According to a report by PTI, the devotees were stopped after crossing into Pakistan through the Attari–Wagah border. Officials allegedly told them, “You are Hindu, you cannot go with a Sikh jatha.” Amar Chand, one of those turned back along with six family members, said that despite having valid travel documents and clearance from Indian immigration, they were refused entry once inside Pakistan.

As per the Hindustan Times report, the jatha of around 1,900 Sikh pilgrims had crossed into Pakistan on Tuesday to participate in the Parkash Purb festivities. Chand’s family, along with seven others from Lucknow, had joined the group intending to offer prayers at prominent gurdwaras, including Nankana Sahib. However, all 14 were sent back by Pakistani officials soon after entering.

As per the HT report, a Punjab intelligence officer posted at the border confirmed the incident, saying: “Those denied entry are Hindus by faith, originally from Pakistan but settled in India for many years. They held valid Indian passports and had obtained immigration clearance from our side. Once they entered Pakistan, officials there examined their documents and returned them to the BSF.”

Interestingly, other Hindu devotees in the same jatha faced no such problems. Palwinder Singh, head of the pilgrimage department of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), which organises the largest pilgrim groups, clarified:

“Nearly 40 Hindus are part of our group this year, and almost all entered Pakistan without any issue. Many Hindu followers of Guru Nanak travel every year for these pilgrimages — they have never been barred on the basis of religion.”

The SGPC jatha will remain in Pakistan until November 13, visiting key Sikh shrines including Gurdwara Panja Sahib (Hasan Abdal), Gurdwara Darbar Sahib (Kartarpur, Narowal), Gurdwara Sacha Sauda (Farooqabad), Gurdwara Dehra Sahib (Lahore), and Gurdwara Rori Sahib (Gujranwala).

Amar Chand recounted that his family had even paid ₹95,000 (Pakistani rupees) for bus tickets after clearing all formalities. “Five officials came and told us to get down from the bus, saying Hindus can’t go with Sikh pilgrims. We were then sent back, and our money was not refunded,” he said. Chand, originally from Pakistan, moved to India in 1999 and obtained Indian citizenship in 2010.

Meanwhile, more than 200 other applicants were stopped at the Indian side of the border as they lacked final approval from the Union Home Ministry.

Earlier, the Indian government had initially decided against sending any jatha to Pakistan this year citing security concerns after Operation Sindoor. However, it later allowed a limited group to proceed under strict conditions.

Under the 1950 Nehru–Liaquat Pact, Sikh pilgrims are permitted to visit Pakistan’s revered shrines on four key occasions each year — Baisakhi, Guru Arjan Dev’s martyrdom day, Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s death anniversary, and Guru Nanak Dev’s birth anniversary.

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As is well known, Kushinagar is one of the most important holy places for Buddhists worldwide, as the Buddha delivered his last sermon here and attained Mahaparinirvana here. Bhadant Gyaneshwar was the most senior Buddhist monk in Kushinagar and had served as President of the Kushinagar Monks’ Association since 2005. He assumed this role after the passing of Bhadant Aniruddha Mahathera of Lumbini. The Kushinagar Monks’ Association was established on December 18, 1952, with Bhadant Chandramani Mahathera as its first President, serving until May 8, 1972. Bhadant Uttikhendariya Mahathera and Achyutananda Mahathera subsequently became Presidents. Bhadant Gyaneshwar Mahathera was thus the sixth President of the Kushinagar Bhikshu Association.

Bhadant Gyaneshwar was born on November 10, 1936, in the village of Jibenji, in the Akyab district of Arakan province, Burma. Arakan is now part of Rakhine State. His childhood name was Aung Ja Wae, and his father was a farmer. Today, Burma is known as Myanmar. Rakhine State remains the most indigenous and largest Buddhist region, though in recent years the treatment of Rohingya Muslims and their plight have drawn considerable international attention.

Bhadant Gyaneshwar had publicly noted that this issue was not so polarised during his time. He recalled that Bengali Muslims had migrated to his region and exploited local people. He vividly remembered events from World War II. In conversations with me, he discussed Myanmar’s diverse ethnicities but emphasised that there was no caste system or untouchability, unlike what he encountered extensively in India. His village, a coastal area with a significant Buddhist population, shaped his early life. Bhadant Gyaneshwar’s mother died during his childhood, causing him great suffering. At a young age, he was drawn to the teachings of Dhamma. On April 12, 1949, he entered a university in Rangoon (now Yangon) to study Pali. On June 3, 1956, after six years of studying Buddhism, he became a shramana and received the name that became known in Hindi as Dnyaneshwar or Gyaneshwar.

Burma was a flourishing centre of Buddhism, and India maintained strong relations with it. In 1954, Burma hosted the Sixth Buddhist Council, attended by Bhante Dharmarakshita. Babasaheb Ambedkar and E.V.R. Periyar also participated in this historic conference in Rangoon. Though only 18 years old, Bhadant Gyaneshwar attended and met Babasaheb Ambedkar. He remembered little of the encounter, being too young to grasp Dr. Ambedkar’s socio-political significance; like other locals, he was there to listen to distinguished guests and serve. The large-scale event held special meaning for him nonetheless.

Buddhist monks from Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Myanmar have long visited India’s historical and religious sites, often saddened by their neglect and dedicating their lives to restoration. Anagarika Dharmapala of Sri Lanka played a pivotal role in reviving Buddhism in India. For context, he fought to restore Buddhist control over the Mahabodhi Temple in Bodh Gaya; his efforts helped revive Buddhism and its heritage across South Asia. He is renowned globally for advancing Buddhist ideas and practices.

Bhadant Gyaneshwar’s parents knew Bhadant Chandramani, as his father followed Buddhism. In 1962, when Bhikkhu Dharmarakshita and Bhikkhu Kittima Mahasthavir learned about Bhadant Chandramani’s declining health—one of India’s most respected monks—their concern deepened. They recognised his efforts to preserve Buddhist Dhamma in Kushinagar and sought someone to care for him while ensuring deep Dhamma knowledge and devotion for the future. By 1962, Bhadant Chandramani’s health had become a worry for the Buddhist community. Accordingly, the two bhikkhus invited 27-year-old Gyaneshwar from Burma to India, directing him to Kushinagar to live with Bhadant Chandramani. Bhadant Gyaneshwar arrived on August 5, 1963, to serve his guru and strengthen Buddhist heritage. From then on, he immersed himself in Indian Buddhist traditions, mastering the local language. He worked for the upliftment of marginalised people and counselled Dhamma practitioners from India and abroad, contributing significantly to Kushinagar’s development.

Bhadant Gyaneshwar possessed a sharp memory and an extraordinary ability to share his vast experiences. He regularly met disciples and people from all walks of life, discussing socio-religious issues. Language was initially a barrier, but he soon became fluent in Hindi and Bhojpuri, travelling worldwide. He continued charitable and social activities initiated by Bhadant Chandramani Mahasthavir. Though unable to return to Myanmar, he maintained ties; the Bhadant Chandramani VIP Guest House in Kushinagar was built with Myanmar Buddhists’ support.

His life exemplified struggle. In conversations with me, he shared key experiences, including efforts to remove unauthorised occupation from land around the Mahaparinirvana site in Kushinagar. These battles—reconstructing sites and reclaiming land—form a long and inspiring story. To adapt to India, he enrolled in local schools, completing high school in 1968, intermediate in 1970, BA in 1973, and MA in 1975 from Buddha Degree College, Kushinagar. He later earned Pali Sahitya Ratna and an LLB degree, reflecting his passion for knowledge.

The Myanmar government honoured him with its highest religious award. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, he could not travel, so the Myanmar Ambassador conferred the title *Abhidhaja Maharatthaguru* in Kushinagar in June 2021. Earlier honours included *Abhidhaja Aggamaha Thaddamma Jotika* (2016), *Aggamaha Pandita* (1993), and *Aggamaha Thaddamma Jotika Daza* (2005) for his service to Buddhism. Bhadant Gyaneshwar became a legal Indian citizen in 1978 and remained President of the Kushinagar Main Temple Bhikshu Sangha until his death.

He was associated with numerous Buddhist religious and charitable organisations and served on the Bodhgaya Mahavihara Administrative Body (appointed by the Bihar government) from 1990 to 2018. 

When I had asked him if Bodh Gaya should remain a Buddhist pilgrimage site, he replied, “Shouldn’t it be handed over to Buddhists as it is the most sacred site for Buddhists.” He advocated transferring all Buddhist sites to Buddhist control. While accepting Archaeological Survey of India oversight for preservation, he noted that global visitors seek not just archaeology but Buddhist teachings. India, as the Buddha’s land, should facilitate this.

Many disciples have become prominent monks strengthening India’s Buddhist movement. Dr. Nanda Ratan Bhante Thero, head of the Sri Lanka Buddha Vihara, met him in 1995 while in Shravasti. He pursued higher education under “Guruji” (as disciples called Bhadant Gyaneshwar). In 1998, Guruji sent him to Myanmar’s International Theravada Buddhist University; he returned to Kushinagar in 1999.

Dr. Nanda Ratan Bhante says Guruji cared deeply for the poorest and most marginalised, prioritising education—especially for girls—and fought caste discrimination and untouchability. Thousands of followers in India and abroad attended his lectures and invitations. At Guruji’s request, Japan’s Maitri Association supported education for hundreds of children within a 10-kilometre radius of Kushinagar. He remained active in Kushinagar’s development.

Bhante Nand Ratan ji cared for Guruji devotedly. Days ago, at a Buddhist prayer meeting at our Prerna Kendra, he asked everyone to wish Guruji health and long life. Today, meeting him where Bhadant Gyaneshwar’s body lay for devotees’ darshan, Guruji was pensive: “We tried our best but could not save him. We wanted him for many more years. This will be my greatest regret.” I have seen Bhante Nand Ratan ji always caring for Bhadant Gyaneshwar. He did everything possible, but some things are beyond human control. Bhadant Gyaneshwar’s presence will be missed, yet his network of followers will carry his legacy forward.

Bhadant Gyaneshwar dedicated his life to Dhamma and gave Kushinagar a renewed identity. Children study in his schools; his temple attracts domestic and foreign visitors. Experiencing caste in India, he told me he had never known it in Myanmar, where ethnic differences existed without hierarchy.

Interviewing him nearly five years ago was a privilege and honour. As the Guru of Gurus, I was hesitant, unsure how to proceed. He called for a chair so I could sit beside him and converse comfortably. He answered with profound depth. Today, paying respects at the same venue, memories of that interview flooded back. At its end, he recited a Buddhist hymn for our well-being.

Throughout his long public life, he followed the Buddha’s path—the hope Babasaheb Ambedkar saw for the Bahujan Samaj, our true freedom for over 85% of the population. Bhadant Gyaneshwar’s efforts to spread Buddha’s wisdom in India and beyond will inspire generations. He loved Kushinagar, building its Buddhist identity. The Burmese Buddha Vihara and its later stupa were major contributions. Frankly, the stupa at the Burmese Buddha Vihara has become Kushinagar’s landmark.

A fitting tribute to Bhadant Gyaneshwar.

**Bhavatu Sabba Mangalam!**

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For Indian audiences, Mamdani’s victory carries significance that extends far beyond New York’s five boroughs. His win represents a complex convergence of identity, ideology and generational change that challenges established political narratives on both sides of the Atlantic.

Seven dimensions of his triumph deserve particular attention, particularly in India.​

1) A modern Muslim identity

Mamdani embodies a form of Muslim political identity that defies the stereotypes that the Bharatiya Janata Party and similar forces rely upon to paint Muslims as fundamentalist or separatist.

He is a practicing Muslim who openly discusses his faith while simultaneously championing secular democratic socialism, feminist causes and LGBTQ rights. This combination directly contradicts the caricature of Muslims as backwards looking Islamists.

His emotional speech outside a Bronx mosque about the humiliations Muslims have endured in New York since 9/11 demonstrated vulnerability and civic commitment rather than religious extremism. He married a Syrian American artist in a relationship that bridges cultural divides, and campaigns in multiple languages including Urdu and Spanish while maintaining his Muslim identity as central rather than hidden.

This presents a progressive Muslim political figure who is comfortable in his faith without being defined solely by it, a model that undermines narratives equating Muslim identity with Taliban style Islamist fundamentalism, as seen from the welcome given to the Taliban leader by the Modi government in Delhi last month.​

2) Mixed heritage and transnational roots

Mamdani’s parentage tells a story of cosmopolitan belonging that resonates across the global South.

Born in Kampala to Mira Nair, the acclaimed Hindu filmmaker from Delhi, and Mahmood Mamdani, a Gujarati Muslim scholar raised in Uganda, Mamdani carries Indian, African and American identities simultaneously. His family was part of the Asian diaspora expelled by Idi Amin in 1972, experienced apartheid-era South Africa, and eventually settled in New York when he was seven.

This background gives him an intuitive understanding of colonialism, displacement and minority experience that informs his politics. For Indians familiar with the complexities of diasporic identity and the lingering effects of British colonial divide and rule strategies, Mamdani’s mixed heritage represents a repudiation of narrow ethnic nationalism. His father’s scholarship explicitly critiques the tribalisation of politics, a pattern visible in both Uganda under Museveni and India under Modi. The son can be considered to have absorbed these lessons.​

3) Youth and generational change

At 34, Mamdani is the youngest New York mayor in 112 years, younger even than the legendary “Boy Mayor” John Purroy Mitchel elected in 1913. His age matters not merely as biography but as political force. He galvanised young voters, winning those under 50 by a two to one margin, precisely the demographic that feels locked out of home ownership, burdened by debt and alienated from establishment politics. His rapid rise from unknown state assemblyman polling at one percent just months before the primary to decisive victor reflects how quickly generational change can upend entrenched power structures.

For India, where Modi’s BJP has dominated national politics for over a decade, Mamdani’s trajectory offers evidence that insurgent campaigns built on youth energy and grassroots organising can overcome entrenched political figures like the Cuomos.

His campaign demonstrates that age and inexperience, typically framed as liabilities, can become assets when voters hunger for change.​

4) Socialist economic policies

Mamdani’s democratic socialism, often dismissed as radical or unworkable, formed the core of his appeal. He proposed rent freezes on stabilised apartments, free bus service, universal childcare, city run grocery stores and raising the minimum wage to 30 dollars, all funded by taxing corporations and the wealthy. These policies directly address the affordability crisis strangling working people in expensive cities. His message resonated because it named the problem clearly and offered concrete solutions rather than technocratic adjustments.

For Indian audiences familiar with the welfare state legacies of pre-liberalisation era, now being dismantled through privatisation, Mamdani’s unapologetic embrace of state intervention in markets to secure basic needs recalls an older social democratic tradition. His success suggests that economic populism focused on redistribution still wins elections when articulated with clarity and passion, a lesson relevant for opposition parties in India struggling to counter Modi’s Hindu nationalism with an economic alternative.​

5) Stance on Gaza and moral consistency

His vocal support for Palestinian rights, unusual for a major American mayoral candidate, cost him support among some Jewish voters but energised others, particularly younger Jews and the broader progressive coalition. He condemned Hamas’s October 7 attack as a war crime while also accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza, pledging to arrest Netanyahu if given the chance and maintaining his criticism despite intense pressure.

This moral consistency, refusing to moderate his position for political convenience, functioned as proof of authenticity for voters exhausted by politicians who say different things to different audiences.

The likes of Modi and his cohort of RSS leaders have mastered this to an art form. Mamdani’s willingness to alienate powerful constituencies rather than compromise on principles he formed during his college activism with Students for Justice in Palestine shows a robust political calculus, one that prizes moral clarity over coalition management.​

6) Criticism of Modi’s Hindutva politics

Mamdani has repeatedly criticised Modi, calling him a war criminal and accusing the BJP of pursuing a vision of India that only has room for certain kinds of Indians. During his Diwali outreach to Hindu voters, he explained that he grew up with a pluralistic vision of India where everyone belonged regardless of religion, contrasting this with what he sees as Modi’s exclusionary Hindutva ideology.

He also attacked New York Mayor Eric Adams for backing Modi’s violent approach.

These statements, unusual for an American politician seeking office, reflect his family background. His father’s scholarship analyses how political leaders use ethnic and religious divisions to maintain power, a dynamic visible in both Uganda and India.

For Indian audiences, particularly those troubled by the erosion of secular pluralism under Modi, Mamdani’s willingness as a Muslim politician to defend a pluralistic vision of India while simultaneously claiming his Muslim identity offers a model. He refuses the choice between assimilation and separatism, instead asserting that diversity itself should be celebrated and protected.​

7) Implications beyond New York

Mamdani’s victory will reverberate beyond the United States. National Democrats will study his combination of social media savvy, grassroots organising and economic populism for lessons applicable to their own campaigns. Republicans will use his democratic socialism as a wedge issue in swing districts.

But for observers in India, the significance lies elsewhere. His win demonstrates that that an authentic progressive position has political rewards even in a city identified with capitalism, that youth can overcome entrenched political leaders, that economic redistribution still motivates voters, and that moral consistency on difficult issues can be rewarded rather than punished.

He will judged on his record at governance when he comes for re-election, but his election itself challenges assumptions about what kinds of politicians can win and what kinds of coalitions are possible in increasingly diverse democracies.

Courtesy: The Wire

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A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice G. Narendar and Justice Subhash Upadhyay, while hearing Noor Jahan v. State of Uttarakhand, on October 29, 2025, instructed the Investigating Officer (IO) to file an action taken report by November 6, and to remove any inflammatory social media posts related to the incident.

The court’s direction came in response to a protection petition filed by Noor Jahan, the wife of Nasir, a local driver who was brutally assaulted on October 23 after rumours spread that he was transporting beef in his vehicle. The petition alleges that Madan Joshi, a local BJP leader and former president of the party’s Ramnagar City Unit, went live on Facebook, falsely claiming that cow meat was being transported — an act that allegedly incited a mob to attack Nasir.

“Lawlessness in Full Display”: Petitioner seeks CBI probe and police protection

According to the petition, reported by LiveLaw, Nasir’s vehicle was stopped by a crowd incited through Joshi’s Facebook Live. The mob allegedly dragged Nasir out, beat him with stones and kicks, and livestreamed the assault. Instead of rushing him to a hospital, the police are accused of taking the severely injured man to the police station first.

Noor Jahan described the episode as “a glaring example of complete lawlessness,” adding that it represented “cow vigilantism in utter disregard of the Supreme Court’s directions in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018).” She also claimed that since the incident, her family had been receiving threats of dire consequences from unidentified persons.

The plea sought a CBI investigation, police protection, and strict enforcement of the Supreme Court’s mob-lynching guidelines, along with compensation for her husband, who continues to receive treatment for severe injuries.

High Court’s order

The High Court’s order, though brief, is a sharp indictment of selective law enforcement and impunity in cases involving political actors. While the Deputy Advocate General informed the Bench that two of the assailants had been arrested, the Court pressed for a full update on the investigation and warned that compliance on removal of inflammatory posts must be shown at the next hearing.

The case will now be taken up on November 6, 2025, when the police are required to submit their action taken report. The Bench’s insistence on immediate removal of hate content marks an important judicial intervention in the digital dimension of communal violence — where misinformation and Facebook Live broadcasts often act as catalysts for mob action.

Selective accountability

The Ramnagar attack adds to a growing pattern of cow-vigilante violence in Uttarakhand’s Kumaon region, where rumours and Facebook Live videos frequently precede communal flare-ups. As Citizens for Justice and Peace has documented, local vigilante groups often operate under tacit political patronage, with little deterrence from police.

The petition cites the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018), which mandated states to curb mob lynching, appoint nodal officers, and ensure prompt FIRs and victim protection. Yet, as Noor Jahan’s case reveals, implementation remains largely on paper.

The High Court’s intervention also reignites a broader question — why politicians accused of hate or incitement rarely face swift prosecution, even when evidence is public. While citizens, journalists, and activists are often booked for online speech, leaders accused of fanning communal hatred enjoy impunity. As legal commentators note, this “selective policing of speech” corrodes faith in the rule of law.

The complete order may be read here.

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The idea of IFWD emerged from the India Fisher Women Assembly 2024, a historic gathering that declared November 5 as the day to honour the invisible hands that feed nations and protect the oceans. The call was later taken to the World Forum of Fisher Peoples (WFFP) General Assembly in Brazil, where it was unanimously adopted. It now stands as a global symbol of recognition — and rebellion.

As fisherwomen say, this day is not about being seen, but about reclaiming what was always theirs.

Anchored in a long tide of struggles

In the long history of people’s struggles, women have always been the conscience of resistance. From the factory floors of early Europe to the beaches of the Indian coast, women have stitched together the labour of survival and the ethics of care. Rosa Luxemburg’s words — “Those who do not move, do not notice their chains” — echo in the voices of fisherwomen today, who refuse to stay still while their waters are fenced, their lives erased, and their rights sold in the name of development.

International Women’s Day, born of the labour and socialist movements of Clara Zetkin and Luxemburg, demanded political equality and an end to exploitation. November 5 extends that lineage from the land to the sea. It reminds us that liberation cannot be confined to borders or industries — that the politics of the ocean, too, must carry the red thread of equality, community, and justice.

As Zetkin had said, “The working women’s question is not an isolated question, but part of the great social question.” The fisherwomen of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have kept that question alive — turning it into a sea of solidarity that stretches from Kanyakumari to Dakar.

Why November 5 matters — and why it began in India

Fisherwomen have always held the coastline together. They wake before dawn to carry fish to market, manage homes through storms and loss, and are the first to rebuild after every cyclone. Yet, their names do not appear in government records. They are still called ‘helpers’ or ‘dependents’, while laws, schemes, and cooperatives continue to be written in the masculine lens.

This erasure, the women declared in Kerala, must end. They demanded recognition not as “wives of fishers,” but as fishers themselves — rightful claimants of the seas, keepers of knowledge, and protectors of coasts.

In doing so, they carried forward the dreams of pioneers such as Thomas Kocherry and Harekrishna Debnath, who had long insisted that the future of fisheries lies not in mechanisation or export figures, but in justice, community control, and the dignity of work. Both leaders believed that the rights of fisherwomen were the moral compass of the movement. Kocherry often said, “When the poor stand up, even the sea must make way.”

The declaration of November 5 thus became a collective act of remembering — of drawing strength from those who built India’s post-colonial fishworker movement and from the women who sustained it quietly all along. This was endorsed by the largest social movement of fishers across the globe, the Word Forum of Fisher Peoples at the General Assembly held in Brazil in the same month of November 2025.

The women of waters and their demands

The call for an International Fisher Women’s Day is inseparable from its politics. Across India’s recently declared more than 11,000-kilometre coastline and its countless rivers and lakes, women are demanding what should never have been denied:

• Recognition as fishers in law and policy, not as dependents.
• Equal rights to access and govern coastal and inland waters, free from corporate intrusion.
• Inclusion in welfare, insurance, and disaster-compensation schemes.
• First-sale and market rights to secure fair prices and independence from exploitative middlemen.
• Representation in fisheries boards and cooperatives.
• Protection of ecosystems from destructive aquaculture, deep-sea mining, and coastal militarisation.
• Legal safeguards from caste and gender-based violence — both within the community and from the state.

These are not demands for special treatment; they are demands for survival, carved from decades of unpaid and unacknowledged work that sustains both the fishing economy and the national food basket.

The ocean remembers

In the last decade, government programmes such as the Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) and new policies under the banner of Blue Economy 2.0 have promised prosperity. But for most coastal and inland fishing communities, these schemes have delivered displacement instead.

Behind the numbers and glossy reports lie harbours privatised, commons enclosed, and women’s livelihoods erased. As industrial trawlers deplete fish stocks and aquaculture pollutes backwaters, fisherwomen are left struggling for survival in a development model that excludes them.

The state’s vision of ‘modernisation’ has turned the sea into a commodity. But fisherwomen, who live by its moods and rhythms, remind us that the ocean is not a market to be managed — it is a living commons that sustains cultures, livelihoods, and spiritual traditions.

Ocean feminism and the new tide

From the lagoons of Chilika to the estuaries of Karaikal and the islands of the Sundarbans, women’s collectives are practising what they call ocean feminism — rooted in care, community, and resistance. They see themselves not as victims but as custodians of ‘aqua territories’ — spaces of relationship, knowledge, and survival.

As Harekrishna Debnath, one of India’s earliest fisher leaders, often said, “We don’t fight the sea; we live with it. But we must fight those who sell it.” Today, that fight is global. It connects fisherwomen in India to their sisters in Senegal, Thailand, and Brazil — all confronting the false climate solutions packaged as Blue Transformation, 30×30, and Marine Spatial Planning, which in practice privatise the oceans and displace small-scale fishers.

Through the five-week campaign initiated by WFFP — from November 5 to December 10 — women and men of the fishing world are asserting their right to live with dignity, protect their territories, and resist enclosure in every form.

From recognition to transformation

This International Fisher Women’s Day is not a commemoration; it is a beginning. It reminds us that the ocean too has a memory — of those who built communities along its edge, who fed others before themselves, and who continue to hold the fragile balance between humanity and water.

As Rosa Luxemburg warned, “Freedom is always the freedom of those who think differently.” Across India’s coasts and rivers, fisherwomen are thinking — and acting — differently: against caste, patriarchy, and neoliberal enclosures; for rights, justice, and community life.

Their struggle is our collective future. When the tide rises, may it rise with their names on its waves.

Jesu Rethinam is the Global Women Coordinator of the World Forum of Fisher Peoples (WFFP).

Vijayan MJ is Director, Participatory Action Research Coalition, India (PARCI).

Courtesy: CounterCurrents

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Ritwik Ghatak films (Ghatak’s filmography) is a treasure trove of cinematic brilliance, transcending unexplored horizons, to reinvent contemporary Indian art. Each film is an intensive exploration of complex human emotions against the backdrop of socio-political realities, reflecting the turbulent times in which he lived.

He was an individual with a characteristic and independent working style, and one of the mascots of the parallel cinema. He also waged a rebellion against a national cinema whose conventions he wanted to make a major rupture from with each of his work.

Ghatak’s life ran parallel to some of the most traumatic periods in the 20th century India, which had a major bearing or influence on the course of his work. He was a product of the convulsions of the 1940s – World War II, the terrible “man-made famine” of 1944, the communal violence that came with independence, and especially the partition of Bengal.

Characteristics of Ghatak Films

 Ghatak’s approach to filmmaking had autobiographical overtones and often reflected his personal experiences. He would experiment with narrative structures, visual aesthetics, and sound design, creating films that were not only intellectually appealing but emotionally vibrant. His works manifested a commitment to truth, a deep empathy for his characters, and a keen sense of social justice.

Ghatak used the theme of alienation to manifest harsh truths of human experience under oppressive social and economic systems. His work expressed a form of cultural resistance against foreign domination, utilising myth and epic to examine cultural conflicts and the fragmentation of Indian identity in the post-colonial era.

Marxist ideology fundamentally shaped his work, his films cantered on the lives and struggles of ordinary people, both rural and urban, particularly the trauma of the Bengal partition. Ghatak’s Marxist perspective was expressed   in his critique of the bourgeoisie and his portrayal of characters who, despite facing adversity, manifested a resilient human spirit.

Ghatak believed that exploring the collective unconscious through Jung was essential for exploring the inner world and that it complemented his materialist, Marxist analysis of social and political reality.  His films, especially his “Partition Trilogy,” used Jungian archetypes, symbolism, and mythologies to explore and manifest the collective trauma and rootlessness of the Bengali refugees.

Ghatak did not see a contradiction between Marx and Jung, but rather as different ways of interpreting the human condition. He diagnosed that the collective unconscious affects unconscious behaviour, while class structure determines conscious behaviour.

What distinguishes his work was a deep engagement with the human psyche and an unapologetic exploration of societal issues.  His subjects repeatedly projected the uprooted and the dispossessed: parentless children, homeless families, disoriented refugees, and the petit bourgeoisie, economically broken by their exile. With touches of artistic genius, he invokes glimmer of optimism in even the darkest adversity

The ability to fuse stark reality with poetic symbolism symbolised a constant struggle, against an age and society which sold itself to the shackles of rampant modernization, and against a national cinema whose conventions he wanted to make a rupture with in each of his works. His films exude sense of emptiness, giving us a feel of what it is to be alienated from one’s roots.

Ritwik Ghatak‘s work is a concoction of socialist ideology with a deep critique of post-partition India, focusing on themes of trauma, class struggle, and the commodification of culture. His female characters, epitomise both specific Indian experiences and universal human struggles against systemic oppression.

Influences in Early Life

His father, Rai Bahadur Suresh Chandra Ghatak, a magistrate in Mymensingh and Rajshahi districts of east Bengal, instilled in him the love for Sanskrit classics, the Vedas and the Upanishads, which often formed an integral theme in his films. In 1942, he was brought back from Kanpur to Rajshahi.

Involved from an early age in politics and in theatre, Ghatak was a member of the Indian Communist Party and considered Brecht and Eisenstein his role models.

He promptly submerged himself into the 10,000 books in the public library of Rajshahi. He was driven by and cultivated a love for the anti-Fascist movement of World War II which included Marx and Lenin. He later read a great deal on archaeology, on the Buddha, he examined the works of Jung, especially his psychology of the collective unconscious. The films he made between 1956 and 1966 bear powerful hoof prints of his deep and obsessive study of these books.

Best Films

It is interesting to note that despite being referred as the most creative artist in the area of filmmaking that India has produced, he only had 8 full length feature films to his credit. This speaks volumes of the impact that his 8 films made in comparison to the tons of films made by his contemporaries.

Ajantrik (1958) is a cinematic essay on the acceptance of the machine into the mental make-up of someone embedded or rooted in an ancient and totally un-mechanical tradition.  Ajantrik it is a ramshackle taxi driven round the town of Ranchi on the Bengal-Bihar border by an eccentric peasant called Bimal. The taxi is a target of ridicule to most who see or drive in it, but for Bimal it has a human character which is alternately jealous, loving and uncaring. Thus it breaks down when Bimal is attracted to a stranded girl.  At the end of the film, with the taxi’s death caused by a betrayal, the machine seems more reliable than its human counterparts.

‘Meghe Dhaka Tara’, ‘Komal Gandhar’ and ‘Subarnarekha’ form the famous trilogy, portraying the complicacies of the refugee families from the erstwhile East Pakistan.

Meghe Dhaka Tara (1960) (or ‘The Cloud-Capped Star’), is the most captivating portrayal of a harsh life in Bengal following the dreaded partition highlighting the atrocities experienced by the refugees. He used music and sound with magical effects. This film is, a ruthless, stunningly bold critique of the family as an institution.

The central character is Nita, who virtually sacrifices her life to keep her family afloat even when she realises that the man she loves, and who professes to love her, is about to marry her more sensual sister. All this is witnessed by Shankar, her musician brother who eventually leaves home, returning to find Nita in a sanatorium. In the film’s last scene, with the singer brother visiting Nita in hospital, the warning vibrato of a Pahadi folk song can be heard before he enters, as we witness the beautiful countryside around the clinic. Nita, sobbing, says to him: ‘Brother, I want to live. I want to live.’ For Ghatak, sound and music often became synonymous, with such scenes forging a perfect synthesis.

Also known as A Soft Note on A Sharp Scale, Komal Gandhar (1961) is the second movie in the Ghatak’s trilogy after Meghe Dhaka Tara.

Along with revolving around the theme of the Partition, the movie also is a narrative of a star-crossed couple and the rift that split apart the Indian People’s Theatre Association (IPTA). ‘Komal Gandhar’ explored three interconnected themes, Anusua, the lead character’s dilemma, the infamous divided leadership of Indian People’s Theatre Association (IPTA) and the tragic fallout after the partition of India. Unlike his other works, this one ends with the lead pair (Vrigu and Anusua) being reunited ultimately.

Subarnarekha (1965) is the last instalment of Ghatak’s Partition Trilogy. ‘Subarnarekha’ narrates the life story of three refugees in West Bengal: a Hindu man, his little sister, and a low-caste boy. Subarnarekha navigates the lives of a man, his child sister and a young boy whom the man provided shelter after the boy loses his mother in a melee. The film begins in a refugee camp of the then Calcutta, where a number of refugees have assembled in the hope of building their homes afresh. It explores how poverty and homelessness transform an individual’s attitude and his decisions throughout his life. Subarnarekha projects the plight of the three characters, the effects of hardships on shaping their thoughts, actions and the very paths they pursue in their lives. It is a tale of darkness and despair at its zenith. It conveyed that there was no political answer to Partition and that the resulting spiritual confusion could not easily be resolved.

The deep sense of waste is sharply expressed and the film itself Ghatak’s most brutal description yet of the social consequences of a political act. The female protagonist, Sita, symbolises a political uprootal. Ghatak restores the imagery of T.S. Eliot’s The Wasteland in this film. Ghatak’s ‘wasteland’ is Calcutta and Sita is the ‘waste’ within it. The wasteland of Calcutta forbids Sita the freedom to live up to the mythical name she was christened with. She cannot accept this reality when she discovers that her ‘client’ is none other than her brother Ishwar, who ‘mothered’ her. Sita’s suicide makes a statement of protest against the dehumanisation of values in a modern, plagued society. Nevertheless life resurrects for the hero of the tragedy, with his sister’s child looking forward to a better life on the banks of the Subarnarekha River.

Titas Ekti Nadir Naam (1973 was originally an epic novel based on the tragic lives of a fishing community in the valley of the River Titus, Bangladesh. The film resurrected Ghatak’s obsession with the female principle, navigating the life and ultimate dissolution of a fishing community on the banks of the river Titash in Bangladesh. The river starts drying up. Death and starvation endanger the lives of the fishing community. Urban vested interests exploit the situation. The fishermen are displaced, and Basanti alone stays back, remaining a live witness to and victim of the incident. It featured multiple characters in a conglomeration of interconnected stories. The film is a powerful parable about the destruction of a traditional Bengali fishing community striking an analogy with the displacement caused by the Partition of India. A  poetic film that portrays the life of a fishing community along the Titas River to navigate realms  of cultural decay, memory, and fate.

In his final film, Jukti Takko Aar Gappo:  (1977) Ghatak played an alcoholic, disillusioned intellectual who comes into contact with Naxalites. The film explores the political and social realities of Bengal in the early 1970s. The film lacked any specific political ideology, navigating the story of an intellectual’s crisis and the isolation he experienced from society. The film is a deeply personal political statement, playing a pioneering role to project the crystallizing of Naxalite movement just taking shape in Bengal.

(The author is freelance journalist; he acknowledges the sources for this article: Times entertainment, Shoma Chatterji in ‘’High on Films’, Shreya Biswas in Indiatoday.in, Philatelyhobby.blogspot and Shoma Chatterji in Hindustan Times)

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A beginning was made by the 12th Finance Commission which allocated a total of ₹1000 crores for this purpose, which was termed a Green Bonus; the share of Himachal was a paltry ₹20 crores. Signatories to the communication are among those former bureaucrats “who have worked with the central and state governments and have come together to speak out on actions of the governments which we consider are against the interests of the people of India and/or in violation of the Indian Constitution.”

This idea of a Green Bonus must be amplified and taken forward by the 16th FC. The signatories that they have learned that the Himachal Chief Minister has taken up this matter of the creation of a  Green Fund or Green Bonus with the 16^th Finance Commission on June 6, 2025, requesting for an outlay of ₹50000 crores for incentivising the mountain states. This proposal must be considered seriously; the additional devolutions would go a long way towards ameliorating their financial condition and removing their present compulsion to ruthlessly exploit their forest and ecological capital to meet budget deficits and development expenditure.

Himalayan states like Himachal, Uttarakhand, Kashmir and Sikkim are slowly going to pieces, literally, under the onslaught of cloudbursts, flash floods, land subsidence and collapsing infrastructure. In just the last four years (2022-2025) Himachal has lost 1200 lives and suffered a loss of ₹18000 crores in these disasters (and this does not include the indirect loss to trade and economic activities). The position of Uttarakhand is even more dire: in just the last ten years (as of 2022) it has recorded 18464 “natural disasters” in which 3554 lives were lost (not including the colossal number of deaths in the Kedarnath disaster of 2013). We have not been able to lay our hands on the total financial/economic loss caused, but an indication is available in the official figures of the Kedarnath calamity: US$ 3.8 billion. Just this year, 2025, the economic losses are estimated at ₹5000 crores.

The entire text of the crucial letter may be read here:

To

Dr. Arvind Panagariya

Chairman, 16^th Finance Commission

Cc: Members of the Finance Commission

Secretary, Finance Commission

Dear Dr. Panagariya,

We are a group of former civil servants who have worked with the central and state governments and have come together as the Constitutional Conduct Group to speak out on actions of the governments which we consider are against the interests of the people of India and/or in violation of the Indian Constitution. We are not affiliated to any political party, individually or collectively.

2. The 16^th Finance Commission, which you head, is in the midst of interacting with various state governments and formulating its recommendations for the devolution of funds from the Centre to the states. We feel that this is an appropriate time to bring to your notice a vital issue concerning the environmental integrity and very survival of some of our northern states, which has not received the attention it merits in this era of global warming and climate change. Previous Finance Commissions have, at best, made only a passing mention of it, but it now deserves to be brought to the forefront of your deliberations.
3. Himalayan states like Himachal, Uttarakhand, Kashmir and Sikkim are slowly going to pieces, literally, under the onslaught of cloudbursts, flash floods, land subsidence and collapsing infrastructure. In just the last four years (2022-2025) Himachal has lost 1200 lives and suffered a loss of ₹18000 crores in these disasters (and this does not include the indirect loss to trade and economic activities). The position of Uttarakhand is even more dire: in just the last ten years (as of 2022) it has recorded 18464 “natural disasters” in which 3554 lives were lost (not including the colossal number of deaths in the Kedarnath disaster of 2013). We have not been able to lay our hands on the total financial/economic loss caused, but an indication is available in the official figures of the Kedarnath calamity: US$ 3.8 billion. Just this year, 2025, the economic losses are estimated at ₹5000 crores. Whether these are natural disasters, as the central and state governments would like us to believe, or man-made disasters, is debatable; but we are not delving into that aspect for now. We are on a larger and more fundamental point: can the country afford the destruction of the Himalayas and do these Himalayan states need help?
4. North India and its Gangetic plain would not survive without the forests, the glaciers and rivers that originate from Himachal, Kashmir and Uttarakhand, and would soon become a desert: these rivers sustain a population of almost 400 million people and are a lifeline for many cities. The Himalaya Hindukush ranges help to moderate the climate, enable the monsoon precipitation and snow that recharge the rivers every year. They contain some of Hinduism’s most revered religious shrines and pilgrimages. They are the green lungs which enable north India to breathe and provide relief to 40 million tourists every year. We cannot afford to lose this landscape.
5. But losing them we are, mainly because of financial compulsions. Himalayan states suffer from a double whammy: on the one hand they are revenue deficit because they have limited sources of income. They have no industrial or manufacturing base, services sector or surplus agriculture (other than some fruit crops), employment creation potential is limited. On the other hand, the cost of providing basic development to the people is much higher than that of the plains because of topographical, connectivity and climatic reasons. The only low hanging source of income they have are their natural resources – the forests and rivers – and these are therefore being exploited ruthlessly for hydel projects and tourism, causing immense damage to the ecology, and resulting in the death and destruction we have been witnessing in the last few years (Himachal and Uttarakhand have diverted 11000 and 50000 hectares, respectively, of dense forests for various non-forestry projects in the last 20 years alone). According to successive State of the Forest Reports the denudation of forests in the north-eastern Himalayan states is even more severe. The disastrous, and predictable, consequences of the depletion of green cover is being further exacerbated by climate change which is drastically altering the hydrology of the rivers, accelerating glacial melt and the threat of GLOF (Glacial Lake Outburst Flood). The increased incidence of EWEs (Extreme Weather Events), landslides, flash floods, land subsidence is, according to the available science, directly attributable to this combination of over-development and climate change. This reckless squandering of their natural assets must be stopped in the national interest.
6. The irony, and tragedy, is that this need not be a zero-sum game, if only the central government and Finance Commissions were to recognise the real wealth and contribution of these states to the national economy and well-being, and compensate them accordingly. According to a 2025 report of the Institute of Forest Management, Bhopal, the total forest wealth of Himachal was valued at ₹9.95 lakh crores. The report calculated the annual Total Economic Value (TEV) of Himachal’s forests at ₹3.20 lakh crores; this includes ₹1.65 lakh crores for carbon sequestration, ₹68941 crores for eco-system services, ₹32901 crores as the value of bio-diversity, ₹15132 crores for water provisioning and ₹3000 crores for regulatory services such as flood control and sediment retention. We are not aware if the other Himalayan states have carried out similar surveys but they would be on similar lines. These contributions benefit the whole nation, not just these states. Unfortunately, these are neither acknowledged nor taken into account while disbursing central assistance to the states.
7. But this must change. Himachal (and other Himalayan states) must be compensated by the central government for their non-monetary, but vital, contribution to the country’s wellbeing, quality of life and in sectors like agriculture, climate control, hydel power, carbon capture and tourism. The mechanism to do so already exists – the Finance Commissions, which determine the formula for devolving central funds to the states. A beginning was made by the 12th Finance Commission which allocated a total of ₹1000 crores for this purpose, which was termed a Green Bonus; the share of Himachal was a paltry ₹20 crores.
8. This idea must be amplified and taken forward by the 16th FC. We learn that the Himachal Chief Minister has taken up this matter of the creation of a Green Fund or Green Bonus with you on the June 6, 2025, requesting for an outlay of ₹50000 crores for incentivising the mountain states. This proposal must be considered seriously; the additional devolutions would go a long way towards ameliorating their financial condition and removing their present compulsion to ruthlessly exploit their forest and ecological capital to meet budget deficits and development expenditure.
9. In this regard, we would like to make two methodology- related suggestions for your consideration:

[1] The current (15^th FC) weightage given for Forests and Ecological services is only 10%. This is wholly inadequate considering the imperatives of climate control goals and only dis-incentivises states from bringing more area under green cover. This weightage needs to be increased to at least 20%; the additional 10% can be located by reducing the weightages for some of the other indicators. For example, weightage for Population should be brought down from 15% to 10% as there is a contradictory logic in allocating a higher weightage for population than for Demographic Performance (currently 12.5 %). Similarly, the weightage for Income Distance could be reduced to 35% from the current 45% (which penalises states with higher per capita incomes).

[2] The present methodology for calculating the area under Forests and Ecology is faulty and disadvantages the mountain states insofar as it excludes the area above the tree line. Much of their geographical area lies above the tree line and comprises of snowfields, alpine pastures and glaciers. These areas are vital natural habitats for many rare and endangered species of animals and have a unique ecological value. They also function as the “water towers” that charge the river denying them their ecological value in the weightage matrix is illogical and self-contradictory. These areas should be included in the definition of forests.

10. We are strongly of the view, however, that the Himalayan states should not be given a free pass with the Green Bonus as finally decided by the Commission. Release of these funds should be indexed to improvement in environmental parameters, sustainability of development and tourism projects, protection of rivers, framing of proper urban development and building plans, and curbing of illegal mining and construction. You would no doubt be aware that the Supreme Court too has taken serious note of the environmental devastation in Himachal Pradesh and has said that at this rate the state would “vanish from the map of India”.
11. We earnestly hope that your Commission too shares this concern and would also play a role in ensuring that the Court’s fears do not come true. Protecting the Himalayas has to be seen as a shared responsibility, not as the concern of the mountain states alone. If the Himalayas lose their forests, rivers and glaciers it won’t be long before north India goes the way of the Indus Valley civilisation.

SATYAMEVA JAYATE

With deep regards,

Yours sincerely,

Constitutional Conduct Group (103 signatories) 

Related:

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This book unpacks Niyogi’s ideas and seeks to explore new discoveries and heights of labour’s interaction with ecology and technology. The study is a testament to tensions and contradictions being an integral part of any endeavour challenging economic, social and political backwardness.

The author explores four major aspects.

1. Through resurrecting Niyogi and the CMM, the author navigates and examines how the ideological frameworks, structures and processes forge a crucial bond between labour and environment.
2. Whether a worker has the capacity to be part of the process of democratising technology, or bridging the boundaries between the ‘user’ environment and the ‘developer’ environment of technology.
3. Whether examining aspects of nationality and sub-nationality, ethnicity and identity hinder aspect of identity deeply rooted in labour
4. Finally, whether debates around technology, environment, and nationality were a contravention of class-based trade union practice.

In addressing these questions, this book will be recommended reading for students and scholars of environment studies and labour studies.

The book explores the path breaking achievements undertaken by Niyogi. The author taps Niyogi’s visions of labour foreseeing the factory as an ecological component within the broader framework of the farm and the forest. He gives a most vivid description of the developmental debates which post-colonial India opened up which welcomed anti- people technological formats. It is a most compelling and illustrative narrative of the journey of the CMM led by Niyogi, in orchestrating the unified resistance of Adivasis, famers, peasants and workers and thus forging links between factory and forest. Most intensively it explores and dissects how the CMM planted the seeds, for a genuinely pro-people alternative of a developmental model. The book also untaps how it used semi-mechanisation to combat technology displacing labour and contractual workers forged a link with Adivasis in forests, in background of industrial pollution plaguing living conditions.

In chapter ‘A 24*7Union’ in immaculate detail it traces the historic transition of the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha in the backdrop of a spectrum of political events or parallel organisations and movements alongside.

The chapter on ‘Labour and Technological Changes in Chhattisgarh ‘makes a clinical and lucid diagnosis of the applicability of traditional Gandhian methods or conventional Marxist approach, and explores the creative role of Niyogi and his path breaking innovations in technology and labour methods. The book explores how Niyogi synthesised Gandhi’s ideas with that of Marx, not blindly or mechanically following either. It threw light on CMM made a major departure from economism, not merely confining itself to boundaries encompassing wages and working conditions. Ecological concerns were made an integral complement to other basic demands. Aspect of technology became a major part of the discourse. The chapter elaborated how Niyogi differed with Gandhi in utilising strike as a weapon and visualised labour as a creative, collective force in contrast to Gandhi’s vison of labour as a moral, individual duty. Unlike Gandhi Niyogi foresaw labour as capable of, innovating, interacting, creating and transforming existing structures. However Niyogi did endorse Gandhi’s critique of mechanisation and support to village technologies, in opposition to mass production of the machine. Still hands down he opposed Gandhi’s semi-feudal structures of rural economy. The chapter also invoked a detailed exploration of the economic model of Kumarappa.

Niyogi invented a Marxist method that addressed ecological contradictions and tensions and spurred workers, trade unionists and activists to re-evaluate their concept of what constitutes the working class. A critique was made of technology imported from former Soviet Union. CMM asserted that to be categorised as ‘socialist’, it had to promote labour participation in the manufacturing process, and not cause retrenchment of labour.

In Chapter on ‘Green and red Imagination’ makes a most extensive and illustrative exploration of how the CMM virtually created a new world for the workers and tribals, highlighting the abolishing of contract labour, winning rights for a fair wage, housing, free health and literacy. It elaborated how a path-breaking model had been constructed by Niyogi, with health facilities for workers transcending horizons unexplored.

In chapter ‘Chhattisgarh for Whom’ the author makes a thorough study of the nationality question and movement in Chhattisgarh. Linking it with the broader framework of political liberation and economic revolution. The experiences are located not only in their historical context, but also in the broader arena of debates on environment, science and technology, and movements for statehood and identity.

A concluding chapter ‘The Road not taken’ reflects how after Niyogi’s death after being murdered on September 28, 1991, the CMM movement strived to walk on the trail or pursue the legacy of Niyogi by keeping his ideas intact.

The work analyses practicality of Niyogi’s ideas in respect to current political and economic scenario. It navigates how globalisation and liberalisation era policies shaped the course of the CMM, recounting protests of CMM against Dunkel in 1994and 1998, jointly with farmers organisations of Punjab and Karnataka. Now the dialogue between forest and factory had sharpened with growth in process of industrialisation.

The CMM reformulated its environmental campaigns, designing posters, songs and entire campaign showcasing this theme. The CMM took an ant-war stance on Kargil after Pokhran blasts in 1998 and also formulated a powerful ant-communal agenda.

This chapter also mentions how selective memories have been obliterated of Niyogi, on environmental movements, ecological concerns and alternative technological and developmental agendas.

(The author is a freelance journalist).

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This article examines the true nature of that “discrimination.” The sources relied upon here are primarily Muslim, but they are far from “revisionist.” They belong to the period when Islam was at its political and moral zenith — when Muslims did not need to indulge in apologetics.

Among these, Imam Abu Yusuf’s Kitab al-Kharaj occupies a central place. Written for Caliph Harun al-Rashid by an eighth-century jurist and student of Imam Abu Hanifa, it remains a foundational text on Islamic finance, taxation, and public administration. Even if some of its stories lack external verification, the principles they reflect are undeniable. Whether historical fact or transmitted ideal, the moral weight of these narratives lies in the standards that Muslim society aspired to — standards so lofty that even the “myths” (if such they be) testify to the civilisation’s ethical conscience. Two non-Muslim sources cited at the end confirm that these were not mere ideals but broadly reflected historical practice.

I. Imam Abu Yusuf’sKitab al-Kharaj

1. On the exemption of the weak and poor:

“The command of Jizyah stands null and void if a man grows decrepit, suffers from a physical ailment, becomes the recipient of alms and charity donated by members of his religion, or has been reduced to destitution. As long as he stays in the Islamic state, the expenses of his family, along with his own, will be met from the public treasury.”
(Kitab al-Kharaj, p.146; cf. Zia-un-Nabi, Vol.4, pp.308–309)

2. The Caliph Umar’s compassion:
Abu Yusuf records that Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab once encountered an elderly beggar who could no longer pay the poll tax. On learning his story, Umar took him home, provided for him personally, and then ordered the public treasury to support him and others like him. He declared:

“We imposed the poll tax on him when he was young and earning, but as he grew old, we ignored him. Alms are for the poor and the needy.” (9:60)
Umar thereupon abolished the tax for the infirm and decrepit, declaring their upkeep a responsibility of the State. (Kitab al-Kharaj)

3. Protection of Dhimmis from oppression:
Umar also issued strict orders to his tax collectors:

“One who subjects a Dhimmi to oppression, inflicts punishment beyond his capacity, causes him harm, or takes anything from his possession against his will shall be my accuser on the Day of Judgement.”
(Kitab al-Kharaj, p.150)

4. Umar’s final testament:
On his deathbed, Umar left these words:

“I advise my successor concerning the non-Muslim subjects of the State: fulfil the covenant made with them; protect them with your army against all aggression; and do not burden them beyond their capacity.”
(Kitab al-Kharaj, p.149)

II. Al-Inayah Sharh al-Hidayah

Written by Akmal al-Din al-Babarti in the 14th century, this authoritative commentary on the Hanafi legal manual al-Hidayah records that a Muslim who had killed a non-Muslim subject without legal cause was executed by the Prophet himself. The Prophet declared:

“My foremost duty is to uphold justice.”
Justice under Islam, therefore, knew no distinction of faith when it came to life and law. (Al-Inayah Sharh al-Hidayah, Vol.8, p.256)

III. Burhan Sharh-e-Mawahib ar-Rahman

1. Equality of blood and wealth:
During the caliphate of Ali ibn Abi Talib, a Muslim had killed a Dhimmi. The victim’s brother forgave the murderer upon receiving compensation. Ali verified that the forgiveness was voluntary and then declared:

“The blood of our Dhimmi is like our blood. His wealth is like our wealth.”
(Burhan Sharh-e-Mawahib ar-Rahman, Vol.2, p.287)

2. Justice without discrimination:
Umar ibn al-Khattab ordered the execution of a Muslim who had murdered a Dhimmi in Heera — a ruling of exact parity.

3. Umar ibn Abdul Aziz’s fairness:
When the Dhimmis of Samarqand complained that a Muslim commander had seized their city unlawfully, Umar II ordered a special court to hear their case. The verdict went in favor of the Dhimmis, and Muslims were ordered to vacate the city.

The Prophet’s warning was recalled:

“Allah will forbid Paradise to one who kills a Dhimmi unjustly.”

The rule of Islamic law thus recognized absolute equality in rights and justice.

IV Tarikh al-Tabari

The 9th-century historian al-Tabari records numerous covenants illustrating this ethos:

1. The pact of Jerusalem:

“Their persons, properties, churches, crosses, sick and healthy are under protection. Their churches shall not be occupied or destroyed. There shall be no compulsion in religion, nor any harm done to them.”
(Tarikh al-Tabari, Vol.1, p.245)

2. The pact of Heera:

“If I can defend your persons and property, I shall impose a tax upon you. In the event of failure, I reserve no right to levy tax.”
(Tarikh al-Umam wal-Muluk, 1939, Vol.4, p.16)

3. Refund of Jizya:
When Muslim forces under Abu Ubaydah withdrew temporarily from Syria, they refunded the Jizya collected from their non-Muslim subjects, announcing publicly:

“We collected it for your protection. Since we cannot defend you now, it is returned.”
History records no parallel of such integrity among conquerors.

4. Waiver of tax for mutual defense:
When the king of Albab allied with the Muslims in defense, Umar ibn al-Khattab approved the waiver of their Jizya. (Tarikh al-Umam wal-Muluk, Vol.5, p.256)

5. Equality in covenants:
Utbah bin Farqad’s pact with the people of Azerbaijan declared protection for all — rich or poor, Muslim or not — according to ability and mutual obligation. (Tarikh al-Tabari, Vol.5, p.25)

V. Bernard Lewis,The Jews of Islam

Bernard Lewis writes:

“Abu Ubayd insisted that Dhimmis must not be burdened beyond their capacity, nor caused to suffer. Abu Yusuf ruled explicitly that none of the Dhimmis should be beaten or humiliated for the collection of Jizya; rather, they should be treated with leniency.” (The Jews of Islam, p.15)

He further observes:

“It was the jurists of early Islam—confident, humane, and expanding—whose attitudes reflected actual governance. The later, harsher interpretations arose in eras of decline and insecurity.” (p.16)

VI. Nassim Nicholas Taleb,Skin in the Game

Taleb, himself from an old Maronite Christian family of Lebanon, writes:

“The Islamic rulers weren’t particularly interested in converting non-Muslims. In fact, my ancestors saw clear advantages in not being Muslim—mostly in the avoidance of military conscription.”

This was not subjugation, he concludes, but a stable, pragmatic coexistence.

Conclusion

These testimonies — from classical Muslim jurists, historians, and non-Muslim scholars alike — converge on a single truth:

Under Islamic governance, minorities retained their dignity, property, and faith. The Jizya was not a badge of inferiority but a contractual payment in exchange for state protection and exemption from military duty. Where non-Muslims volunteered to fight, their Jizya was waived; where Muslims failed to protect them, it was refunded. The non-Muslims saw the Jizya as an advantage, not as a disadvantage. It assured their protection without the obligation to perform military duty.

Even if some of the stories cited are legends, the legends of Islamic rule breathe the fragrance of justice, and legends, far from being fantasies, express the moral aspiration of a civilisation. There is no reason to doubt their historicity; yet even if they were legends, they still testify to what Islamic rule meant to those who lived and ruled by it. That moral testimony outweighs the absence of corroboration for every story by non-Muslim historians.

—–

A frequent contributor to NewAgeIslam.com, Naseer Ahmed is an independent researcher and Quran-centric thinker whose work bridges faith, reason, and contemporary knowledge systems. Through a method rooted in intra-Quranic analysis and scientific coherence, the author has offered ground-breaking interpretations that challenge traditional dogma while staying firmly within the Quran’s framework.

His work represents a bold, reasoned, and deeply reverent attempt to revive the Quran’s message in a language the modern world can test and trust.

Courtesy: New Age Islam

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The Forest Rights Act was passed in 2006 following decades of struggle by forest-working peoples to redress the exclusionary legacy of colonial and post-colonial forest laws. The FRA acknowledges the rights of individual and community access to land, housing, and to minor forest produce, and grants the Gram Sabhas authority to manage and protect forests. The intent of the FRA was to transfer authority from the centralised forest-administrative bodies (like the Forest Department) to local communities and to make the Gram Sabha’s consent a precondition for the approval of any forest diversion. And de-centralisation was recognised as key to protection of both land rights and forest protection.

The Forest (Conservation) Act, enacted in 1980 –and hurriedly amended in 2023 without debate– has a centralised approach to conservation and, following amendments in 2023, has gone further still to consolidate centralized control over forest land. The amendments narrowed the definition of the term “forest” and included broad exemptions for strategic and commercial projects, and also authorised the regularization of diversions under the law. The amendments to the FCA have dismantled community consultation, removed environmental protection, and ultimately weakened the requirements to divert land from indigenous peoples in favour of land acquisition for development. The FCA now enables diversion of forest land for national security and infrastructure development, particularly in border areas, and weakened the requirement for Gram Sabha consent, designed to make community consultation a formality after the diversion has occurred.

It is crucial at this junction to recall the eviction order, passed by the Supreme Court in February 2019 that became the ground for nationwide and lasting protests by forest dwellers and Adivasis. The intent and impact of the order would have been to displace as many as one crore forest community members. Hence, its passage became yet another pivotal moment in the struggle for land and forest rights in India. The order triggered mobilisation among Adivasi and forest community members and immediate civil society response at the nation level, notably the All India Union of Forest Working Peoples (AIUFWP) and Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP). Within two weeks, national civil society intervention (close to a dozen and a half interim applications were finally filed) led to the Court staying its eviction order. This move was also necessitated after an affidavit, filed by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs that requested a full reconsideration of the case. The matter still awaits hearing before the Supreme Court, and demonstrates the ongoing struggle over the rights of statutory recognition against conservation. On October 24, 2025, again, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MOTA) has –once more–sharply rebutted a plea which has challenged before the Supreme Court (SC) the legal validity of the 2012 Rules, made under the law, The Indian Express has learnt. In a counter affidavit filed before the SC in the same matter, the Centre has not only defended the legal validity of the Act but also stressed that the law goes beyond mere land ownership regularisation and aims to restore dignity, livelihoods, and cultural identity of forest-dependent communities.

AIUFWP is a national, women-led membership union representing forest-dwelling communities, agricultural workers, and Adivasis. It creates leadership for grassroots communities, especially among Adivasi women, advocates for distributive justice, and works with stakeholders across India to secure legalisation and recognition of community based customary forest rights. CJP operates as a legal rights and advocacy organisation, in close alliance with the AIUWFP by supporting ground-level training and legal interventions. CJP is both drafter and co-petitioner in the detailed interlocutory application (IA) filed before the Supreme Court in 2019. This IA detailed the historic disenfranchisement of India’s indigenous peoples that led to the enactment of the 2006 law, the systemic grievances with claims being denied, due process failings and the deliberate bypassing of Gram Sabhas, and violations of the statute scheme for the Forest Rights Act, 2006 by the forest administration. It also emphasised that mass evictions (not mandated in the law itself) were without constitutional justification and violated natural justice and legal protections.

In the follow-up hearings, the Supreme Court, going well beyond its original order, required states to file affidavits investigating state processes concerning the assessment of forest rights claims and about claims that were denied altogether. Determining whether community land rights are properly granted is now a question of what the Court would deem sufficient transparency in state action.

Apart from this crucial matter (Wildlife First, in which Adivasi unions and others have intervened), at the same time, the apex court of India –another bench–is considering challenges to amendments made to the Forest (Conservation) Act enacted hurriedly in 2023, which would broaden the chasm between statutory protection (under the FRA 2006) and state sovereignty (under the FCA). As publicly noted in one of the recent bench observations, the principle basis for halting mass evictions focused on the unresolved policy and law contradiction between the tenurial and welfare entitlements granted by the Forest Rights Act and the hard restrictions allegedly imposed for sake of conservation by the Forest (Conservation) Act. Thus, this continuing litigation is sitting at the crossroads of India’s obligations—to forest-dwelling peoples and conservation—creating a tension and dispute between rights-based justice and regulatory control the recurrent subject for adjudication in the future.

Criticism of the FCA amendments is directed specifically to their consequences in the North-East, where a multitude of forests are not recognised officially by the state yet serve as crucial in-state clearings for indigenous communities or communities in general. The amendments have bypassed (pushed aside) Gram Sabhas, authorised less participatory governance, and fostered concerns regarding green credits and monoculture afforestation. The Godavarman judgment (1996) expanded the definition of “forest” to include unclassified and community forests; however, the newly repealed law does not recognise large areas subject to exploitation.

The approach of the Supreme Court has fluctuated over the years: see for example the direction of the Wildlife First case, and then the Niyamgiri judgment acknowledged consent from Gram Sabhas prior to forest diversion. Nevertheless, the legal condition for indigenous rights is presently ambiguous and somewhat unpredictable on fore use, where the discretion of execution has taken priority over community rights and constitutional guarantees.

The exclusion of indigenous communities from forest governance has a historical precedent, as far back as colonial rule where laws regarded them as encroachers instead of custodians of land and resources. The FRA can be understood as an acknowledgement and a corrective action towards this injustice, recognising the rights of Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers to land, resources, and self-governance. The FRA was a multifaceted, energising outcome for these communities after decades of mobilising their rights and advocating for their access to and enjoyment of forests as an acknowledgment of their livelihoods and to democratise forest governance and restore dignity to marginalised communities.

In many ways, the expansion of centralised governance through The Forest (Conservation) Act has been legitimized via the Supreme Court’s Godavarman judgement of 1996, an important case that greatly expanded the administrative definition – and control over the meaning of “forest.” Centralization directly contradicts the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (FRA), which creates firm ground for a decentralised, community-based rights agenda of forest management. The tension is not simply administrative or logistical but is an observed and constitutionally established tension in the power relationship between the executive and authoritative and empowered Gram Sabhas, flooring the foundational conflict of purpose between development, conservation, and indigenous rights.

The Godavarman judgment explicitly stated, “…the word ‘forest’ must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. This description covers all statutorily recognized forests, whether designated as reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of Section 2(i) of the Forest (Conservation) Act. The term ‘forest land’, occurring in Section 2, will not only include ‘forest’ as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the government record irrespective of the ownership.” (Godavarman v UOI, 1996). By contrast, the FRA 2006 frames the legal mandate as, “…to recognize and vest the forest rights and occupation in forest land in forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who have been residing in such forests for generations but whose rights could not be recorded; in order to correct the historical injustice done to the forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who are integral to the very survival and sustainability of the forest ecosystem.”

The 2023 FCA amendments, with a narrower definition of what qualifies as “forest,” and less opportunity for Gram Sabha participation, are yet another movement towards executive power, effectively disenfranchising the FRA’s commitment to decentralisation and democracy. This constitutional tension is yet to be resolved and is at the forefront of ongoing litigation and policy discussions concerning forest governance, development priorities, and the protection of indigenous and community rights.

Conclusion

There is an urgent need for a renewed and comprehensive framework that reconciles the inherent community and historic rights of communities over land/the commons and those of “the state” that seeks to unilaterally claim land for corporate development. Such a people’s right driven scheme would be one that upholds constitutional protections, revives community governance, and ensures community participation in environmental assessments. It will take the reversal of community jurisdiction and accountability of the state to limit logging in India’s forests, and the Supreme Court’s intervention could be a new beginning. India will only be able to protect its forests when it also protects the rights of those who have historically cared for them; by reaffirming the primacy of Gram Sabhas, transparency in impact assessments, and a stronger legal basis for rights recognition.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Urvi Kehri)

Image Courtesy: business-standard.com

References:

• India: Legacies and Challenges of the Land & Forest Rights Movement Booklet
• https://cjp.org.in/forest-conservation-amendment-act-2023-a-challenge-to-adivasi-land-rights-and-environmental-protections/
• https://cjp.org.in/what-is-the-forest-rights-act-2006-and-how-are-we-defending-it/
• https://cjp.org.in/sokalo-gond-and-nivada-rana-lead-the-campaign-for-forest-rights-in-sc/
• https://cjp.org.in/forest-rights-case-sc-directs-states-to-file-compliance-affidavits/
• https://cjp.org.in/forest-conservation-amendment-bill-north-east-to-bear-the-brunt/
• https://thewire.in/environment/the-forest-rights-act-and-the-battle-for-indias-forests
• https://www.scobserver.in/cases/constitutionality-of-the-frawildlife-first-v-ministry-of-forest-and-environment-eviction-of-forest-dwellers-background/
• https://www.sanctuarynaturefoundation.org/article/the-forest-%28conservation%29-amendment-act%2C-2023
• https://www.scobserver.in/journal/the-amended-green-law-is-full-of-red-flags-forests-amendment-act-2023/
• https://www.scobserver.in/reports/arguments-on-february-28th-2019/
• https://www.scobserver.in/reports/wildlife-first-v-ministry-of-forest-and-environment-eviction-of-forest0dwellers-arguments-on-september-12th-2019/
• Godavarman v UOI, 1996, Supreme Court of India

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