Urban solid waste management is among the most critical responsibilities of any modern state. Yet success in this area remains elusive across much of the world, and India is no exception. While governments frequently focus on technologies, treatment facilities, and infrastructure, the most fundamental aspect of waste management often receives insufficient attention: waste is generated by people and can only be managed effectively through their active participation.

The case of Kerala illustrates this challenge. The state generates over 11,000 tonnes of solid waste every day. Yet the infrastructure available for scientific processing and disposal remains limited. A significant quantity of waste, particularly mixed and residual waste finds its way beyond the state’s borders for further processing or disposal. This problem is not simply one of insufficient facilities, although that is a major part of it; it reflects a broader difficulty in creating a system that seamlessly integrates households, local governments, private actors, and public institutions into a coherent framework.

A common misconception is that waste management can be solved primarily through mechanisation and large-scale infrastructure. Machines undoubtedly have an important role. Material Recovery Facilities (MRFs), treatment plants, collection vehicles, incinerators, and scientific landfills are necessary components of any modern waste management system. However, waste begins its journey long before it reaches such facilities. It begins in households, shops, offices, and institutions. If waste is not segregated at source, even the most advanced infrastructure struggles to perform efficiently. After all, the viability of these facilities relies entirely on the steady supply of source-segregated waste.

Waste management is therefore not merely a technical problem but a deeply social one. It involves citizens, local governments, public agencies, and private enterprises. It concerns both the rights and responsibilities of individuals, the actions of institutions at various levels, and collective outcomes. The effectiveness of any system depends on the willingness of individuals to segregate waste at source, reduce waste generation, and cooperate with local authorities, which are the primary administrative units responsible for managing solid waste. Without such civic participation, infrastructure alone cannot succeed.

This social dimension also explains why waste management differs from ordinary market activities. In a typical market transaction, two parties voluntarily exchange goods or services. Waste, however, creates consequences for people who are not directly involved in its generation. A plastic bag discarded in a public space may belong to nobody, yet its effects are borne by everybody through pollution, waterlogging, and environmental degradation. Economists describe such situations as externalities, but the practical implication is straightforward: market incentives alone cannot adequately govern waste. An approach based primarily on the economic aspects of waste management has significant limitations.

For this reason, waste management should not be viewed primarily as a profit-generating activity driven by private players and their interests. Opportunities for revenue generation certainly exist through recycling, recovery, and resource extraction. Yet the central objective of waste management is the creation of public value that safeguards public health and society, rather than ensuring profit for those involved in it. When waste management is approached solely through a market lens, important social and environmental considerations are easily neglected. The management of waste is fundamentally an administrative and civic responsibility involving common resources and public participation.

Decentralisation and Kerala

The possibility of effective solid waste management in a densely populated country like India depends heavily on the decentralisation of waste management mechanisms. By this, we also mean the decentralisation of local administration into layered Local Self-Government (LSG) units: wards, grama panchayats, block panchayats, district panchayats, municipalities, and municipal corporations.

Such a division of administration and representation helps promote participatory planning from the grassroots, as has been happening in Kerala since the launch of the People’s Planning Campaign in 1996. Village-level plans discussed at ward-level meetings of all voters are forwarded to higher levels for approval every six months. This mechanism immediately links administrative responsibility such as that of a municipal health inspector or secretary to political representation through the local ward councilor or standing committee chairman on issues that deserve urgent attention.

Solid waste management issues in each locality require the close participation and attention of administration at these lower levels. In India, people in positions of power are generally disinclined to give attention to waste for two primary reasons:

1. The all-pervasive caste system has historically branded waste handling as a lower-status occupation.
2. Safety and protective equipment remain highly inadequate in most Local Self-Government units, making waste management a hazardous task.

If Kerala has been able to achieve relatively better solid waste management outcomes at a basic level since 2020—specifically through source segregation at households and institutions, and the collection of non-biodegradable waste (NBDW) by the Haritha Karma Sena (HKS) from households, shops, and institutions—it is primarily because the state has fully operationalised its 941 grama panchayats, 14 district panchayats, 152 block panchayats, 87 municipalities, and 6 municipal corporations following the implementation of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments from 1996 onwards.

In the coming years, other states in India should follow suit, given the complex ecological implications of poor waste management in both urban centres and villages. For instance, in Kerala, the recurring floods of recent years (2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021) have compelled the state administration to think seriously about solid waste management as a vital preventive measure, given the state’s vast network of water bodies and its long monsoon season, during which plastic waste clogging water bodies and urban drainage systems can significantly aggravate flooding.

Gandhi and Decentralised Governance

Gandhi’s ideas about society and its relationship with local governance need to be explored further to understand Kerala’s approach to solid waste management. “My Waste is My Responsibility” (Ente Malinyam Ente Utharavadithwam) and “We Are the Change” (Nammalanu Mattam) are two distinctly Gandhian-sounding slogans used by the Kerala Local Self-Government Department in its solid waste management campaigns.

For Gandhi, the decentralisation of administration formed part of a broader effort to mitigate the coercive power of the state and ensure representation for everyone; Sarvodaya, in Gandhian terms. As is well known, Gandhi was deeply influenced by John Ruskin’s Unto This Last. The political and philosophical dimensions of prioritising the last person in society in terms of justice and equality were later elaborated in a profound manner by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.

Gandhi ultimately saw the world as an “ever-expanding circle” of villages rather than an arena of nations fighting one another with increasingly sophisticated weapons over market-driven interests disguised as national interests under capitalism, state socialism, or fascism. To address the problems of centralised production and complex, profit-driven machinery, he stressed the decentralised village or small community as the basic unit of society, irrespective of the immediate economic losses or inconvenience that such an approach might entail.

Haritha Karma Sena as a Gandhian Alternative

The work undertaken by the Haritha Karma Sena in Kerala has generally been regarded as a capital-intensive urban function. However, its involvement makes the system far more labour-intensive, while distributing the benefits of waste management more equitably, as workers are compensated from the value created through their labour. This represents a distinctly Gandhian approach to a social responsibility, particularly because waste management is a socio-environmental obligation whose benefits extend far beyond Kerala and India.

Their involvement makes solid waste management genuinely decentralised at multiple levels. First, their participation makes the process labour-intensive and reduces the likelihood of future dumping. Dump-yard clearance, on the other hand, is a highly capital-intensive activity, as witnessed in Brahmapuram, Kochi, and elsewhere, where decentralisation had long been neglected before it was finally adopted.

Another important contribution of the Haritha Karma Sena to the waste management sector is the decentralisation of governance, income generation, and administration across genders. It also serves as a mitigating force against the historical stigma attached to waste handling in India, particularly within caste-based social structures. The process of visiting households every month to collect source-segregated waste is itself a form of public education that fosters a new ecological consciousness among citizens.

Gandhi believed that power should be shared in such a way that any monopoly over wealth constituted a social wrong; hence his concept of trusteeship. The collection, processing, and consequent reduction of waste through the systematic involvement of the Haritha Karma Sena represent an alternative understanding of both the economy and the community in a society that is rapidly moving in a capitalist direction, where private capital already exercises considerable influence.

Generally, the benefits of urban solid waste management accrue to capital-intensive companies and to a very small section of poor people willing to work under unfavourable conditions. The involvement of the Haritha Karma Sena has transformed waste management into an area in which ordinary people can participate and contribute. As a result, waste management becomes a more transparent process. The financial benefits generated through waste management increasingly reach relatively poorer sections of society, thereby expanding the scope for the democratisation of wealth.

The Haritha Karma Sena and the municipal administration have become trustees of the wealth generated while creating a social good, rather than parties seeking to exploit it for private gain. However, a great deal of conscious effort is still required to fully realise this ideal.

Kerala’s Past Failed Experiences with Centralised Waste Management

The two most prominent failed experiments in centralised waste management in Kerala; Brahmapuram in Kochi and Vilappilsala in Thiruvananthapuram illustrate what happens when Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) lack self-sufficiency. At these dumping sites, unsegregated urban solid waste from various municipalities and towns was piled up indiscriminately.

The facilities failed to function because the fundamental principle of waste management that individual participation through source segregation is paramount was overlooked in favour of the belief that machines and capital-intensive technologies could remediate large dumpsites.

In Brahmapuram, a village used by the Kochi Municipal Corporation, six neighbouring municipalities sent their unsegregated waste to a single dumpsite. A catastrophic fire that lasted twelve days caused widespread toxic pollution across the city. The subsequent land reclamation took nearly two years, during which around 550,000 tonnes of mixed solid waste had to be biomined and removed. Following the disaster, each municipality in the district was instructed to manage its own solid waste within its jurisdiction to the greatest extent possible.

Similarly, at Vilappilsala panchayat, urban waste from Thiruvananthapuram city was dumped for years instead of requiring individuals and institutions to segregate their waste at source. This led to sustained public protests that eventually forced the closure of the facility. In both cases, waste management practices ran directly contrary to the Gandhian principle of village self-sufficiency, whereby production, consumption, and waste are managed by the people themselves to the maximum extent possible. Recognising the shift towards a Haritha Karma Sena-based urban waste management system, the state government aptly titled its comprehensive 2021 status report The State of Decentralised Solid Waste Management in Kerala.

Part 2 Follows.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

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Historically, the Indian state has used demographic data for its population control goals. After decades of deploying demographic data to control fertility and sexuality, and sustained resistance by women’s movements for their reproductive rights, bodily autonomy and integrity, the ‘target’ has now moved to specific religious communities, in particular minorities, with a communal agenda, under the pretext of achieving an ‘infiltrator-free India’. 

The statement states:

“It is in this context that the we as feminists, civil liberties and people’s movements, activists, academics and concerned citizens are deeply concerned at the questionable Terms of Reference (ToR) of the ‘High-Level Committee on Demographic Change’ (HPC-DC) notified by the Government of India on May 26, 2026, in pursuance of the Prime Minister’s announcement of the ‘High-Powered Demography Mission’ on August 15, 2025.

“The Committee is to be chaired by Jst (Retd) Prakash Prabhakar Navlekar, with Mr. Durga Shankar Mishra (Retd. IAS), Mr. Balaji Srivastava (Retd. IPS), Dr. Shamika Ravi and the Census Commissioner, as its members. Notably, the ToR has references to “illegal immigration or “illegal migrants” in seven of its eight action points. The sole action point that does not include such references calls for an analysis of structural population changes among “religious and social communities”

“Demography is a broad field of inquiry that studies population processes such as birth, death, fertility, mortality, ageing, gender ratios, population distribution, migration, urbanisation and the influence of development models on demographic patterns. One would, therefore, expect the ToR to mandate an examination of the full range of demographic transformations currently reshaping India, including declining fertility rates, regional population disparities, internal migration, emigration, changing family structures, ageing populations, gender inequalities, and the intensification of care responsibilities. 

“A genuinely independent Committee would be tasked with analysing the socio-economic drivers of these critical changes, assessing the social, political, cultural and economic consequences at the regional, state and local levels, and recommending policies grounded in evidence and constitutional values. Instead, the ToR has presumed and pre-determined the outcomes of the inquiry and narrowed this vast subject almost exclusively to questions of “illegal immigration”, “religious and social communities”, border management, identification systems, detention and deportation. We are particularly concerned that the Committee has been tasked with analysing population changes among religious and social communities, while simultaneously operating within a framework that repeatedly links demographic change to “illegal immigration” and “demographic imbalance”.

“The Government should ensure that any study of demographic change is independent, methodologically transparent, federally undertaken, and free from assumptions that pre-determine its findings. Instead, this Committee appears poised to recommend mechanisms for identifying, detaining and deporting persons presumed to be illegal immigrants. Although presented as demographic analysis, the ToR effectively continues the regime’s misplaced focus on “illegal immigration” as a primary threat to national sovereignty while simultaneously stigmatising entire communities. Such an approach risks deepening social polarisation rather than advancing evidence-based public policy.

“As feminists, we reject attempts to reduce complex social realities to narratives of demographic threat linked to illegal immigration. History shows that anxieties about population composition often translate into increased surveillance of women’s bodies, restrictions on reproductive autonomy, and heightened discrimination against minorities, marginalized, and communities in peripheral locations.  The recent SIR exercise conducted through the lens of “illegal immigration” resulted in disproportionately high deletions of women voters and Muslims, relative to their share of the population.

“We, therefore, request that the Government undertake a comprehensive review of the objectives and ToR of the said Committee and defer the commencement of the Committee’s work, at least until the ongoing Census is completed. Only a robust, exhaustive, and transparent Census can provide a trustworthy demographic baseline for understanding the myriad complex population changes India is undergoing. The suggested policies based on the analysis of this Census data will equip the state to address the demographic challenges. Proceeding without such a foundation risks compounding errors, deepening exclusions, and enabling pre-determined conclusions, under the guise of demographic study.”

ALIFA has also urged that the government to step back from this misguided approach. Public policy must be guided by constitutional values, rigorous evidence, and respect for human rights. India’s demographic future should be approached as a question of justice, equality and human development, not as a narrative of suspicion and fear.

Related:

High-Level Committee on Demographic Change (HLC-DC): Another Offensive on Indian Muslims!

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This grassroots movement emerged as a direct response to a vast administrative anti-encroachment campaign officially designated as “Operation Sweep.” The Rajasthan’s Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP)-ruled state government’s demolition drive had recently resulted in the demolition of several Islamic religious structures i.e. Mosques/Madrasas and the issuance of hundreds of legal eviction notices to such, reportedly without providing any reasonable opportunity of hearing. In response to these administrative actions, the assembled protesters submitted formal memorandums to local authorities, demanding an immediate suspension of the demolition drive and strict adherence to established legal processes, and the prevention of alleged selective communal targeting of minority religious sites.

सर्व धर्म शांति सभा, बाड़मेर।
“जहाँ सत्य, अहिंसा और धर्म का पग-पग लगता डेरा,
वो भारत देश है हमारा…”
सर्व धर्म शांति सभा में शामिल होकर आपसी भाईचारे, सामाजिक सौहार्द, संविधान के सम्मान और देश की एकता-अखंडता का संदेश दिया।
हमारी विविधता ही हमारी सबसे बड़ी ताकत है। सभी धर्मों, सभी… pic.twitter.com/1SqELVvewY

— Ummeda Ram Beniwal (@UmmedaRamBaytu) June 26, 2026

Background

The tensions in the region originated from a large-scale anti-encroachment and security drive initiated by the Rajasthan government in coordination with border security agencies. This enforcement campaign, named “Operation Sweep,” that began on spans a massive 1,050-kilometer border belt that physically separates India from Pakistan. Pursuant to directions issued by the Union Home Ministry, a joint team comprising the district administration, police, and the Border Security Force (BSF) undertook an operation concerning “alleged illegal constructions within 15 kilometres of the India–Pakistan border in Rajasthan’s Barmer district”, from June 18, 2026 onwards.

Rajasthan Bulldozer Action: Barmer में Operation Clean के तहत Ind-Pak सीमा की मस्जिद पर गरजा बुलडोजर #Rajasthan #BulldozerAction #OperationClean #LatestNews pic.twitter.com/PZHZMN0FxK

— Punjab Kesari (@punjabkesari) June 22, 2026

The operation covers four major administrative districts that contain significant Muslim populations, namely Barmer, Jaisalmer, Bikaner, and Sri Ganganagar. The state government and the associated security apparatus classified the drive as a highly necessary procedural measure designed to clear unauthorised constructions and reinforce critical security infrastructure within a highly sensitive strategic military corridor. However, the execution of these orders quickly drew allegations of systemic bias from local communities.

According to precise data released on dated June 23, 2026 during a press conference by the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), approximately three hundred and fifty mosques and various Islamic religious structures situated across these four border districts were served with administrative demolition notices. Prior to the major public mobilisation, the regional enforcement drive had already resulted in the direct demolition of four separate mosques within the Barmer sector, alongside the destruction of an ancient mazaar, or shrine, in the Jaisalmer district. Local community activists and non-governmental organisations subsequently filed public complaints, asserting that the administration was selectively penalising Muslim places of worship while simultaneously ignoring similar documentation anomalies in the religious and residential structures of other communities.

Demolition of Mosques and Attack on Religious Freedom in India
23 JUNE 2026 | 3:30 PM | PRESS CLUB OF INDIA pic.twitter.com/D4RLnmwAY2

— APCR-Association for Protection of Civil Rights (@apcrofindia) June 24, 2026

In direct response to the sudden executions of these demolition orders, community members from both major religious groups organised public demonstrations to systematically de-escalate potential communal friction and demand immediate legal interventions.

Peaceful public mobilisation across Barmer and Jaisalmer

According to the Maktoob Media, the major public assemblies were recorded in the village of Badbir within the Barmer district, as well as in multiple commercial and residential locations across Jaisalmer. Hundreds of local residents gathered collectively outside the Barmer District Magistrate’s office to conduct an interfaith peace assembly.

The primary objective of these localised rallies was to challenge the execution of the demolition orders through entirely peaceful, constitutional means rather than through civil disobedience. The gathered protesters formally submitted a collective memorandum addressed to the President of India, urgently requesting an immediate pause on the entire demolition drive until transparent, unbiased legal verifications could be executed by the judiciary.

Local community leader demands equal treatment

Surtaram Meghwal, a two-time elected Dalit Sarpanch of Paradia village, emerged as one of the primary figures directing the local public response and articulating the grievances of the unified communities. Meghwal openly challenged the statutory validity of the state’s actions, stating his belief that the demolitions were an extrajudicial exercise being carried out without following any due legal process. He argued that if mosques were being actively checked and demolished by the state, then temples should also be examined under the exact same legal standards to ensure absolute administrative fairness.

Rajasthan: In #Barmer, Advocate Surtaram Meghawal, the Sarpanch of Paradia village, publicly warned the BJP govt against what he described as the selective demolition of #mosques while sparing #temples.

He urged the govt to uphold the Raj Dharma advocated by former PM Atal… pic.twitter.com/cQDPoQB8yB

— MuslimMirror.com (@MuslimMirror) June 25, 2026

Meghwal further detailed the ground realities of the public mobilisation that took place in Badbir following the destruction of multiple religious sites. He communicated to Maktoob that the villagers protested against the demolition of these religious structures to oppose the government actions and convey their collective message peacefully. He noted that since the protest began, the region had witnessed even greater brotherhood with more citizens coming forward in mutual support and reflecting a shared belief that there was still ample time to resolve the administrative issue through dialogue. Addressing the underlying socio-political dynamic of the border region, Meghwal explicitly blamed external political factors for generating artificial friction.

He questioned the procedural fairness of the drive, asking why only mosques and religious structures of Muslims were being targeted and reiterated his stance as a two-time Sarpanch that Hindus and Muslims harbor no inherent issues with each other in the region. He concluded that institutional politics would not break the unity of the people of Rajasthan, as they would consistently stand in solidarity with their Muslim neighbors, as Maktoob Media reported

Dialogue over division

The events in Barmer and Jaisalmer are illustrative of how local leadership and resistance is the best and most effective anti-dote to what is perceived as targeted injustice. Such moves are effective and pre-emptive and preventive, an antidote to communal conflict. Hindu and Muslim residents in these districts have come together to hold joint protests, submitted memorandums to the authorities, and sought legal remedies through constitutional processes. Their actions reflected a shared belief that disputes should be addressed through dialogue, fairness, and the rule of law.

The interfaith assemblies also highlighted the long-standing bonds between the communities living in the border region. Despite facing difficult living conditions and administrative challenges, residents chose to stand together and protect the harmony that has existed in their villages for generations. While the legality of the demolition drive will ultimately be decided through judicial and administrative processes, the peaceful response of the local people demonstrated the value of maintaining communal harmony during times of uncertainty. The events serve as a reminder that equal application of the law, respect for due process, and continued dialogue between communities and public authorities are essential for preserving public trust and social harmony.

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Public Resistance and Democratic Assertion: India through protests, 2025

The post Brotherhood in Rajasthan: Hindus, Muslims Protect Border Mosques appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Widening Crisis and the Call to Reject Blame

The statement highlighted the dangerous trajectory of the crisis, noting that the devastating conflict that erupted between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities in May 2023 has now escalated to include tensions between the Naga and Kuki communities. Warning that the situation must not devolve into a “war of all against all,” the signatories deliberately avoided assigning blame to any specific group. Instead, they mourned the casualties across all communities, including the Kuki-Zo, Meitei, and Naga populations.

The appeal stressed that competitive victimhood has no place in the current crisis, declaring that no historical grievance, political claim, or religious identity can justify the killing of civilians, hostage-taking, or the targeting of women and places of worship.

Furthermore, the coalition demanded the immediate protection of civilians, safe humanitarian access, the release of detainees, and the dignified return of mortal remains.

A major regional concern raised by the collective is the threat the ongoing violence poses to the broader North East’s fragile peace agreements. The appeal referenced the three decades of political negotiations and ceasefires facilitated by the Government of India, particularly the historic 1997 Indo-Naga peace process with the NSCN-IM, warning that the region could be plunged into deeper insecurity if communities lose faith in negotiated settlements.

However, the signatories also acknowledged recent acts of restraint that offer hope, praising Naga civil society’s successful intervention in securing the release of 14 Kuki detainees despite intense public anger.

The collective highlighted this as a crucial gesture for peace, demonstrating that community institutions can still prioritise responsibility over revenge.

A Diverse Coalition Demanding Accountability

The appeal is backed by a diverse and distinguished group of signatories, including filmmakers Anand Patwardhan and Suhasini Mulay, former civil servants Harsh Mander and V. Venugopal, former Planning Commission member Dr. Syeda Hameed and numerous journalists, economists, and environmentalists.

Notably, women’s rights organisations and feminist scholars constitute a significant portion of the coalition. Emphasizing this, political activist Annie Raja stated that women’s organisations across all communities must be empowered as the primary custodians of peace, as women have historically held communities together during times of crisis.

Dr. Syeda Hameed further underscored the national significance of the crisis, stating that Manipur is a direct test of the Indian republic’s constitutional morality and that the Union Government must act before all faith in peace collapses. Nicholas Chinnappan, President of Friends of the Earth India, added that the violence is deeply intertwined with issues of land, resources, and militarization, asserting that peace must be built on a foundation of justice.

Core Demands for Peace and Justice

In its concluding demands, the appeal called upon both the Union and State governments to protect lives without discrimination, recover illegal weapons, and prevent further armed mobilization.

The signatories demanded an impartial, time-bound peace process involving independent mediators and representatives from all affected communities, including the Kuki-Zo, Meitei, Naga, Pangal, Mising, and Hmar communities.

Additionally, they called for an independent, judicially monitored investigation into all major incidents of violence, sexual assault, arson, and custodial abuse that have occurred since May 2023, with scrutiny of the roles played by armed groups, state forces, and political actors. The statement concluded by asserting that democracy cannot survive if communities are forced to negotiate life and death through armed factions while constitutional institutions fail in their fundamental duties.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

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Thereafter, in a detailed statement, MSCE said that the objective of the restrictions is not to interfere with religious practices but to ensure transparency and prevent malpractices during the examination, which will be conducted under live CCTV surveillance.

“The council has not imposed restrictions on what candidates can wear. However, during the examination, the face must be clearly visible on CCTV cameras. No cloth or covering should conceal the ears, head, mouth or any part of the face above the neck,” MSCE commissioner Nandakumar Bedse said.

Outlining the initial rationale behind the decision, the council said that examination authorities across the country are increasingly dealing with sophisticated methods of cheating, including concealed mobile phones, miniature Bluetooth devices and other electronic gadgets.

Officials pointed out that in recent D El Ed and computer shorthand examinations conducted by the council, some candidates were found to have hidden mobile phones inside dupattas and burqas and used them during the examination.

“The Teacher Eligibility Test is a highly sensitive examination. With the emergence of AI-enabled tools, miniature Bluetooth devices and other electronic equipment, preventing malpractices has become increasingly challenging. Ensuring that every candidate’s face is clearly visible on live CCTV is essential to maintaining fairness and credibility,” the council said.

This clarification put out by the council is now expected to put to rest the controversy surrounding the dress-code instructions ahead of the examination scheduled for June 28. Figures reveal that  more than 6 lakh candidates have registered for this year’s TET examination, making effective monitoring a key challenge. Officials said clear visibility of candidates is necessary for identity verification, biometric authentication and CCTV-based surveillance throughout the examination period.

The council also relied on practices followed in several national and state-level competitive examinations, including UPSC, SSC, IBPS, SBI, RRB, GATE and public service commission examinations, where face-covering items are restricted to facilitate identification and monitoring.

The MSCE also referred to a 2024 Bombay high court (HC) judgment in a petition challenging a college dress code that prohibited hijab, burqa and other religious identifiers on campus. The court upheld the college’s dress code instructions, observing that the petitioners had failed to establish that wearing a hijab constituted an essential religious practice.

A translation of the clarifying instructions may be read below:

 Maharashtra State Examination Council, Pune

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Office Building,

(Second and Fourth Floor) Survey No. 832 A, Shivajinagar, Pune – 411004

Telephone No.: 020-29709396    Website: www.mscepune.in   E-mail: mscepune@gmail.com

Outward No.:
MSCE/Svee.Sanha/217/2026                                                           Date: 22/06/2026

Subject: Regarding clarification on the use of dupatta, burqa, and hijab by female candidates in the Teacher Eligibility Test

Clear instructions have been issued that since live CCTV will be used in all classrooms at the examination centers during the Teacher Eligibility Test to be conducted by the Maharashtra State Examination Council on June 28, 2026, nothing including a dupatta, burqa, mask, or cap can be worn so that the entire face is clearly visible. However, emails have been received requesting that female candidates be permitted to use the burqa, hijab, and dupatta. A clarification on the said matter is being made as follows:—

In the Writ Petition WPL No. 17737 / 24, Zainab Abdul Qayyum Choudhary Vs Chembur Trombay Edu. Societys, Chembur Trombay Education Society’s, N.G. Acharya and D.K. Marathe College of Art, Science and Commerce, Chembur, Mumbai, order dated June 26, 2 024, filed in the Hon’ble High Court, Mumbai, 9 female students challenged the college’s dress code instructions, wherein hijab, burqa, niqab, and other attire revealing religious identity were banned on campus. In the said judicial decision, the Hon’ble High Court recorded observations as follows:—

In the writ petition, it has been pleaded that the petitioners have been donning a Hijab and/or Nakab for last few years. The pleadings in the writ petition to support the plea that donning of a Hijab or Nakab is an essential religious practice however are insufficient. Except for stating that the same constitutes an essential religious practice on the basis of the English translation of Kanz-ul-Iman and Suman Abu Dawud, there is no material placed to uphold the petitioners’ contention that donning of Hijab and Nakab is an essential religious practice. The contention in that regard therefore fails.

For the aforesaid reasons, we are satisfied that the Instructions issued by the College under which a dress code has been prescribed for its students does not suffer from any infirmity so as to violate provisions of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 25 of the Constitution of India.

In almost all major competitive examinations in India—national-level examinations such as UPSC, SSC, IBPS, SBI, RRB, GATE, CLAT, CA, CS, CMA, etc., and State Public Service Commission examinations like MPSC, GPSC, BPSC, UPPSC—face-covering clothes such as dupatta, burqa, scarf, cap, and goggles are prohibited. This is because it is necessary for the face to be clearly visible during identity verification, biometric checks, and the CCTV verification process throughout the examination period. The main objective behind banning the hijab, burqa, or dupatta on the face during examinations is to prevent malpractices by closely monitoring all candidates through Live CCTV during the entire examination period, to ease identity verification, and consequently to maintain transparency and credibility in the examination.

Various types of malpractices are being used in examinations nowadays, such as carrying a mobile phone, sending the question paper outside via mobile WhatsApp/Telegram, receiving answers via mobile, and keeping extremely small-sized Wi-Fi Bluetooth devices in the ears, among many other tricks. Therefore, the complete face and the entire portion above the neck—meaning the mouth and ears of all candidates at the examination centre—must be clearly visible so that there is no room for suspicion regarding malpractice. If the face is kept covered, it will not even be known who is talking to whom. Furthermore, if a female candidate is asked to show her face based on suspicion for verification at the examination centre, it might lead to a completely different issue altogether.

Recently, in the D.El.Ed. and Computer Shorthand examinations conducted by the Maharashtra State Examination Council, it has come to light that candidates hid mobile phones in their dupatta/burqa, brought them into the examination centre, and used them.

The Teacher Eligibility Test is a highly sensitive examination, and considering factors like AI, Bluetooth devices, and electronic devices as small as shirt buttons, it has become highly challenging to prevent any kind of malpractice. For the examination to be transparent and to curb all kinds of manipulations, it is necessary that the faces of all 6 lakh candidates are clearly visible in the Live CCTV.

Overall, considering all the above points, female candidates will have the freedom to wear any clothes, dupatta, odhni, or burqa for the Teacher Eligibility Test; however, during the examination period inside the classroom at the examination centre, the face must be fully and clearly visible in the CCTV camera. For this purpose, above the neck—meaning on the ears, head, or mouth/face there should be no cloth/covering of any kind; this is being clarified here.”

The June 22, 2026 circular has been signed by Dr. Nandkumar Bedse (I.P.S.), Chairman, Maharashtra State Examination Council, Pune.

The original circular in Marathi may be read below Embed Original

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According to data presented in Lok Sabha during March, at least 622 sanitation workers died in sewers and septic tank incidents across India since 2017 with Uttar Pradesh recording the highest fatalities at 86. This highlights the structural risks and vulnerabilities faced by sanitation workers.

At a press conference organised by the Dalit Adivasi Shakti Adhikar Manch (DASAM) in New Delhi in May 2026, they revealed that at least 36 sanitation workers died while cleaning sewers, septic tanks, drains and sewage chambers between March and May 2026. Referring to the data presented in Parliament, DASAM said that out of the 622 deaths, 317 occurred between 2021 and 2025. Most of the workers belonged to Valmiki communities, other historically marginalised caste groups, or migrant labour background. [1]

Most sanitation workers in Ward 66 belong to the Balmiki caste, historically associated with sanitation labour and among the most marginalised Dalit communities. Many of these workers live in clustered settlements and are employed, directly or indirectly, by the Lucknow Municipal Corporation (LMC), reflecting the enduring link between caste and sanitation work.

Workers further allege that Rajput used casteist slurs for the workers, even threatening termination for non-compliance. Such allegations also raise questions under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, which criminalises caste-based abuse and intimidation.

Altogether, these accusations point to potential violations of legal protections against caste-based discrimination. Despite these allegations, the supervisor continues to remain in his position, raising questions about accountability and enforcement of existing laws.

While sanitation workers employed by the Lucknow Municipal Corporation (LMC) are issued formal joining letters outlining the terms and conditions to their employment, access to these documents is not always guaranteed. A 25-year-old worker, who wished to remain anonymous, said he has been working with the LMC for nearly a year, yet his joining letter has been withheld. He alleges that requests for the document have been met with derogatory remarks about his caste and class, along with threats of termination. “What are we supposed to show when we get into an accident?” questioned one of the workers.

The workers expressed their dissatisfaction by gathering on June 10, 2026 to protest and demand their additional Rs. 2000 and four days of holidays, while giving the authorities 3 days to act. They allege that authorities at Lucknow Swachhata Abhiyan (LSA) had stated they will be firing Avinash, but they are yet to hear back, despite three days already having passed by.

The allegations against Rajput, however, are not isolated incidents but part of a broader pattern within the sanitation system in Lucknow. One where accountability is inconsistent and often remains unchecked.

“The mayor, Sushma Kharakwa, had already fired him once. We are not sure why he came back,” said another worker.

While ward 66 is struggling to call out the corruption and discrimination, workers say that such situations are far from unique. Across all wards, Sweepers working with LMC are expected to also clean the sewers or pick up animal carcasses if asked. Many of these workers, often in their 20s, say they are required to descend up to five feet into sewers to carry out manual cleaning. For deeper drains, the Lucknow Municipal Corporation (LMC) deploys mechanised equipment, though workers allege this is not always consistently implemented.

Cost considerations often shape these decisions, with workers revealing that bringing in machinery to clean the sewer becomes expensive. The cost adds up with fuel, travel and hiring operators.

This is where private contractors come in with the hopes of saving money that would otherwise be spent on the machinery. “thekedaars allegedly take Rs. 5000-6000 and give their workers 500-600. A government employed sanitation worker would get around Rs. 1000.”

While law is framed to safeguard Scheduled castes, sanitation workers in Lucknow are still fighting for lawful existence. On June 6, 2026 Lalaram, a 28-year-old sanitation worker went into a manhole with only a rope as instructed by his supervisor on scene, Akash Kumar. He soon lost consciousness and was rushed to a hospital, his supervisor. Initially being taken to Ram Manohar Lohia Institute of Medical Sciences (RMLIMS), Akash diverted him to a private hospital. Lalaram died before receiving medical care and Akash Kumar fled the scene. The ward’s corporator is Arun Rai, a representative of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). When contacted, he refused to be interviewed on the topic.

The incident drew responses from city authorities. Mayor Sushma Kharakwa and Municipal Commissioner Gaurav Kumar announced action against the contractor, including blacklisting the firm and initiating an FIR. Financial assistance was also promised to the family.

Workers remain sceptical, questioning whether meaningful change will follow. Many say that the response to the incident has been driven largely by media attention and local political support, which may ensure compensation for the family. However, the larger concern around the safety of sanitation workers continues to persist. “Usually, the supervisors of these private contractors run away after such incidents, and then nothing ends up happening,” said one of the workers.

With Lucknow ranking the third cleanest city in 2024-2025. The irony remains, with regular derogatory comments and a clear spatial hostility moving fluidly between the private and government employees for sanitation work. 

(The author is an independent journalist, currently pursuing masters in Convergent Journalism at AJK MCRC, Jamia Millia Islamia)

[1] These statistics presented in Parliament were reported I The Hindu among other publications

Related:

ASHA workers, Anganwadi workers and sanitation workers overlooked in India’s healthcare protection reforms

8 sanitation workers die in UP in last 10 days due to hazardous cleaning, activists calls for FIR 

Safai Shramik Union raises demands for a law that safeguards rights of sanitation workers: Maharashtra

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That challenge from citizens has now reached the Bombay High Court. This week, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and the Forum Against Oppression of Women filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Special Public Safety Act (MSPSA), contending that the law violates fundamental constitutional guarantees and grants excessive, unchecked powers to the executive. The challenge marks the beginning of a legal test for a legislation that has generated sustained opposition from civil liberties organisations, trade unions, academics, lawyers, students’ groups, political parties and democratic rights movements across Maharashtra.

Importantly, many of the arguments now being advanced before the High Court closely mirror concerns that were repeatedly raised during the legislative process itself. Among the organisations that consistently opposed the legislation was Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), which submitted detailed objections to the Joint Select Committee examining the then Bill, participated in the broader state-wide campaign against the legislation, and warned that the law’s vague provisions could become a tool for suppressing dissent rather than addressing genuine security threats.

A constitutional challenge to the heart of the law

According to the petition filed before the High Court, the Act suffers from a fundamental constitutional defect: it authorises severe restrictions on freedoms of speech, expression, association and assembly without incorporating the procedural safeguards that constitutional jurisprudence requires when the State seeks to limit such rights.

The petition argues that the law violates Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution and undermines broader constitutional principles of liberty, equality and democratic participation. It further contends that the Act creates a framework through which organisations can be declared unlawful on the basis of broad executive discretion, while insulating those decisions from meaningful scrutiny.

Particularly significant is the challenge to the Act’s definitions of “unlawful activity” and “unlawful organisation.” According to the petitioners, these definitions are so broad and vague that they can potentially encompass trade unions, social movements, human rights organisations, political opposition groups and individuals engaged in peaceful dissent.

The challenge therefore strikes at the central architecture of the legislation rather than merely isolated provisions. It asks whether a law ostensibly enacted to combat extremism can constitutionally employ language so expansive that ordinary democratic activity may fall within its ambit.

A warning raised long before the Act was passed

The constitutional challenge did not emerge in a vacuum. For months before the legislation was enacted, Maharashtra witnessed one of the most extensive civil society mobilisations against a proposed law in recent memory. More than 12,750 objections and suggestions were reportedly submitted to the Joint Select Committee examining the Bill, making it one of the largest public responses ever received by the Maharashtra legislature. More than ninety percent of the submissions reportedly opposed the legislation.

Citizens for Justice and Peace was among the organisations at the forefront of this campaign. In April 2025, CJP submitted a detailed objection memorandum to the Joint Select Committee, warning that the legislation posed a serious threat to constitutional freedoms and democratic dissent. CJP argued that the Bill’s framing around the idea of “Urban Naxalism” rested on an inherently vague and politically charged concept that lacked clear legal meaning. Significantly, the organisation pointed out that the Union Ministry of Home Affairs itself had previously stated that it does not use the term “urban naxal” as an official category in dealing with Left-Wing Extremism. CJP warned that a law justified through such an indeterminate concept risked becoming a mechanism for targeting journalists, activists, artists, civil society organisations and political critics rather than genuine security threats.

Today, many of those concerns have reappeared in the constitutional challenge before the High Court.

The battle over “unlawful activity”

One of the most striking parallels between the writ petition and earlier civil society objections concerns the Act’s definition of unlawful activity.

The petition before the High Court argues that the definition is overbroad and vague, allowing the State to invoke the law against a wide range of lawful democratic activities.

CJP’s earlier objections had similarly focused on Section 2(f), arguing that phrases such as conduct that creates a “danger or menace to public order” were left undefined and provided no clear legal standards. According to CJP, terms such as “menace” were capable of subjective interpretation and could permit authorities to categorise ordinary activities as unlawful according to their discretion. The concern was not merely semantic. Constitutional law has long recognised that vague criminal provisions create opportunities for arbitrary enforcement. When citizens cannot reasonably determine what conduct is prohibited, enforcement becomes dependent on the discretion of the executive rather than the rule of law.

That concern now sits at the centre of the High Court challenge.

The question of executive power

The writ petition also challenges the breadth of powers conferred upon the State government to declare organisations unlawful. Again, this reflects a recurring theme in earlier objections raised by civil liberties groups.

CJP argued that the proposed framework granted extraordinary authority to the executive while providing inadequate independent oversight. It questioned the composition of the Advisory Board established under the legislation, noting that members need only be qualified for appointment as High Court judges rather than serving judicial officers. Because appointments are ultimately controlled by the government itself, CJP warned that the mechanism lacked sufficient institutional independence. The broader concern was that a law designed to regulate political organisations and associations should not depend primarily upon executive opinion.

The constitutional challenge now similarly questions whether the legislation creates a system in which governmental discretion is insufficiently constrained by objective standards and procedural safeguards.

Existing laws already covered the field

Another criticism repeatedly advanced by opponents of the legislation was that Maharashtra already possessed an extensive arsenal of security laws.

CJP argued that provisions dealing with terrorism, organised crime, unlawful activities and threats to national security already exist through laws such as the UAPA, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act. It questioned why an additional statute with even broader powers was necessary at all. The constitutional challenge raises a related issue. If existing criminal law already addresses violent extremism and organised criminal activity, what precisely justifies a separate law empowering the State to declare organisations unlawful through broad and vaguely worded standards?

This question becomes especially important because the Act itself repeatedly invokes concerns regarding Left-Wing Extremism while failing to define key terms such as “naxalism” or “left-wing extremist” within its operative provisions.

A state-wide democratic resistance

The present litigation is also the culmination of a much broader political and civic campaign. In April 2025, protests against the Bill were organised across Maharashtra, bringing together civil liberties organisations, workers’ groups, farmers’ organisations, students’ groups, political parties and grassroots movements. Demonstrations took place across dozens of districts and reflected an unusually broad coalition united by concerns regarding civil liberties and democratic freedoms.

CJP played a visible role in that mobilisation, participating in a wider coalition that argued the legislation threatened constitutionally protected rights of speech, association, assembly and protest. The campaign consistently maintained that the law’s vague language created the risk that peaceful political opposition could be conflated with threats to public security. The filing of the writ petition therefore represents not the beginning of resistance to the law, but the latest stage of a struggle that has been unfolding for over a year. The formal objections raised by CJP have been detailed and may be perused here.

Why the High Court’s decision matters

The challenge before the Bombay High Court extends beyond the future of a single state law. At its core lies a constitutional question that has repeatedly confronted Indian courts: how far can the State go in the name of security before constitutional freedoms are impermissibly compromised?

The petition asks whether a law can authorise severe consequences, including the declaration of organisations as unlawful, through definitions that have been described as vague, subjective and susceptible to political misuse. It raises concerns about executive overreach, procedural fairness, access to justice and the protection of democratic dissent.

For organisations such as Citizens for Justice and Peace, the issue has never been whether the State can act against genuine violence or armed insurgency. Rather, the concern has been whether legislation drafted in the language of security can ultimately be deployed against lawful political activity.

The complete dissent note by CJP may be read here.

Detailed reports may be read here, here and here.

Related:

Public Resistance and Democratic Assertion: India through protests, 2025

Dissent Note: The alarming scope of Maharashtra’s Special Public Safety Bill, 2024

Censorship After NEET: A substitute for accountability

The Supreme Court in 2025: When procedure trumped principle

Assam, the third state to pass UCC: Gender justice or targeted communalism the aim?

The post From Protest to Petition: Maharashtra’s Public Safety Act in the dock appeared first on SabrangIndia.

For generations, this has been the lifeline of Pani Sol.

Today, fear travels those roads alongside them.

On 9 June, one of the village’s hawkers, 50-year-old Akbar Ali Mondal, was allegedly beaten to death in Purulia district while earning a living. Yet the arrest of the accused has done little to calm nerves in Pani Sol, where thousands of families depend on hawking for survival.

A week after the killing, the village remains engulfed in anxiety. Men leave for work with apprehension. Families wait anxiously for phone calls. Conversations in tea stalls, village shops and courtyards inevitably return to the same unsettling question: could the next victim be one of us?

Pani Sol, located under Onda Police Station in Bankura district, is one of the largest villages in the region. Home to nearly 80,000 to 90,000 residents, around 90 per cent of whom are Muslims, the settlement is known across neighbouring districts as a village of hawkers, with generations of families relying on itinerant trade for their livelihood.

According to local residents, nearly seventy to eighty per cent of the village’s young men earn their livelihood through itinerant trading. Every day, they travel long distances carrying household goods, relying on personal relationships, trust and repeat customers to earn a living. Few families have agricultural land. Even fewer have access to stable salaried employment.

Akbar Ali Mondal was one of these workers.

How Akbar Ali’s Final Journey Shook a Village of Hawkers

Akbar worked in areas near the Purulia-Jharkhand border alongside his 24-year-old son, Zulfikar Ali. Although father and son operated in different localities, they followed the same routine. They would leave early in the morning and return home after a day of selling goods door to door.

On 9 June, they set out as usual.

By midday, Zulfikar received a phone call informing him that his father had fallen ill and had been taken to hospital. Rushing there, he found not an injured man awaiting treatment but the lifeless body of his father.

Showing photographs of the deceased, Zulfikar struggled to control his emotions.

“I still cannot understand why such brutality was inflicted upon him,” he said.

Akbar Ali Mondal’s killing has left behind more than grief. Akbar’s widow and young daughter depended heavily on his earnings. The family’s modest mud house stands as a reminder of how fragile their economic existence had always been. Now the responsibility of supporting the household rests entirely on Zulfikar.

Fear Spreads Through Bengal’s Village of Muslim Hawkers

While Akbar’s family mourns a personal loss, many residents of Pani Sol fear the killing signals something larger.

Many villagers believe Akbar Ali Mondal’s killing has transformed a livelihood concern into a question of survival. Residents allege that harassment of Muslim hawkers has increased in recent years in some areas where they work. Several claim that traders are sometimes subjected to intimidation and communal abuse.

Zulfikar alleged that Muslim hawkers were occasionally forced to chant religious slogans and threatened with exclusion from local markets and neighbourhoods.

“We have been working under fear for a long time,” he said. “Now that fear has become even greater.”

Whether or not all such allegations are established through official investigations, the perception of insecurity is now widespread across the village. In many homes, parents worry every time their sons leave for work.

The impact on the village economy is already visible. Several hawkers working in distant areas have reportedly returned home after Akbar Ali Mondal’s killing. Others say they are reconsidering where they travel and whether they can continue in the profession at all.

The dilemma is stark: stay home and face hunger, or continue working while fearing for one’s safety.

Why Pani Sol’s Economy Depends on Thousands of Hawkers

Beyond the killing, the deeper tragedy lies in the economic reality of Pani Sol.

A drive through the village reveals a settlement bustling with human activity but struggling with limited opportunities. Bicycles loaded with merchandise are as common here as tractors are in farming villages.

The village economy revolves around hawking because alternative employment opportunities scarcely exist.

Despite its large population, the village has only two high schools and fewer than ten primary schools. Residents complain of teacher shortages and poor educational infrastructure. Extreme poverty forces many children to abandon their studies before completing secondary education.

According to villagers, only a handful of residents have secured government jobs. The number of graduates in a population approaching one lakh is astonishingly small.

The consequence is visible everywhere. Each generation enters the same occupation as the previous one. Sons become hawkers because their fathers were hawkers.

Hawking is not merely a source of income in Pani Sol; it is the backbone of the village economy.

That is why Akbar Ali Mondal’s death has generated fear far beyond his immediate family.

Growing Fear After Attacks on Travelling Muslim Traders

Residents also recalled earlier incidents involving hawkers from the village. One local resident cited an alleged stabbing attack on another trader from Pani Sol a few months ago near Bankura town.

Whether isolated or part of a broader pattern, such incidents have reinforced feelings of vulnerability among villagers.

“Hawking once meant hardship,” said an elderly resident. “Now it also means fear.”

Rights Groups Step In as Family Seeks Justice and Support

Akbar Ali Mondal’s killing has attracted the attention of rights organisations and community groups.

A team from the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), led by social activist Omar Owais, visited the family and assured them of legal assistance. Representatives of Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind also met villagers and expressed concern over both the killing and the broader economic insecurity facing the community.

According to Owais, the family is living under tremendous psychological pressure and requires legal support to pursue the case, particularly because the crime occurred around 90 kilometres away in Purulia district.

For a family already struggling financially, travelling repeatedly to another district to follow legal proceedings presents a major burden.

“How Are We Supposed to Live?”

The question echoing across Pani Sol today is not only who killed Akbar Ali Mondal, but what comes next.

Akbar’s elder brother, Noor Mohammad Mondal, who survives by selling poultry, summed up the village’s predicament.

“Many hawkers are returning home because they are frightened,” he said. “But there is no other work here. Tell me, how are we supposed to survive?”

His question captures the anxiety of an entire village.

For decades, the roads of Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar provided a livelihood for Pani Sol’s residents. Today, those same roads have become a source of uncertainty.

As the investigation into Akbar Ali Mondal’s killing continues, thousands of hawkers from this village will once again leave home in search of customers. They will carry their goods as they always have.

But many will now carry something else as well: the fear that, for Muslim hawkers from Pani Sol, earning a living may itself have become dangerous.

Courtesy: https://enewsroom.in

The post After Akbar Ali Mondal’s Killing, Pani Sol’s Hawkers Ask: How Will We Survive? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The statement states that the signatories have followed with concern Khurram Parvez’s detention on baseless charges since November 2021, and his continued detention without trial in Delhi’s Rohini Jail. By his birthday, June 18, he will have spent 1,670 days in prison.

The signatories have also reminded the Indian authorities that three years ago, in June 2023, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) determined that Khurram Parvez’s detention was arbitrary and called on the Indian authorities to release him. They have expressed concern that the Indian government, despite pledging to participate meaningfully with UN mechanisms as a member of the UN Human Rights Council, has not engaged with the UNWGAD in relation to Khurram’s detention.

Categorising his detention and judicial harassment is happening in a context of longstanding, ongoing grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Jammu & Kashmir, the signatories have also condemned the Indian authorities’ widespread and normalised use of repressive counter-terrorism laws, such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, under which Khurram Parvez is being targeted, to silence human rights defenders and dissenting voices.

The statement had urged the government of India to immediately and unconditionally release Khurram Parvez. It also calls on India’s international partners to publicly denounce Khurram Parvez’s detention and to demand that their Indian counterparts release him immediately and unconditionally. The solidarity with Khurram Parvez will continue.

Background

On June 10, 2026, in one of the cases that Parvez is facing, the Delhi High Court granted bail to Kashmiri rights defender Khurram Parvez after 4½ years in jail. Though significant, the ruling, however, did not immediately secure Parvez’s freedom. He is in continued judicial custody because he is also an accused in a separate NIA case registered in 2020 relating to alleged terror-funding networks in Jammu and Kashmir, where his bail plea remains pending. The June 10 ruling however is still key: a Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja ruled that the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 cannot be indefinitely subordinated to statutory restrictions on bail. “The appellant’s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India need to be balanced and may even trump the restriction imposed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA,” the Court observed, as per LiveLaw, while setting aside a December 2024 order of the Special NIA Court that had refused bail.

SabrangIndia had reported extensively on this ruling and the article may be read here.

The signature campaign cum statement released on June 19, the day after Khurram Parvez’s 49^th birthday had the following signatories:

Signed by:

Organisations:

1. ACAT-France
2. Activate Rights
3. Al-Haq
4. Amnesty International
5. Armanshahr / OPEN ASIA
6. Asia Alliance Against Torture (A3T)
7. Asia Human Rights and Labour Advocates (AHRLA)
8. Asia Justice and Rights
9. Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD)
10. Asian Human Rights Commission
11. Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de España (APDHE)
12. Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM)
13. Association for Democracy in the Maldives (ADM)
14. Association of Women for Awareness and Motivation (AWAM)
15. Association Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la défense des droits de l’homme (ATPDH)
16. Bridging for Sustainable Development (BSD)
17. Bytes For All, Pakistan
18. Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR)
19. Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC)
20. CENIDH
21. Center for Civil Liberties
22. Center for Prisoners’ Rights
23. Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH)
24. Centro de Políticas Públicas y Derechos Humanos (Perú EQUIDAD)
25. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
26. Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN)
27. Collectif de Sauvegarde de la Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme
28. Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS)
29. Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) (Northern ireland)
30. Community Self Reliance Centre (CSRC)
31. Defence of Human Rights Pakistan
32. DITSHWANELO – The Botswana Centre for Human Rights
33. Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO)
34. Forum Against Repression, Telangana
35. FORUM-ASIA
36. Foundation Day of the Endangered Lawyer
37. Front Line Defenders (FLD)
38. Hindus for Human Rights
39. Hivos
40. Human Rights Association (IHD)
41. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
42. Human Rights Defenders’ Alert – India (HRDA)
43. Human Rights Forum
44. Human Rights Online Philippines (HRonlinePH)
45. Human Rights Watch
46. IMPARSIAL, the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor
47. India Labour Solidarity (UK)
48. Indian Alliance Paris (IAP)
49. Indian Social Action Forum
50. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), within the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
51. International Legal Initiative Public Foundation
52. International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
53. International Solidarity with Academic Freedom in India (InSAF India)
54. Just Peace Advocates/Mouvement Pour Une Paix Juste
55. Justiça Global
56. Karapatan
57. Kashmir Law and Justice Project
58. Kazakhstan International Bureau for human rights
59. Kirithavar Vazhvurimai Iyakkam (Christian Rights Forum – India)
60. Lawyers for Human Rights (South Africa)
61. League for Defence of Human Rights in Iran (LDDHI)
62. Liga Voor Mensenrechten
63. Liga voor de Rechten van de Mens
64. Ligue Burundaise des droits de l’homme Iteka
65. Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (LDH – France)
66. Ligue Djiboutienne des Droits Humain (LDDH)
67. Madaripur Legal Aid Association (MLAA)
68. Maldivian Democracy Network (MDN)
69. National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM)
70. Nonviolence International
71. Odhikar
72. Organisation Marocaine des droits humains (OMDH)
73. People’s Watch
74. Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA)
75. Progressive Voice (PV)
76. Project South
77. Public Association “Dignity”
78. Public Committee against Torture in Israel
79. Rafto Foundation for Human Rights
80. Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO)
81. Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA)
82. South Asia Justice Campaign
83. South Asia Solidarity Group
84. South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR)
85. SUARAM
86. Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP)
87. The Advocates for Human Rights
88. The Canadian BDS Coalition and International BDS Allies
89. The Sudanese Human Rights Monitor (SHRM)
90. Think Centre
91. University of Madras, Criminology Students
92. World Organization against Torture (OMCT), within the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

Individuals:

1. Kulandaisamy
2. Ahmed Aloui
3. Aissa Rahmoune
4. Alexis Deswaef (President of FIDH)
5. Allarassem Yemingar
6. Angana Chatterji
7. Appandairaj Jain
8. Asiya Arif
9. Ather Zia
10. Bela Bhatia
11. Bernadette Hamenyimana
12. Cecille Baello (Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND))
13. Cedric Prakash
14. Clifton D’ Rozario
15. David Kaye (former UN Special Rapporteur)
16. Dean Accardi
17. Dhayanithi Raj Jeganathan
18. Diana Alzeer
19. Dr Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan
20. Frazer Mascarenhas
21. Emma Brännlund (Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Mid Sweden University)
22. Farhatullah Babar
23. Fatima Babu
24. Fernand de Varennes (former UN Special Rapporteur)
25. Fionnuala Ni Aolain (former UN Special Rapporteur)
26. Alex Maria Chelliah (OFM Cap)
27. Freny Manecksha
28. Giulia Ganovelli
29. Hafidha Chekir
30. Haley Duschinski
31. Hariprasath V
32. Harsh Mander
33. Immanuel Kalaiselvan
34. Johanna Chardonnieras
35. Joseph Xavier
36. Karan Singha
37. Khadija Errebah
38. Krishnakant Chauhan
39. Kumar Prashant
40. Lotika Singha
41. Mamadou Sy
42. Maryse Artiguelong (former FIDH Vice President)
43. Mody Watt (General Secretary, ONDH/ Sénégal)
44. Mona Bhan
45. Namdev Dagam
46. Nandita Narain
47. Navsharan Singh
48. Oli D’Cruz
49. Omer Aijazi
50. R Shameer Basha
51. Rajeev Singha
52. Rajni Shah
53. Rakshith M R
54. Raqib Naik
55. Ruki Fernando
56. Saba Ismail
57. Sam Kamalesan
58. Shahindha Ismail
59. Sherley Dokiburra
60. Shyama Sivadas
61. Siddeeqa Iram
62. Sidharth Tulsi Ganeshan
63. Siraj Dutta
64. Somasekhara sarma
65. Sruti Bala
66. Stephen J. Rapp
67. Suchitra Vijayan
68. Sudarshan Ramiengar
69. Suresh Babu Marayil
70. Suresh M
71. Théobald Rutihunza
72. Vasantha Lakshmi
73. Vijay S P
74. M
75. Vivek Sundara
76. VS Krishna
77. Yoojung Hong
78. Zainab Jamil
79. Zia Ur Rehman
80. Zohra Yusuf

The statement may also be read here.

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The post Release Kashmiri HRD Khurram Pervez immediately & unconditionally: International HR Fora appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In January 2026, CJP had documented in detail this phenomenon, a report that had been used widely in the public interest litigation that resulted in the May 2026 judgement. That detailed exploration may be read here. In all the documented cases, the photos and videos of accused were shot and shared on social media to embarrass them further. In essence, the police started a social trial against the accused and violated their dignity.

Defining public shaming could be a tricky task as it manifests itself in various forms. It could be through sharing photos online, parading in public, making accused do undignified acts, or simply—by publicly flogging the accused. However, the essence of the act remains, i.e., humiliating or punishing the accused in a manner that in the eyes of society they turn into criminals before the Court pronounces them to be so.

Public shaming does not refer to a single act of physical or mental torture but instead is a broader term wherein the accused is ridiculed (by being publicly paraded, or by having their degrading photos shared online), beaten up, and socially becomes a criminal before the trial ends (in most cases, before the trial even starts). It can be construed to be an umbrella term for violent offences that police inflict upon accused publicly.

Public shaming by police has been on the rise in the last few years. In the recognition of this rise, one has to see who has been affected by such incidents the most. Unsurprisingly, it is Muslims and Dalits, who are at the short end of the stick. As per a report tiled “Status of Policing in India Report 2025” published by Common Cause India and Lokniti empirically shows that more often than not the victims of police brutality have been from these marginalised communities. The specific act of public shaming is not any different, a perusal of the petitioners in all the cases that are analysed below makes it abundantly clear that public shaming by police unfairly affects the already marginalised. Ergo, the matter of Public Shaming has to be understood as a manifestation of State Violence as an instrument to marginalise. By perpetuating a form of violence that induces shame in the victim and ridicule in the observer, the State is further marginalising the already marginalised. Therefore, Public Shaming by police is clearly part of the phenomenon, State sanctioned violence against the minorities.

The act of public shaming is fundamentally Kafkaesque. Kafka in his famous short story In the penal colony talks about a society where accused’s body is inscribed with the alleged offence using needles. This act is carried out by a commander who happens to be the police, the judge and the executioner. The various instances of public shaming as happening in India are the similar if not the same. The police usurp the role of the judge and violates the dignity of an accused by beating and shaming them publicly. It contravenes inter alia, doctrine separation of powers and fundamental rights of the individuals—the salient features of a constitutional democracy.

In fact, in hitherto settled Indian criminal law jurisprudence, even convicts who have been convicted of serious offences are accorded –or should be accorded at least—fair if not humane treatment.

In the face of increase in public shaming by the police in Rajasthan (a detailed report on such incidents can be found here) the State’s High Court in the 2025 Islam Khan judgement laid down several guidelines that have to be followed by the police to curb such instances. It further held the act of public shaming to be violative of the fundamental right to privacy.

This primer will first breakdown the recent, year-old Rajasthan High Court judgement (Islam Khan and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others) and analyse various aspects of it, including the final guidelines that were pronounced.

The second half of the primer shall deal with other judicial decisions pronounced by other constitutional courts, that is several other HCs and also the Supreme Court.

Lastly, we will attempt to demonstrate that there is an inconsistency in how courts have adjudged this issue. Considering the legal, social and psychological ramifications of public shaming, there is clearly a need for a sounder legal framework that can mitigate such occurrences. 

2025: Islam Khan and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others

On the face of increase in acts of public shaming in Rajasthan (read a report on such incidents here), the High Court delivered a comprehensive judgement that laid down certain guidelines with the aim of stifling the practice. In the instance under examination here, the police had arrested the accused, degraded and humiliated them. Their photos and videos were shot and shared on social media. The judicial pronouncement came in response to this.

The judgement does a commendable job in grounding the prohibition of public shaming in three distinct constitutional features—doctrine of separation of powers, presumption of innocence, and respect of individual dignity. On the aspect of separation of powers, the Court starts with emphasising that the rule of law cannot be maintained without a functional separation of power. The invocation of this doctrine is important and novel, for it tacitly collapses the difference between a convict as per the court and a convict as per the media trial instigated by the police. The Court defines such a media trial engineered by the police to be “…a State-engineered narrative, wherein the police machinery, through press conferences, orchestrated disclosures, circulation of photographs, and at times even staged representations of arrest, seeks to project an accused person as culpable even before the due process of law has had an opportunity to unfold” (Paragraph 14)

The Judgement further reads, “Any transgression by the police into the judicial sphere, whether by declaring an accused guilty in the public domain, conducting actions that prejudice a fair trial, or exercising powers not sanctioned by law, would not only be without jurisdiction but would also strike at the very heart of due process” (Paragraph 13.2)

The Court by holding that media trial by police disturbs the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, implicitly held that media trial’s declaration of an accused as guilty is equally socially isolating and harmful as that of a court trial’s declaration, i.e., the mental or psychological effect is similar. Regardless of what the trial later proves, the accused in the eyes of the society becomes a criminal because of police actions that portrays them as convicts–or worse, sub-humans. The Court pegged the police action to its constitutional mandate of administrating law, not pronouncing guilt. The Court’s holding that merely showing an accused to be guilty amounts to a usurpation of judicial duties is crucial: in the context of public shaming particularly so; because the Police has repeatedly portrayed “accused” to be criminals in the eyes of the public. Such unprofessional, often partisan police conduct reduces public confidence in both the Police and Courts, eventually.

Making a logical extension of the aforesaid argument –separation of powers, the Rajasthan High Court went further to hold that criminal declarations vis a vis the accused by the police impacts the cardinal principle of presumption of innocence (until proven guilty). Media trials by the police displace the concept of presumption of innocence and whip up public prejudice and anger. Punishment precedes the conviction, and completely displaces the presumption of innocence.

Last not least, the force of this judgement lies in its assertion that the act of public shaming is a violation of human dignity. The Court recognises that acts of public shaming are ipso facto in contravention of human dignity. Dignity is the cornerstone of human rights. This is how dignity is acknowledged as a manifestation of human rights. The Preamble of the Constitution contains a solemn promise to secure the dignity of the individual as its framers were aware that the Constitution is an outcome of a long arduous struggle, which must value the dignity of an individual, independent of his social status.

The Court here grounded the inappropriateness of public shaming not just in Article 21 of the Constitution, but went a step further in the right direction, and held it to be violative of dignity itself. The effect of such a finding is that no law, circumstance, judicial pronouncement (that are often marred with legal hula-hoops to justify abhorrent actions) can justify public shaming by police. Its very existence is held to be impermissible. This is a crucial finding by a constitutional court.

However, it is the guidelines that the judgement lays down that sets it apart and hence its import. These guidelines are aimed to restrict if not stop public shaming from happening.  It is the first judicial pronouncement that explicitly lays down directions that ought to be followed by the police in the context of public shaming specifically. The guidelines require every police officer to follow the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) prescribed by the authorities. It further emphasises that no arrestee shall be subject to misbehaviour, mishandling, manhandling, harassment, or any form of coercion under any circumstances.

Crucially, the Court held in these guidelines that “any act of social media condemnation orchestrated or facilitated by police authorities, which results in public humiliation of an individual, shall be construed as a form of punishment” (Paragraph 18[iii]).

By construing public shaming as a form of punishment itself, the Court effectively made sure that no police officer can engage in the same because it would contravene both presumption of innocence (as it would lead to punishing before conviction) and doctrine of separation of power (as it would lead to police usurping the judges’ roles of sentencing a punishment).

While the judgement— specifically the guidelines, prima facie, lay down what appears to be an effective deterrent to public shaming, a closer look at it reveals no concrete steps—an absence of enforceability. A logical extension to the guidelines could have been a) compensation for the accused subject to such acts; b) institutional correction and actions against offending police officers and c) any other.

Post May 2025, less than a month after the Islam Khan judgement, the Rajasthan High Court was again asked to adjudicate on an incident of public shaming by police (Puranmal vs State of Rajasthan and Ors.). The accused was arrested, and before producing him before the competent Court, the police forcibly shaved his head, dressed him in women’s clothes, and paraded him through a crowded market, while photographs and videos of the incident were circulated on social media and news channels. Unfortunately, unlike in the case of Islam Khan findings in the Puranmal judgement were diluted. The same court that had the benefit of the guidelines laid down in Islam Khan, (both were single judge benches), the Court in Parunmal held that police’s promise of not repeating such incidents hereinafter, is sufficient. No action was taken. Even in the previous Islam Khan, despite laying such guidelines, the Court had merely asked the police to remove the videos where the accused is degraded from Social Media sites and other platforms. No proceeding was started against the police. Therefore, while the guidelines are welcome, their effectiveness remain in question.

Similarly, various High Courts and Supreme Court over the years have given different judgements on the same issue of public shaming.

Other Judicial Responses to Public Shaming

The case of public shaming was also discussed by the Supreme Court in its 2012 judgement of Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam Vs. State of Chattisgarh and Ors. The Court was called to decide whether compensation should be granted to a victim of such public shaming, the Court held in affirmative and made a distinction between defamation and public shaming.

The Court held that public shaming is distinct from defamation, public shaming causes mental and physical agony. The Court added that “[because of public shaming] the hurt develops a sense of insecurity, helplessness and his self- respect gets gradually atrophied” (Paragraph 40).

Further, the Court held that, “The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making ‘monetary amends’ under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, by not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of ‘exemplary damages’ awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law” (Paragraph 43)

Later, in In-Re Banners Placed On Road Side In The City Of Lucknow (2020), the Allahabad High Court took suo moto action against the banners placed by the UP Police on the streets of Lucknow which contained several individuals’ photographs, name and address. The context is/was the the Uttar Pradesh government’s controversial “name and shame” billboards that had publicly displayed the names, photographs, and residential addresses of individuals accused of vandalism during the anti-CAA protests in December 2019. The administration demanded compensation for public property damages, threatening to seize assets if unpaid!. The Allahabad High Court had, in a judgement, strongly condemned the actions, ordered the removal of all banners that ‘named and shamed’ holding that these acts were a violation of privacy; when the matter was carried to the Supreme Court of India, the court without staying the HC’s finding referred the matter to a constitutional bench. A report may be read here. Clearly, however this judicial rap means little to the UP state administration that had in December 2024 revived this practice that was condemned by the Allahabad HC in 2020 and which, moreover targets privacy and due process. During the violence in Sambhal in western UP, incited because of the controversial attacks on the Shahi Jama Masjid there, the administration had publicly named and shamed over 400 so-called accused! A report may be read here.

In another ruling delivered in January 2021, the Allahabad High Court condemned the act of displaying a list of so-called ‘top criminals at different police stations in various districts of UP (Jeeshan and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.) The Court not only took a dignitarian approach and condemned the State authorities, but also granted compensation for the violation of public shaming. Moreover the Court directed all the Police stations to remove the list, and warned them that if such action is repeated, criminal proceedings and monetary compensation shall follow.

The matter of public shaming has been dealt by Gujarat High Court differently.

In the case of Bhautik Vijaybhai Bhatt Vs Director General Of Police & Ors. (the case involved a bunch of instances of public shaming) in 2019, the Court deferred to the powers of the executive. The Court further held that since departmental actions for the offence had been already initiated by the higher authorities against the police officers, this was a sufficient remedy. As opposed to such a deferential attitude, the same court in the 2023, Jahirmiya Rehamumiya Malek Vs State of Gujarat judgement, held the officers in contempt. In this case, police officers had arrested the accused, tied them to a public pole and beaten them up. Recordings of these offences by the police were uploaded on social media sites. The Court held that such arrest was a violation of the DK Basu judgement (1997), and as the police officers violated Supreme Court guidelines, they ought to be held in contempt

The Madhya Pradesh High Court took a unique approach altogether. In the case of Sangram Singh Rajoot v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the petitioners were forced to walk from police station to Court on foot. The Court held that this act cannot be considered ipso facto, an act of public shaming. The Court gave a wide margin of deference to the police when it instructed the same authority (police) to “internally inquire” about the incident and find if “malice” can be attributed to the police officers! The Court observed that the representations submitted by the accused indicated that a grievance was raised before the authorities, mere non-action on such representations would not automatically warrant issuance of a writ of mandamus for initiating disciplinary proceedings, unless a prima facie case of misconduct is established. The Court delegated all its duties to the executive and did not even issue a writ of mandamus honouring the higher judiciary’s role in checking misuse of power and authority by the executive/administration.

A perusal of this catena of judgements around public shaming from 2012 (SC) to 2025-26, we observe no consistent discernable pattern. While constitutional courts have, in recent times, in some states like Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and even some orders from Gujarat, held the act of public shaming to be condemnable and directed corrective measures, social sanction for such shaming persists. The phenomenon of social media and its intrusive, sometimes unregulated character adds more complex dimensions. There appears a greater imperative on the Court, to intervene not just clearly but swiftly to restore the balance —in favour of the Rule of Law.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis makes it evident that the practice of public shaming by the police is no more an aberration but has increasingly become a baton wielded by an overarching, often authoritarian and unaccountable executive. ‘Elected governments’ are choosing to use this as a  systemic feature of India’s law enforcement architecture. The legal, social, and psychological harms it engenders are profound, recurring, and largely unaddressed.

Decades ago, when such practices certainly existed but were considered an aberration not the norm[1], did the Courts rule more assertively? The Supreme Court in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) was categorical in holding that handcuffing is prima facie inhuman, unreasonable, over-harsh, and arbitrary, and to inflict irons without fair procedure is to resort to zoological strategies repugnant to Article 21. The Court’s ruling was clear that freedom from handcuffs during transit between the prison and the court must be the rule and not the exception. Public shaming, in its various forms, is a direct descendant of the very practice Prem Shankar Shukla condemned. The DK Basu guidelines (1997) compounded this protection by laying down that custodial violence including torture and physical assault infringes Article 21, and that interrogation, though essential, must be conducted on scientific and humane principles, with third-degree methods being totally impermissible.

Yet, as the analysis of the Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh cases demonstrates, these guidelines are honoured more in their breach than in their observance. What the Prem Shankar Shukla and DK Basu guidelines could not anticipate was the peculiar, performative nature of public shaming in the age of social media, where the degradation of an accused: these acts are not merely incidental to an arrest but are part and parcel of the deliberate and orchestrated objective of the police action itself.

The social and psychological ramifications of this practice are equally severe, and they do not resolve themselves once the accused is acquitted. The Supreme Court in Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam observed that because of public shaming, the individual “develops a sense of insecurity, helplessness and his self-respect gets gradually atrophied.” Public humiliation, particularly when state-orchestrated and digitally disseminated, produces lasting trauma. The accused is no longer merely a person under trial. In the eyes of his community, employer, and family, he has been declared a criminal. His social reintegration becomes near impossible, irrespective of what the trial later concludes. The damage is therefore permanent, and the law currently has no instrument to make the victim whole. Monetary compensation, while progressive, cannot undo the viral spread of a degrading video.

The empirical picture is no less alarming. The incidents are not isolated and they are increasing. In Rajasthan alone, police officers in Sikar, Udaipur, Nagaur, Jhunjhunu, and Dausa have repeatedly forced accused men into women’s clothing, half-shaved their heads, and paraded them before crowds, with these unlawful acts being visually documented through 2025. The problem is not geographically contained. In Jammu, within a single month in 2025, there were at least two widely reported incidents of public shaming, one involving a theft accused being made to sit on the bonnet of a moving police vehicle with his hands tied and shoes garlanded around his neck, and another involving three men being publicly thrashed by police personnel after arrest, reigniting debate over the increasing tendency of law enforcement to resort to performative justice. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that a group of advocates in Jammu lodged a complaint with the National Human Rights Commission alleging that law enforcement authorities are bypassing constitutional safeguards and replacing lawful investigation procedures with performative public punishment, leading to irreversible damage to the dignity and fundamental rights of the accused.

In light of all of this, the conclusion is inescapable. Indian criminal jurisprudence (analysed above related to Islam Khan 2025 and other verdicts) needs to be widely discussed, even as citizens, civil rights groups and the media discuss and deliberate on the serious ramifications of this deliberate executive-police fracture and capture of the ‘Rule of Law.’ What are the steps that need to be taken so we return the debate to conduct accountability by the Indian Police?

Is then what is needed is a centralised statutory or Supreme Court-mandated framework that defines public shaming exhaustively, prescribes mandatory consequences for violations including automatic contempt proceedings and compensation, and places a structural obligation on States to train and supervise their police forces accordingly? Without such a framework, the courts will continue to pronounce guidelines that are ignored, and the accused will continue to be paraded, shamed, and broken, long before any verdict is returned.

Relevant Judgements

[1] The 1979-1980 “Bhagalpur blindings” refer to a horrific series of human rights abuses in Bihar, India—when the Police deliberately blinded 31 undertrial and convicted prisoners by puncturing their eyes with needles and pouring acid into the sockets

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Hamzah Patel)

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