Human rights—especially the liberation of women—have long been invoked as moral justification for military interventions aimed at regime change in countries deemed hostile to the West’s vision of global order. As we witness the slow demise of the liberal international global order, with the retreat of USA from multilateral internationalism and the implementation of Trump’s grand plan of a US-led imperial order where both war and peace will be orchestrated by the same actors (especially with Trump’s favourite genocide-loving buddy state, Israel), one realises some vestiges of the moral rhetoric of the dying order persist. While Trump himself appeared unsure which rationale to foreground for the unlawful war on Iran, he nevertheless echoed his predecessors—who cloaked interventions in the faux benevolence of democracy—by announcing that for Iranians, “the hour of their freedom is near”. His friend, Bibi Netanyahu, in Israel’s 2025 attack on Iran, had more clearly invoked the rights of Iranian women to justify the unjustifiable. In an interview with Iran International, he had said, “They have impoverished you, they have given you misery. They have given you death, They shoot down your women, leaving this brave, unbelievable woman, Mahsa Amini, to bleed on the sidewalk for not covering her hair”. In the brutal genocide committed by Israel on Gaza, we had seen how ‘pinkwashing’ was deployed as a justification to attack the Palestinians, which led queer Palestinians to assert that ‘there is no pride in occupation’.

The ‘Us vs Them’ rhetoric, which Netanyahu had used against Palestine, terming them as modern-day Amalek, the nation which is depicted in Torah as having gone to war against the Israelites, is now extended to describe Iran. However, the ‘Us Vs them’ rhetoric was also deployed in his address to the protesting Iranians as a decoy to incite support for regime change through foreign invasion. Women’s rights have now reemerged in discussions and debates on the legitimacy of the war. There is widespread reporting in American media on the celebrations by Iranian women on Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death. However, Iranian activists are also putting forward nuanced arguments that refuse to couple their struggle for rights in Iran with the US-Israel-led invasion. Recently, the video of Spanish politician Manuela Bergerot, vehemently arguing against the depiction of war on Iran as being a magnificent victory for feminism, has been shared widely by feminists and others alike. She asserts that her position against the war is being put forward as a feminist. She joins a long line of feminists who have opposed the “imperialist feminist” position—the claim that certain wars are morally justified because they supposedly rescue women in the “rest” of the world from oppressive states. The imperialist feminist position, which coopts the conceptual language of feminism to justify the current war on Iran as saving the Iranian women from a repressive government, is by no means a new strategy. It was used with disastrous results in Iraq and Afghanistan, wars which had grossly misused the rhetoric of human rights, especially women’s rights and democracy promotion, to justify invasions. This rhetoric of rescuing women is a close corollary of the practice of terming countries as ‘failed’ states and ‘rogue’ states, as well as the earlier colonial use of the ‘Women’s Question’ to justify colonialism, which Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak had described as “white men saving brown women from brown men.”

It is useful to remember the ‘War Against Terrorism’ launched against Afghanistan with huge domestic support in the US, support which was garnered by the use of the rhetoric of women’s rights and the support of women’s organisations in the US. In a widely cited Radio address, Laura Bush had announced that “The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women”. Such ‘Rescue’ narratives tend to depict women in non-Western societies as passive, non-agential beings who need to be saved. Anthropologist and feminist scholar Lila Abu Lughod wrote, questioning this logic in her influential article ‘Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?’, which went on to become a prescribed text in most courses on feminism and gender studies. She urges us in her work to move beyond the rhetoric of saving and instead pay attention to and appreciate the differences among women in the world, including their different conceptions of freedom, choice, and justice. To assess how deceptive the rhetoric of women’s rights was in justifying the war in Afghanistan, one just has to look at the contemporary condition of Afghan women’s rights, most recently further eroded by the new Criminal Procedural Regulation. The war fought, citing the presence of active Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq (active only in the imagination of the USA), was no different. Bush had back then exhorted the Iraqi women to be the midwives of a new liberated Iraq. After more than twenty years of the invasion, as Nadje Al- Ali, Iraqi feminist and scholar, describes, women have come out as the biggest losers of the invasion. While before the invasion, Iraqi women had enjoyed the highest levels of education, labour force participation, and a certain degree of political involvement, women in post-invasion Iraq have seen a steady erosion of their rights along with a rise in conservatism.

The selective nature of caring for women’s rights in countries where the USA wants regime change is no coincidence. Also, the saving women rhetoric is a strategic diversion from not dealing with women’s rights within the USA. Like Bush who talked about the rights of women in Iraq and Afghanistan, but cut off funding to international family planning organisations that offered abortion and counselling services, Trump who talks about caring for Iranians, announcing to Iranians in his social account about ‘Making Iran Great Again’ has systematically cut down the rights of many American citizens under the guise of ‘Making America Great Again’. In In the Name of Women’s Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism, Sara Farris shows how women’s rights have been co-opted by anti-Islam, anti-migration, and xenophobic campaigns to justify exclusionary policies—diverting attention from the real violence faced by women and the erosion of their autonomy. The withheld Epstein files that incriminate Trump have been released and are beyond horrific in what it reveals, while ICE has detained immigrant women in detention in deplorable conditions. In contrast, feminists who have spoken against the stereotyping of non-Western women have not been silent on the issues of women or held back in their criticism of repressive regimes they live in, but as Abu-Lughod has written, “is mindful of complex entanglements in which we are all implicated, in sometimes surprising alignments.” Iranian activists who were on protests deserved support and engagement from around the world, including from the USA, but they definitely didn’t need a US-Israel invasion that ended up bombing an elementary school for girls. Egyptian feminist Nawal el Saadawi had famously suggested, when asked what the people in the US can do to support the revolution in Egypt, “Make your own revolution and change your government for us”. It is perhaps time feminists and citizens in the United States heed her advice.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post Wars Fought in The Name of Women’s Rights appeared first on SabrangIndia.

An ASI survey in November 2024 on court orders had triggered a violent clash between locals and police in which four people died of bullet wounds. The court had been hearing a plea by Hindus claiming that the mosque was built by demolishing a Shiva temple during the rule of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. There had been allegations that some of those accompanying the survey team were chanting “Jai Shri Ram”, nettling the area’s minority population.

Several people are still in jail in connection with the violence.

A commission appointed by the Sambhal district court had reportedly said in a report in 2024 that symbols associated with Hinduism had been found at Sambhal’s Shahi Jama Masjid, protected by the ASI since 1920.

Now, in an RTI application, Sambhal resident Satya Prakash Yadav had sought to know whether the Mughal-era mosque was built by demolishing any ruins or on vacant land, along with the name of the landowner at the time and the documents granting ownership rights.

The ASI, in its reply, stated that “no such information is available in this office”. On questions relating to the nature of constructions at the site at the time the mosque came under the ASI’s protection, any subsequent constructions, and past disputes associated with the shrine, the ASI said such information was not available in its records.

However, during the first appeal proceedings before the Central Information Commission, the ASI had said that although no new construction is permitted within a centrally protected monument, an “illegal” steel railing was being erected at the Jama Masjid site in 2018 and that the department had issued orders to stop the work.

The applicant had also asked about the period of construction of the mosque. The ASI replied that according to its records, “Jama Masjid Sambhal was constructed in the year 1526”, and referred to supporting material.

On whether the structure was known by any other name earlier, the department said the mosque has been protected by the ASI under the same name. In response to a query on the present nature of the structure, the ASI stated: “At present, it exists as a mosque.” It further said the Jama Masjid was taken under the protection of the ASI in 1920, citing a gazette notification.

During the hearing before the Central Information Commission, the appellant had argued that key information had been wrongly denied on the ground of non-availability. The ASI maintained that it had provided all information available on record and that it could not be compelled to create or collect information not maintained by it.

Upholding the ASI’s stand, the commission observed that the RTI Act obliges public authorities to disclose only existing records and does not require them to generate fresh information. It cited judicial precedents to underline that a public authority cannot be directed to furnish information not held by it.

Finding no grounds for further intervention, the commission dismissed the appeal, holding that the ASI’s replies — including its statement of having no records on whether the mosque was built over ruins or vacant land — were in accordance with the law.

Sabrangindia has consistently reported on the issue, and its reports may be read here, here and here.

According to Masjid Committee President Zafar Ali, the protest on November 24, 2024 was peaceful until CO Anuj Chaudhary responded to concerns with verbal abuse and an unprovoked lathi charge. The police, allegedly led by CO Anuj Chaudhary, responded with verbal abuse, a lathi charge, and then tear gas. As people began to flee, the police escalated, firing live ammunition. Tear gas followed, and then live rounds were fired. The crowd began to disperse, but police pursued them into lanes and homes. Eyewitnesses reported police using slurs, destroying property, and shooting indiscriminately.

Five Muslim men were killed, including a minor:

• Kamran (17), shot in the chest.
• Nasir, Abbas, Basim, and Nabeel—each with fatal injuries, many allegedly from police bullets.

Related:

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Uttar Pradesh’s new tactics for harassment: Electricity theft charges, strategic revival of temple, opening up of 1978 Sambhal communal riots cases

Sambhal Mosque, Ajmer Dargah: how deep do we plunge into the abyss?

Sambhal Violence: State crackdown intensifies, thousands accused, and allegations of police misconduct ignite a political and communal crisis in Uttar Pradesh

Sambhal’s darkest hour: 5 dead, scores injured in Mosque survey violence as UP police face allegations of excessive force

The post Sambhal, UP: ASI has no records to prove that Shahi Jama Masjid was built after demolishing earlier structure appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Police said Mohammed Arif, 25, and Syed Imran, 31, were allegedly attacked while they were out for a walk. Deputy police superintendent Madolappa said five suspects were arrested in connection with the assault. “The accused were reportedly under the influence of alcohol,” Madolappa said. Names of the accused have not been released by the authorities.

Unfortunately, the news reports are based only on police sources. HT reports that the police said the incident took communal colour as the Muslim community alleged it was a targeted attack. They cited the complaint filed in the case and said that six to seven assailants made death threats and attacked Arif and Imran with stones, causing head injuries.

Further, the newspaper also reported that the police stated that tensions escalated when protesters gathered outside the station. Some protesters allegedly attacked police personnel, including assistant sub-inspector Mukhtar Patel, and threw stones. “Another case has been registered against 49 Muslim community members for attempting to lay siege to the police station, assaulting Patel, other police staff, and throwing stones,” Madolappa said.

Though the situation was reportedly brought under control thereafter, the original assault on teachers who happened to be Muslim and the motive of the attackers remains a mystery, unreported.

Related:

Why Communal Tension in Tamil Nadu’s Thiruparankundram is Another Warning Signal

Communal Tensions Erupt in Bihar’s Jamui: Alleged stone-pelting during religious procession leads to violence

Attempts to create communal tension reported during Ram Navami celebration in parts of Bengal and UP

The post Bidar, Karnataka: Two school teachers assaulted in Karnataka’s Bidar, triggering communal tensions appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The vandalism and violence by members of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) against a proposed discussion on February 24, 2026, by “Spark”, an informal student reading group of Azim Premji University (APU), Bangalore, are symptomatic of the increasing repression in campuses across the country, where dissent is criminalised and free debate and discussion is shut down. The proposed discussion was on the anniversary of the mass rapes in Kunan Poshpora in 1991.

On February 24, around 25 members of the ABVP, the student wing of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) vandalised the “Kabira” space, a designated location for cultural activities in the Sarjapur campus of the university and the venue of a discussion on Kunan Poshpora by the Spark Reading Group. They tore down posters and assaulted a student and a member of the university’s security staff.

While police arrested 25 members of the ABVP on charges of assault, vandalism and trespass., they were granted bail the next day.

However, police also registered an FIR, based on a complaint by the APU Registrar Rishikesh BS, against office-bearers and members of the Spark Reading Circle. The complaint against the group’s Instagram handle on the event was registered under Sec 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023, on charges of deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, a cognisable and non-bailable charge with a penalty of up to three years imprisonment.

The FIR also cites charges under Sec 66 (e) (violation of privacy by intentionally capturing, publishing, or transmitting images of a person’s private areas without their consent) and 67 (publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form) of the Information Technology Act,2000.

The APU Registrar’s complaint states that no permission was sought or granted for the event and that the group had no official connection with the university. The complaint further blames the reading group for seeking to host the event and said that, by “issuing such invitations, hostility arose between two groups, resulting in activists forcefully entering our campus and creating a disturbance.”

In a statement, the Student Council of Azim Premji University expressed concern over the FIR filed by the university against members of the ‘Spark Reading Circle’, stating that the matter should have been addressed through internal disciplinary mechanisms rather than criminal proceedings.

Indeed, the excessively punitive reaction of the APU administration towards the student reading group for merely planning to hold a discussion on the Kunan Poshpora incident is highly disturbing. A purely administrative and logistical issue of permissions for an event on campus became the basis of a complaint to the police to seek criminal action against a reading group and its members. The complaint against the group’s account on a social media platform amounts to an open invitation to police the academic lives of students. In the guise of a criminal investigation, it allows for surveillance of electronic devices of students and seeks to police their space and time outside the classroom.

Why don’t they want people to remember Kunan Poshpora?

 The ABVP’s protest against the Spark Reading Group’s discussion over Kunan-Poshpora seeks to erase and invisibilise the crucial process of recollection and analysis of painful and sensitive incidents, thereby silencing a historical record.

February 24, 2026, marked the 35th anniversary of the mass rape and torture of women of the villages of Kunan and Poshpora in Jammu and Kashmir by the Indian Army. The allegations of rape and torture were denied by the army and the Indian government.

However, the testimonies of women of the two villages and the extensive records and interviews by researchers Essar Batool, Ifrah Butt, Munaza Rashid, Natasha Rather and Samreena Mushtaq, who documented the incident and its aftermath in their book “Do You Remember Kunan Poshpora?” continue to challenge official narratives even as they persist in the struggle to seek justice and accountability. The book was among the 25 academic books banned in Kashmir last year.

Systematic censorship of academia

The violence by the right wing ABVP, the student wing of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the ominously repressive measures taken by the APU administration result in the censorship and curbs on free discussion and debate on important issues. They are only the latest in the growing list of instances of censorship in academia.

Right-wing students are emboldened and weaponised by the ruling political dispensation. Regrettably, university administrations, including vice chancellors who are unabashed champions of right-wing ideologies, speedily crack down on students who dare to ask questions.

Last year, Free Speech Collective’s annual report “Free Speech in India 2025: Behold the Hidden Hand” documented at least 16 noteworthy instances of censorship in academia, including the criminalisation of student protests, the Delhi University Vice-Chancellor Yogesh Singh’s openly political exhortations to faculty and staff to push the ruling BJP’s agendas and the arrest of Prof Ali Khan Mahmudabad of Ashoka University over posts on Operation Sindoor even as the denial of permission for academic seminars on “sensitive subjects” became routine.

Now, barely two months into 2026, there are already more than six instances of censorship in academia in India.

At least 14 students of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) were arrested for protesting the casteist remarks of the university’s Vice Chancellor Shantisree Dhulipudi Pandit. Granted bail by a Delhi court on February 27, the students continued to remain in jail till late evening on Sunday (March 1) as police took their time to complete the verifications of their permanent addresses. It took the court to direct their immediate release stating that procedural formalities could not be the excuse for their continued detention after bail had already been granted.

Earlier, on February 17, 2026, the Proctor Office of Delhi University (DU) issued an order stating that “public meetings, processions, demonstrations, and protests of any kind are strictly prohibited within the university campus for a period of one month.”

On January 29, 2026, Sarover Zaidi, an associate professor at OP Jindal Global University in Sonepat, was suspended for one semester (February 1 to July 31) for allegedly comparing Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Adolf Hitler. BJP MP from Kurukshetra Naveen Jindal is the founding chancellor of the university.

The action arose after a hearing in the Haryana Human Rights Commission (HHRC) on a complaint by Vishav Bajaj, father of Vikhyaat Bajaj, a first-year undergraduate student of the Jindal School of Design & Architecture, that on November 7, 2025, during a lecture on the course “Politics of Representation” taught by Zaidi, repeated remarks were made in class that were “politically derogatory, inflammatory and deeply disturbing”.

Bajaj alleged that PM Modi was compared to Adolf Hitler, national security operations such as Operation Sindoor were described as “gimmicks” and “branding exercises,” civilian deaths were trivialised and official accounts of terrorism were questioned. Audio recordings made by Vikhyaat were also submitted to the HHRC.

The student had also complained against another assistant professor, Ekta Chauhan, alleging their statements against the RSS. But Chauhan refuted the allegations and described herself as a “devout and practising” Hindu. Her family was associated with RSS-linked social service traditions since 1972, she said in a written statement.

The trend of disinvitation of distinguished persons from campus events continued unabated. In Banaras Hindu University, a lecture by scholar Kedar Mishra, scheduled for January 20, 2026, was cancelled allegedly under government pressure In Mumbai, actor Naseeruddin Shah was disinvited from an academic literary event at Mumbai University on January 31, 2026.

In Mumbai, an SRFTI (Satyajit Ray Film & Television Institute) student film “Da’Lit Kids” was pulled out of the Animela Film Festival at Whistling Woods after it was reportedly denied permission for screening by the Ministry for Information and Broadcasting. In protest, film-makers of all the SRFTI films scheduled for screening at the festival pulled out but the festival went ahead.

The Animela Festival is an international Animation, VFX, Gaming, Comics & XR Festival run by a non-profit organisation – the Aniverse and Visual Arts Foundation (AVAF). While there is no clarity why government permission was sought for the films being screened, the festival website lists multiple sponsors, including the Maharashtra government, embassies of France and Australia and corporate support from sponsors like Adani.

All these instances of censorship further circumscribe the space for the free exchange of information and diverse viewpoints. APU prides itself on being “a space for social change” and a space for higher education that “can create critical and reflective practitioners with an understanding of the social impact of education, the law and development”. Instead of criminalising students, APU needs to ensure that its campuses remain safe spaces that nurture the spirit of enquiry. For a truly transformative educational institution, a climate of free discussion needs to prevail over censorship by vandals and vigilantes.

Courtesy: Free Speech Collective

The post The Throttling of Free Discussion in Academia: Strong-arm Tactics by ABVP and Cave in by Azim Premji University appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In his over, one-hour recitation cum talk Naseeruddin Shah introduced the audience to the charm and possibilities of Urdu and recited from many of the greats like Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Mirza Ghalib, Sahir Ludhianvi, Allama Iqbal and Imtiaz Ali Taj. Through narration, reflection and dramatic nuance Naseeruddin Shah revisited an era when literature shaped social thought and human values, celebrating poetry that spoke of love, injustice, hope and collective dreams

The Lectures That Needed to Happen series by Mumbai for Peace provides a platform to deserving lectures and events that are cancelled due to uncalled & non democratic interference by the State or non-state actors. “Mumbai for Peace” is a citizens’ platform formed by concerned Mumbaikars committed to safeguarding the city’s plural character and nurturing communal harmony.

Preet Nagar was a presentation that was scheduled in Mumbai University on February 1 but was unceremoniously cancelled at the last minute with no explanation. Earlier MFP had collaborated with other organisations to hold the Father Stan Swamy Memorial Lecture by Fr. Prem Xalxo that was similarly cancelled

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The post Censorship Broken: Naseeruddin Shah speaks on the Urdu language at Kalina, Mumbai & recites from its rich poetry appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Temple Pattas and the Politics of Sacred Property 

The decision to grant land titles to temples is being justified as a route to enable them to access government schemes. On the surface, this appears as a bureaucratic correction. But the social context matters. In Rajasthan, temple management and priesthood are overwhelmingly controlled by Brahmin and Bania networks. Regularising temple land thus strengthens institutions already embedded within caste hierarchies.

This is not merely about religion; it is about property, legitimacy, and state-backed sanctification. When the state confers pattas upon temples, it converts religious capital into legal capital. In effect, public land becomes anchored to institutions historically aligned with Brahmanical authority. The material beneficiaries are not abstract “devotees,” but specific caste-based managerial structures.

The larger concern is the asymmetry. If temples are to receive legal facilitation in the name of heritage and welfare access, where is the parallel policy for community institutions run by Dalits, Adivasis, or minority groups? Selective formalisation reproduces structural inequality while appearing neutral.

Meat Shops, NOCs and the Food Governance 

The mandate that meat shops cannot open without Panchayat NOC approval, especially near public places, carries heavy symbolic and economic implications. In Rajasthan, the meat trade is largely associated with Muslim, Dalit and Rajput communities. Introducing an additional layer of discretionary approval effectively subjects these livelihoods to local majoritarian pressures.

The language of “public sentiment” or “cultural sensitivity” often becomes a tool for social policing. Panchayats are not caste-neutral spaces; they reflect local hierarchies. Granting them veto power over meat shops risks institutionalising social prejudice under administrative cover.

Food regulation in India has increasingly mirrored ideological currents rather than public health concerns. When cow shelters receive hundreds of crores while meat sellers face regulatory tightening, the contrast is telling. One sector aligned with Brahmanical social ethos receives subsidy and legitimacy; another, tied to marginalised communities, faces scrutiny and conditionality.

Brahminism, State Patronage, and Sociopolitical Control 

These measures must be understood within the broader framework of Brahminism as a system of graded hierarchy sustained through cultural authority and economic leverage. Historically, Brahmanical power has not relied solely on theology but on proximity to the state and control over symbolic capital — education, ritual, law, and legitimacy. Historian Divya Cherian traces this food-policy in Rajasthan to the political rise of Brahmins, Banias, Mahajans and Jains as intermediaries between the local kings and the jagirdars. During the tenure of Maharaja Vijay Singh Rathore, a devoted Vaishnavite, policies promoting strict vegetarianism imposed legal sanctions on not just Muslims and Dalist but the Rajputs – causing unpopularity of the king among his own Rajput clansmen. His successor, Maharaja Man Singh Rathore, a Nath sampraday adherent, withdrew strict Vaishnavite vegetarianism but by then the state was heavily dependent bureaucratically on the ‘vegetarian’ mercantile- Brahmanical lobbies.

In the 21^st century, granting pattas to temples and privileging cow protection schemes extend this pattern into contemporary governance. They reinforce a moral economy in which Brahmanical religious institutions are treated as guardians of civilization, while occupations associated with lower castes are rendered morally negotiable.

Importantly, this is not confined to the BJP. While the BJP’s ideological articulation is explicit, earlier Congress governments in Rajasthan — especially those preceding Ashok Gehlot — often reproduced similar structural preferences. The rhetoric of socialism coexisted with conspicuous promotion of Brahmanical institutions and Bania-dominated capital networks. Socialist jargons were invoked vigorously only while fomenting caste conflicts between competitive agrarian castes like Rajputs and Jats, but economic policy frequently aligned with established mercantile and brahminical interests.

Thus, the current decisions are less an aberration and more a culmination — a clearer articulation of long-standing patterns.

Bania Capitalism and the Politics of Selective Regulation 

The political economy dimension cannot be ignored. Rajasthan’s commercial networks have historically been shaped by Bania capital, particularly in urban centres. Regulatory regimes tend to burden informal, small-scale, caste-bound occupations — such as local butchers or street vendors — while leaving entrenched commercial capital relatively unscathed.

When the state intensifies scrutiny over meat shops but not over large-scale corporate food supply chains, it signals whose economic activity is deemed culturally legitimate. This differential treatment reinforces caste-coded divisions of labour. The rhetoric of protecting “public order” or “tradition” often masks an uneven terrain of enforcement. Regulation becomes a means of disciplining marginal livelihoods while consolidating a symbolic alignment with Bania and Brahmanical interests.

Studies show that upwards of two-thirds of Scheduled Caste rural households are landless or near-landless, underscoring how economic exclusion persists; state focus on symbolic assets like cows and temples further diverts attention from redistributive needs. Communities such as the Badhik—who traditionally make a living from butchery—are low caste, landless and historically marginalised, raising concerns that new Panchayat NOC requirements for meat shops disproportionately affect socially excluded groups.

Trade data from Rajasthan cattle fairs shows a dramatic decline in cattle sales — from 31,299 in 2010-11 to under 3,000 by 2016-17 — following stricter protective regulations, revealing real economic impacts on livestock trade.” This affects both pastoral and agrarian communities as well.

Cow Shelters and Cultural Priorities 

The allocation of substantial funds to establish cow shelters across Panchayat Samitis fits within a broader politics of sacralisation. Cow protection has long functioned as a mobilising idiom of Hindu identity. But in budgetary terms, prioritizing such projects over pressing issues like rural employment diversification or agrarian distress reflects ideological choice.

Rajasthan collected over ₹2,259 crore in cow protection surcharges and spent more than ₹1,500 crore on gaushalas and related schemes over a 5-year period, according to state finance data, showing the weight of symbolic welfare in the budget compared to other competing social expenditures. This means a major chunk of a designated revenue stream — meant ostensibly to support cow welfare — has gone to cow shelter grants, even as other social sector needs compete for attention. As per a report in the Financial Express.

When combined with land grants to temples and conditionality for meat sellers, a coherent pattern emerges: state resources flow toward institutions and symbols aligned with Brahmin-Bania identity, while regulatory burdens accumulate around occupations associated with Muslims, and Dalits.

Beyond Party Lines: Structural Continuities

It would be simplistic to attribute this entirely to one party or one chief minister. Rajasthan’s post-independence political culture has frequently oscillated between socialist rhetoric and social conservatism. Congress governments often invoked redistributive language in moments of caste tension among agrarian communities, yet maintained close proximity to Brahminical cultural authority and Bania commercial networks.

The BJP’s current moves under Bhajanlal Sharma represent a more overt consolidation of that legacy. The difference lies less in substance and more in explicit ideological framing.

Conclusion: Governance or Cultural Engineering?

At stake is not merely administrative reform but the moral architecture of the state. When temple institutions are regularised and empowered while meat sellers face new hurdles, governance crosses into cultural engineering. It privileges one vision of society over pluralistic livelihood realities.

For a state, that constitutionally promises equality and secular governance, the challenge is to ensure that policy does not become a vehicle for reinforcing inherited hierarchies. Rajasthan’s latest announcements raise difficult questions: Who receives the state’s protection? Whose work is dignified? And whose livelihood is made conditional upon local moral approval?

In answering these, one sees less a neutral reform agenda and more a calibrated reassertion of sociocultural power — rooted in long-standing Brahmanical and mercantile dominance, now articulated with renewed confidence.

(The author is a mechanical engineer and an independent commentator on history and politics, with a particular focus on Rajasthan. His work explores the syncretic exchanges of India’s borderlands as well as contemporary debates on memory, identity and historiography)

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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The post Temple Leases, Food Morality: Rajasthan’s new Panchayat order appeared first on SabrangIndia.

UPI is not just a payments interface. It is the financial nervous system of India, processing billions of transactions every month. Behind every QR scan lies a trail of sensitive information: payer and payee details, transaction metadata, IP addresses, device identifiers, behavioral spending patterns. In 2018, the Reserve Bank of India laid down a clear and unambiguous mandate on data localisation. All payment data generated by systems operating in India must be stored only in India. Foreign processing was permitted strictly for the foreign leg of a transaction, and even then, the data had to be brought back to Indian servers within 24 hours. The intent was obvious: financial data of Indian citizens is a matter of national sovereignty.

But the legal environment has since shifted. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 fundamentally altered India’s cross-border data framework. The earlier logic of allowing data transfers only to approved jurisdictions has been reversed. India now follows a blacklist model: data can flow to any country unless explicitly prohibited by the government. The problem is that the blacklist rules have not even been finalized yet. In the absence of notified restrictions, cross-border data flows become broadly permissible by default. Israel is not on any prohibited list. That raises a structural question: if the regulatory filter itself is incomplete, on what legal and policy basis are sensitive financial metadata flows being supervised?

The DPDP draft rules go further. Rule 22 grants the Central Government broad authority to demand user data from fiduciaries without judicial oversight. At the same time, NPCI, as the data fiduciary for UPI transactions, holds the financial metadata of more than 35 crore users. Every merchant payment, every peer-to-peer transfer, every device fingerprint forms part of a massive behavioral financial dataset. This is not just about clearing payments. It is about profiling economic life at population scale.

The timing intensifies concern. In February 2026, reports indicated that data localization protections were removed from the US trade deal framework. In the same month, UPI was expanded to Israel. Both moves carry implications for cross-border data governance. Neither was preceded by a detailed parliamentary debate focused specifically on data-handling safeguards. There has been no comprehensive public disclosure clarifying whether RBI’s 24-hour data return clause has been embedded contractually and how compliance will be audited. In matters involving sovereign digital infrastructure, opacity does not build confidence.

Israel is not merely a participant in global technology networks; it is a hardened deep state with one of the most sophisticated intelligence and cyber-surveillance infrastructures in the world. Its track record includes documented espionage operations, aggressive cyber capabilities, and deep integration with Western security architectures. At the same time, it involves in genocide, ethnic cleansing and systemic human rights violations to fulfil its plan for establishing a new world order. When a state with such a security posture and conflict past and present becomes intertwined with another nation’s financial data ecosystem, this is not routine diplomacy. It is a matter that demands vigilance, transparency, and uncompromising scrutiny.

That reality does not automatically imply misuse. But responsible governance requires risk analysis, not blind optimism. Financial metadata reveals far more than transaction amounts. It exposes consumption habits, donation patterns, medical expenditures, religious contributions, location-linked behavior and economic vulnerabilities. In the 21st century, data is strategic capital. It shapes influence, leverage and intelligence capability.

This is not about opposing diplomacy. Expanding digital payment connectivity can benefit travelers, businesses and fintech partnerships. But when sovereign financial infrastructure intersects with evolving data protection norms, the public deserves clarity. Under which exact legal framework is foreign infrastructure permitted to process Indian financial metadata? Has the RBI’s mandatory 24-hour repatriation requirement been contractually enforced with audit provisions? Until the DPDP cross-border rules are fully notified, what interim safeguards govern such arrangements?

A mature democracy does not treat these questions as hostility. Digital sovereignty is not a partisan slogan; it is a structural pillar of economic independence. Citizens are not wrong to celebrate innovation and international collaboration. But celebration without scrutiny is not patriotism. In a data-driven world, vigilance is civic responsibility.

The post UPI Goes Global — But At What Cost to Data Sovereignty? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Next day, today, Friday 27, fourteen of hundreds of protesting students from the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) were sent to Tihar Jail after the late night brutal lathi charge by the Delhi police, attacking a student protest and long march aimed to march towards the Ministry of Education yesterday. Protesters have been demanding the resignation of Vice Chancellor (VC) JNU Ms Pandit who had made derogative remarks against Dalits and Blacks recently and also the restoration of the UGC Guidelines of 2026.

On Thursday (February 26), Jawaharlal Nehru University Students’ Union (JNUSU), along with other student organisations, organised a “long march” from the university to the Ministry of Education in Delhi. Students alleged that soon after their march began, Delhi Police lathi-charged them near the main gate of the campus. They said several students were detained and taken to the Kapashera and Sagarpur police stations. Videos and photographs that surfaced on social media showed that many students, including women, were injured in the police action.

The students’ march began around 3 pm from Sabarmati Dhaba inside the campus. Students joined the rally in large numbers, including members of JNUSU, All India Students’ Association (AISA), Students’ Federation of India (SFI), Democratic Students’ Federation (DSF), National Students’ Union of India (NSUI), All India Students’ Federation (AISF) and other student bodies.

You can cut all the flowers but you cannot keep spring from coming

14 JNU students sent to TIHAR JAIL
the state’s cowardice is on full display. They think iron bars break spirit, they are WRONG
​fight against BJP & Shantishri’s casteist regime will only INTENSIFY#JNU #jnusu pic.twitter.com/qJTC3DamOD

— Anjali (@anjali__27) February 27, 2026

जेएनयू में हज़ारों छात्र जब यूजीसी रेगुलेशन के पक्ष में और जातिवादी वाईस चांसलर की बर्खास्तगी की माँग के साथ शिक्षा मंत्रालय की तरफ़ बढ़े।
तब पूरी सरकार में कंपकंपी मच गई। दिल्ली पुलिस ने छात्रों के हाथ से बाबा साहब भीम राव अंबेडकर की तस्वीर छीन ली, हाथों में अपने… pic.twitter.com/2JyjjTrb8m

— Dhananjay (@SathiDhananjay) February 26, 2026

This protest began amid heavy deployment of security forces, including Delhi Police, across the campus. The main gate was completely barricaded to prevent the students from moving forward.

Before the march started, JNUSU president Aditi Mishra had told The Wire: “Our call today was directed at the Ministry of Education. We are demanding that the UGC Equity Regulations be implemented on the lines of the Rohith Act. We are also demanding the resignation of our Vice-Chancellor, Shantisree Dhulipudi Pandit, over her remark that ‘Blacks and Dalits are permanently drugged with victimhood’. We believe such a statement is unacceptable. We are also asking for the restoration of funds [to JNU and other universities], because continuous financial cuts are weakening public universities and affecting students directly.”

She had then added, “What we are seeing instead is a heavy police security presence. The university has been turned into what feels like a cantonment, with barricades placed every few metres, the Rapid Action Force deployed and water cannons and tear gas kept ready. FIRs are being filed against students simply for protesting.”

Despite the heavy police and security force presence and the main gate of the JNU being sealed off, the students remained firm on continuing their march. Around 4 pm, students moved the barricades placed outside the main gate and attempted to proceed with their march. Soon after this, police began detaining students participating in the march. During the process, scuffles broke out between them and the police.

The allegations of brutality included male persons, accused of masquerading as men in uniform assaulting women with pins and other weapons in gendered violence. Hundreds of police, paramilitary and other personnel were brought in to simply “handle a student’s protest.”

It was the obstruction of free movement by the Delhi Police who blocked and locked the JNU gates that began the altercation and thereafter police repression.

Danish, joint secretary, JNUSU, said, “We called for a peaceful march from JNUSU to the Ministry of Education. However, Delhi Police blocked JNU gates, putting locks on them. Around 500 to 700 policemen were deployed with heavy barricading, lathis, tear gas and water cannons. When students broke the locks and marched, the police launched a brutal lathi charge.

“Many students were hurt. Women students were dragged and their clothes torn. They [police] detained at least fifty of us and took us to Kapashera Police Station. Even now, many students, including me, are injured but have not received any first aid. There were also people in civil dress beating students brutally alongside the police. Students are still protesting at the main gate, and the police continue to beat them.”

Dhananjay, former JNUSU President speaks of this police brutality here

On Sunday, 22 February, a “Samta Rally” was organised on the JNU campus to protest against alleged anti-Dalit remarks made by Vice-Chancellor Shantishree Pandit. At the march, students demanded implementation of the new University Grants Commision (UGC) equity guidelines, and asked for the Vice-Chancellor to resign and issue a public apology for her statements.

However, after that march, tensions escalated and clashes broke out between two student groups. Left student organisations and JNUSU members accused members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) offshoot, student body Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), of pelting stones during the confrontation.

On Monday (February 23), the university administration registered a case against JNUSU office bearers over the “Samata Rally” and the alleged violence during the previous night’s protest Thereafter, JNUSU announced another march, and that was the one to be held on 26 February.

The Jawaharlal Nehru University Teachers’ Association (JNUTA) also condemned the police action, describing it as brutal use of force against students at the JNU gate.

In a statement issued on today February 26, JNUTA said several students, including women, were injured and many detained, including two JNUSU office bearers. It raised concerns over reports that women detainees were taken to undisclosed locations and alleged that they faced further mistreatment in custody.

JNUTA said the police action appeared to be aimed at preventing students from exercising their democratic right to march to the Ministry of Education, and demanded the immediate release of all detained students, action against the officials involved and the withdrawal of police personnel from the campus gates.

The text of the JNUTA statement issued by Surajit Mazumdar (President) and Meenakshi Sundriyal (Secretary) reads:

“The JNUTA strongly condemns the brutal use of force by the Delhi Police against JNU students and the detention of several of them, including two JNUSU Office bearers. Reports indicate that several students, including women, have been severely injured in the police action at the JNU gate in which even the laws prohibiting male policemen from acting against women were brazenly flouted. The JNUTA is also extremely concerned at the wellbeing of those detained. There are several women among them and they have been taken to unconfirmed locations that are far away from the campus. Reports are also coming of them being subjected to further police beatings while in custody.

The police action today, and they also came armed with weapons, had the sole objective of preventing come what may the students from exercising their democratic right to march to the Ministry of Education. Prohibition of such marches, and then prosecuting those who march, and use of excessive force against them, have become part of the standard routine for the Delhi Police. In the process, it has become an instrument of not law enforcement but of authoritarianism and the curbing of constitutionally guaranteed democratic rights.

The JNUTA knows that the bankrupt JNU Administration led by the VC cannot be expected to discharge its duty as guardian of the students’ interests. After all, it is its own actions that have led to the current situation. The continuing refusal to act against her and even today’s police action, however, raises serious questions about whether her infamous casteist remarks and other actions in fact have the endorsement of the Ministry of Education. Is it that the Ministry did not want to answer the uncomfortable questions it would have had to face from JNU students?

The JNUTA demands immediate release of all the detained students and strict action against the police officials reponsible for transgressing the laws they are themselves bound by while enforcing them. The Police which is still at the campus gates must also leave immediately. We appeal to JNU teachers to remain vigilant and speak up against this violence and onslaught on democracy.”

Just a few days ago former JNUSU President, Dhananjay filed a complaint against the VC with the NCST. This may be read here.

Related:

JNU: Former JNUSU President complains against Vice Chancellor’s casteist & racist remarks

The Double Stage on Campus: Caste, crisis & UGC equity regulations (2026) controversy

UGC Guidelines 2026: AISA Protest at Delhi University followed by sexual abuse allegations amid police presence

The post JNU Students Lathi-charged, Injured, first detained during protest over V-C remarks, UGC Equity guidelines, now Jailed appeared first on SabrangIndia.

I was inspired by a professor whom,

I was, on record, not taught by;

He was a model to emulate

But it was not easy to try;

His commitment to the profession

Was hard to compare

The competence in his subject

Was the best by far;

His oratory and articulation

Were music to the ears

His repartee, wit and humour

Cooled any intellectual thunder;

He was a wizard of concepts

Loved to use them afresh,

Invented ideas and expressions

In existing literature not easy to trace;

He always put the principle before the person

In academic or public life

He argued for societal cohesion and harmony

Explained and advocated the exclusion of strife;

Mapping the context of an issue

Was his tool so effective

He found no phenomenon universal

It was all specific and relative;

To him, monolithism, homogenisation, majoritairianism

Were anathemas to any society,

A confirmed pluralist in his approach

Spice of life is the variety;

He carried his intellectual conviction

And an audacity of expression,

Crafted, spoke with equal sincerity

No matter the occasion.

Self-hood, integrity and credibility

Were parts of his personality,

He was meticulous and a word-keeper

Never compromising liberty or honesty;

A commitment of his presence in an event

Would not change by any high and mighty,

He treated all his hosts equal

Recognised no ranks but parity;

He was unique in

Combining pragmatism and principle

He was not to trade off either

nor ever sacrificed a scruple

His scholarship was nationally unchallenged

Internationally fairly prized

As his studied-views were unheeded by powers that be

Despair he did hardly disguise

A good human being with compassion and concern

Be them his students, colleagues or people in general

He would stretch out and reach them

With sympathy and support moral and material

I salute you professor

An author, thinker, orator, critic and commentator

Your observations and advice to us

Are invaluable problem-solvers

You were a gift of God

To the academic community, evolving polity and wider society

We will remember you ever

An ideal professor, as good as an intellectual deity.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post An Ode to a Professor- Remembering T.K Oommen appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Rather than emerging organically from local and lived religious practice, it sought to recast a historically plural, socially embedded river into a singular sacred geography, flattening its layered cultural, ecological and political meanings into a uniform religious spectacle.

The analogy with the Kumbh Mela is particularly revealing. In North India, the Kumbh is anchored in centuries-old institutional frameworks involving akharas, monastic orders, ritual calendars and cosmological cycles that have evolved through long-standing social consent. Bharatapuzha, by contrast, has never functioned as a Pan-Hindu pilgrimage centre. It has no historical association with mass ritual bathing, no priestly networks that regulate sacred time, and no inherited mythological mandate that binds the river to cyclical purification rites. The invocation of “Magha” rituals, the language of sin, cleansing and rebirth, and the visual grammar of saffron spectacle are recent insertions, introduced through publicity materials, digital campaigns and political speeches rather than through inherited community practice. What is being staged is not continuity but construction.

The presence of constitutional authority at the inauguration was therefore not incidental. It conferred institutional legitimacy on an invented ritual format, transforming a curated spectacle into an authorised public act, much as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s inauguration of the newly constructed Ram Mandir in Ayodhya did. In Kerala, where religious expression has historically coexisted with strong secular institutions, such gestures alter the delicate balance between faith and governance. State endorsement converts cultural experimentation into an assertion of civilisational authenticity. The river becomes not merely a site of gathering but a stage on which new claims to cultural ownership are rehearsed and normalised.

Attempts to anchor the Mahotsavam in history frequently invoke Mamankam, the medieval assembly held periodically near the Bharatapuzha. Yet this historical analogy collapses under scrutiny. Mamankam bore little resemblance to the religious spectacle being staged today. It was neither a Hindu religious congregation nor a ritualised conflict between faiths. It was a political assembly centred on sovereignty, territorial control and the public contestation of kingship. Held once every twelve years, Mamankam was the site where the Zamorin of Calicut asserted his authority even as it was violently challenged by the Valluvanad rulers through the Chaver warriors. These warriors, drawn from specific lineages, attempted ritualised assassinations of the Zamorin, transforming the assembly into a theatre of political resistance. The purpose was not spiritual sacrifice but the destabilisation of power.

Equally central to Mamankam was its plural social composition. Muslim traders, soldiers and administrators were integral to the Zamorin’s political and economic base. Calicut’s emergence as a maritime hub depended on sustained alliances with Arab merchants, and these relationships were embedded in the very structure of power that Mamankam symbolised. To retrospectively frame Mamankam as a Hindu cultural ritual is to erase these realities and impose a communal lens that did not exist in the historical moment. Mamankam was not organised around ritual bathing, mantra recitation or priestly hierarchies. Its rituals were inseparable from warfare, trade negotiations, artistic performances and displays of military prowess.

Thus, translating Mamankam into the idiom of the Kumbh Mela strips away its political and plural character, replacing it with a homogenised religious narrative that is easier to mobilise but historically indefensible.

What distinguishes the Maha Magha Mahotsavam from earlier cultural events in Kerala is the scale and sophistication of its digital mobilisation. Social media platforms have been used not merely to publicise the festival but to frame it as a corrective to an alleged cultural suppression of Hindus in the state. This rhetoric borrows heavily from the national Hindutva lexicon, where visibility is equated with revival and dissent is recast as hostility to faith. Online narratives repeatedly position Malappuram district as a site of cultural imbalance, invoking its Muslim-majority demography to suggest that Hindu traditions require assertive reclamation. This portrayal is not new. Malappuram has long been marked in political discourse as an exception within Kerala, often detached from its historical contributions to trade, education and anti-colonial resistance. By situating a major “Hindu” event at the district’s symbolic edge, the festival implicitly marks territory.

On the ground, this rhetoric has tangible consequences. Local accounts point to heightened communal sensitivity, with Muslim residents expressing discomfort at the language used in promotional material and commentary. Pluralism is not attacked directly; it is simply bypassed. The idea of a “Hindu awakening” advanced here does not celebrate Kerala’s syncretic traditions but seeks to replace them with a uniform cultural script. In doing so, it narrows the definition of belonging and reimagines public space as an arena of assertion rather than coexistence.

Beyond ideology, the Mahotsavam raises pressing questions about environmental stewardship and public safety. Bharatapuzha is among Kerala’s most endangered rivers, its flow depleted by dams, sand mining and encroachment. Large-scale gatherings on its banks inevitably place additional stress on an already fragile ecosystem. The controversy surrounding the proposed temporary bridge illustrates the tension between spectacle and regulation. The stop memo was issued on procedural and safety grounds, including the absence of clearances and concerns over construction in a sensitive river zone. Yet sections of social media discourse reframed this administrative action as a cultural or communal slight, despite no such intent or basis in official orders. This episode highlights a deeper challenge for Kerala: how routine governance decisions are increasingly vulnerable to politicisation when wrapped in the language of faith.

Further, stampedes at religious events have demonstrated how inadequate crowd management, infrastructural shortcuts and political pressure to maximise attendance can result in tragedy. Kerala’s administrative machinery has limited experience managing events of this scale, particularly in ecologically sensitive zones. There is also the question of precedent.

Once a river is reimagined as a ritual bathing site, pressure mounts to repeat and expand such events. Environmental damage then becomes cumulative, justified in the name of a tradition that did not previously exist.

Organisers describe the Maha Magha Mahotsavam not as a culmination but as a beginning, frequently invoking 2028 as the moment when the initiative will reach its full symbolic and participatory scale. This long-term vision underscores the political nature of the project. Cultural transformation is not achieved through singular events but through repetition and institutional backing that generate familiarity; familiarity hardens into memory, and memory eventually masquerades as antiquity. This is how invented traditions become heritage.

Kerala’s historical strength has been its resistance to such flattening. Its public culture has accommodated religious expression without allowing any single narrative to monopolise history or space. The remaking of Bharatapuzha challenges this equilibrium by privileging one interpretation of the past while marginalising others. What is at stake is not merely the character of a festival but the future grammar of Kerala’s public life. Whether history is engaged as a complex inheritance or reduced to a tool of mobilisation depends on how society responds now.

Supporters present the Mahotsavam as spiritual renewal and a gateway to religious tourism, promising economic visibility and regional development. These claims cannot be dismissed outright. Kerala has long benefited from cultural tourism, and pilgrimage economies can generate livelihoods. Yet spiritual tourism is never purely economic. It reorganises space, privileges certain narratives and fixes meaning in ways that are difficult to reverse. When rituals are newly assembled rather than inherited, tourism risks converting memory into spectacle and communities into bystanders to a story told about them rather than with them.

What is unfolding along the Bharatapuzha is not a disagreement over faith but a struggle over authority: who defines culture, how memory is institutionalised, and which identities are permitted to feel native in shared spaces.

The Maha Magha Mahotsavam marks a shift from lived tradition to curated symbolism, where culture becomes less an expression of social life and more a claim to power. In this transformation, history is not engaged as complexity but recruited as an instrument.

The costs are cumulative. Socially, curated spirituality narrows belonging and renders dissent suspect. Environmentally, rivers turned into ritual stages are subjected to pressures that sanctity cannot mitigate. Historically, selective storytelling flattens the past, replacing layered inheritance with simplified images designed for mobilisation. What is lost is not only accuracy but the ethical discipline of living with contradiction.

Kerala’s pluralism was never ornamental. It was forged through negotiation, overlap and unresolved differences. The remaking of Bharatapuzha tests whether that inheritance will endure or yield to a politics that prefers clarity over truth. Culture can evolve, and tourism can coexist with tradition, but only when history remains a conversation rather than a commodity, and public space remains a site of coexistence rather than conquest.

(The author is an Indian author, political analyst and columnist. His debut book, The Essential (2023), was launched by Dr. Shashi Tharoor and features a foreword by former External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid. His research and commentary have appeared in IJPA, Global Policy Journal, South Asian Voices, ORF, The Unpopulist, SAGE, among others, and leading dailies.He posts on ‘X’ at @ens_socialis)

Related:

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From God’s Own Country to a Hindutva Target: Kerala’s Model of Harmony Faces Persistent Threats

Christmas under siege: right-wing target Christmas celebrations across states, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Kerala

The post Hegemony: Kerala’s Bharatapuzha as a political stage appeared first on SabrangIndia.