The paper has been published by the by the non-profit National Bureau of Economic Research based in Massachusetts. The authors of the paper – Sam Asher, Kritarth Jha, Anjali Adukia, Paul Novosad and Brandon Tan – have observed that while the data analysed in the study dates back to 2011-13, the “neighbourhood patterns described in the paper are likely to be persistent and have emerged over decades of migration and policy.”

According to the observations and findings in this paper, 26% of India’s Muslims live in neighbourhoods that are more than 80% Muslim, while 17% of SCs live in neighbourhoods that are more than 80% SC. Scheduled Caste segregation in cities is just as high as it is in rural areas, and it is even higher for Muslims, the data shows.

The paper also found that government services – like secondary schools, clinics and hospitals, electricity, water, and sewerage – were all “systematically worse” in marginalised neighbourhoods as compared to other localities in the same cities. The paper said that such differences in service access were “statistically significant and substantial”.

Besides, the study has found that children from such segregated neighbourhoods are likely to fare worse than those from non-marginalised localities. “A child growing up in a 100% Muslim neighbourhood can expect to obtain two fewer years of education than a child growing up in a 0% Muslim neighbourhood. Kids living in SC neighbourhoods face a penalty only slightly smaller. The neighbourhood effect explains about half of the urban educational disadvantage of SC and Muslim children,” the paper said.

Related:

Gujarat’s Disturbed Areas Act: Largest Muslim Ghetto Glaring Contrast to Hindu Settlement

The ‘Harijans’ of Bangladesh: Victims of constitutional neglect and social isolation

Gujarat Polls: Juhapura, The Largest Muslim Ghetto In Gujarat, Is A Picture Of Deliberate Neglect

The post SCs, Muslims both live in highly segregated neighbourhoods with poorer public services: International Study appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In an open communication to Mritunjay Kumar Narayan, Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, New Delhi the collective has recorded its objections to “why the Census could not have been carried out by 2023, as was done in 143 other countries. The reasons for delaying the Census by six years instead of two to three years have not been made public. This lack of transparency gives rise to unnecessary apprehensions in the public mind that the Census is being conducted at this juncture to enable the completion of the exercise of delimitation of constituencies in 2027-28, in time for the 2029 Lok Sabha elections.” The collective has expressed the hope that no such extraneous considerations have influenced the timing of the 2027 Census.

Besides, the open communication has stated that “We sincerely expect that the Census exercise will be unexceptionable and in conformity with the United Nations guidelines laid down in the Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses (Revision 4 March 2025), to which India is a signatory. We understand that the main reasons for the delay in the processing and release of the data of past Censuses were: (a) the need for coding of descriptive answers to several questions; and (b) the lack of sufficient expertise within the Census Commissioner’s office to check the quality of data. Providing mobile phones to code everything at field level, where the enumerator is required to select the correct option from a dropdown menu, does not allow for correction of errors in the recorded code. Past experience, especially in the 2001 and 2011 Censuses, has shown that mere technological advance in computing facilities does not necessarily speed up release of data. There is need to be open to the possibilities of errors, with effective measures being put in place to ensure data quality.”

“Dropping questions on data items that are not required cannot be collected or where alternate sources of data are available would help in streamlining the data collection process, reducing respondent fatigue and resulting in better quality data. For example, the questions on children born/surviving are better collected in the National Family Health Surveys.

“Other Backward Classes (OBC) have not been specifically classified in the Census. The methodology for caste enumeration is yet to be announced. While one option could be to compile a list of castes for people to select from (as was done in the Bihar caste survey), we feel the better option is to leave the field open in the Census form, as was done in the 2011 Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC). The methodology of surveying and enumerating languages could be used for condensing the Census data. However, this would require the government to keep the data open for scrutiny by scholars and involve institutions like the Anthropological Survey of India. The process can begin with collecting information on the 1369 mother tongue languages listed in the 2011 Census. An institution like the ASI could then certify the caste based on markers of common language, ancestry, lifestyle, relatives, marriages and kinship bonds.

“Data on tribes were being collected in past Censuses only from the Scheduled Tribe (ST) population. If all tribes, other than those in the ST list, are classified and recorded, a long existing injustice to the Denotified Tribe communities, which account for more than 100 million people, would be rectified.

“The issue of religion is, and has been in the past, a sensitive area for the Census. At a time when political leaders openly express their opposition to the inclusion of so-called “Bangladeshi Muslims” in the electoral rolls, care must be taken to ensure that the Census fully records the population of various minority groups in the country, covering religion, caste and tribe.

“As former civil servants, many of us have been, during our careers, involved in the Census exercises at district, state and national levels. We are sure that you will exercise the highest level of professional competence in ensuring that the upcoming Census meets the threefold goals of accuracy, transparency and accessibility.

The entire letter may be read here:

CCG LETTER TO THE REGISTRAR GENERAL AND CENSUS COMMISSIONER OF INDIA

23 February 2026

To

Shri Mritunjay Kumar Narayan

Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India

New Delhi

Dear Shri Narayan,

We are members of the Constitutional Conduct Group, a collective of former civil servants belonging to the All-India Services and the Central Services. Our group, which has no political affiliation, is committed to the promotion of the foundational values of our Republic and the observance of norms of Constitutional conduct.

We wish to bring to your attention some aspects of the 2027 Census currently under way.  The Decennial Census exercise was carried out in independent India every ten years from 1951 to 2011. While we can understand that the Census could not be carried out in 2021 because of the COVID pandemic, we fail to comprehend why the Census could not have been carried out by 2023, as was done in 143 other countries. The reasons for delaying the Census by six years instead of two to three years have not been made public. This lack of transparency gives rise to unnecessary apprehensions in the public mind that the Census is being conducted at this juncture to enable the completion of the exercise of delimitation of constituencies in 2027-28, in time for the 2029 Lok Sabha elections. We would certainly hope that no such extraneous considerations have influenced the timing of the 2027 Census.

We sincerely expect that the Census exercise will be unexceptionable and in conformity with the United Nations guidelines laid down in the Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses (Revision 4 March 2025), to which India is a signatory. We understand that the main reasons for the delay in the processing and release of the data of past Censuses were: (a) the need for coding of descriptive answers to several questions; and (b) the lack of sufficient expertise within the Census Commissioner’s office to check the quality of data. Providing mobile phones to code everything at field level, where the enumerator is required to select the correct option from a dropdown menu, does not allow for correction of errors in the recorded code. Past experience, especially in the 2001 and 2011 Censuses, has shown that mere technological advance in computing facilities does not necessarily speed up release of data. There is need to be open to the possibilities of errors, with effective measures being put in place to ensure data quality.

Dropping questions on data items that are not required cannot be collected or where alternate sources of data are available would help in streamlining the data collection process, reducing respondent fatigue and resulting in better quality data. For example, the questions on children born/surviving are better collected in the National Family Health Surveys.

Other Backward Classes (OBC) have not been specifically classified in the Census. The methodology for caste enumeration is yet to be announced. While one option could be to compile a list of castes for people to select from (as was done in the Bihar caste survey), we feel the better option is to leave the field open in the Census form, as was done in the 2011 Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC). The methodology of surveying and enumerating languages could be used for condensing the Census data. However, this would require the government to keep the data open for scrutiny by scholars and involve institutions like the Anthropological Survey of India. The process can begin with collecting information on the 1369 mother tongue languages listed in the 2011 Census. An institution like the ASI could then certify the caste based on markers of common language, ancestry, lifestyle, relatives, marriages and kinship bonds.

Data on tribes were being collected in past Censuses only from the Scheduled Tribe (ST) population. If all tribes, other than those in the ST list, are classified and recorded, a long existing injustice to the Denotified Tribe communities, which account for more than 100 million people, would be rectified.

The issue of religion is, and has been in the past, a sensitive area for the Census. At a time when political leaders openly express their opposition to the inclusion of so-called “Bangladeshi Muslims” in the electoral rolls, care must be taken to ensure that the Census fully records the population of various minority groups in the country, covering religion, caste and tribe.

As former civil servants, many of us have been, during our careers, involved in the Census exercises at district, state and national levels. We are sure that you will exercise the highest level of professional competence in ensuring that the upcoming Census meets the threefold goals of accuracy, transparency and accessibility.

We wish the Census exercise all success.

SATYAMEVA JAYATE

Yours sincerely,

Constitutional Conduct Group (90 signatories, as at pages 3-6 below)

The post Ensure transparency and inclusion in the 2027 Census: CCG appeared first on SabrangIndia.

During a high-profile technology expo meant to showcase India’s AI talent, a faculty member from Galgotias University introduced a robotic dog dubbed “Orion,” describing it as a product of the university’s Centre of Excellence.

Almost immediately, keen observers and technology enthusiasts identified the robot as a Unitree Go2 — a commercially available quadruped robot manufactured by a Chinese company, not an original research output of the university.

Videos from the summit circulated widely on social media, and within hours the episode had sparked ridicule, criticism, and questions about transparency and authenticity in India’s tech showcases.

Reports claimed that organisers asked the university to vacate its stall and even had the power at the pavilion switched off in response to the controversy — though the university later contested whether an official expulsion order was issued.

In short: what was meant to signal India’s AI capabilities became a cautionary tale about careless representation, inadequate academic ethics, and short-term showmanship.

Why it matters: Beyond a single mistake 

This episode is not just a PR (public relations) embarrassment — it also opens up deeper questions about the culture of higher education in India, the politics of innovation, and the gap between rhetoric and reality in national technological ambition.

1. Education ethics and quality control 

Universities — especially those with public visibility — are expected to uphold standards of transparency and academic integrity. Presenting an imported product as original research, even unintentionally, reflects a failure in basic accountability and clarity — a breakdown not just of communication, but of institutional rigor.

For students and faculty, hands-on interaction with advanced devices is legitimate. But conflating exposure to technology with actual development — and doing so in a high-stakes international forum — shows a worrying inferiority complex towards genuine innovation.

A Galgotias “research scholar,” Dharmendra Kumar, published a paper claiming that Covid-19 could be destroyed by sound vibrations from clapping or bells in the Journal of Molecular Pharmaceutical and Regulatory Affairs (Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2020). The claim echoed the March 22, 2020 Janata Curfew clapping exercise promoted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi—an idea later rejected by the scientific community as pseudoscience.

2. Government priorities in practice: Scientific progress vs the religion industry

A comparison of public spending on science, education, and AI with allocations—direct and indirect—towards religion-centric infrastructure reveals more than budgetary arithmetic; it exposes the political priorities shaping India’s future.

The Union government often cites education spending as evidence of commitment to knowledge-building. The Ministry of Education was allocated ₹128,650 crore in 2025–26, with ₹78,572 crore for school education and around ₹47,000–48,000 crore for higher education in recent years. While these figures appear substantial, they must sustain one of the world’s largest student populations, thousands of colleges and universities, and a chronically underfunded research ecosystem. Much of this money merely keeps institutions running rather than creating globally competitive laboratories, doctoral programmes or long-term research capacity.

Technology and AI funding shows a similar contradiction. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology received about ₹26,000 crore in 2025–26. Initiatives such as the IndiaAI Mission (around ₹10,300 crore over multiple years) and a ₹500-crore Centre of Excellence in AI for Education suggest ambition. Yet this funding is scattered across missions and pilots, favouring visibility and announcements over sustained investment in universities, basic science, and large PhD pipelines—the foundations of genuine innovation.

In contrast, the religion industry—pilgrimage infrastructure, temple-linked tourism, and heritage projects—commands political attention far exceeding its formal budget share. However, two factors amplify its impact. First is political signalling: religious projects are paired with high-profile inaugurations and constant symbolism. Second are off-budget flows—large temple trusts such as Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams handle multi-thousand-crore revenues, shaping infrastructure and public priorities without appearing in Union Budget comparison (s) .

The result is an imbalance where science receives headline funds but limited depth, while religion-centred projects enjoy visibility, legitimacy and multiple funding streams.

3. Spectacle Over Substance

The controversy also highlights a broader phenomenon in modern institutional and political culture: preference for spectacle over substance.

Political rhetoric around AI and technological leadership in India has grown aggressively in recent years, with grand claims about digital prowess, global tech leadership, and indigenous innovation. But when those claims are measured against reality, episodes like this reveal a gap between promotional narratives and actual research output.

Rather than noble ambition, this can resemble marketing masquerading as innovation — a dynamic that critics have long pointed to in sectors beyond education.

4. The BJP-RSS Context: Aspirations, perceptions, and overselling

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the ideological ecosystem around it, often associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), have frequently championed narratives of technological self-reliance, cultural renaissance, and national resurgence. These themes have strong resonances in public discourse.

But when such grand narratives are paired with weak empirical substance, they risk becoming vacant rhetorics rather than effective policy frameworks.

The AI Expo controversy — wherein an institution aligns itself with big claims (Rs. 350 crore AI investment, “in-house innovation” at a global summit) only to be unmasked over a misrepresented robot — can be seen as a symptom of larger systemic issues: an overreliance on image management, lack of emphasis on foundational science and research, and the temptation to equate presence with excellence.

These are not problems unique to any one institution, but they are exacerbated when political discourse prioritises bravado over authentic capacity building.

Conclusion: A moment of reckoning — or repetition?

The Galgotias AI Expo debacle is uncomfortable because it holds up a mirror: it reflects not only the pitfalls of one university’s presentation, but also the gap between aspiration and achievement in India’s drive toward global tech leadership.

If the goal is genuinely to build an AI-savvy workforce and world-class research ecosystem, then substance must matter more than spectacle, and integrity must undergird promotion. This requires honest assessment, a political leadership that promotes scientific progress over religious industry, rigorous academic culture, and an intellectual climate that values long-term capacity over short-term optics.

Only then can institutions — and the nation — move beyond tall claims and hollow applause toward genuine innovation, learning, and progress.

(The author is a mechanical engineer and an independent commentator on history and politics, with a particular focus on Rajasthan. His work explores the syncretic exchanges of India’s borderlands as well as contemporary debates on memory, identity and historiography; he can be contacted on adityakrishnadeora@gmail.com)

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

Related:

Public Education is Not a Priority in Union Budget 2025-26

Higher Education: How Centre is Undermining State Autonomy & Politicising UGC

Public Vs Private Education – A New Experiment By Y.S.Jagan Mohan Reddy

The post Galgotias University’s AI Expo Debacle: What it says about Contemporary Indian Education & Public Culture appeared first on SabrangIndia.

What follows is excerpted from the second Bhasurendrababu Memorial Lecture, organised by True Dialogue Debates and delivered by former journalist R. Rajagopal in Alappuzha, south Kerala, on February 15. The commemoration of Bhasurendrababu — journalist and political commentator — was inaugurated by Vijoo Krishnan, General Secretary of the All India Kisan Sabha and CPI(M) Politburo member. This is not a full reproduction of the lecture, but an account drawn from it.

The purported legal documents and official letters featured here were sourced from CourtListener, part of the Free Law Project, a federally recognized non-profit organisation in the United States. CourtListener.com is a fully searchable and accessible archive of court data, including growing repositories of opinions, oral arguments, judicial financial records, and federal filings. Founded in 2010, Free Law Project uses technology, data, and advocacy to make the legal ecosystem more equitable and competitive.

On January 21 last month, at 3:28 p.m. EST — around 2 a.m. in India on January 22 — a series of documents appeared on CourtListener.com.

As many as 20 PDF files were uploaded. The files were attributed to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American securities markets watchdog. To the best of available knowledge, neither the SEC — to which these documents are attributed — nor the Government of India, whose purported letters form part of the documents, has publicly contested their authenticity. These documents have remained in the public domain since January 21, 2026 (EST). Although the contents of the files are not legible on the presentation screen, the purpose here is not to dissect their details but to note that multiple documents entered the public domain on that day.

The issue relates to what is known in the United States as “service methods,” referred to in India as serving summons or notice to parties involved in a case. In this instance, the SEC sought to issue documents to Gautam Adani and Sagar Adani. The documents are linked to a civil case in which the SEC has levelled charges against Gautam Adani, chairman of Adani Green’s board of directors, and his nephew Sagar Adani, executive director of the same board. The Adanis have consistently denied all charges.

The SEC filed a motion requesting a New York court to set a date permitting alternative service of summonses to the defendants. Indian nationals cannot be directly served summonses by foreign agencies like the SEC; however, defendants may waive service if they choose. The SEC stated it had approached Gautam Adani’s counsel. Yet in April 2025, it noted that “neither defendant has agreed to waive service of the summons and complaint.” In the absence of such a waiver, foreign agencies in civil matters must route service through India’s Ministry of Law and Justice under the Hague Service Convention. This made the role of the Indian law ministry crucial.

A preliminary statement in the documents notes that while the SEC had filed charges, India’s Ministry of Law and Justice had twice refused service under the Hague Convention. Reports had earlier indicated that the Indian government was dragging its feet. What remained unknown until January 21 were the reasons cited by the ministry — and that the matter had effectively reached a dead end.

Among the 20 uploaded PDFs was a letter purportedly sent by the Indian law ministry to the SEC. For newsrooms accustomed to covering “sealed-cover” submissions by the Narendra Modi government, this letter could well have been manna from heaven. All that newspapers needed to do was seek confirmation from the law ministry regarding authenticity and, in the event of silence, publish the document while noting that the ministry had neither confirmed nor denied it.

The purported letter stated that the SEC’s forwarding letter “bears no seal and signature and the model form bears no seal of the requesting authority.” On this basis, the Indian ministry returned the documents to the SEC.

The SEC responded, writing to the Indian ministry that the Hague Convention does not mandate a seal or signature on the forwarding cover letter. It maintained that its requests complied with the Convention. The Hague Service Convention, the SEC argued, does not require a seal or signature on the forwarding cover letter, nor does the Model Form require a seal. The watchdog resent the request.

The SEC further cited The Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention, stating that demanding a seal and stamp is erroneous and that certification is not required on the Model Form or accompanying documents.

According to the SEC, the Convention only requires the Model Form to be signed by a competent individual. Its requests met these criteria, and the optional cover letter, it argued, should not have been grounds for return.

The SEC’s cover letter was displayed — its second page unsigned — one of the reasons cited by the Indian ministry for returning the request. The SEC countered that the cover letter itself is optional and requires neither seal nor signature.

An image of the purported Hague Convention Model Form showed it signed but without a seal. The absence of a seal had been cited by the Indian ministry. Yet the form itself states “Signature and/or stamp,” a phrase the SEC relied upon in its rebuttal.

On September 12, 2025, the SEC followed up on the requests for service originally sent in February and resent in May.

In November 2025, the Indian ministry responded again, citing SEC procedures and stating that the summonses were not covered under specific categories. The requests were once more returned.

That letter appears to have been the final straw. The SEC then moved a New York court. The uploaded documents show no fresh SEC response to the Indian ministry thereafter. However, the SEC’s court filing states that the ministry’s objection to its authority to invoke the Hague Convention lacked basis.

The SEC’s move triggered rapid developments. On January 23 — just two days after the SEC approached the court — Gautam Adani’s counsel wrote to the court stating that discussions were ongoing with the SEC and requested that the court’s order be deferred.

The court agreed to defer its ruling until January 30, 2026.

Subsequently, the SEC informed the court that counsel for the Adanis had agreed to service of process, eliminating the need for the court to rule on the motion. The defendants, however, retained all litigation rights, including those concerning jurisdiction.

What was resolved in just over a week had, in fact, taken 429 days of back-and-forth since the filing of the original case. Not all delays can be attributed to the Indian ministry. During this period, Donald Trump became the 47th President of the United States, leading to some administrative flux and related pauses. Nonetheless, the sheer number of days required for what is typically a procedural step is illustrative.

Numbers, however, do not tell stories on their own.

In June, a pregnant woman named Sunali Khatun was swept up in Delhi’s drive against alleged illegal immigrants. She was “pushed back” to Bangladesh in “hot haste” within five days — even though the Union home ministry states that verification can take up to 30 days. Following intervention by the Supreme Court, Sunali returned to India on humanitarian grounds.

One process involving a tycoon consumed 429 days.
Another, involving the deportation of a pregnant woman, took only five.

The question remains: when the documents attributed to the SEC entered the public domain, what did India’s paper tigers do?

You’re right. That version became too report-like and lost the sharpness and tone of the original slides. Let me rewrite it properly — as a strong, flowing narrative that keeps everything you said, but with better rhythm, coherence and punch.

Watch the Video Presentation here:

The Silence of the Newsrooms

Let us return to the afternoon of January 21, 2026, in New York. That was when the SEC documents relating to the service of summons on Gautam Adani and Sagar Adani quietly dropped onto the internet. In New Delhi, it was around 2 a.m. on January 22. Too late for most newspapers to carry the development in their January 22 print editions.

So let us grant them that grace. Let us wait for the morning of January 23 — more than 24 hours after the SEC-linked documents had entered the public domain.

Good morning, upcountry India.

The Indian Express arrives. Page 1 is scanned carefully. No SEC-Adani service request story in sight. Perhaps the large advertisement at the bottom elbowed it out. Fine. Let us turn to the business section.

The Economy page does carry an Adani story — tiny, tucked near the bottom. But it is not the SEC development. It is a Press Trust of India report about Adani Energy’s dipping profit. The SEC story remains elusive.

By January 24 — over 50 hours after the documents surfaced — the story finally makes its way to the front page of The Indian Express. Or perhaps it forces its way in, propelled not by editorial urgency but by market tremors. The headline reads: “Adani stocks fall as US SEC plans email summons to Gautam Adani.” Investor jitters appear to have mattered more than the reader’s right to know that the SEC had moved a New York court after 429 days of procedural resistance.

The Times of India — whose parent company’s media school trained me in 1990–91 — never ceases to surprise. The story is on Page 1. Yes, it is a brief. But it is there. The brief points to Page 27.

And so begins a small expedition through the paper. After negotiating the rapids of newsprint, Page 27 appears.

There it is — a larger SEC-Adani story sailing in the Times Business section. Three columns. Five paragraphs. Placed above the “anchor” story. Yet, despite its vast in-house reporting network, The Times has opted for a Reuters report. What kept its reporters so preoccupied that none could be spared for this development? The rest of the page offers no clue.

Next, The Hindu. Usually dependable. Surely this would find space on Page 1. It does not. The colourful NDA advertisement dominates attention. Turning to the business page, the SEC story does appear — a narrow report in the second deck. Once again, Reuters. Once again, a paper with a formidable reporting network relying on a wire copy.

The Telegraph — a paper I once edited — does not carry the story on Page 1 either. On the Business page, the Reuters report sits as a single-column item.

The New Indian Express? I cannot find the story on either the front page or the business page. I deliberately say “I could not find the story,” because newspapers today scatter tiny items across labyrinthine layouts. It is possible the SEC story is camouflaged somewhere. But must readers play Indiana Jones to locate consequential news? Or should newspapers present important developments in ways that are visible and accessible?

Now to my home turf.

I cannot find the SEC story in Malayala Manorama. Malayalam newspapers, these days, seem absorbed in the gold theft at the Sabarimala temple.

Mathrubhumi, too — the story eludes me. On January 23, I also fail to spot the SEC-Adani development on the front pages of the two Left newspapers, Deshabhimani and Janayugam.

Across both print editions and paywalled online editions, the SEC-Adani story does not appear — at least not in any visible form — in The Indian Express, The New Indian Express, Malayala Manorama and Mathrubhumi on January 23. The Telegraph, whose e-paper is free, and some others do carry it in one form or another.

As a subscriber to the four newspapers mentioned, I wrote to their editors on the night of January 23, using the email addresses published in their pages, asking why the story had not been reported that day. There has been no acknowledgement since. I cannot even be certain that my emails reached them.

Watch the Video Presentation here:

Who Swam Against the Tide — and What the Newsrooms Chose to Chase

Let us ask the obvious question: who swam against the tide?

We return once more to the afternoon of January 21 in New York — and 2 a.m. on January 22 in India — when the SEC-Adani story broke.

Not all journalists were asleep.

At 4:28 a.m. on January 22 — less than three hours after the SEC documents entered the public domain — a journalist in India had already filed a report.

Devirupa Mitra published a detailed and comprehensive story for the news portal The Wire at 4:28 a.m., proving that where there is the will, there is always a story. It is worth noting that The Wire does not charge its readers; it relies solely on donations.

Now, about the print editions.

The news that day, in my view, was not about the Adanis. The Adanis — who have denied the charges — were part of a legal process that would unfold in court. It is an ongoing matter. Only a court of law can determine innocence or guilt, and until then, the Adanis are entitled to every protection the law affords.

The Wire struck the nail squarely on the head. Its headline placed emphasis where it belonged — highlighting that the Modi government had blocked the SEC request for several months.

That, I believe, was the real story.

The central issue was how the Union government appeared to have responded to attempts to serve summons on defendants facing charges in a country that India publicly celebrates as a friend. The purported documents — uploaded and attributed to the SEC — suggest that the American watchdog contested the Indian law ministry’s objections, citing material under the Hague Convention. What remains unclear, however, is whether the Indian government subsequently challenged the SEC’s version.

Indian citizens have the right to know whether their government misled a regulatory watchdog; whether it stonewalled a legal process with implications for investors; or whether, conversely, the US watchdog’s claims are inaccurate — in which case the Indian government ought not to take that lying down.

Once again, the story was not about the Adanis. It was about the stand adopted by the Indian government.

Yet no newspaper I examined appeared to foreground that aspect. Rarely are Indian newspapers handed, on a platter, a stack of legal documents already in the public domain. Yet in this instance, most chose either to ignore the development for over 51 hours or to underplay it.

I had assumed that at least some newspapers would use the documents — after erecting the necessary journalistic guardrails.

I had assumed that some would frame the story along the lines indicated here: using documents whose authorship had not been contested until February 14, and pressing the issue of the purported position adopted by the Indian government.

But several newsrooms seem to have perfected the art of swallowing inconvenient news when it concerns powerful players. The inevitable result: readers are denied important information.

And then — bouncing back from these depths of professional despair — I discovered renewed hope.

On February 6, Mathrubhumi carried a Page 1 story that restored my faith in the data-gathering zeal of Indian print newsrooms. The newspaper reported, in meticulous detail, how National Security Adviser Ajit Doval went shopping — unannounced — and purchased banana chips. Yes. B-A-N-A-N-A C-H-I-P-S. Banana chips. In Thiruvananthapuram.

The operation, it seems, was blown open when some employees of a space agency recognised Doval and introduced themselves. Hold your breath: he reportedly exchanged pleasantries with them in Hindi and English.

Pulse racing and adrenaline pumping, I read the chips story with the thrill of watching a Mission: Impossible sequence. Mathrubhumi displayed remarkable courage in revealing what could only be described as state secrets — such as the presence of four vehicles and an ambulance stationed outside while Doval selected his banana chip supplies. The report even disclosed how much money he spent on the purchase.

Indian print newsrooms, clearly, are in safe hands — locked and loaded for the mission.

Step aside, without reservation, Ethan Hunt.

Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to retire.

Thank you.

Watch the video presentation here:

R Rajagopal, Senior Journalist, Former Editor The Telegraph

The post Newsrooms that Swallow Whales appeared first on SabrangIndia.

By an opinion dated November 27, 2025, Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 5, Goalpara, presided over by Member N.K. Nath, declared that Anowara Khatun is an Indian citizen, answering the reference made by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Goalpara, in the negative.

The order brings to a close the said proceedings that originated over two decades ago and highlights persistent structural issues in Assam’s citizenship determination framework, particularly its impact on poor and marginalized women.

Team CJP Assam sits to discuss the case with Anowara Khatun and family outside their home in Assam

From IMDT to Foreigners’ Tribunal: A case born of institutional suspicion

Anowara’s case originated as far back as 2004, when the Superintendent of Police (Border), Goalpara referred her name under the now-defunct Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, alleging that she had illegally entered India between 1966 and 1971. The referral admitted that the “doubt” arose because she could not immediately produce documents during verification — a familiar and deeply flawed basis used against the poor and illiterate.

Following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India (2005), which struck down the IMDT Act as unconstitutional, Anowara’s case was mechanically transferred to Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 5, Goalpara under the Foreigners Act, 1946, shifting the entire burden of proof onto her under Section 9.

Who is Anowara Khatun?

Anowara Khatun was born and raised in Kharda Manikpur (also recorded as Kharija Manikpur), Goalpara, Assam. She is the daughter of Late Alom Shah, a lifelong resident of Assam, and Korimon Nessa, and the granddaughter of Late Rose Mamud Shah. Documentary evidence showed that her father, Alom Shah, purchased land in Assam in 1947, 1952, and 1959. His name, along with that of Anowara’s mother, appears in the electoral rolls of 1966 and 1970, demonstrating their presence in Assam prior to the relevant cut-off dates.

Anowara studied up to Lower Primary level at Majgaon LP School, married Saiful Hussain of Mamudpur Part-I, and later settled in Sidhabari Part-II, where she has lived for decades. She first voted in 1985, and her name consistently appears in electoral rolls for 1985, 1997, 2005, 2011, and 2015.

Despite this, she was eventually marked a “D-Voter”, stripped of voting rights, and subjected to relentless suspicion — a fate shared by thousands of Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam.

Her personal circumstances make the cruelty of this process even more stark. Anowara suffers from mental imbalance and chronic health issues, lives in extreme poverty, has no proper bedding, and struggles daily for food and medical care. She and her husband survive on daily labour, entirely unequipped to navigate a legal system designed to break the poor.

CJP Steps In: Building a case where the State saw only suspicion

Recognising the grave injustice involved, Assam Team CJP took up Anowara’s case, committing to pursue it despite the enormous evidenti and procedural hurdles.

On behalf of Anowara, Advocate Ashim Mubarak, assisted by Advocate Shofior Rahman, and supported by CJP’s para-legal and community teams, presented a meticulous defence before the Tribunal.

Four defence witnesses were examined:

• DW-1: Anowara Khatun herself
• DW-2: Her brother, Kurban Ali
• DW-3: Her sister, Ambia Bibi
• DW-4: The Land Record Assistant, Matia Revenue Circle

CJP placed before the Tribunal a comprehensive documentary trail, including:

• Three registered land sale deeds executed in 1947, 1952, and 1959 in her father’s name
• Electoral rolls of 1966 and 1970, recording her parents as Indian voters
• Subsequent voter lists (1979, 1985, 1997, 2005, 2011, 2015) showing uninterrupted electoral presence
• Jamabandi and citha records proving inheritance of ancestral land in Assam

The Tribunal explicitly accepted that the land deeds were over 30 years old and required no further proof, and relied heavily on the voter lists of 1966 and 1970 to establish her father’s citizenship.

Even when Anowara’s deteriorating mental health made her continued presence difficult, CJP persisted with evidence and arguments, ensuring the case did not collapse under procedural cruelty.

Anowara Khatun with her husband and CJP Team Assam outside her home in Assam

The Tribunal’s Finding: Citizenship proven, suspicion rejected

After a detailed appreciation of evidence, the Tribunal held that:

• Alom Shah, Anowara’s father, was conclusively established as an Indian citizen, present in Assam since at least 1947
• Anowara, being his daughter, cannot be treated as a foreigner
• The state failed to rebut the overwhelming documentary record

The reference was therefore answered in the negative, and Anowara Khatun was declared not a foreigner, with directions issued to inform the Superintendent of Police (Border), Goalpara.

Anowara Khatun holding up the FT order outside her home in Assam

A system designed to break the poor

Anowara Khatun’s case is not an aberration — it is a window into a larger architecture of state oppression. Instruments such as D-Voter tagging, Foreigners’ Tribunals, NRC, detention camps, “push-backs,” the Passport Act, SR and SIR exercises operate together to produce statelessness among workers, farmers, minorities, and Bengali-speaking communities.

Assam has long served as a pilot project for citizenship stripping, but the same logic is now visible across India. Behind this bureaucratic machinery lie document-wars, midnight detentions, suicides, custodial deaths, and families torn apart — all in the name of identifying “Bangladeshis.”

India’s constitutional promise of secularism, dignity, and equality collapses when impoverished citizens are tortured for papers they were never equipped to preserve.

CJP’s Role: Law as resistance

At a time when the Chief Minister of Assam openly targets Muslims, spreads communal suspicion, and legitimises exclusion under the rhetoric of “illegal migration,” CJP continues to fight case by case, restoring citizenship through evidence, law, and persistence.

In the first week of February, members of Team CJP — State In-Charge Nanda Ghosh, DVM Goalpara Zeshmin Sultana, Community Volunteer Hasunir Rahman, and Office Driver Ashikul Hussain — stood by Anowara and her family, reaffirming that justice is not charity, but resistance.

Anowara Khatun’s victory is not just hers. It is a reminder that citizenship in India is increasingly something the poor must fight to prove, and that without sustained legal intervention, countless others will disappear into detention camps, deportation attempts, or silent graves.

This case stands as another testament to what determined legal solidarity can achieve — even in the face of a system designed to erase.

The complete order may be read here.

Related:

CJP flags Zee News broadcast ‘Kalicharan Maharaj vs 4 Maulanas’ for communal framing before NBDSA

The case of “pushback” of Doyjan Bibi and the quiet normalisation of undocumented deportations

Communal Dog-Whistles in an Election Season: CJP flags hate speech by BJP’s Ameet Satam to election authorities

From Hate Speech to State Action: How communal vigilantism at Malabar Hill continues unchecked

The post From D-Voter Tagging to Citizenship Declaration: Anowara Khatun’s case before the foreigners’ tribunal appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Interestingly, the theme for this year’s Justice Day is ‘Renewed commitment to Social Development and Social Justice’. The theme follows the momentum of the Second World Summit for Social Development which was held in Doha, Qatar, from November 4-6, 2025, and the adoption of the Doha Political Declaration, which underscores a shared global responsibility to eradicate poverty and expand decent work.

The theme has some key objectives which include poverty eradication (promoting systems that reduce social exclusion and poverty); decent work (advocating for fair wages, safe working conditions, and labour rights); inclusive growth: (ensuring marginalised groups have equal access to resources and decision-making); global peace (recognising that social justice is an indispensable foundation for maintaining international peace and security).

All this is easier said than done – one can easily term these goals as idealistic! In India, the cries for justice, are becoming louder and longer! They come from different segments of society and particularly from those who continue to be exploited and excluded! These cries are heart-rending: anyone with an iota of conscience will hear them! The sad and tragic reality is that these cries will remain unheard; those who need to hear these cries and to respond to them, have deadened their ears and hardened their hearts!

According to a well-researched working paper (published late in 2024) ‘Income and Wealth Inequality in India, 1922-2023: The Rise of the Billionaire Raj’, inequality in India has skyrocketed since the early 2000s, with the income and wealth share of the top one per cent of the population rising to 22.6 per cent and 40.1 per cent, respectively, in 2022-23. The paper further stated that between 2014-15 and 2022-23, the rise of top-end inequality has been particularly pronounced in terms of wealth concentration. In India the rich become richer and the poor become poorer. The cries of the poor have become louder and shriller!

On the 2024 Environmental Performance Index (EPI), India is ranked at a pathetically low position of 176 out of 180 countries. The low ranking is due to poor air quality, high projected emissions and low biodiversity scores. The EPI uses 58 indicators to assess a country’s environmental performance. Indicators, include biodiversity, air pollution, air and water quality, waste management, emission growth rates, projected emissions, etc., under the three main heads of ecosystem vitality, environmental health and climate change. To assess how well countries are safeguarding their natural treasures, the EPI added a new category: biodiversity and habitat. This category revealed a worrying trend – many protected areas worldwide are being overtaken by buildings and agriculture. India’s heavy reliance on coal is a key factor hindering its environmental performance across multiple indicators. Coal use not only fuels high greenhouse gas emissions but also contributes significantly to India’s severe air pollution problem. This is reflected in India’s rankings: 177 for air quality (above only Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal). India, we are all aware, boasts of some of the most polluted cities in the world. The people of India cry out for environmental justice!

In the 2025 World Press Freedom Index, released by ‘Reporters Without Borders’, India ranked 151 out of 180 countries, with a score of 32.9; the country remains in the “very serious” category for journalists. The index highlights concern over media concentration, political pressure, and attacks on journalists! In a country which is dominated by ‘godified’ media – it is not easy to speak truth to power! Any media house (be it print or electronic) if it takes on the Government – are denied Government advertisements(revenue) and have the ED, the CBI, Income-tax, NIA and other statutory bodies (who have become pliable instruments in the hands of a vindictive regime) breathing on them, raiding them and creating untold suffering on them. A free press is sine qua non in a democracy – and world leaders and Governments have taken on India on this score. A churlish attitude of a fascist regime that is too frightened to face the truth! On 20 February, the 2026 amendments to India’s IT Rules, 2021will be made effective. The new rules enforce strict, immediate accountability for social media and AI platforms, requiring 3-hour takedowns of deepfakes/illegal content, mandatory AI labelling, and 24/7 monitoring. The Government wants to throttle freedom of speech and expression. Those who cherish freedom of the press, of speech and expression cry out for justice!

An estimated 400 million people work in India’s informal sector, on low daily wages and with no contract, pension, paid holidays or health benefits and above all, poor working conditions. The vast majority of them are migrant workers; they are scattered all over the country, who speak different languages. Migrant workers normally cannot defend themselves. When they go to another state, they don’t even speak the local language. No one inspects the premises to check working conditions are safe. They don’t even feature in the records of the local state government. They are invisible. Besides, on 21 November 2025, the Government began implementing the four Labour Codes (Code on Wages, Industrial Relations Code, Social Security Code, and OSHWC Code. These codes have faced intense criticism from trade unions and opposition parties who label them “anti-worker”. They are violative of the rights of workers and favour the employers particularly, the corporate sector! The rural poor are deprived of the MGNREGA scheme. The labourers and the rural poor of India cry out for justice!

Freedom to preach, practise and propagate one’s religion is in the doldrums. At the receiving end, are the minorities particularly the Muslims, Christians and Sikhs. These minorities are consistently targeted: intimidated and harassed,denigrated and demonised, attacked and even killed. India is rock-bottom where the treatment of minorities is concerned. Thousands of Muslims have lost their homes because of demolition raj! the so-called ‘anti-conversion’ laws in several states – are all designed and directed towards the systematic targeting of the minorities in the country. There is much more: what minorities and other vulnerable groups eat, wear, see and read has become the bane of several from the majority community. Livelihoods of minorities are destroyed; Government employment is not given to someone from a minority community – even if the person meets the required competence and has the necessary qualifications. Venomous hate speeches against the minorities have become the order of the day. Those who spew them, do so with gay abandon- because they know that no one will touch them! The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 2025 Annual Report has recommended for the sixth consecutive time that the U.S. State Department designate India as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) due to “systematic, ongoing, and egregious” religious freedom violations. The report cites increased attacks on Christians and Muslims, impunity for perpetrators, and the misuse of laws to target minorities.

The Special Intensive Revision(SIR) has disenfranchised hundreds and thousands of citizens all over the country. Most of them belong the minority communities and to the poorer sections of society. With Census 2027 on the threshold, the reality for the entire country will perhaps become even worse! Then there is the whole process of delimitation and even delisting of tribals/adivasis who have embraced Christianity or Islam. These are all highly manipulative and unconstitutional acts of the ruling regime to establish a Hindutva control of the country. The people of India cry out for Justice and against disenfranchisement!

There is a systematic attack on the sacred, secular and democratic ethos of the country! The ruling regime clearly has a ‘method in their madness’. There is a serious lack of political will to address systemic burning issues which have gripped the nation. There are hurried, biased legislation and prejudiced policies (all designed to decimate the Constitution) which include the National Education Policy, the Citizenship Amendment Act, the anti – conversion laws, the anti-farmer laws, the four anti-worker and pro-corporate labour codes which after a long lull have suddenly become ‘implementable, the Universal Civil Code, the ‘One Nation, One Election’, the Waqf Bill, the Imposition of Hindi as the national language, Constitutional bodies like the Election Commission (which is blatantly biased) the Enforcement Directorate, the Central Bureau of Investigation, the National Investigation Agency(NIA), the police and even sections of the judiciary (the new CJI does not have an impressive track –record) are compromised; they have become ‘Caged Parrots’. Corruption has become the new normal, with this regime! First, it was demonetisation; then, the scam of the Electoral Bonds. We the people of India cry out for justice which is enshrined in our Constitution!

There are several other segments of society who cry out for justice; these include women and children, those of the LGBTQIA+ community, refugees, academics and others from civil society, human rights defenders, others belonging to vulnerable and marginalised sections of society. Above all,there are those who are victims of a heartless, unjust, insensitive and discriminatory society! The list is endless!  It is not without reason that India is ranked 86 out of 143 countries worldwide in the WJP (worldjusticeproject) Rule of Law Index 2025. A great shame indeed! India has a long way to go in the realisation of poverty eradication, ensuring decent work for all, mainstreaming inclusive growth and above all bringing peace to all! The people of  India cry out loudly  and unequivocally for justice!

The challenge today is to get the powers that be, to listen. And act!

( The author is a human rights, reconciliation and peace activist & writer)

The post Cries for Justice in India grow louder! appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Besides these killings, a staggering 1,143 documented complaints of physical and mental harm against Bengali speaking migrants have also been reported. The harassment includes illegal or irregular detentions by the police authorities and labourers threatened or brutalised. This Bengali newspaper has documented these here.

As far back as September 2025, Citizens for Justice and Peace, had submitted a comprehensive complaint to the National Commission for Minorities (NCM), highlighting what it described as an “alarming and coordinated escalation of hate speech” across India. The complaint documents how Bengali-origin Muslims, many of whom are lawful Indian citizens, are being systematically vilified as “Bangladeshis” and “ghuspaithiye” (infiltrators) in election rallies, public protests, and online campaigns. The details of CJP’s submissions to the NCM Chairperson may be read here.

In this complaint, the notorious chief minister of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma’s hate speeches, the speeches by Situ Barua of Jatiya Sangrami Sena and Milan Buragohain of All Tai Ahom Students’ Union, both accused of stopping buses and threatening Muslim labourers to “vacate Upper Assam,” that by Bir Lachit Sen, whose followers reportedly conducted door-to-door “document checks” and forced evictions were included.

Besides there were other such targeted speeches made in Bihar, Delhi and Maharashtra. Maharashtra that has seen four such murders happening has both in the state and local bodies now got the BJP firmly in the saddle of power. Only last week, the newly sworn in Mayor of Mumbai (sworn in close to a month after the election results) vowed “to crackdown on hawkers in the city and ordered birth certificate checks” as part of a “crackdown on illegal Bangladeshi nationals living in the city,” reported India Today.

Related:

Under Suspicion: Bengali Migrant workers face mass detentions, fear, and statelessness in Gurugram crackdown

Under Siege for Speaking Bengali: Detentions, deportations and a rising pushback against the targeting of Bengali migrant workers across India

Bengali Migrant Workers Detained in Odisha: Calcutta High Court demands answers, seeks coordination between states

The post 12 Bengali migrant workers murdered in 6 states, Maharashtra tops the crime list appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The notice did not specify the grounds for the ban but The Wire’s founding editor, Siddharth Varadarajan, who attended the meeting, was informed orally before he was invited to speak that the grounds for blocking the cartoon were that it spread rumours/unverified information that would affect the defence, security, reputation of the country and India’s relations with foreign countries.

The Wire then presented its views to the IDC – which includes senior officials from the ministries of defence, home, information and broadcasting, external affairs, IT and law, as well from the MOD/army.

The Wire has also handed over a written submission to the IDC, which is appended below.

§

The Wire received a notice by email at 6:55 pm on February 10, 2026, purporting to be an “opportunity to appear and submit its comments/ clarifications” before the Inter-Departmental Committee with regard to a ‘request’ for blocking of certain social media URLs where a 52 second animated cartoon was posted by us.

We have been directly informed by one of the social media platforms that the blocking order they received explicitly cites Section 69A of the Information Technology Act.

No ground on which the blocking is permissible or sought or to be considered has accompanied the notice to us or to the social media platforms. Though couched as a hearing on a ‘request’ to block, the fact is that the blocking of the URLs mentioned in the Annexure to the notice has already occurred more than 22 hours prior to the notification to the Wire of this “opportunity”. In other words, this is an ex post facto notice.

At the hearing on February 11 2026 at 3 pm I was told orally that the grounds were – spreading rumours/unverified information that would affect defence, security, reputation of the country and India’s relations with foreign countries. Since this was brought up for the first time, I am placing my written submissions on record.

I was not informed which part was rumour, and how it affected any interest. Can a critical perception of the Prime Minister by a section of the people of his country be inimical to national interest? When has a cartoon video caricaturing a leader or the government ever been viewed in that light? Only a paranoid administration can even suggest this.

The content blocked is a 52-second cartoon clip, containing a humorous depiction of the Prime Minister, whose decision to absent himself from a Parliament debate on account of a purported physical threat from women Opposition MPs (including that they may use their teeth to bite him!) has been widely reported and commented upon.

The Prime Minister is a political personality answerable to the people. The manner in which he deals with questions raised by the Opposition or other issues is eminently a matter for the media and people at large to criticise, discuss – and even mock. To suggest that the Prime Minister of the world’s largest democracy needs to be protected from a satirical 52-second video or that the nation needs to be protected from it is an insult to the Indian State.

The protection of an elected leader in a democracy from criticism or even mockery is not the function of law and indeed not contemplated by Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, under which the order to block access to our cartoon was purportedly made. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted the importance of uninhibited public debate, even that expressed through “sarcastic and sometimes unpleasant sharp criticism of Government and public officials”. (D.C. Saxena v. Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216, para 30)

In any event, there is nothing in the video which can be said to affect even remotely the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order. Neither the executive nor the IDC can direct the blocking of content on grounds not recognised by Section 69-A. There is no legitimate power to block the URLs and the blockage you have ordered is an abuse of authority.

The only power available to the executive for blocking of content under the Intermediary Rules, 2021 comes from and is also limited by Section 69-A of the Information Technology Act (IT Act). Rule 16 of the IT Rules, 2021 merely operationalises the manner of exercise of the power and cannot go beyond the limits of the IT Act.

Section 69-A(1) reads:

“(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officers specially authorised by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource.” (emphasis supplied)

It may be recalled that the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 had upheld the constitutionality of Section 69-A upon the twin conditions that a block should be effected by a reasoned order relatable strictly to the limited grounds enumerated in Section 69-A, and a pre-decisional hearing given to the originator, where the originator is identified or identifiable. None of this has been done.

Your attention is also drawn to the fact that the cartoon only refers to issues already in the public domain and is a simple light-hearted presentation of the issues and use of words that the news media in India has been full of. Absence from Parliament of leaders of government has always been a matter of both comment and concern. Moreover, scores of news items, videos,TV debates and discussions in the social media have used the very words in the video in recent times and as such there is nothing in the cartoon clip that is not already in the public eye.

Since you are now saying that our cartoon has been banned for spreading rumours and unverified information that adversely affects national security, I have appended a list of several reports, including one going back to December 2023, which use words drawn from General Naravane’s book, which I imagine is the source of maximum concern/embarrassment for the prime minister. Not once have these words been denied, either by the government or the general, and scores of reports which reproduce these words – or rumours/unverified information as your IDC may call it – are currently in circulation. But it is The Wire’s 52-second cartoon which has been banned!

In the past, India’s leaders have welcomed and enjoyed satire at their own expense, and the mark of a confident leader is exactly that. This manner of blocking is as unfair to the ruling dispensation as it is to the media houses and to the very essence of freedom of expression.

You may recall that in the past when I have appeared before the IDC for post-facto hearings – first on the forced deletion of an extract from Caravan magazine and then on the blocking of The Wire’s website and the deletion of a story on CNN’s reporting about a downed Indian Rafale jet – neither the proceedings of the same nor the conclusions (reasoned or unreasoned) arrived at after the hearing, have ever been communicated to me, which again is a gross violation of the powers entrusted to the executive government by the IT Act and Rules.

While on the subject, I wish to bring to your notice that The Wire’s entire Instagram account was blocked for a period of time, and when I sought an explanation from the Joint Secretary, MIB, on February 9, I was told “We have not blocked your account.” Since the order to block content came from the MIB, triggering the blocking of the account itself for a while, a public official should surely have given a more transparent answer.

Since the point is a fairly obvious one, which is that the content blocked has no nexus with any of the stated objectives of Section 69-A IT Act, the blocking order must be rescinded with immediate effect. Also, it is only fair that the decision upon these proceedings should be communicated to The Wire, without delay, along with a copy of the order already issued under Section 69-A of the IT Act forming the basis for the blocking of the URLs mentioned in your notice.

LK Advani kept a diary during the Emergency which he published later under the title, A Prisoner’s Scrapbook. There is an entry from August 31, 1975, lamenting the closing down of Shankar’s Weekly, India’s premier satirical publication, that I wish to share with you.

The last issue, dated August 31, carries an editorial captioned ‘Farewell’, in which writes Advani: “Even the word emergency does not find a place in the editorial. But there can scarcely be a more devastating indictment of the emergency than this piece. Shankar writes, inter alia… ‘Dictatorships cannot afford laughter because people may laugh at the dictator, and that wouldn’t do’.”

In the end, I wish to say this. Democracies do not fall in a single dramatic moment. They erode slowly and quietly when those entrusted with power fear laughter and start taking action against it. Before you sign your names on to whatever decision you take, I ask only that you consider whether the Constitution you took an oath to serve was designed to protect authority from satire — or to protect citizens from the abuse of authority.

Thank you.

Annexure

Recent news items on the controversy in parliament

1. Lallantop
2. ⁠Jansatta 
3. ⁠National Herald 
4. ⁠Hindustan Times 
5. ⁠Deccan Herald 
6. ⁠The Federal
7. ⁠NDTV
8. ⁠Outlook 
9. ⁠The Leaflet 
10. The Organiser 
11. India Today (December 2023 report quoting the same words which were referred to in Parliament)

Courtesy: The Wire

The post ‘Democracies Erode When Those Entrusted With Power Fear Laughter and Start Taking Action Against It’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On 8 February 2026 following the Thai general election, there was a paradigm shift ushering in a new era of Southeast Asian politics as the ultra-right Bumjaithai Party took control of every organ of Thai state power, democratically or otherwise. The party are relatively new comers to Thai politics but are the clear successor of a long line of monachal-military-capitalist-ultra-nationalists who have long served as a vanguardist nexus of deep state power. They had already allegedly rigged senate elections in the upper-house in 2024 winning a super majority in the supposedly party neutral chamber- an investigation into these charges of vote rigging are now certain to go nowhere. The judiciary, which have long been in the pocket of the aforementioned monachal-military-ultra-nationalists, are also firmly on team Bhumjaithai (BJT), and due to the kingdom’s centralised government structure little to no opposition remains in any state institutional form.

For the past two decades, and even going back to the 1960s, Thailand has had a relatively well organised peasant and workers movement, particularly given the highly reactionary nature of the state, which has been a US vassal ever since their war on Vietnam. Up until the 2000s this movement was largely extra-parliamentary, with the poor organising around the Farmers Federation (1970s), the insurgent Communist Party (1960s-80s) and subsequently a web of trade unions and localised peasant groups. In 2001, however, the left-agrarian-populist Thai-Rak-Thai party (today Phue Thai) emerged as the parliamentary representative of the poor, winning landslide elections, countless policy victories and experiencing mass state repression in the form of military and judiciary coups, extrajudicial killings, arrests and disappearances. Despite Phue Thai’s successes, over the past two decades, the reactionary state has developed a complex system of weaponised lawfare, as documented by researcher Tyrell Haberkorn in her book Dictatorship on Trial. In short, the reactionary elite learnt how to bar the poor from parliament, and at the time of writing, appear to have successfully neutralised the threat for the indefinite future.

In the aftermath of the 8 February election, many of those on the left are nervously looking to a future that resembles Hun Sen’s Cambodia (CPP) or Modi’s India (BJP). While these examples operate in vastly different political landscapes, they share striking tactical similarities in neutralising opposition through legal, administrative, patronage network, and state institutional means. A new reactionary playbook is rapidly being developed and exported across the region. One by which the ultra-right are able to capture state institutions, weaponize ultra-nationalist grievances outwards, and crush opposition. The much touted “rule of law” is stripped of its liberal pretences to serve as a naked instrument of class rule and state capital. Which brings us to the question of what the opposition—what the poor—can do to recognise and challenge this.

The repeated playbook in all of these cases rely on three basic pillars, judicial neutralisation, opposition absorption & ethno-nationalist redirection:

Judicial Neutralisation
In these cases, the state was built on Western ideas of liberal democracy. The judiciary, once framed in liberal theory as an independent check on power, has been effectively hollowed out and repurposed. It functions as an open and concentrated administrative force dedicated to safeguarding the interests of the dominant economic class, operating as a tactical instrument for enforcement of economic and political monopolies, ensuring that the legal system actively facilitates the accumulation of wealth and power for the ruling elite rather than providing a check on state power.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India: Have repeatedly used law enforcement agencies (Enforcement Directorate, Central Bureau of Investigation) to file corruption or money laundering cases against the opposition, often leading to pre-trial detentions that paralyses opposition leadership during elections, bogging them down in judicial procedure.

The Bhumjaithai Party (BJT), Thailand: Benefits from a “Judicial Coup” model where the courts protect the interests of the aforementioned reactionary vanguardist nexus. They benefit from a judiciary that dissolves major rivals and removes opposition leaders, like the judicial coups against Phue Thai Prime ministers and the dissolution of the Move Forward Party, on constitutional grounds. BJT itself rarely initiates these cases but relies on their dependable ultra-nationalist allies to press the charges.

The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), Cambodia: Perhaps the most ‘advanced’ form, where the distinction between the party and the state has completely withered away. This is the closest we have to Caesarism, in that the judiciary is simply a department of the CPP used to liquidate the political competition, ensuring that the means of production (land, timber, and factories) remain in the hands of the elite class loyal to the CPP project.

Absorbing Opposition
In India, the “BJP Washing Machine” is a mechanism for the centralisation of political rent. Localised political/landowning elites with their existing patronage networks join the BJP to protect their accumulated capital from state seizure and further cement their position locally, while strengthening party hegemony nationally. Former opposition figures become allies and any investigations into their past wrongdoing are washed away by the power of the BJP “Washing Machine”.

In Thailand, the BJT’s absorption of existing “Baan Ya” (local elites) into the party allows for the consolidation of provincial capital and votes. When the judiciary threatens to investigate non-BJT elites, they simply move their assets (votes and influence) to join BJT, moving from a position of weakness to strength and allowing them greater access to state contracts, legal protections and a seat at the table in Bangkok.

In Cambodia, the CPP’s “Golden Handcuffs” are a form of patronage-based feudalism. For opposition figures, or those who wish to challenge CPP hegemony, instead of challenging the party, joining the CPP is the only way to access markets, votes, state contracts, etc., and avoid liquidation. Once tied or ‘handcuffed’ to the CPP they are richly rewarded and protected, providing they adhere to the party’s hegemony.

Ethno-nationalist Redirection
So as to most effectively legitimise their regimes and justify their extraordinary use of heavy handed judiciary, all three cases have relied on stoking ethno-nationalist grievances against outside forces. Ironically, Thailand and Cambodia are mutually dependent on this, given the recent border war, which was instigated by both sides, so as to create this very outcome. As we wrote at the outbreak of the fighting, it was a war of elite consensus on both sides of the border, which served only to strengthen the elites on either side, to justify their militaristic policies, which ultimately are vested in domestic interests, using the military as an internal repressive state apparatus rather than an external—as is the case with the US and Great Britain for example. The same is also true of the BJP, who have used the longstanding conflict with Pakistan to justify crackdowns on domestic opposition who fail to show sufficient fealty towards India’s army in its conflict with Pakistan. In Thailand too, this tactic was used against the left opposition as a means of discipline and control, forcing them to back the reactionary consensus of the ultra-nationalists like BJT or face charges of treason, as was the case with the aforementioned left populist PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra who was evicted from office for this very reason.

The Way Out
The election of Bhumjaithai this month is the most recent country in the region to fall to an ultra-right government using the very same playbook mentioned above. Reactionary forces across Asia are watching closely, taking notes, learning and adapting. It is at this moment that those of us on the left, the poor, must do the same, take time to analyse how reactionary powers operate and where their weaknesses are.

The answer, is of course, not the liberal politics that have been sold by the Western funded NGO’s and think tanks that for decades have portrayed themselves as the vanguards of democracy against fascism. Indeed, they are, in the best case, completely ineffective, as is the case with the Cambodia National Rescue Party, and in the worst case actively harmful, as is the case with The Peoples Party Thailand.

As bleak as the situation may feel in Thailand today in the aftermath of this defeat, there are lessons and examples we can look to as means of resistance, as well as recent moments of such reactionary consensuses breaking—the case of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, albeit currently in a state of flux. Even within the reactionary consensus, liberatory spaces can be created like the incredible achievements of the left coalition in Kerala.

For the poor of Thailand, we are in the first days of a new paradigm, a new reactionary consensus, where parliamentary political organizing may need to be abandoned for several years. While this particular paradigm is fresh, it is one that the poor have faced many times before. We have seen our comrades dead in the street, we still live with their empty bedrooms in our homes. We heard these stories from our grandparents, who in turn heard them from theirs.We have bounced back before and we inevitably bounce back again, as will the poor of India and Cambodia, such is the nature of class struggle.

This article was produced by Globetrotter. Kay Young is a writer and editor at DinDeng journal (Thailand). He has a forthcoming book on Thai revolutionary history with LeftWord Books (India)

Courtesy: CounterView

The post Asia’s ultra-right consensus: ‘Liberal politics, sold by western funded NGOs, isn’t the answer’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Predictably, on February 11, the Centre issued a nationwide protocol prescribing how the national song, written by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, should be sung. At one level, the move may appear innocuous—after all, what harm can there be in honouring a patriotic hymn? Yet, when placed in the larger political context, it raises troubling questions about the direction in which the Narendra Modi government is steering the republic.

The protocol makes it clear that Vande Mataram is to be given precedence over Jana Gana Mana, written and composed by Rabindranath Tagore and adopted as the national anthem. If both are sung, the national song must come first. It also mandates that everyone present must stand in respectful attention when it is sung, with an exception only when the song forms part of a film or documentary. Symbolism, in politics, is never accidental.

This development must be viewed alongside a broader pattern. When the Prime Minister “consecrated” the Ram temple at Ayodhya—on the very site where the Babri Masjid once stood—he blurred the constitutional line separating state and religion. Today, he appears more occupied with temple visits and meetings with religious figures than with addressing the anxieties of citizens grappling with unemployment, inflation and social discord.

There was a time when visiting dignitaries were taken to Bengaluru’s Infosys campus to showcase India’s strides in information technology—a confident, forward-looking nation presenting its modern achievements. Today, they are escorted to Varanasi, the Prime Minister’s constituency, to witness the Ganga aarti. Civilisational heritage has its place, but when spectacle substitutes substance, the message to the world changes.

I have heard Vande Mataram sung at functions organised by RSS veterans such as R. Balashankar. I was once invited to a function hosted by the builders of the Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi, where the chief guest was RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat. On such occasions, only the first two stanzas were rendered—the very portions historically accepted as inclusive.

The February 11 circular, however, insists on singing the entire poem, including portions that were consciously set aside to accommodate the sensitivities of religious minorities. During the parliamentary debate, the Prime Minister asserted that Vande Mataram was the one song that united Indians during the freedom struggle. This is simply not true.

The freedom movement resonated with a chorus of slogans and songs, each reflecting diverse ideological streams and regional energies: Jai Hind, popularised by Subhas Chandra Bose; Inquilab Zindabad, immortalised by Bhagat Singh and his comrades; Quit India; Bharat Mata ki Jai; Jai Bharat; and yes, Vande Mataram. To claim that a single chant alone stirred the nationalist soul is to rewrite history through the lens of contemporary politics.

Modi had accused the Congress of “mutilating” Vande Mataram by adopting only its first two stanzas. The charge is historically untenable. Tagore’s Bharoto Bhagyo Bidhata, originally comprising five stanzas, was similarly abridged when the Constituent Assembly adopted only the first stanza as the national anthem on January 24, 1950. It was chosen for its brevity, inclusiveness and suitability for formal occasions. No one accused the Assembly of disrespecting Tagore.

Likewise, the Indian National Congress adopted only the first two stanzas of Vande Mataram in 1937 because later verses contain explicit references to Durga, Lakshmi and other Hindu deities. Leaders of the freedom movement—deeply conscious of India’s plural character—feared that adopting the entire song might alienate non-Hindus. Tagore himself recommended these two stanzas for their “unobjectionable evocation of the beauty of the motherland.”

Nor was this the decision of Jawaharlal Nehru alone, as is often alleged. It emerged from a unanimous Congress Working Committee resolution passed on October 30, 1937, in Calcutta. Among those present were Nehru, Sardar Patel, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Maulana Azad, Bhulabhai Desai, Jamnalal Bajaj, J.B. Kripalani, Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Rajaji, Acharya Narendra Dev, Jayaprakash Narayan and Subhas Chandra Bose. Mahatma Gandhi, though not a formal member, was a special invitee and assisted in drafting the resolution. Moved by Rajendra Prasad and seconded by Patel, it represented consensus—not mutilation.

It is also worth recalling that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, founded in 1925—half a century after Vande Mataram was written—did not adopt it as its anthem. Instead, it chose Namaste Sada Vatsale Matrubhume, composed by Narhar Narayan Bhide. Now, the RSS does sing Vande Mataram, but it does not sing Jana Gana Mana. Those curious may consult old issues of its mouthpiece, Organiser.

In its early years, the RSS and allied publications derided Jana Gana Mana as a supposed paean to the British monarch, misreading Tagore’s lyrics as loyalty to empire. This claim, long debunked by historians, ignored Tagore’s own clarification that the song hailed the divine guide of India’s destiny, not any earthly ruler.

I recently watched an RSS shakha meeting in Delhi. It began with the RSS anthem and concluded with Vande Mataram, followed by boisterous slogan-shouting. I am not sure whether they sang the full version or the historically accepted two stanzas.

This raises an interesting question. If the government now insists that Vande Mataram take precedence over all else, will the RSS accord it precedence over its own Namaste Sada Vatsale? Or will protocol, like history, prove to be selectively applied?

The deeper unease surrounding the present directive is not confined to Jana Gana Mana alone. The RSS had, for decades, objected even to the national flag, arguing that the Tricolour did not reflect India’s “civilisational ethos.” For years, it declined to hoist the flag at its shakhas. Only after the Modi government launched a hyper-enthusiastic flag-waving campaign did the saffron brotherhood warm up to the Tricolour.

Returning to Vande Mataram, it is important to recall that objections to it were not solely Muslim. The charge of idolatry—of venerating the nation as a goddess—troubled other reformist traditions as well.

I was reminded of this during the funeral of my former colleague at The Hindustan Times, Harish Bhanot, in Chandigarh. His daughter, Neerja Bhanot, remains etched in national memory. On September 5, 1986, during the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73, the 22-year-old flight attendant laid down her life saving hundreds. She became the first woman and the youngest recipient of the Ashok Chakra.

Bhanot was a follower of the Arya Samaj, and through him I had my first glimpse into that reformist tradition. It was the first time I entered an Arya Samaj temple. The walls bore inscriptions—Vedic verses rendered in bold script—but there was no idol, no sculpted deity, no ritual paraphernalia of worship. The austerity was striking, almost disarming. Swami Agnivesh, who belonged to this movement, was a friend. He later spoke at the Maramon Convention. We know who brutally attacked him for his views.

The point bears emphasis: opposition to idolatry is not confined to Islam. Arya Samajists, too, consider it a deviation from true monotheism. When the state elevates a song that personifies the nation as a goddess, it inadvertently places such citizens—Muslim and Hindu alike—in a moral quandary.

The Centre’s directive mandating the full six-stanza, three-minute-and-ten-second rendition of Vande Mataram at official occasions—during flag unfurling, the President’s arrival, and before and after her addresses—effectively pushes Jana Gana Mana to the margins. For all practical purposes, the national anthem risks being reduced to a ceremonial afterthought. It bears recalling that Sri Aurobindo, who rendered the song into English, viewed it as an anthem of a united Bengal in its struggle against colonial rule, not as a national song for the whole of India.

The text itself is rooted in a specific historical moment: its landscape is regional, its imagery sectarian to many, and even its demographic references belong to an era when India, as we know it today, did not exist. Protocol, once a matter of dignified brevity, now threatens to become an endurance test. Elderly citizens, people with arthritis, and those unable to stand for prolonged periods may find patriotism measured not by feeling but by stamina.

A word about the poet, Bankim was among the earliest architects of the Bengal Renaissance—scholar, novelist, satirist, administrator. His prose reshaped Bengali literature and stirred cultural self-awareness among Hindu Bengalis. Yet his nationalism was not the inclusive vision later articulated by Mahatma Gandhi or Jawaharlal Nehru.

His 1882 novel Anandmath forms the backdrop of Vande Mataram. It depicts ascetic warriors—the Sannyasis—fighting Muslim rule. Muslims are portrayed as foreign invaders and oppressors; the narrative closes not with reconciliation but with ascendancy.

Historians S. M. Burke and Salim Al-Din Quraishi, in The British Raj in India: An Historical Review, note that even colonial authorities viewed the song with suspicion. Sir Henry Craik objected that it originated as a hymn of hate against Muslims and had become a war cry of militants in Bengal. In one exchange from Anandamath, a character declares that Hinduism cannot survive unless “the bearded drunkards are expelled”—and, when asked how, replies: “By killing.”

Given such a history, the Congress leadership’s decision to adopt only the nonsectarian stanzas was not cowardice but statesmanship.

Bankim himself was not always a nationalist in the modern sense. In his early writings, he admired Europe’s scientific method, governance, and culture, describing it as a “more perfect type of civilisation,” while lamenting India’s “arrested development.” He praised Europe’s inductive method—systematic observation, experiment, and application of knowledge into power. By the time he wrote Anandamath, he had transformed into a cultural revivalist.

That transformation mirrors our own national journey: from self-doubt to assertion, from reform to revival, from pluralism to a more brittle uniformity.

My grandson Nehemiah once had an unusual hobby. In Class 2 or 3, he delighted in listening to national anthems of different countries. He could identify them by tune and lyric. Among his favourites was the Russian anthem; he admired its martial music.

He informed me—authoritatively, as only children could—that Greece had the longest anthem but uses a shortened version; the Netherlands had the oldest; the American anthem was the most difficult to sing; and Japan’s could be rendered in under 45 seconds. The only anthem he could sing flawlessly, he said, was that of Bahrain. Why? Because it had no words—only sound.

His innocent observations carry a profound lesson: an anthem’s power lies in its brevity, clarity, and inclusiveness. Over three minutes is an eternity when symbolism overshadows sentiment.

Vande Mataram proclaims:
Mother, I praise thee!
Rich with thy hurrying streams,
Bright with thy orchard gleams…

One cannot help asking: Is today’s India—where rivers like the Yamuna in Delhi run dark with sewage and foam—the landscape Bankim praised? Should not the government focus first on making the country worthy of such hymns? Clean rivers, breathable air, and dignified living conditions would inspire spontaneous patriotism far more effectively than mandated recitations.

Instead, we risk compelling citizens—particularly Muslims and Christians—to sing praises that resemble devotion to a Hindu goddess. Patriotism, when coerced, curdles into compliance; when inclusive, it blossoms into belonging.

Nations are not sustained by songs alone. They endure through shared values: justice, dignity, equality, and mutual respect. Symbols matter, but they must unite rather than divide. The framers of the Republic understood this when they chose Jana Gana Mana—brief, inclusive, geographically expansive—as the anthem, while according Vande Mataram an honoured but limited place.

To elevate one by diminishing the other is to reopen settled questions and unsettle fragile harmonies. The real test of nationalism is not how loudly we sing, how long we stand, or how many flags we wave. It lies in whether every citizen—Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian, believer, reformist, or atheist—feels equally at home in the Republic.

If a song must be sung, let it be one that all can sing without hesitation. If a flag must be waved, let it be one that all embrace without qualification. And if a nation must be worshipped, let it be through service—clean rivers, just laws, and compassionate governance—rather than through enforced hymns. Only then will patriotism cease to be performance and become, once again, a shared and silent pride.

Courtesy: Indian Currents

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