In many places, the festival passed peacefully. Families gathered after morning namaz, meat was distributed among relatives and poorer households, and local communities quietly adjusted practices to avoid confrontation. But in several cities and towns, Bakri Eid also became the centre of communal disputes over goats, housing societies, slaughter spaces, public prayer, and even the visibility of Muslim religious life itself.

The result was a festival that revealed two India’s simultaneously: one still capable of accommodation and coexistence, and another where Muslim festivals are increasingly subjected to suspicion, policing, and political contestation. Authorities across the country remained on high alert in the days leading up to Eid-ul-Adha. Police deployments were increased, livestock transportation was monitored, housing societies issued restrictions, and state governments reiterated cattle slaughter regulations. The atmosphere reflected the growing politicisation of Bakri Eid itself.

The festival under regulation

One of the clearest patterns this year was the extent to which Eid celebrations became governed through administrative control and legal regulation. As Moneycontrol reported in a detailed nationwide survey of cattle slaughter laws ahead of Bakri Eid, state governments issued extensive advisories and intensified enforcement drives around livestock transport, slaughterhouses, and sacrificial practices.

The report highlighted how India’s fragmented legal landscape around cattle slaughter shaped Eid observances differently across states. Maharashtra strictly enforced provisions under the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, which bans slaughter of cows, bulls, and bullocks. Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat continued to enforce some of the country’s harshest anti-cow slaughter laws, with penalties extending to life imprisonment in certain circumstances. Assam intensified enforcement under the Assam Cattle Preservation Act, while Karnataka reiterated provisions under its stringent 2020 anti-cattle slaughter legislation.

In Delhi, minister Kapil Mishra publicly warned that sacrifice of prohibited bovine species would invite criminal prosecution. Rapid response teams were formed across districts to monitor transport and slaughter activities.

Municipal corporations and local administrations across cities also insisted that qurbani be conducted only at officially designated spaces. In Mumbai, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation reportedly designated 109 authorised slaughter locations and discouraged sacrifice in residential societies and chawls.

Increasingly, the question was no longer merely what Muslims could sacrifice during Eid, but where, how visibly, and under whose permission.

Pandharpur and the other possibility

Yet even amid this tense atmosphere, there were moments that reflected a very different social reality. Perhaps the most striking example came from Pandharpur in Maharashtra. As reported by Hindustan Times, the town’s Muslim community voluntarily decided to defer goat sacrifice because Bakri Eid coincided with Adhik Maas Ekadashi, an occasion of deep significance for devotees of Lord Vitthal.

Members of the Muslim community told reporters that they wanted to honour the sentiments of Hindu pilgrims visiting the temple town. Some residents reportedly said that Muslims in Pandharpur had long-standing emotional and spiritual connections with the town’s religious culture and had similarly deferred sacrifice in previous years when such overlaps occurred. The symbolism mattered. At a time when Muslim religious practices were being intensely scrutinised elsewhere, Pandharpur offered a reminder that coexistence in India has historically depended less on legal coercion and more on negotiated accommodation and everyday mutual recognition. The story received wide attention precisely because it contrasted so sharply with the hostility unfolding elsewhere.

Mira Road: From housing dispute to communal flashpoint

The most widely discussed communal tensions around Bakri Eid this year emerged from Mira Road near Mumbai. What began as a disagreement by a few inside a housing society over goats being kept ahead of Eid soon escalated into a much larger communal controversy involving right-wing groups, police intervention, counter-protests, and allegations of deliberate provocation.

Detailed report by SabrangIndia may be read here.

Tensions erupted at Poonam Cluster Society after some residents objected to goats being housed within the premises. Muslim residents maintained that they had obtained municipal permission and pointed out that the practice had existed for years within the society. The dispute quickly moved beyond internal society negotiations.

As provided in our report, fringe elements associated with organisations such as the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad entered the scene. What followed was an escalation marked by religious sloganeering, clashes, and eventually one of the most disturbing incidents reported during this year’s Eid period: attempts to bring pigs into the housing society as a counter-protest to the legally valid presence of goats.

The symbolism was unmistakable. And yet, what happened afterward was equally important.

Three days later, the same society celebrated Eid peacefully under police protection. In a follow-up report, Hindustan Times quoted residents insisting that “outsiders” had aggravated what was initially a manageable internal disagreement.

Residents described years of communal coexistence inside the society. Muslim families explained that the temporary goat sheds had existed for years with proper drainage and regular cleaning arrangements. Hindu and Muslim neighbours reportedly exchanged Eid greetings despite the violence of previous days.

The Mira Road episode therefore became more than a local dispute. It illustrated how quickly ordinary disagreements over shared residential space can now be communalised through organised intervention and political mobilisation. At the same time, it also revealed the persistence of local social relationships that continue to resist complete polarisation.

Kalyan and the politics of religious space

Another major point of friction emerged in Kalyan, Maharashtra. As reported by The Hindu, police-imposed restrictions on animal sacrifice inside several housing societies and heavily barricaded the area around the historic Durgadi Fort complex during Eid prayers.

The site is politically and communally sensitive because a temple and mosque exist in close proximity within the fort complex. According to the report, temporary restrictions on temple access during Eid prayers led to protests by members of both Shiv Sena factions and Hindu organisations. Groups gathered nearby to recite the Hanuman Chalisa after prayers concluded, while demonstrations were organised around allegations that Hindu devotees were being prevented from entering the temple.

The issue carried deep historical resonance. The Hindu noted that the Durgadi Fort dispute has remained politically charged since the 1980s and is closely linked to the legacy of Shiv Sena strongman Anand Dighe. Bakri Eid here became not just a religious event but a symbolic battleground over ownership of public and sacred space.

Political language and “new Hindutva”

The tensions surrounding Bakri Eid also triggered overt political commentary. Shiv Sena (UBT) MP Sanjay Raut accused certain groups of attempting to communalise the festival through what he described as “new Hindutva.” According to reports published by News The Truth, Raut argued that Maharashtra historically represented a culture of coexistence and criticised what he viewed as selective outrage around Muslim animal sacrifice while remaining silent on sacrifices associated with other traditions.

His remarks reflected a broader political argument emerging this year: that opposition to Bakri Eid practices was no longer being framed merely through animal welfare or civic regulation, but increasingly through majoritarian identity politics. At the same time, Hindu nationalist groups repeatedly framed their protests around language of “public hygiene,” “society rules,” “religious sensitivity,” and “illegal sacrifice.”

The conflict was therefore rarely articulated openly as anti-Muslim hostility. Instead, it often appeared through the bureaucratic and civic vocabulary of regulation, sanitation, legality, and public order.

Varanasi and the economics of Eid

The tensions surrounding Bakri Eid were not only communal or political. They were also economic. In Varanasi, authorities sealed the city’s decades-old Benia Bagh goat market just days before Eid, triggering panic among traders. According to reports carried by Indian Express, the market — one of eastern Uttar Pradesh’s largest seasonal livestock bazaars — had functioned for nearly four decades before authorities abruptly shut it down citing sanitation complaints and overcrowding.

Traders alleged that they were given little warning and faced devastating losses after travelling from multiple districts with goats purchased on credit.

Several traders reportedly said they had mortgaged valuables and borrowed money at high interest rates to participate in Eid livestock trade and now feared financial ruin if they could not sell their animals.

The closure highlighted another dimension of Eid increasingly overlooked in public discourse: the festival sustains a vast informal economy involving livestock farmers, transport workers, traders, butchers, leather workers, and local markets. Administrative crackdowns therefore carry not only symbolic implications, but material consequences for livelihoods as well.

Prayer, surveillance, and preventive policing

Even public prayer itself became contested in some areas. Reports circulated from Agra that Hindu nationalist leaders planned protests over temporary free entry arrangements at the Taj Mahal for Eid namaz. Police responded by placing several individuals under house arrest to prevent escalation. Elsewhere, social media videos documented protests around Eid prayers and public recitations of the Hanuman Chalisa near Muslim gatherings.

The visible police presence across cities became one of the defining features of Bakri Eid this year. In Mira Road alone, dozens of police personnel were reportedly stationed around sensitive housing societies to prevent further escalation.

The scale of preventive policing reflected both administrative caution and the extent to which Muslim festivals are increasingly treated as potential law-and-order situations.

The festival that revealed the country

Bakri Eid in India this year cannot be reduced either to a story of communal harmony or one of inevitable communal conflict. Both realities existed simultaneously.

There were stories of accommodation: Muslims in Pandharpur postponing sacrifice to respect Ekadashi; local communities negotiating solutions quietly; residents insisting that coexistence mattered more than provocation; neighbours exchanging Eid greetings despite recent tensions.

But there were also unmistakable signs of a changing political climate: housing societies policing Muslim practices; right-wing mobilisation around goats and sacrifice; counter-protests involving pigs; increasing restrictions on where Muslims may pray or perform qurbani; administrative language increasingly framing Eid through surveillance and control.

The deeper significance of Bakri Eid this year lay not merely in the incidents themselves, but in what they revealed about the condition of public life in India.

Questions that once belonged largely to the private domain of religious observance — where goats may be kept, where sacrifice may occur, whether namaz may be offered in a particular place — are now increasingly contested in public and political arenas. And yet, despite everything, the festival still passed. Families prayed. Communities negotiated fragile peace. And in many places, ordinary people continued to protect coexistence even when political actors attempted to fracture it. Bakri Eid in 2026 therefore became a portrait of contemporary India itself: anxious, polarised, heavily policed — but still, in countless everyday ways, struggling to hold together.

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The post Between Celebration and Suspicion: How Bakri Eid passed across india in 2026 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

[Allahabad High Court judgement delivered on May 15, 2026]

“A group of dacoits clad only in undergarments allegedly carried out multiple robberies in Mustafabad and Sithauli villages [Uttar Pradesh]…Armed intruders reportedly scaled the wall of farmer Nizakat’s house in the early hours of Wednesday [May 20, 2026] and held his family hostage… When resisted, they assaulted the inmates, critically injuring six people…According to the police, the robbers beat women also for keeping a chicken dish at home, and told them to eat only vegetables.”

[The New Indian Express, May 21, 2026]

With RSS cadres in full control of the Indian State, June 2014 onward, the country has become a laboratory for a major dietary fabrication:  that vegetarianism is Sanatan to Hinduism. It is not that prior to Modi’s coming to power the concept did not exist, a substantial and powerful section of the ruling elite including Gandhi were vociferous believers in it. However, it was not a project for which Indian State worked vehemently.

The neo-zealots of vegetarian Hinduism argue that diet was not just nourishment for the body. It was a matter of spiritual realm which shaped “our thoughts, emotions, and karmic vibrations… The Vedas say, ‘Yad annam, tad manas’ which means ‘As is the food, so is the mind’ …Vegetarian food is considered sattvik-pure, calm, and balanced. It nurtures peace, compassion, and mental clarity. Non-vegetarian food, on the other hand, is tamasic- heavy, aggressive, and rooted in destruction. It dulls our spiritual perception and increases lower (read base) tendencies like anger, fear, and restlessness.”

[https://www.adityavastu.in/post/eating-non-veg-and-its-impact-on-karmikta]

With the beginning of Modi era, it became normal to ban sale and consumption of non-veg eatables for long periods during many religious festivals and many areas permanently declared out of bound for selling/consuming it. The issue of food was weaponized and both seller as well as consumers of non-veg cuisine were declared to be evil elements, a threat to Hinduism and society. Another sinister dimension added was that meat consumers were also attacked for indulging in beef-eating. There are countless incidents in public domain when non-veg consumers were attacked, lynched, their houses bulldozed, even burnt.

The zeal of RSS-BJP rulers in enforcing vegetarian Hinduism is to be seen and believed in dealing with foreign dignitaries. President of Russia Vladimir Putin visiting India in 2025 was chief guest at a lavish dinner thrown by India President on December 6, 2025) where only vegetarian cuisines were served. It was no different when EU delegation was State Guest on January 29, 2026, Seychelles President Patrick Herminie was chief guest at State dinner on February 9, 2026 and Vietnamese PM To Lam on May 6, 2026).

Only vegetarian menu of the banquet hosted by President Murmu for Seychelles President. For other dignitaries too it was only vegetarian menu with different dishes. As per a report in NDTV.

Across India, across educational institutions, businesses, railways and social-religious gatherings non-veg food has been banned. Debarshi Dasgupta (Strait Times, May 18, 2026) lamented the fact that in “Uttar Pradesh, a state also governed by the BJP, curated a list of local cuisines from each of its 75 districts and released it in May. It is a list that includes over 200 dishes, but, again, not a single one of them is meat-based. What makes this ludicrous is that more than half of the state’s population (53.6 per cent), according to a government survey, confirmed eating fish, chicken or other kinds of meat. It is also a state celebrated for its meat-based cuisines, particularly its capital, Lucknow, whose kebabs are legendary.”

Interestingly, the kebab “even found specific praise from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), when it added Lucknow to its ‘Cities of Gastronomy’ list in 2025. But when Minister of Culture and Tourism Gajendra Singh Shekhawat feted this decision on social media, he disingenuously used a poster of food items that were – no surprise here – entirely vegetarian”.

Pushpesh Pant, a renowned Indian academic and food historian as quoted by Dasgupta stated: “It is also a thinly disguised persecution of Muslims, many of whom are perceived to be butchers and vendors of meat and who supposedly are the beef-eaters.” As per a report in Asia News Network.

Varanasi Iftar-on-Boat Arrests

If we want to understand the gravity of weaponization against non-veg consumers and surrender of the State including judiciary, the case known as Varanasi Iftar-on-Boat Arrests needs to be taken note of. According to a detailed report by Shinjinee Majumdar in The Wire (March 27, 2026), the controversy started with a video of March 15 “in which 14 men — Azad Ali, Aamir Kaiki, Danish Saifi, Mohd. Ahmad, Nehal Afridi, Mahfooz Alam, Mohd. Anas, Mohd. Awwal, Mohd. Tahseem, Mohd. Ahmad alias Raja, Mohd. Noor Ismail, Mohd. Tausif Ahmad, Mohd. Faizan, and Mohd. Sameer — were seen breaking their Ramzan-month fast on a boat, allegedly consuming chicken biryani”.

The video was uploaded by one of the group members and soon went viral.  According to The Wire report: “A complaint filed on March 16 by Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha (BJYM)’s Varanasi president Rajat Jaiswal accused them of hurting religious sentiments by consuming non-vegetarian food on the river and disposing of waste into it. The police subsequently arrested 14 men under multiple charges, including hurting religious sentiments, public nuisance and polluting water. Days later, more serious charges — including extortion — were added, significantly raising the legal stakes.”

Jaiswal’s complaint on which Varanasi police took immediate action stated that eating non-veg while riding a boat at Ganga Mother was a grave sin. Moreover, after eating they washed their hands, dumping the waste, thus hurt the religious sentiments of Hindus.

The initial charges against the accused included: Section 298 BNS — Defiling a place of worship with intent to insult a religion, Section 299 BNS — Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, Section 196(1)(B) BNS — Promoting enmity between groups on religious grounds, Section 270 BNS — Public nuisance, Section 279 BNS — Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir, Section 223(B) BNS — Disobedience of an order by a public servant and Section 24, Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.

Later two more serious charges were added, Section 308(5) BNS — Extortion under threat of death or grievous hurt and Section 67, Information Technology Act — Publishing or transmitting obscene material (linked to the viral video).

With these additions, the potential punishment increased significantly — from a maximum of around six years (under the Water Act) to up to 10 years due to the extortion charge.

According to The Wire report, a Varanasi court had denied bail to the accused on March 23. They had earlier been remanded to 14 days of judicial custody on March 19, until April 1.

However, Allahabad High Court Single Bench of Justice of Rajiv Lochan Shukla granted bail with some conditions to the incarcerated Muslims on May 15. The Judge’s words in the judgement, however, amplified the majoritarian and politicized Hindutva construct of vegetarian Hinduism: “members of the Muslim community having a Roza Iftar party, and during the said Iftar party, while partaking of food, non-vegetarian food is said to have been consumed by the members of the Muslim community, who are then alleged to have thrown the remains into the River Ganges. This fact in the dispassionate opinion of the Court could rightly be said to hurt religious sentiments of the Hindu community.”

[]

The far right propaganda machine of “vegetarian Hinduism” is currently running amok in India belying contents of both scriptures and historical study.

Manusmriti for Meat-eating

According to Hindutva ideologue, VD Savarkar Manusmriti is the go-to scripture after the Vedas for Hindus.

[Savarkar, V.D., ‘Women in Manusmriti’ in Savarkar Samagar (collection of Savarkar’s writings in Hindi) volume IV, Prabhat, Delhi, 2000, p. 416.]

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak sangh, an organisation that is the organizational and ideological fountainhead of the present regime ruling India, made demands that it is the Manusmriti that needs must be declared as the Constitution of India—this at a time when the Indian Constituent Assembly was enacting the Constitution.

[Editorial, RSS English organ, Organiser, ‘The Constitution, November 30, 1949.]

This scripture –Manusmriti–that has been substantively critiqued by Dr BR Ambedkar among many other scholars– glorifies the eating of flesh as we will see in the following.

*That land where the black antelope naturally roams, one must know to be fit for the performance of sacrifices; (the tract) different from that (is) the country of the Mlechas. (II/23)

*[A Brahmin should not eat] food given without due respect, nor (that which contains) meat eaten for no sacred purpose, nor (that given) by a female who has no male (relatives), nor the food of an enemy, nor that (given) by the lord of a town, nor that (given) by outcasts, nor that on which anybody has sneezed. (IV/213);

*‘The consumption of meat (is befitting) for sacrifices,’ that is declared to be a rule made by the gods; but to persist (in using it) on other (occasions) is said to be a proceeding worthy of Rakshasas. (V/31)

*He who eats meat, when he honours the gods and manes, commits no sin, whether he has bought it, or himself has killed (the animal), or has received it as a present from others. (V/32)

*A twice-born man who knows the law, must not eat meat except in conformity with the law; for if he has eaten it unlawfully, he will, unable to save himself, be eaten after death by his (victims). (V/33)

*After death the guilt of one who slays deer for gain is not as (great) as that of him who eats meat for no (sacred) purpose. (V/34)

*But a man who, being duly engaged (to officiate or to dine at a sacred rite), refuses to eat meat, becomes after death an animal during twenty-one existences. (V/35)

*A Brahmana must never eat (the flesh of animals unhallowed by Mantras; but, obedient to the primeval law, he may eat it, consecrated with Vedic texts. (V/36)

*A twice-born man who, knowing the true meaning of the Veda, slays an animal for these purposes, causes both himself and the animal to enter a most blessed state. (V/42)

[This selection of Manu’s Codes is from F. Max Muller, Laws of Manu (Delhi: LP Publications, 1996; first published in 1886). The bracket after each code incorporates number of chapter/number of code according to the above edition.]

Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Meat-Eating

The Arthsastra of Kautilya (Chanakya) is the second go-to book of governance for RSS-BJP rulers and cadres. How dear this treatise is to them can be gauged by the fact that the Modi 3.0 government while organising the Sadhna Saptah (April 2-8, 2026) and Mission Karmayogi declared it to be a basic book  for training Indian administrators along with the Vedas.

Interestingly, the Arthsastra has 67 references decreeing flesh eating. The amazing part is that it has a specific chapter titled ‘Superintendent of Slaughter House’.

[R Shamasastry (trans), Kautilya’s Arthsastra, Mysore Printing and Publishing house,     Mysore, 1915, Pgs 149-53]

According to the rules of the slaughter house, “of beasts of prey that have been captured, the Superintendent shall take one-sixth; of fish and birds (of similar nature), he shall take one-tenth or more than one-tenth; and of deer and other beasts (mrigapasu), one-tenth or more than one-tenth as toll…(Butchers) shall sell fresh and boneless flesh of beasts (mrigapasu deer or wild animal) just killed. If they sell bony flesh, they shall give an equivalent compensation (pratipákam)” [P. 138].

There is no ban on slaughter of cows, however, “cattle such as a calf, a bull, or a milch cow shall not be slaughtered…The flesh of animals which have been killed outside the slaughter-house (parisúnam), headless, legless and boneless flesh, rotten flesh, and the flesh of animals which have suddenly died shall not be sold. Otherwise, a fine of 12 panas shall be imposed [Pgs. 138-39]”.

People are allowed to keep stock of dried flesh, skins, tendons (snáyu)…in such quantities as can be enjoyed for years together without feeling any want. Of such collection, old things shall be replaced by new ones when received. [P. 55]

Referring to different kinds of animals, Arthsastra decrees: “When an animal dies a natural death, they shall surrender the skin with the brand mark, if it is a cow or a buffalo; the skin together with the ear (karnalakshanam) if it is a goat or sheep; the tail with the skin containing the brand mark, if it is an ass or a camel; the skin, if it is a young one; besides the above, (they shall also restore) the fat (vasti), bile, marrow (snáyu), teeth, hoofs, horns, and bones. They (the cowherds) may sell either fresh flesh or dried flesh.” [P. 147]

Kautilya’s cities were not inhabited by vegetarian folks as we find that the chapter ‘Building within the Fort’ allots sites for flesh traders; “To the south, the superintendents of the city, of commerce, of manufactories, and of the army as well as those who trade in cooked rice, liquor, and flesh, besides prostitutes, musicians, and the people of Vaisya caste shall live.” [P. 54]

The chapter titled ‘Superintendent of Store-House’ [p. 101] assigns a duty of collecting taxes/recovery of past arrears to the superintendent from dealers of ‟Clarified butter, oil, serum of flesh, and pith or sap (of plants, etc.)…Dried fish, bulbous roots (kándamúla), fruits and vegetables form the group of edibles (sakavarga)”. [Pgs. 102-103]

The same chapter while dealing with the contents of each meal of an ARYA, low Castes, women and children states: “For dressing twenty palas of flesh, [1000 palas make one tula] half a kutumba of oil, one pala of salt, one pala of sugar (kshára), two dharanas of pungent substances (katuka, spices), and half a prastha of curd (will be necessary). For dressing greater quantities of flesh, the same ingredients can be proportionally increased. For cooking sákas (dried fish and vegetables), the above substances are to be added one and a half times as much. For dressing dried fish, the above ingredients are to be added twice as much.” [P. 105]

Under the head ‘Superintendent of Cows’ the boss has the authority of classifying “cattle as calves, steers, tamable ones, draught oxen, bulls that are to be trained to yoke, bulls kept for crossing cows, cattle that are fit only for the supply of flesh…” [P. 146] According to Chanakya, “When an animal dies a natural death, they shall surrender the skin with the brand mark, if it is a cow or a buffalo; the skin together with the ear (karnalakshanam) if it is a goat or sheep; the tail with the skin containing the brand mark, if it is an ass or a camel; the skin, if it is a young one; besides the above, (they shall also restore) the fat (vasti), bile, marrow (snáyu), teeth, hoofs, horns, and bones. They (the cowherds) may sell either fresh flesh or dried flesh.” [P. 147]

It may be shocking for many animal lovers that the feed for bulls apart from including grass one tulá (100 palas) of oil cakes, 10 ádhakas of bran, 5 palas of salt (mukhalavanam), one kudumba of oil for rubbing over the nose (nasya), 1 prastha of drink (pána) added one tulá of flesh in the daily diet. [P. 148] Daily diet for horse included “50 palas of flesh”. [P. 150]

Likewise, the rations for an elephant (of a specific height) includes “50 palas of flesh” and elephant, watchmen, sweepers, cooks and others shall receive apart from cooked rice, a handful of oil, sugar and salt 10 palas of flesh. [Pgs. 155-158]

The chapter dealing with ‘Remedies against National Calamities’ prescribes a non-vegetarian remedy by stating “Persons acquainted with the rituals of the Atharvaveda, and experts in sacred magic and mysticism shall perform such ceremonials as ward off the danger from demons. On full-moon days the worship of Chaityas may be performed by placing on a verandah offerings such as an umbrella, the picture of an arm, a flag, and some goat’s flesh”. [P. 239]

The Arthashastra makes it clear that tax was collected on flesh. “They (the king’s employees) may demand of cultivators one-fourth of their grain, and one-sixth of forest produce (vanya) and of such commodities as cotton, wax, fabrics, barks of trees, hemp, wool, silk, medicines, sandal, flowers, fruits, vegetables, firewood, bamboos, flesh, and dried flesh.” [P. 274]

The animal flesh/serum was used as medicines/remedies also. “When the body of a man is smeared over with the serum of the flesh of a frog, it burns with fire (with no hurt)…When the body of a man is smeared over with the above serum as well as with the oil extracted from the fruits of kusa (ficus religiosa), and ámra (mango tree), and when the powder prepared from an ocean frog (samdura mandúki), phenaka (sea-foam), and sarjarasa (the juice of vatica robusta) is sprinkled over the body, it burns with fire (without being hurt). When the body of a man is smeared over with sesamum oil mixed with equal quantities of the serum of the flesh of a frog, crab, and other animals, it can burn with fire (without hurt)…paste prepared from the roots of páribhadraka (erythrina indica), pratibala , vanjula (a kind of ratan or tree), vajra (andropogon muricatum or euphorbia), and kadali (banana), mixed with the serum of the flesh of a frog, can walk over fire (without hurt). Oil should be extracted from the paste prepared from the roots of pratibala, vanjula and páribhadraka, all growing near water, the paste being mixed with the serum of the flesh of a frog. Having anointed one’s legs with this oil, one can walk over a white-hot mass of fire as though on a bed of roses. The paste prepared from the powder of the rib-bone of náraka (?), a donkey, kanka (a kind of vulture), and bhása (a bird), mixed with the juice of water-lily, is applied to the legs of bipeds and quadrupeds (while making a journey). The fat or serum derived from roasting a pregnant camel together with saptaparna (lechites scholaris) or from roasting dead children in cremation grounds, is applied to render a journey of a hundred yojanas easy. [Pgs. 458-60.]

Restrictions

“King should prohibit the slaughter of animals for half a month during the period of Cháturmásya (from July to September), for four nights during the full moon, and for a night on the day of the birth-star of the conqueror or of the national star. He should also prohibit the slaughter of females and young ones (yonibálavadham) as well as castration. Having abolished those customs or transactions which he might consider either as injurious to the growth of his revenue and army or as unrighteous, he should establish righteous transactions.” [P. 449.]

Beef Eating Essential for Brahmins in ancient (early) India

Swami Vivekananda, regarded as a philosopher of Hindutva by the RSS, while addressing a meeting at the Shakespeare Club, Pasadena, California, USA (February 2, 1900) on the theme of ‘Buddhistic India’, declared:

“You will be astonished if I tell you that, according to old ceremonials, he is not a good Hindu who does not eat beef. On certain occasions he must sacrifice a bull and eat it.”

[Vivekananda, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, vol. 3 (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1997), P. 536.]

He further stated that without eating beef, “no Brahmin could remain a Brahmin; you read in the Vedas how, when a Sannyasin [a Hindu religious mendicant], a king, or a great man came into house, the best bullock was killed…” [Ibid., P. 174.]

This is corroborated by other research works sponsored by the Ramakrishna Mission established by Vivekananda. According to C. Kunhan Raja, a prominent authority on the history and culture of the Vedic period:

“The Vedic Aryans, including the Brahmanas, ate fish, meat and even beef. A distinguished guest was honoured with beef served at a meal. Although the Vedic Aryans ate beef, milch cows were not killed. One of the words that designated cow was aghnya (what shall not be killed). But a guest was a goghna (one for whom a cow is killed). It is only bulls, barren cows and calves that were killed.”

[Raja, C. Kunhan, Vedic Culture‟, cited in the series, Suniti Kumar Chatterji and others (eds.), The Cultural Heritage of India, vol. 1 (Calcutta: The Ramakrishna Mission, 1993), P. 217.]

Kunhan Raja countering the myth of vegetarian Hinduism stated:

“The Grhya Sutras prescribe different kinds of meat to be given to be given to children at the first feeding ceremony, for different results. Mutton, flesh of different kinds of birds, and other forms of meat were freely eaten by the higher Castes in those days, and still they were the most spiritual nation in the world.” [Ibid.]

One of the greatest researchers, scholar and an authority on Indian politics, religions and culture Dr. BR Ambedkar produced a brilliant essay on the subject titled ‘Did the Hindus Never Eat Beef?’

All those who are really interested in understanding the ‘Hindu Past’ must read this monumental work of Dr. Ambedkar. After studying a large number of Vedic and Hindu scriptures, he arrived at the conclusion that,

“when the learned Brahmins argue that the Hindus not only never ate beef but they always held the cow to be sacred and were always opposed to the killing of the cow, it is impossible to accept their view”.

[Ambedkar, B. R., ‘Did the Hindus never eat beef?’ in The Untouchables: Who Were They and Why They Became Untouchables? in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, vol. 7, (Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1990, first edition 1948) Pgs 323-328.]

Also see the scholarly work by Professor DN Jha, The Myth of the Holy Cow, link: https://archive.org/details/TheMythOfHolyCowJha]

Interestingly, the findings of Ambedkar were that cows were sacrificed and beef consumed because COWS were HOLY.

According to Ambedkar:

“It was not that the cow was not sacred in Vedic times, it was because of her sacredness that it is ordained in the Vajasaneyi Samhita that beef should be eaten.” (Dharma Shastra Vichar in Marathi, Pg. 180). That the Aryans of the Rig Veda did kill cows for purposes of food and ate beef is abundantly clear from the Rig Veda itself. In Rig Veda (X. 86.14) Indra says: ‘They cook for one 15 plus twenty oxen’. The Rig Veda (X.91.14) says that for Agni were sacrificed horses, bulls, oxen, barren cows and rams. From the Rig Veda (X.72.6) it appears that the cow was killed with a sword or axe.”

Ambedkar concluded this essay with the following words:

“With this evidence no one can doubt that there was a time when Hindus, both Brahmins and non-Brahmins, ate not only flesh but also beef.”

[Ibid., Pgs 323-328.]

Anandmath: Sanatan/Hindu Sena consuming flesh

Bankim Chandra Chatterjee is also a Rishi (Holy Teacher) for the RSS-BJP combine. This writer’s otherwise his pro-British novel, Anandmath, is another important (read holy) treatise for votaries of Hindu nationalism. A leader of Santan or Hindu army, Jivananda comes to visit her sister, Nimi who serves him, “some clean, jasmine-white rice, some tasteful dal, a curry of wild figs, some fish netted  [sic] from her own tank and some milk”.

[Sen-Gupta, Nares Chandra (translator Bankim Chandra Chatterjee’s Anandamath), Abbey of Bliss, Padmini Mohan Neogi, Calcutta, P. 65.]

India as a global beef exporter/powerhouse under Modi

India has quietly emerged as global beef powerhouse. The country now ranks as the world’s second-largest beef exporter earning nearly 3.8 billion dollars or around 34,177 crore rupees worth of this meat, annually. Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra,, and Andhra Pradesh account for the bulk of these exports with Uttar Pradesh alone contributing nearly 60% of India’s beef shipments.”

[“India Becomes World’s Second-Largest Beef Exporter Amid Cow Vigilante            Violence”, Jan 02, 2026, https://www.deshabhimani.com/deshabhimani-english -/national-76192/india-beef-exports-cow-vigilante-violence-48452]

Fisheries export

Vegetarian India is making great strides in exporting seafood too, to the world.

According to a Government of India (GOI) press release dated April 3, 2026

“India’s seafood exports have recorded strong and sustained growth, expanding at an average annual rate of 7% over the past 11 years. Marine product exports have more than doubled during the period, rising from ₹30,213 crore in 2013‑14 to ₹62,408 crore in 2024‑25, driven largely by shrimp exports valued at ₹43,334 crore. India’s seafood exports span a wide and diversified basket, with over 350 varieties of products shipped to nearly 130 global markets.” [https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2248721&reg=3&lang=1]

Unholy use of the waters of the Holy Ganga

Hindutva’s claim vis a vis Holy Mother Ganga must be taken not just with a pinch, but fistfuls of salt. According to Government of India data Ganga water is supplied to Delhi, Patna, Rajgir, Gaya, Bodhgaya, Bhagalpur, and Nawada (Bihar), Kanpur, Allahabad, Varanasi and several cities in Western UP, Haridwar (Uttarakhand), and Kolkata (West Bengal). This supply is not for fulfilling some religious duties but for all kinds of cleaning, washing and sanitary purposes.

How is this tolerated? Is it not high time for the courts to intervene?

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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Rewriting NCERT school textbooks: ‘Muslim Raj’ is a mere excuse, the project is to conceal historical facts

Unity not Hate: Commemorating the 168th anniversary of 1857 War of Independence

How Hindutva forces colluded with both the British & Jinnah against the historic ‘Quit India’ movement: Archives

The post Have Hindus always been Vegetarian? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

CJP stated in the complaints that the alleged hate speeches violated constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 15 and 21 and attracted offences under provisions relating to promotion of enmity between groups, criminal intimidation, statements conducing to public mischief, deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings, and incitement to violence.

The complaints concern speeches delivered in Chandivali and Malad Malvani in Mumbai, Kalyani in Nadia district of West Bengal, and Junnar in Pune district.

Complaint against Nitesh Narayan Rane over Chandivali speech: May 12, 2026

In a complaint dated May 12, 2026, addressed to Shri Nikhil Gupta, Additional Director General (Law & Order), Maharashtra, Addl. Commissioner of Police, West Region, Mumbai, and Senior Police Inspector, Sakinaka Police Station, Mumbai, CJP sought registration of an FIR against BJP MLA and Maharashtra Cabinet Minister Nitesh Narayan Rane for allegedly delivering a divisive communal speech during a Hindu convention held in Chandivali, Mumbai on May 3, 2026.

CJP stated in the complaint that Rane utilised dehumanising language against Muslims, spread conspiracy theories regarding “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” “Corporate Jihad,” and “Ghazwa-e-Hind,” and openly encouraged social and economic boycott of Muslims. The complaint alleged that the speech attempted to create fear and hostility by portraying Muslims as an existential threat to Hindus and India.

According to CJP, Rane repeatedly referred to Muslims as “green snakes” and urged the audience to confront them. The complaint reproduces the speech transcript, including the following statements:

“[They] should come to Maharashtra. This writhing of green snakes (referring to Muslims) must stop. That is why the saffron flag has been unfurled in Maharashtra, remember this.”

“And therefore, while moving around as a Hindu, do so with self-confidence. Move with courage. If any green snake is writhing here, take guidance from Tai and then give me a call.”

The complaint further stated that Rane repeatedly described India as a “Hindu Rashtra” and suggested that Muslims were attempting to convert India into an Islamic nation through organised conspiracies.

CJP also stated in the complaint that Rane attempted to create fear among Hindus by claiming that Muslims would prevent Hindu religious practices if their population increased.

The complaint reproduces the following statements:

“You won’t be able to perform puja in your home. This saffron flag won’t be able to fly here. You won’t be able to apply the Tilak on your forehead.”

“Mothers and sisters won’t be able to apply vermilion (Sindoor) on their heads.”

According to CJP, the speech also included references to alleged communal incidents in Palghar and Virar to reinforce hostility against Muslims. The complaint additionally highlighted Rane’s remarks calling for economic boycott of Muslims:

“So, when we are dealing with them, buying from them, or giving them jobs—first, if someone is sitting at a shop, even if the shop’s signboard says ‘Jay Shri Ram,’ sometimes Abdul is sitting inside.”

“First tell him, ‘Recite the Hanuman Chalisa for me first.’ If you recite the Hanuman Chalisa only then will I buy from you, otherwise I won’t.”

“Therefore, if jobs are to be given or purchases are to be made, it should only be for Hindus—this should be the stance of all of us.”

CJP stated in the complaint that these remarks amounted to explicit encouragement of discrimination and exclusion of citizens based on religion and constituted a direct appeal for economic boycott of Muslims.

A copy of complaint dated May 12, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Nitesh Rane over Malad Malvani speech during Ram Navami Yatra

In another complaint dated April 28, 2026, addressed to Maharashtra Police authorities, CJP sought registration of an FIR against Nitesh Narayan Rane over a speech delivered during the Ram Navami Yatra held in Malad Malvani, Mumbai, on March 26, 2026.

According to CJP, the speech promoted communal hostility, issued direct threats of violence, and attempted to alienate Muslims by declaring India a “Hindu Rashtra” and describing the locality as belonging exclusively to “saffron-clad” Hindus.

CJP stated in the complaint that Rane used references to “Pakistan” as a dog-whistle against Muslims and openly threatened those opposing Hindutva ideology.

The complaint reproduces the following portions of the speech:

“Perhaps some people here in Malvani have forgotten that this is our Hindu Rashtra, this is not someone’s Pakistan. If anyone tries to remove that saffron flag, we will not let their cylinder come up again. If anyone again looks at our saffron flag with dirty eyes, then their eyes will be taken out and played with like marbles.”

CJP alleged that these remarks amounted to open threats of violence and intimidation. The complaint further stated that Rane specifically directed slogans toward a mosque in the locality, thereby attempting to provoke confrontation and disturb communal harmony. The reproduced statement reads:

“That voice must reach the big mosque.”

According to CJP, such statements sought to intimidate the Muslim community and portray them as outsiders within the constitutional framework of India. The complaint also alleged that Rane invoked the authority of a “government with a Hindutva ideology” to suggest political backing for aggressive communal mobilisation.

A copy of complaint dated April 28, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Hari Mishra in West Bengal over hate speech during election campaign in Nadia

In a complaint dated May 6, 2026 addressed to the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police in Nadia district, West Bengal, CJP sought registration of an FIR under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, 352 and 353 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 against BJP leader Hari Mishra for a speech delivered during an election campaign in Kalyani, Nadia district, on April 23, 2026. CJP stated in the complaint that Mishra spread anti-Muslim conspiracy theories and falsely claimed that Hindu festivals could not be celebrated in Muslim-majority areas.

The complaint reproduces portions of the speech including:

“In any area where the Muslim population is above 30-35%, Saraswati Puja will not happen. In places like Malda and Murshidabad… you first have to take permission from the nearest mosque. A situation worse than Bangladesh is going to happen on the soil of West Bengal.”

CJP further alleged that Mishra falsely claimed that the Constitution of India did not function in parts of West Bengal. The reproduced transcript includes:

“The Constitution of India does not work in many parts of Malda and Murshidabad. In about 25-30% of the areas in Malda and Murshidabad, the Constitution, rules, laws, and regulations of India do not apply.”

The complaint also referred to statements linking demographic change with political exclusion: “The day Muslims reach above 40-45%, not a single Hindu MP, MLA, counselor, or chairman will remain in West Bengal.”

According to CJP, these remarks sought to portray Muslims as a threat to democratic institutions and communal coexistence and were intended to create fear and polarisation during the election period.

A copy of complaint dated May 6, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Harshu Thakur in Junnar, Pune over speech delivered at Virat Hindu Sammelan

In a separate complaint dated May 6, 2026, addressed to the Additional Director General (Law & Order), Maharashtra, the Superintendent of Police, Pune Rural, and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Junnar Division, CJP sought registration of an FIR against Harshu Thakur over a speech delivered at the Virat Hindu Sammelan held in Junnar, Pune district, on April 19, 2026. CJP stated in the complaint that Thakur spread anti-Muslim rhetoric through references to “Forest Jihad,” “Love Jihad,” and “Land Jihad,” while also making statements encouraging militarised responses and targeting Islamic institutions and burial practices.

The complaint reproduces the following statements:

“Wherever there is open land, there are graves. If you start funding madrasas, then only terrorists will be produced there. Mulla-Maulvis give them training on how to trap girls in ‘Love Jihad’ and how to carry out ‘Land Jihad’. They are taught how to make bombs.”

CJP further highlighted remarks targeting Muslim men and encouraging women to arm themselves:

“All these ‘Abduls’ are the same. Every Hindu woman just needs to be given a weapon.”

The complaint also alleged that Thakur attempted to frame Muslims as inherently violent while encouraging religious segregation and hostility.

A copy of complaint dated May 6, 2026 can be accessed here

Judicial precedents on which CJP relied upon

In the complaints submitted before police authorities in Maharashtra and West Bengal, CJP also relied upon multiple judicial precedents of the Supreme Court concerning hate speech, communal targeting, and the constitutional obligation of authorities to act against inflammatory rhetoric. Referring to the Supreme Court judgment in Firoz Iqbal Khan vs Union of India [W.P. (Civ.) No. 956 of 2020], CJP highlighted the Court’s observations that “the edifice of a democratic society committed to the rule of law under a regime of constitutional rights, values and duties is founded on the co-existence of communities. India is a melting pot of civilisations, cultures, religions and languages. Any attempt to vilify a religious community must be viewed with grave disfavour by this Court as the custodian of constitutional values.”

CJP stated that the speeches delivered by Nitesh Rane, Hari Mishra, and Harshu Thakur collectively portrayed Muslims as conspirators, outsiders, extremists, and demographic threats, thereby directly undermining constitutional values of equality, fraternity, and peaceful coexistence. The complaints further referred to Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India [AIR 2014 SC 1591], where the Supreme Court observed that “hate speech is an effort to marginalise individuals based on their membership to a group,” and warned that such speech can lay the groundwork for discrimination, ostracism, violence, and even genocide. CJP stated that the repeated references to “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” “Forest Jihad,” “Corporate Jihad,” alleged demographic conspiracies, and calls for economic boycott sought to institutionalise fear and hostility against Muslims and therefore warranted immediate criminal action.

The complaints additionally cited the Supreme Court’s order dated April 28, 2023 in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India [W.P. (C) No. 943 of 2021], wherein all States and Union Territories were directed to register suo moto FIRs against hate speech irrespective of religion whenever offences under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 505 IPC and related provisions are attracted.

Provisions related to hate speech under BNS, 2023

CJP further stated that the speeches attract multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, particularly Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, 352 and 353. According to the complaints, the repeated targeting of Muslim religious institutions, educational spaces, and social identity through references such as “green snakes,” “Forest Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” and allegations that madrasas produce “only terrorists” amounted to promoting enmity between religious groups and acts prejudicial to communal harmony under Section 196 BNS.

CJP stated that the speeches also made imputations against the constitutional allegiance of an entire community by portraying Muslims and Islamic institutions as threats to the State, thereby attracting Section 197 BNS. The complaints further alleged that mocking Dargahs, Mazars, burial practices, Islamic scholars, and Muslim religious practices constituted deliberate insults to religion and religious beliefs under Sections 299 and 302 BNS.

CJP additionally argued that the repeated calls for mobilisation, warnings regarding demographic change, threats of violence, references to arming civilians, and calls for economic boycott amounted to intentional provocation intended to breach public peace under Section 352 BNS and dissemination of false information likely to create fear and communal unrest under Section 353 BNS.

The complaints maintained that the speeches delivered across Mumbai, Pune, and Nadia reflected a continuing pattern of inflammatory communal rhetoric aimed at deepening religious polarisation and normalising hostility against Muslims, thereby necessitating immediate registration of FIRs and preventive intervention by the concerned police authorities in compliance with constitutional obligations and Supreme Court directives.

Maharashtra DGP circulars cited by CJP

CJP also referred to circulars issued by the Director General of Police, Maharashtra, in February and April 2023 concerning preventive and penal action against hate speech.

According to the complaint, Circular No. DGP 20/Petition No.940/2022/54.2023 dated February 2, 2023 highlighted the Supreme Court’s order dated January 13, 2023 directing police authorities to take suo motu action whenever speeches attract offences under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A and 505 IPC.

The circular had directed all Unit Commanders to follow the Supreme Court order and entails “measures to be taken to maintain law and order due to agitations, morchas, speeches etc.”

It gives detailed instructions on what steps are to be taken when any morchas are to be held:

“2. All the Unit Commanders should hold a meeting with the concerned organisers before such a morcha and fix the route of the morcha with appropriate terms and condition. A combined meeting of all social groups should be taken to convey clearly to all that they should maintain peace and keep law and order during the morcha. Preventive action against Anti-social elements should be taken. Those elements who help in maintaining peace and harmony should be encouraged. Audio Video recording of the morcha should be done. Police Head Quarters should ensure adequate supply of equipment’s, like Lathi, Helmets, etc. to police men deployed for morcha bandobast. If any law-and-order situation arises, offences should be registered immediately and arrest should be made. Intelligence machinery should be activated to collect advance information about morcha, agitation and efforts should be made to pre-empt any communal incidents.”

Supreme Court directions on preventing/prosecuting hate speakers

CJP further referred to multiple Supreme Court orders concerning hate speech and preventive policing. According to the complaints, on February 3, 2023, the Supreme Court issued directions regarding a proposed event by Sakal Hindu Samaj in Mumbai and directed that if permission was granted for the event, it would be subject to the condition that no hate speech would be delivered.

The court also outlined directives with respect to taking preventive action in such cases:

“We also direct that the Officer(s), in case, permission is granted and, in case, the occasion arises for invoking the power under Section 151 of Cr.P.C. as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the Officer(s) concerned to invoke the said power and to act as per the mandate of Section 151 of the Cr.P.C.” 

Even in 2024 itself, while on January 17, the Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta had expressed their anguish at the petitioners being forced to approach the Supreme Court multiple times against individuals and organisations even after there being guidelines for tacking and taking action against hate speeches. During the said hearing, the Supreme Court issued an order directing the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police at Yavatmal, Maharashtra and Raipur, Chhattisgarh to take ‘appropriate steps’ to ensure that no incitement to hate speech occurs at the rallies scheduled in the said districts in the coming few days of January.

The said order was passed following the concerns raised by the petitioners over delivery of potential hate speeches at rallies planned by Hindu Janjagruti Samiti and Bharatiya Janata Party Legislator T Raja Singh in the month of January.

CJP stated that the court had outlined directives with respect to taking preventive action in such cases:

“We would require the authorities to be conscious that no incitement to violence and hate speech are permissible. The concerned District Magistrates and Superintendent of Police of Yavatmal, Maharashtra and Raipur, Chhattisgarh will take necessary steps, as may be required. If necessary and deemed appropriate, police/administration will install CCTV Cameras having recording facility, so as to ensure identification of the perpetrators in the event of any violence/hate speech.”

Background: Profile of Nitesh Rane and previous complaints filed by CJP

CJP stated in its complaints that the speeches delivered in Chandivali and Malad Malvani were not isolated incidents but formed part of a continuing pattern of inflammatory speeches allegedly delivered by Nitesh Rane across Maharashtra. According to CJP, the organisation had previously filed complaints dated March 7, March 18, and March 28, 2025 concerning speeches delivered by Rane in Sindhudurg, Pune, and Ratnagiri districts.

The complaints related to events including:

• “Hindu Rashtra Adhiveshan” in Kundal on February 8, 2025
• “Shivjanmostav” event in Sawantwadi on February 19, 2025
• Public felicitation programme at Nanijdham, Ratnagiri on February 20, 2025
• Religious gathering in Wagholi, Pune on February 5, 2025

CJP stated that across these events, Rane repeatedly invoked terms such as “Love Jihad” and “Land Jihad,” portrayed Muslims as a collective threat, and made statements capable of inciting hostility, fear, and social boycott against the Muslim community. The complaints further stated that such rhetoric, particularly when delivered by a sitting Cabinet Minister, was inflammatory, unsupported by evidence, and violative of constitutional protections.

FIRs and ongoing legal scrutiny against Nitesh Rane

Under the judicial oversight of the Bombay High Court in Aftab Siddique & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra (2024), multiple FIRs have already been registered against Nitesh Rane in connection with alleged hate speech cases. CJP reproduced details of these FIRs in its complaints and stated that they reflected a continuing pattern of communal speeches delivered by Rane in different parts of Maharashtra.

Mankhurd Police Station (C.R. No. 152/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane under Sections 153A, 503, 504 and 505 IPC. According to the complaint, this case originated from speeches perceived as threatening to the Muslim community and capable of inciting public disorder.

Ghatkopar Police Station (C.R. No. 521/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane and Subhash Ahir under Sections 153A, 504, 506 and 188 IPC in connection with inflammatory speeches delivered in Mumbai suburbs.

Kashimira Police Station (C.R. No. 259/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane and Geeta Jain in relation to the Mira-Bhayander incidents under Sections 153A, 153B, 143, 504 and 506 IPC along with Section 37(1) read with Section 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

Malwani Police Station (C.R. No. 298/2024)

Originally registered against Bhagwan Thakur, with Nitesh Rane later added as an accused under Sections 153A, 504 and 506 IPC in relation to speeches targeting specific religious communities.

CJP further pointed out that Nitesh Rane’s October 2024 election affidavit reportedly disclosed 38 FIRs registered against him, including 20 cases relating specifically to allegations of hate speech.

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Law as Resistance: A year of CJP’s interventions against a rising tide of hate

The post CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a memorandum submitted from its Ahmedabad office, the organisation cited media reports detailing incidents of arson, vandalism and damage across multiple locations in and around Dhandhuka. According to the complaint, shops and garages were damaged and set ablaze near Ranpur Circle and along Barwala Road, while vehicles were torched at Dholera tri-junction and Rudra Complex on Bagodara highway.

Incidents of stone pelting in residential areas such as Naseeb Society and attacks on establishments including Alpha Pan Parlour, Gajanan Restaurant and Ami Hotel were also reported. The memorandum further mentioned damage to transport offices, burning of trucks near Yakin Transport, and destruction at RMS Hospital premises. It also referred to alleged attempts to set fire to a cemetery and agricultural losses, including burning of garlic crops.

The MCC has urged authorities to act in accordance with Supreme Court guidelines on mob violence and lynching, particularly those laid down in the Tehseen S. Poonawalla vs Union of India, which mandate preventive, remedial and punitive measures by state authorities.

Mujahid Nafees, convenor of the MCC Gujarat, said there appeared to be “a specific group intent on disturbing peace and targeting properties belonging to Muslims,” and called for immediate intervention to restore law and order. He demanded a prompt assessment of damages by the revenue department and compensation for those affected, strict legal action against those involved in the violence, and action against individuals spreading inflammatory content on social media.

Dhandhuka, located in Ahmedabad district, has witnessed communal tensions in the past, including incidents that drew statewide attention and prompted heightened policing and surveillance. Authorities have not yet issued a detailed public statement on the latest developments, though local police are understood to have increased deployment in sensitive areas to prevent further escalation.

Courtesy: CounterView

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The recent criticism of Dhurandhar has pointed to a familiar pattern: the packaging of history into over-simplified narratives of Hindu valour and external threat. From naming its chief protagonists as Ajay Sanyal (a Brahmin), Sushant Sinha (a Bania), and Jaskirat Singh Rangi (a Jat Sikh), to misrepresenting administrative facts—such as portraying Prashant Kumar as Uttar Pradesh’s DGP during demonetisation instead of Javeed Ahmad—the film reveals which identities the right wing chooses to glorify and which it side-lines or obscures.

Yet such distortions are not merely about religious conservatism or anti-Muslim polarisation. They also perform a quieter function—re-inscribing Brahminical authority over knowledge and legitimising the capitalist dominance of mercantile communities, even as they mobilise broader Hindu identities against Muslims while exacerbating caste fissures among non-Brahmin non-Bania communities. In this sense, Hindutva deploys distorted or fabricated history to divert attention from governance failures or to manufacture social conflict.

Controversies on History to serve corporate interests

On December 22, while addressing a Bhil audience, BJP veteran and Punjab Governor Gulab Chand Kataria passed remarks about Maharana Pratap that were widely seen as condescending—ironically invoking a figure the BJP has long used for emotive mobilisation. He was criticised by Rajkumar Roat of the Bhartiya Adivasi Party, who stressed Pratap’s enduring place in Adivasi historical memory.

Unease has also surfaced within the BJP’s broader ecosystem. On January 2, speaking at an event attended by Rajnath Singh, Vishvaraj Singh Mewar cautioned for an end to the political misuse of history.

Kataria’s comments also carried a political subtext in a region where mining interests are largely controlled by Jain and Agrawal business groups, while tribal-agrarian communities like Bhils and Rajputs dominate demographically yet bear the disproportionate ecological and social costs. Together, Roat’s direct criticism and Mewar’s measured appeal signal growing discomfort with the appropriation of tribal and agrarian histories to serve entrenched economic and political interests.

Crucially, the RSS–BJP project today goes beyond appropriation. It increasingly involves the active invention of Hindu warriors, the rebranding of historical dynasties, and their institutionalisation through social media, popular literature, and state-backed infrastructure.

Understanding this is essential to grasp how both Hindutva and caste-based parties are together reshaping North India along caste-communal lines while steadily eroding historical literacy and public intelligence.

The Hindutva Factory of Manufactured History 

While the RSS and its Maharashtrian leadership have enlisted sympathetic scholars to sanitise figures like Savarkar and produce grand panegyrics—through novels and high-budget films—on Shivaji, Sambhaji, and the Peshwas, the Hindutva ecosystem has simultaneously generated a stream of previously unknown “historical” figures in North India. These fabrications are deployed to exploit caste fault lines and deliberately flatten historical consciousness among targeted communities.

In recent years, BJP-aligned platforms have circulated stories of King Sudhanwa Chauhan, an alleged ruler of Mahishmati said to have governed an empire larger than that of the historical Chauhansthat of the historical Chauhans of Ajmer–Sambhar, and portrayed as a disciple of Adi Shankaracharya. Other inventions include Kirandevi, claimed to have threatened Akbar with a dagger in a Meena Bazaar for his alleged misdeeds.

None of these figures are supported by inscriptions, chronicles, or even local oral traditions. By contrast, owing to long periods of political dominance—comparable to the Mughals or the Sikhs—the Rajput past is unusually well documented across Hindu, Islamic, and Sikh sources, making such fabrications relatively easy to expose. The scholarly rejection of the sixteenth-century Prithviraj Raso by figures such as G.H. Ojha, Namvar Singh, and Cynthia Talbot, in favour of the contemporaneous Prithviraj Vijaya Mahākāvya by Jayanaka, illustrates this point. As Cynthia Talbot notes, despite more than a century of scholarly dismissal, claims of the Raso’s twelfth-century authenticity persist in popular culture.

The real targets of this strategy are communities that lacked sustained political dominance and now seek a martial or regal past in the absence of historical records.

A Galaxy of Fiction against Phule–Ambedkarism 

Manoshi Sinha Rawal’s 2019 book Saffron Swords, published by Garuda Prakashan also mainstreamed several such fabrications by presenting unsubstantiated valour tales as authentic history.

Endorsed by RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat, Ratan Sharda, and Union minister Kiren Rijiju, the book exemplifies how myth is laundered into legitimacy. Among the promoted figures are Rampyari Gujjari, Jograj Singh Gujar, and Harvir Singh Gulia, who allegedly mobilised an army of 40,000 in western Uttar Pradesh and defeated Timur-i-Lang—who is even claimed to have died from wounds inflicted by Harvir Singh Gulia. This narrative was publicly echoed by then Vice-President Jagdeep Dhankhar. When Alt News sought scholarly verification, historian Heramb Chaturvedi dismissed the claim as “absolutely absurd.”

The correlation between such martial myth-making among landed castes and rising anti-Dalit violence in western Uttar Pradesh cannot be ignored. These narratives offer a fragile sense of caste superiority within the Brahminical Varna (caste) framework, deflecting attention from structural inequality while undermining solidarities forged through Phule-Ambedkarite politics.

Progress for the Rich, Pride for the Poor & Erasure of Muslim Past

Hindutva’s historical fabrication increasingly materialises through state infrastructure. In July last year, Yogi Adityanath unveiled a forty-foot bronze statue of Raja Suheldev Rajbhar in Bahraich. The Caravan has documented how the BJP and Hindu Yuva Vahini mobilised Rajbhar OBCs through Suheldev’s legacy, further popularised by Amish Tripathi’s novel Legend of Suheldev (2020).

Yet the Sangh Parivar’s engagement with Suheldev is older. In 2003, a dubious text, Tulsī Dohā Śatak, was promoted by Rambhadracharya—later debunked by Namvar Singh—as falsely attributing temple destruction narratives to Tulsidas. No eleventh-century inscriptions of the Gaharwar or Kalchuri dynasties, which dominated the region, mention any ruler named Suheldev. His first appearance occurs in the seventeenth-century Mirat-i-Sikandari, where he is depicted not as a benevolent king but as an oppressive Hindu ruler. Thus, a fictional oppressive ruler is reinterpreted in later narratives as a historical Rajbhar king to draw OBCs away from Jatav-led Bahujan politics.

Similar processes are visible elsewhere. In 2000, India Post issued a stamp commemorating Maharaja Bijli Pasi, inaccurately presenting him as a contemporary of Prithviraj Chauhan. Prof. Badri Narayan analysed such inventions in Inventing Caste History. More recently, the Yogi government renamed Nihalgarh railway station—named after the town’s  Nihal Khan, a Bhale Sultan chief—as Maharaja Bijli Pasi station.

Lucknow’s founding is variously attributed in official narratives to Lakshman, Lakhan Ahir, or Lakhan Pasi. As Sunita Sinha observes, this competitive deployment of “caste regal histories” by BJP responds to BSP’s Ambedkar Parks by substituting emancipatory politics with symbolic pride. This is approved with resounding applause by RSS leadership who have themselves promoted such works by likes of Bijay Sonkar Shastri.

These narrative interventions are not merely ideological; they are anchored in networks of patronage and publishing historically dominated by mercantile capital, which shapes both what histories are amplified and which identities are valorised.

Kshatriyaisation: From Arya Samaj to RSS 

As early as 1907, Denzil Ibbetson described the Arya Samaj as a movement with strong political tendencies, rooted in shared interests of middle-class Brahmins and urban mercantile castes, and aimed at reshaping rural landed communities, which coexisted as both Hindus and Muslims. While Hindu–Muslim solidarities fractured, Hindu rural castes were also pitted against one another through competing Kshatriya claims—a project inherited and expanded by the RSS.

Writing in Hans (March 1998), cultural critic Rajendra Yadav argued that landed OBCs sought Kshatriya status within the Varna system, not its dismantling, limiting the scope of caste transformation. Kshatriya history offers an easily appropriable symbolic resource for this which can be “gifted” to landed OBCs in exchange for collaboration towards Brahminical institutional and Bania capitalist hegemony.

The project of Kshatriyaisation has historically involved linking diverse castes to Puranic mythological figures or retroactively assigning them Rajput history and figures. For centuries, Brahmins and Banias functioned as the principal gatekeepers of Hindu mythological and historical narratives—largely enabled by royal patronage across regimes, irrespective of whether the ruling elites were Rajputs, Mughals, Marathas, Afghans, or Jats.

With the dissolution of the princely states and the consequent de-institutionalisation of the Rajput masses, the Brahmin–Bania intellectual elite decisively became gatekeepers defining Rajput history and identity itself. This monopoly over historical narration endowed them with at least two significant socio-political powers within public discourse.

First, through selective manipulation and strategic cherry picking of Rajput history, they could simultaneously vilify Muslims and shame Rajputs for past Rajput alliances with Muslim rulers —, thus imposing upon them a perpetual burden of dharm-raksha. Second, this control enabled the reassignment of Rajput kingship and symbols of martial legitimacy to other dominant castes, such as Jats or Gujjars, often in exchange for political alignment against both Muslims and Rajputs.

For instance, in Rajasthan, the projection of the uncorroborated Jhunjhar Singh Nehra serves to displace Nawab Mohammad Khan’s historical role as Jhunjhunu’s founder. Similarly, official claims attributing Churu’s founding to a Chuhru Jat lack contemporary evidence, while the erasure of local Muslim history continues to marginalise living communities. What unfolded at Rajasthan’s Gogamedi shrine recently exemplifies this.

At one seminar, Kapil Kapoor asserted that Emperor Harsha was a Jat, while Hindutva platforms routinely project Alexander’s contemporary King Porus and Yashodharman, a 6^th century ruler of Central India,  as Jat rulers—replicating Arya Samaj strategies of Vedic Kshatriyaisation.

The most contentious claims concern the Gujjars. Attempts to “Kshatriya-ise” them link early medieval Rajput dynasties to Gujjar origins. In 1997, NH-24 was renamed Gurjar Samrat Mihir Bhoj Marg, and in 2010, a statue at Akshardham identified Mihir Bhoj as a “Gurjar Samrat.” Right-wing political scientist Meenakshi Jain and archaeologist K.K. Mohammed have advanced similar claims, despite their refutation by Prof. Shantarani Sharma in Indian Historical Review.

In Fractured Forest, Quartzite City, Thomas Crowley notes that Gujjar history has been “retrofitted, made into a glorious (if doomed) struggle against vicious outsiders,” In his dissertation , Frank Charles Spaulding highlighted that “there were no traditions, written, oral or otherwise, among the Gujjars to suggest the existence of this medieval kingdom and of the contemporary Gujars’ link to it” (pg. 74), hinting at their recent origins. These competitive claims by Jats and Gujjars over Rajput dynasties, engineered first by the Arya Samaj and later by the RSS, have only fractured agrarian unity rather than empowering marginalised groups.

Conclusion

While Hindutva’s historical revisionism primarily fuels anti-Muslim polarisation, it also functions to manage Hindu society—countering Dalit-Bahujan movements, fragmenting agrarian solidarity, and substituting governance with spectacle. The manufacture of history has become an ideological crutch for policy failure, deepening caste and communal fractures while hollowing historical consciousness itself. In this process, history is reduced from a means of understanding the past into an instrument of control, competition, and political distraction.

(The author is a mechanical engineer and an independent commentator on history and politics, with a particular focus on Rajasthan. His work explores the syncretic exchanges of India’s borderlands as well as contemporary debates on memory, identity and historiography)

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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The post When History substitutes Governance: Hindutva’s Politics of Manufacturing Pasts appeared first on SabrangIndia.

These are not isolated disruptions. When read alongside official data placed before the Odisha Legislative Assembly in March 2026—where Chief Minister Mohan Charan Majhi acknowledged 54 communal riots and 7 mob lynching incidents since June 2024—and a recent audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India exposing the exclusion of over 160,000 Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group (PVTG) members from welfare schemes, a more systemic pattern begins to emerge.

Across districts and contexts, the incidents point to a convergence of communal polarisation, administrative inaction, coercive responses to dissent, and gaps in welfare delivery.

Church Vandalism in Keonjhar: Crime, silence, and communal retaliation

On April 6, 2026, a church in Murgagoth village under Anandpur police station in Keonjhar district was vandalised by a mob, as reported by The Hindu. The attack was triggered by allegations that a visually impaired minor girl had become pregnant after being sexually assaulted months earlier by a man from the same village—identified as her distant uncle.

Police officials confirmed that the alleged assault had not been reported prior to the incident. It was only when villagers recently became aware of the pregnancy that tensions escalated. In the early hours of April 6, when the church was unoccupied, a group of miscreants removed furniture, including chairs and an almirah, and set them on fire.

The accused was reportedly working in Tamil Nadu at the time. The delay in reporting the alleged sexual assault raises serious concerns about access to justice, barriers to reporting, and the vulnerability of the victim, particularly given her visual impairment. At the same time, the targeting of a place of worship reflects how criminal allegations were swiftly reframed through a communal lens.

The village itself, consisting of around 85 households, is almost evenly divided between Hindu and Christian residents. Police described the area as communally sensitive and deployed forces to prevent escalation. A complaint has now been filed regarding the alleged rape, but the sequence of events underscores a troubling dynamic—where due process is bypassed, and collective punishment is enacted before legal accountability is even initiated.

A State Under Strain: Rising communal violence and incomplete accountability

The Keonjhar incident is not an aberration. Data shared by Chief Minister Mohan Charan Majhi in the Odisha Legislative Assembly in March 2026 indicates that 54 communal riots and 7 mob lynching incidents have been recorded in the state between June 2024 and February 2026, according to Hindustan Times.

Nearly 300 individuals were arrested in connection with communal riots, and 61 people in lynching cases. However, the fact that chargesheets were filed in less than 50% of riot cases raises concerns about the effectiveness of investigations and the likelihood of convictions.

District-level data reveals concentrations of violence:

• Balasore: 24 riot cases
• Khurda (including Bhubaneswar): 16 cases
• Additional incidents in Koraput, Malkangiri, and Bhadrak

A government White Paper further recorded 122 communal incidents in 2025, including 16 involving Hindu-Christian tensions.

Yet, significant incidents appear underrepresented in official accounts. The October 2025 communal violence in Cuttack, which led to a three-day curfew following clashes during Durga Puja immersion, was not explicitly acknowledged in the Chief Minister’s reply. The violence reportedly escalated into arson and clashes involving members of right-wing organisations.

Over the past 20 months, multiple towns have experienced curfews, internet shutdowns, and mob violence, including incidents targeting Bengali-speaking Muslims. Officials have conceded that some cases may go unreported, particularly when victims are daily-wage earners reluctant to approach the police.

While the state has pointed to measures such as peace committees and strengthened intelligence gathering, the persistence of incidents and gaps in prosecution suggest a deeper issue of accountability and deterrence.

Rayagada Erupts: Tribal resistance, mining, and militarised policing

Tensions over land, resources, and consent erupted violently in Rayagada district in April 2026, where clashes broke out between tribal communities and security forces over a road construction project linked to the proposed Sijimali bauxite mine, as reported by Hindustan Times.

At least 70 people were injured, including 58 security personnel, after villagers allegedly resisted police with stones, axes, and other weapons. Police responded with tear gas, and prohibitory orders were imposed in the area.

The confrontation occurred in the context of long-standing opposition to the mining project led by Vedanta Limited, which secured rights to the Sijimali reserve in 2023. The project spans approximately 1,500 hectares, including over 700 hectares of forestland, and is expected to produce 9 million tonnes of bauxite annually.

For local tribal communities, however, the issue is existential. Residents have consistently argued that the project threatens their forests, water sources, livelihoods, and sacred landscapes. Central to the dispute is the requirement under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 that Gram Sabha consent must be obtained before forestland diversion.

Authorities have claimed that such consent was secured in 2023. However, multiple villages have since passed resolutions denying that these Gram Sabha meetings ever took place, alleging that approvals were fabricated.

The situation has been further aggravated by allegations of heavy-handed policing. Civil society groups and local organisations have reported:

• Night raids in villages
• Mass detentions, including women
• Use of tear gas and force in residential areas
• Deployment of drones and armed patrols restricting daily life

An open letter by the “Concerned Citizens Forum” described the police response as “barbaric” and called for withdrawal of forces, release of detained individuals, and cancellation of the mining project.

#Vedanta_Go_Back …..
Tribal people of Rayagada district #Odisha hv taken an oath to fight against corporate loot. pic.twitter.com/j0UJcTHSoB

— Amiya_Pandav ଅମିୟ ପାଣ୍ଡଵ Write n Fight (@AmiyaPandav) April 8, 2026

The clash is thus not merely a law-and-order issue, but part of a prolonged conflict over development, legality, and tribal autonomy.

Exclusion by design? CAG flags systemic welfare failures

Parallel to these conflicts, a structural crisis in governance emerges from the findings of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. In an audit conducted between July 2024 and January 2025, the CAG found that 54% of Odisha’s PVTG population—around 160,000 people—remained excluded from welfare schemes.

Despite the Odisha PVTG Empowerment and Livelihood Improvement Programme (OPELIP), only 134,000 out of 294,000 individuals were covered as of March 2024. The exclusion was particularly stark in 1,138 newly identified villages, which were not integrated into the programme even years after recognition.

Key findings include:

• Three Micro Project Agencies (MPAs) created in 2020 remain non-functional, lacking both staff and funding
• Entire communities, such as the Birhor tribe (341 individuals), remain completely excluded
• ₹20.20 crore in funds remained unspent for over three years
• Basic data on infrastructure and services in tribal areas is missing or unavailable

The audit also flagged serious shortcomings in the Late Marriage Incentive Scheme, which reached only 58% of its target beneficiaries and covered just 43% of villages.

These findings reveal not just administrative inefficiency, but a pattern of systemic neglect, where even targeted interventions fail to reach the most vulnerable populations.

The complete CAG report may be viewed below:

Law, Power, and Impunity: MLA firing incident in Balangir

Questions of accountability were further sharpened by an incident in Balangir district in April 2026, where BJP MLA Naveen Jain was booked for allegedly firing blank rounds during a Ram Navami procession.

The firing, which took place in a crowded public setting, caused panic among attendees. Police registered a case under provisions of the Arms Act and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, seized the weapon, and suspended the MLA’s Personal Security Officer.

Despite video evidence, the MLA claimed the weapon was a toy gun—a claim contradicted by police findings. Opposition leaders have argued that the incident reflects a broader pattern of political impunity, particularly given allegations of prior misconduct.

Conclusion

Taken together, the events across Odisha reveal a pattern that cannot be dismissed as episodic unrest. The Keonjhar church vandalism underscores how quickly allegations—particularly involving vulnerable victims—can be communalised in the absence of timely legal intervention. The Rayagada clashes expose the deep faultlines between state-led development and tribal rights, where questions of consent under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 remain unresolved and contested on the ground. The CAG’s findings on PVTG exclusion highlight a parallel reality of administrative neglect, where even designated welfare mechanisms fail to reach those most in need. Meanwhile, incidents like the Balangir firing case involving a sitting MLA raise troubling concerns about accountability and the uneven application of the law.

What binds these developments is not merely their occurrence within a short timeframe, but the institutional responses that follow—or fail to follow. Delayed complaints, incomplete investigations, underutilised funds, disputed consent processes, and selective enforcement together point to a governance framework struggling to maintain both legitimacy and trust.

In this context, the question is no longer limited to law and order. It is about whether state institutions can uphold due process, protect vulnerable communities, and mediate conflict without deepening it. The trajectory suggested by these incidents indicates that without structural course correction, Odisha risks moving further towards a landscape marked by normalised violence, contested authority, and systemic exclusion.

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The post Fractured Fault lines: Violence, governance gaps, and rising tensions across Odisha appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Combining detailed regional overviews with independent commentaries by Anjuman Ara Begum and N P Chekutty, along with insights from academics and activists on Puducherry, the report offers a layered account of how dissent, media, and electoral processes intersect in contemporary India. It locates the upcoming elections within a broader pattern of shrinking civic space, contested electoral practices, and increasingly polarised public narratives—raising fundamental concerns about the conditions necessary for free and fair democratic participation.

The report situates the 2026 elections within a larger context: a shrinking space for dissent, increasing use of censorship, and the growing normalisation of hate speech. Across all three regions, it identifies a pattern where free expression is not only challenged through formal legal mechanisms, but also through intimidation, institutional pressure, and political messaging that reshapes public discourse.

It also highlights the controversy surrounding the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, which has raised concerns about exclusion, transparency, and voter confidence—placing the very foundation of electoral participation under scrutiny.

Assam: Systemic curtailment and the centrality of hate speech

The report’s coverage of Assam is extensive and sharply critical, documenting a sustained pattern of restrictions on free speech alongside the institutionalisation of polarising rhetoric.

It details how journalists and media workers faced criminal cases, arrests, and direct intimidation. A prominent editor was charged with sedition in 2025, while earlier instances included the detention of journalists for reporting on communal violence and the arrest of reporters investigating corruption. Physical attacks and coercion—such as forcing journalists to delete recorded material—further reinforced an environment of fear.

The report also points to more subtle forms of suppression, including the discontinuation of critical columns addressing human rights violations, indicating a climate where self-censorship becomes necessary for survival.

A significant episode cited is the complaint by the CPI(M) alleging that state broadcasters censored portions of its election speech critical of the government, raising concerns about electoral fairness and the misuse of public broadcasting platforms.

At the centre of the report’s Assam analysis is the pervasive use of hate speech. Political rhetoric targeting Bengali-speaking Muslims—particularly the “Miya” community—is described as sustained, deliberate, and electorally mobilising. Statements invoking economic boycotts, branding individuals as “traitors,” and linking communities to national security threats are documented as part of a broader narrative strategy.

The report further highlights the role of technology and disinformation, especially the circulation of AI-generated videos depicting violent and dehumanising imagery aimed at Muslims. These instances are presented as evidence of how digital tools are being deployed to intensify polarisation.

Legal responses, including petitions before courts, are noted—but the report underscores that such interventions have not significantly curbed the continuation of hate speech.

Additionally, it records attacks on media institutions, including the burning of newspaper bundles, and raises concerns about attempts to influence journalists through state-sponsored distributions, such as the gifting of smartphones.

Taken together, the report presents Assam as a case where free speech is constrained both structurally and atmospherically, with fear, lawfare, and polarisation reinforcing each other.

Kerala: Contestation, censorship, and civil society pushback

In contrast, the report’s examination of Kerala presents a more layered and contested environment. It acknowledges that free speech conditions in the state remain comparatively stronger, supported by a vibrant media ecosystem and an active civil society. However, this relative openness coexists with increasing instances of censorship and legal pressure.

The report documents the use of legal mechanisms, including FIRs and defamation case, against journalists, activists, and protestors. It also recounts the ban on a Malayalam news channel by the Union government, later overturned by the Supreme Court, as a key example of institutional censorship.

Cinema emerges as a major site of conflict. The report details:

• Judicial interventions affecting film reviews
• Controversies around propaganda films released in the run-up to elections
• Attempts to block screenings at international film festivals

These developments are framed as indicative of a broader struggle over narrative control in a state where cinema plays a central cultural role.

The report also examines the delayed and redacted release of the Justice Hema Committee report on the film industry, highlighting how even institutional inquiries into gender justice faced forms of informational control.

On the electoral front, it notes the emergence of communal rhetoric—traditionally less dominant in Kerala politics—and the legal challenges that followed, including court scrutiny of campaign speeches. At the same time, the report emphasises the role of public resistance. Civil society interventions, media plurality, and a politically aware citizenry have consistently pushed back against attempts to curb free expression.

However, it also flags emerging concerns: increasing corporate influence over media, declining investigative scrutiny, and growing public dissatisfaction—particularly among younger populations.

Kerala, therefore, is portrayed as a space of ongoing struggle, where democratic safeguards remain active but are under pressure.

Puducherry: Suppression of dissent and structural pressures

The report’s coverage of Puducherry highlights a different but equally significant pattern—where free speech is shaped by administrative control, campus politics, and broader structural inequalities.

A central focus is the curtailment of student expression. The report documents:

• Disciplinary action against students protesting fee hikes
• Disruption and criminalisation of cultural performances
• A controversial university code of conduct that triggered widespread protests

It further records police intervention in student movements, including lathi-charges, detentions, and arrests—underscoring the use of state force in response to dissent.

Journalists in the region also faced violence and intimidation, including physical attacks and verbal abuse during reporting.

Electoral processes come under scrutiny through the report’s discussion of the SIR exercise, which led to significant deletions of voters before partial corrections were made, raising concerns about disenfranchisement.

Beyond censorship, the report situates free speech within a broader political economy. It highlights:

• High levels of youth unemployment
• The dominance of wealthy candidates in elections
• The prevalence of candidates with criminal cases

These factors, it argues, shape the environment in which speech and dissent occur, often limiting meaningful participation in democratic processes.

The report also draws attention to the influence of centralised political power in the Union Territory, suggesting that local democratic autonomy is constrained.

Conclusion: A fragmented but converging crisis

Across Assam, Kerala, and Puducherry, the report does not present a uniform decline—but rather distinct trajectories of constraint.

• In Assam, free speech is undermined by criminalisation, intimidation, and the centrality of hate speech in political discourse.
• In Kerala, it is shaped by institutional pressures and censorship, countered by strong civil society resistance.
• In Puducherry, it is limited through administrative control, suppression of student activism, and structural inequalities.

Yet, despite these differences, the report identifies a common concern: the erosion of the conditions necessary for meaningful democratic participation. Free and fair elections, it argues, depend not only on the act of voting, but on the ability of citizens to speak, question, and dissent without fear. The persistence of censorship, the spread of hate speech, and the controversies surrounding electoral processes together signal a deeper challenge—one that extends beyond any single state or election cycle.

The complete report may be read below:

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The incidents documented across India in 2025, when read collectively, mark a decisive shift in the nature of anti-Christian hostility. What was once episodic violence or localised discrimination has now hardened into a pattern of systemic persecution—socially legitimised, politically emboldened, and administratively enabled. Christians were not merely attacked as individuals or congregations; they were recast as a civilisational problem, a demographic threat, and a suspect population whose very presence required surveillance, regulation, and punishment.

This article undertakes a deep, incident-driven analysis of the violence, intimidation, discrimination, and institutional harassment faced by Christians throughout 2025. Drawing exclusively from the documented incidents provided, it traces how hate speech translated into physical violence, how law was repurposed as a tool of repression, and how everyday Christian life—worship, burial, marriage, education, and celebration—was progressively criminalised. The focus is not merely on what happened, but on how these events collectively reveal an architecture of otherisation that corrodes constitutional guarantees and reshapes citizenship itself. 

Manufacturing the Enemy: Christians as ‘foreign’, ‘anti-national’, and ‘dangerous’

A central pillar of anti-Christian mobilisation in 2025 was the persistent portrayal of Christians as outsiders to the Indian nation. Speakers across states repeatedly asserted that Christianity is inherently foreign—linked to the Vatican, Western powers, or colonial rule—and therefore incompatible with Indian culture. This rhetoric erased the long history of Indian Christianity, including indigenous traditions dating back centuries, and reframed faith as a marker of disloyalty.

The “holy land” disqualification: In Maharashtra and beyond, influential voices like Dhananjay Desai propagated a dangerous geopolitical argument: that because the “holy places” of Christians (the Vatican) and Muslims (Arabia) lie outside India, their loyalty to the Indian state is fundamentally compromised. This narrative effectively created a “Permanent Outsider” status, suggesting that a Christian can never be a “true” Indian.[1]

Public rallies and religious gatherings consistently advanced the idea that “true Indians” cannot be Christian. By redefining national belonging through religious identity, these narratives transformed Christians into conditional citizens—present but perpetually suspect. This framing proved crucial in legitimising subsequent acts of exclusion: if Christians are not truly Indian, then denying them burial rights, worship spaces, or legal protection can be portrayed as acts of cultural defence rather than discrimination.

The ‘foreign religion’ trope also intersected with anxieties about land, resources, and sovereignty. Christians—particularly among Adivasi communities—were accused of acting as agents of foreign interests, allegedly facilitating land grabs or undermining tribal traditions. These claims, devoid of evidence, circulated freely at public events, often in the presence of political leaders, lending them a veneer of legitimacy. 

The ideological framework – language as a weapon

Before the first stone was cast thrown in 2025, the groundwork was laid through a sophisticated linguistic campaign of dehumanisation. The “Otherisation” process relied on specific tropes designed to make the Christian community appear “un-Indian.”

The year 2025 saw the mainstreaming of derogatory slurs:

• “Rice bag” Christians: A trope used by figures like Kajal Hindustani to suggest that faith is a transaction and that converts are “purchasable” and thus lack integrity. (Also read CJP’s Hate Buster on this perennial slur against Indian Christians here.)
• “Chaddar and Father”: A rhyming slur used by Raju Das and Gautam Khattar to group Muslims and Christians into a single “alien threat,” often referred to as a “demonic illness” or a “cancer” that needs to be “cured” through violence.
• The “shoe” metaphor: In Haryana, Mahant Shukrai Nath Yogi explicitly stated he began wearing shoes specifically to “confront” missionaries, a metaphor for crushing and humiliating the “Other.” This was later echoed in Jhabua with slogans like “Isai ke dalalo ko, joote maaro saalo ko” (Beat the agents of Christianity with shoes). 

Conspiracy theories as political technology

Throughout 2025, conspiracy theories functioned as a key technology of mobilisation. The discourse of “love jihad,” initially directed at Muslims, was increasingly redeployed against Christians. Hindu nationalist leaders warned that Christian men were luring Hindu women into relationships to facilitate conversion, framing intimacy and marriage as weapons of religious warfare.

Equally pervasive was the narrative of “rice-bag conversions,” which cast Christian converts—especially Dalits and Adivasis—as morally weak, economically desperate, and incapable of exercising genuine choice. Conversion was framed not as conscience but as corruption. This discourse carried a deeply casteist subtext: it denied marginalised communities’ agency while reinforcing upper-caste paternalism.

Other conspiracies— “land jihad,” “drug jihad,” demographic replacement—were invoked to suggest that Christians operate through hidden networks aimed at destabilising Hindu society. The repetition of these narratives across regions points to ideological coordination rather than spontaneous fear.

Hate speech as infrastructure for violence

Hate speech in 2025 did not merely express prejudice; it actively prepared the ground for violence. Speeches openly called for social boycotts, forced reconversion, and the physical elimination of Christian presence. Chants advocating the destruction of missionaries crossed into explicit incitement.

Speakers frequently invoked mythological violence, comparing Christians to demons or invaders whose defeat was framed as a sacred duty. References to weapons, martial training, and vigilantism were common, signalling a shift from symbolic hostility to endorsement of physical force.

The impunity enjoyed by hate speakers is critical. Despite the public nature of these speeches, legal consequences were rare. The absence of state intervention functioned as tacit sanction, emboldening followers and normalising extremist rhetoric.

 Policing Worship: Raids, surveillance, and the criminalisation of Christian prayer

Throughout 2025, Christian worship—particularly prayer meetings held in private homes—became one of the most visible and repeatedly targeted sites of persecution. The incident record shows a consistent, cross-state pattern: Hindu nationalist groups would accuse Christians of engaging in forced or fraudulent conversions; mobs would arrive at prayer meetings, disrupt worship, and summon the police; law enforcement would then detain pastors or hosts, seize Bibles and religious material, and register cases under anti-conversion or public order laws.

These raids occurred across Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Chhattisgarh. In Uttar Pradesh alone, multiple prayer meetings were raided following complaints by Bajrang Dal or VHP activists, even when attendees stated on record that they were participating voluntarily. In several cases, worship was forcibly stopped mid-prayer, with congregants verbally abused, threatened with violence, or compelled to chant Hindu religious slogans.

In Maharashtra, women attending Bible study gatherings were filmed and interrogated by Hindu vigilantes, accused of illegal religious activity, and pressured to disclose personal information. In Bihar and Rajasthan, elderly worshippers and women were forced to disperse while pastors were taken to police stations for questioning. In Odisha, prayer gatherings were followed by police violence against worshippers, including physical assaults documented by fact-finding teams.

These incidents collectively establish that Christian worship itself was treated as presumptively illegal. The home—constitutionally protected as a private sphere—was transformed into a surveilled space where religious expression invited state intervention. The cumulative effect of these raids was not merely disruption but deterrence: Christians learned that gathering to pray could lead to public humiliation, arrest, and long-term harassment.

Instances:

1. Location: Mayapur, Sidhi, Madhya Pradesh

Date: January 17

Bajrang Dal members, led by Rishi Shukla, raided a Christian prayer meeting held at a household. They harassed the attendees, accused them of engaging in religious conversions, and called the police.

2. Location: Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh

Date: January 27

Members of Bajrang Dal, along with the police, raided a Christian family’s house accusing them of engaging in religious conversion. They presented the Bibles in the house as evidence and arrested the couple.

3. Location: Khargapur, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh

Date: February 9

Members of the Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha attempted to raid a Christian Sunday prayer meeting held in a church at a residence, accusing the attendees of religious conversion. The police confirmed that the church is registered and holds regular prayer meetings but directed them to suspend gatherings until the investigation is complete.

4. Location: Bargarh, Odisha

Date: February 9

Members of Bajrang Dal raided a Christian prayer meeting, alleging forced religious conversions and demanding it be stopped. The attendees pushed back, questioning their authority. https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/1444

5. Location: Bikaner, Rajasthan

Date: February 16

Members of Bajrang Dal and Hindu Jagran Manch raided a Christian prayer meeting at a private residence, assaulting attendees and vandalising the property while accusing them of indulging in religious conversion. During the attack, they chanted slogans of “Jai Shree Ram” and “Narendra Modi Zindabad” as part of their protest. The police detained 6-7 individuals on accusations of religious conversion.

6. Location: Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

Date: March 20

Members of Hindu nationalist organisations, led by Thakur Ram Singh and backed by the police, raided a Christian prayer meeting at a conference hall. They alleged that attendees were being trained to brainwash and convert Hindus. The police arrested three individuals acting on their complaint.

Anti-Conversion Laws: Legal architecture of suspicion and control

Anti-conversion laws operated throughout 2025 as the primary legal framework through which Christian life was criminalised. While framed as safeguards against coercion, the documented incidents show that these laws were overwhelmingly used against Christians on the basis of unverified complaints by Hindu nationalist groups rather than testimonies of affected individuals.

Across Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha, pastors, prayer leaders, and ordinary believers were arrested during or after prayer meetings. FIRs were registered even when alleged converts explicitly denied any force, inducement, or deception. In several Uttar Pradesh cases, police booked Christian couples or pastors under the state’s anti-conversion law solely because prayer was taking place in a domestic setting.

The first reported convictions of Christians under certain state anti-conversion laws marked a critical escalation. These convictions sent a chilling message beyond the individuals involved: Christian worship and evangelism—even when peaceful and consensual—could result in imprisonment. In Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, anti-conversion provisions were frequently combined with charges of unlawful assembly or public nuisance, enabling prolonged detention and heightened intimidation.

Rather than preventing coercion, these laws functioned as instruments of surveillance and discipline. They legitimised mob vigilance, emboldened police intervention, and transformed religious belief into a legally suspect activity.

Instances:

1. Location: Gokarna, Karnataka

Date: June 22

Far-right Hindu nationalists barged into a private Christian prayer meeting; instead of acting against the attackers, police filed an FIR against the worshippers over false conversion claims.

2. Location: Burhanpur, Madhya Pradesh

Date: June 25

Far-right Hindu nationalists brutally stripped, beat, and interrogated Adivasi Christians, falsely accusing them of religious conversions. Police filed an FIR against six Christians, while the attackers faced no action. As the video went viral, demands grew to prosecute the assailants, who, according to the victims, are upper-caste men affiliated with the Bajrang Dal.

Police complicity and administrative alignment

The role of the police across the documented incidents reveals a systemic collapse of institutional neutrality. In numerous cases, police arrived at prayer meetings alongside Hindu nationalist mobs or acted directly on their complaints without independent verification. Christians were detained, questioned, or arrested, while aggressors were rarely booked.

In Uttar Pradesh, there were repeated instances where pastors were detained while the individuals who disrupted worship faced no consequences. In one incident, a pastor’s wife was arrested following an attack on their prayer meeting, while those who assaulted the congregation went uncharged. In Odisha, fact-finding reports documented police assaulting Christian worshippers—including children and priests—during raids on church premises.

Administrative authorities also played a role in reinforcing exclusion. In Chhattisgarh villages where Christian families were denied burial rights, sarpanches and local officials justified the exclusion as adherence to “local custom.” Police were present during several burial denials yet failed to intervene, effectively endorsing the discrimination.

This alignment between police, administration, and vigilante groups produced a regime of structural impunity. Christians were left without effective legal recourse, trapped between mob violence and state hostility.

Institutional response and media coverage

Despite the violence, high-level official response was muted. Occasionally courts intervened (e.g. Supreme Court rebuked Chhattisgarh in the tribal burial case), but on the whole, police and governments largely upheld anti-conversion crackdowns. In regions where BJP governments held power, anti-Christian laws were zealously enforced (e.g. first UP conviction). BJP leaders voiced no regret over extremists’ speeches, and sometimes echoed the fear rhetoric themselves.

Mainstream media coverage of anti-Christian incidents in 2025 frequently diluted their communal character. Raids on prayer meetings were framed as routine law-and-order actions; burial denials were described as village disputes; arrests under anti-conversion laws were reported without scrutiny of evidentiary basis.

By contrast, independent media outlets and civil society organisations documented patterns across states, tracking hate speeches, arrests, and coordinated attacks. Their reporting reveals the scale, consistency, and ideological coherence of the persecution that mainstream narratives often obscured.

This narrative dilution played a crucial role in normalisation. When violence is fragmented into isolated events and stripped of its structural context, it becomes easier for society and institutions to accept persecution as ordinary governance rather than constitutional breakdown.

In summary, the institutional picture is one of complicity or wilful negligence. Police frequently treated Christian worship as a crime, and only rarely held Hindu attackers accountable. For example, after mobs raided an Odisha village burning Bibles, local police were slow to file charges; journalists had to push coverage for any action. Even when arrests were made, they were usually of Christians under anti-conversion laws (not the mobs). Several incident reports note explicitly that police either joined the persecutors (as at Bilaspur, CG) or simply failed to prevent ongoing intimidation.

Denial of Dignity: Burials, death, and civil exclusion

One of the most severe and symbolically devastating forms of persecution documented in 2025 was the repeated denial of burial rights to Christians. In multiple villages in Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, Christian families—often Dalit or Adivasi—were prevented from burying their dead in common burial grounds.

In several incidents, families were forced to transport bodies over long distances to find a place for burial, sometimes under police escort. In one prominent case, the denial of burial to an elderly Christian man in a tribal area prompted judicial intervention, with higher courts reprimanding the state for failing to protect basic dignity.

Other incidents reveal even harsher coercion: local leaders demanded that families undergo reconversion to Hinduism as a condition for allowing burial. These acts were not spontaneous expressions of social prejudice but organised practices of exclusion, enforced through threats and administrative inaction.

Denial of burial constitutes a form of civil death. It communicates that Christians are excluded from the moral and social community—not only in life, but even in death. These practices closely mirror historical caste-based exclusions, revealing how religious persecution in 2025 intersected with entrenched hierarchies of purity and pollution. The denial of burial is the ultimate expression of “Otherisation.” It suggests that the Christian body is so “alien” that it cannot even be permitted to decompose in the soil of its own homeland.

Instances:

1. Location: Surat, Gujarat

Date: February 1

Hindu nationalists, led by Narendra Choudhary, forced out a group of Christian individuals who had come to collect a man’s body for burial. The Christian group claimed that the man was Christian and the family called them. However, the goons accused them of forcefully converting Hindus, and made them leave along with the coffin.

2. Location: Sanaud, Durg, Chhattisgarh

Date: May 26

During the burial of a Christian woman, villagers—pressured by Hindu nationalists and a village sarpanch sympathetic to Hindu nationalist ideology—refused to allow her burial at the public Muktidham, claiming the land was reserved for Adivasi tribals. Despite the presence of police and the SDM, officials did not intervene. The family buried her 30 km away in Dhamtari.

3. Location: Parsoda, Durg, Chhattisgarh

Date: December 8

Members of VHP-Bajrang Dal, along with other villagers, staged a protest opposing the burial of an 85-year-old Dalit Christian man in the public cremation ground. Tension escalated as both sides refused to back down. Police intervened to control the situation. Authorities later directed the family to bury the body on their privately owned land instead of the public cremation ground.

Cultural Erasure: Festivals, symbols, institutions, and public space

Beyond physical violence and legal harassment, 2025 witnessed sustained attempts to erase Christian presence from public and cultural life. Christmas celebrations were repeatedly targeted. In Gujarat, shopkeepers were threatened and pressured to remove Christmas decorations and religious items. In other states, public displays associated with Christian festivals were portrayed as cultural provocation.

Educational institutions also came under pressure. Universities and colleges cancelled lectures or academic events following objections by Hindu nationalist groups alleging religious propaganda. These cancellations extended the logic of persecution into intellectual and cultural spaces, framing even discussion of Christianity as suspect.

Church structures and prayer halls were demolished or sealed in parts of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, often with administrative backing. These actions were justified on technical or zoning grounds, masking their communal intent. The cumulative effect was the shrinking of public space available to Christians for worship, celebration, and community life.

Cultural erasure complemented physical violence by rendering Christianity increasingly invisible, reinforcing the message that Christian identity must remain private, silent, and subordinate.

A detailed report may be read here.

Territorial Warfare – Schools and the battle for the mind

In 2025, the “Otherisation” project moved into the classroom. Christian missionary schools—long respected for their contribution to Indian education—were reframed as “conversion factories.”

Forcible ritualism: In Hojai, Assam (Feb 14), the Rashtriya Bajrang Dal staged a Saraswati Puja at the gates of a Christian school. This was an act of “territorial marking,” asserting that the majority’s rituals must supersede the school’s private character.

Iconoclasm and dress codes: In Burhanpur, MP, the removal of a plaque with a quote from Jesus Christ illustrated a desire to scrub the public landscape of Christian thought. Furthermore, leaders like Suresh Chavhanke attacked the very attire of Christian teachers, labeling “Isai dress” as a psychological threat to children. By attacking the symbols and clothes of the community, the movement sought to make the Christian presence invisible.

Intersectionality: Caste, tribe, gender, and the differential impact of persecution

The incidents recorded in 2025 demonstrate that anti-Christian persecution operated through intersecting axes of vulnerability. Dalit and Adivasi Christians were disproportionately affected. In tribal regions of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, Christian families faced threats of eviction, social boycott, denial of burial, and forced reconversion.

Conversion among marginalised communities was framed as betrayal—both of Hindu religion and of caste order. This framing justified intensified punishment and surveillance. The language used against Dalit and Adivasi Christians often echoed older casteist tropes of impurity and contamination.

Intersectionality magnified vulnerability: faith, caste, tribe, and gender converged to produce heightened exposure to violence and exclusion. Analysis of the data shows that Hindu militants often targeted socially vulnerable Christians. Tribal and Dalit Christians were singled out in multiple incidents. For example, in Durg (Chhattisgarh) villagers blocked the burial of an 85-year-old Dalit Christian man at the public ground, explicitly citing tribal land rights to exclude him. Similarly, a tribal Christian woman in Sanaud was denied a resting place at the village cremation ground. In Assam, Hindutva leaders accused Christian missionaries of undermining tribal society, part of a broader narrative of “protecting Adivasi culture” from conversion. In Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand, Christian converts from local tribes or Dalit castes were especially vulnerable to accusations of “stealing” tribals from Hindu fold (for example the Khapabhat raid).

Gender was another axis. Women were often the direct targets of conversion gossip and social pressure. Incidents in Mumbai and West Bengal show women being publicly humiliated for their faith. Even when men were attacked, their Christian daughters and wives were threatened – e.g. a Kanker (Chhattisgarh) case where girls were shouted at to renounce Christianity under threat of eviction. The logic of “protecting Hindu women” underpinned many hate speeches and attacks. The intersection of gender and religion thus magnified the harassment of female Christians, who were portrayed as spoils of conversion conspiracies.

Caste bias intersected: several persecuted Christian families belonged to lower castes. In several villages, families were pressured to sign documents renouncing Christianity or face ostracism. A MaktoobMedia report notes tribal families in one Chhattisgarh village were forced to sign a “pact” to convert back within days. Even police actions showed caste dimensions: often the accused Christians were Tribals or Dalits, while the accusers were higher-caste Hindus. These layers of caste and gender made it harder for Christian victims to seek redress, as local power structures favoured the Hindu aggressors.

Geography and Escalation: From local attacks to a national pattern

The incidents span much of India, but some states saw particularly high frequency. Uttar Pradesh (37 incidents in the list) and Madhya Pradesh (35) were the worst-hit, reflecting both active VHP-Bajrang Dal chapters and strict anti-conversion laws. These states witnessed many police raids on pastors and prayer meetings, as well as major hate rallies. Chhattisgarh (26 incidents) was also notable, partly due to its large tribal Christian population and local Hindu chauvinist cells (Chhattisgarh saw everything from villages denying burials to BJP-minister-led hate speeches). In the West, Maharashtra (17 incidents) had frequent church raids (e.g. Mumbai and Nashik) and provocative temple ceremonies near Christian schools. Gujarat (9 incidents) saw actions like forcing shopkeepers to curb Christmas sales and at least one case of Bajrang Dal harassment of a Christian family. Eastern and southern states were not immune: Odisha and Bengal had mob attacks on Christians (Odisha families were violently threatened in June; a Bengal mob forcibly imposed a tulsi shrine on a Christian home). Even Nepal’s Terai region saw hate speeches against Christians in January, showing the cross-border spread of these narratives.

Temporally, incidents clustered around Hindu religious or national events. January (just after Ram Mandir consecration) saw several hate-speech gatherings (e.g. Garhwa, Jharkhand) and anti-Christmas actions. February–March featured VHP-sponsored school pujas and rallies (e.g. Saraswati Puja disruptions, several raids by Bajrang Dal). Notably, the highest count was in September (26 incidents) – a period when state elections (e.g. Chhattisgarh MP, Mizoram) and Hindu festivals like Ganesh Chaturthi took place, possibly spurring extremist visibility. Another spike came in December (19 incidents), reflecting year-end polarization (for example, arrests after Republic Day protests).

Overall, the pattern is escalatory and sustained: incidents continued each month with shifting focus (speech rallies give way to mob actions and police crackdowns). No period saw a complete lull. The unbroken string of events from January to December suggests a systemic campaign rather than isolated flare-ups.

Role of Hindu nationalist (read supremacist) organisations

A clear pattern emerges in the perpetrators: the vast majority are linked to Hindu nationalist groups. Bajrang Dal and VHP feature in almost every state account. Bajrang Dal cadres raided prayer meetings in UP, Bihar, MP and Maharashtra, often accompanied by police. The VHP sponsored large events preaching anti-Christian rhetoric (e.g. press conferences in MP, strategy meetings in Balaghat). RSS-affiliated outfits also took part: for example, at an Adivasi conference in Alirajpur (MP), BJP minister Nagarsingh Chauhan warned that Christian conversions among tribals would ignite conflict. The Ayodhya and Kumbh events were spurred by RSS leaders advocating armed “self-defense.”

Smaller groups like Hindu Jagran Manch (HJM) and Hindu Mahasabha were also active. In Mumbai and Assam, HJM members disrupted prayer services and harassed congregants. The Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha attempted to storm a Lucknow church on February 9. These fringe groups often coordinate with VHP-Bajrang Dal outings (e.g. marking Trishul Deeksha ceremonies), using religion to justify street aggression.

Major BJP politicians and influencers lent indirect support. BJP MPs like Bhojraj Nag (Chhattisgarh) equated tribals converting to Christianity with “anti-national activities,” even misquoting the Supreme Court to forbid Christian cremations in Fifth Schedule areas. Some state BJP leaders shared or did not repudiate extremist podium speeches – in Maharashtra a BJP adviser sanctioned Dhananjay Desai’s hate speech on “holy places in Arabia and Vatican”. More subtly, no major party figure vigorously condemned these attacks; indeed, BJP-run state administrations have often defended anti-conversion laws or appealed for Hindu unity in the name of nationalism, tacitly encouraging extremists. Even government-published Hindu religious calendars made headlines by warning Hindus to avoid Christian places (e.g. Andhra Pradesh’s 2025 calendar, though not in our incidents list, followed this trend).

Outside activists have noted this complicity. Christian organisations have written to top officials (including Prime Minister’s office and Human Rights Commission), highlighting that “even the dead aren’t spared” – as one film-maker put it of Pastor Baghel’s burial case. These groups point out that ultra-right vigilantes enjoy de facto impunity in many regions, and allege that local administrations either support or ignore anti-Christian mobs.

Summary of patterns

The 2025 incidents demonstrate systematic persecution of Christians driven by organized hate ideology. Key patterns include:

• Recurring hate narratives: Leaders regularly invoked conspiracies (“love jihad,” “conversion rackets,” foreign backing) that framed Christianity as a national danger. These narratives guided the actions of mobs and organizers.
• Coordinated militant actions: Groups like Bajrang Dal, VHP, RSS-affiliates, and vigilante outfits colluded in raids on homes and churches across multiple states.
• State-sanctioned harassment: Many raids and arrests were carried out jointly by Bajrang Dal activists and police or by police on Hindutva complaints. This shows institutional bias in enforcing anti-conversion laws.
• Geographic hotspots: While nearly every region saw incidents, UP, MP, Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra stand out as epicenters of legal and physical assaults. Eastern states saw new forms of intimidation (e.g. forced religious homicides in Odisha and West Bengal).
• Cultural marginalisation: Attacks extended beyond physical violence to cultural exclusion: Christian festivals and symbols were suppressed (Christmas items banned), burials were obstructed, and Christian education was targeted.
• Intersectional targeting: Marginalised-caste and tribal Christians, as well as women, bore the brunt of violence. Social prejudices overlapped – e.g. Dalit Christians faced casteist burial bans, and women were singled out in conversion narratives.

In all, the compiled data from 2025 indicates an organised campaign of persecution rather than sporadic incidents. The interplay of hate speech (spread at public events and online), legal tools (anti-conversion laws, biased policing) and communal violence paints a picture of institutionalized harassment. Right-wing groups exploited narratives of national security and cultural purity to justify attacks. Without accountability or countervailing political will, Christians remained vulnerable to both mob violence and state repression throughout the year.

Conclusion: 2025 as a year of systemic otherisation and constitutional breakdown

The year 2025 was not just a year of “attacks”; it was a year of “erasure.” The data shows a community being systematically pushed out of the public square, the classroom, the legal system, and the graveyard.

The “Otherisation” of Christians in 2025 was achieved by:

1. Stripping Agency: Treating all conversion as “bribed” or “forced.”
2. Stripping Dignity: Using slurs and physical humiliation (shoes, sticks).
3. Stripping Territory: Removing Christian symbols from schools and bodies from villages.

The incidents of 2025 serve as a stark warning. When the state and the mob align to define who is a “true” citizen based on faith, the very concept of a secular, democratic India is under existential threat. The Christian community in 2025 became the “canary in the coal mine,” signalling a broader collapse of constitutional values and the rise of a majoritarian order that seeks to define India not by its diversity, but by its exclusions.

The incidents documented across 2025 do not describe a series of unfortunate excesses or isolated communal flare-ups. Taken together, they reveal a systematic process of otherisation in which Christians were progressively stripped of constitutional protection, civic dignity, and social legitimacy. What emerges is not episodic violence, but a patterned regime of control.

Christian worship was transformed into an object of suspicion; prayer became a trigger for police action. Anti-conversion laws supplied the legal vocabulary through which belief itself was criminalised, while vigilante accusations were absorbed seamlessly into state action. Policing practices collapsed the distinction between complainant and accused, allowing mobs to function as de facto extensions of law enforcement. Even death did not interrupt exclusion: burial denials marked the most extreme assertion that Christians could be expelled from the moral community altogether.

Equally significant was the attempt to erase Christianity from public and cultural space. Festivals were suppressed, symbols removed, institutions pressured into silence. This shrinking of visibility worked alongside physical violence to communicate a single message: Christian identity was permissible only if invisible, silent, and politically irrelevant.

The media’s fragmentation of these events into localised disputes completed the architecture of persecution. By denying structural context, public discourse neutralised outrage and normalised exclusion. Violence became governance; discrimination became administration.

The persecution of Christians in 2025 must therefore be understood as a constitutional failure. When freedom of religion is subordinated to majoritarian ideology, equality before law becomes illusory. When police and administration align with prejudice, citizenship fractures along religious lines. The question raised by 2025 is not merely about the safety of one minority, but about the survivability of secular democracy itself.

2025 stands as a warning year — a record of how swiftly constitutional guarantees can be hollowed out when law, institutions, and public narratives are mobilised against a community. Ignoring this record risks accepting a future in which belonging is conditional, rights are selective, and democracy itself becomes exclusionary by design.

The analysis above is based entirely on incidents documented in the provided compilation.

References:

The article also lists the following external references, which corroborate and expand on these events:

• https://maktoobmedia.com/india/sc-slams-chhattisgarh-govt-as-tribal-christian-man-unable-to-bury-father/
• https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/were-pained-supreme-court-on-plea-of-christian-man-unable-to-bury-father-in-native-village-in-chhattisgarh-281453
• https://maktoobmedia.com/india/christian-collective-reports-245-incidents-of-violence-against-christians-within-the-last-3-months-in-india/
• https://thewire.in/communalism/chhattisgarh-christian-family-hounded-by-hindutva-mob-forced-into-hiding-police-refuses-fir#:~:text=Zeeshan%20Kaskar,church%20service%20was%20in%20progress.
•  https://persecution.org/2025/01/27/christian-husband-wife-first-to-be-convicted-under-anti-conversion-law/
• https://www.ucanews.com/news/police-arrest-7-indian-christians-for-conversion-on-republic-day/107706
• https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2025/Mar/10/university-of-madras-cancels-lecture-on-christianity-after-social-media-backlash
• https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/pc-george-stirs-another-controversy-calls-for-early-marriage-of-christian-girls-citing-love-jihad/article69313391.ece
• https://sabrangindia.in/from-protectors-to-perpetrators-police-assaulted-women-children-christian-priests-in-odisha-fact-finding-report/    
• https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/hindu-extremists-threaten-genocide-against-christians
• https://persecution.org/2025/06/30/hindu-nationalist-mob-attacks-20-christian-families-in-odisha/
• https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/church-mouthpiece-slams-bjps-double-standards-amid-push-to-woo-christians-in-kerala/article69809988.ece
• https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/pune/christian-groups-protest-mla-padalkars-religious-leaders-10114467/
• https://muslimmirror.com/tamil-nadu-dalit-christians-allege-denial-of-entry-from-church-rituals-stage-protest-demanding-swift-action/ 
• https://cjp.org.in/no-rest-even-in-death-christians-in-india-and-the-growing-targeted-violence-in-chhattisgarh/
• https://www.christiandaily.com/news/church-members-in-india-afraid-to-attend-worship-after-assault

[1] This is a propaganda outcome of the original hardline far right argument for a ‘Hindu nation’originally conceived by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his book, written in the Cellular Jail under the title “Essentials pf Hindutva” in 1923. Characterising the ‘Hindu’ through Religion, Faith, Nationality and Belonging he coined the phrashes ‘Pitrabhoomi’ (Land of the Ancestors, Fatherland) and ‘Punyabhoomi’ (Holy Land). By extension of this exclusivist definition, the loyalty and belonging of ‘others’ like Christians and Muslims is forever in question because their points of worship and faith lie outside the geographical boundaries of the nation.

The post The Siege of Faith: A year-long analysis of the persecution and otherisation of Christians in India appeared first on SabrangIndia.

– Poem by Amir Aziz

It is increasingly evident that Muslims in India are being robbed of their legitimate space and place within a nation that was once imagined as their collective constitutional dream. A vast majority chose to stay back in India after the 1947 bloody Partition, believing in existential roots, lived coexistence and constitutional equality. There have been riots and communal clashes in past decades post-Independence, but rarely was their very belonging to the nation so openly questioned and at grave risk. Rarely was their loyalty publicly doubted, their religion brazenly mocked.

It was uncommon for a sitting Chief Minister to pull a woman’s headscarf[1] simply because of her cultural choice, she donned a headscarf. It was unheard of for a Chief Minister to post violent and provocative imagery (video) depicting him shooting at Muslims[2]! What once manifested as communal ‘push and pull’ now appears to have been hardened and legitimised into something more systemic, an institutionalised propagation of directed othering, hatred and violence. 

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the persons propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

Accidental to Institutional

 This messaging is not confined to political speeches only. It is reinforced through ‘mainstream’ cinema; films marketed as if “based on real events,” filled with questionable, even repulsive and inflammatory depictions that amplify suspicion and hostility towards the Muslim. These narratives shape public imagination. In one disturbing instance, children living on the streets of South Mumbai were heard using hateful language against Muslims. When asked where such sentiments originated, they reportedly said that “aunts and uncles” take them to watch films, one of the few outings they can afford, as their parents earn meagre incomes selling roses on Marine Drive. Hatred, it seems, is being curated and consumed.

Policy, too, reflects this exclusion. Measures such as the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise—executed by the Election Commission of India (ECI) though this has been strongly legally contested—have clearly resulted in the disproportionate removal of Muslim names from electoral rolls, raising concerns about potential disenfranchisement. Legislative developments have added to these anxieties. Under the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 (CAA), which came into force last year, members of specified persecuted minorities from neighbouring countries who entered India on or before 31 December 2014 were made eligible for Indian citizenship. Muslims were excluded from this framework. Not only has the Supreme Court of India kept the substantive legal challenges to this much criticised amendment (CAA 2019) in cold storage, the court will only now hear the batch of 250 petitions in early May 2026 (May 5-7, 2026).[3]

More recently, an order issued under the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025 extended relief to individuals particularly Hindus from Pakistan, who crossed into India after 2014, with officials stating that the cut-off has effectively been expanded by a decade due to the continued cross-border migration of persecuted minorities. This privileges one community over others in fast-tracked citizenship.

Taken together, these measures have intensified debate over whether citizenship policy is being recalibrated along religious lines, especially when viewed alongside voter roll revisions and public rhetoric framing Muslims as “infiltrators.”

‘Torching’ the lawn

Attempts by Hindutva affiliates to enter Masjids, incidents of mob lynching targeting Muslim vendors, mobs stopping individuals to demand proof of nationality, these have become disturbingly common. In Varanasi, “Operation Torch” was launched to identify so-called illegal migrants.

The forcible closure of Muslim-owned businesses under varying pretexts points toward the economic marginalisation of a community already made vulnerable. The cumulative effect suggests a systematic relegation of Muslims to second-class citizenship within their own country.

On the frontline of this targeting –in 2025-206 at least –are Bengali Muslim migrants—often daily wage labourers, domestic workers, and small vendors struggling for survival.

Direct Violence

“I am very poor, and my family is deeply worried about our future. Why did they beat me? I never forced anyone to buy my food.”

— Riyajul Sheikh, Food vendor from West Bengal

“I am a poor man. I earn a living for my family by selling utensils. After this incident, how will I go out and work?”

— Akmal Hussain, assaulted in Bihar in January 2026

On May 24, 2025, in Aligarh, four Muslim men Arbaz, Aqeel, Kadim, and Munna Khan, were brutally attacked by a mob of cow vigilantes over allegations of beef smuggling. The assailants set their vehicle on fire, blocked a highway, and assaulted them with sharp weapons, bricks, and sticks. One unconscious victim was seen being dragged from a police vehicle. This was reportedly the second attack on the same group at the same location within 15 days, suggesting targeted violence. A forensic report from a government laboratory in Mathura later confirmed that the meat was not beef, debunking the allegations. Police arrested four individuals under provisions of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita for rioting, attempt to murder, extortion, and dacoity.

Riyajul (December 2025) was beaten by a mob and his goods were destroyed. He sells patties by walking through the streets of Kolkata. In one such incident from West Bengal, he was allegedly asked whether he had chicken patties in his box. When he replied in the affirmative, the assault began. When they heard his name, the violence intensified as reported by The Wire. It seems that, for many, the only fault is being Muslim. Such initiative feeds into a larger narrative of suspicion.

Source: Maktoob Media

Didar Hossain, a rickshaw puller from Agartala, was assaulted by a mob that attempted to burn him alive. He was robbed of his entire day’s earnings and severely beaten.

On December 22, in Basti, Uttar Pradesh, Akhilesh Singh, a leader of the Vishva Hindu Mahasangh, along with members of the group, harassed and threatened a Muslim chicken vendor for operating his shop near a temple. He described the butcher’s knives as “weapons” that could be used to kill people and threatened to file a police complaint for possessing them.

On December 30, in Madhubani, Bihar, approximately 40–50 Hindu nationalist supporters brutally assaulted and paraded a Muslim construction worker. He was falsely branded a Bangladeshi and forced to chant “Jai Shri Ram” and “Bharat Mata ki Jai.” The attackers allegedly threatened to sacrifice him at a Kali temple. Each incident may appear geographically scattered in Odisha, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Tripura but the pattern is chillingly consistent.  The slogans are the same. The accusations are similar. The humiliation is public. The violence is performative. And the message is unmistakable: belonging is conditional.

On January 7, 2026, in Jharkhand, a 45-year-old Muslim man was killed by a mob after being accused of cattle theft.

On January 1, 2026, in Bhonkhera, Sikandrabad, Uttar Pradesh, threats were reportedly left inside the homes of Muslim residents in the region, creating an atmosphere of fear at the very threshold of their private spaces.

On January 14, 2026 in Sahada, Balasore, Odisha, cow vigilantes lynched Sheikh Makandar Mohammed, a 35-year-old Muslim helper on a pickup van. He was repeatedly forced to chant “Jai Shri Ram” and “Cow is my mother.” Police later took him to the hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries.

On January 22, 2026, a Bengali Muslim vendor from West Bengal was brutally beaten in Odisha by right-wing extremists who accused him of being a Bangladeshi infiltrator. A similar instance occurred the very next day, another Muslim vendor from Birbhum district, West Bengal, was allegedly forced to produce his Aadhaar card, made to chant religious slogans, and threatened with death if he did not leave Odisha.

Such attacks and atrocities have increasingly been framed as expressions of “patriotism.”

According to Akmal Hussain assaulted in Bihar, January 22 2026 (quoted above) the incident began when a woman showed interest in buying utensils and asked him to come near her home. When he arrived, a man confronted him, called him a Bangladeshi, and demanded identity documents. As he attempted to retrieve his phone, a crowd gathered and began assaulting him. He sustained injuries to his head, arms, and legs. Following the attack, he left the city and returned to his hometown in Hooghly, deeply traumatised.

These are not isolated events. There have been multiple incidents of Muslims being beaten to death and forced to chant slogans such as “Jai Shri Ram” and “Gai humari mata hai” before, during, or after being assaulted.

Institutions of prejudice

The University of Delhi found itself at the centre of controversy after its undergraduate admission form listed inappropriate caste-related entries in the “mother tongue” section. Instead of languages such as Urdu, Maithili, Bhojpuri and Magahi, the form reportedly included terms such as Cham***Mazdoor, Dehati, Mochi, Kurmi, Muslim and Bihari, as reported by The Wire and Hindustan Times.

The inclusion of “Muslim” as a language and the removal of Urdu triggered outrage on social media. Bengali was also allegedly absent. The episode raised concerns about institutional insensitivity and the normalisation of caste and religious stereotyping within academic processes.

Meanwhile, in Jammu and Kashmir, educational spaces became a communal flashpoint.

On January 6, hundreds of police and paramilitary personnel were deployed outside the Civil Secretariat in Jammu to prevent protests by a BJP-backed outfit opposing what it called a “biased” reservation system at the SMVD Institute of Medical Excellence in Reasi district.

The protest, led by the youth wing of the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi (SMVD) Sangharsh Samiti and supported by Hindu right-wing groups, centred on the admission of Muslim and other non-Hindu students. Protesters demanded cancellation of their admissions or closure of the college.

“The presence of non-Hindus on the campus and their style of eating and worship is bound to hurt the sentiments of Hindus… The government should cancel their admission or shut down the college,” a protester stated as reported by The Wire.

The agitation is expected to intensify ahead of the J&K Assembly’s winter session beginning February 2. Colonel Sukhvir Singh Mankotia announced a ‘Sanatan Jagran Yatra’, a hunger strike, a signature campaign, and demonstrations on January 8 and January 10, warning of a shutdown across the Jammu division.

The Chief Minister maintained that the college, established through an Act of the J&K Assembly, does not restrict admissions on religious grounds. However, BJP Leader of the Opposition Sunil Sharma stated that only students “who have faith in Mata Vaishno Devi” should be admitted.

All 50 students were admitted on the basis of NEET rankings. The controversy erupted after only eight Hindu students appeared in the first batch, with the remaining 42 being Muslims from the Kashmir Valley. The issue was allowed to take a sharply communal turn, with right-wing affiliates raising slogans demanding the expulsion of non-Hindu students. Following the outrage countrywide and also by the ruling party and opposition in Kashmir and Jammu, on January 26 this year, the Jammu and Kashmir Board of Professional Entrance Examination (BOPEE) was compelled to “adjust” these 50 excluded students in seven government-run medical colleges across J&K based on NEET-UG merit and their preferences. Read more here

At Jamia Millia Islamia, another controversy unfolded. On December 23, 2025 when the university suspended Professor Virendra Balaji Shahare of the Department of Social Work over a question in an end-semester examination paper titled Social Problems in India, set for BA (Honours) Social Work, Semester I, 2025–26. The query attempted a discussion on the plight of the Muslim minority in India (see below).

Source: The Wire

Algorithm for and by Hate

Elected officials, sitting in constitutional positions directing hate. This has been a singular feature of the past close to a dozen years and 2025 and early 2026 were no exception.

A video circulated by the Assam BJP in 2025 intensified concerns about the normalisation of dehumanising rhetoric in mainstream politics and even more specifically within law enforcement.

Source ; The Wire, X deleted video

The footage appeared to show Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma handling an air rifle, interspersed with AI-generated visuals depicting bullets striking images of men wearing skull caps and beards widely recognised as markers of Muslim identity. The clip portrayed Sarma as a Western-film hero, overlaid with the slogan “foreigner free Assam” and captioned “point blank shot.” Reports stated that Assamese text in the video included phrases such as “no mercy,” “Why did you not go to Pakistan?” and “There is no forgiveness to Bangladeshis.”

The imagery echoed Sarma’s earlier public remarks. On January 25, during a press conference, he declared: “Only ‘Miyas’ are evicted in Assam. Which Hindu has got notice? Which Assamese Muslim has got notice? We will do some utpaat [mischief], but within the ambit of law.” On January 27, he said: “This Special Revision is preliminary. When the SIR comes to Assam, four to five lakh Miya votes will have to be deleted in Assam.” A day later, he added: “Whoever can give trouble [to Miyas] should. If a rickshaw fare is Rs.5, give them Rs.4. Only if they face troubles will they leave Assam. Himanta Biswa Sarma and the BJP are directly against Miyas.” He has earlier stated that his job was to “make the Miya people suffer.”

Multiple petitions were subsequently filed before the Gauhati High Court seeking action against Sarma for alleged hate speeches targeting Muslims in the state. On Thursday, a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Arun Dev Choudhury issued notices to the Chief Minister, the Central government and the Assam government. The matter is scheduled for hearing on April 21.

The petitions were filed by the Indian National Congress, Assamese scholar Hiren Gohain and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), after the Supreme Court advised them to approach the High Court. Senior advocates including Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Chander Uday Singh and Meenakshi Arora argued that Sarma’s remarks were provocative and threatening, particularly his references to the “miya” community , a term often used in Assam as a pejorative for Bengali-speaking or Bengali-origin Muslims, though the Chief Minister has described it as referring to “illegal immigrants.” The rhetoric has not been confined to one state.

BJP MLA Nitesh Rane posted a tweet on August 5, 2025 asking: if Hindus were being attacked in Bangladesh, why should Indians spare a single Bangladeshi in their country? He added that they would hunt down and kill every Bangladeshi living in India. The tweet was later deleted after controversy.

In January 2024, during the Ram Mandir Pran Pratishtha procession in Mira Road, Mumbai, amid communal tensions, Rane made a similar incendiary statement threatening to hunt down individuals. Hate speeches by senior BJP leaders, including Devendra Fadnavis and others, have also drawn criticism, with opposition parties and rights groups alleging a pattern of majoritarian mobilisation. Concerns have extended beyond the executive to the judiciary.

On December 8, 2024, a year before at a lecture on the Uniform Civil Code in Prayagraj organised by the Vishva Hindu Parishad, Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav of the Allahabad High Court made remarks widely criticised as Islamophobic. Among other statements, he said: “My country is one where the cow, the Gita, and the Ganga form the culture, where every idol embodies Harbala Devi, and where every child is like Ram.” He added: “Here, from childhood, children are guided towards god, taught Vedic mantras, and told about non-violence. But in your culture, from a young age, children are exposed to the slaughter of animals. How can you expect them to be tolerant and compassionate?”

Justice Yadav also used the term ‘kathmullah’, a slur used against Muslims, and stated that “this country and law will function as per the wishes of the majority.” Lawyers’ bodies renewed calls for an in-house inquiry into his remarks.

Stark and questionable has it been that the higher constitutional courts have taken no action against Justice Yadav for this.

But what does the data reveal?

Parallel to this rhetoric, data-driven reports corroborate these patterns of violence.

In November 2025, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom released an India-specific issue update describing what it termed systemic religious persecution. The report cited the “interconnected relationship” between the Bharatiya Janata Party and the RSS, linking it to citizenship, anti-conversion and cow slaughter laws. It noted that hundreds of Christians and Muslims have been arrested under anti-conversion laws, with 70% of India’s inmates being pre-trial detainees and religious minorities disproportionately represented. In its 2025 Annual Report, USCIRF recommended that the U.S. Department of State designate India as a Country of Particular Concern, or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations.

According to a CSSS report, released in early February 2026, mob violence against Muslims formed a significant category of harm in 2025. Fourteen lynching incidents were reported during the year, resulting in eight recorded deaths. These cases were often linked to allegations of cattle-related offences, suspicions of illegal immigration, and claims of “love jihad,” with some incidents reportedly involving forced religious slogans.

Among the cases cited were the killing of migrant worker Juel Sheikh in Sambalpur, Odisha; multiple lynching incidents in Bihar’s Nawada district; deaths linked to cattle theft accusations in Jharkhand; killings in Maharashtra, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh; an attack on a Muslim migrant in Kerala; and a case involving a student subjected to slurs in Dehradun. Reported by NDTV.

A separate analysis by India Hate Lab recorded 1,318 hate speech incidents in 2025, of which 98 per cent were stated to have targeted Muslims. These reportedly occurred at public rallies, religious gatherings, street events and across social media platforms. Human rights workers quoted in the study argued that such rhetoric had become routine, creating an atmosphere of insecurity despite constitutional guarantees of equal protection.

The CSSS report further raised concerns regarding uneven policing and prosecution, asserting that action appeared swifter in cases involving Hindu victims, while Muslims faced disproportionate arrests or police scrutiny. It also alleged that post-riot narratives sometimes attributed responsibility to Muslims without publicly available evidence.

The study concluded that the violence extended beyond physical attacks to what it described as heightened assertion of majoritarian cultural identity through religious symbols and festivals, alongside marginalisation of Muslim cultural expression. It stated that the cumulative effect was increased impunity for vigilante groups and a deepening sense of insecurity among Muslim citizens.

CSSS noted that its findings were based on monitoring national and regional publications including The Indian Express, The Hindu, The Times of India, Sahafat and Inquilab. Read more on this here.

Conclusion

In a recently released report by Human Rights Watch in February 2026, it was stated that,

“India’s slide to authoritarianism under the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – led government continued, with increased vilification of Muslims and government critics. Authorities illegally expelled hundreds of Bengali-speaking Muslims and Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh, some Indian citizens among them, claiming they were “illegal immigrants.” [page no. 215 ]

The demolition of homes belonging to poor, underpaid and hardworking people has become a recurring image of this moment. The victims, in most cases, are among the most economically vulnerable Muslim families. Hindu extremist groups, critics argue, have increasingly operated with overt or tacit support from segments of the government, administration and, in some instances, judicial authority, a development they attribute to the ideological leanings of the Modi government.

At the same time, India’s deepening political ties with Netanyahu’s Israel invoked here specifically as Netanyahu’s Israel to acknowledge that many Israelis oppose the policies of his regime are seen by some observers as reflective of a broader hardening of majoritarian statecraft.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has warned of a “well-thought-out conspiracy” to alter India’s population composition, referring to “these infiltrators.” Such language, when deployed by the country’s highest elected office, carries consequences. It reinforces the framing of a section of Indian citizens not as equal stakeholders in the republic, but as demographic threats.

When eviction drives, voter roll deletions, hate speeches, vigilante violence and institutional silences converge, they create not just isolated incidents but an atmosphere.

The question that inevitably arises is not only legal or political, but existential: What does it feel like to be a Muslim in Modi’s India?

For many, the answer lies in the steady normalisation of suspicion in the knowledge that citizenship can be questioned, belonging debated, and dignity negotiated.

And that, perhaps, is the deeper crisis beneath the data.

[During the research of this article an overwhelming number of incidents were found, it was difficult to cut down and mention a few. That in itself shows the horrendous state of minorities in our country.]

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Natasha Darade)

[1] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/12/india-chief-ministers-removal-of-womans-hijab-demands-unequivocal-condemnation/

[2] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DUiu9zZin8u/; https://scroll.in/latest/1090625/himanta-sarmas-shooting-at-muslims-video-left-parties-move-supreme-court

[3] https://www.scobserver.in/reports/citizenship-amendment-act-supreme-court-schedules-final-hearings-in-may-2026/; https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-to-hear-caa-petitions-from-may-5/article70651374.ece

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India Hate Lab Report 2025: How Hate Speech has been normalised in the public sphere | CJP

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The post Evicted, Accused, and Deleted: The shrinking space for Muslim citizenship appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In this written reply to the state Assembly, the Chief Minister also detailed that the highest number of cases of communal riots, 24, were reported in Balasore district, followed by 16 cases in Khurda district, which includes the state capital Bhubaneswar.

Absent in the Chief Minister’s reply, was any mention or reference to the communal clash that occurred in Cuttack during Durga Puja immersion and thereafter. In October 2025, in an incident that had few precedents in the city, Cuttack saw a curfew for around three days following communal violence that started with a clash during Durga Puja immersion. Days later, members of the VHP clashed with police and indulged in vandalism and arson.

The discussions saw stormy repartees in the State Assembly as Opposition parties targeted the government, alleging a sharp increase in cases of hate crimes and communal clashes. The Chief Minister defended his administration saying that steps are being taken to coordinate with different communities through peace committees under various police stations and through the local administration.

In the past 20 months, half a dozen towns in Odisha have seen imposition of curfew and Internet suspension over communal incidents, including the lynching of Bengali-speaking Muslims. In most cases, the accused have been members of right-wing outfits. Officials conceded that some cases may have gone unreported, especially when victims are daily wagers hesitant to approach police.

The Opposition has criticised the government over the alleged spread of “communal tension” in the state, where the BJP formed its first solo government in June 2024.

The National Crime Records Bureau puts the number of communal or religion-based incidents in Odisha at 10 in 2021, 44 in 2023 (pre-election year), and 15 in 2025. Data shared by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs in Parliament said that Odisha saw nine communal incidents in 2018 and zero in 2019.

Citizens for Justice and Peace has consistently reported on this spiral in targeted violence in the state over the past 18 months. This report detailed the humiliation and attack on a pastor in Dhenkaal district in early January 2026. The irregular detentions of migrant workers, Bengali, in the state were also questioned by the Court. Worse, was the systemic and consistent attacks on churches and vendors (daily wage earners) selling Christmas goods across Odisha, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh in late December 2025.

Related:

Publicly Tortured, Forced to Eat Cow Dung: No arrests in Odisha Pastor assault case

Odisha: Man forced to chant religious slogan, lynched by cow vigilantes

MP, Odisha, Delhi, Rajasthan: Right-wing outfits barge into 2 churches ahead of Christmas, attack vendors selling X’mas goodies, tensions run high

The post Odisha: 18 months, 54 incidents of communal hate crimes, 7 mob lynchings appeared first on SabrangIndia.