Methodological Prologue: Theory as Lens, not Template

To be able to think caste within the same analytical field of reference as Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci— two intellectual giants who have left an indelible impression upon his generation—whose long shadows loom large over the landscape of modern Europe, demands a first-order methodological clarification. It is an undeniable premise that caste is uniquely South Asian, a totalising social system with a distinct ontology around indigenous cosmologies of purity, pollution and hierarchal interdependency. Its thinking, its historical trajectory and the experience it embodies can be only partially understood through terms drawn from European history such as class or feudalism or racism, as people like Gopal Guru, Sundar Sarukkai and Dalit Studies thinkers have never tired of insisting. To apply these categories would amount to an act of epistemic violence, the imposition of an artificial reality onto a queasy and never quite-fitting architecture that illuminates nothing but dims what appears from Indian soil, reiterating the colonial knowledge systems that sought once to solidify and regulate caste under alien rubrics. Such as it is, the critique of Eurocentrism isn’t merely an afterthought but a disciplinary sensibility tout court.

So, I provide an inversion in this engagement with Foucault and Gramsci. I am not trying to “apply” their theories to the Indian “case” (as if it were a case of universal concern) in order to fit caste into the Procrustean bed of their local historical referents (the clinic, the prison, the European factory or the making of the Italian nation-state). Rather, I seize their essential methodological insights as adaptable analytical heuristics for shedding light on an essentially novel object. Foucault’s dialectic of the scene and the obscene is indispensable if not as an explanation of European épistémès, at least for its sophisticate analytic tool for understanding how power arranges seeing and saying, produces zones of authorized words and tactical silence, articulates a frontier between what is audible and inaudible. And, once again, Gramsci’s idea of hegemony is not used as a theory of European class making but as a dynamic way to grasp the securing of domination through the construction of “common sense” and the combined action between coercion and consent. Within such a machine, theory is no longer a master narrative so much as an array of precision tools. I do this by deploying these instruments to dismantle the historically specific materiality of caste from its sacred roots to its colonial codification and postcolonial mutations making it possible for the specificity of the phenomenon itself to interrogate and remould the theoretical tools. This essay is then a thought experiment of a critical, situated translation. It deploys Foucauldian and Gramscian optics in order to illumine caste’s internal architecture, its historical transmogrification, while insisting that the image at which one arrives is thoroughly, irreducibly Indian and needs also to conjure up its own vocabulary even as it speaks a global language of power. 

Introduction: The Architectonics of Invisibility

One of the most enduring and complex systems of social stratification in the world—India’s caste system (varna-jati)—is found in the Indian subcontinent. Its analysis requires tools that can penetrate not only its economic or political aspects, but its deep entrenchment in the spheres of knowledge production, body and space. Michel Foucault’s conceptually rich dyad of the “scene”, (what is made visible, sayable and governable) and the “obscene” (that structurally figured beyond but which in its beyond-ness constitutes the scene) provides a powerful prism. When coupled with Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, the means by which ruling groups achieve consent via an ideological “common sense”, this set-up reveals how power functions not just through suppression but through careful organization of social reality itself.

This paper opines that the history of caste has to be considered as a history involving managing (or mismanagement) of this scene/obscene border. The shift from premodern India to modern makes for a seismic change in such tactics of management: from an integral sacral-political scene to a fragmented modern settlement, where the official defacement of caste on real constitutional law and its attendant discourse on the public scene is the very condition for its raucous (albeit often underhand) existence in that social obscene. In it, the dominant scientific and technological discourses on which the ‘normalisation’ of modern society is based cohabits uneasily with remnants of an archaic and pre-modern social universe intricately woven into a powerful hegemonic discourse that systematically normalizes denial akin to what we have called here the hermeneutics of caste. The analysis draws from, among others, works by Nicholas Dirks (2001), Anand Teltumbde (2014) and Gopal Guru (2016) to map this transition showing that contemporary caste should be best understood as a sort of social schizophrenia driven by imaginative acts whereby power perpetuates itself through a convoluted hermetic legitimising act in India.

I. The Integrated Premodern Scene: Inscription, Spectacle and Sacral Hegemony

The caste hierarchy was a relatively coherent and explicit “scene” in the precolonial and early colonial environment. Its effectiveness was based on its thoroughgoing visibility and its cosmological basis. This can be felt clearly through the texts and inscriptions of medieval India.

Case of the Chola Temple Inscriptions and the Smritichandrika: The walls of the temples in Chola period (approx. 9th-13th centuries) are not just structural, but are public records of the social scenario. That act of reciprocation is documented in countless inscriptions which record the details of gifts but also control in great detail the spatial and ritual order: which castes could offer which kinds of gift, how close they might reside to the temple, and what the penal fines would be if they broke faith. At the same time, codified legal digests such as Devanna Bhatta’s 13th-century Smritichandrika continued to systematise dharma for a wide range of varnas and jatis, dictating clothing and ornaments suitable for narrow groups and stipulating edible diets or respectable partners in marriage.

They are performances of sovereign power. The law was not concealed in statute books but carved onto the holiest public edifices. That made the caste system, already a great monument to human pettiness and pride, permanently, monstrously visible. The elaborately clothed body of the Brahmin (instituted with the sacred thread, instringent in particular fabrics) contrasted with the regulated “nakedness” or coarse apparel of those belonging to “lower castes” was a wearable map of social arrangement- status could be read at once on bodies. “Conjugable” was not private, but public, scripture-regulated machinery for the perpetuation of biology and society.

This was an order that was not only maintained through coercion. It was the centre of agrarian economic and ritual life. Writing caste duties on the walls, the ruling powers (the Chola king, Brahmin sabha) attached social status to divine will and royal command. What it did was not to punish, but explain, rationalise and naturalise. It was polished over by embedding caste inside a sanctified “common sense” in which following one’s svadharma was identified with piety, social tranquillity and karmic reward. Consent was produced by the reaffirmation of ritual incorporation and cosmological tale.

An opulent calligraphy of gleaming inscriptions is what this glittering scene silences. The manual, waste-dirty work of temple purification, cleaning, and waste management, labour assigned to the lower (in caste hierarchy) communities, was the necessary but repelled root. There they were a required obscenity, consigned to literal geographical peripheries (the cheri outside the village) in order to keep unsullied, the jatra’s pure centre. The violence required to maintain this order, whenever necessary, was a public spectacle in its own right, a Foucauldian “scene” of sovereign punishment that reaffirmed the parameters of the permissible.

The coherence of this “scene” can be better appreciated, and the premodern character of it more clearly identified, by consideration to a ritual control of everyday practices that makes hierarchy in large measure visible and ever self-evident. The very access to water for instance worked as a micro-theatre of caste power. Shudras and untouchables were forbidden to draw water from a common source that the Savarna castes drank. The prohibition was not just economical or hygienic, it was dramaturgical. The distance at which awaiting castes waited to receive water from above the threshold through a high-caste intermediary enacted hierarchy as embodied choreography. Here, power did its work not by abstract law alone, but through disciplined gestures and spatial distance and the policing of touch. The practice of pollution was practised time and again on the body, making domination a matter of course.

Temple Restrictions of Entry Again, temple entry restrictions circumscribe how the holy solidified the sightedness of the field. As a condensation of the cosmic arena for legitimacy, these were the gatekeepers to those who could and could not come near divinity itself but whose mere presence would cause ritual chaos. Therefore, being kept out of temple space was not just  marginalisation but rather the ontological disqualification from the moral order which organized village life. The untouchable body was constitutively “ob-scene”, that which was vulgar so as to be excluded from the sacred frame, and thus a figure of purity in the visible scene. But this exclusion, counter-intuitively, verified centrality: the system needed what it banished. Carcass removal, tanning and sanitation-labour were materially integral to the agricultural way of life, and that the obscene was not external to power but its hidden basis.

This paradox has the kind of echo that Foucault will say later, that power creates what it seemingly excludes. The untouchable was, then, not simply oppressed but discursively produced as pollutant, essential to the symbolic unity of Brahmanical purity. Visibility and invisibility therefore comprised one and the same machine. Although his labour was required to be concealed in the sacred space of ritual, it was common for punitive violence against him to become hyper-visible. Public flogging, forced parade or head-shaving was used as exemplary scenes; measures which were not so much punishments for the individual violator but white lines re-drawn in the scene for all its observers. Acts of sovereign violence, in this respect, reconfigured ritual order by sporadic eruption into theatrical display.

But coercion alone cannot account for the endurance of this structure. Hegemony in Gramsci’s sense explains how domination hardened into “common sense.” The karmic reading of suffering converted structural inequality into a moral story: One’s birth deserved, one’s duty redemptive. Most importantly, this imagination was not the prerogative solely of the dominant castes. The participation of the subalterns in ritual hierarchies, through service function in festivals, acceding to hereditary occupation or practicing endogamy indicates to what extent voluntary and coercive approaches were complementary. This was not passive belief, but lived practice that was realised through kinship, worship and toil.

At the same time, however, that premodern scene was never perfectly sealed. Bhakti movements in various regions periodically disrupted the ritual hierarchy by emphasising devotional equality and vernacular expression. Literary figures like Ravidas or Nandanar made religious claims that transcended caste lines, briefly disturbing the visibility of the status quo. Even these challenges, however, were frequently absorbed (or re-absorbed), their radical potential domesticated within particularities of tradition. This ability to absorb demonstrates the strength of hegemonic formations: protest could be recognised symbolically without altering the material basis of hierarchy.

Here, the premodern caste order is not merely a system of hardened stratification but a staged totality through which space, body, work, force and belief converged aesthetically. The Foucauldian pairing of scene and obscene demonstrates the need for purity to be premised upon exclusion, as well as how visibility became a mode of discipline, while the Gramscian lens helps us understand that the long half-life was driven by moral internalization and quotidian consent. Together they reveal a system whose stability was founded on portraying hierarchy as both sacred and natural, a portrayal that subsequent historical developments would gradually start to undo, but not without enormous effort.

II. The Colonial Interregnum: Re-Scenography, Biopower and Taxonomic Hegemony

With the beginning of colonial governance, a significant change occurred. The British colonial state, a modern bureaucratic state at work, wanted to know, categorise and govern its subjects, effectively transforming the performance of caste.

Case of the 1901 Census and Risley’s Anthropometry: The Census, especially under Superintendent Herbert Risley, turned into one of the effective colonising projects. Risley tried to confer a “scientific” legitimacy on caste hierarchy through the use of anthropometry (the measuring of nasal indexes, skull shapes and other bodily features) to construct a racial taxonomy of Indian castes. This information was then used to generate all-India rankings for caste status. This was biopolitics in the pure, administrative state. Power worked in the colonial state by treating the Indian as an object to know, measure, and categorize. The caste became a fixed category rather than the fluid groups of jati relations that it had been, as well as an enumerated and pan-Indian taxonomy, a trope of colonial “governmentality” (Dirks 2001). The muddled local logic of purity/pollution was transformed into a clean, bureaucratic chart. This gave rise to a new all-India “scene” for caste: the statistical report, the ethnographic survey, the gazetteer. The ritual body became a racialised or datafied body.

This scene of bureaucracy had far-reaching hegemonic implications. In cataloguing (and ranking) castes so consistently, the Census rendered new identities that groups came to accept even as they fought them. It laid the groundwork for caste-based political organisation, as represented in the Non-Brahmin Manifesto of Madras (1916) or in the demands for separate electorates. The strategy of the colonial state was one of “divide and rule,” but it did so by offering the vocabulary, among the enumerated caste identity, through which political claims could be made. It fragmented older, more local solidarities and forced a re-configuration of the political terrain along these freshly rigidified lines.

In fact, this act of scientific observation ushered in an obscene that was entirely new. The native logic of purity/pollution, the “scene” which could be publicly declared is now called by the colonial “civilising” eye primitive, irrational and obscene to modernity. The colonial state could thus present itself as a modernising referee, underling proving to the world that it was not some backward social order the British had themselves rendered calcified. The “native obscenity” of caste practices became the rationale for the colonial mission, just as the colonial economy frequently solidified caste-based divisions of labour.

Colonial rule did not just “disperse” (de Kiewiet’s word) the prehistoric caste “scene”; it re-staged its appearance through its interventions in western technology of knowledge, and techniques of administration and surveillance. If the previous order was premised on ritual spectacle and cosmological legitimacy, colonial modernity made caste legible as an object of bureaucratic reason. Authority was transformed from the dramatic practice of impurity to its less conspicuous, but more far-reaching, work of sorting and classifying. In Foucauldian terms, there was a substitution of sovereignty for governmentality: the village stage of hierarchy was slowly but never entirely replaced by that of archive, census table and legal code.

And enumeration was central to this transformation. Colonial census, from the end of the 19th century onwards, attempted to freeze caste identities into universal pan-Indian categories. What had been a locally contingent and regionally flexible hierarchy became interpretable to the state through lists, schedules and ethnographic description. This act of naming was not neutral. In forcing the community to map onto certain fixed classificatory grids, the colonial state both reinforced and naturalised caste. The scene was not just spatial and ritual; it had turned statistical. From the village square, visibility moved onto the bureaucratic paper. The hidden ‘obscene’ here was not just secret labour, but the insecurity and indeterminacy of everyday caste relations, just what enumeration aspired to hide.

The law additionally re-fashioned the grammar of hierarchy. Colonial law did not assimilate such norms of Dhar­mashastras to create “Hindu Law” but the principles selectively codified in colonial jurisprudence and statutes, transformed Brahmanical textual traditions into enforceable legal standards. But this juridification introduced an unintended ambivalence. On the one hand, it consolidated some structures of endogamy or patrimonial inheritance and, on the other hand, made possible certain space for contestation. Instead, pursuing cases in court and challenging bureaucratic rulings or attempting legal reform created new sites for subordinated groups to express grievance. Power was less visibly violent, but more extensively inscribed in institutional procedure. Foucauldian discipline supplanted sovereign terror, at the same time as older types of social coercion remained a reality.

Meanwhile, colonial political economy transformed the economic basis of caste. Monetisation, commercialisation of agriculture and a new exposure to labour mobility disrupted hereditary occupations to an extent. Emigration to plantations, railways or cities created scenarios in which ritual oversight was diluted and anonymity expanded. These spaces didn’t eliminate caste, but they broke the hermetic unity of the premodern set. Hierarchy had to be re-made in unfamiliar landscapes, creating new solidarities along with new exclusions. The obscene, once exiled from the village borders, began to seep back in through developing public forms, often in submerged or indirect ways.

Gramscian hegemony likewise underwent mutation. The karmic “common sense” which previously helped to naturalize hierarchy faced rival ideological formations: missionary critiques, liberal ideas of equality, print-mediated reform movements and pre-modern anti-caste intellectual traditions. Cosmology alone could no longer determine consent, it had to be negotiated in the languages of rights, representation and progress. But hegemony did not disappear; it was transformed. Domination groups re-articulated caste privilege through discourses of tradition, community autonomy or social order that translated ritual authority into cultural capital in the colonial public- sphere. What emerged was not rupture but re-arrangement: An older hierarchy learned to speak new idioms.

More importantly, the colonial moment created conditions for a systematic anti-caste politics. Access to education, print circulation and associational life facilitated figures like Jotirao Phule and later B.R. Ambedkar to unveil the hidden underpinning of social order. Their criticisms made visible that which had been structurally hidden for so long, the historical making of caste inequality. In Foucauldian terms, new counter-discourses challenged the regime of truth supporting hierarchy; in Gramscian terms, subaltern groups revolted for moral-intellectual hegemony. The very scene itself became a battleground not one that was divinely settled.

Colonial modernity then should be neither mistaken for sheer continuity nor for simple break. It eclipsed spectacle with surveillance, ritual fixity with bureaucratic classification and karmic inevitability with ideological contest. But that dialectic of inside-outside, the mobile frontier between scene and obscene endured in the new guise. Caste lived by infiltrating modern institutions, even as the very same institutions nurtured the forces that would eventually question its legitimacy. The oneness of the pre-modern theatre was broken, and what followed was a much more complex and unstable stage for caste drama to develop.

III. The Postcolonial Modern: Schizophrenia, Eruptions and the Hegemony of Denial

The founding of the Indian republic was a script most thrillingly re-written of the scene/obscene dialectic. Inspired by liberal democracy and led by a modernising elite, this new nation-state wanted to make a complete break with the past. And India’s public, legal “scene” was dramatically re-scripted. The framework of the Constitution, authored under B.R. Ambedkar, a Dalit jurist deeply critical of caste, effectively banished it as obscene to the political-juridical order. Articles 15, 17 (which destroyed untouchability) and the guarantee of equality before the law erected a new platform that transformed individuals into citizen, rather than caste subject. The reservation policies (Articles 15(4), 16(4)) became a temporary, exceptional instrument in this stage, as corrective historical justice until achieving the final goal of “Join Casteless India”. The rhetoric of secular nationalism and, later, that of neoliberal meritocracy helped create a public sphere in which caste was meant to be sloughed off in the interests of national or consumer identity.

Caste, however, did not vanish. It had strategically migrated from the public-sacral scene to the privatised, affective, and social “obscene.” This obscene is no negative empty but a powerfully busy shadow stage. Endogamy would still be the strongest fortress. As sociologist G. Shah (2002) and others have shown, the “c­onjugable/u­nc­onjugable” binary flourishes in the private domain of family alliances, matrimonial ads, and community networks concealed from the law’s scrutiny. Purity/pollution practices can draw back into the private and daily life, who in principle may enter the kitchen, share a water glass, sit as an equal at a meal. These are not officially recorded, but they are vital to social reproduction. In contemporary institutions, the corporate office, the university, elite social clubs, caste operates as though it’s based on race and class, if by its own ecosystem of social capital and unspoken biases. The Dalit expert may be officially welcome on the corporate stage, but exclusion thrives in the obscene of informal circuits and cultural codes (such as hearing a last name). Anand Teltumbde (2010) calls this the “persistence of caste” in new, “camouflaged” versions in hitherto seemingly-casteless modern sites. Lynchings, social humiliations and caste-based rapes are not vestiges of a pre-modern past. They are modern obscene eruptions, as scholars such as Kalpana Kannabiran contend. They are frequently sparked, as others have also noted, by a perception of Dalits “overstepping” their bounds, owning land, riding horseback, sporting a moustache or falling in love across castes. Recorded on cell phones and disseminated through the social media, this violence is at once secret in its execution and hyper-visible in its sharing, revealing the brutal truth that the official scene seeks to deny.

The dominant casts in modern India have had a project: to naturalise the split. The new “common sense” is an aggressive discourse of the successful erasure of caste: “Caste doesn’t matter anymore,” “We are all casteless now,” “Only the backward castes talk about caste.” To talk about pervasive caste discrimination is characterised as “playing the caste card”, an obscene game of etching a primitive poison into the modern body politic. This is the hegemony that allows dominant caste persons to populate public spaces as generalised liberal individuals, free from caste bias while their social and intimate worlds are structured through caste power. It vulgarises the systemic character of caste to analysis, when it is reduced into ‘incidents’ alone or individual prejudices.

Case 1: The Khairlanji Massacre (2006): At Khairlanji town of Maharashtra wherein a Dalit family- the Bhotmanges—was lynched and women were sexually violated before they were murdered. The flash point was their testimony in a police case and the perceived social disobedience of owning property and being educated. Khairlanji is not a remnant of the archaic: it is a contemporary obscene explosion. The violence was not a spectacle of sovereign power but a secret, community-approved atrocity, later brought to light through the media and activism. It was a bid to violently re-assert a weakening local hegemony. By using the tools of modernity (courts, education, land titles), the Bhotmanges broke the “common sense” of Dalit acceptance by demanding subordination. The massacre was a demonstration to force a restoration of that “common sense.” The State’s initial reticence in using the PoA Act[1] was very much present. An alternate dialectic reveals: the progressive law (integral to constitutional scene) was subverted by the police, who were seeing it as a local arm of an obscene social order. The massive Dalit protests that followed were a counter-hegemonic gesture, dragging the obscene out of the closet and into the national eye-scape, compelling the official scene to abandon its hollow bromides and reckon with the violence it had rendered invisible.

Case 2: Corporate India and Duality of the Sabhya-Gavva: In the glass-and-steel offices of Bangalore or Gurgaon, it’s a different story. The office is a place of casteless modernity, it is run by HR (human resource) manuals and meritocratic ideology and professional dress codes. Here, caste is officially obscene; to mention it is a breach of professional etiquette. But it flourishes in the obscene of social capital (Teltumbde, 2010): weekend resorts gupshup, references and mentor chains; and crucially, ‘off-siting’ matrimonial alliances. Attempts to bring the Dalit professional into the elite corporate fold abound but they are not part of these obscene networks driving genuine career mobility and cultural identity. The hegemonic “common sense” is strong: “We don’t see caste here.” Such is the hegemony of caste, the many-layered monopoly by which privilege functions when you are a dominant caste, that it can reproduce itself updated to the gilled hilt with practised ease like no other marauding bandit – and all Dalit assertion of identity or complaint about bias can be counterpoised not as an obscenity but even better – since there’s always a reason why an obscenity cannot be effective enough in its monstrosity: casted as something that comes from ob-scoot-ated couches. This is the crowning achievement of modern caste schizophrenia: an absolute disconnection between the formal scene of liberal equality and the informal obscene of caste-reinforcing sociability.

Independence and the acceptance of a new constitution did not so much lead to the death of caste as to a transformation in the means adopted by it. If colonial modernity banished ritual spectacle in favour of bureaucratic classification, the postcolonial state ushered in a new grammar of visibility mediated by democracy, rights and representation. Caste was no longer publicly exalted in the form of sacred hierarchy; it now existed in the juridical idiom of egalitarianism and administrative calculus of reservations. The stage went from the village square and census archive to the courtroom, legislature, and electoral arena. But this transformation did not erase the old boundary of scene and obscene, it transformed it.

The explicit abjuration of untouchability and fundamental rights in the Constitution was a symbolic break with Brahmanical social ontology. In other Foucauldian terms, a new regime of truth was articulated: caste discrimination became something that it is illegal to speak about, but something that persists. That created a paradox of democratic visibility. Dalit presence in educational institutions, government bureaucracy, Parliament indicated an entry into the national scene, but leaves a lot of mediation through categories of injury, backwardness and compensatory justice. The reservation system, which is and was both re-distributive and emancipatory of caste identity, necessitated –for its operation– ongoing administrative naming of caste identity. By this, the very mechanism proposed to erode hierarchy itself re-inscribed caste within state knowledge. Visibility (to use the title of a good read) became two-edged: recognition and regulation.

This ambivalence is indicative of the larger movement from sovereign or disciplinary power toward what Foucault named bio-political administration. The post-colonial state manages its populations through welfare, quotas, development programmes and statistical surveillance. Caste in these instances is neither simply ritual nor only juridical, but becomes a demographic for techniques of governance. The obscene is no longer the occult labour that sustains ritual purity, but the residue of structural degradation that survives beneath the language of formal equality. Day-to-day violence—social boycott, atrocities, denial of access to housing or marriage networks—is frequented in a domain beyond the spectacular optics of national democracy, where it appears as exception rather than rule. What cannot be incorporated into this story of progress is relegated to the fringe of visibility.

Hegemony, as in Gramsci, thereby assumes a new form. The national promise of unity, development and democratic citizenship generates a strong ‘common sense’ that situates caste as a left-over social problem being slowly dissolved by the process of modernisation. This story line allows for some reform but overcomes more radical change. Dominant castes adjust by converting historical privilege into educational capital, bureaucratic power and management of local political establishments. Hegemony now moves away from ritual superiority to meritocratic language; inequality is no longer described using karma, but as the result of competition, culture, or efficiency. You win consent not so much by theology as by the aspirational rhetoric of the nation-state.

But the post-colonial picture is also one of an un-anticipated countervailing assertion. Dalit protests, Ambedkarite politics, literary publics and mass mobilizations turn humiliation into a collective critique. Public conversion ceremonies, acts of remembrance and symbolic appropriations of public space such as university campuses or spaces of atrocity re-perform the terrain from which Dalits were once confined. In Foucaldian parlance, subjugated knowledge systems explode into discourse questioning the neutrality of law and development. In Gramscian terms, these struggles are driven not only to inclusion but to moral-intellectual leadership capable of redefining the very order. Democracy doubles as instrument of regulation and terrain of insurgency.

This visibility is also complicated by both media and modern popular culture. Caste now whirls through television debates, digital activism, electoral rhetoric and bureaucratic documentation. The scene widens to a national and ever more virtual canvas. But growth is not the same as change. This is the realm of spectacular, and sometimes scripted, moments of outrage which can be simultaneous with banal indifference, giving rise to what could be termed a politics of intermittent visibility- caste appears dramatically in crisis and disappears back into normalcy. The obscene endures right in this several back and forth.

The postcolonial condition, then, is to be understood as a dynamic antagonism [rather than resolution]. Inherited hierarchy is contested by constitutional morality, but is also constantly re-articulated through social practice. Caste becomes subject to critique under democratic inclusion, even as administrative governance secures its categories. Power works less by oppressive and direct prohibition than by selective recognition; hegemony less by naturalised order than by promised development. It is not the distinction between scene and obscene that disappears, but rather becomes mobile, contested and historically contingent.

On this slippery ground, caste endures not as immobile tradition but as malleable entity materialised in modern institutions. Its strength is its adaptability; its weakness, the very visibility that democracy requires. The postcolonial stage then sets the stage for the contemporary moment, where neoliberal recalibration, digital moderation and new identity politics will once again realign what is visible, sayable and contestable in caste’s name.

IV. The Contemporary Neoliberal-Digital Scene: Circulation, Concealment, and Algorithmic Power

The late modern and early postmodern era represents another re-organization of caste’s scene of action, one related to neoliberal financialization, ever-faster urban transformation and digital communication. If the postcolonial constitutional order made caste visible in the languages of rights and welfare, neoliberal modernity deflects attention to markets, mobility, and privatised aspiration. Power increasingly functions by means of circulation rather than repression: capitalist, informational or affective flows transform social existence. In this terrain, caste does not vanish; it mutates, finding solace in infrastructures that seemingly are formal and neutral. The scene becomes diffuse, meshed and not entirely transparent.

Urban anonymity at first appeared to hold the promise of eroding inherited hierarchy. This was a society of skill, and with the migration to metropolitan labour markets, service economies now expanding, and meritocratic competition as the order of the business day it was implied a world governed by skill rather than by birth. But a closer look shows that caste does indeed change in response to these conditions through more subtle forms of recognition and exclusion. The segregation of housing in both the formal and informal real-estate markets, matrimonial advertisements coded by surnames and community markers, professional networks organized around kinship: All are reminders of how caste survives beneath the surface equality of contract. Free choice is, quite often, the cover for inherited social capital. In the Foucauldian sense, discipline becomes internalized as self-improvement: people structure their education, language and behaviour to mimic upper-caste cultural models. Power functions through aspiration.

This paradox of visibility and obscurity is only magnified by digital media. Social media, internet archives and digital journalism created, and continues to create, new Dalit self-presentation, memory-making and political mobilization. Stories of discrimination spread quickly and turn localised instances of pain into national or global conversations. Hashtag activism, digital memorialisation and virtual community building generate new counter-publics that challenge hegemonic narratives of caste vanishing. Subaltern knowledges gain a technological magnification, attempting to recall Foucaultian perceptions of the growth of discourse as a place for resistance.

Yet it is precisely these digital infrastructures that produce new forms of obscuration. Algorithmic sorting, datagov and platform economies all function through categories that look caste-blind even though they frequently reproduce historical inequality. Bandwidth access, linguistic capital, digital literacy, and social networks are variously unevenly distributed such that who can speak and what differences ultimately get heard is formed accordingly. Online anonymity can obscure caste identity, but it also opens the doors to a revival of abuse, harassment and symbolic violence stripped from responsibility. And so once more the obscene moves: not invisible work outside the ritual space, nor systematic humiliation under constitutional equality, but coded replication of hierarchy within seemingly neutral technological systems.

Neoliberal political economy also recasts Gramscian hegemony. Developmental nationalism is displaced by entrepreneurial individualism, with success recast in terms of personal realization rather than collective redistribution. This is an ideological shift that pulls the rug from under solidarity-based politics, while eclipsing structural constraint. Dominant caste privilege is reformulated as excellence, professionalism or global-competitiveness. Today, it is not through moral doctrine (as ideology) that hegemony functions but through desire: the desire for upward mobility within market society. Consent is obtained by promising the irrelevance of caste when in fact, material divisions remain.

Simultaneously, counter-hegemonic energies take on new shapes. Dalit entrepreneurship, trans-national mobilization, inter-sectional alliances, and cultural production in literature, film, and digital art re-invent dignity beyond the abjection of victimhood or what Geisser calls state-replaced recognition. Memory turns into political technology: archives of atrocity, commemoration of historical resistance, re-imagining Ambedkarite thought travel across geographies to confront neoliberal amnesia. These operations are not content with coming in from the outside: they want to redraw the lines of its deck, show us the hidden continuities between ritualized past and digital present.

The result is that the present period is one not of stability but rather of heightened contradiction. Caste is there and it is not; submerged in words while floating above them, crushed and dispersed in the personal but ominous in its structural totality, sundered across experience but knit tightly through data. The Foucauldian analysis shows that there is a move towards power as dispersed and infrastructural – algorithmic, not spectacular – while the Gramscian emphasises a hegemonic order built on aspiration, consumption and selective memory. The line between scene and obscene is constantly reconfigured by media circulation and political contestation.

In this neoliberal-digital formation, caste continues because it is able to occupy invisibility and exploit visibility: become visible when mobilised, disappear when asked. Its fate will rest on whether emerging counter-publics are able to change technological exposure into structure-changing possibilities, converting sporadic oppositional outcry’s to new moral-intellectual leadership. The drama of caste, far from being over, therefore moves on to a stage where power itself is more and more ethereal, and the fight to make inequality observable becomes the primary political act.

Anand Teltumbde’s analysis of caste’s “camouflaged” persistence provides a powerful lens for understanding the modern obscene. As he argues, “caste today is not what it appears to be. It has shed its religious garb and put on the secular attire of modernity” (Teltumbde 2010, 23). This insight resonates deeply with the Foucauldian scene/obscene dialectic: caste thrives precisely because it has migrated from the visible ritual scene to the hidden networks of social capital, professional networking, and matrimonial alliance. The corporate office that publicly celebrates meritocracy while privately excluding Dalits from informal mentorship networks exemplifies this schizophrenic condition. Yet Teltumbde’s Marxist commitments also remind us that this is not merely a matter of discourse or visibility: caste’s persistence is ultimately rooted in material control over land, capital, and labour. The scene/obscene dialectic, therefore, must be understood not as an alternative to materialist analysis but as a framework that reveals how power organises the visibility and invisibility of material exploitation itself.

V. Dalit Politics: Shattering the Proscenium Arch

It is possible to see the history of anti-caste resistance, from Jyotirao Phule’s radical philosophy through Ambedkarian revolutionary constitutionalism to today’s post-bahujan (radical) politics, as a prolonged struggle against this forced dialectic.

It may be noted that Dr. Ambedkar’s public burning of Manusmriti in 1927 was an archetypal act of shattering the sacred instrumentality constitutive of the old stage in scene making. In drafting the Constitution, he was seeking to reconstruct a new, fair scene from below. Dalit political and cultural assertion is, at bottom, a way of calling the obscene into the eye of the scene. The Bahujan political parties (such as the BSP party) emerging to prominence have put caste identity, previously considered a shame marker, on the national stage of the electoral politics for a source of pride and community mobilization. The taking of public space, a public scene which performs the exhibitionism of “dalitness” could be interpreted by authorities as a sign that dalits are trying to create some kind of counter-­public space. The “cattle meet festival” is striking in this regard, by publicly eating the meat deemed most polluting within Brahminical norms, activists force the unspeakable into public space, undermining the grammar of purity/pollution itself.

Dalit Studies, as it is being launched by veteran scholars such as Gopal Guru and others, does this important labour of theorising from the site of the obscene. It confronts the hegemonic “common sense” with a systematic recording and analysis of the lived experience of caste, not leaving it as anecdotal or passé.

VI. Synthesis and Conclusion: The Dialectic’s Enduring Grip and Its Cracks

The Foucauldian Gramscian analysis discovers that caste-modernity is not to be located in its end, but rather its strategic disintegration. Power circulates by keeping intact the gap between disavowing public scene and luminous private torque. The state’s role turns Janus-faced: progressive legislation that has made lives more livable and breathable in some ways, but that has also all too frequently, through institutional bias and political compromise, proved itself powerless to prevent obscene eruptions of violence.

This arrangement suits liberal democracy down to the ground, for it provides protection for the “private” sphere as an area beyond state interference and lets caste flourish there behind a screen of personal choice and cultural preference. It is also conducive to global capitalism, which can use caste-based social networks to control labour even as it floats a veneer of meritocratic neutrality.

But the dialectic is also an inherently unstable one. Every Khairlanji that turns into an issue of national interest, every corporate diversity report that whispers exclusion, every inter-caste marriage that invites ridicule is also a moment of rupture. In its varied avatars, it is Dalit politics that remains the sustained force challenging this division. The last struggle, as Ambedkar hoped, is not one for entry into the existing scene so much as to destroy the double stage itself, to establish a social order where the caste-based history and present are not some dirty secrets but an openly avowed basis for a common sense that is genuinely universalist and egalitarian. So long as that dialectic exists, caste in its morphed and schizophrenic form continues to survive.

(Note-An earlier version of this paper has appeared on SSRN E-Library, Elsevier.)

(The author teaches history at Shivaji College, University of Delhi. He can be reached at skandpriya@shivaji.du.ac.in)

References

Cohn, Bernard S. Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge. Princeton University Press, 1996.

Dirks, Nicholas B. Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India. Princeton University Press, 2001.

Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage, 1977.

Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. International Publishers, 1971.

Guru, Gopal. Humiliation: Claims and Context. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Guru, Gopal, and Sundar Sarukkai. The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Pandian, M.S.S. Brahmin & Non-Brahmin: Genealogies of the Tamil Political Present. Permanent Black, 2007.

Rao, Anupama. The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of Modern India. University of California Press, 2009.

Rege, Sharmila. Writing Caste/Writing Gender: Narrating Dalit Women’s Testimonios. Zubaan, 2006.

Risley, H.H. (Sir). Census of India, 1901. Vol. I, India. Part I, Report. Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1903.

Teltumbde, Anand. The Persistence of Caste: The Khairlanji Murders and India’s Hidden Apartheid. Zed Books, 2010.

The Smritichandrika of Devanna Bhatta (Trans. J.R. Gharpure). 1948.

South Indian Inscriptions (Vol. III, Chola Inscriptions). Archaeological Survey of India.

[1] Prevention of Atrocities Act (1989)

Related:

The Anatomy of Humiliation: Defining caste violence in the Constitutional era

It is religion-based politics that refuses to root out caste: Baba Adhav in conversation with Teesta Setalvad

Caste and community creations of human beings, God is always neutral: Madras HC

The post The Double Stage: Caste’s Schizophrenic Modernity between Spectacle and Shadow appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At the centre of the controversy are two distinct but intertwined developments:

1. AISA women leaders alleging verbal sexual abuse and threats inside and outside a police station. There are videos of this abuse circulating online
2. YouTuber Ruchi Tiwari claiming she was attacked by a mob of nearly 500 people while covering the protest.

As FIRs have been registered and political leaders have entered the fray, the struggle has increasingly shifted from what happened on campus to who controls the narrative of victimhood.

The Protest: UGC equity regulations and campus tensions

The protest on February 13 was organised by the All India Students’ Association (AISA) and allied groups demanding implementation of the University Grants Commission’s (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026.

The regulations — intended to strengthen safeguards against caste discrimination affecting SC, ST and OBC students — were recently stayed by the Supreme Court of India, which observed prima facie concerns of vagueness, particularly in the definitional scope of caste-based discrimination, and directed that the 2012 framework would remain in force pending further hearings.

Details may be read here.

Students supporting the regulations have emphatically argued they are essential to address structural caste bias within higher education. Opponents –many who have led aggressive and violent protests against their implementation –claim certain provisions are “vulnerable to misuse.”

This mobilisation was framed as part of a broader “Adhikar” campaign asserting dignity and institutional accountability.

The Flashpoint: Ruchi Tiwari’s presence and the confrontation

According to reports in The Print, tensions escalated when Ruchi Tiwari, who runs the YouTube channel Breaking Opinion, arrived at the site to cover the protest.

Tiwari describes herself as an “independent ground reporter”. Her channel, which has over 59,000 subscribers and more than 460 uploaded videos, frequently features a privileged caste lens depicting confrontational campus coverage, particularly around reservation, caste debates and identity politics. One of her recent YouTube Shorts is titled: “They want reservation but say don’t indulge in casteism.”

She has alleged that before she could begin reporting, individuals began calling out her name, asking her full identity and caste, after which a crowd surrounded and assaulted her. In statements to ANI (an agency that has increasingly been called out for its right-wing bias) , she claimed nearly 500 people attacked her, that she was held by the neck and arms, subjected to rape threats, and that there was an attempt to push her into a vehicle with its door open — which she described as an attempted abduction and “mob lynching.”

Videos online show pushing and scuffling. However, the full sequence remains disputed.

AISA’s Counter-Version: Provocation, altercation and selective framing

AISA has rejected Tiwari’s allegations as “false and motivated.”

According to statements cited by The Print, AISA leaders allege that the confrontation began when Tiwari engaged in provocative questioning and allegedly made casteist remarks referencing the Mahad Satyagraha led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. AISA further claims she harassed a Dalit journalist named Naveen and attempted to snatch his camera.

Some circulating videos, according to AISA, show Tiwari striking Naveen and later pushing or punching AISA activist Anjali during the confrontation. Another clip shows activists holding Tiwari while attempting to escort her toward police presence.

AISA has argued that several clips being widely shared omit audio or preceding events and therefore reshape public perception.

It is at this point, AISA claims, that the narrative began to shift — from a protest demanding caste equity to a viral storyline of a “woman journalist attacked by Left mobs.”

Another video from the February 13 incident at Delhi University exposes the conspiracy of Sanghi-Casteist-Feudal goons against students demanding equity and social justice. These goons threatened AISA activists and DU students with vulgar abuses inside the Maurice Nagar Police… pic.twitter.com/ObROzq3H4r

— CPIML Liberation (@cpimlliberation) February 14, 2026

Condemn the right-wing assault and hooliganism against Comrade Anjali in DU! Today, AISA DU Secretary Anjali was physically assaulted by a right wing group. Despite the heavy presence of Delhi Police and CRPF, the attackers were given a free hand.

This violence is the clearest… pic.twitter.com/0AS2xYOyIZ

— CPIML Liberation (@cpimlliberation) February 13, 2026

Statement of Communist Party of India -Marxist Leninist- Liberation:

The Police Station Incident: Allegations of sexualised abuse

The most serious allegations, however, concern what happened later at Maurice Nagar Police Station.

AISA leaders Anjali and Neha allege that when they went to file complaints, a right-wing mob gathered outside the police station premises. According to AISA, the crowd swelled from dozens to hundreds, shouting slogans and issuing rape and death threats.

AAP MP Sanjay Singh publicly condemned the episode on X, sharing a video and alleging that in the presence of police personnel, AISA women leaders were abused with explicit insults directed at their mother and were told to “remove their clothes.”

देश की राजधानी दिल्ली में थाने के अंदर, पुलिस वालों के सामने AISA की महिला नेता अंजली और नेहा को मां की गाली देते हुए कहा गया, “कपड़े निकाल।” एक बिहार की बेटी, दूसरी उत्तराखंड की — दोनों सवर्ण हैं, लेकिन वंचितों के हक की आवाज उठाना उनका गुनाह हो गया। अगर यह घटना पंजाब या बंगाल… pic.twitter.com/JgRZ9cgf99

— Sanjay Singh AAP (@SanjayAzadSln) February 15, 2026

Singh questioned how such an incident could occur in the national capital and linked it to broader concerns about women’s safety. He alleged that the targeting of the two women leaders was connected to their vocal advocacy for marginalised communities.

AISA has termed the episode “state-sponsored hooliganism,” alleging that activists were effectively confined inside a room for hours while threats were issued outside. Anjali was reportedly taken for a medico-legal examination.

Delhi Police, according to ANI, has registered two FIRs — one based on Tiwari’s complaint and another based on a complaint by a female AISA student — under sections relating to assault, voluntarily causing hurt, wrongful restraint and common intention under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

UGC का समर्थन कर रही दिल्ली यूनिवर्सिटी कि छात्राओं को दिल्ली पुलिस के सामने थाने में भद्दी-भद्दी गालियां दी जा रही हैं। UGC के नए प्रावधानो का महत्व इसी बात से लगाया जा सकता है कि दलित और पिछड़ों के हुकूक का उलंघन ना हो… pic.twitter.com/Qs8e7eew71

— Ashraf Hussain (@AshrafFem) February 15, 2026

ABVP, DUSU and administrative responses

The Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) has maintained that Tiwari was present in her professional capacity and was attacked for asking questions. Its Delhi state secretary described the episode as an attack on media freedom and characterised Left-affiliated campus politics as violent.

Aryan Maan, President of the Delhi University Students’ Union, condemned the alleged assault on Tiwari and called for a fair and impartial investigation. DUSU leaders have stated that violence has no place in campus politics.

Meanwhile, Vice-Chancellor Yogesh Singh described the incident as a matter of concern and urged the university community to maintain social harmony. He confirmed having spoken with student and teacher groups as well as police authorities.

मैं दिल्ली विश्वविद्यालय के सभी शिक्षकों और विद्यार्थियों से अनुरोध करता हूं कि वह आपस में सौहार्द बनाए रखें। कोई भी ऐसा काम न करें जिससे आपसी मनमुटाव बढ़े और राष्ट्र व विश्वविद्यालय की छवि को नुकसान हो।

दिल्ली विश्वविद्यालय में कल जो घटना हुई वह चिंता का विषय है।…

— University of Delhi (@UnivofDelhi) February 14, 2026

The Larger Question: When violence becomes a narrative weapon

What unfolded at Delhi University is no longer simply a dispute about who pushed whom in a scuffle.

It is a case study in how protests over caste equity are rapidly reframed into spectacles of disorder; how women activists alleging sexualised abuse must compete for credibility against viral video clips; and how digital ecosystems determine which injury becomes the “real” one.

At stake is not merely the credibility of AISA or the veracity of Ruchi Tiwari’s claims. It is the deeper question of whose victimhood travels faster, and why.

When allegations of rape threats and sexualised slurs inside or outside a police station struggle to command sustained outrage — while a competing claim of assault dominates headlines within hours — it reveals something structural about public discourse. Gendered abuse against politically inconvenient women often dissolves into “partisan noise.” Caste-based mobilisation is quickly recast as mob aggression. And campus politics becomes content.

This is not to prejudge the outcome of the FIRs. Due process must determine individual liability. But focusing exclusively on the procedural neutrality of “both sides have filed complaints” risks obscuring the larger asymmetry: narrative power in the digital age is unevenly distributed.

A protest demanding the restoration of equity regulations meant to protect SC, ST and OBC students has been displaced by a battle over viral footage. The structural issue — caste discrimination in higher education — has receded behind the spectacle of confrontation.

This shift is not accidental.

Related:

Campuses in Revolt: How the UGC Equity Stay and Criminalised Dissent Have Ignited Student Protests Across India

The stay of UGC Equity Regulations, 2026: The interim order, the proceedings, and the constitutional questions raised

Higher Education: How Centre is Undermining State Autonomy & Politicising UGC

‘Diluted Existing Rules’: Rohith Vemula, Payal Tadvi’s Mothers Slam UGC’s Draft Equity Regulations

Academic Freedoms at Risk: Federalism and autonomy challenged by UGC’s VC appointment guidelines

The post UGC Guidelines 2026: AISA Protest at Delhi University followed by sexual abuse allegations amid police presence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

But another pattern has emerged alongside these flashpoints: ordinary citizens refusing to comply.

From Kotdwar and Nainital in Uttarakhand to Jaipur in Rajasthan, small acts of resistance are creating ripples that extend far beyond their immediate geography. These moments do not erase communal tension — but they complicate the narrative of inevitability.

Kotdwar: Republic Day, a shop sign, and a national ripple

On January 26, 2026, as reported by The Hindu (February 9, 2026), patriotic music echoed across Kotdwar’s Jhanda Chowk when a confrontation unfolded outside “Baba School Dress and Matching Centre,” a decades-old garment shop run by 71-year-old Wakeel Ahmed.

A group of young men demanded that Ahmed remove the word “Baba” from his signboard, claiming that Kotdwar — associated with Baba Siddhabali — did not permit a Muslim trader to use the term. Mobile phone videos later circulated widely, showing Ahmed visibly shaken.

The incident may have remained another viral moment of coercion had Deepak Kumar, a local gym owner, not intervened. When asked to identify himself, he responded: “My name is Mohammad Deepak.” The addition of “Mohammad” was deliberate — a symbolic rejection of rigid identity boundaries.

What followed, again reported by The Hindu, was swift escalation. An FIR was filed against Deepak, reportedly based on a complaint from members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. His gym memberships collapsed from 150 to 15. A crowd gathered days later outside his premises raising slogans. Police were deployed. His family reportedly received threats.

Yet this is where the story altered course.

As reported by The Indian Express, CPI(M) MP John Brittas publicly purchased a gym membership in solidarity. Fifteen Supreme Court senior advocates followed, each contributing Rs 10,000 as annual membership fees — deliberately structured as subscriptions, not donations, because Deepak refused direct financial aid. More than 20 lawyers pledged pro bono legal assistance.

Public figures such as Kaushik Raj, Raju Parulekar, Ramchandra Guha, Swara Bhaskar and Teesta Setalvad amplified calls for support.

A local confrontation thus transformed into a national solidarity campaign.

The Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), in its January 2026 report Excluded, Targeted & Displaced, contextualised such incidents within a broader pattern of communal narratives, economic boycotts, and displacement in Uttarakhand since 2021. Kotdwar was not an aberration — it was part of a documented trajectory.

And yet, the ripple effect from Deepak’s intervention shows that the story does not end with targeting. It can expand into resistance.

Nainital: “Why are you beating everyone?”

In April 2025, Nainital witnessed unrest following the arrest of a 72-year-old man accused of molestation. According to reporting by The Hindu, although the accused was swiftly detained, protests escalated into vandalism of Muslim-owned shops and attacks on property.

Amid the chaos, Shaila Negi — daughter of a traders’ association office-bearer — confronted a swelling mob. In a viral video, she asks: “Sabko kyun maar rahe ho?” (“Why are you beating everyone?”).

She refused to shut her shop during a bandh called against Muslims.

The backlash, she later told The Hindu, included online rape threats and abuse. But her action inserted dissent into what might otherwise have appeared as unanimous anger.

The importance of her intervention lies not in scale but in rupture — she broke the logic of collective punishment.

Purola: When an 83-year-old lawyer said “no”

The summer of 2023 in Purola saw boycott calls and intimidation after allegations involving two youths of different faith in a love jihad case. Posters marked Muslim homes. Tenants were pressured to vacate. Protests reportedly involved groups including the Bajrang Dal.

As documented in The Hindu’s coverage and referenced in the APCR report, fear spread, and some minority families left. But 83-year-old lawyer Dharam Singh Negi refused to evict his Muslim tenants despite threats and posters pasted outside his own house. His defiance reportedly encouraged other landlords to stand firm. This was not viral. It did not trend nationally. But it stabilised a town at a fragile moment.

Jaipur: Public reversal of moral policing

On February 14, 2026, a public park in Jaipur became the setting for a confrontation that quickly travelled far beyond Rajasthan. Videos widely circulated showed a group of men, reportedly linked to the Bajrang Dal, approaching couples in the park on Valentine’s Day. Dressed in saffron scarves and carrying sticks, the men were seen demanding identification cards and questioning the legitimacy of the couples’ presence. Such scenes have, over the years, become almost ritualistic in parts of India, where fringe groups position themselves as defenders of culture against what they describe as Western influence.

Tingus from Bajrang Dal were asking for ID cards from couples.

People saw them and asked THEM for their ID cards.

All Bajrang Dal tingus started shivering.

This is gold stuff.pic.twitter.com/LNRw55gqZ0

— Jawaharlal Nehru (@PMNehru) February 14, 2026

What made this incident different, however, was the reaction it provoked. Instead of dispersing or complying quietly, the couples — joined by bystanders — began demanding identification from the vigilantes themselves. Voices in the video are heard asking under what authority the men were conducting checks. One individual insists on knowing their names and addresses and warns that he would take them to court. The dynamic of intimidation visibly shifted. What had begun as an attempt to assert moral authority turned into a public challenge to that very authority.

The exchange quickly escalated into a tense standoff, but the significance lay in the reversal. Moral policing typically operates through spectacle and psychological pressure — the presence of a group, symbolic attire, raised voices, and the implicit threat of escalation. Its power depends on the assumption that those targeted will feel embarrassed, cornered, or fearful. In Jaipur, that script collapsed. By demanding accountability, the public reframed the encounter as a legal question rather than a cultural one: who has the right to demand identification in a public park?

The viral circulation of the clip amplified this reversal. Social media users described the moment as an “UNO reverse,” but beneath the humour was a serious civic assertion. Instead of the now-familiar images of couples being chased or shamed, the video showed alleged vigilantes on the defensive, being questioned about their authority. The spectacle of humiliation, so often directed at young people celebrating Valentine’s Day, was replaced by a spectacle of resistance.

The Jaipur episode is important not merely as a viral moment but as an indicator of shifting public thresholds. Unlike instances in Kotdwar, Nainital, or Purola — where individuals initially stood almost alone — the Jaipur confrontation reflected collective, spontaneous pushback. It suggested a growing unwillingness among citizens, particularly younger urban residents, to concede public spaces to self-appointed moral enforcers. In doing so, it signalled that while intimidation may remain visible, compliance is no longer automatic.

The Pattern: From isolation to contagion

These incidents, taken together, reveal an emerging civic reflex:

• A gym owner interrupts harassment.
• Senior lawyers institutionalise solidarity.
• A woman challenges collective punishment.
• An elderly lawyer defies eviction pressure.
• Couples publicly question vigilante authority.

They are geographically scattered. They are politically unaffiliated. They are socially risky.

But they share one thing: they disrupt the perception of unanimity.

Communal polarisation often depends on silence. It thrives when intimidation goes uncontested. What these incidents demonstrate is that public dissent — even by one person — fractures that narrative.

The ripple from Deepak Kumar’s Republic Day intervention is especially instructive. His stand did not remain local. It catalysed legal networks, political support, and social media amplification. It reassured others that resistance might not mean isolation.

Jaipur shows what happens when that reassurance spreads.

None of these incidents eliminate structural tensions. None reverse policy shifts or ideological mobilisation. The APCR report makes clear that displacement and targeting remain real concerns in parts of Uttarakhand.

But they demonstrate something equally real: civic resilience.

They show that:

• Names cannot be monopolised.
• Crime cannot justify collective blame.
• Landlords need not obey mobs.
• Vigilantes can be questioned.
• Solidarity can be structured, visible, and contagious.

Hate travels quickly — through slogans, rumours, and viral clips. But courage travels too.

And increasingly, it is not travelling alone.

Related:

CJP’s 2025 intervention against ‘Digital Hate’: Holding television news channels accountable before the NBDSA

Public Resistance and Democratic Assertion: India through protests, 2025

Law as Resistance: A year of CJP’s interventions against a rising tide of hate

The post Against the Script of Hate: How ordinary citizens are reclaiming public space appeared first on SabrangIndia.

— Rohith Vemula

It has been ten years since Rohith Vemula’s institutional murder.^[1] That emptiness is not his alone. It is the lingering feeling many from marginalised communities carry with them when they enter India’s so-called “elite” institutions –- IITs, IIMs, NITs, and Central Universities.

A 2022 survey in the Quint conducted at IIT Bombay following the Institutional Murder of Darshan Solanki found that one in every three SC/ST students had been asked about their caste identity.

Faculty spaces in these institutions reflect a similar imbalance. Despite constitutionally mandated reservations for SC, ST, and OBC communities, faculty positions continue to be dominated by those from the general category, as reported by The Hindu.

Under representation in these institutions

Under-representation is not incidental; it is structural. In at least two IITs and three IIMs, nearly 90% of faculty positions are held by individuals from the general category. In six IITs and four IIMs, the figure ranges between 80–90%, according to a report by The Wire, based on an RTI filed by Gowd Kiran Kumar, National President of the All India OBC Students Organisation.

The culture of exclusion within India’s elite institutions is not declining. It has been firmly entrenched.

Source: MHRD Data and a report in Quint, November 28, 2019

Faculty recruitment across IIMs has witnessed a significant decline between 2019 and 2026.

OBC, SC, ST – FACULTY IN IIM’s

This was first put out on social media. Verifying this we found that, according to a report in The Print on “The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Education, Women, Children, Youth and Sports titled “2025–26 Demands for Grants of the Department of Higher Education” as of January 31, 2025, 28.56 percent of the total sanctioned teaching faculty positions (18,940) remained vacant across IITs, National Institutes of Technology (NITs), Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs), Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research (IISERs), Central Universities, and other higher education institutions.

The data further reveals that 17.97 percent of the 11,298 Assistant Professor positions (entry-level posts) are vacant, 38.28 percent of the 5,102 Associate Professor positions (mid-level posts) remain unfilled, and an alarming 56.18 percent of the 2,540 Professor positions are currently unoccupied.

The question then is stark: Why are SC, ST, and OBC positions left unfilled even when institutions have vacancies and eligible candidates are available?

When questioned about their recruitment processes, many institutions claim to follow a “flexi” system. When asked why reservation policies are not implemented, some have anonymously stated that hiring is done purely on “merit”. This raises a troubling question, does “merit” imply that candidates from marginalised communities are deemed intellectually unfit to teach in elite institutions? It is also frequently argued that an “adequate talent pool” is unavailable.

The experience of Subrahmanyam Sadrela illustrates the deeper structural problem. After completing his M.Tech and PhD from IIT Kanpur, Sadrela joined the institute as an Associate Professor in the Aerospace Engineering Department in January 2018. Soon after his appointment, colleagues reportedly remarked that his selection was “wrong”, that he did not deserve to be a faculty member, that his English was inadequate, and that he was mentally unfit. In April 2019 nearly a year after he raised allegations of caste-based discrimination on campus, he was accused of plagiarism in his thesis and threatened with the revocation of his PhD degree, as per a report in ­the Times of India. A detailed investigation by the Directorate of Civil Rights Enforcement (DCRE) and reported by the Mooknayak said that the corroborated allegations of caste based discrimination inside IIM – B made by an associate professor Dr Gopal Das were vaild.

A significant portion of the 2025 data is not available online. Most publicly accessible information is from 2023–24, with limited material from early to mid-2025. This absence itself is telling, particularly as the pace of erosion of transparency –by institutions under the union government–appeared to accelerate in 2025, as per a report in the Wire.

RTI data from 2024 revealed that no SC, ST, or OBC faculty members were recruited in 2023 at IIT Bombay. Further, 16 departments at IIT-B did not admit a single student belonging to the ST community in the 2023–24 academic year. Shockingly, in five departments at IIT-B, no ST student had been admitted in the last nine years. This data was shared by the Ambedkar Periyar Phule Study Circle (APPSC), a student group at IIT Bombay, based on an RTI response received on February 6, 2025. In a post shared on X (formerly Twitter) on 9 April, the group alleged that IIT Bombay “Is violating reservation norms despite the MMR (Mission Mode Recruitment) announcement.”

Notably, no information was put out by the Circle regarding 2025 data on PhD enrolments or faculty recruitment. The Circle, which had consistently been active in raising questions of injustice, appeared to fall silent on these figures. Speculations can be made that the voice of the student group was curbed by the institute. Established in 2017, the Circle had positioned its X account as a strong voice responding to issues affecting students within and beyond IIT-B. 

The death of Darshan Solanki, a Dalit student at IIT-B, further intensified concerns. His father claimed that caste-based harassment led to his son’s suicide. However, the committee constituted by the institute concluded that the suicide was linked to poor academic performance, stating that none of Darshan’s close associates had reported instances of caste-based harassment. It must be noted that the committee did not include a single external member; it comprised only IIT staff. The inquiry was entirely internal. To many, it appeared a complete white wash.

Similar patterns of hostility have surfaced in other premier institutions. Students at the Indian Institute of Mass Communication (IIMC), Delhi, reported that casteist messages such as “SC/ST leave the campus” and “Jai Parshuram” were circulated by fellow students on unofficial WhatsApp groups. Memes targeting Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar were also shared.

When anonymous complaints were submitted, the institute’s director and faculty reportedly responded that since the complaint had been made anonymously, it could not be entertained. This was conveyed by a senior official on the condition of anonymity.

If students are made to feel this unwelcomed within these institutions, why would they not drop out? Why would faculty members not resign? 

The dropout rates of SC, ST, and OBC students in these elite institutions are often attributed to financial difficulties or “excessive academic pressure.” Yet, the lived experiences of students suggest a far more troubling reality.  Following Darshan Solanki’s death, a survey was conducted at IIT Bombay. Students were asked a series of questions about campus climate and discrimination. One such question, along with several responses, is reproduced here. These responses reveal the brutal reality of a systemic failure—one that institutions attempt to downplay or conceal, even when exposed by the deaths of students like Darshan.

1.  What Has The Survey Revealed?

• On being asked if anyone has hurled “caste/tribal slurs or abuses or discriminated against you on campus,” 83.5 percent students said ‘No’.
• While 16.5 percent students said that they had, in fact, witnessed such instances, 70.4 percent students said that they had not witnessed anyone else being discriminated against on campus
• Nearly 25 percent, or one in every four students, said that the fear of disclosing their identity has stopped them from joining an SC/ST forum or collective.
• As many as 15.5 percent of students said that they have faced mental health issues arising from caste-based discrimination.
• Nearly 37 percent of students said that they were asked their Joint Entrance Exam (JEE)/ Graduate Aptitude Test in Engineering (GATE)/ Joint Admission Test for Masters(JAM) /Undergraduate Common Entrance Examination for Design (U)CEED rank by fellow students on campus in a bid to find out their (caste) identity.
• 26 percent of students were asked their surnames with the intention of knowing their caste.
• 6 percent, or one in every five students, said that they feared backlash from the faculty if they talked back against caste discrimination.
• 2 percent, or one in every three students, said that they feel SC/ST Cell needs to do more to address casteism on campus.
• Nearly 25 percent of the 388 students, that is one in every four students, did not attend an English-medium school in class 10.
• Nearly 22 percent of students are first-generation graduates from their family.
• Nearly 36 percent of students foretell that open category students perceive their academic ability as ‘average’. This is in contrast to 51 percent SC/ST students perceiving the academic ability of open category students as ‘very good’. (Source: the Quint)

There is a powerful story from the Solomon Islands that when people wish to uproot a tree, they gather around it and hurl abuses at it until the tree withers and dies. Whether or not this myth holds true for plants, its metaphor is painfully relevant in the context of India’s elite institutions.

An unwelcoming, hostile environment does not merely push students to drop out; it drives faculty members to resign as well.

Vipin V. Veetil resigned from IIT Madras in July, 2021. He had joined in 2019 as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS) in August the previous year. In his resignation email to the institute’s authorities, Veetil stated that his sole reason for quitting was caste-based discrimination allegedly faced from senior Brahmin faculty members within the department. However, the committee constituted by IIT Madras concluded that there was “no evidence of decisions being biased due to caste discrimination,” reasoning that most faculty members had “hardly interacted” with Dr. Veetil.

This was not the first instance. In January 2022, Veetil had also resigned after rejoining the institute in August 2020.

In another case, K. Ilanchezhian, a senior assistant director at the institute, filed a complaint alleging that his office space had been shifted to a students’ hostel, while his original office was allotted to an ‘upper’ caste research assistant.

Similarly, the Director of the National Institute of Fashion Technology (NIFT), Chennai, was booked at the Taramani police station under the SC/ST Act following allegations of caste discrimination against a colleague.

In 2024, an FIR was registered under various provisions of the SC/ST Act and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita by the Bengaluru Police in a case alleging caste-based atrocities and systemic discrimination at IIM Bangalore. Eight individuals were named, including the institute’s Director and seven professors. The Directorate of Civil Rights Enforcement (DCRE), in its investigation findings dated December 20, 2024, confirmed systemic caste-based harassment faced by Associate Professor Gopal Das, a globally acclaimed Dalit scholar at IIM Bangalore, as per a report in the Mooknayak.

These cases represent only the tip of the iceberg.

Data on PhD enrolments in these institutions reveals that only a small number of students from SC, ST, and OBC communities have been able to secure admission into these prestigious doctoral programmes

Source: Table showing the 2022 PhD admission data of 13 IIMs obtained by RTI filed by APPSC IIT Bombay, The Wire

Scholarships for SC, ST, and OBC students are delayed and the students often get the amount after the end of their semesters. It has become an annual tradition for students to receive their scholarships after the end of their academic semester as reported in The Hindu. Minister Subhas Sarkar in this winter session of the Lok Sabha presented statistics that reveal the harrowing figures about dropouts by marginalised students studying in central universities, Indian Institutes of Technology, and Indian Institutes of Management.

In response to a question raised by BSP Member of Parliament (MP), Ritesh Pandey in 2023, the government disclosed that over the preceding five years, a staggering 13,626 SC, ST, and OBC students had discontinued their education.

The data further revealed that in Central Universities alone, 4,596 OBC students, 2,424 SC students, and 2,622 ST students had dropped out during this period. In the IITs, 2,066 OBC students, 1,068 SC students, and 408 ST students discontinued their studies. Similarly, in the IIMs, 163 OBC, 188 SC, and 91 ST students dropped out, reported SabrangIndia.

As stated before, no data for 2025 is accessible as of now, online.

Background

The Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), the nodal central government agency on matters relating to reservation, issued an order in 1975 exempting certain scientific and technical posts from the reservation policy.

Siddharth Joshi, an IIM Bangalore doctoral alumnus and researcher who co-authored a paper with IIMB Professor Deepak Malghan on caste bias in IIMs, noted: “In 1975, an exemption was granted to IIM Ahmedabad by the Department of Personnel and Training with respect to reservation in faculty positions. While IIM Ahmedabad had expressly sought this exemption, other IIMs simply assumed that they were also exempt and began not implementing reservations in faculty recruitment.”

Institutions have frequently justified the marginal representation of SC and ST faculty by arguing that there is a lack of a sufficiently qualified applicant pool, as reported by the Quint.

However, marginalised communities remain underrepresented in these institutions both as students and as faculty. They are subjected to grave mental harassment on the basis of caste identity, by peers, by authorities, and by colleagues. At the same time, institutions routinely deny the existence of discrimination and attempt to curb voices that raise these concerns.

The deeper truth is this: people from marginalised communities are seldom truly accommodated within these spaces. They are rarely made to feel that they belong. They are otherised – their culture, language, and food practices subtly or overtly looked down upon. In these elite institutions, they continue to remain “they,” never fully accepted as “us.”

UGC Guidelines: Context, Counter-revolt and protest 

It is in this overall context of entrenched exclusion and othering that recent developments around the much-needed UGC guidelines 2026 need to be understood. Brought in following a rigorous human rights battle in the courts –spearheaded by the mother of Rohith Vemula and Payal Tadvi—they evinced visceral reactions from sections of the privileged caste elite. The union government, without putting up a spirited defence of its own enacted guidelines capitulated in its arguments of caste elite organisations in the Supreme Court. The Court too was prompt to stay implementation of these measures that would go a long way in addressing entrenched exclusion. Dozens of campuses across the country have seen spirited protests against this capitulation. Chandrashekhar Azad of the Bhim Army party even held a demonstration at Jantar Mantar on February 11 demanding that the 2026 Guidelines be implemented without change. Read references to this issue here, here and here.

Conclusion

“One out of three SC/ST students reported being asked about their caste,” revealed an IIT Bombay survey conducted in 2022.

Many students from the general category have reportedly hurled casteist abuses at SC/ST students. These elite institutions increasingly resemble exclusive spaces of savarna dominance. Yet, reports such as Caste-Based Enrolment in Indian Higher Education: Insights from the All-India Survey on Higher Education (AISHE) are published, claiming that nearly 60% of seats in higher education institutions are occupied by students from marginalised communities (p. 11 of 26).

While the AISHE data indicates a rise in enrolment from marginalised communities in recent years, it fails to answer a fundamental question: which institutions are being counted? Are these Tier 2 and Tier 3 colleges in urban peripheries, or institutions located in remote rural areas? Or are we speaking of IITs, IIMs, NITs, AIIMS, and Central Universities, the institutions that command prestige, resources, networks, and opportunity?

The distinction matters. A BSc degree from IIT Bombay can open doors to high-paying corporations and global opportunities. A BTech degree from an under-resourced college in a remote district often cannot. Access to elite institutions translates into access to power.

Meanwhile, over 13,000 SC, ST, and OBC students have dropped out of higher education in recent years. In Central Universities alone, approximately 4,500 OBC students, over 2,400 SC students, and nearly 2,600 ST students discontinued their studies. In the IITs and IIM’s, India’s premier institutes of learning — renowned not only for academic excellence but increasingly for caste discrimination and student suicides – around 2,000 OBC students, 1,000 SC students, and 408 ST students dropped out. At the IIMs, 163 OBC, 188 SC, and 91 ST students discontinued their education reported SabrangIndia.

The disbursal of fellowships and scholarships is frequently delayed, often reaching students only after the semester has ended. Students are made to feel undeserving and unwelcome—by faculty and by peers alike. They are shunned for their caste identities. They are made to feel like outsiders, as though these institutions belong only to certain classes and castes. Even their food practices are policed and mocked, as has been reported in several IITs. Sabrangindia has frequently reported on this alienation and discrimination.

Faculty positions in these institutions are overwhelmingly occupied, often 80 to 90 percent—by those from the general category. Those who dominate these spaces frequently go on to hire within the same social circles, reproducing exclusion in the name of “merit.” It becomes a vicious cycle. Even when scholars like Gopal Das or Subrahmanyam Sadrela manage to reach the other end of this black hole, the system finds ways to pull them back.

Nearly 79 years after Independence, sections of our people continue to be treated as second-class citizens within spaces that claim to represent the pinnacle of knowledge and progress. India prides itself on constitutional morality, yet its elite institutions often operate within what increasingly resembles an internal apartheid.

How long will this continue? How long will students like Rohith Vemula, Payal Tadvi, Darshan Solanki, and countless others be pushed into a system so steeped in humiliation and mental harassment that death appears to them more bearable than a life stripped of dignity?

That is the question we must confront.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Natasha Darade)

[1] A suicide born of distress, mental and other torture and alienation at the Hyderabad Central University (HCU) on January 17, 2026 inspired the Dalit students movement to coin the term “institutional murder” as this was the last of many and the beginning of several such deaths with institutions of higher learning in India

Related:

Campuses in Revolt: How the UGC Equity Stay and Criminalised Dissent Have Ignited Student Protests Across India | SabrangIndia

A Long Battle, A Swift Stay: The Fight for Equitable Campuses | SabrangIndia

My birth is my fatal accident, remembering Rohith Vemula’s last letter

Rohith’s death: We are all to blame

To Live & Die as a Dalit: Rohith Vemula

The post Cementing exclusion: What the numbers say about SC, ST, OBC presence in India’s elite institutions appeared first on SabrangIndia.

After partition Muslim communalism asserted itself in Pakistan, eroding the possibility of the country becoming a thriving democracy. Social and economic progress was the biggest victim here diminishing the possibility of its transition into a modern state with progress, peace and Amity. India had a very secular leadership under Jawaharlal Nehru and he, with others, laid the foundations of a nation which –until a few decades ago –was held up as a unique experiment with core syncretic values. However, communal forces that have risen over the last couple of decades are undoing the achievements of the first four-five decades of peace and amity. Hate against Muslims has been their core method; to increase their power and hold over society.

During this march towards converting an aspiring democracy into a sectarian nationalist state, those brandishing this majoritarian politics have devised newer and newer languages and slogans against Muslims in particular and also against Christians.

The situation is pathetic now. Social common sense is full of Hate against Muslims and this is increasing by the day. We saw Hindu communalism developing a mechanism to spread far and wide to the extent that Muslim ghettos are the order of the day, vegetarianism being asserted, love jihad, land jihad, Corona jihad have been commonplace words. Starting from the top leadership the foot soldiers implement this hate into practical violence leading to polarisation of society.

The top leadership throws up slogans like ‘Batenge to Katenge’, ‘Ek hain to safe hain’, they can be identified from their clothes, they proliferate like rabbits, Hindus will become a minority, Hindus are in danger; to name just the few.  On the top of this pyramid, the Assam Chief Minister, who was earlier in Congress and is now in BJP from last few years, has made statements against Miyas, (Bengalis speaking Muslims), which exceed all the earlier hate speeches against Muslims. On January 27, 2026, he stated ‘four to five lakh Miyas will be removed from the electoral rolls through SIR’. He went on to state “Vote chori means we are trying to steal some Miya votes. They should ideally not be allowed to vote in Assam, but in Bangladesh.” According to media reports, Sarma also openly instigated the public by saying, “Whoever can give trouble in any way should give, including you. In a rickshaw, if the fare is Rs 5, give them Rs 4. Only if they face troubles will they leave Assam.” Reported the Deccan Herald.

To cap it all he has recently released a video on social media showing him shooting through rifle and bullet going and hitting the skull capped man and the boy standing close to him. This tweet has been deleted now. Seeing all this the renowned Human Rights activist and eminent author, Harsh Mander filed a petition against him for Hate speech to “Promote hatred, harassment and discrimination against Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam.” He said he had sought prompt action and the registration of an FIR under relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.To this Sarma responded that he will file multiple FIRs against Mander for helping the Muslims during NRC process, and ensure that he is sent to jail. (Latest news reports suggest that after two petitions moved in the Supreme Court of India, Sarma has made a scapegoat of the BJP’s social media chief and sacked him, disclaiming all responsibility for the controversial, hate-filled, video—Editors).

So, what has happened to the syncretic culture which has been part of our land for centuries, where Azan Peer and Shankar Dev of Assam preached harmony and lived in Assam itself? So, what happened to the Hindu Muslim interaction in all areas of life, food, literature, architecture and religious festivals? One starts feeling hopeless in this scenario and feels despondent.

And then came the incident from Kotdwar in Uttarakhand. Here an old Muslim man was running a shop called ‘Baba school dress’ for the last 30 years. Bajrang Dal activists pounced upon him questioning how he can name his shop Baba, which for them means a Hindu figure. Seeing this Deepak intervened. As he was confronting the Bajrang Dal attackers the police was a mute spectator and police filed FIRs against Deepak Kumar and his friend. In another FIR against the Bajrang Dal activists the FIR is against unknown persons.

Details of Deepak Kumar’s stand and the backlash he faced may be read here.

So much hope was generated after this incident. The hope that humanism is not totally wiped in the flood of hate created by the followers of Hindu nationalism. Deepak is a living example of the thick Hindu Muslim relations which prevailed here but have become an exception by now. This exception shows the prevalence of earlier amity. Indian Currents reported, Deepak Kumar’s act of Humanism is worth 100 salutes. Rahul Gandhi, the leader of opposition, complimented Deepak Kumar and stated, “”Deepak is fighting for the Constitution and humanity—for that Constitution which the BJP and the Sangh Parivar conspire every day to trample underfoot. He is a living symbol of a shop of love in the marketplace of hate, and that is what stings those in power the most. The Sangh Parivar is deliberately poisoning the country’s economy and society so that India remains divided and a few continue to rule on the crutches of fear.” Reported the Hindustan Times.

Deepak Kumar himself had a very sweet answer as to why he called himself Mohammad. It was an act of solidarity and he said, ““Saraswati was sitting on my tongue, and that’s why, at that moment, the name ‘Mohammad Deepak’ came out of my mouth. I thought they would understand that I am Hindu, and that the situation, which was getting heated, would calm down. But instead, an FIR has now been filed against me.” Reported the Quint.

One only hopes and wishes we see more of people like Deepak Kumar who represent the true idea of India.

(This piece has been edited in part for language and style)

The post Mohammad Deepak: Upholding fraternity amidst a sea of hate appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The statement recorded that, PUCL was constrained to point out that Himanta Biswa Sarma has a notorious track record of making hateful statements about religious minorities, from Christians to Muslims as well as statements which reinforces the legitimacy of caste hierarchy and order. The rhetoric of the Chief Minister has often gratuitously and pejoratively invoked the term “jihad” in connection with various issues involving the Muslim community.

In November 2025, the Citizens for Justice & Peace had complained to the Election Commission of India, under the Representation of People’s Act, on Himanta Biswa Sarma’s speech filled with hate delivered during the Bihar state assembly elections. Details may be read here. Another complaint to the National Commission for Minorities may be read here.

“In August 2024, Sarma recklessly accused the University of Science and Technology, Meghalaya, a Muslim-run institution, of engaging in “flood jihad”, blaming it for the outbreak of floods in Guwahati. He has also made the ridiculous claim that the university has a Mecca-like structure, and therefore it is a symbol of “jihad”. Similarly, Sarma also made the unfounded allegation that Bengali Muslim farmers were practising “land and fertiliser jihad” by using high amounts of fertilisers on their crops.

Moreover, the human right platform links this spiral in hate speech in the north-eastern state with the 2026 Vidhan Sabha elections. “As Assam prepares for its next state general election in 2026, Sarma has intensified his targeting of Bengali Muslims. Sarma said that between ‘four to five lakh Miya voters’ would be removed from the electoral rolls during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process in the state. He also emphasised that “Himanta Biswa Sarma and the BJP are directly against Miyas” and urged people to “trouble” Miyas saying, “only if they face troubles will they leave Assam”.

Besides, says the PUCL statement, “He (Sarma) has made no bones of not only discriminating against Bengali speaking Assamese Muslims but has also illegally incited others to discriminate against them. On January 28, 2025, he said that, ‘Whoever can give trouble in any way should give, including you. In a rickshaw, if the fare is Rs 5, give them Rs 4. Only if they face troubles will they leave Assam… These are not issues. Himanta Biswas Sarma and the BJP are directly against Miyas. What is the point of telling us that these are issues? We are saying it openly; we are not hiding it. Earlier, people were scared; now I myself am encouraging people to keep giving troubles”.’”

The Chief Minister has moved from speech which demeans, degrades and humiliates to speech which incites civil society to demean, degrade and humiliate Bengali speaking Muslims. With none of this hate speech facing any significant pushback, the Chief Minister has been emboldened to further extend the boundaries of his hateful and unconstitutional rhetoric.

Background 

On February 8, 2026,  a video which has come to be referred to as the `Point-blank video’ purportedly showed Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma aiming a rifle and firing a shot at two individuals — one wearing a skullcap and the other sporting a beard that looked like a Muslim man. The wall the photo was hung on bore the words “No mercy” – with the caption “point-blank shot”. Though the outrage which greeted this video resulted in the video being removed from social media page of the BJP Assam unit, the damage had been done. For the video reinforced the CMs constant diatribe against Bengali Muslims as intruders who have stolen the jobs of Assamese thereby inflaming passions with the potential to result in major violence against Muslims and other minorities.

The only conclusion one can draw is that the incitement to murder was a bridge too far as far as what was acceptable from the Chief Minister and he was forced to take down the video.

However, the fact that the video was deleted cannot be allowed to obscure the history of Sarma’s repeated violations of his constitutional oath as Chief Minister to ‘faithfully and conscientiously discharge’ his ‘duties as a Minister for the State’ and to ‘do right to all manner of people in accordance with the Constitution and the law without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.’

The PUCL has also strongly condemned the language of the Assam Chief Minister as a complete repudiation of his oath of office. The Chief Minister has used language which demeans and degrades Assam’s Muslims, incites discrimination against them and goes so far as to incite the murder of Muslims. None of this language is sanctioned by the Constitution. The Chief Minister has violated his oath not to discriminate on grounds of religion and not to incite violence against members of a community. Far from promoting fraternity, which is the most basic constitutional obligation of a head of state, he has gone out of his way to promote divisiveness, hatred and violence in Assam.

“The Chief Minister has thus been a serial violator of the most basic norms which govern a constitutional democracy as well as the constitutional responsibility of a head of state.  His language has made it amply clear that he does not seek to govern on behalf of the Muslim communities of Assam. As such he has unequivocally and expressly repudiated his constitutional oath to govern without ‘fear or favour, affection or ill-will.’ In particular the Chief Minister has made it clear that he governs with an animus which targets the Muslim community. The Chief Minister has thus proved himself constitutionally incapable of abiding by the mandate of the Constitution that all person are equal before the law.

“The PUCL calls for the Chief Minister to resign as he has repeatedly violated his oath of office to govern without ‘fear or favour, affection or ill-will.’ The PUCL also calls on the Prime Minister to take action against the Chief Minister under Article 355 to ensure that Assam is governed in ‘accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.’”

The statement has been issued by the Kavita Srivastava, president of the PUCL and Dr V Suresh, General Secretary.

Citizens for Justice and Peace,  had in this creatively analysed this new political playbook of parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) who use a full-fledged, cynical and multi-layered hate assault –(mis) using fringe groups to star campaigners—to systemically dish out hatred, at peace time but especially during an increasingly weaponised election cycle. The article may be read here.

Related:

Law as Resistance: A year of CJP’s interventions against a rising tide of hate

Hate Watch 2025 | Tracking Hate, Defending Democracy | CJP

Poster-boy of ‘Hindutva’, Assam CM targets, Himanto Biswas Sarma threatens ex-US President with Islamophobic Slur: ‘Hussain Obama’

Hate Watch: Himanta Biswas Sarma on ‘Love Jihad’ during the Gujarat poll campaign

The post Himanta Biswa Sarma must resign as Chief Minister of Assam for serial violations of his oath of office: PUCL appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The 2025 Intervention Tracker:

• NCSC: 2 Complaints
• NCM: 6 Complaints
• NHRC: 2 urgent memorandums
• Police/Administration: 6 Complaints
• Preventive Actions: 2 pre-emptive Complaints

1.  National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC): Battling caste-based atrocities

In early January 2025 (January 8), CJP approached the NCSC to highlight a troubling spike in atrocities against Dalit communities across Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. These complaints, detailing incidents from late 2024, emphasised that such violence is rooted in a deeply ingrained discriminatory mind-set. CJP’s intervention sought to move the Commission beyond mere observation toward active enforcement of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the bigots propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

“Dignity for All”: a national mapping of 30 critical atrocities across 9 states

On June 24, CJP further filed a major formal complaint documenting 30 distinct incidents of violence across nine states, ranging from horrific sexual assaults on minors to the murder of a 10-year-old boy in Etah (Uttar Pradesh). Invoking Article 338 (5) of the Constitution, CJP sought an urgent probe into these crimes, which included social boycotts and the denial of cremation rights.

Widespread crimes against SCs violating the PoA Act and Civil Rights

CJP Stated in its complaint that, these incidents directly contravene the spirit and letter of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, and more critically, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST PoA Act), which specifically aims to prevent atrocities against Scheduled Castes and to provide for special courts for the trial of such offenses and for relief and rehabilitation of the victims. The recurring nature of these incidents, especially the multiple instances of sexual violence and physical attacks, reveals a severe lapse in the implementation and enforcement of these crucial legislations.

Targeted crimes against SCs, a pattern of abuse

Through this complaint, CJP highlights that systemic, widespread incidents of caste-driven oppression that are prevalent countrywide, across states governed by different political dispensations pointing to a deep-rooted societal malaise that has not only acquired a frightening level of ‘normalised violence and oppression’ but also is ‘allowed because of structured levels of immunity’.

CJP also stated in its complaint that as per the NCRB report, there are a total of 70,818 cases of atrocities against SCs and 12,159 against STs that remained pending for investigation at the end of the year 2021. A total of 2,63,512 cases of SCs and 42,512 cases of STs were placed for trial in the courts. At the end of the year, more than 96 percent of the total cases were still pending for trial. Though the charge-sheeting percentage was more than 80%, but the conviction rate remained below 40%.

Why did CJP intervene?

CJP stepped in because these atrocities were no longer isolated crimes but had become the “new normal” of daily humiliation and violence revealing spiralling trends. When local police failed to register FIRs or provided “structured immunity” to dominant-caste perpetrators, it became clear that only a high-level constitutional push could break the deadlock. CJP’s intervention was necessary to force the NCSC to address the systemic collapse of the PoA Act and protect the basic human dignity of the marginalised communities.

1.  National Human Rights Commission (NHRC): CJP’s Memorandum 

On May 31, 2025, CJP submitted a memorandum to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) regarding a major human rights crisis in Assam. In memorandum CJP reported that between May 23 and May 31, the Assam Border Police conducted secretive night raids across 33 districts, detaining at least 300 individuals, primarily Bengali-speaking Muslims, without warrants or legal paperwork. While some were eventually released, approximately 145 people remained untraceable, leading to fears of illegal “pushbacks” across the Indo-Bangladesh border.

The memorandum highlighted that many detainees were already involved in ongoing legal cases or had lived in India for generations. CJP argued that these actions bypassed the rule of law and violated constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22. CJP has asked the NHRC to demand a full report from the government, set up a fact-finding committee, and ensure the immediate safety and return of those unlawfully detained or expelled.

On June 4, 2025, CJP submitted a supplementary memorandum to the NHRC providing harrowing first-person testimonies of illegal night detentions and forced expulsions in Assam. This submission followed the initial May 31 memo and documented a systematic campaign where the Assam Border Police allegedly bypassed all judicial sanctions to deport Bengali-speaking Muslims, including the elderly, the chronically ill, and individuals protected by court stay orders.

The memorandum included testimonies from survivors like Hajera Khatun and Sona Bhanu, who described being blindfolded, fingerprinted without consent, and abandoned in “no-man’s land” swamps under the cover of darkness. Families reported finding their missing loved ones only through viral social media videos filmed in Bangladesh. Notably, CJP revealed that individuals previously released from detention centres through legal efforts—such as Doyjan Bibi and Abdul Sheikh—were re-detained and forcibly removed despite complying with all bail conditions. CJP has urged the NHRC to launch an independent inquiry, summon top officials, and ensure the safe return of all those subjected to these extra-legal deportations.

Rationale of CJP’s Intervention

This crisis demanded CJP’s intervention because the state was operating entirely outside the law, conducting what looked more like abductions than legal detentions. By disappearing people in the dead of night and “pushing” them across borders, the administration bypassed the entire judicial system, including the Supreme Court’s own stay orders. CJP acted to stop this “stealth purge” and ensure that no person is rendered stateless through secretive, extra-legal executive actions.

III. National Commission for Minorities (NCM: Stemming Organised Hate

Throughout 2025, CJP acted as a constitutional vanguard, filing six major complaints with the National Commission for Minorities (NCM).

• “Dharma Sansads” and 2. “Trishul Deekshas”

The beginning of the year 2025 was marred by high-decibel events like “Dharma Sansads” and “Trishul Deekshas” in regions like Delhi, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh. These gatherings were marked by explicit calls for economic boycotts and physical violence against Muslims and Christians. CJP’s complaints to the NCM detailed how speakers propagated baseless conspiracies such as “love jihad” and “land jihad” and these events created an atmosphere of deep fear and uncertainty. Consequently, we urged the Commission to hold those responsible accountable by ensuring FIRs are filed under the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023

• Complaint over hate speech at Trishul Deeksha events

On January 29, CJP had filed a formal complaint with the NCM, raising alarm over a series of Trishul Deeksha events held in December 2024 across Punjab, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, and Rajasthan. Organised by far-right groups such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal, and Antarrashtriya Hindu Parishad (AHP), these gatherings featured openly inflammatory rhetoric, hate speech, and mobilisation against minority communities, particularly Muslims and Christians.

• Complaint against hate speeches at ‘Dharma Sansad’ events

On January 22, CJP filed a complaint with the NCM regarding a series of hate speeches delivered at ‘Dharma Sansad’ events on December 20, 2024, led by Yati Narsinghanand and other right-wing figures. Despite being denied permission to hold the event in Haridwar, the gathering proceeded at another location, where inflammatory and violent rhetoric was once again espoused, targeting Muslims and calling for a Hindu-only nation. The speeches at the event included derogatory language and explicit calls for physical violence against Muslims, promoting a vision of a society devoid of religious diversity.

• The Hindu Sanatan Ekta Padyatra: a ten-day mapping of fear

On December 2, 2025, Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) submitted an exhaustive complaint to the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) regarding the Hindu Sanatan Ekta Padyatra, a massive 10-day mobilisation led by Dhirendra Krishna Shastri. Traversing 422 village panchayats across Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, the march was documented by CJP as a systematic campaign of “othering” that weaponised religious identity. CJP’s detailed mapping of speeches Categorised the rhetoric into direct hate speech and high-intensity fearmongering, notably demographic conspiracy theories claiming Hindus were on the “brink of becoming minorities.”

The yatra featured exclusionary slogans such as “Jo Ram ka nahi wo kisi kaam ka nahi” and explicit calls for the economic boycott of Muslims and Christians. CJP highlighted how speakers used their spiritual authority to normalise “bulldozer justice” and incite historical resentment, such as invoking the Babri Masjid demolition to demand the reclamation of other religious sites. Warning that such organised campaigns, involving an estimated 3,00,000 participants, could trigger real-world violence, CJP urged the NCM to launch a fact-finding mission. Crucially, the organisation prayed for the appointment of nodal officers as per the Tehseen Poonawalla guidelines to protect vulnerable communities from the volatile atmosphere generated by the padyatra’s rhetoric.

1. Targeting Bengali-origin Muslims

In late September (September 30, 2025), submitted a comprehensive complaint to the National Commission for Minorities (NCM), highlighting what it described as an “alarming and coordinated escalation of hate speech” across India. The complaint documents how Bengali-origin Muslims, many of whom are lawful Indian citizens, are being systematically vilified as “Bangladeshis” and “ghuspaithiye” (infiltrators) in election rallies, public protests, and online campaigns. CJP’s submission to the NCM Chairperson requested a full inquiry and preventive directions to curb vigilante activity, emphasising that such rhetoric directly contravenes Supreme Court directions on hate crimes.

• CJP’s key demands to the NCM

The complaint called upon the Commission to:

• Take legal cognisance under the NCM Act and initiate an inquiry.

• Direct registration of FIRs against individuals and organisations spreading hate.

• Curb vigilante activity by outfits like Bir Lachit Sen and All Tai Ahom Students’ Union.

• Ensure police compliance with Supreme Court orders on suo motu action.

• Enforce preventive measures, such as videographing rallies and banning repeat hate offenders.

• Urge social media platforms to remove hateful content.

• Launch a fact-finding mission on the profiling, harassment, and eviction of Bengali-origin Muslims nationwide.

• CJP’s key intervention in systemic targeted harassment and hate-motivated violence against Christians in Rajasthan (September, 2025)

On October 8, 2025, CJP filed a formal complaint with the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) regarding a surge in targeted harassment and hate-motivated attacks against the Christian community in Rajasthan throughout September 2025. The complaint highlights a series of disturbing incidents following the introduction of the Rajasthan Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Bill, 2025. Key flashpoints included a police raid on a children’s hostel in Alwar on September 3, the coercive interrogation of believers in Kotputli-Behror on September 9, and the forceful closure of St. Paul’s Hostel School in Dungarpur on September 11. Most notably, on September 21 in Jaipur, a mob of 40–50 activists assaulted a private prayer meeting, injuring eight people.

CJP urged the Commission to take immediate cognizance of these events, which they describe as a “coordinated campaign” involving vigilante violence and administrative bias. CJP requested a time-bound investigation into police misconduct and the registration of FIRs under BNS Sections 196 and 299. They further called for the implementation of Supreme Court guidelines from the Tehseen Poonawalla case to ensure accountability and the protection of constitutional rights under Articles 14, 21, and 25.

Action Taken by NCM: Following the formal complaint lodged by CJP, the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) initiated official proceedings on October 14, 2025, by issuing a directive to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Rajasthan. In its formal communication, the Commission stated that “The complainant should be apprised of the action taken in the matter and the Commission should also be informed.”

• The rise of extra-legal vigilantism and “Identity Policing”

On December 18, 2025, CJP formally approached the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) to report a surge in vigilante violence and state-led targeted evictions. The comprehensive complaint documents a disturbing pattern of incidents occurring between September and November 2025, primarily targeting Muslim and Christian communities across multiple states. CJP highlighted five critical areas of concern as physical vigilantism involving cow protection and moral policing; economic intimidation through informal boycotts of minority-owned businesses; disruption of Christian prayer meetings under the guise of preventing conversions; coercive identity policing; and large-scale demolitions that disproportionately affect vulnerable populations without adequate rehabilitation.

The central theme of the CJP’s complaint is the emergence of “self-appointed enforcers” who act with a perceived sense of impunity. CJP argued before the NCM that these are not isolated events but a recurring pattern that erodes constitutional guarantees of equality and religious freedom. The organisation expressed grave concern over selective law enforcement, noting that police often act upon vigilante complaints while ignoring the initial unlawful acts of the perpetrators. CJP has urged the NCM to demand action-taken reports from state governments, ensure the impartial application of criminal law, and safeguard the livelihoods and dignity of minority groups against normalisation of such violence.

Action Taken by NCM: On January 23, 2026, the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) has officially taken cognizance of the representation submitted by CJP on December 18, and has registered the case. Acting on complaint, the Commission formally forwarded a copy of the complete representation to the Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, North Block, New Delhi, for urgent consideration and appropriate intervention.

III. Police Authorities: Demanding Neutrality & Accountability

In 2025, CJP filed 5 major collective complaints with police and administration, across several states, to demand accountability, immediate preventive action, and a strict adherence to the rule of law.

“In the line of Crossfire”: when CJP demanded authorities to Act

Throughout February and March, CJP filed multiple state-wide complaints against BJP MLA and Minister Nitesh Rane for inflammatory speeches delivered in Pune, Sindhudurg, and Ratnagiri. CJP contended that as an elected representative in a position of significant influence, Rane bore a heightened legal and ethical responsibility to maintain communal harmony. Invoking the Supreme Court’s landmark Amish Devgan judgment, which distinguishes between free speech and harmful incitement, the organisation filed a series of formal complaints to demand that law enforcement act decisively against rhetoric that threatened the state’s social fabric.

1.  Nanijdham, Ratnagiri – On March 28, 2025, CJP approached the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate of Ratnagiri regarding a speech delivered by Rane during a public felicitation. The complaint documented how Rane propagated baseless conspiracy theories like “love jihad” and “land jihad,” utilising Islamophobic slurs and specifically targeting religious sites such as Mazars and Dargahs. CJP argued that this inflammatory language was a direct attempt to stir fear and mistrust toward the Muslim community, citing the Amish Devgan standard that such speech serves no legitimate purpose other than to sow division and provoke social discord.
2.  Wagholi, Pune – On March 18, 2025, CJP approached the Additional Director General (Law & Order) and the Pune Police regarding a contentious speech delivered at a temple in Wagholi. In this instance, Rane openly advocated for housing discrimination, urging Hindus to rent properties exclusively to fellow Hindus and warning that renting to even one “Aslam” would lead to a demographic takeover. CJP asserted that this rhetoric incited segregation and violated Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Furthermore, Rane’s fabrication of a coordinated plot to turn India into an Islamic nation by 2047 was flagged as a dangerous exploitation of public anxiety designed to dehumanise an entire community.
3.  Sindhudurg District – On March 7, 2025, CJP filed a joint complaint with the SP and Collector of Sindhudurg addressing speeches delivered in Kundal and Sawantwadi. These events, organised by right-wing outfits, featured Rane warning locals about “Islamisation” and issuing explicit threats. In Sawantwadi, Rane reportedly told the audience to contact him directly to “settle” matters if anyone “kept an evil eye” on his religion, pointedly remarking that he would ensure such individuals would not return to their place of worship on Fridays. CJP highlighted this as a clear incitement to communal violence and a violation of Supreme Court mandates that require police to take suo moto action against hate speech regardless of the speaker’s political standing.
4.  Nagpur City –  On April 24, 2025, Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) filed a formal complaint with the Additional Director General of Police (Law & Order), Maharashtra, and the Nagpur Police Commissioner regarding a divisive speech delivered by right-wing influencer Kajal Hindustani (Kajal Singhala). The speech, delivered during a public “Shivjanmotsav” event in Nagpur on February 19, 2025, targeted the Christian and Muslim communities through inflammatory narratives and baseless conspiracy theories.

CJP’s submitted that Hindustani’s rhetoric—which characterised conversions as being traded for “a sack of rice” and utilised the “Love Jihad” trope—meets the definition of hate speech as established in the Supreme Court’s Amish Devgan vs. Union of India (2021) 1 SCC 1 ruling. The complaint argues that such statements serve no purpose other than to sow mistrust, demean minority religious practices, and dehumanise marginalised sections.

Partisan conduct by Jagaon Police: CJP’s intervention

CJP intervened in October 2025 following a distressing breach of professional conduct by the police in Jalgaon. CJP filed a comprehensive complaint with the Director General of Police (DGP) of Maharashtra and the Superintendent of Police in Jalgaon, calling for immediate disciplinary action against officials from the Jamner Police Station. This demand for accountability arose after police personnel were observed publicly participating in a communal procession organised by Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan—the very organisation whose members are accused in the brutal August 2025 lynching of 20-year-old Suleman Pathan.

The complaint, which was also marked to the Maharashtra Home Department and the National Human Rights Commission, contends that such conduct is a blatant violation of the police oath of office and the Maharashtra Police Conduct Rules. CJP argued that the participation of investigating officers in a rally organised by a far right group linked to the accused is not just an ethical failure, but a total collapse of the constitutional principle of neutrality. Such actions severely compromise the integrity of criminal investigations and shatter the public’s—particularly the victim’s family’s—faith in the fairness of the legal process.

In its pursuit of justice for the Pathan family, CJP has demanded the immediate suspension of the concerned officers and the transfer of the Suleman Pathan investigation to an independent agency. Furthermore, the organisation has pressed for a state-wide directive to reaffirm the necessity of police impartiality in all communal and hate-crime cases.

Curbing market vigilantism: the Malabar Hill incident

In late November (November 25, 2025), CJP moved against a former political leader who conducted unauthorised “Aadhaar checks” of Muslim vendors at Mumbai’s Malabar Hill. CJP identified this as an unlawful assumption of policing functions and religious profiling intended to disrupt the livelihoods of minority communities. By demanding identity documents and instructing Hindu vendors to display saffron flags, these actors attempted to enforce a system of visible segregation. CJP’s complaint urged the police to protect the vendors’ right to trade and to register FIRs against the vigilante actors.

Action Taken by NCM: Pursuant to the CJP’s complaint submitted on November 25, 2025 against Raj Saraf, the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) has taken cognisance of the matter and forwarded the complaint to the concerned authorities for appropriate inquiry and action. The complaint was received from the office of the National Commission for Minorities, Malabar Hill, Thane, and was thereafter transmitted to V. P. Marg Police Station for further investigation. The police authorities have acknowledged receipt of the complaint and have initiated the process of inquiry in accordance with law.

1.  Preventive Action against Hate-filled Gatherings

CJP’s proactive stand against the proposed communal mobilisation in Pune and Goa

In January, CJP proactively filed two complaints with the Pune and Goa Police to halt “Hindu Rashtra Jagruti” events. Highlighting the track record of the organising outfits in promoting Islamophobia and economic boycotts, CJP urged authorities to invoke Sections 130 and 132 of the BNSS, 2023 to prevent cognisable offences. CJP emphasised in its complaints that allowing such gatherings would violate fundamental rights and contravene Indian criminal law, particularly by inciting communal tensions in otherwise peaceful regions.

• When CJP asks Pune Police to halt right-wing’s ‘Hindu Rashtra Jagruti Andolan’ event

On January 4, 2025, CJP filed a formal complaint with the Pune Police seeking immediate preventive action against the “Hindu Rashtra Jagruti Andolan” scheduled for the following day. Organised by the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti (HJS), the event raised alarms due to the group’s history of inflammatory rhetoric regarding “Love Jihad,” economic boycotts, and religious conversions. CJP argued that such gatherings stoke communal tensions and violate constitutional rights, citing a Mumbai precedent where a similar rally was denied permission to preserve social harmony.

• CJP seeks preventive action against HJS’s Goa event

On January 22, 2025, CJP further filed a formal complaint with the Goa Police, seeking immediate preventive action against the “Hindu Rashtra Jagruti Sabha” event scheduled for January 25 in Sanguem. Forwarded to the Inspector General and Superintendent of Police, the complaint highlighted the potential threat posed by the organiser, Hindu Janajagruti Samiti (HJS), a group with a documented history of hate speech and divisive rhetoric. CJP raised a sharp alarm, noting that the HJS frequently propagates baseless conspiracies like “Love Jihad” and calls for economic boycotts against minorities, which could ignite communal tensions in a diverse region.

Rebuilding faith in the Rule of Law

CJP’s 2025 interventions were not just about reporting crimes; they were about providing a blueprint for administrative action. Through the distribution of our handbook, “Towards a Hate-Free Nation,” CJP equipped police and district administrations with the latest jurisprudence from the Supreme Court. We maintain that combating hate is a collective responsibility, and our relentless intervention with the NCM, NCSC, NHRC & other constitutional bodies/authorities and state police/administration remains the frontier of this effort to reclaim the secular and democratic fabric of India.

Related

Fighting Hate in 2024: How CJP Held Power to Account

2024: CJP’s battle against communal rallies before and after they unfold

Holding power to account: CJP’s efforts to combat hate and polarisation

The post Turning the Constitution into Action: CJP’s year against a rising tide of hate appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At the centre of this legal moment is Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, whose public utterances over the last five years—now exhaustively catalogued before the Court—are alleged to represent not isolated political rhetoric but a sustained pattern of communal vilification, exclusionary exhortation, and legitimisation of social and economic discrimination against Muslims, particularly Bengali-origin Muslims in Assam.

The petitions—filed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), CPI leader Annie Raja, a group of twelve citizens comprising former IAS, IFS officers, diplomats, academics and civil society actors, and Islamic clerics’ body Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind—seek criminal accountability, independent investigation, and for the first time, judicially enforceable standards governing the speech of constitutional functionaries.

“Point Blank Shot”, “No Mercy”: The video that triggered urgency

The immediate trigger for the CPIM and Annie Raja petitions is a video uploaded on February 7, 2026, from the official X (formerly Twitter) handle of BJP Assam.

The video depicts Chief Minister Sarma firing a gun at animated images of two men shown within a crosshair, portrayed as Muslims. As the gun discharges, the figures are struck repeatedly. The visuals are overlaid with phrases such as “Point blank shot” and “No mercy”, culminating in slogans that read:

• “Foreigner-free Assam”
• “Community, land, roots first”
• “Why did you go to Pakistan”
• “No forgiveness for Bangladeshis”

The video ends with a stylised, cowboy-like portrait of the Chief Minister himself.

Although the video was deleted following widespread outrage, the petition stresses that it continues to circulate widely, amplified by unofficial accounts and political messaging networks. The petition describes it as the most explicit and violent crystallisation of an already entrenched political narrative, one that frames an entire community as legitimate targets of exclusion and hostility.

Urgent mentioning before the Supreme Court

Senior Advocate Nizam Pasha mentioned the CPIM and Annie Raja petitions before Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, seeking urgent listing.

“We seek urgent intervention of this Court with respect to disturbing speeches made by the sitting Chief Minister of Assam. Complaints have been filed, but no FIRs have been registered,” Pasha submitted, as per LiveLaw, specifically referring to the February 7 video and earlier speeches.

The Chief Justice remarked that electoral seasons increasingly see political disputes entering constitutional courts, observing that “part of the elections is fought inside the Supreme Court.” However, the Court indicated that it would examine the matter and grant a date.

Details of the petition filed by the CPIM

1. Not an Isolated Video: A five-year pattern of exclusionary speech

Crucially, the petitions insist that the February 7 video cannot be viewed in isolation.

The CPIM petition places before the Court a detailed chronology stretching from 2021 to February 2026, documenting a steady escalation in the Chief Minister’s public rhetoric. These include statements that allegedly:

• Conflate illegal immigration with Muslim identity
• Repeatedly deploy the slur “Miya” to refer to Bengali-speaking Muslims
• Call for denial of land, employment, transport, and livelihoods
• Advocate social and economic boycott framed as “civil disobedience”
• Encourage harassment through electoral roll objections
• Suggest removal of voting rights for members of a religious community

One of the most striking passages cited urges citizens to create conditions in which Muslims “cannot stay in Assam” by denying them rickshaws, shops, vehicles and land. Another openly exhorts supporters to short-pay rickshaw pullers belonging to the targeted community so that they are compelled to leave.

The petition argues that when such statements emanate from the head of the elected executive, they do not remain rhetorical—they acquire coercive force, shaping behaviour on the ground.

2. From Speech to Social Harm: “Acting on the CM’s directions”

What distinguishes these petitions from earlier hate speech challenges is the emphasis on documented social consequences.

The CPIM petition cites reports of daily-wage workers being harassed, rickshaw pullers being deliberately underpaid, and individuals being confronted and asked to vacate neighbourhoods for being “Bangladeshi Muslims.” In several instances, videos circulating online allegedly show perpetrators explicitly stating that they are acting in accordance with the Chief Minister’s directions.

The petition warns that this marks a dangerous constitutional threshold: the translation of executive rhetoric into informal, decentralised enforcement by citizens, blurring the line between State authority and vigilante conduct.

3. Immigration, NRC and the charge of deliberate conflation

A central legal argument advanced is that the Chief Minister’s rhetoric deliberately collapses the distinction between illegal immigration and Muslim identity.

The CPIM petitions point out that immigration is religion-neutral under Indian law, and that NRC data demonstrates that a majority of those excluded were non-Muslims. The selective focus on Muslims, therefore, is argued to expose the communal intent underlying the speeches.

What is framed publicly as demographic anxiety or border security, the petition contends, operates in effect as religious profiling and collective punishment, incompatible with Articles 14, 15 and 21.

4. Constitutional oath and misfeasance in public office

The CPIM petition anchors its challenge in the constitutional oath taken by ministers to uphold sovereignty, integrity, fraternity and equality.

Relying on decisions such as Manoj Narula v Union of India, State of Maharashtra v SS Chavan and Daulatmal Jain, the petition argues that repeated, deliberate use of State authority to stigmatise and exclude a community constitutes misfeasance in public office and a breach of constitutional trust.

The petition further invokes the Supreme Court’s continuing mandamus in the hate speech batch (Qurban Ali, Shaheen Abdulla), which mandates suo motu registration of FIRs in cases attracting Sections 153A, 153B, 295A and 505 IPC (now reflected in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita). The complete absence of FIRs, despite repeated complaints, is characterised as systemic executive impunity.

5. Reliefs Sought: FIRs, SIT, transfer of investigation

Given that the alleged offender is a sitting Chief Minister, the petition seeks:

• Mandatory registration of FIRs under the BNS
• Constitution of an independent Special Investigation Team
• Transfer of all related investigations to an independent authority

The petition argues that State and Central agencies cannot reasonably be expected to act independently when the subject of investigation occupies the apex of political power.

Other petitions filed

1. A Parallel Constitutional Question: Who regulates the speech of the powerful?

Running alongside the CPIM petition is a broader writ petition filed by twelve citizens—former civil servants, diplomats, academics and public intellectuals—which raises a distinct but connected constitutional concern: the complete absence of standards governing the public speech of constitutional authorities.

As per LiveLaw, this petition highlights not only the Assam CM’s remarks on “Miya Muslims,” “flood jihad,” “love jihad,” and voter removal, but also similar patterns across states and offices—references to “land jihad,” “infiltrators,” “anti-nationals,” and exhortations to “avenge history.”

The petition argues that while individual statements may fall short of statutory hate speech thresholds, their cumulative effect corrodes constitutional morality, erodes fraternity, and legitimises discriminatory governance.

Drawing on Navtej Singh Johar, Joseph Shine, and Government of NCT of Delhi, the petition contends that constitutional morality must operate as a restraint on those who exercise public power.

“Holders of public office are not ordinary speakers,” the petition emphasises. Their words carry the imprimatur of the State, shape administrative behaviour, and have a chilling effect on vulnerable communities—even absent explicit incitement.

The petition seeks declaratory relief that official speech must conform to constitutional values, and urges the Court to lay down guidelines that regulate conduct without curtailing free speech. Detailed report may be read here.

2. Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind: Hate speech, disguised and normalised

Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind has reinforced these concerns by flagging Sarma’s January 27 statement that four to five lakh “Miya voters” would be removed during electoral roll revision.

According to the report of LiveLaw, the clerics’ body argues that many such utterances function as disguised hate speech, escaping prosecution due to selective enforcement and unchecked police discretion.

Relying on India Hate Lab data, Jamiat notes a 74% rise in hate speech incidents in 2024, with nearly 98% targeting Muslims, and links this surge to rising hate crimes against minorities.

A Common Grievance: Police inaction and the charge of selective enforcement

Across petitions, a common grievance emerges: law enforcement’s pick-and-choose approach.

While FIRs are swiftly registered against minorities, complaints against powerful public officials remain unattended. This, the petitioners argue, violates Article 14 and hollow out the rule of law.

Invoking Lalita Kumari, Tehseen Poonawalla, Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan and Kaushal Kishore, petitioners urge the Court to exercise its powers under Article 142 to impose binding accountability mechanisms.

A constitutional crossroads

Taken together, these petitions force the Supreme Court to confront a profound constitutional dilemma:

• Can holders of constitutional office weaponise speech without consequence?
• Does repetitive exclusionary rhetoric itself constitute unconstitutional governance?
• Can constitutional morality be judicially enforced against executive speech?
• When does silence and inaction by institutions become complicity?

With judgment reserved in the broader hate speech matter, the Assam CM petitions may well shape the next doctrinal chapter on hate speech, executive accountability, and the constitutional limits of political power.

Related:

When Genocide is provoked from the Stage: Raebareli hate speeches, Bhagalpur dog whistles, and a delayed FIR

The Politics of Processions: How the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra amplified hate speech in plain sight

The Orchestrated Extremism: An analysis of communal hate speech in India’s election cycle (2024–2025)

CJP urges NCM action against hate speech campaign vilifying Bengali Muslims as ‘Infiltrators’

‘Islamophobia dominates Indian hate speech’: Equality Labs report on Facebook India

The post Supreme Court asked to intervene as petitions flag “normalisation of hate” in Assam CM’s public speeches appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In the communication, the signatories have stated that these series of public statements made by the Chief Minister of Assam, Shri Himanta Biswa Sarma, on their face, amount to hate speech, executive intimidation, and open vilification of a particular community commonly referred to as the “Miyan” or Bengal origin Muslim community. Over the course of more than 100 years they have become a part of the larger Assamese society by adopting the Assamese language and assimilating with the Assamese culture, says the communication. Besides, the letter states that the statements of the Chief Minister, delivered repeatedly in public forums, go far beyond political rhetoric and enter the prohibited constitutional zone of dehumanisation, collective stigmatisation, and threats of state-sponsored harassment.

In addition, the letter enumerates what they see violations of the Oath of Constitutional Office by the Chief Minister.

The entire letter may be read below:

February 5, 2026

To

The Hon’ble Chief Justice Gauhati High Court

Guwahati, Assam

Subject: Request for Suo Moto Cognisance of Repeated Hate Speech, Executive Interference, and Constitutional Violations by the Chief Minister of Assam

Respected My Lord,

We write this letter with profound faith in the constitutional role of the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court as guardian of the fundamental rights.

It is with deep concem that we draw the attention of this Hon’ble Court to a series of public statements made by the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Assam, Shri Himanta Biswa Sarma, which, on their face, amount to hate speech, executive intimidation, and open vilification of a particular community commonly referred to as the “Miyan” or Bengal origin Muslim community. Over the course of more than 100 years they have become a part of the larger Assamese society by adopting the Assamese language and assimilating with the Assamese culture. The statements of the Chief Minister, delivered repeatedly in public forums, go far beyond political rhetoric and enter the prohibited constitutional zone of dehumanisation, collective stigmatisation, and threats of state-sponsored harassment.

(A) Instigation for physical harm, economic discrimination and social humiliation

In a recent public statement Chief Minister of Assam instigated people to make people from Miyan community suffer, he categorically stated, “Whoever can, in whichever way should make Miyan suffer. If you board a rickshaw, if the fare is 5, pay them #4”. Such a statement, coming from the highest executive authority of the State, constitutes a direct call for physical harm, economic discrimination and social humiliation of the Miyan community, normalising

cruelty and stripping them of their inherent right to live with dignity as guaranteed under the Constitution.

(B) Direction to interfere in the Special Revision (SR) process

Equally alarming are public statements wherein the Hon’ble Chief Minister has stated that he has directed or ordered BJP party workers to file objections during the Special Revision (SR) process, particularly targeting members of the Miyan community, he has also said that the officers should work overtime to make Miyan suffer. This is a grave constitutional impropriety. A constitutionally mandated and quasi-judicial process such as the SR cannot be converted into a partisan or communal exercise at the behest of the Chief Minister. Such statements amount to executive interference, undermine institutional neutrality, and violate the principle of free and fair democratic processes, which form part of the basic structure of the Constitution. But, till now, the Election Commission authorities have not taken cognizance of such illegal interference in the SR exercise by the Assam Chief Minister and BJP workers.

Collectively, these utterances have a chilling effect on the right to life with dignity under Article 21, violate equality before law under Article 14, and erode fraternity, a core constitutional value expressly enshrined in the Preamble. They also strike directly at secularism, which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

Violation of Constitutional Oath

Under Article 164(3) of the Constitution, the Chief Minister swears an oath to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and to discharge duties without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. Publicly singling out a religious community for suffering, economic deprivation, heightened scrutiny, and exclusion is fundamentally incompatible with this oath. Such conduct represents not merely political impropriety but a constitutional breach by a constitutional functionary.

Supreme Court Directions on Hate Speech

The brazen hate speech of the Assam Chief Minister is prejudicial to national integration and directly promotes enmity between different groups on grounds of religion. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, has categorically directed that where instances of hate speech come to the notice of authorities, the police are duty-bound to register FIRs suo moto, irrespective of the identity or position of the speaker, and that failure to do so would invite contempt of wit Thace dirartinne are hindinn under Artide 141. Where the alleged violator is the

identity or position of the speaker, and that failure to do so would invite contempt of court. These directions are binding under Artide 141. Where the alleged violator is the Chief Minister himself, the ordinary executive machinery becomes structurally compromised, making judicial Intervention indispensable.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India reiterated that any attempt to spread hate speech must be dealt with iron hand. The Supreme Court observed that, “Hate speech cannot be tolerated as it leads to loss of dignity and self-worth of the targeted group members, contributes to disharmony amongst groups, and erodes tolerance and open-mindedness, which is a must for a multi-cultural society committed to the idea of equality. Any attempt to cause alienation or humiliation of the targeted group is a criminal offence and must be dealt with accordingly.”

Secularism as Basic Structure

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution, notably in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, and Aruna Roy v. Union of India. State power cannot be exercised to privilege or prejudice citizens on the basis of religion, nor can governance be infused with communal considerations. The statements and directions referred to above are plainly inconsistent with these binding constitutional principles.

In these extraordinary circumstances, we respectfully submit that this is a fit case for this Hon’ble Court to exercise its suo moto jurisdiction to:

1. Direct competent authorities to register a case against hate speech, executive interference, and violations of fundamental rights;
2. Protect the dignity, equality, and security of the affected community;
3. Reaffirm that constitutional functionaries are bound by their oath and constitutional discipline; and
4. Uphold public confidence in secular constitutional governance and the rule of law.

The intervention of this Hon’ble Court is crucial not only for the protection of a vulnerable community but also for preserving the constitutional equilibrium between executive power and fundamental rights. Silence or inaction in the face of such open constitutional transgressions risks normalising them and eroding the moral authority of the Constitution itself.

We submit this representation with utmost respect and hope that this Hon’ble Court will consider taking appropriate action in accordance with law.

Yours faithfully,

1. Dr. Hiren Gohain, Scholar and public intellectual
2. Harekrishna Deka, former DGP, Assam and author
3. Thomas Menamparampil, former Archbishop Guwahati
4. Ajit Kumar Bhuyan, Member of Rajya Sabha
5. Dr. Dulal Chandra Goswami, Environmental Scientist
6. D. Salka, retd. IAS
7. Paresh Malakar, Editor-in-Chief, Northeast Now Duball hoswe upall
8. Deepak Goswami, former Deputy Director General, NIC
9. Lakhi Nath Tamuli, retd. IAS
10. Jayanta Borgohain, retd. Deputy General Manager, IOCL
11. Dr. Indrani Dutta, former Director, Omiyo Kumar Das Institute of Social Change and Development
12. Robin Dutta, former Director, Forensic Science Laboratory, Assam
13. Rashmi Goswami, Social Activist
14. Najibuddin Ahmed, retd. Adl. Chief Engineer, PHED.
15. Taufiqur Rahman Borborah

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On January 26, 2026, Deepak Kumar stepped in when a group of men, allegedly affiliated with the Bajrang Dal and the Vishva Hindu Parishad, confronted 70-year-old Muslim shopkeeper Vakeel Ahmed over the use of the word “Baba” in the name of his decades-old shop. Within days, the episode spiralled far beyond the narrow dispute at its origin — triggering multiple FIRs, large-scale mobilisation by right-wing groups, a blockade of a national highway, and the registration of criminal cases not only against alleged intimidators and protestors, but also against those who intervened to defend the elderly shopkeeper.

Extensively reported by national media, the Kotdwar incident has now emerged as a test case for how the state polices communal vigilantism, protects freedom of expression and conscience, and balances claims of law and order against the constitutional obligation to safeguard equality before the law. As investigations continue and police deployment remains heightened, the episode raises an unsettling question: when ordinary citizens resist religious intimidation, does the legal system shield them — or subject them to prosecution.

The spark: January 26 and the dispute over “Baba”

According to The Indian Express, 46-year-old Deepak Kumar, who runs a gym in Kotdwar, was present at a friend’s shop on January 26 when he overheard a group of men confronting 70-year-old Vakeel Ahmed (also reported as Ahmed Wakil), a Muslim shopkeeper whose store — Baba School Dress — has existed on Patel Marg for nearly 30 years.

The men, allegedly identifying themselves as members of the Bajrang Dal and the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), reportedly objected to Ahmed’s use of the word “Baba” in his shop’s name. They allegedly demanded that the name be changed, claiming the term was exclusive to Hindu religious figures.

When Kumar intervened and asked why an elderly man was being threatened, he was reportedly told not to interfere.

The viral moment: “My name is Mohammad Deepak”

A video of the confrontation — later widely circulated across social media platforms — shows Kumar directly questioning the mob’s logic. He is heard asking why other shops are allowed to use the word “Baba” but Ahmed’s shop is not, and whether a three-decade-old establishment should now be forced to change its identity.

When members of the group ask Kumar his name, he responds: “My name is Mohammad Deepak.”

Speaking later to The Indian Express, Kumar clarified that the statement was deliberate and symbolic. “I intended to convey that I was an Indian and that everyone is equal before the law,” he said.

The phrase quickly went viral, earning praise across social media — but also, according to Kumar, triggering threats against him and his family.

“My Name is Mohammed Deepak”- How this Hindu man stood between a Bajrang Dal-linked mob and ‘Baba’ an elderly Muslim Shopkeeper in Kotdwar, Uttarakhand. The Mob was demanding the shopkeeper change his shop name. Full report @themojostory pic.twitter.com/uXLTh4TJEF

— barkha dutt (@BDUTT) January 31, 2026

The shopkeeper’s complaint and the first FIR

Following the January 26 incident, Vakeel Ahmed filed a police complaint, stating that three to four men claiming to be Bajrang Dal members had entered his shop, threatened him, and warned of “serious consequences” if he did not change the shop’s name.

Based on this complaint, police registered an FIR at Kotdwar police station under multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), including:

• Section 115(2) – voluntarily causing hurt
• Section 333 – house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint
• Section 351(2) – criminal intimidation
• Section 352 – intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of public peace

The FIR names two individuals and includes unnamed persons, as per The Hindu.

Mobilisation and backlash: Protests against Deepak Kumar

While the initial confrontation ended on January 26, the situation escalated sharply days later.

On January 31, intelligence inputs indicated that people were assembling to confront Kumar at his gym and near Ahmed’s shop. According to a complaint later filed by Sub-Inspector Vinod Kumar, around 30–40 people, arriving in 12–15 vehicles, gathered in Kotdwar.

Many were reportedly from Dehradun and Haridwar and identified themselves as members of the Bajrang Dal, according to Hindustan Times.

Highway blockade, sloganeering, and police confrontation

As per the FIR registered on the sub-inspector’s complaint, the group:

• Raised slogans near Kumar’s gym
• Obstructed police personnel deployed at a barrier
• Removed police barricades
• Parked vehicles across the road, creating a traffic jam
• Blocked the National Highway for nearly an hour, affecting civilian traffic and ambulances
• Marched toward Kotdwar market and Baba School Dress, raising religious slogans and using abusive language

Deepak stood up against the Bajrang Dal activists in Uttarakhand who were harassing a muslim shopkeeper-

His house is now being attacked by Bajrang Dal members.

This is total GundaGardi.

Police must protect him.pic.twitter.com/tRZyaEy7Qz

— Arpit Sharma (@iArpitSpeaks) January 31, 2026

After being dispersed once, the group regrouped near Malviya Udyan, in front of the Municipal Council on the National Highway, where they again sat on the road and blocked traffic. The FIR records that the actions created “fear and panic” among passers-by and were aimed at disturbing communal harmony. Based on these events, according to IE, police registered an FIR against unknown persons under sections relating to:

• Unlawful assembly
• Obstruction of public servants
• Breach of peace
• Promoting enmity between groups

A parallel FIR — this time against the interveners

In a development that drew widespread criticism, Uttarakhand Police also registered an FIR against Deepak Kumar and Vijay Rawat, another local resident who had supported Ahmed on January 26.

According to The Hindu, this FIR was filed following complaints by Gaurav Kashyap, reportedly a VHP member, and Kamal Pal, identified as a Bajrang Dal member.

The complainants alleged that Kumar and Rawat:

• Assaulted them
• Snatched money, watches, and mobile phones
• Hurled caste-based slurs
• Acted as part of a violent mob

The police booked Kumar and Rawat on charges including criminal intimidation, voluntarily causing hurt, rioting, and breach of peace.

Superintendent of Police Sarvesh Panwar told The Hindu that the complainants claimed to have been conducting a “door-to-door outreach initiative” at the time of the incident.

Deepak Kumar’s response: “Why am I booked, not the harassers?”

Kumar has denied the allegations and questioned the police’s approach. Speaking to the media, he said that his life and his family’s safety were under threat and asked why action had been taken against him while those accused of harassing a 70-year-old shopkeeper remained at large.

In a subsequent Instagram video, Kumar said: “I am not Hindu, not Muslim, not Sikh, not Christian. First and foremost, I am a human being… No one should be targeted for their religion.”

He added that while hatred spreads easily, standing up for love and humanity requires courage.

Deepak Kumar, the man who confronted right wing groups harassing a Muslim shopkeeper, is getting death threats. The local administration in Kotdwar town of Uttarakhand is hands in glove with the mob, says Deepak https://t.co/bch32S1JBP pic.twitter.com/6xYbL7yKHh

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) February 1, 2026

Police position: “Law and order first”

Addressing the controversy, SSP Sarvesh Panwar stated that all FIRs were registered to prevent escalation and maintain law and order. He confirmed that police personnel were present during the protests and had directly witnessed the blockade and sloganeering.

Police said:

• Video footage is being examined to identify participants
• Statements of all involved parties are being recorded
• Additional forces have been deployed in Kotdwar following intelligence inputs about possible fresh mobilisation

A senior officer quoted by The Hindu said investigations would proceed strictly on legal grounds and that “no one found guilty will be spared.”

Political and civil society reaction

The FIR against Kumar and Rawat triggered sharp criticism from civil rights activists, lawyers, and social media users, many of whom argued that the state appeared to be penalising those who intervened against intimidation rather than those who initiated it.

Congress leader and Leader of the Opposition Rahul Gandhi publicly backed Kumar, calling him a “living symbol of love in the marketplace of hate.” In a post on X, Gandhi accused the Sangh Parivar of deliberately fostering division and alleged that the Uttarakhand government was siding with “anti-social forces.”

“We need more Deepaks — those who do not bow, who do not fear, and who stand firmly with the Constitution,” Gandhi wrote.

उत्तराखंड के दीपक भारत के हीरो हैं।

दीपक संविधान और इंसानियत के लिए लड़ रहे हैं – उस संविधान के लिए जिसे BJP और संघ परिवार रोज़ रौंदने की साज़िश कर रहे हैं।

वे नफ़रत के बाज़ार में मोहब्बत की दुकान का जीवित प्रतीक हैं और यही बात सत्ता को सबसे ज़्यादा चुभती है।

संघ परिवार… pic.twitter.com/c1D4VHV5XO

— Rahul Gandhi (@RahulGandhi) February 1, 2026

Senior Congress leader Suryakant Dhasmana said that the Kotdwar incident, along with other recent communal and targeted attacks in Uttarakhand, had seriously damaged the state’s social fabric.

An unresolved moment

As of now, three separate FIRs remain under investigation:

1. The shopkeeper’s complaint against alleged Bajrang Dal members
2. The police FIR against unidentified protestors for highway blockade and disorder
3. The FIR against Deepak Kumar and Vijay Rawat based on right-wing complaints

Police deployment remains heightened in Kotdwar, and authorities have appealed for calm while warning against the spread of unverified information online. What began as a neighbourhood dispute over a shop name has now become a test case for how the state responds when ordinary citizens intervene against communal intimidation — and whether standing up for constitutional equality comes at a legal cost.

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The post How defending a 70-year-old Muslim shopkeeper triggered FIRs, highway blockades, and a law-and-order crisis in Uttarakhand appeared first on SabrangIndia.