In this written reply to the state Assembly, the Chief Minister also detailed that the highest number of cases of communal riots, 24, were reported in Balasore district, followed by 16 cases in Khurda district, which includes the state capital Bhubaneswar.

Absent in the Chief Minister’s reply, was any mention or reference to the communal clash that occurred in Cuttack during Durga Puja immersion and thereafter. In October 2025, in an incident that had few precedents in the city, Cuttack saw a curfew for around three days following communal violence that started with a clash during Durga Puja immersion. Days later, members of the VHP clashed with police and indulged in vandalism and arson.

The discussions saw stormy repartees in the State Assembly as Opposition parties targeted the government, alleging a sharp increase in cases of hate crimes and communal clashes. The Chief Minister defended his administration saying that steps are being taken to coordinate with different communities through peace committees under various police stations and through the local administration.

In the past 20 months, half a dozen towns in Odisha have seen imposition of curfew and Internet suspension over communal incidents, including the lynching of Bengali-speaking Muslims. In most cases, the accused have been members of right-wing outfits. Officials conceded that some cases may have gone unreported, especially when victims are daily wagers hesitant to approach police.

The Opposition has criticised the government over the alleged spread of “communal tension” in the state, where the BJP formed its first solo government in June 2024.

The National Crime Records Bureau puts the number of communal or religion-based incidents in Odisha at 10 in 2021, 44 in 2023 (pre-election year), and 15 in 2025. Data shared by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs in Parliament said that Odisha saw nine communal incidents in 2018 and zero in 2019.

Citizens for Justice and Peace has consistently reported on this spiral in targeted violence in the state over the past 18 months. This report detailed the humiliation and attack on a pastor in Dhenkaal district in early January 2026. The irregular detentions of migrant workers, Bengali, in the state were also questioned by the Court. Worse, was the systemic and consistent attacks on churches and vendors (daily wage earners) selling Christmas goods across Odisha, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh in late December 2025.

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The post Odisha: 18 months, 54 incidents of communal hate crimes, 7 mob lynchings appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The media reported that Indian captain Surya Kumar Yadav, head coach Gautam Gambhir, and ICC Chairman Jay Shah visited a Hanuman temple in Ahmedabad soon after the victory celebrations. News agency ANI posted a short video on Twitter in which the skipper is seen entering the temple while holding the trophy.

Surya, along with Gambhir and Shah, went to the temple and offered prayers. The foreheads of Surya and Shah were marked with a tika (a vermilion mark), which Hindu devotees usually apply on their foreheads while visiting a temple. They also received prasad (blessed food) after offering their prayers.

Do Hindus not have the right to visit a temple? If they do, then why am I raising an issue about it? Let me clarify that I am not asking Hindus, Muslims, or people of any faith to give up their religious beliefs. Nor am I suggesting that one should not visit temples or mosques, or refrain from performing religious rituals. In fact, I have often accompanied my family members to temples and even purchased flowers and prasad for them. Just as I have respected their faith, they have never imposed their particular ways of performing rituals upon me. Should not an individual be left alone to reflect on questions of faith?

As a student of political science, I am aware that religious freedom lies at the core of the Indian Constitution. Citizens are free to profess any religion of their choice. The state has no business interfering in the personal beliefs of an individual. The freedom to practise a religion of one’s choice, to give it up and embrace another faith, or not to practise any religion at all, is guaranteed under the Fundamental Rights.

Going by these constitutional provisions, one may argue that Surya, Shah and Gambhir went to the temple as part of their personal faith. Therefore, I may be accused of finding fault with them and, by doing so, revealing my “Hindu-phobic” mind-set.

In my defence, I would first state that criticising the mixing of religion and politics is not an act of being a “Hindu-phobic”. My argument here is not to oppose any religion—be it Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc.—but to highlight the threat that religious nationalism and majoritarianism pose to a democratic polity.

Majoritarian politics often hides itself under the garb of nationalism, religiosity, and popular culture. The shrewdness of right-wing leaders lies in their ability to promote religious nationalism through sports, festivals, songs, films, and public celebrations. None other than Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the messiah of the downtrodden and the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution of India, cautioned the people against the danger of religious nationalism when he said: “If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, no doubt, be the greatest calamity for this country.”

When cricket, the most popular sport among more than a billion Indians, is used as a tool to promote religious nationalism, one has to take it very seriously. If Surya, Gambhir, and Shah had visited the Hanuman Temple as devotees of Hanuman, they would have gone there simply as devotees and not as celebrities. There would have been no triumphal images been circulated. The difference between ordinary devotees visiting a religious place and celebrities rushing to a temple is significant. Devotees keep their faith at a personal level. Celebrities, however, often perform such acts in the presence of cameras and PR teams, turning a private expression of faith into a public spectacle.

While devotees perform religious rituals as part of their faith and sincerely believe in what they do, celebrities often visit religious places to serve their political interests. They know very well that their interests are best served if they publicly display their acts of performing pooja. Politicians, a smart group among celebrities, often begin their electoral campaigns by visiting temples. They also ensure that their visits to temples are circulated to every household through news stories, photographs, videos, and other media.

In a representative democracy, where governments are often formed through majority votes, there is a strong tendency among politicians to equate the majority religion with the “national” one and even with a “way of life”. In contrast, even a minor display of the religious or cultural symbols of minority communities is often demonised as the rise of “fundamentalism”. Even those who work for the human rights of minorities and show solidarity with their culture—often suppressed under the weight of majoritarianism—are branded as “anti-Hindu.

That is why, there is a strong case to argue that the temple visit of Indian captain, coach and ICC chairman is not simply a matter of personal faith. In fact, it is a case of using popular sport indirectly to reinforce the politics of religious majoritarianism. Since cricketers are one of the biggest icons for the youth of the country, their visit to temple and the viral video afterwards seemed to be carefully planned to equate the national cricket team of secular and democratic republic with “Hindu” India.

The temple visit incident should also not be seen as an isolated event. Over the years, the process of mixing religion and cricket has intensified. Some cricket fans who go to the stadium to cheer for Team India often chant aggressive nationalist slogans and display overt religious symbols. Some of them even pass inappropriate comments on the supporters of the opposing team and sometimes get into fights with them.

Even TV commentators, particularly those in the vernacular broadcasts, frequently use highly jingoistic and sometimes misogynistic idioms. It is beyond comprehension why English commentary tends to remain relatively measured, while vernacular commentaries often turn into acts of shouting and whipping up passion. Worse still, social media influencers, as well as some former cricketers-turned-commentators, do not miss an opportunity to indulge in Pakistan-bashing. While their criticism may be directed at “the poor performance” of Pakistani cricket, their choice of words and tone often ends up feeding communal polarisation.

A quick look at the official jersey of the Indian cricket team reveals the prominent use of the colour, saffron. Is this selection arbitrary, or is it part of a careful design? As a cricket fan, I remember the older Indian jerseys where the tricolour was prominently represented on the T-shirt. Should this shift in the choice of colour be seen as merely random, or does it reflect a deliberate change—and perhaps even a shift in the political equation?

These trends are dangerous at least for two reasons.

First, the instrumental use of cricket to promote religious nationalism has the potential to weaken national unity. We should never forget that the Indian team as well as Indian supporters do not belong to one religion. Those who believe that the temple visit by the Indian captain, coach, and ICC chairman is a normal act should also reflect on how such gestures appear to millions of citizens who belong to different faiths.

Those who think that Surya’s visit to the temple is a “normal” matter should also ask themselves whether they would consider it equally normal if, instead of Surya, a Muslim cricketer had been the captain of India and, after winning the match, had gone straight to a mosque with the trophy and the video of it had gone viral.

Pakistani cricketers are often seen invoking religious expressions while speaking to commentators before or after a match. However, the example of Pakistan may not be appropriate for India, as our Constitution envisions a secular polity. In a multicultural society like India, the state itself has no religion, nor should public institutions be used to promote any particular faith.

Indian cricket is watched by millions of people, and the cricket board should ensure that it maintains the image of a secular institution and remains free from political pressure. As the Chairman of the ICC, Jay Shah carries the hopes of cricket fans around the world. They expect him to work for the promotion of cricket globally and to allow the BCCI to independently carry out the responsibility of managing Indian cricket.

(The author is has recently published book, Muslim Personal Law: Definitions, Sources and Contestations (Manohar, 2026). Email: debatingissues@gmail.com)

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Panikkar, affectionately called KN by his colleagues, was one among a select group of historians such as Bipan Chandra, Sabyasachi Bhattacharya and S Gopal who created a strong department of modern Indian history at JNU’s Centre for Historical Studies. Among other achievements, his course on the history of ideas in India in the 19th century was pioneering.

The Indian History Congress, has, in a statement expressed its deep sorrow and loss upon the demise of K.N. Panikkar, an esteemed historian and public intellectual of India, whose profound impact on historical scholarship and advocacy for secularism has left a lasting legacy. The Indian History Congress has expressed its heartfelt condolences to his family, colleagues, students, and admirers. His scholarship and example are poised to continue inspiring future generations of historians.

As a member of a remarkable generation of historians, Professor Panikkar significantly influenced the study of modern Indian history in the post-independence era. Through meticulous research, pedagogical endeavours, and consistent public discourse, he exemplified the manner in which historical inquiry could elucidate the intricate dynamics of colonialism, culture, and ideology that have shaped Indian society. His scholarly work was distinguished by rigorous archival investigation complemented by a nuanced understanding of the intellectual and cultural facets of historical transformation.

KN was one among the legendary historians who was accessible to students, activists and academia alike, firm in the belief that history and its methods—historiography—must and should be understood by the citizenry. At a time in the early 1990s when history was the contested site for the extreme, far right—Hindu ‘nationalist’—take-over of the public discourse KN’s contributions through lectures and workshops went a long way in ensuring a more nuanced and mature understanding of both past and present.

His work, including books like Against Lord and State: Religion and Peasant Uprisings in Malabar; Culture and Consciousness in Modern India; Culture, Ideology and Hegemony – Intellectuals and Social Consciousness in Colonial India, and Before the Night Falls were the subject matter of wide study and debate. He was also appointed by the government of Kerala as chairman of an Expert Committee that looked into the complaints raised from various quarters concerning new textbooks introduced to state-supported schools. The committee submitted its report in October 2008.

Trained in Kerala and subsequently affiliated with Jawaharlal Nehru University, Professor Panikkar played a pivotal role in fostering a thriving academic community. His seminal writings on colonialism, social movements, and the cultural politics of nationalism introduced novel perspectives on the interplay between power, ideology, and popular consciousness. Notably, his influential studies on peasant resistance in Malabar and the cultural underpinnings of colonial dominance remain crucial for scholars of modern India.

However, far beyond his academic contributions, Professor Panikkar was esteemed as a public intellectual known for his articulate and courageous stance on issues concerning historical interpretation and the role of historians. Amidst the increasing politicisation of historical narratives, he steadfastly championed the autonomy of historical scholarship and the imperative of evidence-based historiography, thereby contributing significantly to the preservation of India’s plural and secular historical narrative.

Professor Panikkar also made substantial contributions to Indian academia through various institutional roles, including his tenure as Vice-Chancellor of Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, where he endeavoured to enhance research and teaching in the humanities. His dedication to intellectual discourse, academic freedom, and the societal relevance of scholarship garnered him widespread admiration.

The demise of Professor Panikkar is a profound loss to the community of historians, who benefited from his intellectual rigor and moral integrity during a formative period in the discipline’s development. His work and legacy continue to inspire historians committed to rigorous inquiry, intellectual openness, and the defense of secular historiography.

For us at Sabrang and especially KHOJ—Education for a Plural India¸ K.N. Panikkar was among those rare breed of historians who were always available for workshops for school teachers and activists. In 1997, at a work organised in Mumbai’s National College, Bandra, four historians participated and among them, on Modern India, was KN Panikkar. The others included Romila Thapar on early India, Keshavan Velluthat on the Early Medieval period and Anirudha Ray on the Medieval Period.

At this workshop, the theme of KN Panikkar’s lecture was “Grown of Hindu and Muslim Communalisms was a parallel process.” Excerpts from the texts of all the lectures may be read here.

Other in-depth writing on the communalisation of education during the NDA government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1999-2004) may be read here, here and here. All these explorations were as a result of the intense research carried on by the KHOJ team under its director, Teesta Setalvad.

We reproduce, in tribute, the text of KN Panikkar’s lecture below as a tribute:

Khoj (Archived from Communalism Combat, March 1997 – Cover Story)-Growth of Hindu and Muslim communalisms was a parallel process

— Prof K. N. Panikkar, Jawahar Lal Nehru University, New Delhi

In 1997, Khoj education for a plural India programme held a workshop that enabled interaction
between in India’s leading historians and school teachers in Mumbai. This article is the edited transcript of the lecture by professor K. N Panikkar.

Modern India

For the British, as rulers trying to understand and control Indian society, it was important to develop an understanding of what Indian society is. It was through this process that the category of a community of Hindus and a community of Muslims began to be widely and increasingly used.

This use of community terminology became part of our scholastics and analysis. What we need to ask ourselves is: does this category as a category of analysis give us the whole picture?

Conversion, both as a continuing and a historical phenomenon is an important facet that is constantly brought to bear on communal discourse. The most important aspect to remember when we look at the issue of conversion historically is that the largest concentrations of Muslim population are not in states where there was a Muslim ruler or dynasty; quite the contrary. What does this tell us?

For example, in the Malabar Coast in Kerala, large scale conversions to Islam did not take place during the invasion by Tipu Sultan. The largest conversions to Islam on the Malabar Coast were during the period 1843-1890 and were directly linked to the fact that in 1843 slavery was abolished in this region. As a result, large numbers of formerly oppressed castes bonded in slavery by upper caste Hindus moved over to Islam which they perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a religion of equality and justice.

Religious stigmatisation also, unfortunately affects our reading and interpretation of the reigns of specific historical rulers like say Tipu Sultan or Shivaji. Do we know, that it was during the reign of Tipu Sultan that a Maratha Sardar, a good believing Hindu, invaded Mysore several times and during one such attack plundered and destroyed the Sringeri Math.

Who was responsible for the reconstruction of the math and the pooja that was performed before the reconstruction? Tipu Sultan. We need to ask ourselves what a “good, secular Hindu Sardar” was doing destroying the Math and how come a “fanatical Muslim ruler” restored it?

During the invasion of the same Tipu Sultan of Kerala, there were hundreds killed, not because they were Hindus but because the people of Kerala resisted his invasion.

There are hundreds of such examples in history. We need to search them out and examine in the right perspective what were the motives of the rulers of those times for such actions. What were the politics and the historical processes behind the destruction and plunder of temples, the invasion of new territories and kingdoms and the conversion to a different faith?

Another aspect critical to the study of Modern Indian History is the counter positions of communalisms, Hindu Communalism and Muslim communalism that have so dramatically affected the politics of the subcontinent. We must be very conscious when we read and interpret this period to understand that the development of both communalisms was a parallel process that is not rooted in the second or third decades of the 20th century (the birth of the Muslim League or the Hindu Mahasabha) but must be traced back to the middle of the 19th century.

This critical juncture in the communalisation process (mid-19th century) has to be more closely examined by us: it will reveal how these processes occurred in parallel, how the Arya Samaj that began as a reform movement turned communal and similarly the Aligarh movement that began as a movement for internal reform also became communal.

Another critical aspect to a non-communal approach to the study of modern Indian history is rooted in understanding the development of the concept of Indian nationalism that was always characterised by its anti-colonial thrust.

We have through the early part of this century distinct trends visible that go beyond the anti-colonial, negative thrust, and moving towards a positive understanding of Indian nationalism. One is Anantakumar Swamy’s ‘Essays on Nationalist Idealism’ that explores the real essence of a nation as being not politics but culture. The other is Gandhi’s ‘Hind Swaraj’ which explains the essence of nationalism as civilizational. Both these thinkers did not link the concept of nationalism with religion.

Yet another contribution in this area was by Radhakumar Mukherjee who in his works, ‘Fundamental Unity of India’ and ‘Culture and Nationalism’ tried to conceptually trace the relationship of nationalism to the ancient period of history. He sought to link culture with religion.

In 1924, Veer Savarkar’s ‘Hindutva’ forcefully pushed this link, between culture and religion. The compositeness and plurality of Indian tradition was overlooked completely when Savarkar explained how the Indian nation evolved. In his chapter ‘The Six Glorious Epochs of India’ where his key questions were: How did India become a nation? How did Hindus become a nation? The book, forcefully written, is based on an erroneous interpretation of facts.

But the important thing for us to understand is why Savarkar did this given his own history of being a revolutionary. In his earlier work written some years earlier, ‘National War of Independence’ the same Savarkar describes the 1857 War of Indian Independence as the combined efforts of Hindus and Muslims and the rule of Bahadur Shah Zafar in New Delhi as its culmination as “five glorious days of Indian history.”

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The post A history that teaches, a historian that shared, in Memoriam: Professor K.N. Panikkar appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Human rights—especially the liberation of women—have long been invoked as moral justification for military interventions aimed at regime change in countries deemed hostile to the West’s vision of global order. As we witness the slow demise of the liberal international global order, with the retreat of USA from multilateral internationalism and the implementation of Trump’s grand plan of a US-led imperial order where both war and peace will be orchestrated by the same actors (especially with Trump’s favourite genocide-loving buddy state, Israel), one realises some vestiges of the moral rhetoric of the dying order persist. While Trump himself appeared unsure which rationale to foreground for the unlawful war on Iran, he nevertheless echoed his predecessors—who cloaked interventions in the faux benevolence of democracy—by announcing that for Iranians, “the hour of their freedom is near”. His friend, Bibi Netanyahu, in Israel’s 2025 attack on Iran, had more clearly invoked the rights of Iranian women to justify the unjustifiable. In an interview with Iran International, he had said, “They have impoverished you, they have given you misery. They have given you death, They shoot down your women, leaving this brave, unbelievable woman, Mahsa Amini, to bleed on the sidewalk for not covering her hair”. In the brutal genocide committed by Israel on Gaza, we had seen how ‘pinkwashing’ was deployed as a justification to attack the Palestinians, which led queer Palestinians to assert that ‘there is no pride in occupation’.

The ‘Us vs Them’ rhetoric, which Netanyahu had used against Palestine, terming them as modern-day Amalek, the nation which is depicted in Torah as having gone to war against the Israelites, is now extended to describe Iran. However, the ‘Us Vs them’ rhetoric was also deployed in his address to the protesting Iranians as a decoy to incite support for regime change through foreign invasion. Women’s rights have now reemerged in discussions and debates on the legitimacy of the war. There is widespread reporting in American media on the celebrations by Iranian women on Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death. However, Iranian activists are also putting forward nuanced arguments that refuse to couple their struggle for rights in Iran with the US-Israel-led invasion. Recently, the video of Spanish politician Manuela Bergerot, vehemently arguing against the depiction of war on Iran as being a magnificent victory for feminism, has been shared widely by feminists and others alike. She asserts that her position against the war is being put forward as a feminist. She joins a long line of feminists who have opposed the “imperialist feminist” position—the claim that certain wars are morally justified because they supposedly rescue women in the “rest” of the world from oppressive states. The imperialist feminist position, which coopts the conceptual language of feminism to justify the current war on Iran as saving the Iranian women from a repressive government, is by no means a new strategy. It was used with disastrous results in Iraq and Afghanistan, wars which had grossly misused the rhetoric of human rights, especially women’s rights and democracy promotion, to justify invasions. This rhetoric of rescuing women is a close corollary of the practice of terming countries as ‘failed’ states and ‘rogue’ states, as well as the earlier colonial use of the ‘Women’s Question’ to justify colonialism, which Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak had described as “white men saving brown women from brown men.”

It is useful to remember the ‘War Against Terrorism’ launched against Afghanistan with huge domestic support in the US, support which was garnered by the use of the rhetoric of women’s rights and the support of women’s organisations in the US. In a widely cited Radio address, Laura Bush had announced that “The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women”. Such ‘Rescue’ narratives tend to depict women in non-Western societies as passive, non-agential beings who need to be saved. Anthropologist and feminist scholar Lila Abu Lughod wrote, questioning this logic in her influential article ‘Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?’, which went on to become a prescribed text in most courses on feminism and gender studies. She urges us in her work to move beyond the rhetoric of saving and instead pay attention to and appreciate the differences among women in the world, including their different conceptions of freedom, choice, and justice. To assess how deceptive the rhetoric of women’s rights was in justifying the war in Afghanistan, one just has to look at the contemporary condition of Afghan women’s rights, most recently further eroded by the new Criminal Procedural Regulation. The war fought, citing the presence of active Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq (active only in the imagination of the USA), was no different. Bush had back then exhorted the Iraqi women to be the midwives of a new liberated Iraq. After more than twenty years of the invasion, as Nadje Al- Ali, Iraqi feminist and scholar, describes, women have come out as the biggest losers of the invasion. While before the invasion, Iraqi women had enjoyed the highest levels of education, labour force participation, and a certain degree of political involvement, women in post-invasion Iraq have seen a steady erosion of their rights along with a rise in conservatism.

The selective nature of caring for women’s rights in countries where the USA wants regime change is no coincidence. Also, the saving women rhetoric is a strategic diversion from not dealing with women’s rights within the USA. Like Bush who talked about the rights of women in Iraq and Afghanistan, but cut off funding to international family planning organisations that offered abortion and counselling services, Trump who talks about caring for Iranians, announcing to Iranians in his social account about ‘Making Iran Great Again’ has systematically cut down the rights of many American citizens under the guise of ‘Making America Great Again’. In In the Name of Women’s Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism, Sara Farris shows how women’s rights have been co-opted by anti-Islam, anti-migration, and xenophobic campaigns to justify exclusionary policies—diverting attention from the real violence faced by women and the erosion of their autonomy. The withheld Epstein files that incriminate Trump have been released and are beyond horrific in what it reveals, while ICE has detained immigrant women in detention in deplorable conditions. In contrast, feminists who have spoken against the stereotyping of non-Western women have not been silent on the issues of women or held back in their criticism of repressive regimes they live in, but as Abu-Lughod has written, “is mindful of complex entanglements in which we are all implicated, in sometimes surprising alignments.” Iranian activists who were on protests deserved support and engagement from around the world, including from the USA, but they definitely didn’t need a US-Israel invasion that ended up bombing an elementary school for girls. Egyptian feminist Nawal el Saadawi had famously suggested, when asked what the people in the US can do to support the revolution in Egypt, “Make your own revolution and change your government for us”. It is perhaps time feminists and citizens in the United States heed her advice.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

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An ASI survey in November 2024 on court orders had triggered a violent clash between locals and police in which four people died of bullet wounds. The court had been hearing a plea by Hindus claiming that the mosque was built by demolishing a Shiva temple during the rule of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. There had been allegations that some of those accompanying the survey team were chanting “Jai Shri Ram”, nettling the area’s minority population.

Several people are still in jail in connection with the violence.

A commission appointed by the Sambhal district court had reportedly said in a report in 2024 that symbols associated with Hinduism had been found at Sambhal’s Shahi Jama Masjid, protected by the ASI since 1920.

Now, in an RTI application, Sambhal resident Satya Prakash Yadav had sought to know whether the Mughal-era mosque was built by demolishing any ruins or on vacant land, along with the name of the landowner at the time and the documents granting ownership rights.

The ASI, in its reply, stated that “no such information is available in this office”. On questions relating to the nature of constructions at the site at the time the mosque came under the ASI’s protection, any subsequent constructions, and past disputes associated with the shrine, the ASI said such information was not available in its records.

However, during the first appeal proceedings before the Central Information Commission, the ASI had said that although no new construction is permitted within a centrally protected monument, an “illegal” steel railing was being erected at the Jama Masjid site in 2018 and that the department had issued orders to stop the work.

The applicant had also asked about the period of construction of the mosque. The ASI replied that according to its records, “Jama Masjid Sambhal was constructed in the year 1526”, and referred to supporting material.

On whether the structure was known by any other name earlier, the department said the mosque has been protected by the ASI under the same name. In response to a query on the present nature of the structure, the ASI stated: “At present, it exists as a mosque.” It further said the Jama Masjid was taken under the protection of the ASI in 1920, citing a gazette notification.

During the hearing before the Central Information Commission, the appellant had argued that key information had been wrongly denied on the ground of non-availability. The ASI maintained that it had provided all information available on record and that it could not be compelled to create or collect information not maintained by it.

Upholding the ASI’s stand, the commission observed that the RTI Act obliges public authorities to disclose only existing records and does not require them to generate fresh information. It cited judicial precedents to underline that a public authority cannot be directed to furnish information not held by it.

Finding no grounds for further intervention, the commission dismissed the appeal, holding that the ASI’s replies — including its statement of having no records on whether the mosque was built over ruins or vacant land — were in accordance with the law.

Sabrangindia has consistently reported on the issue, and its reports may be read here, here and here.

According to Masjid Committee President Zafar Ali, the protest on November 24, 2024 was peaceful until CO Anuj Chaudhary responded to concerns with verbal abuse and an unprovoked lathi charge. The police, allegedly led by CO Anuj Chaudhary, responded with verbal abuse, a lathi charge, and then tear gas. As people began to flee, the police escalated, firing live ammunition. Tear gas followed, and then live rounds were fired. The crowd began to disperse, but police pursued them into lanes and homes. Eyewitnesses reported police using slurs, destroying property, and shooting indiscriminately.

Five Muslim men were killed, including a minor:

• Kamran (17), shot in the chest.
• Nasir, Abbas, Basim, and Nabeel—each with fatal injuries, many allegedly from police bullets.

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The post Sambhal, UP: ASI has no records to prove that Shahi Jama Masjid was built after demolishing earlier structure appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Police said Mohammed Arif, 25, and Syed Imran, 31, were allegedly attacked while they were out for a walk. Deputy police superintendent Madolappa said five suspects were arrested in connection with the assault. “The accused were reportedly under the influence of alcohol,” Madolappa said. Names of the accused have not been released by the authorities.

Unfortunately, the news reports are based only on police sources. HT reports that the police said the incident took communal colour as the Muslim community alleged it was a targeted attack. They cited the complaint filed in the case and said that six to seven assailants made death threats and attacked Arif and Imran with stones, causing head injuries.

Further, the newspaper also reported that the police stated that tensions escalated when protesters gathered outside the station. Some protesters allegedly attacked police personnel, including assistant sub-inspector Mukhtar Patel, and threw stones. “Another case has been registered against 49 Muslim community members for attempting to lay siege to the police station, assaulting Patel, other police staff, and throwing stones,” Madolappa said.

Though the situation was reportedly brought under control thereafter, the original assault on teachers who happened to be Muslim and the motive of the attackers remains a mystery, unreported.

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The post Bidar, Karnataka: Two school teachers assaulted in Karnataka’s Bidar, triggering communal tensions appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The vandalism and violence by members of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) against a proposed discussion on February 24, 2026, by “Spark”, an informal student reading group of Azim Premji University (APU), Bangalore, are symptomatic of the increasing repression in campuses across the country, where dissent is criminalised and free debate and discussion is shut down. The proposed discussion was on the anniversary of the mass rapes in Kunan Poshpora in 1991.

On February 24, around 25 members of the ABVP, the student wing of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) vandalised the “Kabira” space, a designated location for cultural activities in the Sarjapur campus of the university and the venue of a discussion on Kunan Poshpora by the Spark Reading Group. They tore down posters and assaulted a student and a member of the university’s security staff.

While police arrested 25 members of the ABVP on charges of assault, vandalism and trespass., they were granted bail the next day.

However, police also registered an FIR, based on a complaint by the APU Registrar Rishikesh BS, against office-bearers and members of the Spark Reading Circle. The complaint against the group’s Instagram handle on the event was registered under Sec 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023, on charges of deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, a cognisable and non-bailable charge with a penalty of up to three years imprisonment.

The FIR also cites charges under Sec 66 (e) (violation of privacy by intentionally capturing, publishing, or transmitting images of a person’s private areas without their consent) and 67 (publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form) of the Information Technology Act,2000.

The APU Registrar’s complaint states that no permission was sought or granted for the event and that the group had no official connection with the university. The complaint further blames the reading group for seeking to host the event and said that, by “issuing such invitations, hostility arose between two groups, resulting in activists forcefully entering our campus and creating a disturbance.”

In a statement, the Student Council of Azim Premji University expressed concern over the FIR filed by the university against members of the ‘Spark Reading Circle’, stating that the matter should have been addressed through internal disciplinary mechanisms rather than criminal proceedings.

Indeed, the excessively punitive reaction of the APU administration towards the student reading group for merely planning to hold a discussion on the Kunan Poshpora incident is highly disturbing. A purely administrative and logistical issue of permissions for an event on campus became the basis of a complaint to the police to seek criminal action against a reading group and its members. The complaint against the group’s account on a social media platform amounts to an open invitation to police the academic lives of students. In the guise of a criminal investigation, it allows for surveillance of electronic devices of students and seeks to police their space and time outside the classroom.

Why don’t they want people to remember Kunan Poshpora?

 The ABVP’s protest against the Spark Reading Group’s discussion over Kunan-Poshpora seeks to erase and invisibilise the crucial process of recollection and analysis of painful and sensitive incidents, thereby silencing a historical record.

February 24, 2026, marked the 35th anniversary of the mass rape and torture of women of the villages of Kunan and Poshpora in Jammu and Kashmir by the Indian Army. The allegations of rape and torture were denied by the army and the Indian government.

However, the testimonies of women of the two villages and the extensive records and interviews by researchers Essar Batool, Ifrah Butt, Munaza Rashid, Natasha Rather and Samreena Mushtaq, who documented the incident and its aftermath in their book “Do You Remember Kunan Poshpora?” continue to challenge official narratives even as they persist in the struggle to seek justice and accountability. The book was among the 25 academic books banned in Kashmir last year.

Systematic censorship of academia

The violence by the right wing ABVP, the student wing of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the ominously repressive measures taken by the APU administration result in the censorship and curbs on free discussion and debate on important issues. They are only the latest in the growing list of instances of censorship in academia.

Right-wing students are emboldened and weaponised by the ruling political dispensation. Regrettably, university administrations, including vice chancellors who are unabashed champions of right-wing ideologies, speedily crack down on students who dare to ask questions.

Last year, Free Speech Collective’s annual report “Free Speech in India 2025: Behold the Hidden Hand” documented at least 16 noteworthy instances of censorship in academia, including the criminalisation of student protests, the Delhi University Vice-Chancellor Yogesh Singh’s openly political exhortations to faculty and staff to push the ruling BJP’s agendas and the arrest of Prof Ali Khan Mahmudabad of Ashoka University over posts on Operation Sindoor even as the denial of permission for academic seminars on “sensitive subjects” became routine.

Now, barely two months into 2026, there are already more than six instances of censorship in academia in India.

At least 14 students of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) were arrested for protesting the casteist remarks of the university’s Vice Chancellor Shantisree Dhulipudi Pandit. Granted bail by a Delhi court on February 27, the students continued to remain in jail till late evening on Sunday (March 1) as police took their time to complete the verifications of their permanent addresses. It took the court to direct their immediate release stating that procedural formalities could not be the excuse for their continued detention after bail had already been granted.

Earlier, on February 17, 2026, the Proctor Office of Delhi University (DU) issued an order stating that “public meetings, processions, demonstrations, and protests of any kind are strictly prohibited within the university campus for a period of one month.”

On January 29, 2026, Sarover Zaidi, an associate professor at OP Jindal Global University in Sonepat, was suspended for one semester (February 1 to July 31) for allegedly comparing Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Adolf Hitler. BJP MP from Kurukshetra Naveen Jindal is the founding chancellor of the university.

The action arose after a hearing in the Haryana Human Rights Commission (HHRC) on a complaint by Vishav Bajaj, father of Vikhyaat Bajaj, a first-year undergraduate student of the Jindal School of Design & Architecture, that on November 7, 2025, during a lecture on the course “Politics of Representation” taught by Zaidi, repeated remarks were made in class that were “politically derogatory, inflammatory and deeply disturbing”.

Bajaj alleged that PM Modi was compared to Adolf Hitler, national security operations such as Operation Sindoor were described as “gimmicks” and “branding exercises,” civilian deaths were trivialised and official accounts of terrorism were questioned. Audio recordings made by Vikhyaat were also submitted to the HHRC.

The student had also complained against another assistant professor, Ekta Chauhan, alleging their statements against the RSS. But Chauhan refuted the allegations and described herself as a “devout and practising” Hindu. Her family was associated with RSS-linked social service traditions since 1972, she said in a written statement.

The trend of disinvitation of distinguished persons from campus events continued unabated. In Banaras Hindu University, a lecture by scholar Kedar Mishra, scheduled for January 20, 2026, was cancelled allegedly under government pressure In Mumbai, actor Naseeruddin Shah was disinvited from an academic literary event at Mumbai University on January 31, 2026.

In Mumbai, an SRFTI (Satyajit Ray Film & Television Institute) student film “Da’Lit Kids” was pulled out of the Animela Film Festival at Whistling Woods after it was reportedly denied permission for screening by the Ministry for Information and Broadcasting. In protest, film-makers of all the SRFTI films scheduled for screening at the festival pulled out but the festival went ahead.

The Animela Festival is an international Animation, VFX, Gaming, Comics & XR Festival run by a non-profit organisation – the Aniverse and Visual Arts Foundation (AVAF). While there is no clarity why government permission was sought for the films being screened, the festival website lists multiple sponsors, including the Maharashtra government, embassies of France and Australia and corporate support from sponsors like Adani.

All these instances of censorship further circumscribe the space for the free exchange of information and diverse viewpoints. APU prides itself on being “a space for social change” and a space for higher education that “can create critical and reflective practitioners with an understanding of the social impact of education, the law and development”. Instead of criminalising students, APU needs to ensure that its campuses remain safe spaces that nurture the spirit of enquiry. For a truly transformative educational institution, a climate of free discussion needs to prevail over censorship by vandals and vigilantes.

Courtesy: Free Speech Collective

The post The Throttling of Free Discussion in Academia: Strong-arm Tactics by ABVP and Cave in by Azim Premji University appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In his over, one-hour recitation cum talk Naseeruddin Shah introduced the audience to the charm and possibilities of Urdu and recited from many of the greats like Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Mirza Ghalib, Sahir Ludhianvi, Allama Iqbal and Imtiaz Ali Taj. Through narration, reflection and dramatic nuance Naseeruddin Shah revisited an era when literature shaped social thought and human values, celebrating poetry that spoke of love, injustice, hope and collective dreams

The Lectures That Needed to Happen series by Mumbai for Peace provides a platform to deserving lectures and events that are cancelled due to uncalled & non democratic interference by the State or non-state actors. “Mumbai for Peace” is a citizens’ platform formed by concerned Mumbaikars committed to safeguarding the city’s plural character and nurturing communal harmony.

Preet Nagar was a presentation that was scheduled in Mumbai University on February 1 but was unceremoniously cancelled at the last minute with no explanation. Earlier MFP had collaborated with other organisations to hold the Father Stan Swamy Memorial Lecture by Fr. Prem Xalxo that was similarly cancelled

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The post Censorship Broken: Naseeruddin Shah speaks on the Urdu language at Kalina, Mumbai & recites from its rich poetry appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Temple Pattas and the Politics of Sacred Property 

The decision to grant land titles to temples is being justified as a route to enable them to access government schemes. On the surface, this appears as a bureaucratic correction. But the social context matters. In Rajasthan, temple management and priesthood are overwhelmingly controlled by Brahmin and Bania networks. Regularising temple land thus strengthens institutions already embedded within caste hierarchies.

This is not merely about religion; it is about property, legitimacy, and state-backed sanctification. When the state confers pattas upon temples, it converts religious capital into legal capital. In effect, public land becomes anchored to institutions historically aligned with Brahmanical authority. The material beneficiaries are not abstract “devotees,” but specific caste-based managerial structures.

The larger concern is the asymmetry. If temples are to receive legal facilitation in the name of heritage and welfare access, where is the parallel policy for community institutions run by Dalits, Adivasis, or minority groups? Selective formalisation reproduces structural inequality while appearing neutral.

Meat Shops, NOCs and the Food Governance 

The mandate that meat shops cannot open without Panchayat NOC approval, especially near public places, carries heavy symbolic and economic implications. In Rajasthan, the meat trade is largely associated with Muslim, Dalit and Rajput communities. Introducing an additional layer of discretionary approval effectively subjects these livelihoods to local majoritarian pressures.

The language of “public sentiment” or “cultural sensitivity” often becomes a tool for social policing. Panchayats are not caste-neutral spaces; they reflect local hierarchies. Granting them veto power over meat shops risks institutionalising social prejudice under administrative cover.

Food regulation in India has increasingly mirrored ideological currents rather than public health concerns. When cow shelters receive hundreds of crores while meat sellers face regulatory tightening, the contrast is telling. One sector aligned with Brahmanical social ethos receives subsidy and legitimacy; another, tied to marginalised communities, faces scrutiny and conditionality.

Brahminism, State Patronage, and Sociopolitical Control 

These measures must be understood within the broader framework of Brahminism as a system of graded hierarchy sustained through cultural authority and economic leverage. Historically, Brahmanical power has not relied solely on theology but on proximity to the state and control over symbolic capital — education, ritual, law, and legitimacy. Historian Divya Cherian traces this food-policy in Rajasthan to the political rise of Brahmins, Banias, Mahajans and Jains as intermediaries between the local kings and the jagirdars. During the tenure of Maharaja Vijay Singh Rathore, a devoted Vaishnavite, policies promoting strict vegetarianism imposed legal sanctions on not just Muslims and Dalist but the Rajputs – causing unpopularity of the king among his own Rajput clansmen. His successor, Maharaja Man Singh Rathore, a Nath sampraday adherent, withdrew strict Vaishnavite vegetarianism but by then the state was heavily dependent bureaucratically on the ‘vegetarian’ mercantile- Brahmanical lobbies.

In the 21^st century, granting pattas to temples and privileging cow protection schemes extend this pattern into contemporary governance. They reinforce a moral economy in which Brahmanical religious institutions are treated as guardians of civilization, while occupations associated with lower castes are rendered morally negotiable.

Importantly, this is not confined to the BJP. While the BJP’s ideological articulation is explicit, earlier Congress governments in Rajasthan — especially those preceding Ashok Gehlot — often reproduced similar structural preferences. The rhetoric of socialism coexisted with conspicuous promotion of Brahmanical institutions and Bania-dominated capital networks. Socialist jargons were invoked vigorously only while fomenting caste conflicts between competitive agrarian castes like Rajputs and Jats, but economic policy frequently aligned with established mercantile and brahminical interests.

Thus, the current decisions are less an aberration and more a culmination — a clearer articulation of long-standing patterns.

Bania Capitalism and the Politics of Selective Regulation 

The political economy dimension cannot be ignored. Rajasthan’s commercial networks have historically been shaped by Bania capital, particularly in urban centres. Regulatory regimes tend to burden informal, small-scale, caste-bound occupations — such as local butchers or street vendors — while leaving entrenched commercial capital relatively unscathed.

When the state intensifies scrutiny over meat shops but not over large-scale corporate food supply chains, it signals whose economic activity is deemed culturally legitimate. This differential treatment reinforces caste-coded divisions of labour. The rhetoric of protecting “public order” or “tradition” often masks an uneven terrain of enforcement. Regulation becomes a means of disciplining marginal livelihoods while consolidating a symbolic alignment with Bania and Brahmanical interests.

Studies show that upwards of two-thirds of Scheduled Caste rural households are landless or near-landless, underscoring how economic exclusion persists; state focus on symbolic assets like cows and temples further diverts attention from redistributive needs. Communities such as the Badhik—who traditionally make a living from butchery—are low caste, landless and historically marginalised, raising concerns that new Panchayat NOC requirements for meat shops disproportionately affect socially excluded groups.

Trade data from Rajasthan cattle fairs shows a dramatic decline in cattle sales — from 31,299 in 2010-11 to under 3,000 by 2016-17 — following stricter protective regulations, revealing real economic impacts on livestock trade.” This affects both pastoral and agrarian communities as well.

Cow Shelters and Cultural Priorities 

The allocation of substantial funds to establish cow shelters across Panchayat Samitis fits within a broader politics of sacralisation. Cow protection has long functioned as a mobilising idiom of Hindu identity. But in budgetary terms, prioritizing such projects over pressing issues like rural employment diversification or agrarian distress reflects ideological choice.

Rajasthan collected over ₹2,259 crore in cow protection surcharges and spent more than ₹1,500 crore on gaushalas and related schemes over a 5-year period, according to state finance data, showing the weight of symbolic welfare in the budget compared to other competing social expenditures. This means a major chunk of a designated revenue stream — meant ostensibly to support cow welfare — has gone to cow shelter grants, even as other social sector needs compete for attention. As per a report in the Financial Express.

When combined with land grants to temples and conditionality for meat sellers, a coherent pattern emerges: state resources flow toward institutions and symbols aligned with Brahmin-Bania identity, while regulatory burdens accumulate around occupations associated with Muslims, and Dalits.

Beyond Party Lines: Structural Continuities

It would be simplistic to attribute this entirely to one party or one chief minister. Rajasthan’s post-independence political culture has frequently oscillated between socialist rhetoric and social conservatism. Congress governments often invoked redistributive language in moments of caste tension among agrarian communities, yet maintained close proximity to Brahminical cultural authority and Bania commercial networks.

The BJP’s current moves under Bhajanlal Sharma represent a more overt consolidation of that legacy. The difference lies less in substance and more in explicit ideological framing.

Conclusion: Governance or Cultural Engineering?

At stake is not merely administrative reform but the moral architecture of the state. When temple institutions are regularised and empowered while meat sellers face new hurdles, governance crosses into cultural engineering. It privileges one vision of society over pluralistic livelihood realities.

For a state, that constitutionally promises equality and secular governance, the challenge is to ensure that policy does not become a vehicle for reinforcing inherited hierarchies. Rajasthan’s latest announcements raise difficult questions: Who receives the state’s protection? Whose work is dignified? And whose livelihood is made conditional upon local moral approval?

In answering these, one sees less a neutral reform agenda and more a calibrated reassertion of sociocultural power — rooted in long-standing Brahmanical and mercantile dominance, now articulated with renewed confidence.

(The author is a mechanical engineer and an independent commentator on history and politics, with a particular focus on Rajasthan. His work explores the syncretic exchanges of India’s borderlands as well as contemporary debates on memory, identity and historiography)

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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UPI is not just a payments interface. It is the financial nervous system of India, processing billions of transactions every month. Behind every QR scan lies a trail of sensitive information: payer and payee details, transaction metadata, IP addresses, device identifiers, behavioral spending patterns. In 2018, the Reserve Bank of India laid down a clear and unambiguous mandate on data localisation. All payment data generated by systems operating in India must be stored only in India. Foreign processing was permitted strictly for the foreign leg of a transaction, and even then, the data had to be brought back to Indian servers within 24 hours. The intent was obvious: financial data of Indian citizens is a matter of national sovereignty.

But the legal environment has since shifted. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 fundamentally altered India’s cross-border data framework. The earlier logic of allowing data transfers only to approved jurisdictions has been reversed. India now follows a blacklist model: data can flow to any country unless explicitly prohibited by the government. The problem is that the blacklist rules have not even been finalized yet. In the absence of notified restrictions, cross-border data flows become broadly permissible by default. Israel is not on any prohibited list. That raises a structural question: if the regulatory filter itself is incomplete, on what legal and policy basis are sensitive financial metadata flows being supervised?

The DPDP draft rules go further. Rule 22 grants the Central Government broad authority to demand user data from fiduciaries without judicial oversight. At the same time, NPCI, as the data fiduciary for UPI transactions, holds the financial metadata of more than 35 crore users. Every merchant payment, every peer-to-peer transfer, every device fingerprint forms part of a massive behavioral financial dataset. This is not just about clearing payments. It is about profiling economic life at population scale.

The timing intensifies concern. In February 2026, reports indicated that data localization protections were removed from the US trade deal framework. In the same month, UPI was expanded to Israel. Both moves carry implications for cross-border data governance. Neither was preceded by a detailed parliamentary debate focused specifically on data-handling safeguards. There has been no comprehensive public disclosure clarifying whether RBI’s 24-hour data return clause has been embedded contractually and how compliance will be audited. In matters involving sovereign digital infrastructure, opacity does not build confidence.

Israel is not merely a participant in global technology networks; it is a hardened deep state with one of the most sophisticated intelligence and cyber-surveillance infrastructures in the world. Its track record includes documented espionage operations, aggressive cyber capabilities, and deep integration with Western security architectures. At the same time, it involves in genocide, ethnic cleansing and systemic human rights violations to fulfil its plan for establishing a new world order. When a state with such a security posture and conflict past and present becomes intertwined with another nation’s financial data ecosystem, this is not routine diplomacy. It is a matter that demands vigilance, transparency, and uncompromising scrutiny.

That reality does not automatically imply misuse. But responsible governance requires risk analysis, not blind optimism. Financial metadata reveals far more than transaction amounts. It exposes consumption habits, donation patterns, medical expenditures, religious contributions, location-linked behavior and economic vulnerabilities. In the 21st century, data is strategic capital. It shapes influence, leverage and intelligence capability.

This is not about opposing diplomacy. Expanding digital payment connectivity can benefit travelers, businesses and fintech partnerships. But when sovereign financial infrastructure intersects with evolving data protection norms, the public deserves clarity. Under which exact legal framework is foreign infrastructure permitted to process Indian financial metadata? Has the RBI’s mandatory 24-hour repatriation requirement been contractually enforced with audit provisions? Until the DPDP cross-border rules are fully notified, what interim safeguards govern such arrangements?

A mature democracy does not treat these questions as hostility. Digital sovereignty is not a partisan slogan; it is a structural pillar of economic independence. Citizens are not wrong to celebrate innovation and international collaboration. But celebration without scrutiny is not patriotism. In a data-driven world, vigilance is civic responsibility.

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