this investigation is that the conspiracies were not uncovered by speculation or political debate, but through official investigations.

In several cases, it was the police who concluded that a child had allegedly been coached to raise Pakistan slogans during the Muharram procession in Bareilly. Police investigations also uncovered alleged conspiracies involving fabricated “love jihad” complaints, identified those accused of defacing temples in Aligarh to falsely implicate Muslims, and reportedly found that a Hindu man had assumed a Muslim identity while issuing death threats.

These findings highlight an important aspect of the problem. The issue is not simply that misinformation circulates, but that communal allegations often gain widespread acceptance before they are properly investigated. By the time police complete their inquiries or courts assess the evidence, the original claims have frequently spread through social media platforms, messaging applications, television debates and public speeches. Although official investigations may ultimately establish the facts, they often struggle to undo the impact of allegations that have already entered the public consciousness.

The Pattern Did Not Begin in 2026: Earlier cases reveal how false allegations against Muslims can endure for years before the truth emerges

The incidents of 2025 and 2026 are not isolated aberrations. They belong to a much longer trajectory in which allegations against Muslims have often acquired legitimacy long before they are subjected to judicial scrutiny or independent investigation.

In several cases, the truth has emerged only after years of litigation, prolonged criminal proceedings or detailed fact-checking exercises. By that stage, however, those accused have frequently spent years defending themselves against allegations that eventually failed to withstand scrutiny.

The following cases illustrate the enduring costs of weaponising communal accusations:

• Six years after being branded ‘pro-Pakistan’, seventeen Muslim men were found to have been falsely prosecuted

One of the clearest examples comes from Madhya Pradesh, where 17 Muslim men were accused in 2017 of celebrating Pakistan’s victory after an India-Pakistan cricket match. The allegations carried enormous political weight.

Celebrating Pakistan’s victory in India is frequently portrayed not merely as poor judgment but as evidence of anti-national sentiment and disloyalty. The accusation quickly attracted public attention and reinforced familiar stereotypes questioning the patriotism of Indian Muslims. For the seventeen accused men, however, the allegations translated into criminal prosecution. It was only six years later, in March 2024, that courts examining the evidence concluded that the prosecution’s case could not be sustained.

As reported by Article 14, the courts found that the police case was false, effectively bringing to an end year of legal uncertainty faced by the accused. The judgment exposed serious deficiencies in the evidence relied upon to prosecute the men and underscored the dangers of criminal cases driven by communal assumptions rather than credible proof.

The case raises difficult questions about the consequences of false communal allegations. Even where courts ultimately reject such prosecutions, the process itself becomes punishment. Years spent attending court hearings, legal expenses, social stigma and the label of being “anti-national” cannot simply be erased by an acquittal or dismissal. The correction comes, but it comes years too late.

• Ramzan, Roza and the allegation of forced conversion

Another case that drew significant attention emerged from Uttar Pradesh during Ramzan 2025. A Muslim woman was arrested under the state’s anti-conversion law after allegations that she had persuaded a minor Hindu girl to observe roza (fasting) and convert to Islam. The allegations immediately acquired communal significance because they appeared to fit within broader political narratives surrounding unlawful religious conversions. Subsequent reporting, however, suggested that the factual background was far more complex.

According to The Wire, the dispute appeared to revolve less around organised religious conversion than around personal and financial disagreements between the families involved. The report questioned the evidentiary basis of invoking anti-conversion legislation and examined how routine interpersonal disputes could become transformed into allegations of religious conversion once communal narratives entered the picture. Crucial to note is that an FIR was lodged in Jhansi on March 13, 2025 after a Hindu man alleged that his daughter aged 16 was lured by two Muslim women in his neighbourhood to keep fast during Ramzan in a bid to convert her to Islam. On March 26, additional sessions judge Jhansi Vijay Kumar Verma denied bail to Shahnaz.

Whether or not criminal liability ultimately survives judicial scrutiny, the case illustrates how allegations of conversion can rapidly escalate into communal controversies before investigators establish the underlying facts.

• Karnataka: A neighbourhood scuffle falsely communalised

Another example emerged from Karnataka, where claims circulated widely alleging that Muslims had pelted stones at a Ganesh idol. The allegation spread quickly across social media and was presented yet another instance of religious hostility directed against Hindu festivals. Independent verification, however, told a different story. Notably, Kreately Media, which has shared communal misinformation on several occasions, shared the video on X on September 4 and wrote, “They hate idol worshippers”.

An investigation by Alt News, published just a day later, found that the viral claims were misleading. Rather than a communal attack by Muslims, the incident stemmed from a scuffle involving Hindu groups, with no evidence supporting the allegation that Muslims had targeted the Ganesh idol. The communal framing had been added only after the incident entered social media circulation.

Like the temple video falsely linked to Eid celebrations in 2026, the Karnataka episode demonstrated how ordinary disputes can be stripped of their original context and repackaged as evidence of communal aggression. The transformation requires little more than an altered caption. The consequences, however, can be profound.

A recurring blueprint for communal polarisation

Although the incidents documented in this investigation differ in their immediate facts, they reveal a remarkably consistent pattern in the way communal narratives are constructed and disseminated. The allegations vary—from Pakistan slogans and “love jihad” to cow slaughter, religious conversion, temple desecration and terrorism—but the underlying method remains strikingly similar.

In almost every case, the sequence follows a familiar trajectory. A sensational allegation is made, often identifying Muslims as the perpetrators at the outset. The claim is then amplified through social media platforms, messaging applications, local networks and, in some instances, political speeches or public demonstrations. The allegations generate widespread public outrage before investigators have had an opportunity to verify the facts. It is only later, through police investigations, independent journalism, fact-checking organisations or judicial proceedings, that the accuracy of the original claims comes under scrutiny.

As the cases examined here demonstrate, a significant number of these allegations either proved to be entirely fabricated or were found to be materially different from the narratives that initially captured public attention. By that stage, however, the allegations had often already entered public discourse, making the subsequent corrections far less visible than the original claims.

The incidents documented in this investigation point to a phenomenon that extends beyond the spread of misinformation. They demonstrate how existing communal prejudices can be deliberately exploited because those responsible understand that allegations involving Muslims often attract immediate public attention and are less likely to be questioned in their initial stages.

Whether it is a fabricated Pakistan slogan, a staged act of temple vandalism, a false allegation of “love jihad” or a misleading claim of religious conversion, these narratives frequently gain traction because they resonate with stereotypes that have already become embedded in sections of public discourse. The allegations are often amplified long before evidence is examined, allowing them to shape public opinion even if they are later disproved.

The consequences are significant. Individuals falsely accused may face criminal proceedings, social ostracism, threats, economic losses and lasting damage to their reputations. More broadly, such allegations reinforce collective suspicion towards an entire community, contributing to an atmosphere in which discrimination and exclusion appear increasingly justified.

In this sense, the weaponisation of religion is not confined to the dissemination of hate speech. It also involves the strategic use of fabricated or misleading allegations to lend credibility to existing prejudices and to normalise distrust of a particular community. Even when investigations eventually expose the truth, the original allegations often continue to influence public perceptions, demonstrating that the impact of such narratives frequently extends well beyond the outcome of any individual case.

Need: Sustained Hate Watch Campaigns at the Community & professional levels

This unbroken and cynical cycle of targeting misinformation and hate needs equally sustained and creative contestation, intervention. From housing societies, classrooms, playgrounds to parks, local trains and buses, discourses need to foreground the dangers of such invidious blood-letting. CJP has attempted in the past and continues to generate materials and interventions that can be used as discursive tools to combat this phenomenon. Read about these efforts here, here, here, here, here and here.

Conclusion: The Constitutional Cost of Manufactured Communal Narratives

Viewed in isolation, each of the incidents documented in this investigation may appear to be an unrelated act of misinformation, a local criminal conspiracy, or an instance of communal rumour. The motives also differ. In some cases, the objective appears to have been extortion or personal revenge; in others, political mobilisation, social media attention, or the deliberate creation of communal unrest. Yet, when these incidents are examined together, they reveal a strikingly consistent pattern in the manufacture and circulation of false allegations against Muslims.

The pattern extends far beyond the simple spread of misinformation. It demonstrates how certain allegations are repeatedly chosen because they draw upon narratives that are already deeply embedded in public discourse. Whether the incident occurred in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Karnataka or Madhya Pradesh, the accusations almost invariably revolved around the same themes: “love jihad“, Pakistan slogans, cow slaughter, religious conversion, temple desecration, terrorism or attacks on Hindu festivals. These are not random allegations. They are accusations that have, over the years, acquired enormous political and emotional resonance. As a result, they require relatively little supporting evidence to gain traction because they reinforce stories that sections of the public have already heard repeatedly through political speeches, television debates, election campaigns and social media.

One of the clearest lessons emerging from these cases is that the accusation itself often becomes more consequential than the truth. In many of the incidents discussed in this investigation, police investigations, independent journalists, fact-checking organisations or courts ultimately dismantled the original allegations. The Bareilly incident revealed that a child had allegedly been coached to raise Pakistan slogans during a Muharram procession. Investigations uncovered alleged conspiracies to fabricate “love jihad” cases and falsely implicate Muslim youths. Police reportedly exposed a plan to frame a Muslim man in a fabricated cow slaughter case in Bijnor. The Aligarh temple graffiti investigation led to the arrest of individuals accused of writing provocative slogans to falsely implicate Muslims. Investigators also found that a Hindu man had allegedly posed as a Muslim while issuing death threats to a Member of Parliament. Earlier cases similarly exposed misleading communal claims surrounding Ganesh festival violence, false allegations of conversion, and criminal prosecutions that courts later found to be baseless.

These investigations underline an important reality. The problem is not simply that misinformation exists; it is that false communal allegations often become accepted as truth before any meaningful investigation has taken place. Investigations require time. Evidence must be collected, witnesses examined and facts verified. Social media operates according to an entirely different logic. Within hours, an allegation can spread across WhatsApp groups, Facebook pages, Telegram channels and X, before being repeated by political actors, local organisations or television debates. By the time investigators establish what actually occurred, the original narrative has often travelled much further than the correction.

The incidents examined in this investigation also reveal a remarkably consistent blueprint for communal polarisation. In case after case, the sequence follows the same trajectory. A sensational allegation is first made against Muslims. The allegation is then amplified through social media, local networks and, in some instances, political speeches or public gatherings. Public outrage follows almost immediately, while the factual basis of the allegation remains unverified. Only later do police investigations, fact-checking organisations, journalists or courts examine the evidence. In a significant number of the cases documented here, that evidence proved the original allegations to be false, misleading or materially different from the claims that had initially captured public attention.

The cumulative effect of these repeated falsehoods is perhaps even more significant than any individual incident. A single fabricated allegation may eventually be disproved, but communal narratives do not function in isolation. Each new accusation builds upon earlier ones, creating an ecosystem in which repetition gradually substitutes for evidence. A fabricated “love jihad” allegation reinforces memories of previous claims. A staged Pakistan slogan appears to confirm existing suspicions. A false allegation of temple desecration is interpreted alongside earlier rumours. Over time, these incidents collectively contribute to an environment in which allegations against Muslims appear increasingly plausible simply because similar stories have circulated before, regardless of whether those earlier stories were ever substantiated.

This process has profound implications for the administration of justice. Criminal law is built upon the principle that individuals are judged on the basis of evidence and personal culpability. The incidents documented here demonstrate how communal narratives frequently abandon that principle. Allegations against one individual are projected as evidence of the conduct of an entire community. In some of the cases discussed in this investigation, even that individual culpability proved illusory because investigators found that Muslims had been falsely implicated from the outset. Yet the allegations continued to reinforce broader stereotypes portraying Muslims as inherently suspect, disloyal or dangerous. In this way, fabricated allegations cease to be about individual criminal conduct and instead become instruments for the collective criminalisation of an entire religious community.

Equally troubling is the imbalance between the reach of the allegation and the reach of the correction. The original accusation often receives extensive media attention, dominates social media conversations and becomes the subject of political speeches and public mobilisation. By contrast, the eventual finding that the allegation was fabricated or unsupported frequently receives only limited coverage. Many people remember hearing that Pakistan slogans were raised or that temples had been desecrated. Far fewer remember learning that police later concluded the slogans had allegedly been orchestrated or that the vandalism had reportedly been staged to implicate Muslims. This asymmetry ensures that even disproved allegations continue to influence public memory long after they have collapsed under scrutiny.

The consequences extend well beyond misinformation. Individuals who are falsely accused may face criminal investigations, arrests, prolonged legal proceedings, threats, economic hardship and lasting reputational harm. Communities become increasingly vulnerable to social boycotts, discrimination and exclusion. Businesses suffer, neighbourhood relationships deteriorate and public trust between communities weakens. Even where investigations ultimately establish the truth, they cannot easily undo the social and psychological damage caused by the original allegations.

The cases documented in this investigation therefore demonstrate that the weaponisation of religion today is not confined to inflammatory speeches or overt acts of communal violence. Increasingly, it operates through the manufacture of facts themselves. A staged slogan, a fabricated criminal complaint, a misleading video, a false identity, an edited clip or a rumour repeated often enough can become the foundation upon which broader communal narratives are constructed. The objective is not always to secure convictions in a court of law. More often, it is to secure convictions in the court of public opinion, where allegations spread rapidly and corrections struggle to command equal attention.

This raises important constitutional concerns. India’s constitutional framework rests upon the promise that every individual will be treated equally before the law, irrespective of religion. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, among other protected characteristics. Article 21, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, protects not only life and personal liberty but also the dignity and reputation of every individual. Equally fundamental to the criminal justice system is the presumption of innocence—the principle that guilt must be established through evidence, tested through due process and determined by an independent court. Manufactured communal allegations invert each of these principles. Suspicion precedes investigation, identity precedes evidence, and public outrage often precedes due process.

Ultimately, the incidents examined in this investigation are not merely stories about misinformation or isolated conspiracies. Together, they expose a recurring method by which religion can be weaponised to manufacture social divisions and legitimise discrimination. They illustrate how carefully crafted falsehoods, amplified through digital platforms and public discourse, can transform unverified allegations into accepted truths, often with serious consequences for those falsely accused and for communal harmony more broadly.

The greatest danger, therefore, is not simply that false allegations continue to be made. It is that they are repeatedly constructed around familiar communal stereotypes, allowing prejudice itself to become the foundation upon which those allegations are believed. In such an environment, the rule of law is weakened, constitutional guarantees are placed under strain, and the distinction between fact and communal fiction becomes increasingly blurred. Protecting India’s constitutional commitment to equality, secularism and due process requires not only exposing individual falsehoods but also recognising—and resisting—the broader pattern through which fabricated communal narratives are repeatedly manufactured, amplified and deployed to deepen religious polarisation.

Related:

SIR 2025-26: Dismantling the very Idea of India?

How big tech is profiting from Hindutva hate music

Judging the Judge: The communal backlash against a lynching verdict

Shared Muharram Heritage: Hindus lead Tazias, Sikhs serve water

Nazia Elahi Khan faces multiple FIRs over alleged hate speech

Bombay HC condemns use of externment to silence political dissent; says opposition to government cannot be treated as a crime

The post Weaponising religion, manufacturing distrust appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Released by the Washington D.C.-based Centre for the Study of Organized Hate (CSOH), the report, Profiting from Hate Music, examines what researchers describe as the rapidly expanding ecosystem of Hindutva pop music, or “H-Pop”—a genre that combines devotional, nationalist and popular musical styles with rhetoric targeting Muslims and Christians. According to the report, this music is no longer confined to fringe corners of the internet. Instead, it is thriving across some of the world’s largest technology platforms, generating millions of views, streams and shares while simultaneously producing revenue for creators and, indirectly, the platforms themselves.

Authored by journalist Kunal Purohit, whose book H-Pop: The Secretive World of Hindutva Pop Stars further documented the rise of the genre, along with CSOH researchers Tavishi and Hamaad Meer, the report presents itself as the first comprehensive effort to map the scale, reach and monetisation of hate music in India. Supported through a grant from the Human Rights Foundation, the study argues that major technology companies are not merely hosting such content but are enabling its amplification and profitability despite maintaining public policies against hate speech and incitement.

At the heart of the report lies a stark claim: online platforms have become critical infrastructure for the production, dissemination and monetisation of music that allegedly promotes hatred, dehumanisation and violence against religious minorities.

Over a year before Kunal Purohit’s H-Pop… was released on November 22, 2023, on October 10, 2022 Citizens for Justice and Peace was among the first to conduct its own investigation into YouTube and other platform’s promotion of hate lyrics. Hate through music, lyrics and visuals: Hindutva pop. CJP’s The online eco-system hosts a plethora of videos peddling hate may be read here. Four months before that, in June 2022, Caravan had also done its own investigation into Hindutva’s hate music: Hindu Rashtra OST authored by Samriddhi Sakuniya that can be read here. The CSOH’s recent report is then a logical, research driven extension to earlier work done that exposed this further capture of ‘culture’ by the majoritarian far right.

From white supremacist rock to Hindutva pop

The report situates Hindutva hate music within a broader global history of extremist music cultures. Researchers trace parallels with white power music in Europe and the United States, particularly the rise of white supremacist bands in the 1980s that used music as a vehicle for recruitment, radicalisation and political mobilisation. Similar patterns, the report notes, have emerged in other contexts, including Rwanda and Myanmar, where music was used to reinforce ethnic and religious hostility before or during periods of violence.

According to the authors, Hindutva pop has evolved into a distinctly Indian manifestation of this phenomenon. Unlike conventional devotional music, these songs frequently depict Muslims and Christians as enemies, invaders, traitors or existential threats. The report argues that many songs go beyond ideological messaging and explicitly advocate discrimination, exclusion, boycotts or violence.

The researchers further link the growth of the genre to broader political and social developments in India, including increasing incidents of anti-minority hate speech and communal polarisation. Citing data from India Hate Lab, the report notes that hate speech incidents documented in India increased dramatically in recent years, providing a social and political backdrop against which Hindutva music has flourished.

Importantly, the report does not portray these songs as isolated cultural products. Rather, it argues that they form part of a larger ecosystem in which music is used during religious processions, political gatherings, social media campaigns and community mobilisation efforts. Several incidents of communal tension and violence, the report notes, have involved processions playing songs containing anti-Muslim themes or violent rhetoric.

Building a database of hate music

One of the report’s most significant contributions is methodological. Rather than relying on anecdotal examples, the researchers spent a year building what they describe as a comprehensive database of Hindutva hate music across multiple platforms.

The study examined four major platforms: YouTube, Spotify, Apple Music and Meta’s Music Library, which powers audio used in Instagram Reels. Before identifying songs, researchers first analysed each platform’s published policies governing hate speech, incitement to violence and discriminatory content. These policies then became the framework through which songs were assessed.

Data collection occurred between January 2025 and January 2026 and involved multiple research techniques. Researchers conducted keyword searches in English and Hindi, monitored social media accounts of prominent Hindutva influencers, reviewed footage of religious processions and tracked channels and creators repeatedly associated with such music. Songs identified through one platform were subsequently traced across others to determine their broader distribution.

The resulting database contains 523 songs that researchers concluded violated the content policies of at least one platform. These songs were then categorised according to the type of violation involved, including direct incitement to violence, dehumanisation, promotion of supremacist beliefs and other forms of hateful content.

The researchers also tested platform accountability by reporting a sample of songs and tracking platform responses over several months. In addition, they investigated how creators and platforms monetised such content through advertising, subscriptions, and fan funding and other revenue streams.

A vast digital ecosystem

The report’s findings suggest that hate music is not confined to a few isolated uploads but forms a substantial and highly visible digital ecosystem. Across the four platforms studied, researchers identified 523 songs that they argue violate platform policies. Of these, 210 were found on YouTube, 109 on Spotify, 103 within Meta’s Music Library, and 101 on Apple Music.

The scale of engagement documented in the report is striking. The YouTube songs alone accumulated more than 198 million views, while songs available through Meta’s Music Library were used in over 5.9 million Instagram Reels. Researchers argue that the actual audience exposure is likely far greater because each Reel can be viewed, shared and recommended repeatedly through Instagram’s algorithmic systems.

Perhaps most significantly, the report concludes that roughly half of all identified songs contain explicit calls for violence. Researchers found that 263 of the 523 songs directly threatened, encouraged or glorified violence against religious minorities, while the remaining songs primarily relied on dehumanisation, conspiracy theories, derogatory stereotypes and other forms of hateful rhetoric.

According to the report, Muslims were overwhelmingly the primary targets. Many songs promoted familiar Hindu nationalist narratives, including allegations of “love jihad,” demographic replacement theories, claims that Muslims pose an existential threat to Hindu society, and demands that India be transformed into an explicitly Hindu nation.

The researchers argue that these narratives do not merely express political opinions but function as tools of radicalisation. By repeatedly portraying minorities as enemies, traitors or invaders, the music allegedly normalises hostility and creates conditions in which discrimination and violence become easier to justify.

YouTube: The largest hub

Among all platforms studied, YouTube emerged as the most significant repository of Hindutva hate music. The report identified 210 allegedly violative songs uploaded across 100 channels with a combined subscriber base exceeding 76 million. Researchers found that nearly half of these songs contained direct threats or calls for violence against Muslims.

Particularly notable was the concentration of content among a relatively small number of channels. According to the report, three channels alone accounted for more than 40 percent of the identified songs. Despite repeatedly hosting content that researchers argue violates YouTube’s own hate speech policies, these channels allegedly remained active, verified and monetised.

The report further argues that YouTube’s own systems may be helping such content spread. Researchers note that the platform automatically generates videos for music tracks even when creators do not upload visual content, thereby ensuring additional visibility for songs distributed through music services.

Spotify, Meta and Apple: A pattern across platforms

While YouTube accounted for the largest number of allegedly violative songs, the report argues that the problem extends well beyond video-sharing platforms. Researchers found what they describe as a consistent pattern across Spotify, Meta’s Music Library and Apple Music, with songs containing anti-Muslim hate speech, conspiracy theories and incitement to violence remaining available despite each platform maintaining policies that prohibit such content.

The report argues that this demonstrates a systemic moderation failure rather than isolated lapses in enforcement. Although each platform adopts different approaches to content moderation and community standards, the researchers contend that all four companies continue to host content that appears to violate their own published rules.

Spotify: Hate music available beside mainstream artists

Spotify, the world’s largest music streaming platform, hosts 109 songs that the report argues violate its Platform Rules. Researchers found that 51 of these songs explicitly praise or encourage violence against Muslims, while 44 others promote hatred, dehumanisation or harmful stereotypes directed at the community.

According to the report, Spotify’s own rules prohibit content that promotes hatred or violence against protected groups based on characteristics including religion. Yet researchers argue that songs encouraging violence against Muslims, promoting the “love jihad” conspiracy theory, or portraying religious minorities as enemies of the nation remained easily accessible through ordinary searches.

The report also highlights Spotify’s recommendation architecture. Unlike traditional music stores where users actively purchase specific tracks, streaming services recommend songs, playlists and artists based on listening behaviour. Researchers argue that this recommendation system can inadvertently increase the reach of extremist content once a listener engages with similar material.

Another concern identified is the coexistence of such songs alongside mainstream music. The report argues that users do not encounter these tracks in isolated corners of the platform; instead, they exist within the same searchable ecosystem as Bollywood music, devotional songs and popular commercial artists, making discovery significantly easier.

Instagram Reels and Meta’s Music Library: Turning hate into viral content

Perhaps the report’s most striking findings concern Meta’s Music Library, the catalogue of licensed music available to users creating Instagram Reels. Researchers identified 103 songs within Meta’s music catalogue that they argue violate the company’s Hate Speech Community Standard. Of these, 46 songs actively encourage or incite violence against Muslims, while another 57 use abusive language, slurs or dehumanising rhetoric targeting the community.

What makes Meta’s ecosystem particularly significant, the report argues, is the extraordinary scale of amplification. Rather than simply existing as songs available for listening, these tracks have been incorporated into more than 5.9 million Instagram Reels, transforming music into a reusable soundtrack for millions of user-generated videos.

Researchers contend that every Reel using a hate song effectively creates another distribution channel for the underlying message. Since Instagram’s recommendation algorithm actively promotes short-form videos beyond a creator’s followers, songs embedded in viral Reels can rapidly reach audiences far larger than those who might deliberately search for the original track.

The report provides numerous examples illustrating this phenomenon. One of the most widely circulated songs documented is “Bharat Ka Bacha Bacha Jai Shri Ram Bolega.” According to the report, the song had already been used in over 730,000 Instagram Reels. Researchers note that some individual Reels featuring the song accumulated millions of views, vastly exceeding the reach of the original audio itself. One Reel showing a DJ performing the song before a large public audience reportedly received over 5.7 million views and hundreds of thousands of likes.

Similarly, the song “Gau Mata“, which the report says contains anti-Muslim slurs and threats of violence, had been used in more than 40,000 Instagram Reels. Researchers observed that many of these videos were posted by self-described cow vigilante groups or supporters, often depicting vehicle chases, confrontations or assaults involving alleged cattle transporters while the song played in the background.

Another frequently used track, “Bhagwa Se Dar Lagta Hai Toh Bharat Chod Do,” had reportedly been used in over 104,000 Reels by May 2026. The report documents examples where the song accompanied videos of Ram Navami processions, saffron flag displays and other communal imagery, with individual Reels reaching hundreds of thousands of viewers.

The report argues that Meta’s music catalogue effectively allows hateful audio to be endlessly repurposed, giving songs an afterlife far beyond their original release.

Apple Music: Minimal hate speech standards

Among the four platforms examined, researchers identify Apple Music as having the least detailed public standards specifically addressing hate speech. Unlike YouTube, Meta and Spotify, Apple does not publish an extensive standalone hate speech policy governing music content. Instead, the company requires artists to comply with local laws, cultural sensitivities and general standards of appropriateness.

Applying Indian legal standards as well as the report’s analytical framework, researchers identified 101 songs on Apple Music that they argue should not remain available. Several songs promote the discredited conspiracy theory of “love jihad,” alleging that Muslim men systematically target Hindu women for religious conversion. The report notes that the Government of India itself informed Parliament in 2020 that the term has no legal basis, yet multiple songs continue to invoke it as an established fact while encouraging hostility against Muslims.

Researchers also criticise Apple’s moderation of album artwork. According to the report, several songs employ imagery that reinforces anti-Muslim narratives, including depictions of veiled Muslim women intended to portray interfaith relationships or Islamic identity as inherently threatening.

The report argues that visual imagery, combined with inflammatory lyrics, contributes to a broader ecosystem of communal propaganda rather than functioning merely as artistic expression.

Violence is not an exception—it is a central theme

One of the report’s most significant conclusion concerns the nature of the content itself. Researchers argue that violent rhetoric is not confined to a handful of fringe songs but constitutes one of the defining characteristics of the Hindutva pop ecosystem.

Across platforms, they found:

• 104 YouTube songs containing explicit violent themes targeting minorities;
• 51 Spotify songs praising or encouraging violence;
• 46 Meta Music Library tracks directly calling for violence;
• 67 Apple Music songs encouraging or glorifying violence against minorities.

Beyond explicit threats, the report identifies recurring themes that appear repeatedly across hundreds of songs. These include portraying Muslims as traitors or foreign invaders; invoking historical grievances involving Mughal rulers; calling for the demolition of mosques and construction of temples in their place; depicting demographic change as an existential threat; promoting conspiracy theories such as “love jihad” and “Ghazwa-e-Hind”; glorifying cow vigilantism; and encouraging Hindus to prepare for what songs describe as an inevitable religious conflict.

According to the researchers, these recurring narratives collectively create a worldview in which violence against minorities is portrayed not as criminal conduct but as a legitimate form of self-defence or historical justice.

The report therefore argues that the danger lies not only in individual songs but in the cumulative effect of hundreds of tracks repeating similar messages across multiple platforms, reinforcing one another through algorithms, recommendations and user-generated content.

Profiting From Hate: How platforms monetise extremist music

One of the report’s most serious allegations is that technology companies are not merely failing to remove hateful content—they are also profiting from it. The report argues that while companies publicly maintain zero-tolerance policies towards hate speech, many of the creators producing anti-Muslim songs continue to benefit from platform monetisation tools, while the platforms themselves earn advertising and subscription revenue generated by user engagement with this content.

Researchers contend that this creates what they describe as a perverse incentive structure. The more popular a hate song becomes, the more advertisements it attracts, the more revenue it generates for both the creator and the platform, and the more likely platform algorithms are to recommend it to additional users. According to the report, this commercial ecosystem transforms communal hatred into profitable digital content.

YouTube’s monetisation ecosystem

The report identifies YouTube as the platform where monetisation is most visible. Researchers found that many channels repeatedly uploading songs that allegedly violate YouTube’s hate speech policies remain eligible for monetisation through the YouTube Partner Program. This allows creators to earn money from advertisements shown before or during videos, while also accessing features such as Super Thanks, Super Chats, Channel Memberships and paid subscriptions.

The report notes that the 210 songs identified on YouTube had collectively amassed approximately 198 million views, generating substantial audience engagement through more than 3.1 million likes across roughly 100 channels with a combined subscriber base exceeding 76 million subscribers. Researchers argue that these figures indicate that Hindutva hate music is not a niche phenomenon but a commercially successful content category operating within YouTube’s broader creator economy.

The report also raises concerns about YouTube’s own automated systems. Even where artists did not upload music videos themselves, YouTube automatically generated videos—known as “Art Tracks”—using album artwork and audio files. According to the researchers, this meant that hateful songs could continue circulating on YouTube even without dedicated video production, further expanding their visibility through YouTube Music integration and algorithmic recommendations. Researchers argue that these automated uploads demonstrate how platform infrastructure itself can contribute to the dissemination of harmful content.

Brand advertising beside hate content

One of the most troubling commercial finding concerns advertising. The report states that advertisements from internationally recognised companies appeared before or alongside videos containing anti-Muslim hate music.

Researchers documented advertisements from major multinational brands—including technology companies, consumer goods manufacturers and financial services firms—being served on videos that they argue contain hate speech and incitement. The report stresses that there is no suggestion that these companies intentionally chose to advertise on such videos. Rather, advertisements were placed through automated advertising systems that purchase inventory across YouTube. Nevertheless, the report argues that automated advertising effectively channels corporate advertising budgets towards creators producing hateful material. This, researchers contend, raises broader questions about advertiser oversight, brand safety mechanisms and the adequacy of platform controls designed to prevent commercial support for extremist content.

A small network, massive reach

Another important finding is the concentration of influence. Rather than thousands of independent creators, the report identifies a relatively small network of artists and YouTube channels responsible for producing a disproportionately large share of Hindutva hate music.

The researchers profiled dozens of prominent singers and creators who repeatedly produced songs centred on similar themes: portraying Muslims as enemies of the nation, glorifying violence, advocating the demolition of mosques, promoting conspiracy theories such as “love jihad” and “Ghazwa-e-Hind,” and encouraging Hindus to prepare for religious conflict. According to the report, this demonstrates that Hindutva hate music is not a spontaneous or decentralised phenomenon but an identifiable ecosystem with recurring artists, production houses, distribution channels and audiences.

The report argues that because the same creators repeatedly upload allegedly violative content across multiple platforms, enforcement against a relatively limited number of accounts could significantly reduce the overall reach of the ecosystem.

Music and offline communal mobilisation

A recurring theme throughout the report is the relationship between online music and offline communal mobilisation. Researchers emphasise that the songs they identified are not simply consumed privately through headphones. Instead, they frequently accompany religious processions, political rallies, vigilante activities, election campaigns and public demonstrations, giving digital content a tangible presence in physical spaces.

Several songs documented in the report call for the demolition of mosques, the construction of Hindu temples at disputed sites, retaliation for historical grievances associated with Mughal rule, or violent action against individuals portrayed as threatening Hindu society. Others celebrate cow vigilantism or invoke slogans commonly associated with Hindu nationalist mobilisation.

The report argues that when such music becomes embedded within public processions and viral social media videos, it helps normalise hostile narratives against minorities and reinforces communal identities through repetitive cultural messaging.

The Pahalgam attack and the rapid weaponisation of tragedy

The report devotes particular attention to the aftermath of the April 22, 2025 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, in which 26 civilians were killed. According to the researchers, Hindutva pop artists responded with remarkable speed. Within hours and days of the attack, multiple songs were released portraying Indian Muslims collectively as responsible or urging Hindus to unite against an alleged internal enemy.

Five songs released immediately after the attack reportedly accumulated more than 1.1 million YouTube views within a short period. Several rapidly spread to Spotify, Apple Music and Instagram Reels, where users created thousands of videos using the songs as background audio.

The report does not claim a direct causal relationship between these songs and subsequent incidents of communal violence. However, it argues that they contributed to an environment in which anti-Muslim hostility intensified.

Researchers cite monitoring by India Hate Lab, which documented 64 anti-Muslim hate rallies within ten days of the attack and 113 hate speech incidents and hate crimes within approximately three weeks. The report presents this as evidence that online hate music formed part of a broader ecosystem of communal mobilisation during a period of heightened national tension. Detailed report may be read here.

Less than two months after the Pahalgam attack, Citizens for Justice and Peace had mapped the rising hate attacks against Muslims, across five key states. The data based investigation had, on June 19, 2025, published 180 plus attacks with 37 % tied to ‘revenge’ for Pahalgam. CJP’s Mapping Hate: The Pahalgam Attack and its ripple effects may be read here.

Testing the platforms

Beyond documenting content, the researchers also sought to assess whether technology companies acted when alerted. The report explains that researchers formally reported numerous songs through the platforms’ own complaint mechanisms and monitored the outcomes over several months.

According to the report, most of the reported content remained available despite allegedly violating the platforms’ published hate speech policies. Researchers argue that this demonstrates substantial inconsistencies between the companies’ stated rules and their enforcement practices.

The report contends that the persistence of such content, despite repeated reporting, raises broader questions about transparency, accountability and the effectiveness of automated moderation systems, particularly in languages other than English.

Recommendations and a warning for Big Tech

The report concludes with an extensive set of recommendations directed at YouTube, Meta, Spotify and Apple. Among other measures, researchers call on platforms to:

• proactively identify and remove music that promotes hatred or violence against protected groups;
• improve moderation of music and audio content rather than focusing primarily on text and video;
• strengthen moderation capacity in Indian languages;
• ensure that creators repeatedly producing hate content are ineligible for monetisation;
• increase transparency regarding enforcement decisions;
• improve advertiser safeguards so that brands are not inadvertently funding extremist content; and
• invest in specialised moderation teams capable of recognising coded forms of communal hate speech.

Ultimately, Profiting from Hate Music argues that music has become one of the most powerful yet understudied vehicles for spreading communal hatred online. Rather than treating songs as merely another form of entertainment, the authors urge policymakers, researchers and technology companies to recognise them as influential political and cultural artefacts capable of shaping public attitudes at enormous scale. The study significantly expands the conversation around online hate speech in India. It shifts attention beyond viral speeches and inflammatory posts to an ecosystem where melody, repetition and algorithmic amplification intersect—raising difficult questions about the responsibilities of digital platforms when content that allegedly promotes hatred is not only hosted, but also recommended, monetised and transformed into a profitable business model.

The complete report may be read below:

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CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal

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The protesters foot march happened days after the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), which protects the mosque, wrote to the district administration to not allow any “large gathering” on June 10, even as the campaign was building up. However, under the banner of temple Shri Chakradhar Swami National Heritage Conservation Committee and several Jain organisations, a march was organised from Hostel ground to the district collectorate, covering nearly a kilometre.

Apart from Gujaratis, several followers of Chakradhar Swami from Amravati and other districts in Maharashtra participated along with local residents, holding placards and banners. Among the participants was Bhavesh Patel, who was released on bail after his conviction in the Ajmer Dargah blast case of 2007 investigated by the National Investigation Agency. Patel had by then become a self-styled godman, assuming the name of “Swami Muktanand” reported Indian Express.

Protesters handed a memorandum to Bharuch Collector Navnath Gavhane and demanded preservation of the monument to its original structure. The memorandum states that a drive was carried out to create public awareness in Gujarat and Maharashtra by the followers of Chakradhar Swami from May 18-23. Signatures of over 35,000 were taken, along with their mobile phone numbers.

Muktanand Swami alias Bhavesh Patel of Bharuch said, “The Jama Masjid has its origin in the birthplace of an ancient Jain temple, and the birthplace of Swami Chakradhar of Maharashtra. The Islamic rulers had converted the monument into a mosque. The Masjid is presently under the possession of the ASI. We have come to know that the rules and regulations of the ASI are not followed, as some people are involved in making changes in the existing structure. Actions should be taken against those who are involved in alterations or changes made to the historically protected monument.”

Quick to set the record straight, however Bharuch district collector Dr. Navnath Gavhane said, “There is no law-and-order situation. District Superintendent of Police, District magistrate office and ASI (Archaeological Survey of India) officials are maintaining it. We have appealed to people to refrain from making any generalised comments about the monument or believing in rumours and misunderstandings. The ASI is a competent authority to decide about the monument.”

Over the past decades, far right groups have been consistently mobilising to “re-claim” Mosques and Dargahs in campaigns that threaten the cultural and religious rights of the religious minority.

Related:

ASI, Gujarat: Will Bharuch’s 700 year old Jama Masjid be the next target of right-wing saffron grab and terror?

Bhojshala Judgment: MP High Court declares Dhar site a Saraswati Temple, ends Namaz rights at complex

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To understand why this matters beyond electoral law, we must place the SIR process within a deeper theoretical framework: the biopolitical understanding of Hindutva fascism. The question of who qualifies as a citizen, and whose body bears the imprint of the nation, lies at the heart of this analysis. When the state deletes a voter, it is not merely updating a roll; it is making a sovereign declaration about whose life is politically legible, and whose life can be reduced to bare existence.

The question of who qualifies as a human being, who attains citizenship, and the intricate relationship between humanity and citizenship is profoundly significant. Fascism, as a historical phenomenon, emerges as a radical redefinition of this relationship, transforming what once were purely anthropological inquiries into politically charged, nationalist, racial, and ultimately fascist projects.

In the ancient context, the distinction between City and Citizen was central to the organisation of society. The city-state, or polis, represented the epitome of political life. A resident of the polis was inherently political, echoing Aristotle’s famous assertion that humans are political animals. However, not all individuals born within the city-state were automatically granted citizenship. Thus, while humanity may be defined as inherently political, not every individual born within the city was considered a political being.

This subtle understanding emphasises the complexity of citizenship and political participation in ancient societies. It highlights the selective nature of citizenship and the hierarchical structures that governed access to political rights and privileges. In fascist contexts, this distinction becomes even more pronounced, as regimes seek to manipulate and redefine citizenship according to arbitrary criteria, including race, ethnicity, and religious ideology.

Ultimately, the question of who qualifies as a human being and who attains the status of a citizen is not merely an abstract philosophical inquiry but a deeply political and historical one. It speaks to the fundamental principles of equality, justice, and democracy and underlines the enduring struggle to uphold these ideals in the face of tyranny and oppression.

The Superimposed Body: From Birth to the Body Politic

In the ancient Greek democratic system, the concept of citizenship was strictly exclusive. Neither women nor slaves were afforded a share in the polis. They were relegated to a subhuman status or entirely excluded from the realm of political humanity. In this framework, reproduction and labour were perceived merely as animalistic qualities, devoid of the political agency (bios) granted to citizens.

The human body, far from being solely a product of nature (zoe), is inseparably entangled with politics and law. It embodies a complex amalgamation of natural and political forces; a synthesis forged in the crucible of societal norms and governance. At birth, an individual’s body becomes imbued with a biopolitical essence, a term denoting the state’s regulation and control over biological life, and a body politic is superimposed on their natural form.

This fusion of the natural and the political renders the body a site of power and control, subject to the whims of the state, fascism, and sovereignty. It is through this superimposed body politic that individuals are governed and regulated, with their rights and freedoms dictated by the structures of power that govern society. Thus, the human body becomes not merely a vessel for biological existence but a battleground for competing political ideologies and systems of governance.

While Rousseau famously proclaimed that “man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains,” the truth of this statement is open to interpretation. Indeed, no individual is born into absolute freedom. Every human being is born into a web of preconceived roles and identities, predetermined by factors such as gender, language, nationality, and ethnicity.

The assertion that man is a political animal emphasises that human birth is not only a biological event but also inherently political. Each individual’s entry into the world is inseparable from the socio-political context of their birth. Their very existence is framed within a politico-juridical landscape, in which legal and political frameworks shape their rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.

Sovereignty, Agamben, and the Tragedy of the Declaration

The evolution of citizenship from ancient city-states to modern nation-states marks a profound transformation in the status of individuals, shifting them from subjects to active participants in political life. This shift also extended citizenship to previously excluded groups, broadening political engagement and rights. The transition from the sovereignty of kings to national sovereignty reflects the emergence of public sovereignty, in which the authority of governance is vested in the collective body of citizens.

However, the philosopher Giorgio Agamben highlights the latent risks inherent in this apparently progressive transition. By interrogating foundational documents such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) and the development of habeas corpus in England, Agamben reveals the complexities and ambiguities underlying the construction of citizenship in modern liberal democracy. These documents, while intended to safeguard individual rights and freedoms, also reinforce structures of power and exclusion, perpetuating inequalities and hierarchies within society.

The French Declaration of Rights asserts that “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights,” emphasising the fundamental equality and freedom inherent in all individuals. However, the term “man” in this context refers to a specific subset of humanity, namely, the citizen. While seemingly universal, the rights enshrined in the declaration are exercisable only by citizens, narrowing the scope of entitlements to a specific legal and political category.

This transition from the broader concept of “man” to the more limited category of “citizen” marks a shift from a natural or biological understanding of humanity to a legal and political construct. In essence, the declaration replaces the inherent rights of all human beings with the societal framework of citizenship, thereby transforming the abstract notion of “man” into the tangible status of “citizen.”

The transition from God-given royal sovereignty to national sovereignty marks a significant shift from subjects to citizens. However, this transition also brings a profound tragedy: the commodification of birth itself as a point of sovereignty. While all beings are born, not all possess the inherent rights to equality and life. These rights are reserved only for individuals whose bodies are explicitly imbued with citizenship. The metaphor of commodification describes how the modern nation-state transforms the natural, biological act of human birth into a state-controlled asset, a legal registry, and a tool of political currency. When modern democracy overthrew kings, sovereignty shifted to “The People” (National Sovereignty). But this created a massive bureaucratic problem for the new state: Who exactly are “The People”? Where does the state get its legitimacy?

The modern state’s answer was Birth. The nation-state linked political legitimacy directly to human reproduction. It declared that, by virtue of being born within a certain territory (jus soli) or to certain parents (jus sanguinis), a biological body is automatically claimed by the state. This is where commodification occurs. The state steps into the maternity ward, establishes a “territory” in the mother’s womb, and places an invisible, sovereign “tag” on the newborn body. The state turns the most innocent, natural act, a child entering the world, into the ultimate site of sovereign control, policing, and structural exclusion.

If your birth occurs outside the arbitrary criteria of the state, or if a majoritarian state retroactively changes the rules of belonging (like the ECI’s voter deletions or citizenship screenings), your birth is stripped of its political currency. You become an administrative Homo Sacer, a bare life. Your birth is suddenly worth nothing under the law.

According to Agamben, this transformation from biopolitics to “thanatopolitics”, a politics centred on the power to decide who matters and who is marked for death, occurs precisely at the intersection of citizenship, where the distinction between life and death becomes increasingly blurred. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), together with the proposed Uniform Civil Code (UCC), exemplifies this biopolitical shift in contemporary India, raising deep concerns about the potential legal vulnerability and targeted disenfranchisement of Indian Muslims.

The Political Production of the Homo Sacer

When attempting to define citizenship, the concept of identity becomes paramount. Defining citizenship is inherently problematic, as it often involves delineating oneself from the “other.” This process is particularly significant in Indian social psychology, where self-awareness as a Hindu often arises primarily in contrast to the identity of a Muslim. In the political absence of this “other,” the monolithic Hindu identity risks regressing into its internal, fractured realities of caste. To define oneself, one must establish something outside oneself. Thus, majoritarian citizenship can only be comprehended by creating an external boundary through the definition of the “other” and subsequent exclusion.

The answer to the question of citizenship varies with the ideology governing a nation. In some contexts, citizenship is defined by birthright (jus soli): anyone born within the country’s borders is considered a citizen. However, in regimes such as Nazi Germany, Ethnic Israel, and Hindutva India, citizenship is increasingly untethered from the place of birth and is instead tied to racial, ethnic, or religious identity. Hitler’s concept of German citizenship was strictly limited to those born within the Aryan race, excluding others regardless of birthplace.

This racialised or communalised notion of citizenship transforms the human body into a biopolitical entity, in which citizenship becomes a political stamp imposed on nature. Fascism divides society along identity lines, relegating certain groups to the margins through arbitrary definitions of belonging. Yet such exclusionary definitions erode individuals’ inherent humanity, reducing them to mere subjects of political ideology rather than autonomous beings.

In an ethnically defined concept of citizenship, individuals who do not belong to the designated group are considered to be born without rights. They are viewed as “Homo Sacer”, an ancient legal figure resurrected by Agamben to describe individuals whose lives are deemed “bare life,” stripped of legal protection, expendable, and subject to targeting with impunity. In essence, their mere biological existence is seen as a threat to the ideological purity of the state, rendering them legally disposable.

The Democratic Channel to Fascism

With the rise of modern democracy, marginalised lives, women, workers, and the vulnerable were formally integrated into the political sphere, leading to the complete politicisation of human birth and natural life. The modern nation-state rests on a political framework in which existence itself is explicitly managed by law. Consequently, those deemed irrelevant or dangerous by authority can be stripped of their political rights and expelled from the system.

This process renders anyone susceptible to political disenfranchisement, transforming them into Homo Sacer. Agamben’s observation remains highly relevant today: whereas biopolitics in Nazi Germany targeted specific, legally catalogued religious and ethnic groups as scapegoats, today any citizen can be reduced to bare life. The concept of bare life is no longer confined to an exceptional category; it resides within the biological body of every living being, leaving everyone vulnerable to being stripped of their rights and reduced to mere existence at the state’s discretion.

Agamben argues that modern democracy does not eliminate the sacred, banishable life but rather fragments and disperses it across every individual body, investing it in all civic bodies. When definitions change, citizens are transformed into refugees. This is historically exemplified by the plight of German Jews who lost their citizenship following the implementation of the Nuremberg Laws, as well as by Rohingya Muslims and Palestinians who were forced into refugee status due to shifting political boundaries and legal classifications.

Modern nation-states and democracies are founded on the biopolitical framework of citizenship, which determines who is considered a citizen. In this context, fascism is not an antithetical force opposing democracy; rather, it embodies the core political logic inherent in modern democracy itself. This explains how democratically elected leaders can transition seamlessly from democratic governance to fascist tendencies. The trajectory from democracy to fascism is facilitated by the underlying structures of democracy, such as majority rule, executive centralisation, and legal codification, which can morph into fascist ideologies when the constitutional coating of democracy is stripped away.

(To be continued)

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post The Biopolitical Anatomy of Hindutva Fascism: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Bare Life |Part 1| appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In many places, the festival passed peacefully. Families gathered after morning namaz, meat was distributed among relatives and poorer households, and local communities quietly adjusted practices to avoid confrontation. But in several cities and towns, Bakri Eid also became the centre of communal disputes over goats, housing societies, slaughter spaces, public prayer, and even the visibility of Muslim religious life itself.

The result was a festival that revealed two India’s simultaneously: one still capable of accommodation and coexistence, and another where Muslim festivals are increasingly subjected to suspicion, policing, and political contestation. Authorities across the country remained on high alert in the days leading up to Eid-ul-Adha. Police deployments were increased, livestock transportation was monitored, housing societies issued restrictions, and state governments reiterated cattle slaughter regulations. The atmosphere reflected the growing politicisation of Bakri Eid itself.

The festival under regulation

One of the clearest patterns this year was the extent to which Eid celebrations became governed through administrative control and legal regulation. As Moneycontrol reported in a detailed nationwide survey of cattle slaughter laws ahead of Bakri Eid, state governments issued extensive advisories and intensified enforcement drives around livestock transport, slaughterhouses, and sacrificial practices.

The report highlighted how India’s fragmented legal landscape around cattle slaughter shaped Eid observances differently across states. Maharashtra strictly enforced provisions under the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, which bans slaughter of cows, bulls, and bullocks. Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat continued to enforce some of the country’s harshest anti-cow slaughter laws, with penalties extending to life imprisonment in certain circumstances. Assam intensified enforcement under the Assam Cattle Preservation Act, while Karnataka reiterated provisions under its stringent 2020 anti-cattle slaughter legislation.

In Delhi, minister Kapil Mishra publicly warned that sacrifice of prohibited bovine species would invite criminal prosecution. Rapid response teams were formed across districts to monitor transport and slaughter activities.

Municipal corporations and local administrations across cities also insisted that qurbani be conducted only at officially designated spaces. In Mumbai, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation reportedly designated 109 authorised slaughter locations and discouraged sacrifice in residential societies and chawls.

Increasingly, the question was no longer merely what Muslims could sacrifice during Eid, but where, how visibly, and under whose permission.

Pandharpur and the other possibility

Yet even amid this tense atmosphere, there were moments that reflected a very different social reality. Perhaps the most striking example came from Pandharpur in Maharashtra. As reported by Hindustan Times, the town’s Muslim community voluntarily decided to defer goat sacrifice because Bakri Eid coincided with Adhik Maas Ekadashi, an occasion of deep significance for devotees of Lord Vitthal.

Members of the Muslim community told reporters that they wanted to honour the sentiments of Hindu pilgrims visiting the temple town. Some residents reportedly said that Muslims in Pandharpur had long-standing emotional and spiritual connections with the town’s religious culture and had similarly deferred sacrifice in previous years when such overlaps occurred. The symbolism mattered. At a time when Muslim religious practices were being intensely scrutinised elsewhere, Pandharpur offered a reminder that coexistence in India has historically depended less on legal coercion and more on negotiated accommodation and everyday mutual recognition. The story received wide attention precisely because it contrasted so sharply with the hostility unfolding elsewhere.

Mira Road: From housing dispute to communal flashpoint

The most widely discussed communal tensions around Bakri Eid this year emerged from Mira Road near Mumbai. What began as a disagreement by a few inside a housing society over goats being kept ahead of Eid soon escalated into a much larger communal controversy involving right-wing groups, police intervention, counter-protests, and allegations of deliberate provocation.

Detailed report by SabrangIndia may be read here.

Tensions erupted at Poonam Cluster Society after some residents objected to goats being housed within the premises. Muslim residents maintained that they had obtained municipal permission and pointed out that the practice had existed for years within the society. The dispute quickly moved beyond internal society negotiations.

As provided in our report, fringe elements associated with organisations such as the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad entered the scene. What followed was an escalation marked by religious sloganeering, clashes, and eventually one of the most disturbing incidents reported during this year’s Eid period: attempts to bring pigs into the housing society as a counter-protest to the legally valid presence of goats.

The symbolism was unmistakable. And yet, what happened afterward was equally important.

Three days later, the same society celebrated Eid peacefully under police protection. In a follow-up report, Hindustan Times quoted residents insisting that “outsiders” had aggravated what was initially a manageable internal disagreement.

Residents described years of communal coexistence inside the society. Muslim families explained that the temporary goat sheds had existed for years with proper drainage and regular cleaning arrangements. Hindu and Muslim neighbours reportedly exchanged Eid greetings despite the violence of previous days.

The Mira Road episode therefore became more than a local dispute. It illustrated how quickly ordinary disagreements over shared residential space can now be communalised through organised intervention and political mobilisation. At the same time, it also revealed the persistence of local social relationships that continue to resist complete polarisation.

Kalyan and the politics of religious space

Another major point of friction emerged in Kalyan, Maharashtra. As reported by The Hindu, police-imposed restrictions on animal sacrifice inside several housing societies and heavily barricaded the area around the historic Durgadi Fort complex during Eid prayers.

The site is politically and communally sensitive because a temple and mosque exist in close proximity within the fort complex. According to the report, temporary restrictions on temple access during Eid prayers led to protests by members of both Shiv Sena factions and Hindu organisations. Groups gathered nearby to recite the Hanuman Chalisa after prayers concluded, while demonstrations were organised around allegations that Hindu devotees were being prevented from entering the temple.

The issue carried deep historical resonance. The Hindu noted that the Durgadi Fort dispute has remained politically charged since the 1980s and is closely linked to the legacy of Shiv Sena strongman Anand Dighe. Bakri Eid here became not just a religious event but a symbolic battleground over ownership of public and sacred space.

Political language and “new Hindutva”

The tensions surrounding Bakri Eid also triggered overt political commentary. Shiv Sena (UBT) MP Sanjay Raut accused certain groups of attempting to communalise the festival through what he described as “new Hindutva.” According to reports published by News The Truth, Raut argued that Maharashtra historically represented a culture of coexistence and criticised what he viewed as selective outrage around Muslim animal sacrifice while remaining silent on sacrifices associated with other traditions.

His remarks reflected a broader political argument emerging this year: that opposition to Bakri Eid practices was no longer being framed merely through animal welfare or civic regulation, but increasingly through majoritarian identity politics. At the same time, Hindu nationalist groups repeatedly framed their protests around language of “public hygiene,” “society rules,” “religious sensitivity,” and “illegal sacrifice.”

The conflict was therefore rarely articulated openly as anti-Muslim hostility. Instead, it often appeared through the bureaucratic and civic vocabulary of regulation, sanitation, legality, and public order.

Varanasi and the economics of Eid

The tensions surrounding Bakri Eid were not only communal or political. They were also economic. In Varanasi, authorities sealed the city’s decades-old Benia Bagh goat market just days before Eid, triggering panic among traders. According to reports carried by Indian Express, the market — one of eastern Uttar Pradesh’s largest seasonal livestock bazaars — had functioned for nearly four decades before authorities abruptly shut it down citing sanitation complaints and overcrowding.

Traders alleged that they were given little warning and faced devastating losses after travelling from multiple districts with goats purchased on credit.

Several traders reportedly said they had mortgaged valuables and borrowed money at high interest rates to participate in Eid livestock trade and now feared financial ruin if they could not sell their animals.

The closure highlighted another dimension of Eid increasingly overlooked in public discourse: the festival sustains a vast informal economy involving livestock farmers, transport workers, traders, butchers, leather workers, and local markets. Administrative crackdowns therefore carry not only symbolic implications, but material consequences for livelihoods as well.

Prayer, surveillance, and preventive policing

Even public prayer itself became contested in some areas. Reports circulated from Agra that Hindu nationalist leaders planned protests over temporary free entry arrangements at the Taj Mahal for Eid namaz. Police responded by placing several individuals under house arrest to prevent escalation. Elsewhere, social media videos documented protests around Eid prayers and public recitations of the Hanuman Chalisa near Muslim gatherings.

The visible police presence across cities became one of the defining features of Bakri Eid this year. In Mira Road alone, dozens of police personnel were reportedly stationed around sensitive housing societies to prevent further escalation.

The scale of preventive policing reflected both administrative caution and the extent to which Muslim festivals are increasingly treated as potential law-and-order situations.

The festival that revealed the country

Bakri Eid in India this year cannot be reduced either to a story of communal harmony or one of inevitable communal conflict. Both realities existed simultaneously.

There were stories of accommodation: Muslims in Pandharpur postponing sacrifice to respect Ekadashi; local communities negotiating solutions quietly; residents insisting that coexistence mattered more than provocation; neighbours exchanging Eid greetings despite recent tensions.

But there were also unmistakable signs of a changing political climate: housing societies policing Muslim practices; right-wing mobilisation around goats and sacrifice; counter-protests involving pigs; increasing restrictions on where Muslims may pray or perform qurbani; administrative language increasingly framing Eid through surveillance and control.

The deeper significance of Bakri Eid this year lay not merely in the incidents themselves, but in what they revealed about the condition of public life in India.

Questions that once belonged largely to the private domain of religious observance — where goats may be kept, where sacrifice may occur, whether namaz may be offered in a particular place — are now increasingly contested in public and political arenas. And yet, despite everything, the festival still passed. Families prayed. Communities negotiated fragile peace. And in many places, ordinary people continued to protect coexistence even when political actors attempted to fracture it. Bakri Eid in 2026 therefore became a portrait of contemporary India itself: anxious, polarised, heavily policed — but still, in countless everyday ways, struggling to hold together.

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[Allahabad High Court judgement delivered on May 15, 2026]

“A group of dacoits clad only in undergarments allegedly carried out multiple robberies in Mustafabad and Sithauli villages [Uttar Pradesh]…Armed intruders reportedly scaled the wall of farmer Nizakat’s house in the early hours of Wednesday [May 20, 2026] and held his family hostage… When resisted, they assaulted the inmates, critically injuring six people…According to the police, the robbers beat women also for keeping a chicken dish at home, and told them to eat only vegetables.”

[The New Indian Express, May 21, 2026]

With RSS cadres in full control of the Indian State, June 2014 onward, the country has become a laboratory for a major dietary fabrication:  that vegetarianism is Sanatan to Hinduism. It is not that prior to Modi’s coming to power the concept did not exist, a substantial and powerful section of the ruling elite including Gandhi were vociferous believers in it. However, it was not a project for which Indian State worked vehemently.

The neo-zealots of vegetarian Hinduism argue that diet was not just nourishment for the body. It was a matter of spiritual realm which shaped “our thoughts, emotions, and karmic vibrations… The Vedas say, ‘Yad annam, tad manas’ which means ‘As is the food, so is the mind’ …Vegetarian food is considered sattvik-pure, calm, and balanced. It nurtures peace, compassion, and mental clarity. Non-vegetarian food, on the other hand, is tamasic- heavy, aggressive, and rooted in destruction. It dulls our spiritual perception and increases lower (read base) tendencies like anger, fear, and restlessness.”

[https://www.adityavastu.in/post/eating-non-veg-and-its-impact-on-karmikta]

With the beginning of Modi era, it became normal to ban sale and consumption of non-veg eatables for long periods during many religious festivals and many areas permanently declared out of bound for selling/consuming it. The issue of food was weaponized and both seller as well as consumers of non-veg cuisine were declared to be evil elements, a threat to Hinduism and society. Another sinister dimension added was that meat consumers were also attacked for indulging in beef-eating. There are countless incidents in public domain when non-veg consumers were attacked, lynched, their houses bulldozed, even burnt.

The zeal of RSS-BJP rulers in enforcing vegetarian Hinduism is to be seen and believed in dealing with foreign dignitaries. President of Russia Vladimir Putin visiting India in 2025 was chief guest at a lavish dinner thrown by India President on December 6, 2025) where only vegetarian cuisines were served. It was no different when EU delegation was State Guest on January 29, 2026, Seychelles President Patrick Herminie was chief guest at State dinner on February 9, 2026 and Vietnamese PM To Lam on May 6, 2026).

Only vegetarian menu of the banquet hosted by President Murmu for Seychelles President. For other dignitaries too it was only vegetarian menu with different dishes. As per a report in NDTV.

Across India, across educational institutions, businesses, railways and social-religious gatherings non-veg food has been banned. Debarshi Dasgupta (Strait Times, May 18, 2026) lamented the fact that in “Uttar Pradesh, a state also governed by the BJP, curated a list of local cuisines from each of its 75 districts and released it in May. It is a list that includes over 200 dishes, but, again, not a single one of them is meat-based. What makes this ludicrous is that more than half of the state’s population (53.6 per cent), according to a government survey, confirmed eating fish, chicken or other kinds of meat. It is also a state celebrated for its meat-based cuisines, particularly its capital, Lucknow, whose kebabs are legendary.”

Interestingly, the kebab “even found specific praise from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), when it added Lucknow to its ‘Cities of Gastronomy’ list in 2025. But when Minister of Culture and Tourism Gajendra Singh Shekhawat feted this decision on social media, he disingenuously used a poster of food items that were – no surprise here – entirely vegetarian”.

Pushpesh Pant, a renowned Indian academic and food historian as quoted by Dasgupta stated: “It is also a thinly disguised persecution of Muslims, many of whom are perceived to be butchers and vendors of meat and who supposedly are the beef-eaters.” As per a report in Asia News Network.

Varanasi Iftar-on-Boat Arrests

If we want to understand the gravity of weaponization against non-veg consumers and surrender of the State including judiciary, the case known as Varanasi Iftar-on-Boat Arrests needs to be taken note of. According to a detailed report by Shinjinee Majumdar in The Wire (March 27, 2026), the controversy started with a video of March 15 “in which 14 men — Azad Ali, Aamir Kaiki, Danish Saifi, Mohd. Ahmad, Nehal Afridi, Mahfooz Alam, Mohd. Anas, Mohd. Awwal, Mohd. Tahseem, Mohd. Ahmad alias Raja, Mohd. Noor Ismail, Mohd. Tausif Ahmad, Mohd. Faizan, and Mohd. Sameer — were seen breaking their Ramzan-month fast on a boat, allegedly consuming chicken biryani”.

The video was uploaded by one of the group members and soon went viral.  According to The Wire report: “A complaint filed on March 16 by Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha (BJYM)’s Varanasi president Rajat Jaiswal accused them of hurting religious sentiments by consuming non-vegetarian food on the river and disposing of waste into it. The police subsequently arrested 14 men under multiple charges, including hurting religious sentiments, public nuisance and polluting water. Days later, more serious charges — including extortion — were added, significantly raising the legal stakes.”

Jaiswal’s complaint on which Varanasi police took immediate action stated that eating non-veg while riding a boat at Ganga Mother was a grave sin. Moreover, after eating they washed their hands, dumping the waste, thus hurt the religious sentiments of Hindus.

The initial charges against the accused included: Section 298 BNS — Defiling a place of worship with intent to insult a religion, Section 299 BNS — Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, Section 196(1)(B) BNS — Promoting enmity between groups on religious grounds, Section 270 BNS — Public nuisance, Section 279 BNS — Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir, Section 223(B) BNS — Disobedience of an order by a public servant and Section 24, Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.

Later two more serious charges were added, Section 308(5) BNS — Extortion under threat of death or grievous hurt and Section 67, Information Technology Act — Publishing or transmitting obscene material (linked to the viral video).

With these additions, the potential punishment increased significantly — from a maximum of around six years (under the Water Act) to up to 10 years due to the extortion charge.

According to The Wire report, a Varanasi court had denied bail to the accused on March 23. They had earlier been remanded to 14 days of judicial custody on March 19, until April 1.

However, Allahabad High Court Single Bench of Justice of Rajiv Lochan Shukla granted bail with some conditions to the incarcerated Muslims on May 15. The Judge’s words in the judgement, however, amplified the majoritarian and politicized Hindutva construct of vegetarian Hinduism: “members of the Muslim community having a Roza Iftar party, and during the said Iftar party, while partaking of food, non-vegetarian food is said to have been consumed by the members of the Muslim community, who are then alleged to have thrown the remains into the River Ganges. This fact in the dispassionate opinion of the Court could rightly be said to hurt religious sentiments of the Hindu community.”

[]

The far right propaganda machine of “vegetarian Hinduism” is currently running amok in India belying contents of both scriptures and historical study.

Manusmriti for Meat-eating

According to Hindutva ideologue, VD Savarkar Manusmriti is the go-to scripture after the Vedas for Hindus.

[Savarkar, V.D., ‘Women in Manusmriti’ in Savarkar Samagar (collection of Savarkar’s writings in Hindi) volume IV, Prabhat, Delhi, 2000, p. 416.]

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak sangh, an organisation that is the organizational and ideological fountainhead of the present regime ruling India, made demands that it is the Manusmriti that needs must be declared as the Constitution of India—this at a time when the Indian Constituent Assembly was enacting the Constitution.

[Editorial, RSS English organ, Organiser, ‘The Constitution, November 30, 1949.]

This scripture –Manusmriti–that has been substantively critiqued by Dr BR Ambedkar among many other scholars– glorifies the eating of flesh as we will see in the following.

*That land where the black antelope naturally roams, one must know to be fit for the performance of sacrifices; (the tract) different from that (is) the country of the Mlechas. (II/23)

*[A Brahmin should not eat] food given without due respect, nor (that which contains) meat eaten for no sacred purpose, nor (that given) by a female who has no male (relatives), nor the food of an enemy, nor that (given) by the lord of a town, nor that (given) by outcasts, nor that on which anybody has sneezed. (IV/213);

*‘The consumption of meat (is befitting) for sacrifices,’ that is declared to be a rule made by the gods; but to persist (in using it) on other (occasions) is said to be a proceeding worthy of Rakshasas. (V/31)

*He who eats meat, when he honours the gods and manes, commits no sin, whether he has bought it, or himself has killed (the animal), or has received it as a present from others. (V/32)

*A twice-born man who knows the law, must not eat meat except in conformity with the law; for if he has eaten it unlawfully, he will, unable to save himself, be eaten after death by his (victims). (V/33)

*After death the guilt of one who slays deer for gain is not as (great) as that of him who eats meat for no (sacred) purpose. (V/34)

*But a man who, being duly engaged (to officiate or to dine at a sacred rite), refuses to eat meat, becomes after death an animal during twenty-one existences. (V/35)

*A Brahmana must never eat (the flesh of animals unhallowed by Mantras; but, obedient to the primeval law, he may eat it, consecrated with Vedic texts. (V/36)

*A twice-born man who, knowing the true meaning of the Veda, slays an animal for these purposes, causes both himself and the animal to enter a most blessed state. (V/42)

[This selection of Manu’s Codes is from F. Max Muller, Laws of Manu (Delhi: LP Publications, 1996; first published in 1886). The bracket after each code incorporates number of chapter/number of code according to the above edition.]

Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Meat-Eating

The Arthsastra of Kautilya (Chanakya) is the second go-to book of governance for RSS-BJP rulers and cadres. How dear this treatise is to them can be gauged by the fact that the Modi 3.0 government while organising the Sadhna Saptah (April 2-8, 2026) and Mission Karmayogi declared it to be a basic book  for training Indian administrators along with the Vedas.

Interestingly, the Arthsastra has 67 references decreeing flesh eating. The amazing part is that it has a specific chapter titled ‘Superintendent of Slaughter House’.

[R Shamasastry (trans), Kautilya’s Arthsastra, Mysore Printing and Publishing house,     Mysore, 1915, Pgs 149-53]

According to the rules of the slaughter house, “of beasts of prey that have been captured, the Superintendent shall take one-sixth; of fish and birds (of similar nature), he shall take one-tenth or more than one-tenth; and of deer and other beasts (mrigapasu), one-tenth or more than one-tenth as toll…(Butchers) shall sell fresh and boneless flesh of beasts (mrigapasu deer or wild animal) just killed. If they sell bony flesh, they shall give an equivalent compensation (pratipákam)” [P. 138].

There is no ban on slaughter of cows, however, “cattle such as a calf, a bull, or a milch cow shall not be slaughtered…The flesh of animals which have been killed outside the slaughter-house (parisúnam), headless, legless and boneless flesh, rotten flesh, and the flesh of animals which have suddenly died shall not be sold. Otherwise, a fine of 12 panas shall be imposed [Pgs. 138-39]”.

People are allowed to keep stock of dried flesh, skins, tendons (snáyu)…in such quantities as can be enjoyed for years together without feeling any want. Of such collection, old things shall be replaced by new ones when received. [P. 55]

Referring to different kinds of animals, Arthsastra decrees: “When an animal dies a natural death, they shall surrender the skin with the brand mark, if it is a cow or a buffalo; the skin together with the ear (karnalakshanam) if it is a goat or sheep; the tail with the skin containing the brand mark, if it is an ass or a camel; the skin, if it is a young one; besides the above, (they shall also restore) the fat (vasti), bile, marrow (snáyu), teeth, hoofs, horns, and bones. They (the cowherds) may sell either fresh flesh or dried flesh.” [P. 147]

Kautilya’s cities were not inhabited by vegetarian folks as we find that the chapter ‘Building within the Fort’ allots sites for flesh traders; “To the south, the superintendents of the city, of commerce, of manufactories, and of the army as well as those who trade in cooked rice, liquor, and flesh, besides prostitutes, musicians, and the people of Vaisya caste shall live.” [P. 54]

The chapter titled ‘Superintendent of Store-House’ [p. 101] assigns a duty of collecting taxes/recovery of past arrears to the superintendent from dealers of ‟Clarified butter, oil, serum of flesh, and pith or sap (of plants, etc.)…Dried fish, bulbous roots (kándamúla), fruits and vegetables form the group of edibles (sakavarga)”. [Pgs. 102-103]

The same chapter while dealing with the contents of each meal of an ARYA, low Castes, women and children states: “For dressing twenty palas of flesh, [1000 palas make one tula] half a kutumba of oil, one pala of salt, one pala of sugar (kshára), two dharanas of pungent substances (katuka, spices), and half a prastha of curd (will be necessary). For dressing greater quantities of flesh, the same ingredients can be proportionally increased. For cooking sákas (dried fish and vegetables), the above substances are to be added one and a half times as much. For dressing dried fish, the above ingredients are to be added twice as much.” [P. 105]

Under the head ‘Superintendent of Cows’ the boss has the authority of classifying “cattle as calves, steers, tamable ones, draught oxen, bulls that are to be trained to yoke, bulls kept for crossing cows, cattle that are fit only for the supply of flesh…” [P. 146] According to Chanakya, “When an animal dies a natural death, they shall surrender the skin with the brand mark, if it is a cow or a buffalo; the skin together with the ear (karnalakshanam) if it is a goat or sheep; the tail with the skin containing the brand mark, if it is an ass or a camel; the skin, if it is a young one; besides the above, (they shall also restore) the fat (vasti), bile, marrow (snáyu), teeth, hoofs, horns, and bones. They (the cowherds) may sell either fresh flesh or dried flesh.” [P. 147]

It may be shocking for many animal lovers that the feed for bulls apart from including grass one tulá (100 palas) of oil cakes, 10 ádhakas of bran, 5 palas of salt (mukhalavanam), one kudumba of oil for rubbing over the nose (nasya), 1 prastha of drink (pána) added one tulá of flesh in the daily diet. [P. 148] Daily diet for horse included “50 palas of flesh”. [P. 150]

Likewise, the rations for an elephant (of a specific height) includes “50 palas of flesh” and elephant, watchmen, sweepers, cooks and others shall receive apart from cooked rice, a handful of oil, sugar and salt 10 palas of flesh. [Pgs. 155-158]

The chapter dealing with ‘Remedies against National Calamities’ prescribes a non-vegetarian remedy by stating “Persons acquainted with the rituals of the Atharvaveda, and experts in sacred magic and mysticism shall perform such ceremonials as ward off the danger from demons. On full-moon days the worship of Chaityas may be performed by placing on a verandah offerings such as an umbrella, the picture of an arm, a flag, and some goat’s flesh”. [P. 239]

The Arthashastra makes it clear that tax was collected on flesh. “They (the king’s employees) may demand of cultivators one-fourth of their grain, and one-sixth of forest produce (vanya) and of such commodities as cotton, wax, fabrics, barks of trees, hemp, wool, silk, medicines, sandal, flowers, fruits, vegetables, firewood, bamboos, flesh, and dried flesh.” [P. 274]

The animal flesh/serum was used as medicines/remedies also. “When the body of a man is smeared over with the serum of the flesh of a frog, it burns with fire (with no hurt)…When the body of a man is smeared over with the above serum as well as with the oil extracted from the fruits of kusa (ficus religiosa), and ámra (mango tree), and when the powder prepared from an ocean frog (samdura mandúki), phenaka (sea-foam), and sarjarasa (the juice of vatica robusta) is sprinkled over the body, it burns with fire (without being hurt). When the body of a man is smeared over with sesamum oil mixed with equal quantities of the serum of the flesh of a frog, crab, and other animals, it can burn with fire (without hurt)…paste prepared from the roots of páribhadraka (erythrina indica), pratibala , vanjula (a kind of ratan or tree), vajra (andropogon muricatum or euphorbia), and kadali (banana), mixed with the serum of the flesh of a frog, can walk over fire (without hurt). Oil should be extracted from the paste prepared from the roots of pratibala, vanjula and páribhadraka, all growing near water, the paste being mixed with the serum of the flesh of a frog. Having anointed one’s legs with this oil, one can walk over a white-hot mass of fire as though on a bed of roses. The paste prepared from the powder of the rib-bone of náraka (?), a donkey, kanka (a kind of vulture), and bhása (a bird), mixed with the juice of water-lily, is applied to the legs of bipeds and quadrupeds (while making a journey). The fat or serum derived from roasting a pregnant camel together with saptaparna (lechites scholaris) or from roasting dead children in cremation grounds, is applied to render a journey of a hundred yojanas easy. [Pgs. 458-60.]

Restrictions

“King should prohibit the slaughter of animals for half a month during the period of Cháturmásya (from July to September), for four nights during the full moon, and for a night on the day of the birth-star of the conqueror or of the national star. He should also prohibit the slaughter of females and young ones (yonibálavadham) as well as castration. Having abolished those customs or transactions which he might consider either as injurious to the growth of his revenue and army or as unrighteous, he should establish righteous transactions.” [P. 449.]

Beef Eating Essential for Brahmins in ancient (early) India

Swami Vivekananda, regarded as a philosopher of Hindutva by the RSS, while addressing a meeting at the Shakespeare Club, Pasadena, California, USA (February 2, 1900) on the theme of ‘Buddhistic India’, declared:

“You will be astonished if I tell you that, according to old ceremonials, he is not a good Hindu who does not eat beef. On certain occasions he must sacrifice a bull and eat it.”

[Vivekananda, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, vol. 3 (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1997), P. 536.]

He further stated that without eating beef, “no Brahmin could remain a Brahmin; you read in the Vedas how, when a Sannyasin [a Hindu religious mendicant], a king, or a great man came into house, the best bullock was killed…” [Ibid., P. 174.]

This is corroborated by other research works sponsored by the Ramakrishna Mission established by Vivekananda. According to C. Kunhan Raja, a prominent authority on the history and culture of the Vedic period:

“The Vedic Aryans, including the Brahmanas, ate fish, meat and even beef. A distinguished guest was honoured with beef served at a meal. Although the Vedic Aryans ate beef, milch cows were not killed. One of the words that designated cow was aghnya (what shall not be killed). But a guest was a goghna (one for whom a cow is killed). It is only bulls, barren cows and calves that were killed.”

[Raja, C. Kunhan, Vedic Culture‟, cited in the series, Suniti Kumar Chatterji and others (eds.), The Cultural Heritage of India, vol. 1 (Calcutta: The Ramakrishna Mission, 1993), P. 217.]

Kunhan Raja countering the myth of vegetarian Hinduism stated:

“The Grhya Sutras prescribe different kinds of meat to be given to be given to children at the first feeding ceremony, for different results. Mutton, flesh of different kinds of birds, and other forms of meat were freely eaten by the higher Castes in those days, and still they were the most spiritual nation in the world.” [Ibid.]

One of the greatest researchers, scholar and an authority on Indian politics, religions and culture Dr. BR Ambedkar produced a brilliant essay on the subject titled ‘Did the Hindus Never Eat Beef?’

All those who are really interested in understanding the ‘Hindu Past’ must read this monumental work of Dr. Ambedkar. After studying a large number of Vedic and Hindu scriptures, he arrived at the conclusion that,

“when the learned Brahmins argue that the Hindus not only never ate beef but they always held the cow to be sacred and were always opposed to the killing of the cow, it is impossible to accept their view”.

[Ambedkar, B. R., ‘Did the Hindus never eat beef?’ in The Untouchables: Who Were They and Why They Became Untouchables? in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, vol. 7, (Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1990, first edition 1948) Pgs 323-328.]

Also see the scholarly work by Professor DN Jha, The Myth of the Holy Cow, link: https://archive.org/details/TheMythOfHolyCowJha]

Interestingly, the findings of Ambedkar were that cows were sacrificed and beef consumed because COWS were HOLY.

According to Ambedkar:

“It was not that the cow was not sacred in Vedic times, it was because of her sacredness that it is ordained in the Vajasaneyi Samhita that beef should be eaten.” (Dharma Shastra Vichar in Marathi, Pg. 180). That the Aryans of the Rig Veda did kill cows for purposes of food and ate beef is abundantly clear from the Rig Veda itself. In Rig Veda (X. 86.14) Indra says: ‘They cook for one 15 plus twenty oxen’. The Rig Veda (X.91.14) says that for Agni were sacrificed horses, bulls, oxen, barren cows and rams. From the Rig Veda (X.72.6) it appears that the cow was killed with a sword or axe.”

Ambedkar concluded this essay with the following words:

“With this evidence no one can doubt that there was a time when Hindus, both Brahmins and non-Brahmins, ate not only flesh but also beef.”

[Ibid., Pgs 323-328.]

Anandmath: Sanatan/Hindu Sena consuming flesh

Bankim Chandra Chatterjee is also a Rishi (Holy Teacher) for the RSS-BJP combine. This writer’s otherwise his pro-British novel, Anandmath, is another important (read holy) treatise for votaries of Hindu nationalism. A leader of Santan or Hindu army, Jivananda comes to visit her sister, Nimi who serves him, “some clean, jasmine-white rice, some tasteful dal, a curry of wild figs, some fish netted  [sic] from her own tank and some milk”.

[Sen-Gupta, Nares Chandra (translator Bankim Chandra Chatterjee’s Anandamath), Abbey of Bliss, Padmini Mohan Neogi, Calcutta, P. 65.]

India as a global beef exporter/powerhouse under Modi

India has quietly emerged as global beef powerhouse. The country now ranks as the world’s second-largest beef exporter earning nearly 3.8 billion dollars or around 34,177 crore rupees worth of this meat, annually. Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra,, and Andhra Pradesh account for the bulk of these exports with Uttar Pradesh alone contributing nearly 60% of India’s beef shipments.”

[“India Becomes World’s Second-Largest Beef Exporter Amid Cow Vigilante            Violence”, Jan 02, 2026, https://www.deshabhimani.com/deshabhimani-english -/national-76192/india-beef-exports-cow-vigilante-violence-48452]

Fisheries export

Vegetarian India is making great strides in exporting seafood too, to the world.

According to a Government of India (GOI) press release dated April 3, 2026

“India’s seafood exports have recorded strong and sustained growth, expanding at an average annual rate of 7% over the past 11 years. Marine product exports have more than doubled during the period, rising from ₹30,213 crore in 2013‑14 to ₹62,408 crore in 2024‑25, driven largely by shrimp exports valued at ₹43,334 crore. India’s seafood exports span a wide and diversified basket, with over 350 varieties of products shipped to nearly 130 global markets.” [https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2248721&reg=3&lang=1]

Unholy use of the waters of the Holy Ganga

Hindutva’s claim vis a vis Holy Mother Ganga must be taken not just with a pinch, but fistfuls of salt. According to Government of India data Ganga water is supplied to Delhi, Patna, Rajgir, Gaya, Bodhgaya, Bhagalpur, and Nawada (Bihar), Kanpur, Allahabad, Varanasi and several cities in Western UP, Haridwar (Uttarakhand), and Kolkata (West Bengal). This supply is not for fulfilling some religious duties but for all kinds of cleaning, washing and sanitary purposes.

How is this tolerated? Is it not high time for the courts to intervene?

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

Related:

Rewriting NCERT school textbooks: ‘Muslim Raj’ is a mere excuse, the project is to conceal historical facts

Unity not Hate: Commemorating the 168th anniversary of 1857 War of Independence

How Hindutva forces colluded with both the British & Jinnah against the historic ‘Quit India’ movement: Archives

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CJP stated in the complaints that the alleged hate speeches violated constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 15 and 21 and attracted offences under provisions relating to promotion of enmity between groups, criminal intimidation, statements conducing to public mischief, deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings, and incitement to violence.

The complaints concern speeches delivered in Chandivali and Malad Malvani in Mumbai, Kalyani in Nadia district of West Bengal, and Junnar in Pune district.

Complaint against Nitesh Narayan Rane over Chandivali speech: May 12, 2026

In a complaint dated May 12, 2026, addressed to Shri Nikhil Gupta, Additional Director General (Law & Order), Maharashtra, Addl. Commissioner of Police, West Region, Mumbai, and Senior Police Inspector, Sakinaka Police Station, Mumbai, CJP sought registration of an FIR against BJP MLA and Maharashtra Cabinet Minister Nitesh Narayan Rane for allegedly delivering a divisive communal speech during a Hindu convention held in Chandivali, Mumbai on May 3, 2026.

CJP stated in the complaint that Rane utilised dehumanising language against Muslims, spread conspiracy theories regarding “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” “Corporate Jihad,” and “Ghazwa-e-Hind,” and openly encouraged social and economic boycott of Muslims. The complaint alleged that the speech attempted to create fear and hostility by portraying Muslims as an existential threat to Hindus and India.

According to CJP, Rane repeatedly referred to Muslims as “green snakes” and urged the audience to confront them. The complaint reproduces the speech transcript, including the following statements:

“[They] should come to Maharashtra. This writhing of green snakes (referring to Muslims) must stop. That is why the saffron flag has been unfurled in Maharashtra, remember this.”

“And therefore, while moving around as a Hindu, do so with self-confidence. Move with courage. If any green snake is writhing here, take guidance from Tai and then give me a call.”

The complaint further stated that Rane repeatedly described India as a “Hindu Rashtra” and suggested that Muslims were attempting to convert India into an Islamic nation through organised conspiracies.

CJP also stated in the complaint that Rane attempted to create fear among Hindus by claiming that Muslims would prevent Hindu religious practices if their population increased.

The complaint reproduces the following statements:

“You won’t be able to perform puja in your home. This saffron flag won’t be able to fly here. You won’t be able to apply the Tilak on your forehead.”

“Mothers and sisters won’t be able to apply vermilion (Sindoor) on their heads.”

According to CJP, the speech also included references to alleged communal incidents in Palghar and Virar to reinforce hostility against Muslims. The complaint additionally highlighted Rane’s remarks calling for economic boycott of Muslims:

“So, when we are dealing with them, buying from them, or giving them jobs—first, if someone is sitting at a shop, even if the shop’s signboard says ‘Jay Shri Ram,’ sometimes Abdul is sitting inside.”

“First tell him, ‘Recite the Hanuman Chalisa for me first.’ If you recite the Hanuman Chalisa only then will I buy from you, otherwise I won’t.”

“Therefore, if jobs are to be given or purchases are to be made, it should only be for Hindus—this should be the stance of all of us.”

CJP stated in the complaint that these remarks amounted to explicit encouragement of discrimination and exclusion of citizens based on religion and constituted a direct appeal for economic boycott of Muslims.

A copy of complaint dated May 12, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Nitesh Rane over Malad Malvani speech during Ram Navami Yatra

In another complaint dated April 28, 2026, addressed to Maharashtra Police authorities, CJP sought registration of an FIR against Nitesh Narayan Rane over a speech delivered during the Ram Navami Yatra held in Malad Malvani, Mumbai, on March 26, 2026.

According to CJP, the speech promoted communal hostility, issued direct threats of violence, and attempted to alienate Muslims by declaring India a “Hindu Rashtra” and describing the locality as belonging exclusively to “saffron-clad” Hindus.

CJP stated in the complaint that Rane used references to “Pakistan” as a dog-whistle against Muslims and openly threatened those opposing Hindutva ideology.

The complaint reproduces the following portions of the speech:

“Perhaps some people here in Malvani have forgotten that this is our Hindu Rashtra, this is not someone’s Pakistan. If anyone tries to remove that saffron flag, we will not let their cylinder come up again. If anyone again looks at our saffron flag with dirty eyes, then their eyes will be taken out and played with like marbles.”

CJP alleged that these remarks amounted to open threats of violence and intimidation. The complaint further stated that Rane specifically directed slogans toward a mosque in the locality, thereby attempting to provoke confrontation and disturb communal harmony. The reproduced statement reads:

“That voice must reach the big mosque.”

According to CJP, such statements sought to intimidate the Muslim community and portray them as outsiders within the constitutional framework of India. The complaint also alleged that Rane invoked the authority of a “government with a Hindutva ideology” to suggest political backing for aggressive communal mobilisation.

A copy of complaint dated April 28, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Hari Mishra in West Bengal over hate speech during election campaign in Nadia

In a complaint dated May 6, 2026 addressed to the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police in Nadia district, West Bengal, CJP sought registration of an FIR under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, 352 and 353 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 against BJP leader Hari Mishra for a speech delivered during an election campaign in Kalyani, Nadia district, on April 23, 2026. CJP stated in the complaint that Mishra spread anti-Muslim conspiracy theories and falsely claimed that Hindu festivals could not be celebrated in Muslim-majority areas.

The complaint reproduces portions of the speech including:

“In any area where the Muslim population is above 30-35%, Saraswati Puja will not happen. In places like Malda and Murshidabad… you first have to take permission from the nearest mosque. A situation worse than Bangladesh is going to happen on the soil of West Bengal.”

CJP further alleged that Mishra falsely claimed that the Constitution of India did not function in parts of West Bengal. The reproduced transcript includes:

“The Constitution of India does not work in many parts of Malda and Murshidabad. In about 25-30% of the areas in Malda and Murshidabad, the Constitution, rules, laws, and regulations of India do not apply.”

The complaint also referred to statements linking demographic change with political exclusion: “The day Muslims reach above 40-45%, not a single Hindu MP, MLA, counselor, or chairman will remain in West Bengal.”

According to CJP, these remarks sought to portray Muslims as a threat to democratic institutions and communal coexistence and were intended to create fear and polarisation during the election period.

A copy of complaint dated May 6, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Harshu Thakur in Junnar, Pune over speech delivered at Virat Hindu Sammelan

In a separate complaint dated May 6, 2026, addressed to the Additional Director General (Law & Order), Maharashtra, the Superintendent of Police, Pune Rural, and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Junnar Division, CJP sought registration of an FIR against Harshu Thakur over a speech delivered at the Virat Hindu Sammelan held in Junnar, Pune district, on April 19, 2026. CJP stated in the complaint that Thakur spread anti-Muslim rhetoric through references to “Forest Jihad,” “Love Jihad,” and “Land Jihad,” while also making statements encouraging militarised responses and targeting Islamic institutions and burial practices.

The complaint reproduces the following statements:

“Wherever there is open land, there are graves. If you start funding madrasas, then only terrorists will be produced there. Mulla-Maulvis give them training on how to trap girls in ‘Love Jihad’ and how to carry out ‘Land Jihad’. They are taught how to make bombs.”

CJP further highlighted remarks targeting Muslim men and encouraging women to arm themselves:

“All these ‘Abduls’ are the same. Every Hindu woman just needs to be given a weapon.”

The complaint also alleged that Thakur attempted to frame Muslims as inherently violent while encouraging religious segregation and hostility.

A copy of complaint dated May 6, 2026 can be accessed here

Judicial precedents on which CJP relied upon

In the complaints submitted before police authorities in Maharashtra and West Bengal, CJP also relied upon multiple judicial precedents of the Supreme Court concerning hate speech, communal targeting, and the constitutional obligation of authorities to act against inflammatory rhetoric. Referring to the Supreme Court judgment in Firoz Iqbal Khan vs Union of India [W.P. (Civ.) No. 956 of 2020], CJP highlighted the Court’s observations that “the edifice of a democratic society committed to the rule of law under a regime of constitutional rights, values and duties is founded on the co-existence of communities. India is a melting pot of civilisations, cultures, religions and languages. Any attempt to vilify a religious community must be viewed with grave disfavour by this Court as the custodian of constitutional values.”

CJP stated that the speeches delivered by Nitesh Rane, Hari Mishra, and Harshu Thakur collectively portrayed Muslims as conspirators, outsiders, extremists, and demographic threats, thereby directly undermining constitutional values of equality, fraternity, and peaceful coexistence. The complaints further referred to Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India [AIR 2014 SC 1591], where the Supreme Court observed that “hate speech is an effort to marginalise individuals based on their membership to a group,” and warned that such speech can lay the groundwork for discrimination, ostracism, violence, and even genocide. CJP stated that the repeated references to “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” “Forest Jihad,” “Corporate Jihad,” alleged demographic conspiracies, and calls for economic boycott sought to institutionalise fear and hostility against Muslims and therefore warranted immediate criminal action.

The complaints additionally cited the Supreme Court’s order dated April 28, 2023 in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India [W.P. (C) No. 943 of 2021], wherein all States and Union Territories were directed to register suo moto FIRs against hate speech irrespective of religion whenever offences under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 505 IPC and related provisions are attracted.

Provisions related to hate speech under BNS, 2023

CJP further stated that the speeches attract multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, particularly Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, 352 and 353. According to the complaints, the repeated targeting of Muslim religious institutions, educational spaces, and social identity through references such as “green snakes,” “Forest Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” and allegations that madrasas produce “only terrorists” amounted to promoting enmity between religious groups and acts prejudicial to communal harmony under Section 196 BNS.

CJP stated that the speeches also made imputations against the constitutional allegiance of an entire community by portraying Muslims and Islamic institutions as threats to the State, thereby attracting Section 197 BNS. The complaints further alleged that mocking Dargahs, Mazars, burial practices, Islamic scholars, and Muslim religious practices constituted deliberate insults to religion and religious beliefs under Sections 299 and 302 BNS.

CJP additionally argued that the repeated calls for mobilisation, warnings regarding demographic change, threats of violence, references to arming civilians, and calls for economic boycott amounted to intentional provocation intended to breach public peace under Section 352 BNS and dissemination of false information likely to create fear and communal unrest under Section 353 BNS.

The complaints maintained that the speeches delivered across Mumbai, Pune, and Nadia reflected a continuing pattern of inflammatory communal rhetoric aimed at deepening religious polarisation and normalising hostility against Muslims, thereby necessitating immediate registration of FIRs and preventive intervention by the concerned police authorities in compliance with constitutional obligations and Supreme Court directives.

Maharashtra DGP circulars cited by CJP

CJP also referred to circulars issued by the Director General of Police, Maharashtra, in February and April 2023 concerning preventive and penal action against hate speech.

According to the complaint, Circular No. DGP 20/Petition No.940/2022/54.2023 dated February 2, 2023 highlighted the Supreme Court’s order dated January 13, 2023 directing police authorities to take suo motu action whenever speeches attract offences under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A and 505 IPC.

The circular had directed all Unit Commanders to follow the Supreme Court order and entails “measures to be taken to maintain law and order due to agitations, morchas, speeches etc.”

It gives detailed instructions on what steps are to be taken when any morchas are to be held:

“2. All the Unit Commanders should hold a meeting with the concerned organisers before such a morcha and fix the route of the morcha with appropriate terms and condition. A combined meeting of all social groups should be taken to convey clearly to all that they should maintain peace and keep law and order during the morcha. Preventive action against Anti-social elements should be taken. Those elements who help in maintaining peace and harmony should be encouraged. Audio Video recording of the morcha should be done. Police Head Quarters should ensure adequate supply of equipment’s, like Lathi, Helmets, etc. to police men deployed for morcha bandobast. If any law-and-order situation arises, offences should be registered immediately and arrest should be made. Intelligence machinery should be activated to collect advance information about morcha, agitation and efforts should be made to pre-empt any communal incidents.”

Supreme Court directions on preventing/prosecuting hate speakers

CJP further referred to multiple Supreme Court orders concerning hate speech and preventive policing. According to the complaints, on February 3, 2023, the Supreme Court issued directions regarding a proposed event by Sakal Hindu Samaj in Mumbai and directed that if permission was granted for the event, it would be subject to the condition that no hate speech would be delivered.

The court also outlined directives with respect to taking preventive action in such cases:

“We also direct that the Officer(s), in case, permission is granted and, in case, the occasion arises for invoking the power under Section 151 of Cr.P.C. as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the Officer(s) concerned to invoke the said power and to act as per the mandate of Section 151 of the Cr.P.C.” 

Even in 2024 itself, while on January 17, the Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta had expressed their anguish at the petitioners being forced to approach the Supreme Court multiple times against individuals and organisations even after there being guidelines for tacking and taking action against hate speeches. During the said hearing, the Supreme Court issued an order directing the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police at Yavatmal, Maharashtra and Raipur, Chhattisgarh to take ‘appropriate steps’ to ensure that no incitement to hate speech occurs at the rallies scheduled in the said districts in the coming few days of January.

The said order was passed following the concerns raised by the petitioners over delivery of potential hate speeches at rallies planned by Hindu Janjagruti Samiti and Bharatiya Janata Party Legislator T Raja Singh in the month of January.

CJP stated that the court had outlined directives with respect to taking preventive action in such cases:

“We would require the authorities to be conscious that no incitement to violence and hate speech are permissible. The concerned District Magistrates and Superintendent of Police of Yavatmal, Maharashtra and Raipur, Chhattisgarh will take necessary steps, as may be required. If necessary and deemed appropriate, police/administration will install CCTV Cameras having recording facility, so as to ensure identification of the perpetrators in the event of any violence/hate speech.”

Background: Profile of Nitesh Rane and previous complaints filed by CJP

CJP stated in its complaints that the speeches delivered in Chandivali and Malad Malvani were not isolated incidents but formed part of a continuing pattern of inflammatory speeches allegedly delivered by Nitesh Rane across Maharashtra. According to CJP, the organisation had previously filed complaints dated March 7, March 18, and March 28, 2025 concerning speeches delivered by Rane in Sindhudurg, Pune, and Ratnagiri districts.

The complaints related to events including:

• “Hindu Rashtra Adhiveshan” in Kundal on February 8, 2025
• “Shivjanmostav” event in Sawantwadi on February 19, 2025
• Public felicitation programme at Nanijdham, Ratnagiri on February 20, 2025
• Religious gathering in Wagholi, Pune on February 5, 2025

CJP stated that across these events, Rane repeatedly invoked terms such as “Love Jihad” and “Land Jihad,” portrayed Muslims as a collective threat, and made statements capable of inciting hostility, fear, and social boycott against the Muslim community. The complaints further stated that such rhetoric, particularly when delivered by a sitting Cabinet Minister, was inflammatory, unsupported by evidence, and violative of constitutional protections.

FIRs and ongoing legal scrutiny against Nitesh Rane

Under the judicial oversight of the Bombay High Court in Aftab Siddique & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra (2024), multiple FIRs have already been registered against Nitesh Rane in connection with alleged hate speech cases. CJP reproduced details of these FIRs in its complaints and stated that they reflected a continuing pattern of communal speeches delivered by Rane in different parts of Maharashtra.

Mankhurd Police Station (C.R. No. 152/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane under Sections 153A, 503, 504 and 505 IPC. According to the complaint, this case originated from speeches perceived as threatening to the Muslim community and capable of inciting public disorder.

Ghatkopar Police Station (C.R. No. 521/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane and Subhash Ahir under Sections 153A, 504, 506 and 188 IPC in connection with inflammatory speeches delivered in Mumbai suburbs.

Kashimira Police Station (C.R. No. 259/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane and Geeta Jain in relation to the Mira-Bhayander incidents under Sections 153A, 153B, 143, 504 and 506 IPC along with Section 37(1) read with Section 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

Malwani Police Station (C.R. No. 298/2024)

Originally registered against Bhagwan Thakur, with Nitesh Rane later added as an accused under Sections 153A, 504 and 506 IPC in relation to speeches targeting specific religious communities.

CJP further pointed out that Nitesh Rane’s October 2024 election affidavit reportedly disclosed 38 FIRs registered against him, including 20 cases relating specifically to allegations of hate speech.

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Law as Resistance: A year of CJP’s interventions against a rising tide of hate

The post CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a memorandum submitted from its Ahmedabad office, the organisation cited media reports detailing incidents of arson, vandalism and damage across multiple locations in and around Dhandhuka. According to the complaint, shops and garages were damaged and set ablaze near Ranpur Circle and along Barwala Road, while vehicles were torched at Dholera tri-junction and Rudra Complex on Bagodara highway.

Incidents of stone pelting in residential areas such as Naseeb Society and attacks on establishments including Alpha Pan Parlour, Gajanan Restaurant and Ami Hotel were also reported. The memorandum further mentioned damage to transport offices, burning of trucks near Yakin Transport, and destruction at RMS Hospital premises. It also referred to alleged attempts to set fire to a cemetery and agricultural losses, including burning of garlic crops.

The MCC has urged authorities to act in accordance with Supreme Court guidelines on mob violence and lynching, particularly those laid down in the Tehseen S. Poonawalla vs Union of India, which mandate preventive, remedial and punitive measures by state authorities.

Mujahid Nafees, convenor of the MCC Gujarat, said there appeared to be “a specific group intent on disturbing peace and targeting properties belonging to Muslims,” and called for immediate intervention to restore law and order. He demanded a prompt assessment of damages by the revenue department and compensation for those affected, strict legal action against those involved in the violence, and action against individuals spreading inflammatory content on social media.

Dhandhuka, located in Ahmedabad district, has witnessed communal tensions in the past, including incidents that drew statewide attention and prompted heightened policing and surveillance. Authorities have not yet issued a detailed public statement on the latest developments, though local police are understood to have increased deployment in sensitive areas to prevent further escalation.

Courtesy: CounterView

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The recent criticism of Dhurandhar has pointed to a familiar pattern: the packaging of history into over-simplified narratives of Hindu valour and external threat. From naming its chief protagonists as Ajay Sanyal (a Brahmin), Sushant Sinha (a Bania), and Jaskirat Singh Rangi (a Jat Sikh), to misrepresenting administrative facts—such as portraying Prashant Kumar as Uttar Pradesh’s DGP during demonetisation instead of Javeed Ahmad—the film reveals which identities the right wing chooses to glorify and which it side-lines or obscures.

Yet such distortions are not merely about religious conservatism or anti-Muslim polarisation. They also perform a quieter function—re-inscribing Brahminical authority over knowledge and legitimising the capitalist dominance of mercantile communities, even as they mobilise broader Hindu identities against Muslims while exacerbating caste fissures among non-Brahmin non-Bania communities. In this sense, Hindutva deploys distorted or fabricated history to divert attention from governance failures or to manufacture social conflict.

Controversies on History to serve corporate interests

On December 22, while addressing a Bhil audience, BJP veteran and Punjab Governor Gulab Chand Kataria passed remarks about Maharana Pratap that were widely seen as condescending—ironically invoking a figure the BJP has long used for emotive mobilisation. He was criticised by Rajkumar Roat of the Bhartiya Adivasi Party, who stressed Pratap’s enduring place in Adivasi historical memory.

Unease has also surfaced within the BJP’s broader ecosystem. On January 2, speaking at an event attended by Rajnath Singh, Vishvaraj Singh Mewar cautioned for an end to the political misuse of history.

Kataria’s comments also carried a political subtext in a region where mining interests are largely controlled by Jain and Agrawal business groups, while tribal-agrarian communities like Bhils and Rajputs dominate demographically yet bear the disproportionate ecological and social costs. Together, Roat’s direct criticism and Mewar’s measured appeal signal growing discomfort with the appropriation of tribal and agrarian histories to serve entrenched economic and political interests.

Crucially, the RSS–BJP project today goes beyond appropriation. It increasingly involves the active invention of Hindu warriors, the rebranding of historical dynasties, and their institutionalisation through social media, popular literature, and state-backed infrastructure.

Understanding this is essential to grasp how both Hindutva and caste-based parties are together reshaping North India along caste-communal lines while steadily eroding historical literacy and public intelligence.

The Hindutva Factory of Manufactured History 

While the RSS and its Maharashtrian leadership have enlisted sympathetic scholars to sanitise figures like Savarkar and produce grand panegyrics—through novels and high-budget films—on Shivaji, Sambhaji, and the Peshwas, the Hindutva ecosystem has simultaneously generated a stream of previously unknown “historical” figures in North India. These fabrications are deployed to exploit caste fault lines and deliberately flatten historical consciousness among targeted communities.

In recent years, BJP-aligned platforms have circulated stories of King Sudhanwa Chauhan, an alleged ruler of Mahishmati said to have governed an empire larger than that of the historical Chauhansthat of the historical Chauhans of Ajmer–Sambhar, and portrayed as a disciple of Adi Shankaracharya. Other inventions include Kirandevi, claimed to have threatened Akbar with a dagger in a Meena Bazaar for his alleged misdeeds.

None of these figures are supported by inscriptions, chronicles, or even local oral traditions. By contrast, owing to long periods of political dominance—comparable to the Mughals or the Sikhs—the Rajput past is unusually well documented across Hindu, Islamic, and Sikh sources, making such fabrications relatively easy to expose. The scholarly rejection of the sixteenth-century Prithviraj Raso by figures such as G.H. Ojha, Namvar Singh, and Cynthia Talbot, in favour of the contemporaneous Prithviraj Vijaya Mahākāvya by Jayanaka, illustrates this point. As Cynthia Talbot notes, despite more than a century of scholarly dismissal, claims of the Raso’s twelfth-century authenticity persist in popular culture.

The real targets of this strategy are communities that lacked sustained political dominance and now seek a martial or regal past in the absence of historical records.

A Galaxy of Fiction against Phule–Ambedkarism 

Manoshi Sinha Rawal’s 2019 book Saffron Swords, published by Garuda Prakashan also mainstreamed several such fabrications by presenting unsubstantiated valour tales as authentic history.

Endorsed by RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat, Ratan Sharda, and Union minister Kiren Rijiju, the book exemplifies how myth is laundered into legitimacy. Among the promoted figures are Rampyari Gujjari, Jograj Singh Gujar, and Harvir Singh Gulia, who allegedly mobilised an army of 40,000 in western Uttar Pradesh and defeated Timur-i-Lang—who is even claimed to have died from wounds inflicted by Harvir Singh Gulia. This narrative was publicly echoed by then Vice-President Jagdeep Dhankhar. When Alt News sought scholarly verification, historian Heramb Chaturvedi dismissed the claim as “absolutely absurd.”

The correlation between such martial myth-making among landed castes and rising anti-Dalit violence in western Uttar Pradesh cannot be ignored. These narratives offer a fragile sense of caste superiority within the Brahminical Varna (caste) framework, deflecting attention from structural inequality while undermining solidarities forged through Phule-Ambedkarite politics.

Progress for the Rich, Pride for the Poor & Erasure of Muslim Past

Hindutva’s historical fabrication increasingly materialises through state infrastructure. In July last year, Yogi Adityanath unveiled a forty-foot bronze statue of Raja Suheldev Rajbhar in Bahraich. The Caravan has documented how the BJP and Hindu Yuva Vahini mobilised Rajbhar OBCs through Suheldev’s legacy, further popularised by Amish Tripathi’s novel Legend of Suheldev (2020).

Yet the Sangh Parivar’s engagement with Suheldev is older. In 2003, a dubious text, Tulsī Dohā Śatak, was promoted by Rambhadracharya—later debunked by Namvar Singh—as falsely attributing temple destruction narratives to Tulsidas. No eleventh-century inscriptions of the Gaharwar or Kalchuri dynasties, which dominated the region, mention any ruler named Suheldev. His first appearance occurs in the seventeenth-century Mirat-i-Sikandari, where he is depicted not as a benevolent king but as an oppressive Hindu ruler. Thus, a fictional oppressive ruler is reinterpreted in later narratives as a historical Rajbhar king to draw OBCs away from Jatav-led Bahujan politics.

Similar processes are visible elsewhere. In 2000, India Post issued a stamp commemorating Maharaja Bijli Pasi, inaccurately presenting him as a contemporary of Prithviraj Chauhan. Prof. Badri Narayan analysed such inventions in Inventing Caste History. More recently, the Yogi government renamed Nihalgarh railway station—named after the town’s  Nihal Khan, a Bhale Sultan chief—as Maharaja Bijli Pasi station.

Lucknow’s founding is variously attributed in official narratives to Lakshman, Lakhan Ahir, or Lakhan Pasi. As Sunita Sinha observes, this competitive deployment of “caste regal histories” by BJP responds to BSP’s Ambedkar Parks by substituting emancipatory politics with symbolic pride. This is approved with resounding applause by RSS leadership who have themselves promoted such works by likes of Bijay Sonkar Shastri.

These narrative interventions are not merely ideological; they are anchored in networks of patronage and publishing historically dominated by mercantile capital, which shapes both what histories are amplified and which identities are valorised.

Kshatriyaisation: From Arya Samaj to RSS 

As early as 1907, Denzil Ibbetson described the Arya Samaj as a movement with strong political tendencies, rooted in shared interests of middle-class Brahmins and urban mercantile castes, and aimed at reshaping rural landed communities, which coexisted as both Hindus and Muslims. While Hindu–Muslim solidarities fractured, Hindu rural castes were also pitted against one another through competing Kshatriya claims—a project inherited and expanded by the RSS.

Writing in Hans (March 1998), cultural critic Rajendra Yadav argued that landed OBCs sought Kshatriya status within the Varna system, not its dismantling, limiting the scope of caste transformation. Kshatriya history offers an easily appropriable symbolic resource for this which can be “gifted” to landed OBCs in exchange for collaboration towards Brahminical institutional and Bania capitalist hegemony.

The project of Kshatriyaisation has historically involved linking diverse castes to Puranic mythological figures or retroactively assigning them Rajput history and figures. For centuries, Brahmins and Banias functioned as the principal gatekeepers of Hindu mythological and historical narratives—largely enabled by royal patronage across regimes, irrespective of whether the ruling elites were Rajputs, Mughals, Marathas, Afghans, or Jats.

With the dissolution of the princely states and the consequent de-institutionalisation of the Rajput masses, the Brahmin–Bania intellectual elite decisively became gatekeepers defining Rajput history and identity itself. This monopoly over historical narration endowed them with at least two significant socio-political powers within public discourse.

First, through selective manipulation and strategic cherry picking of Rajput history, they could simultaneously vilify Muslims and shame Rajputs for past Rajput alliances with Muslim rulers —, thus imposing upon them a perpetual burden of dharm-raksha. Second, this control enabled the reassignment of Rajput kingship and symbols of martial legitimacy to other dominant castes, such as Jats or Gujjars, often in exchange for political alignment against both Muslims and Rajputs.

For instance, in Rajasthan, the projection of the uncorroborated Jhunjhar Singh Nehra serves to displace Nawab Mohammad Khan’s historical role as Jhunjhunu’s founder. Similarly, official claims attributing Churu’s founding to a Chuhru Jat lack contemporary evidence, while the erasure of local Muslim history continues to marginalise living communities. What unfolded at Rajasthan’s Gogamedi shrine recently exemplifies this.

At one seminar, Kapil Kapoor asserted that Emperor Harsha was a Jat, while Hindutva platforms routinely project Alexander’s contemporary King Porus and Yashodharman, a 6^th century ruler of Central India,  as Jat rulers—replicating Arya Samaj strategies of Vedic Kshatriyaisation.

The most contentious claims concern the Gujjars. Attempts to “Kshatriya-ise” them link early medieval Rajput dynasties to Gujjar origins. In 1997, NH-24 was renamed Gurjar Samrat Mihir Bhoj Marg, and in 2010, a statue at Akshardham identified Mihir Bhoj as a “Gurjar Samrat.” Right-wing political scientist Meenakshi Jain and archaeologist K.K. Mohammed have advanced similar claims, despite their refutation by Prof. Shantarani Sharma in Indian Historical Review.

In Fractured Forest, Quartzite City, Thomas Crowley notes that Gujjar history has been “retrofitted, made into a glorious (if doomed) struggle against vicious outsiders,” In his dissertation , Frank Charles Spaulding highlighted that “there were no traditions, written, oral or otherwise, among the Gujjars to suggest the existence of this medieval kingdom and of the contemporary Gujars’ link to it” (pg. 74), hinting at their recent origins. These competitive claims by Jats and Gujjars over Rajput dynasties, engineered first by the Arya Samaj and later by the RSS, have only fractured agrarian unity rather than empowering marginalised groups.

Conclusion

While Hindutva’s historical revisionism primarily fuels anti-Muslim polarisation, it also functions to manage Hindu society—countering Dalit-Bahujan movements, fragmenting agrarian solidarity, and substituting governance with spectacle. The manufacture of history has become an ideological crutch for policy failure, deepening caste and communal fractures while hollowing historical consciousness itself. In this process, history is reduced from a means of understanding the past into an instrument of control, competition, and political distraction.

(The author is a mechanical engineer and an independent commentator on history and politics, with a particular focus on Rajasthan. His work explores the syncretic exchanges of India’s borderlands as well as contemporary debates on memory, identity and historiography)

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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Rajasthan: Gogamedi, a Rajput-Muslim shrine and the politics of communal capture

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