The decision did more than meet Kaushik’s claims for compensation. It issued far-reaching institutional directions: the creation of a committee headed by retired Justice Asha Menon to propose a model Equal Opportunity Policy (EOP) for transgender persons, and then, further ordered that the policy, following the guidelines, would be binding on all establishments, public and private, until the Union Government delivered its own. Through this action, the Court bridged the historic gap between recognition and implementation of equality, making it move from being an aspiration into an enforceable mechanism.

A Case that Became a Constitutional Reckoning

Unfortunately, Jane’s experience is not unique. After revealing her gender identity, she was forced to turn in her resignation after only eight days on the job at a school in Uttar Pradesh; a school in Gujarat later rescinded her job offer on similar grounds. She subsequently filed with the Supreme Court, under Article 32, arguing that these actions were violations of her constitutional rights and of the 2019 Act that prohibits discrimination “in any matter relating to employment.”

The court agreed. The Bench noted that discrimination on the part of private employers that is gender identity-based “strikes at the heart of the constitutional guarantee of dignity and equality” and explained that by not doing something about such exclusions by private entities state was making an “omissive discrimination.” The judges reminded the government, in the end, that the TG Act and its 2020 Rules were not too long ago, “brutally reduced to dead letters” by the government’s bureaucratic apathy.

While acknowledging the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, and the 2020 Rules, the Court regretted that they “have been brutally rendered dead letters” (para 35, p. 29). It further criticized the “grossly indifferent approach to the transgender community,” noting that this inaction “cannot in any way be fairly regarded as inadvertent or accidental; it is deliberate and is undoubtedly rooted in societal stigma, compounded by a lack of bureaucratic will” (para 35, p. 29). This scathing indictment of bureaucratic failure was coupled with a clear finding that the petitioner’s termination constituted a violation of her dignity, livelihood, and equality.

In asserting both direct and indirect discrimination, the Court put the question of gender identity discrimination into a framework of systemic injustice, and not simply a personal grievance. The damages awarded to Kaushik were symbolic, but profound: declaring through the judiciary that dignity is not contingent on conformity.

The Constitutional Arc: From NALSA to Kaushik

The judgment in Jane Kaushik v. Union of India is not disconnected from a trajectory of equality jurisprudence over the last decade or so. Its reasoning is founded upon three separate but constitutional landmark decisions — National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India [(2014) 5 SCC 438], Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [(2017) 10 SCC 1], and Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. v. Union of India (Ministry of Law and Justice) [(2018) 10 SCC 1] — each of which represented a point in India’s constitutional journey from recognition to dignity.

In National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (NALSA), the Supreme Court expressly recognized transgender individuals as “the third gender,” indicating that Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21 recognize the right to equality and dignity for all individuals, regardless of their gender identity. The judgment stated, “Gender identity is inherent to the concept of personhood…one of the most fundamental elements of dignity, self-determination, and freedom.” The Court also mandated that the state governments recognize self-identification and take proactive measures relating to education and employment. The Kaushik Bench cited NALSA to reaffirm that, “Articles 15 and 16 must be read in a manner that prohibits discrimination based on gender identity” (para 30, p. 26), but importantly extended this reasoning into the employment context, stating that neither public nor private employers may deny employment based on gender identity.

Three years later, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, a nine-judge Bench recognized that the right to privacy under Article 21 includes bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and the right to express one’s identity. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud wrote that “privacy protects individual autonomy and recognizes the right to make vital personal choices.” Kaushik recognizes this principle and extends autonomy to the workplace, contending that the right to live with dignity includes the right to livelihood without stigma.

Finally, in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, Section 377 of the IPC was invalidated, decriminalizing relations between persons of the same sex, and holding that equality is grounded in constitutional morality rather than public morality. With NALSA, Puttaswamy, and Navtej all providing a philosophical basis for the holding in Kaushik, they enforce those rights in the workplace. From recognition of identity, to protection of autonomy, to the enforcement of economic dignity, Jane Kaushik marks an evolution in India’s constitutional journey to not only a right to exist but to a right to thrive.

Equality Beyond Formalism: The Court’s Expansive Interpretation

One particularly notable aspect of the Kaushik case is its recognition of substantive equality, an embodied notion of equality that requires not just that all people be treated the same, but that normative structural barriers are eliminated so that certain groups can realize their rights.

Citing Articles 14 through 16 of the Indian Constitution, the Court validated that discrimination based on gender identity is a form of discrimination based on sex. The Court also connected this idea to the right to a dignified life and to live under Article 21 of the Constitution by stating that refusing employment based on gender identity results in “economic and social death” to an individual. The judgment invoked something called constitutional morality and reminded employers, both public and private, that the obligation of equality is not discretionary; it is a part of being a democratic citizen.

This point is significant because, as observed by CJP in its report about transgender rights in 2023, a lot of the discrimination experienced by the transgender community is not a result of outright bad intentions but rather due to inertia and ignorance by the institutional structure. The Court’s reasoning captured that in its justification by holding that to omit, or not act, can itself be a form of discrimination.

By recognizing “omissive discrimination,” the Bench also expanded and layered the idea of state obligations. As the Bench explained, equality means positive obligations. The State must ensure that the rights of transgender persons are not merely enshrined in law, but that they are realized and effective.

Strengthening Employment Protection

The first sphere of impact of the judgment for the transgender community is with respect to employment security.  The Court found expressly that the protections available under the TG Act apply equally to public and private employment, which makes it unlawful for any establishment to deny employment, promotion, or continuance for reasons relating to gender identity.

This means that where previously, major alterations to workplaces across India were difficult to put in place properly (at a general level, but increasingly across specific employment compartments governed by individual laws, such as recognition also in respect of ‘male and female’), this is now a seismic shift in practice and the obligation on employers. Employers must now make reasonable accommodation, whether borrowing the term from disability rights jurisprudence or applying the principle from the Court in respect of substantive equality, on any decision or treatment, covering everything that applies to transgender persons: recruitment forms, uniforms, leave policy, goodwill policy, and grievance procedures, also all included.

Having also ordered a compensation award to Kaushik, the Court now presents a precedent in respect of damages in fear to workplace discrimination, making it clear that discrimination is not only a negative ethic but an illicit treatment too. As earlier argued in CJP’s “The Discordant Symphony”, the work for transgender rights in India is not only about legal recognition, but within the real act, one of accessing responsible means of livelihood. This judgment helps stitch the gap between legal and lived rights responsibly, moving now toward enforceable law work.

Mandating an Equal Opportunity Policy

Arguably, one of the most progressive components of the ruling is the instruction to draft a template Equal Opportunity Policy (EOP) for transgender persons. The Court observed that Rule 12 of the 2020 Rules already imposes an obligation on every establishment to implement an EOP, designate a complaint officer, and create an environment free of discrimination, but noted that few, if any, establishments had done so.

The newly constituted Justice Asha Menon Committee is to produce a uniform EOP to be used by all establishments. Until it is formally adopted by the Union Government, the Court ruled that the guidelines of the committee will have a binding effect.

This shifts the responsibility of inclusion from a moral goal to a legal duty. The Court effectively constitutionalizes workplace inclusivity as an obligation of employers. Employers, schools, corporations, etc., now have an ongoing obligation to have trans-inclusive policies, grievance policies, and sensitization regimes.

As CJP’s earlier analysis in “From Judgments to Handbook: India’s Transformative Journey towards LGBTQIA Equality” pointed out, systemic inclusion cannot be left to goodwill; it has to be planned design. The Supreme Court has now offered precisely that design.

Ripple Effects: Recruitment Norms and Affirmative Action

Jane Kaushik’s implications transcend a single case. For the public sector, the judgment reopens discussion around reservation and affirmative action for transgender persons. Only a handful of states, including Karnataka, which offered a 1 % horizontal reservation, and Odisha, which instructed departments last month to incorporate “transgender” as a category of gender separately on forms, have taken action on inclusive hiring policies.

By calling out inaction by the state, the Supreme Court has signalled that governments cannot sit idly. Departments will have to insist on representation, reasonable relaxations, and non-discriminatory criteria in recruiting and promoting.

The implications for the private sector are equally significant. Employment discrimination based on gender identity now not only carries reputational risk, but legal risk as well. The binding EOP means private institutions will now need to modify their recruiting advertisements, the recruiting application forms, and internal HR policies to ensure inclusion. Selection committees and the Board of Directors will require mandatory sensitivity training, and failure to comply could result in judicial assessment.

In that regard, the judgement extends the ethos of equality into India’s economic systems, making sure that the transformative promise of the Constitution governs behaviour not only by the State, but the marketplace as well.

Constitutional Morality Meets the Workplace

Through Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has issued one of its most important equality decisions since Navtej Johar. It extends the Constitution into dimensions of society where discrimination can often continue without intervention. It does this by asserting the need to implement a national Equal Opportunity Policy and assigning significant responsibility to the State to respond to “omissive discrimination”, therefore transforming equality from a right to a collective responsibility of every institution.

For India’s transgender citizens, this decision substantively transforms symbolic recognition into meaningful participation – from simply existing to being able to be employed, from invisibility to the possibility of inclusion. True progress is not identified merely in laws or decisions but in the security of dignity in everyday life.

The next test is whether this landmark ruling is remembered, not as a judicial victory but as when workplaces, all over India, began to embody the values of the Constitution itself.

The judgment in Jane Kaushik v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India can be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related

Reflecting on Transgender Rights in 2023: Have Legal Recognition and Advocacy Efforts Broken the Cycle of Discrimination and Ostracism?

The discordant symphony: where does the transgender community go from here?

From Judgments to Handbook: India’s Transformative Journey towards LGBTQIA+ Equality

Can pride be apolitical? Perspectives from queer and trans* community

Mapping Gender-Based Violence in India: Trends, determinants, and institutional frameworks

MAT highlights state’s duty under Transgender Act 2019 for Trans inclusion

The post Beyond mere Recognition: The Jane Kaushik judgment and the next frontier of transgender equality appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Given that most anti-Hindutva critiques in the media emerge from the more privileged Brahmin–Bania perspectives, they inadvertently reinforce this diversion—keeping the focus on “Rajput history” and “Muslim history” while avoiding deeper discussions about present-day skewed representation, social engineering, and economic power in the state.

The real project is social engineering to secure Brahmin dominance in politics, bureaucracy, and culture. Crucially, this dispensation operates in tandem with Bania corporates, who reap massive economic benefits while Brahmins provide ideological legitimacy.

Cabinet and Leadership: It is numbers that matter

In early 2024, the BJP’s elevation of Bhajan Lal Sharma as Rajasthan’s Chief Minister, C.P. Joshi as state party chief and Babulal Sharma as Jaipur prantpracharak, signaled a clear shift towards Brahmin-Raj: three top Brahmin leaders at the helm, despite Brahmins being a small fraction of the state’s population. Although, after some uproar, C.P. Joshi was replaced by Madan Rathore (from OBC Teli) as the State president.

RSS Supremacy and Institutional Capture

The RSS, dominated by Maharashtrian Brahmin leadership, directs this design.  Mohan Bhagwat, personally presided over major coordination meetings in Jodhpur held between September 5 and 7 this year, underlining Rajasthan’s importance in the evolution of a national Hindutva strategy. These gatherings link the BJP’s governance in the state directly to Sangh priorities: temple projects, Sanskritisation drives, and rewriting cultural narratives to affirm Brahmin custodianship of tradition. Rajputs, OBCs and SCs are recast as auxiliary players in a story authored by Brahmin ideologues.[1]

The increased focus on Maratha figures from the Peshwa period, despite their irrelevance or controversial relation with the state’s history. The state-level celebration of Ahilyabai Holkar, despite her irrelevance to the state’s history, illustrates this strategy. This can be contrasted with the state government’s ambivalence towards the NCERT’s recent Hindutva led revisions, although disfavouring the State’s own history which only exemplifies this attitude.

Bureaucracy: The Quiet Arm of Hegemony

It is within the bureaucracy is where the real engineering occurs. National studies confirm that Brahmins are heavily over-represented in senior IAS/IPS ranks despite being a demographic minority. Rajasthan has seen repeated controversies around promotions and selections, with Brahmin-Bania candidates favored over Rajput, SC, ST, and OBC aspirants. For instance, the chief secretary of Rajasthan, Sundhansh Pant and the Finance Secretary Vaibhav Galariya are both Brahmins. Further, nine of the 24 Officers deputed at the Chief Minister’s Office (CMO) are Brahmins — that is more than one-third. This pattern also reflects in appointments of Vice Chancellors & Judiciary. At Rajasthan University, 5 out of 8 Deans are Brahmins. Out of 32 government-run universities in Rajasthan, Brahmins were appointed as Vice-Chancellors in 11 — a striking overrepresentation for such a small demographic group.

Similarly, while several Brahmin and Bania officers currently serve as District Superintendents of Police, there is only one Rajput—and not a single Muslim—holding that position.

These administrative patterns influence which textbooks are printed, which religious boards receive funds, and which police cases are prioritised. The dominance of Brahmin officers ensures Hindutva’s agenda is implemented with sympathetic pro-Brahmin filters. For instance, both Sharma and Joshi (although no longer BJP State president but still highly influential) frequently attend events promoting Parshuram as a cultural icon — recently Sharma inaugurated a Parshuram Gyanpeeth.

Hence, institutional capture through selections ensures policy-shaping and policy enforcement in favour of the concerned castes — increased State funding towards the Vipra Boards, Vipra foundations, Brahmin-controlled Gyanpeeths, promotion of vegetarianism and selective application of cow protection laws highlight this policy-shift.

The Brahmin–Bania Axis

Recently, Shikhar Agrawal, the Additional Chief Secretary was given additional charge as chairman of RIICO. Rajasthan, particularly the Marwar region and Jaipur-Shekhawati belt, has been the traditional home of major capitalist Bania houses like the Birlas, Bajajs, Mittals, Godrejs, Jhunjhunwalas, Agrawals and Khatris. The Hindutva order in Rajasthan rests not only on Brahmin dominance in ideology and bureaucracy but also on the economic muscle of Bania corporates. Brahmins provide ideological legitimacy and administrative control; Banias provide capital, campaign financing, and media ownership.

Deregulation in mining, real estate, and energy overwhelmingly benefits Bania-controlled enterprises. Contracts in solar parks, cement, and infrastructure disproportionately go to groups like Adani, Birla, and Mittal. GST centralisation, championed by Bania networks has weakened smaller competitors while favouring large corporates.

The Adani Group’s explosive expansion into Rajasthan’s mines, solar projects, and logistics under BJP, the interests of the Birlas & Mittals in Cement, telecom, and education sectors safeguarded by policy, and Local Khatri & Mahajan networks thrive under SME-friendly reforms while enjoying bureaucratic protection, exemplify this. On the other hand, Rajasthani Muslims, historically strong in art, culture, handicrafts and local trade, are vilified to marginalise them economically. Similarly, ownership of farms and orans (grasslands) by small Rajput farmers and traditional heritage by Rajput elites is often attacked under the rhetoric of samantwad.  Thus, while the state actively promotes the economic hegemonies of Brahmins, Banias, and Jats — and popular civil society discourse normalises these — the same socio-political channels stigmatise Muslim businesses and undermine Rajput property ownership.

In short, Brahmin–Bania synergy ensures that while Muslims are scapegoated and Rajputs are historically and politically side-lined, the real beneficiaries are the Brahmin-Bania elites who monopolise both state power and wealth.

Mechanisms of Social Engineering

This institutional capture and policy favouritism, is guarded by many strategies of social engineering like controlling information, culture, and using media and cinema to mislead public discourse.

The control of information and culture has played a pivotal role in social engineering.
Curricula and festivals are increasingly tilted towards Sanskritic, Brahminised traditions, side-lining Rajasthan’s syncretic and regional heritage. Similarly, Rajput-Muslim syncretic culture, exemplified by Sufi-Nathjogi traditions like that of Gogapir, are disfavoured for a more Brahmin-centric orthodox traditions like that of Parshuram. Similarly, Rajput-Dalit heterodox traditions of Ramdevji Tanwar and Rani Bhatiyani remain under constant attacks of Brahminisation by the State. This helps clear more space for Brahmin social influence over other communities — normalizing both institutional capture and policy favouritism.

However, what is more discomforting is the means and strategies employed to protect this hegemony, especially the social ramifications on the communities projected as social-punchbags for narrative decoys.

Muslims and Rajputs as the Mobilising “Other”

Unlike the Persian-origin Ashraf elites of Lucknow and Hyderabad — Rajasthani Muslims are either SC and ST convert or Rajput converts. While Kayamkhanis of Marwar & Bikaner, Sindhisipahis of Jaisalmer, and Khanzadas of Mewat are Muslim Rajputs, others like the Mirasis, Rangrezs, Langhas, Meos have been part of the traditional culture of the Hindu Rajputs.

Anti-Muslim mobilisation remained difficult in most pre-accession princely states due to the Muslim proximity to the Rajputs. However, that has dramatically changed in the last few years with various social engineering strategies, particularly Sanskritisation and Kshatriyaiaation. Hence, despite being local ethnic groups and despite being well-integrated contributors to the pre-accession Rajput States, including the modern armies — the Muslims are projected as the Turkic or Mughal “other.”

Furthermore, Muslim-othering has been followed by self-contradictory anti-Rajput rhetoric — the samantwad rhetoric by Brahmin and Jat politicians on one hand, and the violent conflicts over identity of medieval-era Rajput kings and other feudal lords on the other. The militant claims by Jats and Gujjars over Mihirbhoj Pratihar, Anangpal Tomar, Prithviraj Chauhan are not spontaneous social phenomena but politically-planned social engineering, termed “Rajputisation”. In this, different historical Rajput warriors and saints are assigned to different OBC communities to create social clashes between Rajputs and various OBC castes.

Hindutva’s obsessive appropriation of Maharana Pratap serves three key objectives. First, it eclipses the broader social, economic, and cultural contributions of Rajput dynasties, from the Pratiharas of Mandore onward. Second, it casts the rest of the Rajputs as collaborators with the Muslim ‘other.’ Third, it diverts attention from Hindutva’s ongoing project of Rajputisation.

Hence, BJP-RSS’s social engineering protects its policy of allotting more political space to Brahmins and economic space to Bania corporates. However, such social engineering is further compounded by narrative decoys (eg. Haldighati inscription debates) planted in media and films.

Discourse Deflection: Karauli Riots and the Afwaah Irony

During the run-up to the 2022 State elections, the State witnessed communal tensions and riots in Udaipur, Jodhpur and Karauli.

In Udaipur, the gruesome murder of Kanhaiyalal Sahoo was milked by BJP for anti-Muslim social-tension, while Karauli witnessed communal clashes triggered by rumours during a procession. Amid the fear, Madhulika Singh Jadaun, and her relative Sanjay Singh sheltered Muslims in her home and saved lives. Being the real heroes against Hindutva polarisation, they are reported to have said “This is Hindustan and we are Rajputs, we are known to protect people and we will always do it. Irrespective of faith,”

This irony deepens when we turn to the cultural sphere. Set in a Rajasthan town, Sudhir Mishra’s film Afwaah (2023), portrayed how rumours and political manipulation escalate into violence. However, both Madhulika, a garments seller, and Sanjay, a technician, are forgotten a year later. Instead, the film starring Bhumi Pednekar and Sumit Vyas, cleverly placed Rajputs at the centre of anti-Muslim violence.

Furthermore, the obsessive discourse around the change of the Rakt-talai inscription accompanied by a complete silence over Rajput protests against NCERT’s recent revisions fuels a misleading narrative that positions Rajput history as a beneficiary of Hindutva revisionism—a claim flatly contradicted by the recurrent protests Rajputs themselves have mounted against Hindutva’s distortions of their history in recent years — which can be read here, here, here & here.

The BJP-RSS machinery in Rajasthan has pursued Brahmin dominance with remarkable consistency, yet this reality remains conspicuously absent from most critiques of Hindutva in the state — deflecting discourse towards Rajput-Muslim history and the false binary instead.

Conclusion:

The real dangers of Hindutva lies not merely in the hate it spreads, but in the social order it entrenches: a system where Brahmins and Banias, wield an outsized supremacy over Rajasthan’s politics, economy, and culture — while constantly scapegoating the Muslims and the Rajputs through popular literature and cinema.

(The author is a mechanical engineer and an independent commentator on history and politics, with a particular focus on Rajasthan. His work explores the syncretic exchanges of India’s borderlands as well as contemporary debates on memory, identity and historiography; he can be contacted on adityakrishnadeora@gmail.com)

1. https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Sep/03/rss-all-india-coordination-meet-in-jodhpur-from-sept-5-to-7
2. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/ahilyabai-holkar-statue-unveiled-on-jmc-h-initiative/articleshow/121541829.cms

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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The post Hindutva’s Rajasthan Project: Brahmin-Bania Power, not just Muslim baiting appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Tharu Community and Dudhwa National Park

In the Palia Tehsil area of Lakhimpur Kheri district resides the Tharu community, known for its rich cultural heritage and deep-rooted connection to nature. Recognised as a Scheduled Tribe in 1967, most Tharu families depend heavily on forest resources for their livelihood, including bamboo, sugarcane, timber, and other forest produce.

The Tharu community inhabits around 40 villages situated in and around the Dudhwa National Park, which was established in 1977. The subsequent declaration of Dudhwa as a Tiger Reserve further intensified restrictions on land use and access to forest resources for local residents.

Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (Restriction on the de-reservation of forests or use of forest land for non-forest purposes) provides that:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force in a State, no State Government or other authority shall make, except with the prior approval of the Central Government, any order directing—
(i) that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the expression ‘reserved forest’ in any law for the time being in force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved;
(ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose.”

While this law was intended to prevent the diversion of forest land, its rigid implementation in Dudhwa effectively displaced the Tharu population from their traditional habitats. Following the creation of the National Park and Tiger Reserve, many Tharu villages found themselves enclosed within or adjacent to protected forest zones, leading to the loss of access to ancestral lands and essential resources.

Forest Rights Act, 2006 and Criminalisation of the Tharu Tribe

The Forest Rights Act, 2006 (FRA) (attached below) recognises and vests the rights of forest-dwelling communities by providing a legal framework through which they can claim ownership over land, forest resources, and livelihoods. It was enacted to undo the historical injustice faced by Adivasi and traditional forest-dependent communities who were excluded from forest governance for decades.

Section 4(2) of the FRA provides that:

“The forest rights recognised under this Act in critical wildlife habitats of National Parks and Sanctuaries may subsequently be modified or resettled, provided that no forest rights holders shall be resettled or have their rights in any manner affected for the purposes of creating inviolate areas for wildlife conservation.”

However, in practice, these provisions were ignored. The Tharu community was arbitrarily denied their forest rights, including the right to collect firewood, graze cattle, and access forest produce, despite fulfilling all statutory criteria. In 2012, when members of the Tharu tribe petitioned the court demanding recognition of their rights, the Forest Department responded by filing thousands of fabricated “forest crime” cases against them.

As reported by The Times of India, BJP MLA Romi Sahani from Palia constituency stated that “they filed cases not only against those who went into the forest, but also people who never left home, the physically incapable, and even the dead.”

Over the years, the Tharu community has continued to face bureaucratic harassment and administrative pressure, resulting in the systematic erosion of the rights guaranteed to them under the FRA. Seventy-year-old Badhana Devi recounts, “If we raise our voices or refuse to pay when officers come, we are threatened with new cases.”

In 2020, the District Level Committee (DLC) further rejected the Tharu community’s forest rights claims, disregarding the explicit provisions of the FRA, which confer rights irrespective of the revenue status of a village. (See CJP’s previous coverage: “Vested Rights under Threat: Tharu Tribe Petitions High Court against Administrative Harassment”)

These instances illustrate a clear misuse of statutory powers and administrative authority, effectively stripping the Tharu community of their constitutionally protected rights under the pretext of performing “official duties.” What was meant to be a restorative statute has instead become a tool of persecution, deepening the community’s marginalisation.

Misuse of Conservation Laws across India

Over the years, similar patterns of criminalisation of Adivasi and tribal groups have been witnessed across India. In Uttarakhand, for instance, the Van Gujjars were evicted from their homes as part of a drive to ‘clear encroachments on forest property’. They invoked their right to inhabit forest land under Section 3 of the FRA, 2006 (read below). Further, Section 4 of the Act clearly states that, in cases where these members are residing in critical wildlife areas and National Parks, it is important first to rehabilitate them, to provide them a secure livelihood.

The Uttarakhand High Court, through an interim order, upheld the Van Gujjars’ right to migrate to their summer homesteads and held that any attempt to evict them would violate Article 21 of the Constitution as well as their rights under the FRA, 2006.

In the Hoshangabad district of Madhya Pradesh, the Adivasi tribes such as the Korkus and Rajbhars have faced similar ordeals. At Itarsi, the Central Proof Range was established as a testing ground for armaments and ammunition, leading the government to acquire vast stretches of forest land and displace Adivasi and Dalit families. The concept of ‘protected forests’ was further expanded under Section 4(2) of the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023 (attached below), to include land used for strategic or defence projects and paramilitary camps. These exemptions and definitional ambiguities are now frequently misused by the government to bypass conservation obligations and to criminalise local communities.

Perhaps the most alarming example lies in the implementation of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972. Under the pretext of ‘conservation’, the Act has criminalised essential livelihood practices of forest dwellers, such as collecting mahua, grazing cattle, and fishing. Entry into these lands itself became a punishable offence. A report by the Criminal Justice and Public Accountability Project (CPA) reveals that most offences registered against Adivasi communities were categorised as ‘threats to ecological security and animal habitats’, often without any specific allegations.

Further, forest dwellers and Adivasis continue to face evictions through industrialisation and mining projects. The mineral-rich states of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand are particularly affected. To facilitate mineral extraction, the standard state response has been to first declare forest land as ‘protected’ under the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023, and then evict its inhabitants in the name of ‘conservation’. This systematic process not only undermines the FRA’s purpose but also perpetuates the cycle of dispossession and displacement of forest communities.

Legal Framework: Setting a Precedent for the Tharu Position

The judicial trajectory surrounding forest rights has consistently reinforced the constitutional legitimacy and welfare-oriented purpose of the Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006. As seen in the preceding instances, from the Tharu community in Uttar Pradesh to the Van Gujars of Uttarakhand and the Adivasi groups in Madhya Pradesh, the administrative machinery has often undermined the FRA’s intent through procedural denials and criminalisation. However, Indian courts have, on several occasions, upheld the protective spirit of the FRA and reaffirmed the rights of forest-dwelling communities.

In Wildlife First v. Union of India, 2019 (read below),  the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the FRA, recognising it as a vital mechanism for securing the livelihoods and cultural identity of Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers. The Court underscored that the Act does not weaken forest conservation but instead democratises it by empowering local communities as custodians of the environment.

Similarly, in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests & Ors., 2013, concerning the proposed bauxite mining project in the Niyamgiri Hills, the Supreme Court upheld the Ministry’s decision to deny forest clearance. The Court found that the project violated both the FRA and the customary rights of the Dongria Kondh tribe, whose spiritual and cultural ties to the Niyamgiri Hills were constitutionally protected.
In paragraph 43 of the judgment (attached below), the Court characterised the FRA as a “social welfare or remedial statute” designed to recognise and vest forest rights. The legislative intent, it observed, is unambiguously to safeguard the customs, usages, and traditional practices of forest dwellers. The judgment further emphasised that under the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) (read below), particularly Section 4(d), the Gram Sabha is entrusted with the duty to preserve and protect tribal traditions, cultural identity, and community resources.

This landmark ruling thus establishes a jurisprudential framework that directly supports the claims of the Tharu petitioners. Their ongoing struggle to secure recognition of their Community Forest Resources (CFRs) in the Terai region echoes the Dongria Kondhs’ defence of their sacred landscapes. The same legal reasoning: recognition of customary rights, participatory decision-making through the Gram Sabha, and the FRA’s remedial purpose, should guide judicial interpretation in the Tharu case as well.

Constitutional Implication: Articles 14, 21, and 300A

The arbitrary usage of the Indian Forest Act and Wildlife (Protection) Act, to arrest and detain Tharu Tribe members, under the guise of ‘protecting wildlife and natural habitat’, violates equality and liberty guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. The forest officials particularly target people belonging to Scheduled Tribes, who often lack legal and financial recourse to raise their voices. The FIRs are filed without looking at the facts of the circumstance (as in the case of Surdas Ram Bhajan), and any sort of resistance is framed as insurgency. Therefore, non-arbitrariness, which is at the heart of Article 14, is violated.

Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The FRA helps secure the right to life for forest-dwelling communities by protecting their ability to earn a livelihood from the forest. The petitioners argue that non-conferment of their forest rights is a violation of Article 21, and a further perpetuation of historical injustice, against which the FRA was meant to protect.

Article 300A of the Constitution protects the right of an individual to not be deprived of their property, secured by the authority of law. The Adivasis and Tharu tribe members are forced into a system of private/state property, as a result of unsettled land rights and lack of clear demarcations. The logic holds that any land that is not owned by individuals automatically becomes state property.

Thus, the 4000 cases against Tharu Community members violate their right to life, equality and property.

Conclusion and Way Forward

The core purpose of the Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006 was to rectify the “historical injustice” committed against forest-dwelling communities, particularly Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers, whose customary rights to forest lands and resources were denied during the colonial period and, regrettably, even after independence (as reiterated in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests).

In the case of the Tharu community, the lands they had long inhabited were declared “forest land” or designated as “protected areas” for wildlife conservation, disregarding their traditional conservation practices and deep ecological dependence on forest resources.

The extensive rights guaranteed under the FRA remain largely unrealised due to the excessive control exercised by forest officials, whose discretion often renders these legal protections ineffective in practice. Furthermore, the recent Forest Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2023, has weakened the FRA’s intent by allowing the Union Government to grant forest clearances even before the rights of forest-dwelling communities are settled or their consent obtained. This legal overlap has created a dangerous precedent where conservation is invoked to justify dispossession.

These developments also highlight how state machinery, including the Police and Forest Departments, disproportionately target communities residing in and around forest areas, a significant proportion of whom belong to Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes.

The petition submitted by Santari Ram Rana and Sadai before the Allahabad High Court exposes this subtle yet pervasive bureaucratic violence embedded within law. Unlike overt forms of repression, this harm is inflicted quietly through administrative procedures, documentation, and regulatory control, reflecting a colonial mindset that continues to view forests as needing protection from the very people who have protected them for generations.

While the writ petition remains pending before the High Court, members of the Tharu community must continue asserting their legal and cultural rights, drawing inspiration from the Van Gujjars of Uttarakhand and the Adivasi movements in Hoshangabad. Only through sustained advocacy, awareness, and judicial engagement can the original spirit of the Forest Rights Act be truly realised.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

Related

Vested Rights under Threat: Tharu tribe petitions High Court against administrative harassment

Forest Conservation Amendment Act, 2023: A challenge to Adivasi land rights and environmental protections

U’khand Forest Dept admits faults in eviction notices issued to Van Gujjars

Forest Conservation Rules, 2022- An overview of changes that snatch rights of Gram Sabhas

Sokalo Gond and Nivada Rana lead the campaign for Forest Rights in SC

Tribals Allege Officials Use Forest Rights Act to Harass, Demand Money; Picket DM’s Office

The post When Conservation Becomes Coercion: The silent violence faced by the Tharus of Kheri appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The act, discovered on the morning of Saturday, October 25, 2025, was immediately seen as a deliberate communal provocation. Given the charged atmosphere in the state over the “I Love Muhammad” slogan, which had led to widespread police crackdowns in other districts, the incident was treated with extreme seriousness. Local Hindu residents and right-wing organisations were incensed. A formal police complaint (FIR) was swiftly lodged by Gyanendra Singh Chauhan, the All-India Vice President of the Karni Sena.

Based on this complaint, Aligarh police initially registered a case against eight Muslim men from the locality. The men named in the FIR were Mustaqeem, Gul Mohammad, Sulaiman, Sonu, Allahbaksh, Hameed, and Yousuf. After the incident, heavy police forces were deployed to the villages to prevent any outbreak of violence as tensions soared.

However, as investigators, led by Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Neeraj Kumar Jadaun, began their work, they noticed inconsistencies. According to a report in The Times of India, the officers observed that the slogans were “misspelled, and all in the same way.” This misspelling was crucial. It did not match the stencilling or lettering style of the “I Love Muhammad” banners and posters that had been seen during protests and processions in other cities, such as Bareilly. This discrepancy led investigators to suspect “mischief” and the possibility of a different motive.

Police investigation

Police teams pivoted their investigation. Shifting from the assumption of a communal motive, they employed technical surveillance and began examining local disputes. Their work led them to a group of men from the Hindu community.

On October 30, SSP Neeraj Jadaun held a press briefing to announce the arrest of four men, Zeeshanth Singh (also reported as Jishant Kumar), Akash Saraswat (or Akash Kumar), Dilip Sharma (or Dilip Kumar), and Abhishek Saraswat. A fifth accused, identified as Rahul, was reported as absconding.

Aligarh: Abhishek Saraswat (s/o Virendra Sharma, Aakash (s/o Santosh Saraswat), Dileep Kumar (s/o Ramraj Sharma) & Zeeshanth Kumar (s/o Yashpal Singh) arrested by UP’s Aligarh police for allegedly writing “I love Mohammed” on temple walls to frame Muslim neighbours due to… pic.twitter.com/f7l9DHhxQA

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) October 30, 2025

The motive, police revealed, was not communal hatred. It was a calculated conspiracy born from a personal vendetta.

SSP Jadaun stated that the main accused, Jishant Singh, had a “personal dispute” with Mustakeem, one of the Muslim men who was initially named in the FIR. Media reports specified the conflict was related to a land-related rivalry. In a deliberate and malicious attempt to settle this score, Jishant Singh allegedly conspired with his friends to paint the inflammatory slogans on the temple walls. Their goal was to “falsely implicate” Mustakeem and his associates, leveraging the existing communal tensions surrounding the “I Love Muhammad” slogan to ensure their rivals were arrested and publicly disgraced.

“The investigation found that the graffiti was not a communal act but a deliberate attempt to implicate others due to a land-related rivalry,” SSP Jadaun said, as reported

The revelation was a profound shock to the local community. It demonstrated how easily personal conflicts could be masked as communal ones, with perpetrators willing to risk widespread violence to settle a score. Even before the arrests, some had suspected a setup.

On October 25, Samajwadi Party leader Zia Ur Rehman Barq had alleged that the graffiti was part of a “well-thought-out conspiracy” and stated, “If an impartial investigation is conducted, it will be clear that no Muslim person was involved in this act.”

#WATCH | Sambhal, UP: On Moradabad Madrasa asking for a virginity certificate from girls, SP MP Zia ur Rahman Barq says, “We also found out about this through social media. However, I still believe that it has not happened at any of our Madarsa or religious institutions where a… pic.twitter.com/0f3afPBxnJ

— ANI (@ANI) October 25, 2025

Following the arrests, SSP Jadaun confirmed that the case registered against the eight Muslim men would be withdrawn, and the four arrested men were booked under relevant sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 for promoting enmity between groups and disturbing public peace.

Background: the “I Love Muhammad” campaign and state crackdown

The Aligarh incident did not happen in a vacuum. It was the volatile endpoint of a controversy that had been building for nearly two months, starting with a simple expression of faith.

The timeline begins on September 4, 2025, in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. As part of the celebrations for Eid Milad-un-Nabi, the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, some young Muslim men in the Syed Nagar locality of Rawatpur put up a decorative light board at the entrance of a lane. It bore a simple message in English: “I Love Muhammad.”

As per a report in The Wire, this act drew objections from some local right-wing groups. They claimed the banner was a “new tradition” and alleged it was a “deliberate provocation” because it was placed on a public road near a gate also used for Hindu festival processions like Ram Navami.

On September 9, police in Kanpur registered an FIR against 24 people (nine named and 15 unidentified) for allegedly “disturbing communal harmony.” A local prayer leader, Shabnoor Alam, who was named in the FIR, told The Wire that police had asked him to help convince the crowd to move the board. Another accused, Mohammad Siraj, stated, “Last year, we displayed the same message on a cloth banner, and no one raised objections. This year, we used a light board, and suddenly people started protesting. I don’t understand why.”

The flashpoint: violence in Bareilly

The police action in Kanpur transformed the slogan from a festive decoration into a symbol of protest. In response to what they saw as the criminalisation of their faith and expressions, Muslim groups in other cities began displaying the slogan as an act of religious expression and defiance.

This set the stage for a major confrontation in Bareilly. Maulana Tauqeer Raza Khan, a prominent local cleric and leader of the Ittehad-e-Millat Council (IMC), called for a large protest after Friday prayers on September 26, 2025. The protest was called to oppose the police crackdowns and alleged derogatory remarks made against the Prophet.

Despite authorities denying permission for a march, thousands gathered at the Islamia Ground. The situation quickly spiralled out of control. Clashes erupted between protesters and police. Reports from the ground described stone-pelting from the crowd and even alleged gunfire, which prompted a heavy lathi charge from security forces to disperse the gathering.

The aftermath was severe. Maulana Tauqeer Raza Khan and seven others were arrested and later sent to 14-day judicial custody. As many as ten FIRs were registered across Bareilly, each naming between 150 and 200 Muslims, with over 2,500 people accused in total. By late September, the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), a non-governmental organisation, had already documented at least 21 FIRs nationwide related to the campaign, with 1,324 Muslims named and 38 arrested. In Meerut, five men were arrested simply for putting up a poster with the slogan, as per a report in The New Indian Express.

The counter-campaign and political rhetoric

As the “I Love Muhammad” slogan became a national controversy, it triggered a counter-campaign from right-wing organisations. In Varanasi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Lok Sabha constituency, activists from a saffron outfit called the Sanatan Sena began pasting posters with the slogan “I love Mahadev” on walls, temples, and mutts.

Jagadguru Shankaracharya Narendrananda, who led the effort, told Deccan Herald that the “saint community will respond to the fundamentalists through these posters” and that some elements were “trying to foment communal tension” with the “I Love Muhammad” posters.

This “poster war” highlighted a sharp political and social divide. Political leaders like AIMIM Chief Asaduddin Owaisi and PDP President Mehbooba Mufti publicly questioned the discrepancy.

I LOVE MOHAMMAD ﷺ @adgzonekanpur ये जुर्म नहीं है। अगर है तो इसकी हर सज़ा मंज़ूर है।

तुम पर मैं लाख जान से क़ुर्बान या-रसूल
बर आएँ मेरे दिल के भी अरमान या-रसूल

क्यों दिल से मैं फ़िदा न करूँ जान या-रसूल
रहते हैं इस में आप के अरमान या-रसूल https://t.co/8kKWY22zHC

— Asaduddin Owaisi (@asadowaisi) September 15, 2025

They asked why expressing “I Love Muhammad” was being met with FIRs, lathi charges, and arrests, while slogans like “I Love Mahadev” or “Jai Shree Ram” were seen as acceptable expressions of faith.

Jharkhand Minister Irfan Ansari remarked, “Just like people who believe in Sanatan Dharma, write ‘I love Ram’… and I don’t have any problem, I love Prophet Mohammed… I cannot understand how these three words can be the cause of arrests.”

#WATCH | Ranchi | Jharkhand Minister Irfan Ansari says, “Just like people who believe in Sanatan Dharma, write ‘I love Ram’, ‘I love Hanuman’, ‘I love Krishna’, ‘I love Sita’ or ‘I love Radha’, and I don’t have any problem, I love Prophet Mohammed and Islam as I belong to… pic.twitter.com/9s66IAMrnN

— ANI (@ANI) September 25, 2025

The controversy was further inflamed by the rhetoric of high-ranking officials. On September 28, 2025, in the wake of the Bareilly violence, Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath made a series of widely reported public statements. Speaking at an event, he warned against “vandalism in the name of faith” and promised severe retribution.

“If you trouble us, we will not spare you,” he stated, using the Hindi phrase, “chedhoge to chodenge nahi.” He promised action that would be remembered by “future generations” and said that “denting and painting must be done.”

Civil rights groups and media critics argued that this language, which was amplified by national news channels, effectively framed the display of the “I Love Muhammad” slogan not as an issue of religious freedom, but as a severe law-and-order problem. This, they argued, legitimised the harsh police crackdowns across the state.

The Aligarh incident, therefore, serves as a crucial case study. It exposed the danger of a high-tension environment where a slogan had become so loaded with political and communal baggage that individuals felt they could weaponise it to settle a personal score, confident that the blame would fall along pre-existing fault lines. It was only through a police investigation that looked beyond the obvious communal narrative that the true, and more personal, conspiracy was brought to light.

Related:

From slogan to sanction: how a Chief Minister’s words hardened into punitive policing after the “I Love Muhammad” row

Free speech, even in bad taste, is protected if no incitement to violence: HP HC

Two Hate-Filled Speeches, One Election: CJP complaints against Himanta Biswa Sarma and Tausif Alam for spreading hate and fear in Bihar elections

The post A Conspiracy of Hate: The Aligarh temple graffiti incident appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Delivering judgment in Muhammad Shareef C & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Anr., decided on October 30, 2025, Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan declared that while Islamic personal law may permit a man to marry more than once, the law of the land and the Constitution must prevail when such a marriage is to be formally registered.

“A Muslim first wife cannot be a silent spectator to the registration of the second marriage of her husband, even though the Muslim Personal Law allow a second marriage to a man in certain situations. The 1st petitioner can marry again if his Personal Law permits him to do so. However, if the first petitioner wishes to register his second marriage with the second petitioner, the law of the land will prevail, and in such a situation, an opportunity of hearing for the first wife is necessary. In such situations, religion is secondary and constitutional rights are supreme. In other words, this is essentially the fundamental principle of natural justice. This Court cannot ignore the feelings, if any, of the first wife when her husband registers his second marriage in accordance with the law of the land. I am sure that 99.99% of Muslim women will be against their husband’s second marriage when their relationship with him is in existence. They may not disclose the same to society. However, their feelings cannot be ignored by a court, at least when their husbands attempt to register the second marriage in accordance with the Rules 2008.” the Court held. (Para 10)

Background of the case

The first petitioner, Muhammad Shareef, a 44-year-old man from Kannur, was already in a subsisting marriage with two children when he claimed to have solemnised a second marriage in 2017 with Abida T.C., the second petitioner, as per Muslim custom. The couple, who have two children together, approached the Registrar to register their marriage under the 2008 Rules, asserting that it was essential to secure property and inheritance rights for the second wife and their children.

When the Registrar declined to register the marriage, the petitioners approached the High Court contending that Muslim personal law allows up to four wives and that, therefore, the registration authority had no right to refuse.

The legal questions before the court

Justice Kunhikrishnan framed two fundamental questions:

1. Whether notice to the first wife is necessary for registering a Muslim man’s second marriage under the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008; and
2. What remedy exists if the first wife objects to such registration on grounds of invalidity.

“Polygamy is an exception, not the rule” — The Qur’anic context

The judgment is remarkable not only for its constitutional vision but also for its interpretive depth in reading Islamic law through the lens of justice and equality. Referring to Jubairiya v. Saidalavi N. [2025 (6) KHC 224], Justice Kunhikrishnan extracted passages from the Qur’an to dispel the misconception that a Muslim man may marry multiple times at will.

Citing the verses, the Court underscored that justice, fairness, and transparency lie at the heart of Muslim marriage law — principles that align with constitutional values. Providing the same, the Court highlighted the facts of the case and held “

“In this case, admittedly, the 1st petitioner married another woman and in that relationship, he has two children. When the relationship with that woman was in existence, the first petitioner submitted to this Court that he fell in love with the second petitioner and married her. I don’t think that the Holy Qur’an or the Muslim Law permits an extramarital relationship with another lady when his first wife is alive and his first marriage with her is in existence, and that also, without the knowledge of his first wife. The principles derived from the Holy Qur’an and Hadith collectively enjoin principles of justice, fairness, and transparency in all marital dealings. However, the petitioner is relying on Muslim Personal Law to justify his marriage to the second petitioner.” (Para 6)

The Law of the Land: Rule 11 of the 2008 Rules

The Court examined Rule 11 of the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008, which obligates the Local Registrar to verify the details furnished in the memorandum of marriage, including previous marital status (Columns 3(f) and (g) of Form I). Justice Kunhikrishnan observed that this requirement gives the registrar clear knowledge of whether a spouse is already married — and therefore, whether due notice must be given to the first wife before proceeding with registration.

While citing Hussain v. State of Kerala [2025 (4) KHC 314], the Court clarified that the Registrar has no power to adjudicate on the validity of the marriage, but cannot ignore procedural fairness:

“…the Registrar is not vested with the power to decide the validity of the marriage. The question is, when a muslim man marries again, when his first wife is alive and the marital relationship with her is in existence, the second marriage can be registered as per the Rules 2008 behind the back of the first wife. The Holy Qur’an is silent about the consent of the first wife for the second marriage to a muslim man when the earlier marriage is in existence. However, it does not prohibit the option of obtaining consent from the first wife, or at least informing her before he marries again. Equality in gender is a constitutional right of every citizen. Men are not superior to women. Gender equality is not a women’s issue, but it is a human issue. As I mentioned earlier, the principles derived from the Holy Qur’an and Hadith collectively enjoin principles of justice, fairness, and transparency in all marital dealings. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that, if a Muslim man wants to register his second marriage in accordance with the Rules 2008, when his first marriage is in existence and the first wife is alive, an opportunity of hearing should be given to the first wife for the registration.” (Para 10)

Justice Kunhikrishnan: “A Muslim first wife cannot be a silent spectator”

In one of the most stirring portions of the judgment, Justice Kunhikrishnan emphasized that registration of a second marriage behind the back of the first wife would violate principles of natural justice and human dignity:

“A Muslim first wife cannot be a silent spectator to the registration of the second marriage of her husband, even though the Muslim Personal Law allow a second marriage to a man in certain situations.” (Para 10)

The Court observed that even though personal law permits polygamy, it is conditioned upon fairness and capacity — both moral and financial — to treat each wife equally. Ignoring the first wife’s perspective would amount to legalising injustice.

Gender equality as a constitutional mandate

Justice Kunhikrishnan firmly anchored his reasoning in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, holding that the procedural fairness demanded by the 2008 Rules flows directly from the constitutional right to equality:

“Equality in gender is a constitutional right of every citizen. Men are not superior to women. Gender equality is not a women’s issue, but it is a human issue.” (Para 10)

The judgment went beyond mere procedural compliance and addressed the emotional dimension of injustice suffered by first wives:

“I am sure that 99.99% of Muslim women will be against their husband’s second marriage when their relationship with him is in existence. They may not disclose the same to society. However, their feelings cannot be ignored by a court, at least when their husbands attempt to register the second marriage in accordance with the Rules 2008. Article 14 of the Constitution says that the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” (Para 10)

This humane acknowledgment of emotional agency — rare in judicial discourse — underlines the Court’s empathetic understanding of women’s lived realities within personal law frameworks.

What Happens if the First Wife Objects?

The Court provided clear procedural guidance for registrars and litigants. If the first wife objects to the registration of a second marriage, the Registrar must not proceed with registration and must refer the matter to a competent civil court:

“If the first wife objects to the registration of the second marriage of her husband, alleging that the second marriage is invalid, the registrar shall not register the second marriage, and the parties should be referred to the competent court to establish the validity of the second marriage as per their religious customary law. As I mentioned earlier, there is nothing in the holy Qur’an which mandates a man to get permission from his first wife for his second marriage. However, Customary Law is not applicable when the question of registering a second marriage arises. I am not saying that the second marriage cannot be registered, but an opportunity of hearing should be given to the first wife by the statutory authorities, while a second marriage of a Muslim man is to be registered.” (Para 10)

Balancing Faith and Law: The Constitutional Synthesis

Perhaps the most profound aspect of Justice Kunhikrishnan’s judgment is the synthesis it achieves between faith and fundamental rights. While reaffirming that Islam does not mandate consent from the first wife for a second marriage, the Court held that when registration under a secular statute is sought, constitutional guarantees must take precedence:

“Customary Law is not applicable when the question of registering a second marriage arises. I am not saying that the second marriage cannot be registered, but an opportunity of hearing should be given to the first wife by the statutory authorities, while a second marriage of a Muslim man is to be registered. Muslim Personal Law states that a man can have more than one wife, provided that he has the capacity to maintain more than one wife and can give justice to his first wife. If the husband is neglecting the first wife or not maintaining the first wife, or inflicting cruelty on the first wife and thereafter contracting a second marriage, making use of his Personal Law, an opportunity of hearing to the first wife will be beneficial to her at least when the second marriage is registered in accordance with the Rules 2008. marriage registration officer can hear the first wife, and if she objects to her husband’s second marriage, stating that it is invalid, the parties can be referred to a competent civil court to establish the validity of the second marriage.” (Para 10)

Outcome and broader implications

The writ petition was dismissed as the first wife had not been made a party. Nonetheless, the Court issued a transformative directive:

“Let the Muslim women also get an opportunity of hearing when their husbands remarry, at least at the stage of registering the second marriage.” (Para 10)

The ruling thus extends procedural protection to Muslim women within a statutory framework that transcends personal law — ensuring that no woman is blindsided by a state-sanctioned act of erasure.

Why this judgment matters

1. Reasserts constitutional supremacy: Personal law cannot override statutory procedure or fundamental rights when interfacing with state authorities.
2. Advances gender justice: By recognizing the first wife’s right to be heard, the Court has extended procedural dignity to Muslim women.
3. Bridges faith and constitution: It integrates Islamic principles of justice and fairness with the Constitution’s egalitarian ethos.
4. Sets a model for inclusive procedure: The decision creates a precedent for harmonizing personal law practices with secular regulatory frameworks.

Conclusion

Justice Kunhikrishnan’s ruling is a landmark in both family law and constitutional jurisprudence. It acknowledges the validity of personal law while firmly situating all state-recognised acts within the boundaries of constitutional morality, equality, and natural justice.

In essence, the judgment transforms a narrow question of registration into a broader affirmation of women’s rights and human dignity. It is a model of judicial craftsmanship that blends empathy with principle — reaffirming that in India’s constitutional democracy, faith may guide conduct, but fairness must govern the law.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

Shah Bano Begum (1916-1992): A Socio-Political Historical Timeline

Misogyny & Faith: Extreme narratives curtailing the autonomy of women

Shubha case: Reformative Justice meets Gendered Realities

Andhra Pradesh High Court rules Trans woman is a ‘woman’

A Question of Rights: Supreme Court backs teacher in maternity leave dispute

The post Kerala High Court: First wife must be heard before registering Muslim man’s second marriage appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Note: Meanwhile, Shah Bano’s daughter has approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court on Tuesday (November 4) claiming that the movie ‘Haq’ starring Yami Gautam Dhar and Emraan Hashmi affects the personality rights of her mother, depicts her image in a derogatory manner and must not be released. After hearing all the parties–including the producers and the Censor board, Justice Pranay Verma reserved his verdict in the matter.

In the 1970s, Shah Bano filed a suit for maintenance from her husband. As the court proceedings ensued, just to unburden himself from paying maintenance to his separated wife, Shah Bano, he (Mr Khan) divorced Shah Bano (reportedly inside the Court itself), and argued that un-Quranic Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) didn’t provide for maintenance. The litigation reached up to the Supreme Court which ruled in favour of Shah Bano, in April 1985. This created a huge furore. Muslims and the Urdu press initially welcomed it (according to Nawaz B Mody’s essay). By August 1985, the Muslim conservatives began to massively agitate asking for upturning it through legislation. Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, was persuaded/misled to oblige the Muslim conservatives. Ever since then, the Ayodhya-Babri Masjid dispute took a new, sharper turn, giving an excuse to Hindutva supremacists to influence wider Indian society and the polity.

Five years ago I wrote:

….In the 1980s, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB)—guided forces among Muslims made their own contributions of fodder to rising majoritarianism. On January 15, 1986, in a session of the Momin Conference at the Siri Fort Auditorium in Delhi, the then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi announced his intention to amend the law to nullify the Supreme Court’s April 1985 verdict in favour of Shah Bano. A bill was introduced in March and it became the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in May 1986. In January 1986, there were strident Muslim protests against the progressive verdict, which had granted Shah Bano, a Muslim woman, alimony after her divorce.

The approach of the conservative Muslims became pretty clear from the Urdu memoir, Karwan-e-Zindagi, published in 1988 by Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Miyan Nadvi (1914-1999). In Volume 3, Chapter 4, Page 134, Nadvi clearly narrates that it is he who had persuaded Gandhi not to accept the proposition that many Islamic countries have already reformed their personal laws. Nadvi’s narration is triumphant; he rejoices in the successful accomplishment of his effort to stymie a similar reform in India. He says his persuasion had a particular psychological impact on Gandhi and that his “arrow precisely hit the target— woh teer apney nishaaney par baitha”.

On page 157 comes Nadvi’s candid “confession”: “Our mobilisation for protecting the Shariat in 1986 resulted into complicating the issue of Babri Masjid and vitiated the atmosphere in a big way— is ne fiza mein ishte’aal wa izteraab paida karney mein bahut bara hissa liya,” he writes.

For further substantiation, one must read Nadvi’s memoir in Nicholas Nugent’s book,  Rajiv Gandhi: Son of a Dynasty, published by BBC Books, in 1990. On page 187 Nugent writes:

“…a decision had been taken by the Congress High Command in the early 1986 to ‘play the Hindu card’ in the same way that the Muslim Women’s bill had been an attempt to ‘play the Muslim card’… Ayodhya was supposed to be a package deal… a tit for tat for the Muslim women’s bill… Rajiv played a key role in carrying out the Hindu side of the package deal by such actions as arranging that picture of Hindus worshipping at the newly unlocked shrine be shown on television.”

The lock was opened within an hour of the judgment being delivered by the district court of Faizabad on 1 February 1986. As said earlier, the deal between the Prime Minister, the Muslim clergy and the Momin Conference’s Ziaur Rahman Ansari (who died in 1992) had already been struck in January 1986. There is a reference to this in his biography, Wings of Destiny, 2018, written by his son Fasihur Rahman. Yet, a nagging question remains: who wanted to open the locks, and why? After all, the elections were four long years away and so Gandhi did not have a direct electoral stake in the event…”

This biographical timeline of Shah Bano therefore attempts at capturing the journey of the India(n) republic veering around the issue of Muslim resistance to reforms in Personal (Gender) laws and surge in Hindu majoritarian influence. This timeline also provides a significant reading list, by many including some of the dramatis personae in this saga. Many of these facts pertaining to the issue remain largely unknown even to informed readers. They provide an informed reading.

1916:  Shah Bano Begum was born; [the year when Congress-Muslim League & Moderate-Extremist Pact took place at Lucknow].

1932: Shah Bano marries Indore-based advocate Md Ahmad Khan (1913-2006), her cousin. [The year Gandhi-Ambedkar Poona Pact happened].

1937 to 1939: The Shariat Application Act was enacted. Jinnah, the pork-eating non-practicing Muslim, was the pilot of the legislation. The roles of Maulana Azad, Maulana Madani, etc., in this legislative pursuit not known, so far. A daughter (of the Punjab’s Khizr & Sikandar Hayat Khan family) asks for inheritance in landed property, as per Shariat. [Tiwana-Jinnah] deny this right, invoking cunning arguments, such as, (i) Customary laws deny daughter’s share in land, and (ii) that land & agriculture was a state Subject whereas the Shariat Act was a Central law! Thus, Muslim women are made to suffer from the Shariat Act on two fronts: the marriage-divorce issue as well as the inheritance rights in parental assets.

1938 to 1947: Muslim League & Savarkar led Hindu Mahasabha come together, ally, pushing India towards Partition, with the active support of the British colonial state.

1946: Mr Md. Ahmad Khan marries again (second marriage), with Halima Begum, a cousin of Shah Bano.

1946-1950: Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) on Article 44, Uniform Civil Code (UCC), Articles 25 to 28 and 37.

1947: Partition happens; millions are raped, displaced, looted, amputated, mutilated. Jinnah’s goal of consolidating Muslims politically through the enacted Shariat Act gets accomplished and manifests in Partition, leaving an unending legacy of bloodshed, communal hatred. India’s Muslims are rendered ever more vulnerable.

January 30, 1948: Gandhiji was assassinated by Hindu bigots affiliated with radical Hindu outfits. Just ten days before, they had failed in their attempt to assassinate Gandhi and one of them was arrested. Yet, for many hours after the killing, on January 30, 1948, an apprehension prevailed about the identity of the assassin until then Prime Minister Nehru and Home Minister Sardar Patel clarified the situation, declared the reality.

1951-1961: Nehru led govt reforms Hindu Personal Laws; expects the religious minorities to initiate reforms at their own, from within. (For details see, Reba Som’s essay, “Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code: A Victory of Symbol over Substance?”, in the Modern Asian Studies, 28, 1, Feb 1994).

1962: Pakistan reforms Muslim personal Laws; the reforms which elude India’s Muslims even in 2025.

1972-1973: The Indira-led govt amends the Cr P C 1898 to help deserted women & abandoned old parents, with maintenance, and for adoption of child. Muslims protest across India against the essentially Hindu law reforms by coming out on streets– April 1973 the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) at Hyderabad, spearheads these protests.

(Despite the fact that the custody of Zayd, the son adopted by the Prophet continued with him till Zayd was martyred; Zayd’s son, Osama, also continued to enjoy utmost affection of the Prophet. The Quran doesn’t prohibit “adoption” per se, it only prohibits erasure of biological paternity.)

1975:  Mr Md Ahmad Khan drove Shah Bano out of her home; she had three sons and two daughters and one Bahu (daughter-in-law) who was said to have been in support of Mr. Khan in driving Shah Bano out of her home. [The same year Emergency was imposed in the country].

April 1978: Shah Bano went to the trial court (Indore) asking for maintenance; the Court issued an interim order for payment of maintenance.

August 1979: the local magistrate directed Khan to pay a sum of Rs. 25 (US$2) per month maintenance to Shah Bano who alleged that her former husband earned a professional income of about Rs.60,000 annually (US$4,600).

November 1979: Mr Khan protested this in the court invoking personal law; the judge said even under the existing interpretation of and codified Muslim Personal Law, a separated wife does remain entitled for maintenance. On hearing this, right inside the court, before the judge, Mr Khan pronounced the un-Quranic instant triple divorce. Simply to avoid payment of maintenance, of a meagre allowance of amount Rs 179/- per month.

1979: The Supreme Court verdict (in the Tahira Bi vs Ali Hasan) for maintenance to the divorced Muslim woman.

1980: Shah Bano filed a revised application for increased maintenance, and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh raised the amount to Rs.179.20 per month (US$14).

1980: Supreme Court verdict for maintenance in the Fazlun Bi vs Qadir Wali case.

Feb 19, 1981: Meenakshipuram (Tamil Nadu) Dalits Converted to Islam, en masse, and the village was renamed Rahmatnagar. This created furore and communal strife. [For details see, Theodre P Wright Jr (October 1982), “The Movement to Convert Harijans to Islam in South India”, The Muslim World, 72, 3-4, pp. 239-245]

February 1983: Nellie (Assam) Massacre [See Myron Weiner (June 1983), “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-Immigrant Movement”, Population and Development Review, vol. 9, Issue 2]

8 April 1984: “VHP gave a clarion call for the removal of the Babri Masjid”. [A G Noorani, 2019, The RSS, p. 207].

September 25, 1984: Former BJP President, Lal Krishna Advani-led Rath Yatra began

October 31, 1984: The Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated; Rath Yatra suspended.

April 23, 1985: The Supreme Court, hearing the appeal (High Court also retained maintenance), endorsed the verdict (for maintenance of Rs 500/- per month) given by the Lower & High Court. Justice Y. V. Chandrachud’s observations were not confined to Quran alone; the verdict subjected (the patriarchic aspects of Hinduism as well as Islam) to criticism.

Last Friday of Ramzan (1985) observed as Yaum-e-Tahaffuz-e-Shariat.

August 1985: Signing of the Assam accord, widely considered to be a political concession made at the cost of the immigrant Muslims.

Aug 1985: Arif M Khan, Union Minister of State in Rajiv cabinet, spoke in Parliament welcoming the Supreme Court verdict.

October 23, 1985: Rath Yatra resumed from 25 places. Deadline of Shivratri (March 8, 1986). Before this, discussions on the possibility of the locks of the Babri Masjid sought to be opened, by former PM, Rajiv Gandhi were discussed, according to Neerja Chowdhury’s report in the Statesman.

Nov 15, 1985: Succumbing under mass protests before Shah Bano”s house in Indore, she was forced to affix her thumb impression to a statement saying she disavowed the Supreme Court verdict. [Ritu Sarin, “Shah Bano: The Struggle and the Surrender”, Sunday, 1-7 Dec 1985].

December 1985 to January 1986: Five lakh Muslims came out on the streets of Bombay, Calicut.

The Hindu Mahasabha retaliated by handing out the same treatment to the effigies of Maulana Ziaur Rahman Ansari (d. 1992), Union minister of state for environment, who leads the fundamentalist pressure group within the Congress (I).

In the first few weeks after the Shah Bano verdict, most Urdu press welcomed the verdict and expected that the Muslims will introspect and will launch reforms (Nawaz B Mody’s research essay, Asian Survey, 1987).

December 1985: Ziaur Rahman Ansari (MoS Environment, in Rajiv cabinet) spoke against the verdict in a three-hour long speech in Parliament. He used casteist slurs against the judges: something like this, “Kya ab teli tamboli bhi Sharaiat mein dakhal dengey!” (Indian Express, December 21, 1985).

Muslims protested against the Supreme Court verdict and the observations recorded in the verdict (misleadingly propagating that Islam alone was targeted by the Supreme Court). Asghar Ali Engineer’s columns in Bombay’s Urdu Blitz kept appreciating the verdict and kept talking of the reformism.

December 1985: Shah Bano met Rajiv Gandhi at his invitation, in which Gandhi persuaded Bano to refuse the maintenance telling her the situation was very critical.

Post-verdict, till January 1986: Ali Miyan Nadvi (+ Syed Shahabuddin+Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait) led AIMPLB “bargained” with the Prime Minister to legislate against the verdict. “In exchange”, locks of Babri Masjid to be opened, via the Faizabad Court; the opening to be telecast on Doordarshan.

This is “confessed” by Ali MiyaN (1914-1999) in his Urdu memoir, Kaarwaan-e-Zindagi (1988; vol.3, chapter 4, pages 134-137, 157); corroborated by Nicholas Nugent’s biography (1990, p. 187) of Rajiv Gandhi. Neerja Chowdhury (Statesman, 20 April and 1 May 1986), “There is evidence of a connection between the opening of the doors of the disputed ram Janmabhoom in Ayodhya and introduction of the Muslim [Women] Bill in Parliament…”

Ali Miyan Nadvi had also promised the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that the Muslim clergy would make “some arrangement” for maintenance of divorced Muslim women out of the Waqf assets. This promise remains forgotten.

August 1985 to January 1986: Rallies and Protests in Bombay, Calicut, Indore, Assam, Patna, Lucknow, etc. against the Verdict— “Shariat Bachao!” Different responses of the Muslim civil society, academics, and politicians. Over 500 teachers of AMU and a good number of teachers in JMI (barring a few dozen teachers of Left-Liberal leanings) side with the Muslim conservatives and reactionaries.

19 December 1985: Vir Bahadur Singh, the Congress CM of UP visited Ayodhya’s Ramayan Mela organised by the government agencies.

January 1986: The deal to legislate against the Supreme Court Verdict was finalized/endorsed by Ziaur Rahman Ansari (& Momin Conference?), with the PM, Rajiv Gandhi. See the biography (2018) of Ansari, Wings of Destiny.

January 25, 1986: Umesh Chandra Pandey, a 28 years old local lawyer filed an application in the Munsif Court, Faizabad, seeking removal of restrictions on the puja at the disputed Babri Masjid site. The Munsif declined as the files were in the High Court since 1961.

January 31, 1985: Appeal was filed in the Babri Masjid dispute court of the District Judge, Faizabad;

February 1, 1986: The case was heard. Md Hashim’s application was rejected who was already a plaintiff. The District Judge (K M Pandey) heard the District Magistrate and the SSP Faizabad on the law-and-order situation.

February 1, 1986: Faizabad Court orders (at 4.40 pm) opening; within less than 40 minutes of the verdict, unlocking done (at 5.19 pm) & televised, “as per the deal between the AIMPLB & PM” (see Urdu memoir of Ali Miyan Nadvi, Kaarwaan e Zindagi, vol.3, chapter 4, p. 134, 135, 157; also read, Nicholas Nugent’s biography of Rajiv Gandhi, 1990, p. 187). 

Ali Miyan’s offer and the promise to the PM to institute a measure for looking after the abandoned, helpless women through Waqf or any other way, was a part of the deal which everybody including Ali Miyan chose to forget. The Qaum (community) never asked him about this, even after he wrote about the promise and deal in his Urdu memoir, Kaarwaan-e-Zindagi (1988, vol. 3, chapter 4). 

“There was a prior understanding between Indira Gandhi and later Rajiv Gandhi and VHP on the opening of the locks”, writes Noorani (The RSS, 2019, p. 207) citing Neerja’s two reports in the Statesman.

February 19, 1986: Bill tabled to nullify the Supreme Court verdict.

March 8, 1986: Shivratri, Deadline of the VHP’s Rath Yatra to open the locks.

March 29-April 4, 1986: The Eve’s Weekly quoted Arif Md Khan’s resignation who also said, within law, “Indian Muslim women will be the only women to be denied maintenance anywhere in the world”.

April 1986 (Muslim India monthly): “AMU Teachers Support the Bill”; “As for AMU, the few dozens of teachers who signed the petition against the Muslim Women’s Bill paled in comparison to the more than 500 teachers (including sixty-three women) who signed a memorandum to express their ‘whole-hearted suport’ for the Bill”, and stated that the Muslims were hurt by the Supreme Court judgement [Laurence Gautier, 2024, p. 379].

May 1986: Parliament legislated law on Muslim Women, against the Supreme Court Verdict.

1986: Shah Bano pressurised to refuse to take the maintenance.

1986: Ram Shila (Bricks) Pujan Rath Yatra.

1989: Kar Seva in Ayodhya and the police firings on them.

1990: Mandal Report Implemented followed by caste riots and Advani’s W(r)ath Yatra.

1991: Narasimha Rao led govt brings in neo-liberalisation

1992: Shah Bano Begum dies; hardly any obituary was published by the press.

Sunday, December 6, 1992: Babri Masjid demolished, followed by massive pogroms across the country, and then a bomb blast in Bombay on Friday 12 March 1993.

April 1994: Allahabad High Court declared Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) illegal.

BJP kept rising, expanding and consolidating to emerge soon as the dominant and hegemonic political power, transforming the society, polity, administration and every other institution.

2001: Supreme Court verdict in Daniel Latifi case (after a few months of Latifi’s death) clarifying/reiterating that the law legislated in 1986 does provide for maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code of India.

Feb 2002: Gujarat pogrom.

2006: Md Ahmed Khan died in Indore at the age of 93.

May 2014: NaMo Era comes and stays.

August 22, 2017: Supreme Court verdict (in the case of Shayera Bano of Allahabad) declared the ITT (Instant Triple Talaq) unconstitutional. The AIMPLB was respondent no. 7 in this case. It had submitted its affidavit that Court shouldn’t intervene; Parliament should. Yet, even after the verdict, the AIMPLB didn’t submit its draft proposal/bill, of reforms, in the Muslim Personal Laws.

February, 10-11, 2018: While going for its 26th plenary at Hyderabad in early February 2018, the AIMPLB announced that the session would prepare a model nikahnama, but reneged on it.

August 1, 2019: The Parliament criminalised ITT (Instant Triple Talaq). Maintenance to the divorced/abandoned women remains ignored as ever.

Feb 2024: Uttarakhand legislates for UCC; AIMPLB & Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) contemplate challenging the legislation in the court of law, without reforming the Muslim Personal Laws.

July 10, 2024: Supreme Court upholds Telangana High Court verdict for maintenance of Rs 10 000 per month to a divorced woman.

July 14, 2024: AIMPLB resolves to find ways of protesting against the verdict.

Further Readings

• Asghar Ali Engineer (1987), The Shah Bano Controversy.
• Zoya Hasan (January 7, 1989), “Minority Identity, Muslim Women Bill Campaign and the Political Process”, Economic and Political Weekly, 24, Issue 1.
• Ziya Us Salam (2018), Till Talaq Do Us Part
• Shekhar Gupta, Inderjit Badhwar, Farzand Ahmed (January 31, 1986), “Shah Bano judgment renders Muslims a troubled community, torn by an internal rift”, India Today.
• “Secularism on the Bend”, Frontline (English Fortnightly, Madras/Chennai), 11-24 January 1986.

Disclaimer: The author is unaware of the content of the biopic, Haq scheduled to be released on Friday, November 7.

Prepared by Mohammad Sajjad, Professor, Modern & Contemporary Indian History, AMU, Aligarh.

[Biography of Shah Bano: Biography of the Indian Nation-State]. Updated on 27 Sept 2024

Hindi Rendering published in Baya, Oct 2024 to March 2025

Related:

Shah Bano Lives

How the Ulema are Perpetuating Male Hegemony in the Name of Islam

The post Shah Bano Begum (1916-1992): A Socio-Political Historical Timeline appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice G. Narendar and Justice Subhash Upadhyay, while hearing Noor Jahan v. State of Uttarakhand, on October 29, 2025, instructed the Investigating Officer (IO) to file an action taken report by November 6, and to remove any inflammatory social media posts related to the incident.

The court’s direction came in response to a protection petition filed by Noor Jahan, the wife of Nasir, a local driver who was brutally assaulted on October 23 after rumours spread that he was transporting beef in his vehicle. The petition alleges that Madan Joshi, a local BJP leader and former president of the party’s Ramnagar City Unit, went live on Facebook, falsely claiming that cow meat was being transported — an act that allegedly incited a mob to attack Nasir.

“Lawlessness in Full Display”: Petitioner seeks CBI probe and police protection

According to the petition, reported by LiveLaw, Nasir’s vehicle was stopped by a crowd incited through Joshi’s Facebook Live. The mob allegedly dragged Nasir out, beat him with stones and kicks, and livestreamed the assault. Instead of rushing him to a hospital, the police are accused of taking the severely injured man to the police station first.

Noor Jahan described the episode as “a glaring example of complete lawlessness,” adding that it represented “cow vigilantism in utter disregard of the Supreme Court’s directions in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018).” She also claimed that since the incident, her family had been receiving threats of dire consequences from unidentified persons.

The plea sought a CBI investigation, police protection, and strict enforcement of the Supreme Court’s mob-lynching guidelines, along with compensation for her husband, who continues to receive treatment for severe injuries.

High Court’s order

The High Court’s order, though brief, is a sharp indictment of selective law enforcement and impunity in cases involving political actors. While the Deputy Advocate General informed the Bench that two of the assailants had been arrested, the Court pressed for a full update on the investigation and warned that compliance on removal of inflammatory posts must be shown at the next hearing.

The case will now be taken up on November 6, 2025, when the police are required to submit their action taken report. The Bench’s insistence on immediate removal of hate content marks an important judicial intervention in the digital dimension of communal violence — where misinformation and Facebook Live broadcasts often act as catalysts for mob action.

Selective accountability

The Ramnagar attack adds to a growing pattern of cow-vigilante violence in Uttarakhand’s Kumaon region, where rumours and Facebook Live videos frequently precede communal flare-ups. As Citizens for Justice and Peace has documented, local vigilante groups often operate under tacit political patronage, with little deterrence from police.

The petition cites the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018), which mandated states to curb mob lynching, appoint nodal officers, and ensure prompt FIRs and victim protection. Yet, as Noor Jahan’s case reveals, implementation remains largely on paper.

The High Court’s intervention also reignites a broader question — why politicians accused of hate or incitement rarely face swift prosecution, even when evidence is public. While citizens, journalists, and activists are often booked for online speech, leaders accused of fanning communal hatred enjoy impunity. As legal commentators note, this “selective policing of speech” corrodes faith in the rule of law.

The complete order may be read here.

Related:

Madhya Pradesh Muslim man lynched in Rajasthan’s Bhilwara: Family alleges religious targeting masked as cow vigilantism

Rising Cow Vigilante Violence: Muslim truck drivers targeted across states amid police inaction

2024: July and August see surge in cow vigilantism with brutal assaults, raids based on rumours and targeting of Muslims while legal consequences for perpetrators missing

November 2024 Surge in Cow Vigilantism: Rising Violence and Legal Apathy in North India

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The idea of IFWD emerged from the India Fisher Women Assembly 2024, a historic gathering that declared November 5 as the day to honour the invisible hands that feed nations and protect the oceans. The call was later taken to the World Forum of Fisher Peoples (WFFP) General Assembly in Brazil, where it was unanimously adopted. It now stands as a global symbol of recognition — and rebellion.

As fisherwomen say, this day is not about being seen, but about reclaiming what was always theirs.

Anchored in a long tide of struggles

In the long history of people’s struggles, women have always been the conscience of resistance. From the factory floors of early Europe to the beaches of the Indian coast, women have stitched together the labour of survival and the ethics of care. Rosa Luxemburg’s words — “Those who do not move, do not notice their chains” — echo in the voices of fisherwomen today, who refuse to stay still while their waters are fenced, their lives erased, and their rights sold in the name of development.

International Women’s Day, born of the labour and socialist movements of Clara Zetkin and Luxemburg, demanded political equality and an end to exploitation. November 5 extends that lineage from the land to the sea. It reminds us that liberation cannot be confined to borders or industries — that the politics of the ocean, too, must carry the red thread of equality, community, and justice.

As Zetkin had said, “The working women’s question is not an isolated question, but part of the great social question.” The fisherwomen of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have kept that question alive — turning it into a sea of solidarity that stretches from Kanyakumari to Dakar.

Why November 5 matters — and why it began in India

Fisherwomen have always held the coastline together. They wake before dawn to carry fish to market, manage homes through storms and loss, and are the first to rebuild after every cyclone. Yet, their names do not appear in government records. They are still called ‘helpers’ or ‘dependents’, while laws, schemes, and cooperatives continue to be written in the masculine lens.

This erasure, the women declared in Kerala, must end. They demanded recognition not as “wives of fishers,” but as fishers themselves — rightful claimants of the seas, keepers of knowledge, and protectors of coasts.

In doing so, they carried forward the dreams of pioneers such as Thomas Kocherry and Harekrishna Debnath, who had long insisted that the future of fisheries lies not in mechanisation or export figures, but in justice, community control, and the dignity of work. Both leaders believed that the rights of fisherwomen were the moral compass of the movement. Kocherry often said, “When the poor stand up, even the sea must make way.”

The declaration of November 5 thus became a collective act of remembering — of drawing strength from those who built India’s post-colonial fishworker movement and from the women who sustained it quietly all along. This was endorsed by the largest social movement of fishers across the globe, the Word Forum of Fisher Peoples at the General Assembly held in Brazil in the same month of November 2025.

The women of waters and their demands

The call for an International Fisher Women’s Day is inseparable from its politics. Across India’s recently declared more than 11,000-kilometre coastline and its countless rivers and lakes, women are demanding what should never have been denied:

• Recognition as fishers in law and policy, not as dependents.
• Equal rights to access and govern coastal and inland waters, free from corporate intrusion.
• Inclusion in welfare, insurance, and disaster-compensation schemes.
• First-sale and market rights to secure fair prices and independence from exploitative middlemen.
• Representation in fisheries boards and cooperatives.
• Protection of ecosystems from destructive aquaculture, deep-sea mining, and coastal militarisation.
• Legal safeguards from caste and gender-based violence — both within the community and from the state.

These are not demands for special treatment; they are demands for survival, carved from decades of unpaid and unacknowledged work that sustains both the fishing economy and the national food basket.

The ocean remembers

In the last decade, government programmes such as the Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) and new policies under the banner of Blue Economy 2.0 have promised prosperity. But for most coastal and inland fishing communities, these schemes have delivered displacement instead.

Behind the numbers and glossy reports lie harbours privatised, commons enclosed, and women’s livelihoods erased. As industrial trawlers deplete fish stocks and aquaculture pollutes backwaters, fisherwomen are left struggling for survival in a development model that excludes them.

The state’s vision of ‘modernisation’ has turned the sea into a commodity. But fisherwomen, who live by its moods and rhythms, remind us that the ocean is not a market to be managed — it is a living commons that sustains cultures, livelihoods, and spiritual traditions.

Ocean feminism and the new tide

From the lagoons of Chilika to the estuaries of Karaikal and the islands of the Sundarbans, women’s collectives are practising what they call ocean feminism — rooted in care, community, and resistance. They see themselves not as victims but as custodians of ‘aqua territories’ — spaces of relationship, knowledge, and survival.

As Harekrishna Debnath, one of India’s earliest fisher leaders, often said, “We don’t fight the sea; we live with it. But we must fight those who sell it.” Today, that fight is global. It connects fisherwomen in India to their sisters in Senegal, Thailand, and Brazil — all confronting the false climate solutions packaged as Blue Transformation, 30×30, and Marine Spatial Planning, which in practice privatise the oceans and displace small-scale fishers.

Through the five-week campaign initiated by WFFP — from November 5 to December 10 — women and men of the fishing world are asserting their right to live with dignity, protect their territories, and resist enclosure in every form.

From recognition to transformation

This International Fisher Women’s Day is not a commemoration; it is a beginning. It reminds us that the ocean too has a memory — of those who built communities along its edge, who fed others before themselves, and who continue to hold the fragile balance between humanity and water.

As Rosa Luxemburg warned, “Freedom is always the freedom of those who think differently.” Across India’s coasts and rivers, fisherwomen are thinking — and acting — differently: against caste, patriarchy, and neoliberal enclosures; for rights, justice, and community life.

Their struggle is our collective future. When the tide rises, may it rise with their names on its waves.

Jesu Rethinam is the Global Women Coordinator of the World Forum of Fisher Peoples (WFFP).

Vijayan MJ is Director, Participatory Action Research Coalition, India (PARCI).

Courtesy: CounterCurrents

The post Every Wave Has a Memory: Women, Waters and the Promise of November 5 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Premnagar Basti, also known as the Chick-Chatai Wali Basti, is an at least 45-year-old settlement of BPL migrant labourers, most of which has now been destroyed. 86 of the 250 or so jhuggi-jhopdis that made up the urban village remain protected, entitled to rehabilitation in a 2-decade old low-income housing project called the Ashiana Scheme, as per the state government.

Unlike many similar demolitions of marginalised populations’ homes, the demolition of the Premnagar Basti was initiated not for the purpose of clearing public land, but at the behest of local industrialist Gulaab Singh. In 2013, the Central Market Welfare Association (CMWA) of the market complex opposite the basti filed a lawsuit against the Haryana government and its urban development authority, Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran (HSVP), complaining that the very existence of the Premnagar Basti was affecting their business adversely. Singh is the president of this association, and also the owner of the Sector 12 market complex.

The same year that the CMWA filed the lawsuit demanding Premnagar’s demolition, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill was passed in Parliament, repealing 1894’s Land Acquisition Act such that every acquisition would require the government to pay compensation to its occupants, or rehabilitate them. Essentially, it meant that there is no such thing in Indian law as a ‘legal forced eviction’ or a ‘legal forced demolition’.

The act was enforced the following year in 2014, but the CMWA’s case was temporarily dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court at the time, as the occupied land in question was not public property at all, but disputed private property that the government had been attempting to acquire for three decades.

Premnagar’s impending demolition has terrorised its residents through much of the last decade, ever since HSVP acquired the land in the mid 2010s (HSVP’s present estate officer, Rakesh Saini, alongside GMDA Nodal Officer and Town Planner R.S. Batth declined comment on the exact date, or any other technical or legal details). Wednesday marked the end of a decade long battle, despite the fact that till date, not a single family has been rehabilitated or compensated by the HSVP as required by the 2013 Act.

In fact, the Ashiana Scheme apartments in sector 47, where the HSVP now promises to house 86 families currently protected from demolition, have sat empty for 15 years. These flats are in a state of utter disrepair, with the HSVP having failed to allot even one of 1,088 flats since the project’s completion in 2010. In 2023, the HSVP announced that these flats would be demolished! The land was set to be resold for high-end commercial use, which the HSVP felt better suited its ‘premium value’; just this year, it was announced that they would not be demolished after all, and Rs. 9 crores  were then allotted for their repair!

In the High Court’s final judgement regarding Premnagar given in January earlier this year, 204 families had been marked as eligible for rehabilitation in these inhospitable Ashiana Scheme apartments. Now, this number has arbitrarily shrunk to 86, and not a single allotment letter has been given to any of them either.

The demolition drive, which employed the use of a massive armed police force, water cannons, detention vans and a bulldozer—blocking Old Delhi Road for regular commuters through the hours of 10 and 6—was overseen by GMDA’s Nodal Officer for ‘removal of illegal encroachments’, R. S. Batth, a somewhat notorious figure for his attempts at internet fame—through the act of demolition itself.

Batth’s Instagram account, @r_s_batth_dtp, consists largely of vertical short-form videos of himself overseeing various demolition drives in addition to participation in Savarna religious events, with the former ranging from the destruction of street food vendor stalls to the huts and homes of slum dwellers. Batth has built a loyal Instagram following, with over 2,71,000 followers and at least 6 fan pages, and a corresponding internet infamy within less than a year of taking office, seemingly entirely at the cost of Gurugram’s urban poor.

On the 8th of October, as sick children were dragged from their homes and men and women beaten with sticks as they were made to watch their homes being razed to the ground, Batth could be seen recording videos of requesting victims of demolition to have tea or water to calm themselves down. These videos, along with closeups of bulldozer action, were then quickly uploaded to his Instagram page, receiving applause from his following.

Surprisingly though, there are forms of attention that Batth does not in fact, enjoy. When reporters from Sabrang India asked him about the legality of the demolition with reference to the 2013 Act, how, if at all, he planned to rehabilitate the people whose homes he’d demolished as constitutionally required, or why the 120 remaining families earlier promised rehabilitation were suddenly dropped from the list. Batth declined comment on each question, and requested that ‘technical questions’ be directed to HSVP’s Estate Officer, Rakesh Saini instead.

“I am not questioning your legal knowledge. Please ask all these technical questions to the Estate Officer and not me,” said Batth. Saini himself also declined comment on the matter, saying that he would prefer if the matter were discussed with him privately instead.

Interestingly, both authorities also failed to answer how many homes it was that they’d set out to demolish. “It is not possible to say the exact number,” said Saini. “It is somewhere around a hundred and fifty.”

Barring the 86 protected homes, marked out by yellow spray paint on bamboo walls and notices pasted everywhere the eye could see, at least 170 homes would have been planned to be demolished. Till the evening, 50 or so homes were destroyed by the Haryana government, with many families not even being permitted to retrieve their belongings.

“That is 50 year’s worth of possessions,” said Reema Devi, resident of one such home, weeping on the street with her granddaughters beside her. “They expect us to get rid of it in a day.”

“This is all the fault of Mukesh Sharma,” she then added. The BJP MLA had campaigned around Premnagar intensely, promising an end to the battle for Premnagar which had begun during Congress’ tenure.” He promised us this wouldn’t happen. That we would be rehabilitated within two months of his taking office,” said Reema Devi.

While Sharma has never since revisited Premnagar,  nor had he replied to the petition sent to him by residents of the basti informing him of the unjust processes of demolition being carried out over there and seeking remedy for the same, he has come very close: On 25th September, Sharma visited the popular Sheetla Mata Mandir merely 2km away from the Premnagar basti, to inaugurate a new building within the temple, and to ensure that no one would sell meat within a four-hundred metre radius of it. These achievements are boasted of on his very own website, mukeshsharma.in.

The following day, the police and demolition authorities were set to return to finish their incomplete task of razing over a hundred more homes, but as of 9th October, at time of writing, no further action is taking place. It seems as if now that Batth’s videos have gone viral, the urgency to ‘clean up’ the streets of Gurugram has ceased.

The homes of a few poor Dalit families have little value to the incumbent government beyond cheap publicity stunts and monkey-fights with the opposition; Congress’ mayoral candidate, alongside their advocate, Abhay Jain were both present at the sight of demolition and spoke vehemently against the drive, requesting that the government at least ‘let Diwali pass’ in peace for the families, most of whom make livings through artisan work and seasonal employment. Both left immediately after the police lathi-charged the basti’s protesting crowd, gathered protectively around the urban village.

“At this point, I don’t understand anything. I don’t know what to do,” said Muskan, an 18-year-old preparing to become a software engineer, who was one of the key voices among the basti’s youth who have been fighting the demolition threats since the judgment of January 16.

“After today, it feels like nothing we can do matters.”

Muskan was among many young women who very nearly escaped violent detention as police forcefully cleared the homes on the outer periphery of the basti. Her friend, a young girl named Shivani was among five people falsely imprisoned without food or water in a detention van outside for the entire duration of the demolition drive, which continued from early afternoon till the evening. Four of these five detainees were women.

“We did nothing. We weren’t violent, we weren’t obstructing anything.  We just asked them not to raze our homes,” said Shivani from behind the grills of the detention van. All the detainees were released past sunset.

For now, the 86 families marked for rehabilitation wait in limbo — their allotted homes in the Ashiana Scheme still locked, decaying, and unfit for habitation. With no timeline or written assurance from the HSVP, uncertainty looms large. Many fear that once the media attention fades, their protection too will quietly dissolve, leaving them next in line for eviction.

(The author is a scholar of religion at Jamia Millia Islamia and a freelance journalist from New Delhi. Additional fieldwork by Vishnu Khanawalia, a reporter and activist from New Delhi.)

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There is a story of unbroken violence behind the language of percentages. The NCRB might record a few percentage points of change year to year, but the factual curve of cruelty, fear, and impunity is steep and continuous. In projecting a neutral and comprehensive approach, the Bureau displays a sort of bureaucratic amnesia: it renders visible structural violence and the inaction of the State as statistical.

The Myth of ‘Marginal’ Improvement

According to NCRB 2023, India recorded 471,000 reports of crimes against women, a nominal increase of three percent from the previous year. The largest single category remains “cruelty by husband or relatives” under section 498-A of IPC, at over 31 percent of all crimes against women. Reported rapes amounted to 32,032, roughly the same as the reports in 2022; assault with intent to outrage modesty was recorded at about 20 percent. However, the situation is worse for children: POCSO (Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences) and associated crimes increased by 9.2% this year, exceeding 170,000 cases.

In June 2023, the Dewas district in Madhya Pradesh experienced a tragedy resulting from coercive harassment. A married woman, Reena Joshi, 26 years old, died after allegedly ingesting acid as the culmination of months of harassing behaviour by a local man, Zakir Hussain. The FIR her husband filed stated that Hussain had been harassing Reena, threatening her to end her marriage, to convert to Islam, and to marry him. The FIR also noted that despite the couple’s multiple complaints to the local police, no preventive measures were taken. On 10 June 2023, Reena died from her injuries, and at the time of her death, she directly named Zakir in her statements to those trying to save her life. Zakir was charged with and arrested under Sections 306 (abetment of suicide), 354D (stalking), and the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2021. The incident led to protests by women’s and community groups, calling for accountability from police for their inaction in the face of reported harassment. In aggregate, this was an episode that illustrated structural neglect, collapsing everyday harassment into fatal violence: the law can then only respond after someone dies, while the accused would not be charged with murder but instead abetment of suicide as recorded by the NCRB —both minimizing and removing the gendered and communal motivation behind the behaviour.

At first glance, these small percentage increases may seem to indicate stability or a sense that things haven’t really changed. Yet the small percentage increase masks the inability of gendered justice to make progressive change, improvement. Further, an increase of three percent represents over 14,000 more women reporting violence against women. In India, however, we know that one in ten assault cases will be reported at the very least – on an already underreported crime according gf to the NFHS-5. Thus, NCRB appearances of reported cases are a fragment of a much larger, certainly unreported crisis and violation, and depend upon those individuals to sacrifice their dignity in an institutional and systemic sense. Statistically, the NCRB is relying on reported FIRs (first information reports), so that the illusion appears real.

The rationale suggests that if we don’t file a complaint, there is no problem. Mainstream coverage also advances the invisibility: by attributing the word “marginal” to the increase, the newsroom and media outlets unconsciously (or otherwise) participate in the state’s rhetoric of containment, as if gendered violence is merely a data problem, not a social emergency. What masquerades as stability is, in fact, indifference, which has both institutional and systemic impact.

Data without Identity: How Categories erase Vulnerability

If NCRB’s percentages flatten time, its categories flatten people. Crimes committed against women are presented as one large, lumped category that does not disaggregate for caste, religion, class, or disability, all of which structure vulnerability and allow access to justice, anywhere in the 2023 report. The only modest exception is “Crimes against Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe women,” and that is put into its own category, marking the pattern of intersectional violence as totally separate from the gendered whole.

This structural erasure substantiates what feminist scholars have termed the violence of difference itself: that a Dalit woman’s rape, an Adivasi girl’s trafficking, or a disabled woman’s assault do not happen on their own but at the intersection of several hierarchies. The Hathras case (2020) stands as an emblematic instance of this: a Dalit woman was raped, her story ignored and erased, her body burnt to the ground. However, NCRB’s data design ensures that no such trend can be evidenced statistically again.

Furthermore, the Bureau’s gender binary means that LGBT survivors are entirely erased from the data. Trans women, gender non-conforming people, and male survivors of sexual violence disappear from the Bureau’s reporting, making counts impossible. To only count individuals that conformed to gender is to reproduce the very harm again through “neutrality.” In the NCRB’s data-driven justice, invisibility signifies that count.

The West Bengal Case Study: Acid Violence and Everyday Cruelty

Few forms of gendered violence are as literal or as haunting as acid attacks. West Bengal is, not surprisingly, the epicentre of the violence. It accounted for nearly one-fifth of all reported acid attacks in India in 2023. The vast majority of victims are young women, punished for rejecting advances, defying control, or asserting self-determination.

Behind every NCRB statistic lies the face of a survivor, disfigured by both acid and inaction. Survivors describe experiences of being transported between hospitals without burn units, climbing a three-to-five-year waiting list for a hearing at court, or working with police officers who treat the investigation as a waste of time. A field report from 2023 conducted by the Hindu from North 24 Parganas documented that survivors have yet to receive the Rs 3 lakh mandated compensation prescribed under the Supreme Court, an entire decade after the attack. For more than half of the survivors, the only consistent part of their experience after the attack is falling into poverty.

Where acid attacks appear in NCRB 2023, they appear under a neutral, bureaucratic category entitled “grievous hurt.” The neutralised language, substituted in place of targeted misogynist violence, reduces it to bodily harm and ignores its symbolic and social identity. There is also no data about rehabilitation, conviction rates, or disbursal of compensation. Defining acid violence in an unqualified way allows the State to distance itself from characterizing this as a moral failure, under the medical lexicon.

In West Bengal, civil society organisations such as Acid Survivors Foundation India (ASFI) have consistently pointed out how police evade filing complaints under the relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code (326A, 326B) to suppress “rising crime rates,” and the National Crime Records Bureau then records this reduction in cases, rounding out this circle of denial. Each entry is then not progress toward justice, but rather a record of silence, reported the Indian Express.

On August 16, 2023, Jayanta Roy, a 35-year-old resident of Zamindar Para, a locality in Jalpaiguri town, threw acid on his neighbour, a 22-year-old woman, after she consistently turned down his romantic gestures. The woman, whose name family asked to be concealed, suffered deep burns to her face, chest, and shoulders. She was rushed to North Bengal Medical College, where doctors found she had incurred third-degree chemical injuries. Roy’s attack followed her, attracting weeks of trailing and loud harassment. The woman’s family reported that both times reported her was rebuffed by police, who told them to leave as it amounted to a “personal dispute.” Local outrage finally prompted local police to arrest Roy, superficially charging Roy under IPC Sections 326A (acid attack), 341 (wrongful restraint), and 354 (assault on a woman). The event was treated as a fast-track case, and the Jalpaiguri District and Sessions Court ultimately sentenced Roy in February 2024 to 15 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹3 lakh.

The case is noteworthy not only for the infrequent conviction but also for revealing the important procedural bias that ASFI has been publicly advocating for as long as two years — that is, most acid attacks are never afforded the appropriate legal formality and thus simply disappear from the NCRB records altogether. As The Hindu reported, West Bengal had 16 acid attacks in 2023, the highest in India, but local NGOs report the actual number is likely double that when misclassifications of burns and withdrawn FIRs are considered. 

Structural Underreporting and the Politics of Marginality

The structure of India’s justice system guarantees that the majority of gendered violence never reaches official visibility. FIRs rely on police discretion; prosecution relies on political will; data on conviction relies on judicial efficiency; and all this relies on survivors’ emotional stamina. For poor and marginalized women, it is deadly.

Data from the 2023 NCRB indicates there are a little over 1.3 lakh rape cases and over 2 lakh domestic cruelty cases that are pending. The time taken to complete a trial averages at over 5 years. One-Stop Centres (OSCs) that are supposed to provide integrated support to survivors are woefully underfunded and are not well-served. In many states, there are fewer than a dozen functioning centres. The NCRB does not provide cross-references for these service inadequacies; all it does is count cases, not conditions.

In digital spaces, gendered violence is finding new forms. Offences of online stalking, non-consensual sharing of images, and blackmail comprise a substantial proportion of the complaints now received under the IT Act. But, as indicated by the data from RTI from Mumbai, only a fraction of these offences turn into FIRs. Cyber harassment, in particular of journalists and women activists, has simply become a normalized way of life, but these acts are often framed as ‘defamation’ or ‘obscenity’ and thus escape the NCRB’s gendered lens entirely.

This type of structural undercount is not by mistake; it is a performance of stability. By keeping official numbers deceptively low, the State can suggest that its policies from Beti Bachao Beti Padhao to dispersing Nirbhaya Fund are “working.” Meanwhile, the continuum of harm remains intact, only concealed under an administrative façade of calm.

The Absences of Intersectionality and Enumeration

The omissions by the NCRB in categories like mob lynching, honour killing, or hate crimes further impoverish our understanding of how gender inter-relates with other forms of violence. Most forms of violence against women in interfaith or inter-caste relationships, for example, then get recategorised under “murder” or “kidnapping.” The political decision to stop monitoring 2017 these forms of violence reflects a larger trend of erasure.

The same erasure occurs in more publicly visible anti-feminist violence against women, whether they are journalists, protestors, or organizers. The 2023 IFEI Press Freedom Report recorded 226 accounts of harassment, hindrance, and threats, including for women journalists covering communal or gender issues. When we looked at the NCRB categories of “Offences Against the State” and “Offences Affecting Public Tranquility,” there are essentially no entries.

It’s the same when thinking of women online. The cyber restrictions and internet shutdowns during the farmers’ protests, or in Manipur, severed women from online safety resources – an erasure that does not fall under any NCRB recognisability.

What cannot be charged is not counted, and what is not counted does not exist in the eyes of the State.

The Cost of the Systemic Erasure of Crime

The NCRB’s 2023 report, similar to its precedents, is not just a record of data — it is a story about denial. By calling violence “marginal,” it converts the devastating meaningfulness of persistent crises to that of a simple statistical aberration. By disregarding intersectional detail, it obliterates how caste, poverty, and gender are complicit. And, by ignoring certain crimes, the NCRB builds a semblance of peace.

To think of a 3% increase as being “marginal” does not grapple with the implications of suffering from systemic violence or marginalization. Each number signifies a life subjected to fear, shame, and bureaucratic indifference. The NCRB’s visibility is selective. It only displays what the State is open to confronting.

When data conceals more than it presents, counting becomes collusion. To genuinely see the reality of gendered violence in India today, you need to see beyond the numbers, in survivors, in silence, in omissions, etc. Because in the measures of oppression, what the State frames as marginal is often collected in massive quantities. 

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:

Mapping Gender-Based Violence in India: Trends, determinants, and institutional frameworks

The ‘Missing Women’ in Crime Data: Caste, Gender, and Institutional Blindness

Acid Survivors Speak: The Long Road to Justice and Rehabilitation

Digital Violence, Silence, and State Failure: Women’s Safety Online in India

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