Dozens of protesters from the Christian community marched to Kolkata’s Esplanade on Thursday (November 5, 2026) in protest against the rising cases of mob attacks on churches across West Bengal.  Thereafter, a mega-prayer rally was called by the Bangiya Chirstiya Parishad at Rani Rashmoni Road in Esplanade on Sunday (November 1, 2026). A sea of people from Kolkata and surrounding districts walked from Sealdah, Birla Planetarium, and Howrah to gather there and express their dissent over the rapid attacks.

“An unprecedented crisis has brought us together today at this prayer gathering in Kolkata. Over the past five months, coordinated attacks, vandalism, and atrocities targeting prayer meetings, worship centres, and churches have been taking place relentlessly across various districts,” said Herod Mullick, state secretary of BCP.

SabrangIndia had reported on the terror generated by local outfits of the Bajrang Dal against the Christian community in October 2026. This report may be read here.

Media has reported that at least 48 such incidents have been reported since May across the state since the far right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) “swept to power”. The elections have been contentitious however as allegations of mass voter exclusion under the controversial Special Intensive Revision (SIR) have been before, during and after the 2026 elections, been proven.

Despite 48 incidents being documented, however, the first information reports could be lodged in only 15 cases. Out of the 48 targeted churches, 7 belong to mainline denominations—6 Catholic and 1 Church of North India (CNI). Mr. Mullick has told the media that the central allegation levelled against the community is ‘forced conversion’. He said it is a ‘false narrative’ deliberately used only to frame peaceful Christian prayer gatherings as illegal conversion events.

“Our repeated appeals to the Chief Minister to uncover the truth remain unheeded, while miscreants who take the law into their own hands operate with complete impunity. While the victims have chosen forgiveness and you have continued to pray in silent endurance, the reality on the ground remains grim,” he added.

He also addressed the deep anxiety among the Christian community in Bengal over the upcoming Christmas festival in December. He said that the people are scared to celebrate any event or even to step out due to these recent incidents. However, Mr. Mullick assured them that the organisation is speaking to the administration and the dialogue seems positive.

Seeking a “constructive way forward”, a five-member delegation of the BCP also met the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) State Head, Dr. Jishnu Basu, on Wednesday. “Dr. Basu firmly assured us that attacks or vandalism on places of worship are entirely unacceptable and cannot be justified under any circumstances. He committed to personally taking up this matter with the CM,” he said.

The development comes only four days after a newly erected church at Basanti in South 24 Parganas was vandalised by a violent mob belonging to some Hindu outfits. Several priests and also the Bishop of the church have been injured during the incident.

A similar incident also took place at a prayer meeting in Malda’s Harishchandrapur on the same day. However, nobody was injured in this incident. Another under-construction church was also vandalised by a mob on July 5 at Subhashgram in South 24 Parganas.

Archbishop Joseph D’Souza, the President of the All India Christian Council and National Federation of Churches, Bishop Shyamal Bose, Bishop Nirmal Gomes, Bishop Subodh Mondal, Rev. Samaresh Naik from the National Council of Baptist Churches, Odisha, and representatives of Churches and Organisations from Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland were also present at Thursday’s (November 4, 2026) mega prayer rally.

“Attacks on the Christians are not new. We have been victims of such religious oppression historically. We must stand together against such barbarism unleashed on the Christian community. We are all the children of God, and he shall protect us. Our fight will continue,” said Mr. D’Souza, addressing the rally, according to media reports.

Meanwhile, a separate rally was also held at Basanti, where a newly constructed protestant church was attacked by a group of people on its inaugural day. The local Christian people marched to the local BDO office and submitted a memorandum demanding swift action against the culprits.

Related:

Christian families assaulted, humiliated and forced into Durga Puja rituals in West Bengal village

The post West Bengal: Outpour of anguish from the Christian community over recent attacks on churches appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“A Hindu should only buy from a Hindu. We should only do business with Hindus,” Rane declared at the launch of the HARHAR (Hindu Association of Restaurants, Hotels, Aahar & Refreshments) campaign in Jui Nagar. In a video shared on his official X account, he called on Hindus to ensure that the person they traded with was Hindu, presenting this religious test to strengthen a Hindu Rashtra.

आज जुईनगर, नवी मुंबई येथे HARHAR (Hindu Association of Restaurants, Hotels, Aahar & Refreshments) या मोहिमेच्या शुभारंभ सोहळ्यास उपस्थित राहिलो.

हिंदू उद्योजकांना एकत्र आणून त्यांच्या व्यवसायाला आर्थिक बळ, व्यापक बाजारपेठ आणि नवी संधी उपलब्ध करून देणारा हा उपक्रम निश्चितच कौतुकास्पद आहे.

‘हिंदूंकडून खरेदी, हिंदू व्यापाराला प्रोत्साहन’ या संकल्पनेतून हिंदू उद्योजकता, भारतीय खाद्यसंस्कृती आणि स्वावलंबनाला अधिक बळ देऊया.

संघटित हिंदू समाज, सक्षम हिंदू उद्योजक आणि समृद्ध हिंदू अर्थव्यवस्था हेच आपले ध्येय!

HARHAR मोहिमेस मनःपूर्वक शुभेच्छा!

#HARHAR #HinduEntrepreneurs #HinduUnity #स्वावलंबीभारत #NiteshRane

— Nitesh Rane (@NiteshNRane) October 24, 2026

He then directed this call for economic exclusion towards the Nashik Kumbh Mela, demanding that Muslims not be allowed to set up shops at the gathering. His rhetoric escalated into an outright threat: “If Muslims come to the Kumbh Mela, they should not go back on their feet.”

This is not a call for self-reliance. It is a call for exclusion, backed by the threat of violence. A minister advocating that citizens refuse to trade with fellow citizens because of their religion, while warning of physical harm to those who attend a public religious gathering, raises concerns that cannot be brushed aside as political rhetoric or community mobilisation. In a separate video shared by news agency IANS, Rane referred to vandalism in France, claiming that Muslim-owned shops had been spared. He used this account to reinforce his demand that Hindus verify the religious identity of those with whom they conduct business.

“When you buy things, do business, or engage in trade, you must ensure that the person in front of you is a Hindu before moving forward,” he said. He also asserted that a country with a Hindu majority did not need any certificate to be a Hindu Rashtra.

Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra: Minister Nitesh Rane says, “During all those riots and vandalism, the moment they realized a shop belonged to a Muslim, they didn’t break it. They immediately moved to the next shop and continued their vandalism. When you buy things, do business, or engage in trade, you must ensure that the person in front of you is a Hindu before moving forward. That is why I am telling you this. This is how our Hindu Rashtra will be strengthened. In a country where 90% of the population is Hindu, we don’t need any certificate to be a Hindu Rashtra…”

(Source: Nitesh Rane PR Team)

— IANS (@ians_india) October 24, 2026

The logic is stark: Muslims are to be treated not as fellow citizens participating in the economy, but as people from whom Hindus must withdraw their custom, business and trust.

An economic boycott dressed up as entrepreneurship

HARHAR was presented as an initiative to bring Hindu entrepreneurs in the food and hospitality sectors together, expand their markets and strengthen their businesses. There is nothing objectionable about entrepreneurs organising around shared interests, promoting domestic products or preserving food traditions. But these legitimate objectives cannot be used to sanitise a campaign that explicitly calls for Muslims to be excluded from economic life.

As reported by The Free Press Journal, Swami Vigyananand, joint general secretary of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and founder of the World Hindu Foundation, identified food imports, the alleged dominance of Muslims in certain sectors and the popularity of foreign brands as obstacles to creating a Hindu food ecosystem. Restaurateur Sachin Shetty spoke of building a network of Hindu entrepreneurs and restoring Hindu dominance in the fruit supply chain. Although Shetty reportedly clarified that he did not want Muslim traders thrown out, the language of restoring religious dominance sits uneasily alongside the stated aim of building an inclusive and prosperous economy.

Rane, however, left little room for ambiguity. Hindu traders, he insisted, should sell only to Hindus, while Hindu consumers should purchase only from Hindu shopkeepers, including during Diwali. The issue is not whether Hindu businesses deserve support; they do. The issue is why that support must be built on the exclusion of Muslims.

Economic self-reliance is about strengthening domestic production, supporting small enterprises, improving supply chains and creating livelihoods. A religious boycott does none of this by definition. It instead seeks to turn everyday transactions into tests of religious loyalty, casting Muslim traders as people whose businesses should be avoided simply because they are Muslim.

Rane also invoked allegations of “love jihad”, “land jihad”, “halal jihad” and “corporate jihad”, claiming that money earned through business with Muslims was being used for “jihad” against Hindus. He urged people to stop buying from Muslims and portrayed ordinary commercial relationships as a potential source of danger. These sweeping allegations were offered as justification for collective economic punishment, without credible evidence presented at the gathering to establish the claims.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Hindutva Watch (@hindutvawatchin)

The consequence of this rhetoric is to transform an ordinary act of buying or selling into a communal choice. A trader’s religion becomes a reason to distrust them; a customer’s religion becomes a condition for serving them. The economic boycott is presented as solidarity, while the people targeted by it are made to bear the cost of that solidarity.

When exclusion becomes a political objective

The demand to exclude Muslim vendors from the Nashik Kumbh Mela makes the stakes even clearer. Organisers and authorities may establish rules for licensing, sanitation, safety and the management of commercial spaces. But demanding a blanket ban on Muslim traders because of their religion raises fundamental questions about equal treatment and the right to earn a livelihood.

The threat that Muslims attending the Kumbh Mela should not return on their feet is especially grave. It goes beyond advocating a boycott or expressing hostility. It invokes physical violence against people based on religious identity. Coming from a serving minister, such language demands public scrutiny rather than being dismissed as a provocative flourish.

The constitutional implications are equally important. Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution establish guarantees of equality before the law and protection against state discrimination on grounds including religion. Their application to specific private transactions or the rules governing a particular religious gathering depends on the circumstances. But the larger democratic principle is unmistakable: religious identity cannot be turned into a general licence to threaten citizens or demand their exclusion from public life.

What is being advanced in the name of Hindu entrepreneurship is a much more consequential proposition: that Hindus should withdraw economic support from Muslims, that Muslim traders should be excluded from a major religious gathering, and that Muslims who attend should face intimidation. This is not simply a debate about food culture or domestic industry. It is a demand to organise economic and public life along religious lines.

The question raised by Rane’s remarks is not whether Hindus should support Hindu entrepreneurs. It is whether that support should be weaponised into a campaign against Muslim livelihoods and accompanied by threats of violence. In a constitutional democracy, the answer must begin with a basic principle: no citizen should have to fear exclusion from economic life, or threats to their physical safety, because of their religion.

Related:

“Festivals Must Be Fun. Not Vehicles of Hate” | Teesta Setalvad

‘Abandon Christianity or Face Consequences’: Christian families face three days of violence in Bengal

Dalit Class XI student dies by suicide after alleged casteist harassment in Coimbatore

‘Free the Temple’, ‘Defend the Faith’, ‘Take Up Weapons’: How festivals became vehicles for anti-Muslim hate in September

The post Economic Boycott as Hindu Solidarity: BJP leader Nitesh Rane calls for Muslims to be shut out appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The attacks, reported by The Indian Express, took place under Chandrakona police station limits on October 18, 19 and 20, amid allegations that the families had faced sustained harassment for embracing Christianity. The assailants allegedly threatened to kill them, burn their homes and force them to renounce their faith. Despite the families approaching the police, the intimidation continued for three days before a formal First Information Report (FIR) was registered on October 20.

Thirteen people have been named in the FIR. As reported by The Indian Express on October 23, no arrests had been made at the time of publication, although police personnel had been deployed near the families’ homes.

Women assaulted, clothes torn; families threatened over their faith

Lakshmi Mondal, one of the victims, told The Wire that the harassment intensified on October 16, when a group allegedly threatened the Christian families with consequences unless they abandoned their religion. Two days later, the threats escalated into physical violence.

Recounting the assault, Lakshmi said she was struck below her ear by Ranjit Dolui and lost consciousness. When she partially regained consciousness, she could feel people removing her sari and tearing her blouse. She subsequently learnt that Dolui, Pocha Patra and Bapi Mondal had allegedly stripped and assaulted her.

The attackers allegedly splashed water on her face to revive her before pouring water over her body in front of onlookers, chanting “Jai Shri Ram” and declaring that she had been purified. Lakshmi said she was left lying on the floor of her home in that condition. The group also allegedly took away a Bible kept in the house.

The violence was accompanied by explicit threats against her family. According to Lakshmi’s account to The Wire, the assailants threatened to rape her Class X daughter and burn the family alive if they refused to abandon Christianity and return to Hinduism. The group allegedly attacked the homes of two other Christian families, including that of Saraswati Mondal and her husband, Ashok Mondal. Saraswati’s 15-year-old daughter was allegedly subjected to an attempt to strangle her, according to the family.

The account provided by a 40-year-old victim to The Indian Express corroborated the allegations of assault and forced religious purification. She said that on October 18, a group dragged her and her husband out of their home, beat them and tore her clothes before making her consume Tulsi and Bel leaves and pouring water over her as a purification ritual.

The allegations point to more than physical violence. The victims describe being publicly humiliated and subjected to rituals intended to undermine their religious identity, in an apparent attempt to force them to abandon a faith they say they had adopted voluntarily.

Forced to offer anjali at Durga Puja pandal

The attacks allegedly continued on October 19, when members of the group forced the families to participate in Hindu religious rituals. Lakshmi told The Wire that Madan Manna and Bappaditya Chatterjee, who were allegedly part of the previous day’s assault, took her and her husband, Tapan Mondal, along with Saraswati and her husband, Gopal Mondal, to a Durga Puja pandal in Dangal.

“They took us there against our will and forced us to offer anjali,” she alleged.

The families said they were made to participate in the ritual in front of others despite having been assaulted the previous day. The incident, as described by the victims, illustrates how religious rituals were allegedly used as instruments of coercion rather than voluntary expressions of faith.

On October 20, the intimidation allegedly continued. Lakshmi said that Manna and his associates took the men of the affected families to an isolated location and threatened to kill them if they did not renounce their belief in Jesus Christ. According to the complaint, the accused also abused and threatened Lakshmi and other family members and confined her inside her house. The families said they were too frightened to leave their homes and sent three minor girls to stay with relatives for their safety. Lakshmi eventually approached the police station again and lodged a formal complaint naming 13 people. The families said a police picket was deployed only after the FIR was registered.

Harassment allegedly began last year

The families told The Wire that the hostility did not begin with the October attacks. According to their account, Lakshmi’s husband, Tapan, his brother Gopal and another villager had embraced Christianity several years ago. Other residents of neighbouring villages had also converted. Lakshmi maintained that the decision was voluntary and rooted in their religious beliefs. She said the families continued to respect other religions and had been practising Christianity peacefully inside their homes.

However, she alleged that her relatives, Asit, Arun, Barun and Tarun Mondal, began harassing the family during Durga Puja last year, questioning their decision to convert. The family said they had submitted a written complaint to Chandrakona police station at the time. Although the police visited the village, they alleged that no effective action was taken against those accused of harassment.

The families said the intimidation later intensified, particularly after the change of government in West Bengal in May. According to Lakshmi, the attackers allegedly invoked the arrival of a new government and claimed that the Bajrang Dal would ensure that the families abandoned Christianity. Several witnesses who spoke to The Wire reportedly corroborated aspects of the victims’ account. 

Police security offered, but families remain afraid

Patlapur, located around 15 kilometres from Chandrakona town, is home to approximately 150 families belonging to different social and religious communities. Agriculture and the manufacture of copper ornaments are among the principal sources of livelihood in the area. Local primary school teacher Soumitra Gharui told The Wire that the village had not witnessed caste-related disputes or violence of this nature for decades. Residents alleged that efforts to disturb the area’s social harmony had begun around a year ago.

The families said the three days of violence had left them traumatised. Lakshmi also expressed concern for her elderly father-in-law, Krishnapada Mondal, who has reportedly been living with paralysis for several years and witnessed the harassment of the family. Speaking to The Indian Express, one of the victims said that four police personnel had been stationed outside their homes. While welcoming the security, she expressed fear that the protection might not last.

“We are happy the police helped us. But threat calls are coming. One day the police will leave. What will we do then?” she said. She added that she wanted only to live peacefully in her own home.

On October 21, Paschim Medinipur Superintendent of Police Papiya Sultana told The Wire that an FIR had been registered and that the police would provide security to the families and investigate the incident. Speaking to The Indian Express, Sultana said a police picket had been deployed because the families felt insecure and that the police were taking steps to prevent further incidents. An advocate who assisted the victims told The Indian Express that the FIR was registered after he visited the police station on October 20, but the accused had not been arrested.

For the families, the immediate concern remains their safety. They have alleged that they were threatened, assaulted and pressured to abandon their faith despite seeking police intervention. While a police picket has been established, the absence of reported arrests has added to their apprehension.

Related:

Dalit Class XI student dies by suicide after alleged casteist harassment in Coimbatore

CJP helps secure Ajabha Khatun’s release after 772 days in Assam’s Matia detention camp

Six police personnel suspended after custodial death of Dilshad Ansari in Bihar

‘Free the Temple’, ‘Defend the Faith’, ‘Take Up Weapons’: How festivals became vehicles for anti-Muslim hate in September

Six Days, One Unanswered Question: What happened to Shaheen and Nafisa Khan at Saket Police Station?

The post Christian families assaulted, humiliated and forced into Durga Puja rituals in West Bengal village appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The incidents documented this month of September range from demands linked to the Mathura temple-mosque dispute and provocative religious sloganeering outside a mosque to warnings against alleged “infiltrators”, claims of Hindu demographic decline and repeated exhortations to acquire weapons. While the speakers and settings differ, the rhetoric follows recognisable patterns of exclusion and otherisation.

From a place of worship to a demand for its “liberation”

Location: Basti, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 4

On the occasion of Krishna Janmashtami, Vishva Hindu Mahasangh leader Akhilesh Singh asserted that if those celebrating Janmashtami had taken an oath to celebrate it only after demolishing the mosque in Mathura, similar to the Babri Masjid, and “freeing” the temple, it would have been “freed” long ago. He claimed that Krishna had been imprisoned in a jail and that the temple had been occupied. He also announced a march for “Krishna Janmabhoomi” in October.

https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/5188

On September 4 in Basti, Uttar Pradesh, Vishva Hindu Mahasangh leader Akhilesh Singh used the occasion of Krishna Janmashtami to invoke the Mathura mosque-temple dispute. He said that if those celebrating Janmashtami had taken an oath to celebrate it only after demolishing the mosque in Mathura, “like the Babri Masjid”, and “freeing” the temple, it would have been “freed” long ago. He also announced a march for “Krishna Janmabhoomi” in October.

The significance of this rhetoric lies in the transformation of a contested place of worship into a religious obligation. The mosque is not presented simply as a structure involved in an ongoing legal and political dispute. Its presence is rhetorically framed as an obstacle to the fulfilment of a Hindu religious claim.

The invocation of the Babri Masjid demolition is particularly concerning. A constitutional and legal dispute over a place of worship is thereby connected to a historical episode in which a mosque was demolished by a extremist mobilisation. The language of “liberation” further recasts the removal of a Muslim religious site as an act of religious restoration. This is one of the recurring mechanisms through which religious difference becomes exclusionary: a particular religious community is represented as occupying space that rightfully belongs to another.

When religious practice becomes a public assertion against Muslims

Location: Achalpur, Amravati, Maharashtra

Date: September 8

During a grand Kanwar Yatra organised by Jableshwar Baba Mitra Mandal, participants recited the Hanuman Chalisa and raised “Jai Shri Ram” slogans outside a mosque, with former MP Navneet Rana seen reciting the Hanuman Chalisa. The religious recitation and slogan-shouting reportedly led to brief communal tension, following which security was tightened in the area.

https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/5194

A similar dynamic appeared in Achalpur, Amravati, on September 8, where participants in a Kanwar Yatra organised by Jableshwar Baba Mitra Mandal recited the Hanuman Chalisa and raised “Jai Shri Ram” slogans outside a mosque. Former MP Navneet Rana was seen participating in the recitation. The incident reportedly generated brief communal tension, after which security was increased.

When religious activity is deliberately performed outside another community’s place of worship and accompanied by slogans that have acquired a powerful political resonance, religion can cease to function merely as an expression of personal faith. It can become a public demonstration of dominance, particularly where the immediate setting is already communally sensitive. The issue, therefore, is not the Hanuman Chalisa itself. It is the use of religious symbolism in a setting where the identity of another religious community becomes part of the spectacle.

Constructing the Muslim as the outsider

Location: Howrah, West Bengal

Date: September 11

A Hindu nationalist speaker, defending religious preacher Dhirendra Shastri’s comment about banning non-vegetarian food from Durga Puja, warned that anyone who insulted a saint again would be “beaten so badly” that they would be unable to get up. He targeted those he termed “Bangladeshi infiltrators”, accusing them of disrespecting Bengali culture and vandalising Durga Puja pandals, breaking Saraswati idols, and setting fire to pandals. He named Muslim leaders from opposition parties and alleged that such people had “become Bengalis” and accused “intellectuals” of abusing Hindus who worship Durga and Saraswati. He claimed that efforts had begun in Bengal to get rid of this “drug” from their minds.

https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/5258

In Howrah, West Bengal, on September 11, a Hindu nationalist speaker defending religious preacher Dhirendra Shastri’s remarks on non-vegetarian food during Durga Puja threatened that anyone who insulted a saint again would be “beaten so badly” that they would be unable to get up. The speech then moved from defending a religious figure to identifying an alleged enemy.

The speaker referred to people he described as “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and accused them of disrespecting Bengali culture, vandalising Durga Puja pandals, breaking Saraswati idols and setting fire to pandals. Muslim political leaders were named, while “intellectuals” were accused of abusing Hindus who worship Durga and Saraswati. This is a familiar form of otherisation: disparate questions of nationality, religion, culture, political affiliation and alleged criminality are collapsed into a single hostile category.

The label “Bangladeshi infiltrator” is particularly potent in this construction. It does not merely describe an alleged immigration status. In the speech, it becomes attached to a broader image of the Muslim as someone who does not belong to Bengal, does not respect its culture and is therefore positioned outside the legitimate social body. The result is a rhetorical equation in which defending Hindu religious culture is presented as requiring resistance to an allegedly Muslim threat.

From demographic anxiety to militarisation

Location: Rasdhan, Kanpur Dehat, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 14

During a Ganesh Utsav program, far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva, leader of the armed monks’ group Shiva Shakti Akhada, invoked Partition to claim that Hindus were again facing a similar “tragedy” because they were “weapon less.” He claimed that 10 lakh Hindus were killed during Partition and suggested that a similar number of “Miya” could have been killed had Hindus been armed. He contrasted Hindus’ worship of Ram with his killing of demons and urged Hindus to take up weapons to protect their religion. He also alleged that Hindus were converting to Christianity and Islam because they lacked knowledge of Hindu deities and religious teachings. He urged organisers to establish classes in temples to teach children aged 6–14 about Hindu deities, arguing that merely installing Ganesh idols was not enough to establish dharma.

https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/5263

The speeches by far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva across Uttar Pradesh in September took this logic further. At a Ganesh Utsav programme in Rasdhan, Kanpur Dehat, on September 14, Shiva invoked Partition to claim that Hindus were again facing a similar “tragedy” because they were “weapon less”. He referred to the deaths of Hindus during Partition and suggested that a comparable number of “Miya” could have been killed had Hindus been armed. He invoked Ram’s killing of demons and urged Hindus to take up weapons to protect their religion.

Location: Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 15

During a Ganesh Utsav program, far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva, leader of the armed monks’ group Shiva Shakti Akhada, questioned why the Ganesh idol does not carry weapons and alleged that Hindus were gradually declining across the world because they had abandoned weapons. He claimed that religious scriptures are torn and places of worship destroyed when Hindus do not practise weapons training, asserting that “if there is knowledge of dharma and shaastra (religious scriptures), that knowledge is incomplete without weapons.”

https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/5256

The following day, at another Ganesh Utsav programme in Kanpur Nagar, he questioned why the Ganesh idol did not carry weapons and argued that religious knowledge was incomplete without weapons.

Location: Makhi, Unnao, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 16

During a Ganesh Utsav program, far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva, leader of the armed monks’ group Shiva Shakti Akhada, fearmongered about the decline of the Hindu population, citing Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh and alleging that Hindu populations in nine states had fallen from around 90% to as low as 5–10%, leaving Hindus unable to organise religious events. He claimed that religious scriptures are torn and places of worship destroyed when Hindus do not practise weapons training, alleging that more than 500,000 temples were destroyed over 500 years. He questioned why “no god” came to protect temples when the Ram temple and Somnath temple were destroyed, arguing that Hindu religious teachings require Hindus to protect their own faith and that “without weapons, protection is impossible.” He urged Hindus to study their religious scriptures and become “dharma yoddhas,” declaring that those who carry weapons become “veers” (brave warriors).

https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/5255

On September 16 in Makhi, Unnao, the rhetoric centred on alleged Hindu demographic decline. Shiva invoked Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh and made claims about the Hindu population having fallen dramatically in several Indian states. He also alleged that hundreds of thousands of temples had been destroyed over centuries and asked why Hindu gods had not protected temples such as the Ram temple and Somnath. His conclusion was that Hindus themselves must become “dharma yoddhas” and that protection of the faith was impossible without weapons.

The argument begins with fear. Hindus are portrayed as a community in demographic decline, surrounded by hostile forces and historically dispossessed of temples. That fear is then connected to a solution: Hindu unity, physical preparedness and weapons. Religion thus becomes not simply an identity but a justification for militarisation.

The invocation of Hindu gods and religious texts plays an important role in this process. Religious figures are selectively interpreted through the vocabulary of battle, while the distinction between spiritual instruction and physical confrontation is deliberately narrowed. The implied message is that to be a sufficiently committed Hindu, one must be prepared to defend the community against an identified adversary.

The making of an internal enemy

The rhetoric also repeatedly moves beyond an abstract “threat” to identify Muslims as the people against whom Hindu unity must be consolidated. That distinction matters. A speech about preserving one’s religion does not automatically constitute hate speech. But when religious preservation is constructed through the identification of another religious community as dangerous, disloyal, invasive or responsible for historical and contemporary grievances, religious identity becomes a mechanism of exclusion.

The September speeches repeatedly follow this trajectory. Muslims are represented variously as occupants of Hindu sacred spaces, cultural outsiders, demographic threats, political enemies or people against whom Hindus must physically organise. The vocabulary changes, but the underlying structure remains strikingly similar.

From “Hindu culture” to political ownership

Location: Dongri, Mumbai, Maharashtra

Date: September 23

During a Ganesh celebration, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane declared that India was a Hindu Rashtra and said that in Dongri he wanted to hear “Har Har Mahadev” and not “I Love Mohammed”, while describing the government as one based on Hindutva ideology. He also referred to Muslims as “green snakes” and said he would always stand with Hindus in disputes with Muslims.

https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/5278

The September 23 incident in Mumbai brought this directly into electoral and political language. During a Ganesh celebration in Dongri, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane declared that India was a Hindu Rashtra and said that he wanted to hear “Har Har Mahadev” rather than “I Love Mohammed” in Dongri. He described the government as one based on Hindutva ideology, referred to Muslims as “green snakes” and said he would stand with Hindus in disputes involving Muslims. Here, religious identity is explicitly linked to political authority and territorial belonging.

Dongri is not merely a neighbourhood in this formulation. It becomes a symbolic site in which one religious expression is presented as belonging and another as something that should not be heard. The contrast between “Har Har Mahadev” and “I Love Mohammed” is particularly revealing. It converts religious expression into a test of communal ownership: one slogan is presented as appropriate to the space, while the other is implicitly marked as alien. The reference to Muslims as “green snakes” goes a step further by reducing an entire religious community to a dehumanising metaphor.

A recurring grammar of exclusion

Read individually, these incidents come from different contexts. Taken together, however, they reveal a recurring rhetorical grammar.

First step: Sacred injury- A mosque is presented as occupying a Hindu sacred site. A temple is described as having been destroyed. A religious figure is portrayed as having been insulted. Hindu festivals are presented as being under threat.

Second step: Collective identification- The alleged perpetrator is no longer an individual. “Muslims”, “Miya”, “Bangladeshi infiltrators” or an undefined Muslim political establishment become collective categories.

Third step: Invoke fear- The community is portrayed as demographically declining, culturally threatened, historically victimised or physically vulnerable.

Final step: Mobilisation- The proposed response ranges from marches and public religious assertions to demands for religious unity and, in the most extreme speeches, weapons training and physical confrontation.

This progression is important because hate speech does not always begin with an explicit call for violence. It can begin by changing how a community is imagined. A mosque becomes an encroachment. A Muslim becomes an outsider. A demographic change becomes an existential threat. A historical grievance becomes a present danger. Religious self-defence becomes a justification for arming. And eventually, violence or confrontation can be presented as the logical consequence of protecting the community.

Religion as an instrument of otherisation

The central issue running through these September incidents is therefore not religious belief itself. It is the political use of religious identity to divide the population into those who supposedly belong and those who supposedly threaten that belonging. Hindu festivals provide the setting. Temples and mosques provide the symbols. Religious figures provide moral authority. Historical episodes provide grievance. Demographic claims provide fear. Political slogans provide mobilisation. Muslims are repeatedly positioned at the other end of this construction.

This matters because constitutional secularism does not require citizens to abandon their religions. It requires the State and public institutions to recognise citizens as equal members of the political community regardless of religion. The danger in this rhetoric lies precisely in the opposite proposition: that religious identity determines who has a stronger claim to public space, cultural legitimacy or political belonging.

Related:

CJP Demands FIR, Independent Probe into Alleged Police Assault on Journalists Shaheen and Nafisa Khan

The Kanwar Yatra: Between devotion and domination

From Statelessness to Citizenship: CJP helps Adori Bibi reclaim her Indian identity

Hate Watch: Jihad rhetoric, forced sloganeering mark UP-Uttarakhand week

Clashes, Slogans, Stone-Pelting: How Eid Milad processions turned tense across India

The post ‘Free the Temple’, ‘Protect the Faith’, ‘Take Up Weapons’: How September’s festivals became stages for anti-Muslim hate appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The advise offered by Dhirendra Krishna Shastri (Parchiwale baba, whom Prime Minister Modi calls his younger brother) in this regard, evoked reactions in fish and meat-eating West Bengal. The state is on the eve of celebrating its biggest festival, Durga Puja. The BJP swept to power in in West Bengal in early-mid 2026. Even before this, the visibility of BJP’s political assertion in the state has been accompanied by promotion of Lord Ram (over Maa Kaali/Durga). This is a move which had previously yielded rich electoral dividends for it in North India, also affecting the electoral scenario in India as a whole.

As the BJP government settled in to ‘governance’ in the state, the season for the annual Durga Puja came. And the party in power invited Shastri of Bageshwar Dham as its passport to vegetarianism. This was a testing tactic, a well-honed technique tried by the far right sangh parivar, to test its schemes before an all-out imposition.  He visited West Bengal for a ‘Hanuman Katha’ in Howrah’s Liluah. He advised the people to keep non-vegetarian food away from Durga idols during the Puja. Similar advice was already proffered by the RSS affiliate, the Viswa Hindu Parishad (VHP). This triggered a storm among Bengali Hindus, including those calling themselves “Hindu nationalists”. There were statements and protests from prominent Bengalis that Shastri should not teach them how to celebrate Durga Puja and what to eat and what not.

The reaction was due to the fact that fish in particular but goat-meat too, during the Durga festival are almost mandatory to the menu. Many of them underlined that fish is very crucial to Bengali culture and the broad umbrella of Hindu religion has many tendencies where non-vegetarian food is part of the ritual. Many from former Tripura Governor Tathagata Roy to journalists and content creators, people from a diverse section, including those who described themselves as “Bengali Hindu nationalists”, retaliated. “Don’t tell a Bengali how to celebrate Durga Puja,” Kolkata-based content creator Shreyasi Biswas Banerjee wrote on Facebook. In the video (link attached), Biswas underlined that an “outsider” was prescribing rules for a festival embedded in Bengal’s distinct religious and culinary traditions. A few people even tore down posters of Shastri.

Suvendu Adhikari who had earlier received Shastri with great warmth thereafter attended a ceremony at a Durga temple and was seen consuming ‘Fish Prasad.’ A clear mitigatory gesture! Many right-wing sympathisers and detractors even stated that the core value of fish in Bengali culture.

India is a country full of diversities in all matters, food, clothing, language and religion. Hindus also have many sects and many diverse food habits. We have Kashmiri Pandits for whom Mutton dishes are as an inalienable part of their culture. The food habits are decided by multiple factors, geographical location being an important part of that. In Coastal areas, sea food is an important part of their diet.

However, the ruling regime has persisted this vegetarian imposition.

In the recently held BRICS meeting, in the Gala dinner (mid-September 2026), only vegetarian food was served. Indecently Xi Jing Ping skipped this dinner, whatever be his reasons! While serving only vegetarian food for international guests was criticised by the opposition parties, Kiran Rijiju, the minister and loyal handyman of the most powerful in the government, defended it by saying that the guests appreciated the menu.

The Uttar Pradesh (UP) Government (its chief minister is Yogi Adityanath) recently published a map of important food items of all districts of UP. In this culinary map, the much loved and savoured Lucknow’s Tunde kabab was missing!! Only vegetarian items were presented, as if UP consumes only the vegetarian food.

In yet another incident 14 Muslims were put behind the bars (some months ago) for having chicken biryani at their private Iftar party on a boat ride in Ganga River. Interestingly some Hindus who consumed liquor during another private boat ride were left un-policed.

Despite knowing the fact that nearly 70% of Indians are non-vegetarians, vegetarianism is being promoted by the BJP Governments, and at some places successfully. In Gujarat where BJP has been in power for the past three decades, non-vegetarian joints have been selectively invisibilised. Many people go to the restaurants near Gujarat border and satisfy their craving for non-vegetarian food.

This remains a dilemma for the majoritarian BJP: a balancing act between Indian’s prevalent food habits and their agenda of imposing vegetarianism. At every possible chance they and their cohorts try to push forward vegetarianism. Somehow BJP associates’ non-vegetarianism with Muslims (and Christians) in particular, never mind what history tells us about the food habits of early India. This bypassing of non-vegetarian food, an essential part of Indian food habits, irrespective of religion of the people is facing this dilemma. They get away with this aggressive vegetarianism in places like in Gujarat, however in WB, they are facing an opposition.

Human society has evolved through various stages, and food habits have always been very diverse. The aim of RSS-BJP and their political-cultural supporters remains to glorify vegetarianism purely for ideological reasons. There may be some other reasons for promoting Veganism or vegetarianism, but respect for people’s food habits is the starting point for a democratic society.

How much does this regime believe in democracy is free for all to see.

Related:

Non veg food ‘ban’: Student group plans protest at Delhi’s Hansraj College

Most Indians Non Vegetarian; Men More Than Women, South & East Most

Can majoritarian societal pressure re-write the rulebook? The illegality behind forced non-veg shutdowns during festivals

The post Politics through a forced imposition of food habits appeared first on SabrangIndia.

What led to the violent disruption of the reading circle on August 27 at the AUDA Garden in Vastrapur this year? Was it just the two books – ‘I Am Malala’ and ‘Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl’ that provoked the violent mob led by the Bajrang Dal? Or was this part of a much larger pattern of violence in the Hindu version of Taliban where everything – from books, clothes, food, to films, comedy and protests – offends them?

More troubling is the role of a section of parents who brought in Bajrang Dal elements to “solve” their issues with the school management. Why would they willingly invite extremist hindutva elements into a school their wards studied in? While they sought to force changes in curriculum and administration, did these parents think that bringing in goons was the best way to do so?   

How it all started

The genesis of the reading circle was the decision of the Anand Niketan School, a private upmarket school in Ahmedabad to remove the books – the memoirs of Malala Yousafzai, the Pakistani education activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner and the diary of the German Jew and holocaust victim Anne Frank from its reading list after protests from a section of parents and right-wing groups.

But even before the books became the target of these parents and their rightwing supporters, a food safety issue at the school had pitted parents against the school administration. On August 12, a piece of glass was found in the canteen food, and the school authorities, rushed to get the student X-rayed to assure his parents that it was not swallowed.

The angry parents did not trust the report and soon the issue escalated. Other, unconfirmed reports said that a student had found worms in vegetables and   parents protested about eggs being cooked in the school canteen.

Target of Attack Shifted From Food to Books

The parents then chose to target a Muslim curriculum consultant who had been associated with the school for several years. They objected to the books ‘I Am Malala’ and ‘The Diary of a Young Girl’ being on the optional reading list. According to reports, some parents called Bajrang Dal members to fight the school administration on their behalf and on Aug 14, a mob led by Bajrang Dal leader Hiren Rabari climbed the gate and the boundary wall of the school to demand the removal of the books from the curriculum.

The issue snowballed from then on and the school administration decided to remove the books as well as terminate the contract of the consultant.

A young businessman in the city found the controversy over the books troubling and wanted to organise a silent reading in protest. He reached out to core members of the Students and Youth Collective (SYCA), Ahmedabad, and the collective co-organised the reading.

Violent Disruption of a Peaceful Reading

 The reading went on peacefully from 4 p.m. to about 6:15 p.m. at a park near the DEO office in Vastrapur. Around 6:30, as the group was dispersing, about 40 men entered the park shouting “Jai Shree Ram” and carrying thick wooden sticks, metal rods and baseball bats. Some wore saffron scarves. They had left more sticks outside the park, near the entrance.

Their body language was aggressive from the start, and the first thing they objected to was I Am Malala, though we also had books on Sardar Patel, Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar. They shouted, “Kya bola tha Malala ne Kashmir ke baare mein?” and “Usko padhne wale desh drohi hain.”

I was standing a little behind the group, filming. Two of them were staring at me, and I asked, “Kya hai, ghoor kyun rahe ho?” They said, “Tujhe dikkat hai to bahar chali ja, humein jo karna hai hum karenge.” Another said, “Zyada bolegi to pakad lo isko.” A second woman who was recording was told, “Kal tak gayab kar denge tujhe.” The man who appeared to be leading the mob gave his name: Hiren Rabari.

I could see this would turn violent quickly. A call was made to the police helpline. Some people tried to sit the men down and talk calmly, but they had no interest in a dialogue. To buy time, some of the readers began singing the national anthem; the attackers objected to that too, claiming one person’s shoulders had moved and that this was disrespect!

Then they began pushing and beating people. They shouted, “Inke pant utar ke check karo ye Musalman hai ki nahin.” Two or three ran towards the gate and tried to shut it so no one could come in to help. I ran over and stood there so they could not, shouting, “Aapki private property nahi hai ye, jo darwaza band kar sakte ho.”

By then, they were chasing people down the street in separate groups. It was about 7 p.m., peak office hours, and the street was full of people walking and riding two-wheelers. Residents of Casa Vyoma, the society directly opposite the park, were also watching.

Despite telling the police that the mob had assembled in large numbers, only two policemen arrived in a van — one in uniform, the driver in casuals. When the officer in uniform tried to stop the assault, the attackers beat him too, in front of everyone. No one watching said or did anything.

A man came up asking questions, giving the impression that he might be able to help. In my panic, I told him we had been reading books silently and that Bajrang Dal goons had come and started hitting us. He immediately began shouting, “Aeee, gunda kisko bola?” I said, “Jo dande leke aayega aur pitai karega wo gunda hi hai,” and he turned aggressive himself, advancing on me and repeating the question multiple times.

Another woman was hit with a stick. I saw that a friend was being beaten and ran towards him. By then, the police officer was panicking and instructing us to get into the van. We tried, but the attackers kept pulling my friends back out and slapping them. Both policemen looked badly shaken. “Kaise bhi jaldi baitho van mein, hum tumhe police station le ja rahe hain. Yahan ruke to ye log tumhe maar dalenge,” they said.

We reached Vastrapur police station. Others arrived with the books, and with sticks left behind in the park to show both the range of what we had been reading and the weapons used. We gathered in one room and began explaining the sequence of events. The PI, G M Chaudhary, spoke to us but did not pay attention to the details.

She watched some of the videos we had taken and asked the writer to record our statement, who wrote a single summary paragraph that left out everything specific. Seeing this, we said we would give a written complaint instead of an oral one. Some lawyers and senior activists had reached the station by then. We went over the draft several times, since each detail could determine a corresponding criminal charge.

We gave Hiren Rabari’s name. We had also identified some other attackers by matching our videos to their Instagram accounts — after Bajrang Dal Gujarat’s official account posted a video of the attack, boasting that they had taught us a lesson in their own language. The algorithm began pushing similar accounts to us, and we identified another attacker as Jimit Rabari.

The police brought three young attackers to the station, and they sat in the same space as us, quite casually. Soon, more of them began arriving, as though they were sitting in a park. It was very intimidating and triggering. We recognised at least 20 to 25 of their faces from the park. Two or three senior Bajrang Dal men came to the station and spoke to the PI for a long time behind a closed door.

Unlike the businessman, who had protested for the first time in his life, perhaps the rest of us did not look gullible. The PI shrewdly took him aside, recorded his statement — which again left out crucial details from our written complaint — and persuaded him to sign it. The rest of us, the primary complainants, witnesses and informants, were left out of the FIR process without our consent.

The PI kept saying she would match the details later, that she needed to eat, that she wanted to go home. We left the station at 2:15 a.m. The FIR, without the details we had been promised, was uploaded at 3 a.m., and, based on the messages we received in response, all three of those arrested were released at the same time.

No arrests, no further police action against the mob

There have been no arrests since. We filed an additional complaint setting out the differences between our written complaint and the FIR, had it inwarded from the DCP office and met the DCP Harshadkumar Patel, who said action would be taken within a week. Nothing followed. We were attacked on 27th August. On 31st, we held a press conference demanding the arrest of the two primary accused, Hiren Rabari and Jimit Rabari, within 72 hours; a ban on Bajrang Dal in Gujarat and across India; and a response and apology from Home Minister Harsh Sanghvi for failing to protect us and to deliver justice.

Twenty days on, we are still waiting. We hold responsible not only Bajrang Dal, the state government and the police — for a grave violation of our safety, for rioting, and inciting religious violence — but also the section of Anand Niketan parents and the people on the street, who have let Gujarat become a factory of hate and crime over the decades. These elements have given complete impunity to state-sponsored terrorism and culture wars.

These are the people who countenance violence against Muslims and Dalits every Navratri, or behave with cowardice and hypocrisy even when their own friends are attacked by saffron-clad men. These are the Brahmin and Jain men who eat meat in private while the administrators of their children’s school claim “all the students are strictly vegetarian.” They laugh at cheap jokes on caste, gender and class. They laugh at pronouns and the Palestinian flag and blame reservation for everything.

However, there is a pushback. The reading circle itself had emerged as a coming together of two groups -one led by students and the other, by working professionals – who were undoubtedly part of privileged castes and classes and would have been otherwise invested in the status quo of a post-2002 pogrom model of a “rising” Gujarat.

What follows now is a contest between the collusion of these elite hate mongers and the persistence of not-so-privileged young people who refuse to be cowed by political and social violence. We won’t be silenced!

*(The writer, who prefers to remain anonymous, was a participant in the reading circle and a witness to the violent mob’s disruption of it.)

Courtesy: Free Speech Collective

The post Anatomy of a Censoring Mob Threatened by Book Reading in Public appeared first on SabrangIndia.

I argue however that, when this 2026 defence of ancient Hindu jurisprudence is placed alongside Mahmood’s long-standing jurisprudential positions—most notably his January 11-24, 1986 Frontline interview during the Shah Bano controversy—a consistent ideological trajectory emerges.

Far from a progressive effort to humanise legal history, Mahmood’s intellectual framework represents a sophisticated defence of systemic patriarchy. Across four decades, his legal logic systematically rebrands female subordination as benevolent care, denies women’s non-monetary economic contributions, and reduces women to perpetual financial and social liabilities who require lifelong male custodianship.

A foundational pillar of Mahmood’s legal philosophy is the absolute rejection of women’s independent economic agency within the marital unit. In his January 11-24 1986 Frontline interview (“Secularism on the Bend”), Mahmood forcefully criticised the Supreme Court’s ruling (April 23, 1985) in Mohammed Ahmad Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum, which had granted a meagre maintenance allowance to a 73-year-old divorced woman under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Mahmood argued that Shah Bano (1916-1992) was not entitled to maintenance from her former husband because she was an affluent woman with three adult, solvent sons—one of whom was a practicing lawyer. Under his interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, the primary financial liability to support an elderly mother falls squarely upon her male offspring rather than her former spouse, regardless of the duration of the marriage.

When directly (and publicly) challenged on whether a wife’s decades of domestic labour, childcare, and household management constitute an economic contribution to the marriage that justifies post-divorce support or a share in marital property, Mahmood’s response was unambiguous. He rejected the “Western concept of matrimonial property”, asserting that in India, an uneducated or homemaker wife does not make an economic contribution. Instead, he explicitly declared her to be a financial burden: “How is that an economic contribution? On the contrary, she is a liability. She needs to be maintained in any case”. He went so far as to claim that a wife could only legally demand financial compensation for her domestic services if she formally declared herself an “employee” or an “agent of the husband” rather than a mother.

This worldview is far from an isolated legal quirk; it aligns directly with a broader, long-standing tradition of South Asian patriarchal instructional literature designed to socialise women into absolute domestic servitude. A prime historical example is Ashraf Ali Thanwi’s reformist handbook Bihishti Zewar (Heavenly Ornaments, 1905). Written at the turn of the twentieth century as an instructional guide for Muslim women, Thanwi’s text systematically constructs a piety centered on female self-effacement, unquestioning submission, and absolute obedience to the husband. In Bihishti Zewar, a wife is instructed that her religious duty and spiritual salvation depend on serving her husband as her earthly lord—enduring his tempers without complaint, prioritizing his comfort over her basic needs, and viewing her presence in the household as an act of perpetual devotion.

What Thanwi codified as religious virtue in 1905, Mahmood “secularised” and operationalised as legal jurisprudence in 1986 and 2026. In both frameworks, the woman’s internal value is tied entirely to her domestic utility, while her structural status is reduced to an uncompensated, obedient dependent. Thanwi’s theological insistence that a woman must endure systemic domestic inequity in exchange for heavenly reward seamlessly mirrors Mahmood’s legal assertion that an uneducated homemaker generates no economic value and remains merely a financial liability.

Decades later, in his September 2026 analysis of the Manusmriti, Mahmood deploys this exact same paternalistic logic. By equating the verse’s prescription of lifelong male guardianship with modern maintenance obligations, Mahmood once again reduces female existence to an inherent financial dependency. In all these contexts—whether examining Thanwi’s reformist didactic manuals, classical Sanskrit codes, or medieval Islamic jurisprudence—there is a shared refusal to recognise women as equal economic or legal partners in a household. A woman’s labour inside the home is dismissed as non-existent or dutifully owed, her status is framed as an inherent liability, and her entitlement to survival is made contingent upon the paternalistic charity of male guardians.

This institutionalised denial of agency seamlessly informs Mahmood’s defence of structural male dominance and the restriction of female self-determination. In his discussion of divorce law, Mahmood attempted to construct a facade of gender parity by claiming that Islamic law grants equal rights of unilateral dissolution to both men and women. He argued that a woman can unilaterally discard her husband through khula just as a man can through talaq, and that seeking a judicial decree is merely a confirmatory remedy against male chauvinism rather than a structural requirement.

Yet, this assertion conveniently glossed over the severe, asymmetrical financial penalties embedded in the process. While a man pronouncing talaq retains his assets and merely pays the agreed mehr (dower), a woman initiating khula is legally required to forfeit or return her mehr. When pressed on how an economically dependent, illiterate woman could realistically exercise this right without facing total destitution, Mahmood shifted the entire burden back onto women and their families, insisting that financial terms should have been negotiated in the nikahnama (marriage contract) prior to the wedding. When reminded that young girls and illiterate women rarely possess the agency or leverage to negotiate such contracts, Mahmood dismissed the widespread grievances of Muslim women’s rights groups who characterized personal laws as instruments of oppression, attributing their critique to sheer “ignorance of law”.

This pattern of dismissing female agency culminates in Mahmood’s semantic reinterpretation of classical patriarchal texts. In his 2026 Indian Express column, Mahmood attempts to sanitize the phrase na stri swatantrayamarhati—traditionally translated by both classical commentators and colonial scholars as “a woman does not deserve independence”—by translating it as “never left unprotected”. In doing so, he deliberately conflates the denial of autonomy with an act of paternalistic devotion. By framing the institutionalized denial of female freedom as a sacred male duty of safety, Tahir Mahmood constructs an apologetic framework that shields historic patriarchy from legitimate critique.

As the historian, Mubarak Ali observes in his critical study “Behishti Zewar Aur Aurat” (in his Urdu language book, Tareekh Aur Aurat, 1993), textually mandated codes of female conduct invariably function to “confine the woman within the domestic sphere while sanctifying her subjugation as moral virtue”, and that such normative texts manipulate legal and religious rhetoric to stripping women of independent agency under the guise of protecting tradition.

When read together, Mahmood’s writings across forty years (1986 and 2026) reveal a cohesive, conservative worldview that normalises gender hierarchy under the guise of legal protectionism. Whether relying on didactic texts like Bihishti Zewar, or opposing the Supreme Court’s secular intervention (1985) in Shah Bano, or reinterpreting the Manusmriti for a modern readership, the core thesis remains unchanged: women do not require constitutional equality, independent legal agency, or economic recognition; they merely require male oversight. By recasting the denial of independence as an act of care and framing female domestic existence as a financial liability, Mahmood, relying upon the same rhetorical sleight of hand, provides an intellectual defence of systemic misogyny that ensures women remain perpetual wards of male authority. In both instances (Indian Express, Sept 1, 2026, and Frontline, January 11-24, 1986), systemic misogyny and the denial of gender justice are sanitized as reverence for scriptural tradition and personal law, reducing female autonomy to a negotiable casualty of cultural preservation.

(The author teaches Modern and Contemporary Indian History at the Aligarh Muslim University. His X handle is: @sajjadhist)

Related:

Muslim women will define their own lives & choices: Bebaak Collective responds to Kerala cleric

“Balancing Principles”: Are Hindutva far-right supporters and Muslim illiberalism often cosy bedfellows?

The post Four decade-long misogyny of a law academic? Tahir Mahmood’s defence of Manusmriti echoes in his criticism of the 1985 Shah Bano verdict appeared first on SabrangIndia.

–Editors

Professor Faizan Mustafa

Vice-Chancellor, Chanakya National Law University, Patna

(Former Vice-Chancellor, NALSAR & NLUO; Former Registrar, Aligarh Muslim University)

Date September 2, 2026

Subject: An Open Letter on Ideological Opportunism, Public Intellectualism, and More

Dear Professor Faizan Mustafa,

In recent years, your public profile as a legal commentator has expanded considerably through frequent columns in national dailies.

In enhancing your public profile, Ravish Kumar has played a considerable role. On NDTV Prime Time he provided you with a platform. He never brought you into a panel discussion though. He always provided you with a solo programme with no uncomfortable, critical questions and counter-questions being put to you. That is how he initiated the practice of Godi Media (Milquetoast Media) with you on NDTV Prime Time Shows. Today, Ravish Kumar, on his own YouTube channel also does not expose you by criticising your pro-Sangh columns in the Indian Express and elsewhere. Of course, no Liberal, Left remains Liberal when it comes to exposing and critiquing Muslim conservatism-communalism!

However, a systematic review of your published op-eds alongside your institutional footprint reveals a troubling pattern of political accommodation, academic displacement, and prolonged reliance on university deputation rules. In short, this appears to be a form of the crassest possible opportunism that you have consistently been displaying for the last nine years or so.

This open letter addresses three distinct areas where your public record stands in sharp contrast to the expectations of a senior constitutional law professor.

Early Writings and Conservative Stance on Affirmative Action

Your ideological shifts are not a recent development. As far back as 1992, in an essay titled “Reservation-Politics or Social Upliftment” published in the AMU-Arts Faculty Magazine (1992-93, pp. 128–131), you articulated a deeply conservative and critical stance against social justice initiatives.

Writing as a Lecturer in the Department of Law, AMU, you argued that affirmative action had failed, was monopolised by elites, and was driven purely by electoral vote-bank politics (such as the Mandal Commission implementation in 1990). You went on to advocate for drawing a hard line against reservations in science and technology, capping benefits to a single generation or stage of career, and ultimately calling to “do away with reservation policy step by step.”

This early record underlines a long-standing ideological pattern that prioritised anti-reservation rhetoric well before your later shifts toward political accommodation with right-wing majoritarianism.

The Timeline of Ideological Shifts and Selective Silence

Your commentary over the past decade demonstrates a consistent eagerness to accommodate Hindu majoritarian power structures, juxtaposed against a complete absence of critique toward conservative elements within your own institutional and religious baseline.

January 18, 2018 (The Tribune): On the eve of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to India, your piece titled “Learn from Israel’s Legal Pluralism” praised Israel’s legal framework, deceptively likening it with Ottoman-era Millet personal law system. Written while serving as a visiting professor at Tel Aviv University, the article presented Israel’s religious legal autonomy as a model for India, choosing to ignore the ongoing structural disenfranchisement of Palestinians.

May 28, 2019 (The Indian Express): Following the 2019 general elections, your column “Reaching out to Muslims” argued that the Muslim community should expect better treatment from the RSS, initiating a public stance of seeking reconciliation with Hindutva leadership. Obviously, this was less because of your conviction in the principle of “Truth and Reconciliation”, and more intended to appease the RSS-BJP for personal favours?

March 21, 2020 (The Indian Express): In “Why Hindu Rashtra should not terrify Muslims”, you engaged in an accommodating re-reading of majoritarian nationalism, a piece subsequently amplified by right-wing media outlets like Swarajya (April 22, 2020) as an endorsement from a prominent Muslim academic.

July 6, 2021 (The Indian Express): In “What Mohan Bhagwat Said”, you offered praise for RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat’s public statements on Hindu-Muslim shared ancestry. This was part of a broader pattern of synchronized op-eds from the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) leadership—followed closely by the then-AMU-VC (now BJP Vice President cum MLC, Uttar Pradesh), Tariq Mansoor in The Hindu (July 13, 2021) and his son, Assistant Professor (Law), Mohd Nasir in Hindustan Times (July 15, 2021).

Projecting yourself as a champion of social justice and Pasmanda uplift, you tweeted a respectful tribute to Manu’s statue in the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench), in late 2021. What you chose to ignore is the fact that the name Manu is just an epithet and imagine calling a misogynist-casteist to be the greatest law giver! No wonder, then, that you endorse Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) and extend support to the Muslim regressives! Your extraordinary brilliance of reading thousands of pages of judgments and elucidating –in writing or video your analyses ready to be published in a few moments to publish in next morning’s English daily/portals has already made you acquire an-almost divine untouchable position. Salman Khurshid’s book, The Sunrise over Ayodhya exposes this with a subtle sarcasm; also excerpted on The Print.in, October 26, 2021.

Your great respect shown to Shri Ram Madhav Ji of the RSS on your YouTube video is already the subject of jokes and ridicule.

June 14, 2024 (The Indian Express): In your column titled “Unity with diversity“, published following the 2024 general election results, you asserted: “This author continues to believe that declaring Hinduism as the dominant spiritual heritage of India may be a good thing for our secularism.” Commentators have highlighted how egregious this observation is for a constitutional scholar. Under the pretext of defending federalism and constitutionalism, such arguments effectively build a case for ethnocracy. Applying political geographer Oren Yiftachel’s framework, endorsing a dominant religious/spiritual heritage erodes essential democratic structures—specifically equal citizenship, a unified territorial demos, and basic protections against majoritarian tyranny.

And now comes the latest. A nail in the coffin?

August 31 / September 1, 2026 (The Indian Express): Your column “Mohan Bhagwat’s Hindutva is not narrow: Are his words in New York heard in India?” again selectively praised the RSS Chief’s address in New York, asserting that Bhagwat’s stance demolishes the foreign-origin argument against Muslims. Written from the position of a university head, this piece minimises contemporary ground realities under the guise of intellectual engagement. The very same day, Professor Tahir Mahmood (also an AMU Law alumnus) published his piece in the same Indian Express, appreciating the Manusmriti.

Is this just a mere coincidence? Or, part of something else, moves of sections of the Muslim elite towards co-option into a specific narrative-setting?

The Ideological Paradox

While you continuously seek to project moderation onto majoritarian leadership (which is actually your pretence and sophistry), you have systematically avoided issuing any public critique of Muslim Right-Wing orthodoxy, reactionary student outfit politics, or conservative religious organizations (such as, for example, the alleged Saudi-funded frameworks linked with the Institute of Objective Studies).

This calculated dualism allows you to cultivate favour with the ruling saffron dispensation as a “pragmatic bridge-builder” while retaining support among conservative Muslim elites (maslehat; actually, it is collective makkari of the Muslim elites), who view your manoeuvres as strategic preservation rather than principled scholarship.

Intellectual Production vs. Administrative Dominance

A review of your academic trajectory reveals that for over two decades, classroom teaching and peer-reviewed legal research have been displaced by administrative appointments.

Lack of Peer-Reviewed Output: Since your 1991 publication (Strict Liability in the Criminal Law) from a non-descript publication house, you have produced virtually no top-tier, internationally peer-reviewed academic monographs or high-impact journal articles. Media op-eds have replaced rigorous legal research.

The 1991 title is “plagiarized” from Richard Wasserstorm’s 1960 essay, in the Stanford Law Review. As per news-report (mark the word, only, in the news-report), in The Hindu, Aug 20, 2014, “India’s only book on ‘Strict Liability in Criminal Law’ was written by him in 1991 and he was awarded Commonwealth British Fellowship to further pursue this subject”. Have you really produced anything with the fellowship? No. The truth of your Fulbright (not the prestigious Fulbright Fellowship! you got the Fulbright Visiting Scholar Programme, as the VC in NLSIU Hyderabad, Oct 2018. You got the best SAARC Teacher award, in 2014, whereas since 2004, you have not been teaching. You are aimply governing various universities.

Administrative Tenure: From your tenure as AMU Registrar (2004–2007; when AMU was pushed into a judicial crisis of minority status. The issue is still sub judice and far from resolved) to successive terms as Vice-Chancellor at NLUO (Odisha), NALSAR (Hyderabad), and CNLU (Patna), you have operated primarily as an administrative officer rather than as an active teacher or researcher. Receiving teaching awards or academic fellowships while serving exclusively in executive officer roles, raises serious questions regarding academic evaluation standards.

AMU Deputation Rules and Systemic Accommodation

Your continuous absence from your substantive academic post at Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) highlights a significant administrative anomaly regarding University Grants Commission (UGC) and AMU service rules:

Statutory Limits on Deputation

Under standard UGC guidelines, Central University Ordinances and Govt of India Service rules, there is a cap on deputation. Deputation or Extraordinary Leave (EOL) to serve in external organizations or state universities is strictly capped—typically not exceeding 5 years continuously, with an absolute career ceiling of 7 years (or less) under exceptional circumstances.

AMU allows you to retain lien on your permanent substantive post. Holding a post on deputation for nearly two decades flagrantly violates the fundamental intent of the AMU recruitment ethics and rules. It freezes departmental vacancies, and prevents fresh/junior faculty recruitments and progression. Nobody however asks the AMU-VCs and its Executive Council (EC) as to why do they keep extending your deputation endlessly? Shall they extend similar favour to anyone except you?

Governance Failure within the AMU Executive Council

The repeated granting of continuous deputations and extensions by the AMU Executive Council (EC) over two decades demonstrates how institutional governance is bent to accommodate elite networking. By retaining your lien at AMU while continuously holding Vice-Chancellorships elsewhere, you have used the university as a safety net while denying the institution your active teaching presence.

Furthermore, the en masse support you received from the AMU Court and EC during Vice-Chancellor empanelment processes (October 2023) underscores how internal political networks prioritise opportunism and administrative clout over academic output and institutional integrity.

Conclusion

A constitutional law professor owes an unambiguous duty to truth, institutional ethics, and systemic accountability. When commentary routinely aligns with the politics of the ruling power, when administrative tenure stretches past statutory limits, and when community critique is applied selectively, the credibility of the public intellectual is entirely compromised.

The above account reveals a lot about you and also about the Muslim elites as much as about the Liberal-Left in not exposing you; in fact they have been promoting you. So much so that recently, the Leader of Opposition, Rahul Gandhi proposed your name to the Prime Minister Modi to appoint you as the Chief Information Commissioner of India (The Hindu, April 24, 2026).  This only means, the Liberal-Left as well as the Muslim elites have kept Rahul Gandhi ill-informed about your pro-Sangh credentials articulated in the prominent English dailies of New Delhi.

The academic community deserves clear answers: On what statutory grounds has AMU extended your deputation for two decades, and why has your constitutional critique remained silent on Muslim reactionary politics while consistently validating the ruling power?

Respectfully,

Members of the University and Academic Community

(The authors who are currently teaching and studying at the AMU have requested anonymity)

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

Links:

The Tribune https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/comment/learn-from-israel-s-legal-pluralism-530205/

The Indian Express, May 28, 2019   https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/muslims-india-narendra-modi-bjp-elections-2019-5751350/

The Indian Express, 21 March 2020  https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/narendra-modi-govt-6324468/

July 6, 2021 https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/are-mohan-bhagwats-recent-remarks-a-sign-of-moderation-in-hindutva-7390598/lite/

Salman Khurshid, Sunrise over Ayodhya, https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/if-you-cant-beat-them-join-them-cant-be-our-response-to-hindu-rashtra-salman-khurshid/756821/

June 10, 2024 https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/new-government-diversity-constitutionalism-federalism-india-9382218/

YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtHFAJ5ZH78

Sept 1, 2026 https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/mohan-bhagwats-hindutva-is-not-narrow-are-his-words-in-new-york-heard-in-india-10857107/

Tahir Mahmood, Sept 1, 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/on-women-manusmriti-has-a-context-dont-go-by-colonial-interpretation-10857186/

April 24, 2026 https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/rahul-gandhi-disagreed-on-government-cic-candidate-rti-response-reveals/article70901317.ece

Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law (Stanford Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Jul., 1960), pp. 731-745 (15 pages), https://doi.org/10.2307/1226524

The Hindu, 20 Aug 2014, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/NALSAR-V-C-gets-SAARC%E2%80%99s-best-law-teacher-award/article11208173.ece

The post “Balancing Principles”: Are Hindutva far-right supporters and Muslim illiberalism often cosy bedfellows? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The incidents varied significantly in their immediate triggers. In some cases, police and media reports described clashes between groups following arguments and slogan-shouting; elsewhere, disputes centred on religious imagery, procession routes, sound systems or alleged acts of provocation. Yet a common feature ran through many of the reports: once videos began circulating on social media, competing narratives about who had provoked whom spread rapidly, often well ahead of verified police findings.

• Mumbai: Parel-Chinchpokli turns tense after Eid procession

The most prominent incident in Maharashtra was reported from Mumbai’s Parel-Chinchpokli area on the night of August 26. According to The Indian Express, tension erupted near Laxmi Cottage after two groups clashed following an Eid procession. Police said they suspected that both groups had raised slogans, leading to a verbal altercation. Reports of stone-pelting and the use of mild police force subsequently emerged. The Free Press Journal similarly reported that a scuffle and stone-pelting occurred near Laxmi Cottage during the Eid Milad-un-Nabi procession. It reported allegations that banners were torn and slogans were raised, while videos circulating online showed crowds blocking roads and police attempting to disperse those involved.

The police response was immediate. Mumbai Police Joint Commissioner (Law and Order) Dr Manoj Sharma said senior officers were present and appealed to people not to believe rumours, stating that the situation had returned to normal. Additional police personnel were deployed in Parel, Chinchpokli and surrounding areas, while roads leading towards the area were blocked as a precaution. The Byculla-Lalbaug-Parel Bridge was also shut to vehicular traffic temporarily.

The incident has since generated sharply divergent accounts on social media. One set of claims alleges that Muslim youths were assaulted by Hindutva activists after a dispute over the alleged desecration or disrespect of a flag associated with the procession. Videos circulated online appear to show a physical altercation involving several people. However, subsequent reporting indicates that police were still investigating the precise trigger.

The Times of India reported on August 27 that three people had been booked following the Parel clash, while additional police personnel were deployed to prevent further disturbances. A later report by ABP Majha provided another version of the sequence, reporting that the confrontation occurred during police nakabandi and involved bikers allegedly violating traffic rules. It said the altercation began late on August 26 and continued into the early hours of August 27, with some police personnel also injured and three people booked.

• Bengaluru: Hindutva activists named in FIRs as police investigate competing complaints

A more detailed picture emerged from Bengaluru, where a clash took place in Basavanagudi during an Eid Milad procession. According to The Hindu‘s reporting, tensions flared near Garadi Apartments on KR Road when members of a Hindutva group, including activist Puneeth Kerehalli, allegedly raised slogans as the procession passed. Police intervened, but a youth identified as Murali was subsequently allegedly assaulted with a weapon.

Police later registered multiple FIRs arising from the confrontation. One case, based on a complaint by Abdul Razak Khan, invoked provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita relating to promoting enmity between groups, unlawful assembly, assault and criminal intimidation. Kerehalli, Gopi Gowda and Vinod Nayak were among those arrested in connection with that case.

At the same time, a second FIR was registered on the basis of a complaint by Kerehalli. That case included allegations of attempt to murder and provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Three people, namely Kamal Pasha, Abubakar Siddiq and Syed Anas, were arrested in that case, while two juveniles were produced before the Juvenile Justice Board.

A third case was registered by traffic police concerning obstruction of a public road. Police were examining CCTV footage and recording statements as the investigation continued. The Times of India reported that complaints had been filed by both sides following the Basavanagudi confrontation, with police maintaining additional security in the area.

• Rajasthan: Religious imagery triggers dispute in Chittorgarh

In Rajasthan, a separate confrontation was reported during an Eid Milad procession in Bassi town of Chittorgarh district. The Times of India reported that controversy arose over religious images on plastic sheets allegedly thrown into the air from a tempo-mounted setup accompanying the procession. The incident led to protests, and around 200 people from the Hindu community reportedly gathered near the old bus stand, shut shops and recited the Hanuman Chalisa. Police intervened and stopped the throwing of the plastic sheets. Additional forces were deployed and officials negotiated with representatives of the two communities. The procession was subsequently allowed to continue to its destination.

A complaint was later filed and Bassi police registered a case against unidentified persons under Sections 125, 299 and 302 of the BNS, according to The Times of India. Another report by Aaj Tak described the dispute as involving fariya, sheets or objects thrown during the procession, which allegedly contained images of Hindu deities. Hindu organisations objected and sought action from the administration.

• Gwalior: Confrontation over DJ music

Gwalior also witnessed a dispute during Eid Milad celebrations over the playing of DJ music. Reports from Madhya Pradesh said an argument broke out after police attempted to stop the DJ. A report by IBC24 News provided that the confrontation reportedly involved heated exchanges between police personnel and people participating in the procession.

The social-media battle begins almost immediately

The events of August 26 also demonstrate another increasingly familiar feature of communal tension in India: the speed with which isolated incidents become competing communal narratives. Within hours of the Mumbai incident, videos circulated claiming to show Muslims attacking Hindus; other accounts alleged that Hindutva activists had attacked Muslim participants. Neither narrative can safely be adopted merely because a video appears dramatic.

In fact, The Indian Express explicitly cautioned that reports of stone pelting and police use of force had not been independently verified. Meanwhile, as reported by Free Press Journal, Mumbai police publicly appealed to citizens not to believe rumours and said senior officers were monitoring the situation.  This is particularly important in communal incidents because the first version of events can acquire a life of its own. Once a video is captioned as an “attack by Muslims” or an “attack by Hindutva activists”, subsequent users often circulate it without checking its date, location, sequence or context. The result is not merely misinformation. It can itself become an accelerant of violence.

One cannot ignore the pattern of violence as well and hold that the August 26 incidents did not occur in a vacuum. Mumbai had already witnessed tension earlier in the week after eggs were allegedly thrown at a Ganesh idol procession in Mazgaon. Hindustan Times had reported that organisers alleged eggs were hurled at the Ganesh procession, following which tensions escalated and police deployed additional security. The Parel incident occurred only days later, and local accounts cited by Free Press Journal linked the atmosphere to the earlier Mazgaon episode. This is precisely where the responsibility of political actors, religious organisations, police authorities and media platforms becomes critical.

The August 26 incidents also expose a broader challenge for Indian cities entering the peak festival season: equal enforcement of public-order rules. If authorities prohibit provocative slogans, the prohibition must apply regardless of who raises them. If loudspeakers and DJs are regulated, the same standards must apply to every religious procession. If roads are blocked, organisers of every community’s procession must comply with traffic restrictions. If religious symbols are damaged, the police must investigate regardless of whose symbol was targeted. Selective enforcement does more than create resentment. It undermines public confidence in the neutrality of the State and provides fertile ground for competing narratives of victimhood.

Related:

Amnesty Investigation finds unlawful and deadly force against CJP-led protesters in Delhi and Siwan

From the violence of 2024 to the Bakri Eid tensions of 2026, a fact-finding report examines Mira Road’s deepening communal fault lines

Water Cannons Instead of Answers: Bihar’s recruitment crisis and the state’s crackdown on protest

Address Discrimination & Hate Crimes India told: CERD, UN

A people on the brink: The fight to protect the Shompen of Great Nicobar   

The post Eid Milad 2026: Processions, clashes and the politics of communal provocation across India appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The report’s first part, titled “Communal Polarisation in Mira Road,” was authored by Irfan Engineer and Neha Dabhade. Its second part, titled “Communal Tensions Surrounding Bakri Eid at Poonam Estate Cluster 1, Mira Road, Maharashtra, May 2026,” is based on fact-finding undertaken between May 30 and July 12, 2026. The second exercise was conducted by a team comprising Irfan Engineer, Director of CSSS; Sameer Wagle, member of the civil society initiative Mumbai for Peace; Rukmini Iyer, peacebuilder; and Sudhakar Suradkar, a retired IPS officer.

Taken together, the two parts offer a picture of a city suburb where disputes that may initially concern housing, public space, animals, religious practices or municipal regulation can rapidly acquire a communal character when political mobilisation, misinformation and outside intervention enter the picture.

From a growing suburb to a communally marked locality

The report begins by challenging simplistic understandings of Mira Road’s demographic composition. Mira Road emerged as a major residential destination as property prices in Mumbai increased and middle-class families, workers and young couples sought more affordable housing. Improved railway connectivity and the expansion of the real-estate sector accelerated this transformation.

But the report argues that the locality’s demographic evolution cannot be separated from the history of communal violence in Mumbai. Following the 1992–93 Bombay riots, substantial numbers of Muslim families from South Central and Central Mumbai moved towards Naya Nagar in Mira Road. At the same time, Hindu residents who acquired economic opportunities elsewhere gradually moved out. This produced the concentrated Muslim population that is now frequently described as a “ghetto”.

The 2011 Census figures cited in the report put Hindus at 68.96% of the population of Mira-Bhayander city and Muslims at approximately 16.28%. Christians constituted 6.01%, Jains 5.67%, Buddhists 1.86% and Sikhs 0.53%. Yet the report warns against treating Naya Nagar’s present demographic character as evidence of an inherently segregated or sectarian community.

Its founding story, in fact, was explicitly pluralist. Naya Nagar was established by Syed Nazar Hussain in 1979, who invited Shiv Sena founder Bal Thackeray and Indian Union Muslim League leader G.M. Banatwala to jointly inaugurate the colony. This occurred before the undivided Shiv Sena formally adopted Hindutva as its party ideology in 1985. Long-time residents interviewed for the report described decades of ordinary Hindu-Muslim coexistence.

The report does, however, document patterns of informal residential exclusion. Muslim residents reportedly face difficulties obtaining rental housing in the neighbouring Hindu-majority Shanti Nagar. It argues that the language of “ghettoisation” is itself unevenly applied: Muslim-majority neighbourhoods are frequently described as ghettos and subjected to heightened scrutiny, while exclusionary practices in Hindu-majority localities do not receive comparable treatment.

Communal politics and the electoral competition in Mira Road

The first part of the report places considerable emphasis on the role of political competition. It examines the trajectory of local legislator Geeta Jain, who contested the 2019 Assembly election as an independent candidate on a platform centred on development, women’s rights and employment. The report notes that she had earlier attempted to organise an Iftaar event using municipal funds.

Her political positioning subsequently changed significantly. By March 2023, Jain was participating in the flagging-off of a Hindu Jan Akrosh Morcha organised by Hindutva-affiliated groups. In January 2024, following the violence, she publicly stated that Hindus required only “five minutes” to demonstrate their numerical and physical superiority over Muslims.

The report places this transformation within the context of competition for the BJP ticket ahead of the 2024 elections. It points to other political actors employing increasingly prominent religious symbolism, including BJP district president Ravi Vyas, who inaugurated a replica of the Ayodhya temple in the constituency, and former legislator Narendra Mehta, who proposed a competing religious procession along a route substantially overlapping with an earlier Hindu Akrosh rally. The Shinde faction of the Shiv Sena also organised a motorcycle rally invoking the idea of Ram Rajya.

The report’s broader argument is that communal mobilisation increasingly became an electoral resource in an area where political competition was intense. The political consequences were followed by legal proceedings. A writ petition was filed before the Bombay High Court in March 2024 seeking action against Jain, BJP legislator Nitesh Rane and Telangana legislator T. Raja over alleged inflammatory speeches connected with the January violence.

The report records that the Bombay High Court subsequently directed police to examine recordings and transcripts of relevant speeches. Criminal cases were registered against Rane and Jain under provisions including Sections 153A, 153B, 143, 504 and 506 of the IPC, along with provisions of the Maharashtra Police Act.

Hate speech before the January 2024 violence

The report is particularly significant in its insistence that the January 2024 violence did not emerge from nowhere. It traces an escalating pattern of communal rhetoric to at least March 2023. At a March 12, 2023 rally organised by the Sakal Hindu Samaj, social media commentator Kajal Shingala, also known as “Kajal Hindustani,” called for an economic boycott of Muslims and made derogatory communal assertions. The report says she also made unsupported claims portraying Naya Nagar as a narcotics hub and made unsubstantiated claims concerning fertility-related harms allegedly caused by Muslim vendors. The speech was delivered in the presence of police officials and was followed by a citizen complaint. A case under Sections 153A and 505(2) was eventually registered.

Around a week later, a mass gathering addressed by spiritual figure Dhirendra Shastri saw assertions that Maharashtra would play a central role in the establishment of a “Hindu rashtra”. The report also records accounts from students and minors of recurring religiously motivated harassment during 2023, including pressure to recite religious slogans, intimidation in educational spaces and communal messages circulating in peer groups.

The significance of these episodes lies in the report’s larger thesis: communal violence is rarely an isolated eruption. It can follow a period in which language that marks one community as threatening, alien or economically undesirable becomes normalised.

CJP’s involvement: 2024

Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) has previously intervened in matters concerning communal tensions and the potential for provocative mobilisation in Mira-Bhayandar. In February 2024, CJP wrote to the Commissioner of Police, Mira-Bhayandar, expressing concern over the proposed visit and rally of BJP MLA T. Raja Singh in Mira Road. The intervention came against the backdrop of communal violence reported in the area in January 2024. Singh had announced a rally organised under the banner of the ‘Hindu Jan Aakrosh Morcha’ to mark the birth anniversary of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj. After an earlier rally planned for February 19 was cancelled for want of police permission, a fresh announcement was made for February 25. CJP urged the police to carefully assess the proposed mobilisation and take steps to prevent any further deterioration of the law-and-order situation.

CJP’s detailed complaint may be read here

CJP again became involved in June 2026, when it assisted Sadique Basha, a senior CPI (M) leader from the Mira-Bhayandar region who has worked extensively on issues of communal harmony, in drafting a complaint to the police concerning events at Poonam Estate Cluster-1 in Mira Road in the period preceding Eid-ul-Adha. The complaint sought the registration of an FIR and a comprehensive investigation into allegations of communal provocation, intimidation, hate speech and other unlawful acts associated with the incident. In fact Sadique Basha is an activist who has campaigned at the time of the Covid-2019 crisis for access to public health and vaccines and also consistently for right to access to public education.

The complaint called upon the police to preserve and examine all available evidence, including CCTV recordings, mobile-phone videos, media footage and social-media material. It also sought the recording of statements of residents, eyewitnesses and others who had publicly spoken about the incident. Further, it urged the police to investigate the role of individuals and organisations allegedly involved in mobilising crowds, making inflammatory statements or otherwise contributing to communal provocation.

Importantly, the complaint emphasised that any investigation and subsequent legal action must be impartial and must not be influenced by political affiliation, organisational position or public standing. CJP called for appropriate action against anyone found to have violated the law.

The intervention reflected CJP’s broader position that maintaining communal peace cannot be limited to managing tensions after they have erupted. It also requires timely scrutiny of alleged acts of provocation, preservation of evidence and accountability for those responsible. A prompt, fair and impartial investigation, the complaint argued, is essential to reinforce the principle that attempts to generate communal hostility will be treated as matters of law and not merely as issues of public order.

Reconstructing the January 2024 violence

The report reconstructs the events of January 21–23, 2024 in considerable detail. On the night of January 21, at approximately 10.30 pm, a procession consisting of around four cars and ten two-wheelers, carrying saffron flags and equipped with a microphone, travelled through Naya Nagar.

According to police accounts cited in the report, the procession passed two mosques on Lodha Road while religious slogans were allegedly shouted. The vehicles then entered a dead-end lane containing another mosque. Residents, fearing an attempt to enter the mosque, confronted the procession. A confrontation followed, involving stones and physical altercation. Police intervention brought the immediate situation under control and five arrests were made. The following day coincided with the consecration of the Ram temple in Ayodhya, dramatically increasing the political significance of the incident.

BJP legislator Nitesh Rane posted a warning that there would be “strong reactions” to what had happened in Mira Road. At the same time, a media outlet described the previous night’s mob action as “jihadi” in a social-media post that reportedly received more than 800,000 views. Violence then spread beyond Naya Nagar.

In Shanti Nagar, shops identified as Muslim-owned were vandalised. According to residents interviewed for the report, some shops were targeted because of Muslim proprietor names or because they lacked saffron symbols. In Bhayander West, Jabir Siraj Ansari, an Ola-affiliated cab driver, was reportedly stopped, removed from his vehicle after his Muslim identity was established and beaten, sustaining multiple facial fractures. Another motorcyclist was identified as Muslim through a religious decal and was allegedly forced, under threat of violence, to recite a Hindu religious slogan. A Muslim-owned commercial tempo was also stopped by an armed group. The driver and another employee were injured, with the latter requiring stitches for a head wound. A mosque in Bhayander West was also reportedly subjected to stone throwing.

Detailed report on the incident may be read here, here and here.

Detailed reports on BJP MLA Raja Singh and his speech may be read  here, here, here and here.

Detailed reports on BJP MLAs Geeta Jain and Nitesh Rane may be read here and here.

The bulldozer action: when demolition followed communal violence

Perhaps the most contentious finding in the first part concerns the municipal demolition drive. On January 23, 2024, the Mira-Bhayander Municipal Corporation’s anti-encroachment division demolished structures in Naya Nagar. One proprietor who had operated an automobile repair business there for 22 years said he was physically removed from his premises immediately before demolition. He estimated his loss at between ₹5 lakh and ₹6 lakh and said authorities disregarded tenancy-related documentary evidence. A municipal official confirmed that the demolished structures were Muslim-owned but described the action as part of an enforcement drive against unauthorised construction.

Contemporary estimates cited in the report placed the number of demolished structures between 12 and 17. What generated particular concern was the timing. The demolition took place shortly after Deputy Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis demanded strict action against those responsible for the violence. Yet, according to the report, the structures demolished were exclusively identified as Muslim-owned, while no comparable immediate enforcement action was documented against Hindu participants in the violence.

Residents also questioned why structures that had allegedly existed for more than two decades were suddenly targeted immediately after the communal clashes. The report cites Amnesty International India, which criticised the demolitions as reflecting a discriminatory de facto policy of punitive demolition and called for due process and prosecution rather than collective punishment.

A troubling asymmetry in policing

The report’s analysis of police and criminal proceedings is among its strongest findings. It examined eight FIRs connected with the violence and found that in four cases where the complainant was Muslim, no arrests had been made at the time of review. More significantly, despite at least 22 Muslim-owned commercial establishments reportedly being vandalised during the three-day period, the report found that police had not registered a single FIR concerning those incidents at the time of its review.

The alleged assault on Jabir Ansari and the attack on the Muslim-owned transport vehicle also had not resulted in arrests in the weeks following the violence, despite victims reportedly assisting in the identification of assailants from circulating video footage. The disparity was also visible in the charges.

Muslim residents accused in connection with the January 21 confrontation were charged under Section 307 IPC — attempt to murder, carrying a maximum punishment of life imprisonment. The FIR reportedly attributed collective responsibility to a crowd of approximately 50–60 people without individualised allegations. By contrast, Hindu individuals implicated in attacks on the tempo driver and others were charged under provisions including Sections 141, 143, 147, 149, 324, 341 and 427, with a maximum punishment of three years.

The report does not claim that every accused person was innocent or guilty. Rather, it highlights the apparent difference in the treatment of comparable violence and asks whether the criminal justice response itself became communalised.

Two years later, another communal flashpoint

The second part of the report moves from the 2024 violence to Poonam Estate Cluster 1, where communal tensions erupted in May 2026 in the run-up to Bakri Eid. The immediate issue was the temporary keeping of goats within the residential complex. CSSS began its fact-finding on May 30 and continued the exercise through July 12. The team visited Poonam Cluster and interviewed residents, managing committee representatives, political and community representatives and a person who reported being assaulted.

The team also spoke to Nagnath Kamble, associated with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal, met senior municipal and police officials and observed police-convened meetings with Muslim residents on July 5 and Hindu residents on July 12.

Importantly, CSSS expressly acknowledges the limitations of its investigation. The team did not have access to several relevant documents, including FIRs, CCTV footage, some permissions and correspondence, and municipal orders or circulars. The report therefore distinguishes between corroborated information, official statements, allegations and contested interpretations, and expressly states that determining individual criminal responsibility falls outside its scope.

A detailed may be viewed here.

The goat enclosure dispute

According to Muslim residents interviewed by CSSS, goats had been temporarily kept in the society ahead of Bakri Eid for approximately eight to ten years. They consistently stated that ritual slaughter, or qurbani, had never taken place within the residential complex and was not intended there in 2026. At the same time, the report does not dismiss the concerns of Hindu residents.

Hemendra Joshi, who identified himself as a complainant, said he had objected to the practice since 2019, citing smell and use of common space. The report therefore characterises the dispute as one involving both a longstanding practice and longstanding objections. A police application or intimation was reportedly made around May 13–15. Senior Police Inspector Rajendra Kamble subsequently confirmed that police permission had been granted in time. Preparation of the temporary enclosure reportedly began around May 16. However, the administrative process remained unclear. Residents said they had approached MBMC and received acknowledgement of their application but neither a clear approval nor rejection.

Around May 24, municipal officials removed the asbestos roof of the temporary enclosure, reportedly citing fire-safety concerns. Bamboo supports were subsequently removed, and authorities ultimately ordered the goats to be taken away. Approximately 48 goats were moved on May 26 to a ground near NH School in Naya Nagar. The police later raised questions about documentation, including medical certificates, ear tags and photographs, as well as animal transportation requirements. But residents maintained that they had followed substantially the same practice for years and were willing to comply with applicable rules. The report notes that Senior PI Kamble himself recommended, after the incident, that MBMC formulate clearer regulations governing the transportation and management of animals.

When an administrative dispute became a communal confrontation

The report’s central finding on the Poonam Cluster episode is that there were real practical grievances, but these were subsequently transformed into a communal confrontation. Residents had longstanding disagreements concerning smell, hygiene, visitors and common space. The tensions also reflected earlier disputes over Taraweeh prayers, namaz, loudspeakers, religious lighting and banners, festival committees and the use of common areas.

The decisive change came when people and organisations from outside the society became involved. Residents reported the arrival of persons associated with the VHP and Bajrang Dal. Nagnath Kamble told the fact-finding team that Poonam Cluster residents had approached the VHP for assistance and estimated that the crowd eventually reached 400–500 people. Violence followed. A person interviewed by CSSS, identified as Rahim, said he was assaulted by a group after stopping near the society to enquire about the gathering. Police personnel reportedly extracted him from the crowd.

Three FIRs had been registered, according to Senior PI Kamble, although the fact-finding team did not have sufficient documentary material to establish individual criminal responsibility. A particularly provocative moment involved the appearance of a pig during the confrontation. Videos circulated widely, but CSSS could not conclusively establish who was responsible or what the person’s intention was. That uncertainty is important.

The report does not convert an unverified viral narrative into a factual conclusion. Instead, it observes that social-media circulation and political intervention increasingly reframed the dispute as one about animal sacrifice. This was materially different from the consistent account given to CSSS by Muslim residents: that the goats were being temporarily housed and that qurbani was neither being conducted nor proposed within Poonam Cluster.

What does the law actually regulate?

One of the report’s most important contributions is its attempt to separate legal questions that were repeatedly collapsed into one another. There are different legal issues concerning transportation of goats; temporary keeping of goats, animal welfare, slaughter, municipal regulation, fire safety, sanitation, and use of common residential spaces.

The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, particularly Sections 3 and 11, establishes duties concerning animal welfare and prevention of unnecessary suffering. The Transport of Animals Rules, 1978, as amended, regulate transportation of sheep and goats, including veterinary certification, fitness for transport, overcrowding and transport conditions. But, crucially, the report says these provisions do not by themselves establish a blanket prohibition on temporarily keeping goats inside residential society premises.

The report also examines the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, and the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, 1976. It notes that goats are not among the cattle categories whose slaughter is prohibited under the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, although slaughter remains subject to other applicable requirements. The report also considers the Bombay High Court’s 2019 interim order in Jiv Maitri Trust v. Union of India, but points out that the case concerned temporary permissions for slaughter during Bakri Eid and did not, on its face, establish a general prohibition on temporarily keeping goats in residential societies. The critical administrative problem, therefore, was not that no regulation could apply It was that the applicable regulation was never made sufficiently clear.

CSSS says it was unable to establish which specific MBMC provision, bye-law or administrative order was being used to prohibit or regulate the temporary keeping of goats at Poonam Cluster. If requirements had changed, or if existing requirements were being enforced differently in 2026, residents should have been informed beforehand and the rules applied transparently and consistently.

The report is particularly critical of the involvement of outside organisations. Its finding is not that religious organisations cannot raise concerns. Rather, it argues that whatever the merits of residents’ grievances, outside organisations cannot be permitted to exercise an extra-legal veto over the religious practices of residents or substitute themselves for lawful authorities and internal dispute-resolution mechanisms. This is a larger constitutional and civic question.

The report’s recommendations

CSSS calls for a considerably more transparent administrative system. It recommends that MBMC and police publish clear, multilingual guidelines well before major festivals, distinguishing between animal transportation, temporary housing, slaughter, sound, common spaces, sanitation, fire safety and crowd management. It proposes a single-window permission mechanism or nodal officer coordinating municipal, police, fire, veterinary and transport authorities. It calls for impartial and proportionate enforcement, written reasons for approvals and refusals, and an end to selective enforcement.

The report also recommends representative internal mechanisms within Poonam Cluster involving different faith communities, owners and tenants, women and senior citizens. It also calls for trained mediators and Mohalla or Shanti Committees to intervene before ordinary disputes become communal flashpoints.

Most significantly, the report calls on police to act preventively against unauthorised gatherings, intimidation, threats, blockades and attempts by outside groups to impose decisions upon residential communities.

On hate speech, it refers to Sections 196 and 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the Supreme Court’s directions in Shaheen Abdullah v. Union of India concerning suo motu action by police where hate speech meets the legal threshold. The report also calls for more responsible communication by political actors, community organisations and the media, specifically warning against conflating temporary goat-keeping with slaughter.

The report ultimately does not call for the State to ignore genuine grievances. Its position is more demanding: the State must address genuine grievances without allowing communal identity to determine whose grievance is heard, whose violence is prosecuted and whose rights are protected. CSSS concludes that the Poonam Cluster episode was neither simply a dispute about goats nor an inexplicable outbreak of communal hostility. It resulted from the interaction of religious practice, local grievances, unclear regulation, weak internal dispute-resolution mechanisms, municipal intervention, outside mobilisation, political intervention, violence and social-media amplification.

The complete report may be read here:

Related:

Attempts to communalise Mira Road Eid preparations defused by residents and police

Mira Road: Mosque clerics welcome people from across religion and caste to Jama Masjid Al Shams this Ramzan

Mira Road to see Hindutva rally tomorrow after HC grants permission, citizens approach police to ensure peace

Bombay HC grants conditional permission to BJP MLA Raja Singh for Feb 25 Mira Road-Bhayander meet, orders videotaping and ‘No Hate Speech’

#GetWellSoonGeetaJain Campaign gets off the ground, Mira Road Bhayander residents’ push back against Hate

Mira-Road Bhayander Police rejects permission to BJP MLA T Raja Singh for rally on February 25, cites hate speeches

Police disrupt anti hate-speech campaign in Mira-Bhayandar 

The post From the violence of 2024 to the Bakri Eid tensions of 2026, a fact-finding report examines Mira Road’s deepening communal fault lines appeared first on SabrangIndia.