The judgment came in a writ petition filed by Dabir Rahman challenging a 2018 opinion of a Foreigners Tribunal which had declared him to be a foreigner who entered India after 25 March 1971 — the statutory cut-off date under the Assam Accord framework.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar Medhi and Justice Pranjal Das dismissed the challenge and upheld the Tribunal’s findings, holding that the petitioner had failed to discharge the mandatory evidentiary burden imposed by Section 9 of the Foreigners Act.

Yet, beyond the immediate outcome of the case, the ruling once again exposes the deeply contentious architecture of citizenship determination operating in Assam — a framework built upon a colonial-era reverse burden law, extraordinary evidentiary expectations, and a process in which impoverished and document-deficient individuals are often compelled to prove lineage, residence, and belonging across generations through fragile and inconsistent archival traces.

Court reiterates that burden of proof “never shifts”

At the heart of the ruling lies the Court’s reaffirmation of the exceptional evidentiary framework governing Foreigners Tribunal proceedings in Assam. The Bench observed that Section 9 of the Foreigners Act creates a complete departure from ordinary evidentiary principles and squarely places the burden upon the person proceeded against to prove that he or she is not a foreigner. Stressing the overriding nature of the provision, the Court held:

The Bench observed:

“With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts. In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable.” (Para 18)

The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that, in the absence of rebuttal evidence from the State, the Tribunal ought to have accepted his claim of citizenship. The Bench made it clear that citizenship cannot be presumed merely because the State fails to adduce contrary evidence. In proceedings under the Foreigners Act, the initial and continuing burden remains solely upon the proceedee throughout.

The ruling therefore reinforces a long-standing judicial position that citizenship claims before Foreigners Tribunals are not adjudicated through adversarial balancing of evidence in the conventional sense, but through a statutory reverse burden mechanism requiring the proceedee to affirmatively establish citizenship through reliable documentary linkage.

One cannot forget that the Foreigners Act, 1946 is not merely a pre-Constitution statute — it is a pre-Independence colonial enactment originally designed to regulate the entry, presence, and departure of foreigners during British rule. Significantly, the statute itself contains no detailed machinery for identification or detection of foreigners. That role eventually emerged through the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, which vested wide discretionary powers in quasi-judicial tribunals tasked with determining citizenship status.

What makes Section 9 particularly extraordinary is that it creates a reverse burden framework unlike ordinary criminal or civil adjudication. In conventional jurisprudence, the State must first establish foundational facts before the burden shifts onto an accused person. Reverse burden clauses in statutes such as narcotics, customs, or dowry laws operate only after certain threshold facts are established by the prosecution.

Citizenship proceedings in Assam, however, frequently begin merely on the basis of suspicion, “D-voter” marking, vague border police references (notices issued without any prior investigations), or unverifiable allegations of illegal migration — after which the entire burden shifts onto the proceedee to prove citizenship.

The present judgment strongly reiterates this framework but does not substantially engage with the constitutional tensions underlying such an approach.

Detailed piece on this legal and existential dilemma may be read here.

A constitutional court’s treatment of documentary discrepancies

One of the most striking aspects of the ruling lies in the Court’s treatment of discrepancies in names, ages, electoral entries, and village descriptions.

Before the Tribunal, the petitioner had relied upon electoral rolls of 1966, 1971, 1997 and 2018, a voter identity card, NRC acknowledgement receipt, legacy data code, and a Gaonburah certificate to establish linkage with his projected father and claim Indian citizenship.

However, the High Court found “lots of inconsistencies” in the documents. The Court noted that the names of the projected parents differed across the 1966 and 1971 voter lists. It also pointed to changes in village names and inconsistencies relating to the petitioner’s projected brother, who appeared as a 27-year-old in the 1971 voter list despite his absence in the earlier 1966 roll.

The Bench noted:

“So far as the Voters Lists of 1966 and 1971 are concerned, apart from the fact that the same would not serve as link documents, it is found that there are lots of inconsistencies. In the Voter List of 1966, the names of the parents were Jasi Seikh (father) and Moujan Nessa (mother) and the village was Bhelenganari Part No.54. On the other hand, in the Voter List of 1971, the names are Jasimuddin (father) and Matujan (mother), there is also a change in the village to No.3 Nangli Char. Further, though the same contains the name of a projected brother, Tabibar Rahman, it is seen that the said projected brother was 27 years of age in 1971 and therefore, it was necessary for his name to be featured in the earlier Voters List especially, in the List of 1966 along with his parents. Though the Voters Lists of 1989 and 1993 have been referred, those have not been exhibited.” (Para 23)

One of the most damaging aspects of the petitioner’s case, according to the Court, was the unexplained absence of documentary continuity over several decades. The Bench noted that by 1997, the petitioner was already shown as being 45 years old. Yet, there were no exhibited voter lists or contemporaneous records from the earlier years reflecting his presence.

The Court remarked:

“What is intriguing is the fact that though in 1997, the Page No.# 13/14 petitioner was aged 45 years why Voters List of earlier years did not contain his name and have not been proved. As regards the Voters List of 2018, the same is not a certified copy. It is also noted that there is inordinate and unexplained delay in the Voters List produced and exhibited. As noted above, the first Voters List wherein the name of the petitioner finds place is of the year 1997 and the previous Voters List which has been relied upon is of the year 1971 and the huge gap of more than 25 years remains unexplained. Even thereafter, the Voters List produced, though uncertified is of the year, 2018 which is after a gap of about two decades.” (Para 24)

This aspect of the ruling is particularly important because it reflects the judiciary’s increasing insistence upon documentary continuity in citizenship adjudication. Merely producing isolated voter lists from scattered years, without establishing a consistent and traceable documentary chain, may not suffice to prove citizenship claims. The Court’s reasoning indicates that unexplained gaps in documentary history can themselves generate adverse inferences regarding the authenticity and reliability of the citizenship claim.

These inconsistencies were ultimately treated as fatal to the petitioner’s claim.

Yet, the judgment raises larger concerns regarding how constitutional courts evaluate documentary irregularities in Assam’s citizenship litigation. Spelling variations, phonetic inconsistencies, transliteration errors, age discrepancies, and changes in village nomenclature are endemic to rural documentation practices in Assam, especially among poor and marginalised communities whose records often span decades of floods, displacement, illiteracy, migration within districts, administrative restructuring, and inconsistent clerical practices across Assamese, Bengali, and English records.

Women, landless labourers, internally displaced families, and Bengali-speaking Muslims are particularly vulnerable to such documentary instability. The judgment, however, appears to approach these discrepancies through a framework of suspicion rather than social context.

Notably, the Supreme Court itself in Sirajul Hoque v. State of Assam had intervened against precisely such rigid treatment of documentary inconsistencies, setting aside a Foreigners Tribunal order where spelling discrepancies in ancestral names had been treated as determinative of foreignness. The present ruling, however, appears to adopt a far stricter evidentiary posture.

Citizenship through documents — or documentary survival?

The High Court also reiterated that oral testimony, in the absence of reliable documentary corroboration, carries limited evidentiary value in Foreigners Tribunal proceedings. Rejecting the petitioner’s attempt to rely upon oral assertions and unproved certificates, the Court held:

“In the case of Bijoy Das Vs. UOI reported in2018 (3) GLT 118, this Court Page No.# 14/14 has laid down that in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence alone would not be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and corroborated by documentary evidence and contemporaneous records. However, in this case, the same has not been able to be done by the petitioner. We are of the view that the petitioner as proceedee had failed to discharge his burden to prove his citizenship.” (Para 26)

The Gaonburah certificate relied upon by the petitioner was also rejected on the ground that it had not been proved in accordance with law.

At one level, the reasoning reflects settled evidentiary principles repeatedly applied in Foreigners Tribunal jurisprudence. At another, however, the judgment once again foregrounds a deeper structural paradox within Assam’s citizenship regime: citizenship has increasingly become dependent upon documentary preservation across generations in a country where millions historically lacked formal birth registration, land ownership, literacy, institutional access, or bureaucratic continuity.

The Citizenship Act, 1955 itself does not prescribe any singular document as conclusive proof of citizenship for natural-born citizens. Yet, in practice, Foreigners Tribunal proceedings have evolved into extraordinarily document-centric adjudications where the inability to produce perfectly consistent records from decades ago may itself generate suspicion of foreignness.

The burden imposed upon proceedees is often particularly severe because the documents demanded by the system are precisely those least likely to have survived among impoverished populations vulnerable to floods, erosion, displacement, or chronic administrative exclusion.

In Assam, where river erosion has destroyed entire villages and displaced lakhs over generations, the expectation of seamless documentary continuity across fifty or sixty years often sits uneasily with lived social realities.

Tribunal opinion upheld

After examining the entire evidentiary record, the Division Bench concluded that the petitioner had failed to discharge the statutory burden imposed under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act.

The Court ultimately held that the petitioner as proceedee had failed to discharge his burden to prove his citizenship. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed and the Foreigners Tribunal’s 2018 opinion declaring the petitioner to be a foreigner who entered India after 25 March 1971 was affirmed.

Suspicion, alienage, and the missing foundational question

The ruling also revives a larger jurisprudential question that has long haunted citizenship litigation in Assam: when does suspicion become sufficient to trigger adjudication under the Foreigners Act?

While Section 9 shifts the burden to the proceedee, critics of the citizenship determination framework have repeatedly argued that the State must nevertheless establish at least some foundational material pointing toward alienage before invoking such an extreme reverse burden mechanism.

This distinction becomes crucial because failure to conclusively prove citizenship does not automatically establish foreign nationality.

Yet, in many citizenship proceedings in Assam, the inability to produce satisfactory documents gradually transforms into a judicial declaration that the person is a Bangladeshi who entered India illegally after 1971 — often without independent evidence establishing foreign origin, foreign domicile, or cross-border migration.

The present judgment does not substantially engage with this conceptual distinction. Instead, the Court proceeds from the premise that failure to satisfactorily establish Indian citizenship is sufficient to sustain the Tribunal’s conclusion.

This approach reflects a broader tendency visible across many Foreigners Tribunal proceedings, where suspicion of foreignness frequently operates as the starting point rather than the conclusion of adjudication.

The shadow of Sarbananda Sonowal

The judgment also sits within the continuing shadow of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India and its subsequent sequel, both of which fundamentally reshaped Assam’s citizenship regime. Those decisions are frequently invoked by the State to justify stringent detection and deportation mechanisms. However, the jurisprudence emerging from Sarbananda Sonowal is considerably more layered than official narratives often suggest.

While the judgments strongly endorsed mechanisms for identifying “illegal migrants,” they also discussed the need for application of mind, prima facie satisfaction, and foundational material before initiating proceedings.

Similarly, the Gauhati High Court’s own decision in Moslem Mondal recognised that references cannot mechanically proceed without some degree of satisfaction regarding the allegation of foreignness.

These nuances are often overshadowed in contemporary citizenship adjudication, where Section 9 is invoked as though it entirely absolves the State from producing any foundational basis whatsoever.

The present judgment aligns firmly with the stricter strand of this jurisprudence.

Contrasting Realities: When courts accept documentary continuity

The present ruling also sharply contrasts with several other tribunal decisions where courts and Foreigners Tribunals have accepted broader patterns of documentary continuity despite minor inconsistencies.

One such case recently supported by Citizens for Justice and Peace involved Anowara Khatun of Goalpara district, who had similarly been marked a “D-Voter” and subjected to prolonged citizenship proceedings. Detailed report on her case may be read here.

In that matter, the Tribunal accepted decades-old land deeds from 1947, 1952, and 1959, electoral rolls from 1966 and 1970, inheritance records, and oral testimony establishing linkage with her father, Alom Shah, who had long resided in Assam.

Despite poverty, illiteracy, mental health struggles, and years of bureaucratic suspicion, the Tribunal ultimately concluded that Anowara Khatun was an Indian citizen and rejected the State’s allegations.

The contrast between such cases reveals the deeply uneven nature of citizenship adjudication in Assam, where the fate of individuals often turns on how particular tribunals and courts interpret documentary inconsistencies, oral evidence, and historical gaps.

For thousands of marginalised residents, citizenship has become less a stable constitutional status and more an ongoing exercise in documentary survival.

Beyond Law: The human consequences of citizenship adjudication

The present judgment ultimately reinforces the severe evidentiary standards governing Foreigners Tribunal proceedings in Assam. The Court concluded that the petitioner had failed to discharge the burden imposed under Section 9 and accordingly upheld the declaration of foreignness.But beyond the legal reasoning lies a larger and deeply troubling constitutional question.

In Assam, citizenship adjudication no longer concerns merely nationality in the abstract. It determines access to liberty, political participation, livelihood, detention, and belonging itself. Over the years, the architecture surrounding citizenship determination — D-voter tagging, Foreigners Tribunals, NRC exclusions, detention centres, alleged “push-backs,” and prolonged litigation — has created a system in which poor and marginalised communities are repeatedly compelled to prove their existence before the State.

Detailed piece may be read here.

The present ruling therefore does more than decide one individual’s citizenship claim. It reflects the continuing evolution of a legal regime where documentary imperfections increasingly become grounds for exclusion, and where the burden of proving belonging falls most heavily upon those least equipped to navigate the evidentiary demands of the system.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

The Immigrant Expulsion from Assam Act, 1950: Re-evaluating executive powers in light of judicial pronouncements and due process

CJP Assam: A journey without parallel, evolving & expanding rights jurisprudence

Assam’s “Doubtful Citizens”: CJP secures justice for Anowara Khatun, declared Indian citizen after decades of state persecution

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Assam’s New SOP Hands Citizenship Decisions to Bureaucrats: Executive overreach or legal necessity?

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The agitation, organised under the banner of the Kanda Utpadak Shetkari Kranti Mahamorcha, drew large participation from onion growers across Nashik — one of India’s largest onion-producing regions — and was supported by leaders of the opposition Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA), including Rohit Pawar, Harshvardhan Sapkal and Ambadas Danve.

Demonstrations by different lots of farmers in a few thousands at the APMC’s procurement offices across districts culminated in a 10,000-strong blockade on the highway with several thousand being detained/arrested by the police. Apart from the protesting farmers, Opposition leaders who stood with protesting farmers in support were also detained. Harshvardhan Sakpal, President of the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee (MPCC), Rohit Pawar, Member of Vidhan Sabha (MLA) from Karjat from the NCP-Sharad Pawar (NCP-SP) and Ambadas Danve, former Leader of the Opposition in the State Assembly from Shiv Sena-Udhav Thackeray.

According to a report published by Rural Voice, nearly 1,500 farmers gathered in Chandwad town and temporarily blocked traffic on the highway while demanding remunerative prices for onions amid a steep crash in market rates. Farmers argued that the current prices being offered in markets are far below their production costs and have pushed cultivators into severe distress. The report noted that onion wholesale inflation has remained negative since March 2025, while retail inflation has stayed negative since May 2025, reflecting a prolonged decline in prices that has sharply reduced farmer earnings.

Across several other media reports, farmers repeatedly highlighted the widening gap between cultivation costs and market returns. The New Indian Express reported that onion growers were demanding procurement at ₹32 per kilogram while prevailing market prices in parts of Maharashtra had reportedly crashed to as low as ₹4–6 per kilogram. Farmers and opposition leaders argued that the current rates are insufficient even to recover the cost of seeds, fertilisers, labour, storage and transport.

The immediate trigger for the protest was the Centre’s announcement of onion procurement through NAFED and NCCF at revised rates of approximately ₹1,580 per quintal. Farmer groups rejected the procurement price as grossly inadequate. Speaking during the protest, several cultivators stated that onion production itself costs roughly ₹1,800–2,000 per quintal, making the government’s procurement rate economically unviable. The Hindu quoted one farmer saying that cultivators were “not even able to recover the cost of production after selling onions.”

Farmer organisations demanded that procurement prices be increased substantially, with various groups seeking rates between ₹2,400 and ₹3,000 per quintal. Protesters also called for compensation for farmers who had already sold onions at distress prices over recent months. Reports in National Herald, Mid-Day and The Times of India noted that growers additionally demanded expanded procurement operations across onion-producing talukas, direct intervention in markets, and stronger implementation of price deficiency payment schemes.

The protest also reflected growing anger over repeated export restrictions imposed on onions over the past several years. Farmers alleged that unstable export policies and sudden government interventions had weakened India’s onion trade and severely damaged farmer incomes. According to The Hindu, opposition leaders argued that international markets, including Bangladesh, had increasingly reduced onion imports from India due to inconsistent export policies.

The demonstrations quickly escalated into a large-scale highway blockade. Multiple media outlets, including The Times of India and The Economic Times, reported that protesters marched from the Chandwad APMC to the Mumbai–Agra highway, blocking traffic for nearly 90 minutes to two hours. Long queues of vehicles formed on both sides of the road as farmers raised slogans, dumped onions onto the highway and wore garlands made of onions as a symbol of their distress.

Some protesters also distributed Melody toffees during the agitation in a symbolic political gesture directed at the Prime Minister after recent public attention around the confectionery brand. The Economic Times reported that protesters sarcastically remarked that if onions were promoted in the same way, perhaps their prices too would rise.

Police later intervened and detained several protesters and opposition leaders, including Harshvardhan Sapkal (INC) Rohit Pawar (NCP-SP), and Ambadas Danve (SS-UBT). According to The Times of India, more than 300 police personnel, including riot control units, were deployed to manage the situation. The report stated that over 50 protesters were detained under provisions of the Bombay Police Act before being released later.

While authorities alleged that some protesters attempted to deflate the tyres of stranded vehicles, opposition leaders claimed they had instructed demonstrators not to target ambulances, public transport or ordinary civilians. Nevertheless, the confrontation underscored the intensity of frustration among onion growers, many of whom say they have been trapped in recurring cycles of debt, price crashes and policy uncertainty.

Importantly, the Nashik protests are not an isolated flashpoint. They reflect a broader agrarian crisis that has repeatedly surfaced in Maharashtra’s onion economy over the past decade. Farmers participating in the agitation argued that while the costs of cultivation have steadily increased due to fertilisers, pesticides, labour, transport and storage expenses, government interventions have largely focused on controlling consumer prices rather than ensuring farmer incomes.

Several farmer leaders warned that continuing distress sales and unstable pricing policies could intensify indebtedness and deepen the agrarian crisis across onion-producing regions of Maharashtra. As protests spread beyond Nashik into areas including Sambhaji Nagar and Solapur, the demonstrations have once again drawn national attention to the fragile economics of onion cultivation — a sector where even minor policy shifts can determine whether farmers survive a season or sink further into debt.

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The post “₹4 a Kilo for a Crop That Costs ₹20 to Grow”: Nashik’s onion farmers erupt in protest over deepening price crisis appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Appearing before a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice Vipul Pancholi, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta stated that the Union had decided, “keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,” to facilitate the return of the deported individuals and examine their claims to Indian citizenship in accordance with law.

“My instructions are, the Government will bring them back, and thereafter will examine their status, and depending on the outcome, will take steps accordingly,” the Solicitor General submitted before the Court, reported LiveLaw.

Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, appearing for the affected individuals, urged the Court to formally record the Union’s assurance. The Solicitor General agreed, while clarifying that the statement was being made in the exceptional circumstances of the present case and should not be treated as a precedent for future matters involving deportation or citizenship disputes.

As per LiveLaw, recording the submission, the Supreme Court passed an order stating: “The Solicitor General of India submits that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and by not treating it as a precedent to be followed in other instances, the Government of India has decided to bring the respondents back to India and to verify the claim of Indian citizenship. Their continuation in India will depend on the outcome of such enquiry.”

The Solicitor General informed the Bench that the process of bringing the individuals back from Bangladesh could take approximately eight to ten days.

The proceedings arise out of a series of habeas corpus petitions concerning Bengali-speaking families who were deported to Bangladesh in June 2025 during identity-verification operations allegedly conducted under a Ministry of Home Affairs directive. In September 2025, the Calcutta High Court had directed the repatriation of several deported persons, including Sunali Khatun, her husband Danish Sekh and their minor son Sabir Sekh, as well as Sweety Bibi and her two sons, Kurban and Imam. The High Court had sharply criticised the “hot haste” with which the deportations were carried out, observing that the affected individuals were removed without adequate inquiry, without a meaningful opportunity of hearing, and in apparent violation of procedural safeguards contained in the Union Government’s own guidelines.

The present development marks a substantial shift in the Union’s position. Earlier, in December 2025, the Centre had agreed to facilitate the return of Sunali Khatun—who was then in an advanced stage of pregnancy—and her young son on what it described as “purely humanitarian grounds.” At the time, the Supreme Court had underscored the need to balance legal enforcement with humanitarian considerations, remarking that some situations required “law to bend to humanity.”

That earlier intervention had followed disturbing findings by the Calcutta High Court regarding the manner in which the deportations were executed. According to the pleadings before the High Court, the affected families, originally from West Bengal but residing in Delhi for livelihood, were detained during an identity-verification exercise and deported to Bangladesh within five days. The High Court had noted that documentary material, including electoral records relating to the deportees’ family members, prima facie indicated Indian lineage and warranted a fuller inquiry before any coercive action could be taken.

While the Union Government has consistently maintained that the deportations were lawful and that the citizenship claims remain disputed, Friday’s undertaking before the Supreme Court indicates that the affected individuals will now be given an opportunity to establish their nationality status within India before any further steps are contemplated.

Related:

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From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

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CJP Win! Gauhati HC stays deportation of Ajabha Khatun, will address bail demand on April 4

The post Bhodu Sekh Case: Union agrees before Supreme Court to repatriate deported Bengali-speaking individuals pending citizenship inquiry appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In Reham Ali v. UT of J&K, decided on May 13, 2026, Justice Rahul Bharti held that the allegations against the detenue, even if accepted at face value, pertained to issues of “law and order” and not “public order” — a constitutionally crucial distinction that determines whether preventive detention laws may legitimately be invoked.

The Court was hearing a habeas corpus petition filed by Reham Ali challenging his detention under Section 8(1)(a) of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. The detention order, issued by the District Magistrate, Jammu on October 28, 2025, alleged that Ali’s activities were “prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.”

According to the police dossier submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Jammu, Ali had been implicated in seven FIRs between 2022 and 2025. The authorities relied on these FIRs to portray him as a habitual offender involved in “bovine smuggling,” arguing that substantive criminal law had proved insufficient to restrain him.

However, the High Court noted that all seven FIRs stemmed from a common set of allegations — offences under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 concerning the transportation of cattle or bovine animals.

The judgment carefully dismantled the administration’s attempt to elevate these allegations into a “public order” issue warranting preventive detention. Justice Bharti observed that, at its highest, the allegations disclosed a conventional law-and-order problem capable of being addressed through the ordinary criminal justice system.

The Court stated:

“This Court has no hesitation to hold that the preventive detention of the petitioner is misconceived by reference to maintenance of Public Order as the petitioner, at the best, is a problem on the law and order side for which the provisions of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 are fully equipped if those are meant to be activated by the law and enforcement agency in realistic manner, but since the District Magistrate, Jammu has come up with a very apologetic assessment that ordinary law of the land has failed that assessment cannot form a basis for ordering preventive detention of a person to deprive him of his fundamental right of personal liberty.” (Para 13)

In a particularly sharp observation, the Court criticised the District Magistrate’s reasoning that ordinary criminal law had “failed” to curb the petitioner’s activities. The judgment held that such an assessment cannot justify suspending a person’s liberty through preventive detention.

The Court’s reasoning is significant because preventive detention jurisprudence has consistently drawn a distinction between breaches of “law and order” and disturbances affecting “public order.” While ordinary criminal offences may disrupt law and order, preventive detention is constitutionally permissible only where activities threaten the even tempo of public life or create wider societal disorder. The judgment reiterates that preventive detention cannot become a shortcut for perceived inadequacies in investigation, prosecution, or enforcement under ordinary criminal law.

The Court also took note of the procedural history of the detention. Ali had been taken into custody on November 1, 2025 and supplied with a 174-page compilation relating to his detention. By the time the petition was adjudicated, he had already undergone six months of preventive detention out of the maximum permissible period of one year.

During the hearing, counsel for the petitioner relied on an earlier decision of the same Bench in HCP No. 4/2024 (Hamid Mohd.), where a similar preventive detention order had been examined.

Ultimately, the Court allowed the habeas corpus petition, quashing both the detention order dated October 28, 2025 and the subsequent approval/confirmation order issued by the Union Territory administration. The authorities were directed to immediately release the petitioner from District Jail Poonch or any other place of detention.

The complete order may be read below:

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The judgment is remarkable for three interconnected reasons. First, it forcefully restores the constitutional framework laid down in KA Najeeb, which had recognised prolonged incarceration and delay in trial as an independent ground for bail despite the statutory rigours of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA. Second, it openly expresses “serious reservations” regarding the correctness of the January 2026 ruling in Gulfisha Fatima v. State — the judgment that denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots larger conspiracy case. Third, it mounts a broader institutional critique against the gradual dilution of larger-bench constitutional precedents through restrictive interpretation by smaller benches.

The judgment must therefore be read not simply as a bail order, but as a constitutional correction to the increasingly punitive trajectory of UAPA jurisprudence.

The Constitutional Foundation: Bail as a principle of liberty, not mere procedure

One of the most significant contributions of the judgment lies in the Court’s attempt to relocate the principle of bail from the narrow confines of statutory criminal procedure into the broader domain of constitutional liberty.

Justice Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, authoring the judgment for both him and Justice Nagarathna, observed:

“The often invoked phrase ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception’ is not merely an empty statutory slogan flowing from the CrPC as Gurwinder has stated. It is a constitutional principle flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and the presumption of innocence which is the cornerstone of any civilised society governed by the rule of law.” (Para 35)

This paragraph is foundational to understanding the judgment. The Court is consciously rejecting the tendency to treat bail merely as a discretionary procedural question. Instead, it roots the concept directly in constitutional structure — specifically Article 21’s guarantee of personal liberty and the presumption of innocence that underlies criminal justice systems governed by the rule of law.

The significance of this reasoning becomes even more pronounced in the context of UAPA prosecutions. Over the past several years, courts have increasingly approached bail under anti-terror statutes through the lens of statutory embargoes alone, often reducing constitutional scrutiny to a secondary consideration. The Andrabi judgment reverses that hierarchy.

The Court unequivocally held:

“The statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) must remain a circumscribed restriction that operates subject to the guarantee of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, we have no manner of doubt in stating that even under the UAP Act, ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception’; of course, in an appropriate case, bail can be denied having regard to the facts of that particular case.” (Para 35)

This observation is doctrinally critical because it clarifies that Section 43D(5) does not override constitutional guarantees; rather, it operates within constitutional limitations. In other words, the Constitution remains supreme even in national security prosecutions. This is perhaps the strongest reaffirmation in recent years that anti-terror legislation cannot create a parallel constitutional order where liberty stands suspended indefinitely.

Reaffirmation of KA Najeeb and the constitutional right against endless pre-trial incarceration

The central doctrinal axis of the judgment is its reaffirmation of Union of India v. KA Najeeb.

The Court repeatedly emphasised that KA Najeeb had already settled the principle that constitutional courts retain the power to grant bail under the UAPA where prolonged incarceration and delay in trial render continued detention constitutionally unjustifiable.

The bench noted that KA Najeeb specifically recognised the structural dangers inherent in Section 43D(5). Because the provision creates an exceptionally stringent threshold for bail, trials that move slowly can result in undertrials remaining imprisoned for years before guilt is determined.

The Court observed:

“A plain reading of Najeeb will show that it was trying to prevent precisely this possibility from arising when it cautioned that Section 43-D(5) must not become ‘the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.” (Para 27.8)

This paragraph is perhaps the conceptual heart of the judgment.

The Court is acknowledging that when bail adjudication is governed exclusively by Section 43D(5), and trials continue indefinitely, the criminal process itself begins to inflict punishment irrespective of conviction. The danger identified is not merely procedural delay, but the transformation of pre-trial detention into substantive punishment.

The Andrabi judgment therefore restores the original constitutional logic of KA Najeeb: anti-terror statutes cannot be interpreted in a manner that destroys the right to speedy trial.

Importantly, the Court rejects the argument that KA Najeeb applies only in extraordinary or narrowly exceptional situations.

The Court stated:

“…we make it clear that Najeeb is binding law entitled to the protection of stare decisis. It cannot be diluted, circumvented, or disregarded by trial courts, High Courts or even by Benches of lower strength of this Court.” (Para 39)

This is a direct response to the narrowing interpretations that emerged in later judgments.

Direct Critique of Gulfisha Fatima and Gurwinder Singh

One of the most extraordinary aspects of the ruling is the Court’s explicit criticism of Gulfisha Fatima v. State and Gurwinder Singh v. Union of India.

The Court observed that both judgments appeared to take a “divergent view” from the law laid down in KA Najeeb.

The Bench stated:

“In our view, the decision in Gurwinder inasmuch as it refuses to be bound by Najeeb, is difficult to be followed by us as a matter of precedent. It is plain that a judgment rendered by a Bench of lesser strength is bound by the law declared by a Bench of greater strength. Judicial discipline mandates that such binding precedent must either be followed or, in case of doubt, be referred to a larger Bench. A smaller Bench cannot dilute, circumvent, or disregard the ratio of a larger Bench.” (Para 27.2)

This observation has enormous institutional significance. The Court is effectively warning against a judicial technique where binding precedents are not expressly overruled, but are instead gradually weakened through restrictive interpretation. Such an approach undermines certainty in constitutional adjudication and destabilises the doctrine of precedent.

The Court’s criticism becomes particularly important because both Gulfisha Fatima and Gurwinder Singh, authored by Justice Aravind Kumar, had significantly narrowed the scope of KA Najeeb.

In Gulfisha Fatima, the Court had held that KA Najeeb applied only in exceptional cases. The present bench expressly disagreed with that understanding.

The Court also expressed “serious reservations” regarding the direction in Gulfisha Fatima effectively preventing the accused from seeking bail for one year. This criticism is constitutionally significant because bail adjudication necessarily involves continuing judicial supervision over deprivation of liberty. A blanket embargo on future bail applications risks freezing constitutional scrutiny despite changing trial circumstances.

Rejection of the “two-prong test” and the recognition of punitive pre-trial detention

The judgment contains a particularly powerful critique of the “two-prong test” evolved in Gurwinder Singh.

Under that approach, bail could be considered only if:

1. there was prolonged incarceration; and
2. the accused could also demonstrate that the prosecution case lacked prima facie merit.

The Supreme Court rejected this formulation outright.

Justice Bhuyan observed:

“If this twin-prong test is accepted, the State need only satisfy a low prima facie threshold while the trial may continue for years with the result that pre-trial incarceration begins to acquire a post-trial punitive character and even then, no court could ever grant bail no matter the length of period of such incarceration because the case stood prima facie made out against the accused.” (Para 27.8)

This paragraph is one of the strongest judicial recognitions yet of the phenomenon commonly described as “process as punishment.” The Court identifies the structural reality of UAPA prosecutions: once the State crosses the low threshold of prima facie satisfaction under Section 43D(5), undertrials may remain imprisoned for years because trials move slowly and courts refuse to reconsider liberty claims.

The Court correctly recognised that in such circumstances, incarceration ceases to be preventive or regulatory and instead becomes punitive — despite the absence of conviction. The judgment therefore rejects the idea that constitutional courts must indefinitely defer to prosecutorial allegations where the criminal process itself becomes oppressive.

Limiting the reach of Watali

The Court’s treatment of NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali is another crucial aspect of the judgment. Watali has frequently been used to argue that courts should not meaningfully scrutinise prosecution evidence at the bail stage in UAPA cases.

The present bench clarified:

“The position of law emerging from Najeeb and Sk. Javed Iqbal is therefore clear: Watali cannot be invoked to justify indefinite incarceration of the accused under the UAP Act. For the aforesaid reasons, the attempt in Gurwinder to read Watali as laying down a general rule of denial of bail notwithstanding the period of incarceration is difficult to reconcile with this Court’s own subsequent clarification of what the ratio in Watali actually meant.” (Para 27.6)

This clarification is significant because Watali has often functioned in practice as a near-automatic barrier against bail. The Andrabi judgment restores doctrinal balance by clarifying that Watali cannot be interpreted in isolation from constitutional guarantees and from KA Najeeb.

Even where a prima facie case exists, constitutional courts remain obligated to assess whether prolonged incarceration and delayed trial have rendered continued detention unconstitutional.

The Court’s Reliance on NCRB Data: An empirical critique of UAPA incarceration

One of the most striking features of the judgment is its reliance on empirical conviction data.

Referring to NCRB statistics placed before Parliament by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, the Court observed:

“…it is evident that the country-wide percentage of conviction under the UAP Act for the five years comprising the period 2019-23 hovers between 2% to 6%. In other words, there is 94% to 98% possibility of acquittal in such cases in the country. When it comes to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the percentage of conviction is abysmal, to say the least. For the aforesaid period, the annual rate of conviction is always less than 1%. It means that at the end of the trial, there is 99% possibility of acquittal in such cases. With these kind of statistics staring at our face, the question is, should we continue the detention of the appellant or defer the consideration to a later stage, simply because the charges are serious?” (Para 42.3)

This reasoning is extraordinary because the Court explicitly connects low conviction rates with the constitutional legitimacy of prolonged detention. Ordinarily, anti-terror jurisprudence focuses almost exclusively on allegations and national security considerations. The Andrabi judgment shifts attention to outcomes: if acquittal rates are overwhelmingly high and trials take years, then prolonged incarceration cannot be justified solely on the basis of accusation.

This represents a subtle but important constitutional shift. The Court is effectively recognising that the practical operation of the UAPA must be assessed not only in theory but also through its systemic consequences.

Article 21, Speedy Trial, and the Constitutional Crisis of Delay

The Court repeatedly foregrounded Article 21 and the right to speedy trial by observing:

“We do not want to join issue any further with the two-Judge Bench either in Gurwinder Singh or in Gulfisha Fatima. As noted supra, Gurwinder Singh has already been explained in Sheikh Javed Iqbal and in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh, reiterated in Arvind Dham, this Court has categorically held that Article 21 applies irrespective of the nature of the offence. Ideally, more serious the accusations are, the speedier the trial should be.” (Para 40)

This statement directly challenges the prevailing judicial logic where grave allegations often justify more restrictive bail standards and slower constitutional scrutiny. The Court instead inverts the framework: the greater the seriousness of allegations, the greater the constitutional obligation upon the State to ensure expeditious adjudication.

The judgment therefore recognises that prolonged detention without trial is not merely an administrative problem; it is a constitutional injury.

The Court’s reasoning implicitly acknowledges a larger systemic reality: UAPA trials often involve enormous witness lists, voluminous documentary records, and prolonged delays that make timely completion virtually impossible. When combined with restrictive bail standards, this creates a carceral structure where accused persons may spend years imprisoned irrespective of eventual guilt or innocence.

Conclusion: A constitutional warning against “punishment through process”

The Andrabi judgment ultimately functions as a constitutional warning against the gradual normalisation of punitive pre-trial detention under anti-terror laws.

The Court restores several foundational propositions:

• that Article 21 survives even in UAPA prosecutions;
• that Section 43D(5) cannot eclipse constitutional liberty;
• that KA Najeeb remains binding law;
• that Watali cannot justify endless incarceration;
• that smaller benches cannot dilute larger-bench precedents;
• and that prolonged delay itself may render detention unconstitutional.

Most importantly, the judgment recognises a reality that has increasingly shaped anti-terror prosecutions in India: where trials take years, conviction rates remain exceptionally low, and bail thresholds are interpreted rigidly, incarceration itself becomes the punishment.

The Court’s intervention is significant precisely because it identifies this not merely as a policy concern, but as a constitutional crisis.

Related report may be read here.

The complete judgment is attached below:

Related:

Supreme Court reasserts KA Najeeb, warns against “hollowing out” constitutional protections in UAPA cases; questions Umar Khalid bail verdict

CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal

NSA slapped on journalist, DU scholar in Noida workers’ protest case amid allegations of crackdown on dissent

Caged Voices, Silenced Truths: FSC’s expansive indictment of India’s press freedom crisis

From Cow Slaughter to “Public Order”: Allahabad High Court’s expanding use of preventive detention

The post Andrabi Judgment: Section 43D(5) UAPA cannot override right to speedy trial, restores primacy of Article 21 in UAPA cases appeared first on SabrangIndia.

However, only time can answer whether this was merely a display of rivalry between the two competing power centres within the Congress government — Siddaramaiah and D.K. Shivakumar — or a sign of the emergence of a new one. Likewise, the criticisms made by the opposition BJP regarding the Congress government’s three-year rule carry neither genuine public concern nor sincerity.

All these are discussions and critiques driven by the ruling circles’ own power interests. They attempt to portray their class interests as public interest. Therefore, these mainstream discussions should not overshadow the real questions concerning the people — namely, whether the Congress government has brought real winds of change into the lives of the people of Karnataka in the past three years.

Should not this be the fundamental question?

In 2023, the people of Karnataka, who had been distressed by the continuous attacks carried out by the Bommai-led Sangh-affiliated BJP government against Muslims, Dalits, and the poor of this land, brought the Congress government to power with a clear majority. Compared to the BJP, Congress received 7% more votes (43%) and won 70 more seats (136 seats).

In its manifesto and budget speeches, the Congress party had promised to provide a genuine alternative to the BJP government. In particular, it assured communal harmony, punishment for divisive forces, social justice, welfare, guarantees, and people-oriented development.

Although politically aware sections and large parts of the public may not have had very high expectations regarding these promises, the disappointments and betrayals committed by the Siddaramaiah government over the past three years have exceeded expectations.

In fact, when the Siddaramaiah government completed two and a half years, several scholars under the leadership of a Bengaluru civic organization conducted a detailed study of the government’s budget promises and their implementation and released a comprehensive report. According to that report, even after half the government’s tenure had passed, only 6% of the budget promises had been fulfilled. The remaining 94% were categorised as promises that had either not yet begun, had begun but were limping along, or had still not been fully implemented. The report identified lack of resources, lack of political will, and administrative negligence as the primary reasons.

Recently, the Karnataka Muslim Federation also conducted an in-depth study on the promises made by the Congress government to the Muslim community during the last three years and the manner of their implementation, and released its report through a massive convention.

The report mainly exposed the immense political irresponsibility shown by the government in failing to curb Hindutva oppressive forces that continue targeting the Muslim community even after three years, in not repealing laws introduced by the BJP government specifically to harass Muslims, in failing to provide adequate representation to Muslims within the party and government, and in protecting the state from the SIR measures currently being implemented by the Modi government allegedly to further marginalise Muslims. The organisation also warned of massive resistance if time-bound solutions were not provided.

Read reports on this initiative here and here.

In addition, various farmers’, workers’, Dalit, student-youth, women’s, transgender, slum dwellers’, and minority organizations have individually and collectively criticised several policies implemented by the Congress government over the last three years through their struggles and protests.

Taken together, all these constitute a public review of the Congress government’s three years in power.

At a time when the Congress government is celebrating its third anniversary with self-deception and self-indulgence, these public reviews must be used to examine the government’s promises. In particular, there is a need to remind people of the disillusionments experienced over the past three years regarding communal harmony, social justice, welfare of the poor, and development.

Communal Harmony or Soft Hindutva?

As soon as the Congress came to power, it had promised to consider banning the Bajrang Dal. But immediately after assuming office, the respected Home Minister performed a ceremonial foot worship (Padapooja) of Pejawar Swamiji, regarded as a spiritual patron of the Bajrang Dal, at  his  residence and declared that there was no proposal to ban the organization. According to studies, such organisations have been responsible for 270 communal incidents over the last three years. Whenever public pressure increased, the government merely registered FIRs and washed its hands of the matter.

On the other hand, in support of the saffronisation of the Baba Budan Dargah — considered one of the root causes for the BJP’s rise in Karnataka — the Congress government also agreed to appoint Vedic priests at the dargah! The anti-cow slaughter law and anti-conversion law introduced by the BJP government have still not been repealed. Only after suffering setbacks in the Davanagere by-election and realising that Muslims were prepared to organise warning conventions against the Congress despite all pressure, did the government reluctantly withdraw the hijab order.

Furthermore, as the West Bengal elections have reportedly made clear, the Election Commission’s implementation of SIR under Modi’s direction is primarily aimed at denying citizenship rights to Muslims. SIR is set to begin in Karnataka from June. Yet even on this issue, the Congress government’s stance appears mute indirectly helping SIR. After repeated perusal by the civil society organisations and protest movement on the streets, the cabinet met recently and deliberated about the SIR problems. Even though a larger meeting of the leaders of the Congress party and Minsiters has been scheduled to discuss the way in which it could intervene, it has been clubbed with the agenda of discussing upcoming Greater Bangalore Authority (GBA) and other local body elections. The Government is not even thinking of approaching the SC pleading to postpone the Third Phase of SIR until it settles the question of Unconstitutionality of the SIR or the question ill-intentioned Logical Discrepancy or the SC;s own promise of looking into specific issues where the SIR deletions is more than the margin of victory, which has happened in at least 83 constituencies all favouring BJP!

Behind all this lies not a commitment to communal harmony, but rather “soft Hindutva” — the fear that taking a stand for truth and justice may invite accusations of being anti-Hindu and result in losing Hindu votes.

Thus, the Congress government is not defeating the BJP. Instead, by continuing the BJP’s policies, it is helping the BJP to further its agenda. The Congress government is implementing BJP-style policies to such an extent that people may begin to wonder whether they elected Congress or BJP to power.

Social Justice or Injustice?

The deliberate delay in implementing the internal reservation policy, along with the manner of its implementation that allegedly harms the most oppressed communities, both serve as evidence that the Siddaramaiah government is continuing social injustice in much the same way as the BJP.

In particular, nomadic communities categorized as extremely backward were grouped within “Group C” alongside socially advanced touchable castes among Scheduled Castes, and allocated only 4.5% reservation, resulting in severe injustice. Although the law passed with BJP support during the Belagavi session created an additional internal reservation within Group C — reserving the fifth of the first five positions for nomadic castes — it also provided that if eligible candidates from nomadic communities were unavailable, those positions could be filled by touchable Scheduled Castes, thereby creating yet another layer of injustice.

Additionally, in the response prepared for submission to the court, the government reportedly argued that nomadic communities are socially as advanced as Lambani-Bhovi groups and therefore were included in Group C — a position described here as deeply unjust.

Beyond this, there continues to be neglect regarding implementing the much-needed internal reservation within the ST community and increasing the existing 17% reservation for Dalits to 24% along with constitutional protection for the same.

Although the Congress manifesto promised that resources for the guarantee schemes would be generated through development and administrative efficiency, none of this was done. Instead, every year ₹12,000–14,000 crore is being diverted from the SCSP-TSP fund — which was meant to reduce welfare and development disparities affecting SC and ST communities and the wider society — thereby worsening social injustice.

The Kantharaj Commission report, which was specifically constituted to ensure social justice, was withdrawn under pressure from socially dominant groups. Likewise, the newly constituted Nayak report has allegedly been prevented from being published.

All this, according to the writer, proves that the Congress government too is continuing the BJP’s deceptive policies regarding social justice.

Congress Government – BJP Bulldozer?

The demolition of the huts of the economically marginalised in both Kogilu and Thanisandra was carried out by the Congress government’s bulldozer. Across the country, it is BJP bulldozers that are rendering lakhs of poor people homeless, but in Karnataka the Congress has taken up that contract. Is there then really any difference between the BJP and Congress in this regard?

The bulldozer has become a symbol of the oppressive and anti-poor development model followed in this country. BJP governments use bulldozers treating people as though they are not even citizens, then classify the displaced as Hindu or Muslim to carry out communal politics. That is social injustice — uncivilised and inhuman.

However, even the Siddaramaiah government, which makes claims commitment to social justice, is running bulldozers overnight and pushing poor slum dwellers onto the streets. Street vendors are displaced to make way for luxury malls. Though slums lack drinking water, tunnel roads costing ₹24,000 crore are being built for car users. Through the Greater Bengaluru Authority, a city for the privileged is being created. For this, thousands of acres of farmers’ land in Devanahalli, Anekal, and Bidadi are sought to be forcibly acquired.

Even though lands acquired from farmers in Devanahalli were reportedly returned after protests, several deceptive and corporate-friendly conditions were imposed so that farmers would not remain complete owners of their land.

What difference exists between Modi’s corporate-driven “Developed India,” which legalizes encroachments by builders occupying over 25,000 acres in Bengaluru while criminalizing the poor living in tin sheds and huts, and Siddaramaiah’s “Greater Bengaluru” project for builders — apart from chanting the mantra of social justice?

Likewise, just as the BJP-led central government uses the NEP bulldozer to close down the government schools serving poor children in the remote villages in the name of ensuring excellence in few centres,  the Congress government in Karnataka is using the KPS (Karnataka Public Schools) as a  bulldozer to close down all government primary schools in the vicinity of 5-6 kms to act as feeder to the KPS schools.

If depriving children in remote villages of even basic literacy through the BJP’s NEP is injustice, does the same act become justice when the Congress government follows the same policy in the name of KPS?

A Socialist Land Grab?

On one hand, the Congress government has continued the BJP’s practice of forcibly acquiring fertile agricultural land from farmers for corporate interests. On the other hand, like the BJP, it has remained deaf for over a decade to the demands of landless and homeless people in this state.

Yesterday in Tumakuru, ministers proudly spoke about providing e-Pauti and land survey (darakhastu podi) records to farmers across the state. It is true that those who already possess at least some documentation may benefit from this scheme. But the Siddaramaiah government has rejected 3.4 million applications submitted by poor peasants and agricultural workers — many of whom have survived through bonded labour and tenant farming since Independence — seeking legal rights over the lands they cultivate and sites to build homes.

Despite the Karnataka government owning 1.11 crore acres of land, it refuses the demand to enact a law that would guarantee even one acre of land to landless farmers. Additionally, the Congress government has still not repealed the corporate-friendly APMC Amendment Act introduced by the BJP government.

How, then, is all this any different from the BJP’s position of “land to the wealthy instead of land to the tiller”?

Dissent Mukt Karnataka?

There is little doubt that the Modi government at the Centre seeks not merely a Congress-free India, but an opposition-free India by suppressing dissent. Even though the BJP currently rules at the Centre, it uses UAPA laws originally introduced during the UPA regime to imprison or eliminate dissenters.

But how is the Siddaramaiah-led Congress government in Karnataka fundamentally different?

While the Congress government grants permission to Sangh Parivar groups to conduct hate speeches and marches in every neighbourhood, lane, and street of Bengaluru, it tells protesting farmers in Devanahalli — because the area falls under the Bengaluru Commissionerate — that they cannot protest there and must instead demonstrate only at Freedom Park in Bengaluru, 40 kilometers away.

Even though the Congress party itself has taken a stand against Israel’s attacks on Palestine, the government denies permission even for peaceful protests demanding “No War, We Want Peace.”

During the Naxal surrender process, the Siddaramaiah government assured surrendered Naxals and the civil society groups mediating the process that it was committed to granting them immediate bail and livelihood support, claiming that the Congress government was different from the BJP. But even after one and a half years following this surrender, not only has bail not been granted, even a single case trial has not begun, and all of them continue to languish in prison.

Meanwhile, it is reported that in Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra, BJP governments have reportedly not continued cases against surrendered Naxals. Most of those who surrendered there have either been released without charges or are out on bail.

Similarly, the Congress government has not conducted the necessary investigation into the alleged inhuman killing of unarmed Naxal leader Vikram Gowda, nor punished those responsible. In effect, the Karnataka Congress government too is assisting the BJP’s project of creating a “Naxal-free India.” Furthermore, it is cooperating in body, speech, and spirit with the BJP’s dream of turning India into an authoritarian nation free of dissent.

This does not mean that the BJP is better than the Congress. Certainly not.

The BJP is the Nations’ Menace.
The Congress is Indians’ disappointment.

The BJP is the problem.
The Congress has so far not been the solution but a continuation of the problem.

Even when Siddaramaiah is Chief Minister,
the Congress government softly continues the BJP’s capitalist and Brahminical policies.

The BJP implements the same policies more aggressively.

So, in summary:

Congress and BJP are not One and the same.
But…
the difference is too narrow to pin people’s hopes on.

Therefore, merely changing parties in power will not improve people’s lives.

The illusion that fascism can be defeated through the Congress will not succeed.

At the very least, the past three years of the Siddaramaiah government should dispel that illusion.

To realise the constitutional ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, the country needs another freedom struggle.

Without that, there will be no escape from fascism.

Related:

Karnataka: Hindutva groups call for economic boycott of Muslim vendors at Siddheshwar Temple

In line with the approaching Karnataka polls, BJP MLA KS Eshwarappa gives anti-Muslim speech

Supreme Court takes action amid outrage following Karnataka Judge’s anti-Muslim and gender-insensitive comments in court

The post Three Years of the Congress Government appeared first on SabrangIndia.

That belief is fragile. It can endure for generations and yet weaken quietly, not through dramatic rupture but through gradual shifts in political culture. Institutions may survive, elections may continue, constitutions may remain unchanged, yet the moral foundations of citizenship can erode. The outward form of democracy remains while its inner ethic changes. Secularism is often the first casualty of that transformation, because it is the principle that prevents the majority from confusing its cultural identity with the nation itself.

Secularism is often misunderstood as hostility to religion. In many plural societies, it has meant something more demanding: not the exclusion of religion from public life, but the refusal of the state to privilege one faith as the defining essence of the nation. Religious traditions may shape festivals, language, and collective memory. Public life may remain visibly religious. Yet the political order must preserve equal standing among communities. The state may engage with religions, but it cannot derive its legitimacy from any one of them.

The secular state did not emerge solely from abstract philosophy. It was born from historical exhaustion. Across Europe, centuries of confessional conflict taught societies that political order could not survive if sovereignty belonged to a single religious truth. The memory of the Thirty Years’ War, sectarian massacres, and religious empire produced a practical conviction: citizenship had to supersede creed. Secularism was therefore not conceived as irreligion, but as a political settlement after the discovery that sacred certainty could destroy civil peace.

In India, this insight emerged through a different tragedy. The Partition of India revealed that when religion became the basis of statehood, centuries of coexistence could collapse into mass displacement and violence. The republic that followed chose a radically different path. It refused to define the nation through a single faith despite the overwhelming numerical presence of one religious majority. Citizenship, not belief, became the formal basis of belonging.

That choice was historically remarkable. India was not a homogeneous nation-state but a civilizational mosaic of languages, castes, sects, tribes, and regions. The republic’s founders wagered that diversity could endure not by assimilation but by constitutional equality. Secularism in India, therefore, differed from the Western model of strict separation between church and state. Religion remained visible in public life, and the state often engaged with religious institutions. The principle was not exclusion but equal dignity among communities within a common civic order.

A Shared Inheritance

Indian Muslims are not a peripheral chapter in the story of India; they are among its principal authors. Across centuries, they have helped shape the country’s civilizational fabric through architecture, language, music, governance, scholarship, and commerce. The plural culture that defines much of the subcontinent emerged through sustained exchange among communities, and Muslims were central to that process. To narrate India without this inheritance is to tell only part of its story.

In independent India, this legacy evolved into nation-building. In science and public life, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam embodied the aspirations of a modern republic, shaping India’s missile and space programmes while inspiring generations. In education, Abul Kalam Azad laid the foundations of modern higher learning, while Zakir Husain deepened that vision through scholarship and public service. Leaders such as Rafi Ahmed Kidwai strengthened the early administrative and political architecture of the republic.

In business and industry, Azim Premji transformed Wipro into a global enterprise while redefining corporate philanthropy through education. Yusuf Hamied expanded access to affordable medicine through Cipla, making life-saving drugs widely available and reshaping public health equity.

The republic’s constitutional and institutional foundations also bear this imprint. M. Hidayatullah upheld constitutional continuity during uncertain times, while jurists such as A. M. Ahmadi and M. C. Chagla strengthened the judiciary and the republic’s legal philosophy. Fathima Beevi broke historic barriers as the first woman to serve as a Supreme Court judge. In diplomacy and public life, Asaf Ali represented India in its formative years, while Idris Hasan Latif rose to the highest ranks of national defence.

The symbolic and political foundations of the nation also reflect this shared authorship. Surayya Tyabji contributed to the design of India’s national flag, while her husband, Badaruddin Tyabji, belonged to a distinguished constitutional tradition. The freedom movement was shaped by powerful voices such as Mohammad Ali Jauhar and Shaukat Ali, whose activism was deeply shaped by their mother, Abadi Bano Begum—one of the earliest and most forceful women’s voices of anti-colonial resistance. Alongside them, the reformist and aristocratic legacy associated with the Begum of Awadh represents another important strand of India’s layered political history.

Regional Muslim polities also contributed significantly to institutional and social development. The Nizam of Hyderabad presided over one of the most influential princely states. At the same time, the Begums of Bhopal created an enduring legacy of education, reform, and public welfare that shaped modern institutional culture.

In arts and culture, A. R. Rahman carried Indian music to global audiences, while Bismillah Khan elevated the shehnai into a classical concert instrument. Mohammed Rafi defined the emotional grammar of Hindi film music across generations. In cinema, Dilip Kumar redefined screen acting, while Shah Rukh Khan, Aamir Khan, and Salman Khan became defining figures of modern popular culture. Shabana Azmi, Waheeda Rehman, Naseeruddin Shah, and M. F. Husain further enriched India’s artistic imagination.

In literature and journalism, Qurratulain Hyder explored memory and migration; Khwaja Ahmad Abbas bridged journalism and cinema; M. J. Akbar shaped political commentary; while Rahi Masoom Raza, Ali Sardar Jafri, Kaifi Azmi, and Javed Akhtar expanded the moral and literary imagination of modern India.

Sport reflects the same shared legacy. Mansoor Ali Khan Pataudi, Mohammad Azharuddin, Zaheer Khan, Mohammed Kaif, and Syed Mushtaq Ali shaped Indian cricket across generations. In hockey, Aslam Sher Khan, Mohammad Shahid, and Zafar Iqbal strengthened India’s global standing. Sania Mirza and Syed Modi extended that excellence into international sport.

The significance of these contributions lies not in isolated achievement but in their cumulative pattern—stretching across institutions, disciplines, and generations. Taken together, they show how Indian Muslims have helped build the republic’s scientific capacity, strengthen its democratic institutions, and enrich its cultural and intellectual life. Their presence is not episodic but structural, running through the very architecture of modern India.

The Slow Erosion of Equality

The crisis begins when the majority community ceases to see itself as one part of the nation and comes to regard itself as the nation’s authentic owner. At that point, the distinction between citizenship and cultural inheritance collapses. The nation is no longer understood as a legal community of equals but as the historical possession of one tradition. Minorities retain formal rights, yet their belonging becomes conditional. They are tolerated as residents rather than recognised as equal co-authors of the republic.

This process rarely announces itself as a rejection of democracy. It often advances through democratic means. Elections provide legitimacy. Popular majorities empower governments that claim to restore the historical rights of the majority community. Electoral success is then invoked as proof that the state should reflect the majority’s civilisational identity. Political disagreement becomes cultural betrayal. Opposition is framed not as dissent from government but as disloyalty to the nation itself.

The challenge in India lies less in formal dismantling than in a shift of national self-understanding. Public ceremonies, educational narratives, historical memory, and political rhetoric increasingly align the state with one civilisational story. The constitutional framework remains, yet its symbolic centre changes. A republic founded on equal citizenship risks becoming culturally graded.

Democratic decline seldom begins with the destruction of institutions; it begins with their moral repurposing. Courts may continue to function, universities may continue to teach, and elections may continue to be held. Yet the ethos that animates them shifts. Institutions begin to internalise the assumptions of majoritarian power. Bureaucracies enforce selectively. Public media amplify one narrative. Silence becomes political, because institutions that should resist instead learn to accommodate.

This transformation is not only legal but atmospheric. A society need not revoke rights to alter belonging. It can create insecurity through rhetoric, targeted policing, selective prosecution, and vigilante enforcement. Citizens remain equal before the law on paper, yet feel perpetually scrutinised. Their citizenship remains legal, but no longer emotionally secure. Fear becomes ambient, shaping how people move, speak, worship, and participate.

Memory, Myth, and Majoritarian Power

Such transformations affect institutions beyond minority rights. Universities, media, courts, and civil society depend on the principle that criticism is compatible with citizenship. When the majority’s identity fuses with the nation, dissent becomes suspect. Journalists are portrayed as enemies, scholars as subversive, activists as foreign agents. Institutions survive but lose independence because they are measured against loyalty to the majority’s historical self-image.

A central mechanism of this shift is the rewriting of memory. The majority is encouraged to see itself as historically wronged even while politically dominant. Ancient invasions, medieval empires, colonial humiliation, and modern political contests are woven into one narrative of civilisational injury. Historical complexity gives way to moral drama. The majority becomes the eternal victim whose dominance appears as delayed justice.

This politics of grievance is powerful because it converts dominance into victimhood. Once the majority believes itself threatened, measures that weaken minorities appear defensive. Restriction becomes protection. Exclusion becomes restoration. Citizens are invited to feel simultaneously powerful and aggrieved—heirs to greatness and victims of history.

Majoritarian politics thrives on mythic time. It collapses centuries into a single emotional present. Old conquests become current injuries. Long-dead rulers become contemporary enemies. Memory is mobilised not to understand the past but to authorise the present. In such narratives, reconciliation appears as surrender and pluralism as weakness.

Economic and technological changes intensify this dynamic. Urbanisation dissolves traditional forms of belonging. Economic inequality produces resentment. Social media accelerates the spread of rumours and symbolic conflicts. Political movements fuse cultural nationalism with development, welfare, and strong leadership. Citizens are offered not only economic aspiration but a story of civilisational recovery. The nation becomes an emotional project, and secular restraint begins to appear rootless or unpatriotic.

India and the Global Future of Plural Democracy

What makes secular decline especially dangerous is normalisation. It proceeds through repetition. What once provoked outrage gradually becomes ordinary. Inflammatory speech, selective policing, communal targeting, and symbolic exclusion cease to shock. Citizens adapt. Institutions accommodate the acceptable range of shifts. Democracy may preserve elections while losing the plural ethos that confers moral legitimacy on elections.

This crisis extends far beyond India. Across Europe, the United States, the Middle East, and parts of Africa, majoritarian identities increasingly seek political expression as cultural entitlement. Immigration, demographic change, and economic anxiety create fertile ground for narratives of belonging and exclusion. The stranger becomes a political symbol. Citizenship becomes conditional on cultural conformity.

The global significance of India lies in scale and example. It is the world’s largest democracy and among its most diverse societies. If such a polity can sustain equal citizenship across profound civilizational differences, it strengthens the case for plural democracy everywhere. If it yields to cultural majoritarianism, it reinforces a darker proposition: that deep diversity ultimately requires one dominant identity to govern all others.

This pattern can be seen elsewhere. In Hungary, Turkey, Israel, and the United States, democratic legitimacy has increasingly been invoked to narrow constitutional pluralism. The challenge is no longer whether people can vote. It is whether majorities, after winning, can remain faithful to equality.

Secularism, therefore, matters not as a technical doctrine but as an ethical discipline. It asks the majority to accept restraint. It demands that numerical power not become moral entitlement. It insists that the stranger, the minority, and the dissenter are not outsiders but co-owners of the nation. That discipline is difficult because majoritarian politics offers emotional rewards: belonging, grievance, pride, and historical redemption.

The deeper crisis is moral. Secular democracy depends on a simple but demanding idea: that people can share a political future without sharing a single faith. It asks citizens to value equal rights above inherited hierarchy. It requires the state to treat difference not as a threat but as a condition of freedom.

A secular republic is not secured by courts alone, nor by constitutions, nor by ceremonial declarations of tolerance. It survives only when citizens accept a discipline more difficult than victory: the discipline of sharing power with those they did not choose, do not resemble, and may not fully understand.

When that ethic erodes, democracy may continue procedurally, but its soul changes. Citizenship survives in law but weakens in experience. Belonging becomes graded. The republic becomes a homeland for some and a conditional residence for others.

The siege of secularism is therefore not merely the rise of religious politics. Religion has always shaped public life. The deeper transformation occurs when the state ceases to mediate among communities and begins to embody one community’s historical self-image. At that point, the republic no longer belongs equally to its citizens. It becomes the inheritance of the majority, while others inhabit it by permission.

That is why the future of secularism remains a central question of the twenty-first century. It determines whether democracy can truly sustain equality amid big differences, or whether every plural society eventually yields to the oldest political instinct: that the majority alone owns the nation, and the rest belong only by grace.

…

Moin Qazi is an Indian author and development leader who advanced dignity-centred, community-led change. A pioneer of microfinance and grassroots institutions, he fused ethics with social innovation. With deep interdisciplinary scholarship, he bridged policy, justice, and lived realities. His legacy affirms ethical leadership and people’s agency as drivers of India’s progress…

Courtesy: The New Age Islam

The post The Faultlines In Secularism appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In doing so, as the media have widely reported, the court expressed “serious reservations” regarding several aspects of the apex court judgement through which it denied bail to activists Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, who have been incarcerated, in jail, since 2020.

Besides this observation that has given rise to much public commentary given the clearly split verdict of India’s highest court on the granting of bail under UAPA, the bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan most notably observed in the same judgment that conviction rates in UAPA cases across India remained abysmally low, ranging between 1.5% and 4% from 2019-2023. Even worse still, conviction rates in Jammu and Kashmir have stayed below 1%.

The court therefore noted that these statistics suggest a high probability of acquittal in such cases, reported Live Law.

“For all India figures, we have 2% to 6% conviction, meaning thereby that there is 94% to 98% possibility of acquittal in such cases in the country. In so far as the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, the annual rate of conviction is always less than 1%. It means that at the end of the trial there is 99% possibility of acquittal in such cases,” the bench observed.

The present case and bail conditions

Who is Syed Iftikhar Andrabi? A village-level worker for the Rural Development department in Kupwara district of Jammu and Kashmir, who was taken into preventive detention in August 2019, following the reading down of Article 370, but was released after the high court declared the detention legally untenable. Thereafter, he was subsequently arrested in June 2020 in connection with a National Investigation Agency (NIA) case alleging narco-terrorism activities.

Interestingly, his appeals for bail were denied by both the Special NIA Court as well as the Jammu and Kashmir high court. The prosecution alleged that on information provided by the appellant, drugs and cash were recovered from a co-accused’s premises, further claiming that his phone records linked him to operatives in Pakistan.

According to the May 18, Supreme Court judgment, no evidence was directly recovered from Andrabi’s person or premises, directing to release the appellant on bail, subject to conditions imposed by the special NIA court. The conditions stipulate that the appellant must deposit his passport and appear before the Handwara police station once every fortnight. He is also prohibited from threatening or influencing witnesses.

The UAPA has long since been criticised as an instrument of crushing dissent in India, with numerous activists and journalists slapped with cases under the draconian rule. In Kashmir, the act has seen some of its most controversial use.

Previous analyses of this counter-terror law may be read here, here and here.

Low rates of conviction

Making a reference to official data presented before the parliament by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, drawn from National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) figures covering 2019-2023, the bench stated that the all-India conviction rate in UAPA cases falls between 1.5-4%.

What this means that a person charged under the act faces a 96% to 98.5% probability of acquittal. The court added, “In so far as the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, the annual rate of conviction is always less than 1%. It means that at the end of the trial there is 99% possibility of acquittal in such cases.”

Hence, referring to the high rate of exoneration for the accused in such cases, the court emphasised that “bail is the rule and jail the exception.” Invoking an earlier ruling, Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb, the judgement reiterated that Section 43D(5) of UAPA cannot be used in isolation to deny bail and does not serve as a blanket instrument for prolonged pre-trial detention.

The Order passed by the Supreme Court of India may be read here.

Related:

Supreme Court reasserts KA Najeeb, warns against “hollowing out” constitutional protections in UAPA cases; questions Umar Khalid bail verdict

Supreme Court restores Article 21 safeguards, calls 24-month UAPA custody without charge sheet illegal; sets aside Gauhati HC’s reliance on Sec 43D(7)

Allahabad HC grants bail in UAPA case over WhatsApp video; raises questions on overuse of stringent national security laws

The post UAPA: ‘99% Possibility of Acquittal’: What the SC said on Conviction Rates appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In this wider context, therefore, this attempt, “India Economic & Social Justice Report 2025”, authored by none less than Professor K S Chalam, former Vice Chancellor, Dravida University, Andhra Pradesh and former Member, Union Public Service Commission, Chairman, Institute for Economic and Social Justice, Vishakhapatnam, is both significant and path-breaking. This report analyses the historical, constitutional, and socio-economic landscape of justice in India, with a specific focus on marginalised communities. This report is first of its kind to measure and indicate where both the Union and State governments stand in providing constitutional guarantees of Justice –both economic and social— equally and to all citizens of the country. Inspired by Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), this report has examined several indictors to determine the Economic and Social Justice Index.

Finally, it has fixed following three dimensions.

1: MPCE (monthly per capita expenditure) per family, among Scheduled Castes to signify economic Justice. (The MPCE for ST is not produced because, states the author, it reflects the same trend).

2: Atrocities committed on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe population published by NCRBI

3. Human rights violations as recorded by NHRC are considered for estimating the Index.

The report has followed a statistical method on the lines of UNDP’s HDI. The report presents data for two periods 2011 and 2023. It is surprising to find states that are economically proactive are socially regressive in protecting the SC and ST populations; as a result, the overall ranks of ESJI are getting depressed over a period of time for such states. The report provides data and information on castes, sub castes of SC, ST and OBC population by states with caste wise data on education, economic status, reservations etc given in the Appendix. This analytical appraisal under pioneering concepts reviewing 75 years of the implementation of the Constitution is both profoundly innovative and also, bold.

The text begins with highlighting the concept of “Justice” in the Indian Constitution noting that it was heavily influenced by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who served as the Chairman of the Drafting Committee.  The report cited how Ambedkar argued in the Constituent Assembly that social and economic justice could only be achieved through a socialistic economy, including the nationalisation of land and industry. The Preamble places “Justice—social, economic, and political” as its first element, signalling its role as the ultimate goal of the Republic.  The report emphasises that democracy in India is a “top dressing” on an undemocratic soil, requiring the cultivation of constitutional morality to overcome historical cultures of inequality as its back drop.

The report contrasts Western theories of justice with the Indian social reality of the caste system.  It discusses John Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness” and Amartya Sen’s critique, which utilises the Indian concepts of niti (organizational propriety) and nyaya (realized justice). The text argues that Western libertarian and liberal theories often fail to account for the “caste mode of production” and the “Composite Index of Discrimination” (CID) inherent in Indian society. To assess the achievements and limitations of the Constitution during the last 75 years of its operation, the report identified the instruments and institutions of justice with which they can be interrogated the transactions both in the legislature and in the judiciary. Given the limitations of the scope of the study, it broadly discusses the instruments of justice as legal documents, including Acts, Rights, Rules, Property, Budget provisions, Atrocity rates, Gini Co-efficients etc.

The institutions of Justice in India can be identified as the judiciary, civil society, market, and state represented by the proceedings of Parliament/Assembly and not necessarily the private institutional structures, as the report is concerned here with public documents: the Constitution and Government Reports .The process of delivering or dispensing social justice through the passing of various Acts, such as the SC ST (prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989, including the Protection of Civil Rights Act (prevention of Untouchability) 1955, 1976, and the judicial interpretations or interventions over a period of 70 years, is termed ‘a saga of social justice drama in India’. The report opines that the appointment of the SC, ST, Minorities and Backward Classes commissions indicate the government’s intentions and obligations as per the mandate of the Constitution. However, the imagined constitutional objectives of social justice seem to have not been realized due to litigation. The issue of social justice as part of the routine prevention of untouchability cases is not limited to the broad understanding of the term Dalit at the all-India level and goes beyond. The report brings out a significant fact that some of the untouchables of North India like in UP, Bihar etc are listed as Scheduled castes there and are recorded as Backward Classes (BCs) in South India. It is difficult; the report agrees to understand the social categories without looking at the evolution of each caste group in the social history of India. The report however, has not gone deep in to that dimension here.

The first part of the report examined various aspects of each dimension, namely the Economic and Social measures of justice. After identifying the dimensions, the data was normalised. In the second stage, the indicators for economic justice, consisting of monthly per capita expenditure are considered. The maximum and minimum values of each dimension were obtained from the internal dimensions of the factors considered. For example, the four categories of social groups SC, ST, OBC, and others for which data are made available have been tested as to which group was the most deprived in terms of their mean values, and the group with the least value was used for the calculation of the indicator (the data are given in the appendix Tables not in the text). As noted above, the economic dimension of MPCE adequately explains literacy; therefore, it is dropped at the stage of calculating the index. Finally, the ESJI is arrived at by combining the three dimensions and dividing it by 1 by 3 to arrive at the average and subtracting the value from 1 to arrive at the comprehensive index. The ESJI value indicates deprivation, with zero indicating absolute justice and one indicating Absolute Injustice or Deprivation.

The significant finding of the report is estimation of Wealth Stolen from Native Indians including ‘Untouchables and lower (depressed) castes’ who suffered the loss of lands cleared and cultivated by them. These were ultimately stolen by the traivarnikas[1] with the support of the state, argues the report Native Indians have remained landless and poor. Yet, they were the ones who were involved in the production process and created wealth. The report obtained data from the Madison study on the World GDP and GDP for India from the year 0 to 1973 as published by OECD. The data was used to arrive at the contribution of ‘lower (depressed) castes’ to India GDP and its proportion in the World economy. It is surprising to find that one fourth of the Wealth of the World was created by these ‘depressed’ castes of India amounting to around $ 25 billion in the year 0 and this figure could have reached $ 25 trillion cumulatively by the end of 1000 AD known as the age of conflicts and regional satraps. The Report notes (observes) that a vast portion of India’s historical wealth was created by depressed (lower) castes but appropriated by “non-productive groups”. The report has cited the Oxfam Report on India 2025 to show that the amount of colonial plunder of the British India is almost equal to the amount estimated to have been stolen by the upper castes from Dalits and Bahujans. This is a very important statistic that might, in future, lead to probing debates across activist groups.

A significant portion of the text is dedicated to the unequal distribution of assets and wealth.  Historically, Dalits (Scheduled Castes) were forbidden from owning land, gold, or weapons. As of 2015-16, the average land holdings of Scheduled Castes have dropped to 0.78 hectares, and roughly 58% of them remain landless at all India. The author of the report introduces the concept of “Caste-Based Cronyism,” arguing that modern economic liberalisation has primarily benefited the “Dvija” (upper-caste) groups through Multi-Caste Corporations (MCC), effectively recreating Varnashrama Dharma in the 21st century.

Social Injustice is measured in terms of the atrocities data for SC and ST obtained from the NCRB reports. It is noted that despite Article 17 of the Constitution, the report notes a sharp rise in atrocities. NCRB data shows atrocities on Dalits increased from 17,667 in 1990 to 53,886 in 2020, more than threefold raise.  In the context of women empowerment as part of Social Justice the text of the report recognizes the “Founding Mothers” of the Constitution (e.g., Sarojini Naidu, Amrit Kaur) who fought for women’s rights and the Hindu Code Bill against “blatant sexism” in the Assembly. The judiciary is critiqued for its “non-representative character,” with allegations that it remains influenced by a small number of elite families (as reported by Prof Mark Gallanter etc.), often leading to the acquittal of those accused of atrocities against Dalits implying that it did not result in reducing the intensity of injustice. Apart from the NCRB data, the report makes use of the NHRC data on human rights violations recorded by caste and state to arrive at the Economic and Social Justice Index.

The report proposes a new quantitative tool, the ESJI, inspired by the UNDP’s Human Development Index. This is calculated using the three dimensions: MPCE: Monthly Per Capita Expenditure of SC households, SC and ST Atrocities: Rates recorded by the NCRB per lakh of population and Human Rights Violations: Cases recorded by the NHRC.  The index aims to provide a measurable “deprivation index” where a value of zero indicates absolute justice and one indicates absolute injustice.  The report concludes that while the Constitution provides a mandate for justice, institutional structures—particularly the judiciary and the market have failed to gift justice to the victims and the same have largely helped to reinforce traditional caste-based inequalities rather than dismantling them.

The report notes that Justice is not quantifiable, but its impact can be envisaged in terms of the dimensions through which it affects the human condition. There are several measures developed and used to state the economic circumstances of the people like the PQLI (Physical Quality of Life) Index constructed by ODA in the 1970s. There are other indices that are now being used to quantify and analyse human quality of life, economic and social development indicators along with the aggregate concept of GDP, HDI etc. Against this background, the objective of this report as claimed by the author is to determine where Economic and Social Justice, as defined in the text, stands at different periods of time in India. The values are arranged such that the highest value indicates more deprivation and the lowest value nearing zero indicates perfect justice. The ESJI was 0.212 in 2011 and climbed to 0.305 in 2023. This means that economic and social justice deprivation has almost doubled over 12 years in India.

Economic and social justice are interdependent, complimentary and it is only a comprehensive approach that will tremendously help India grow. Such ‘growth’ is simply not possible unless the fruits of development reach the most marginalised sections. The report examines state wise indicators in terms of the above-mentioned dimensions and found the major former BIMARU states, Bihar, U.P, Rajasthan that are being touted now as improving in terms of economic indicators like per capita income or expenditure, are however consistent in getting higher ranks of deprivations except U.P that records minor change.

In 2011, the ESJI of Bihar was 0.141, M.P 0.184, Rajasthan 0.225 and U.P 0.510. The ESJI for 2023 for Bihar is 0.281, M.P 0.412, U.P 0.443 and Rajasthan 0.433. Uttar Pradesh (UP) that had an index of 0.443 in 2011 has the highest rank among the states now and has lowered its value to 0.470. Rajasthan with 0.480 has replaced U.P in the dubious position of highest rank in 2023.  These five states are listing as the better performing West Bengal 0.040, Assam 0.041, Chhattisgarh 0.074, Tamil Nadu 0.099, Punjab 0.101 and Maharashtra 0.107 in 2011. The same states remained as better though their ranks have altered. In 2023 Assam with 0.077, West Bengal 0.110, Chhattisgarh 0.112, Jharkhand 0.167 and Punjab 0.162 are found to be in a better position with lower ranks. Interestingly Jharkhand a predominantly tribal state joined the ranks of better performed states in 2023 and Maharashtra slid down one mark in its rank.

Among the South Indian states, the ranks of Andhra Pradesh in 2011 was 13 with 0.196, Kerala with 0.317 in 16^th rank were among the lowest five ranks. It is noted that in 2023 Telangana joined the ranks of lowest performing states with 0.380 at the 20th rank and Andhra Pradesh has improved its rank with a value of 0.285. The ranks and values of ESJI are given for all the states and Union Territories are given in the Appendix to the Report.

The author is very pragmatic in accepting the limitations of the study: restrictions in data and the inadequacies of reports of the government for an all-India study of this nature.   However, the estimated indices to quantify and explain how India is performing in terms of the Constitutional objectives of Economic and Social Justice is a first rigorous endeavour and commendable. With all these limitations, this is an excellent report with useful parameters and matrix on economic, social and other related issues. These tables and data are presented in the Appendix of Tables for reference to assist scholars and activists and lead them towards compiling more such indices.

The report is not a simple exercise of research and reflection. The exercise reveals the author’s commitment to the most marginalized peoples, Constitutional categories of persons that were promised justice, economic and social about 75 years ago and who have suffered betrayal for decades since. This section is also the major segment of our population.

The study is not just presentation of figures and statistical tables to substantiate the arguments, but the sheer writing —sentences with emotions carried through the paragraphs reflect the agony and despair the author experienced both as a scholar and perhaps as a silent worker. Frankly speaking, much has been talked about Human Development Reports but they fail to take into account Caste discrimination and other systematic deprivations that are both social as well as political.

Prof K.S.Chalam should be applauded for the effort of producing such a report despite acute hardships of access, especially because most of data relied upon is institutional data. It is also important that the publication of such/similar reports becomes an annual feature to assist and guide policy makers who frame policies for the widest sections of Indians.

We hope that NITI Ayog and other important institution both at the Centre as well as in the states will benefit from these reports and encourage each state to engage with such an approach to publish HDIs on social, economic and political justice. The Institute for Economic and Social justice along with Prof Chalam’s vast experience in socio-economic and political economy studies should continue this exercise and bring in greater nuances into the public debate. The report is an important step in that direction.

Pre-launch orders (before May 31, 2026 are discounted and the price for the single copy is at Rs 400 including postage charges during this period) Contact for copies: Email: Chalamks@hotmail.com

[1] Traivarnikas (or Traivarṇika) is a Sanskrit term referring to the members of the three upper classes (varnas) in traditional Hindu society: the Brahmins (priests/scholars), Kshatriyas (warriors/rulers), and Vaishyas (merchants/traders); the term translates directly to “those of the three colors” or “three classes.” It serves to group these three communities together and distinguish them from the Shudras (laborers) and Avarnas (those considered outside the traditional four-fold Varna system).

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Dr BR Ambedkar: How the ongoing tussle between the BJP and Congress is both limited & superficial

The post India Economic & Social Justice Report 2025: First-ever study measures constitutional justice across union and state governments, have they delivered? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Millions of people sharply criticized the contrast between the approach taken in Karnataka in 2018 and that later adopted in Tamil Nadu. They wondered what strategy or constitutional reasoning lay behind that decision. The Union Government, particularly the Union Home Ministry, also bears responsibility for protecting constitutional federalism in such situations.

If such a long leash could be offered in Bengaluru, could a similar blueprint unfold for Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) leader Vijay in a fractured Tamil Nadu Assembly? In a hypothetical scenario where the state is staring at a deeply divided mandate, what determines who grabs the crown? Is it a masterstroke strategy, a calculated constitutional interpretation, a political illusion, or sheer cinematic magic?

A Matinee Idol as CM

Vijay’s transition from a cinematic powerhouse to a frontline political contender has broken the conventional speed limits of Dravidian politics. As a young Scheduled Caste Christian leader, his political identity carries deep symbolic resonance:

• Breaking the Reservation Mold: Defying traditional identity politics, Vijay chose to contest and win from two unreserved general constituencies.
• Rapid Mainstream Acceptance: Within days of the election results, he transformed TVK from a nascent political startup into a formidable claimant for the Chief Minister’s office.
• Strategic Representation: For his supporters, his ascent represents a generational shift, a rare moment where a Dalit-Christian leader commands center stage in Tamil Nadu without relying on traditional Dravidian umbrellas.

During the height of this post-election instability, the acting Governor of Tamil Nadu, Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar, holding temporary additional charge, maintained a calculated, unusual silence. Free from dramatic public posturing or polarizing declarations, the Raj Bhavan silently allowed the political gears to turn toward an eventually stable resolution.

When TVK initially staked its claim with the backing of roughly 108 legislators, critics pointed out that Vijay lacked an absolute majority. Vijay countered by demanding the right to prove his strength on the floor. This brought a classic constitutional debate back to life: does the “single largest party” hold an inherent right to form a government?

The short answer is no. The phrase “single largest party” is conspicuously absent from the text of the Constitution of India, nor is there any legally binding convention that forces a Governor to invite them first. Once sworn in, the authority of the office is to engineer defections and gather support over several days or weeks.

SC radically redefined federalism.

In the landmark S. R. Bommai v. Union of India case, the Supreme Court radically redefined federalism and gubernatorial discretion. The judgment laid down ironclad principles that directly govern hung assemblies:

• The Assembly Floor is Supreme: Majority support cannot be assessed through headcount lists in Raj Bhavans or resort roll-calls; it must be tested exclusively on the floor of the House.
• No Partisan Preferences: Governors cannot act on personal political whims or align their decisions with partisan agendas.
• Limits on Article 356: The threat of President’s Rule cannot be wielded arbitrarily to dismantle or prevent elected governments.
• No Studio Mandates: Legitimate majorities are manufactured through constitutional processes, not in television studios or luxury hotels.

Commissions and Conventions

While the Constitution is silent, successive expert panels, most notably the Sarkaria Commission and the Punchhi Commission, have outlined a clear hierarchy of preferences for Governors navigating a fractured mandate.

Though these guidelines lack the force of codified law, they heavily guide gubernatorial ethics. In this instance, constitutional strategist Vikas Bansode reportedly advised that the Governor’s primary duty is not just tracking down the biggest single entity, but actively facilitating a regime that promises long-term structural stability.

This explains why a Governor functioning under a BJP-led Central Government acted with unexpected institutional restraint, deviating from past controversies. In places like Goa and Manipur (2017), governors skipped the single largest party (Congress) to invite BJP-led coalitions that demonstrated stable post-poll numbers. Conversely, rushed swearing-in’s in Karnataka (2018) and Maharashtra (2019) ended in public embarrassment and abrupt resignations within days.

Vijay’s transition

Vijay’s transition from a vulnerable claimant with 108 seats to an unassailable leader was a masterclass in quiet political realignment. The operation moved through three distinct phases:

1. The Initial Staking (108 MLAs): On May 5th, Vijay approached Raj Bhavan with a base of 108 legislators. The crucial momentum shift came when 5 Congress MLAs broke ranks to back him. Remarkably, they did this while their party formally remained a part of the DMK-led INDIA alliance—moving like silent grandmasters on a multi-dimensional chessboard.
2. The Governor’s Validation (120 MLAs): Backed by the Bansode stability doctrine, the Governor permitted a floor test once Vijay’s consolidated file reached 120 MLAs.
3. The Coronation (144 MLAs): During the actual voting process on the floor of the House, the numbers swelled dramatically to 144, transforming a fragile minority into an absolute, commanding majority.

Twin titans of Dravidian politics

Vijay’s rise evokes memories of iconic actor-politicians like M.G. Ramachandran, J. Jayalalithaa, and N.T. Rama Rao. Yet, his structural consolidation raises deep, lingering questions about what truly transpired behind the scenes.

If the twin titans of Dravidian politics- the DMK and the AIADMK- wanted to stop TVK, they possessed the combined numbers to do so. Why did they falter?

• The DMK’s Calculated Retreat: Former Chief Minister M.K. Stalin publicly announced that the DMK would not destabilize a TVK government for at least six months. During the final vote, his party staged a strategic walkout rather than voting Vijay down.
• The AIADMK’s Internal Fractures: The AIADMK, traditionally aligned with the BJP, suffered sudden internal rifts at the exact moment of the vote, effectively paralyzing their opposition and indirectly strengthening Vijay’s hand.

Ultimately, this sequence of events enters the realm of political philosophy. Was Vijay the ultimate architect of his own destiny, a lucky beneficiary of a fractured era, or an unsuspecting protagonist in a larger, intricate script written within the quiet corridors of Raj Bhavan? Thus, the Governor steered Tamil Nadu, protecting the constitutional propriety.

While the public witnessed a spectacular, cinematic climb to the apex of power, the real puppeteers steering the strings may choose to remain forever invisible.

Dr. Madabhushi Sridhar, Professor of Media Law, LL.D., Advisor, Mahindra University, Hyderabad.

Courtesy: CounterCurrents

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