According to The Indian Express, the order was passed by City Magistrate Kuldeep Singh under the Uttar Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. The dispute arose from a complaint filed by Vikas Tyagi, a former provincial coordinator of the Bajrang Dal, who alleged that a mosque had been illegally constructed within the Collectorate premises—a sensitive government complex where administrative and confidential official work is carried out. The complaint also alleged that the property was being used for commercial purposes, with portions of the premises rented to private occupants and a post office operating from the site.

Revenue inquiry and allegations

Following the complaint, the Revenue Department initiated an inquiry. In March 2025, a Lekhpal (revenue official) filed an application before the City Magistrate alleging that Abdul Hamid, described as the mosque’s manager and maulvi, was in unauthorised occupation of government land. Notices were issued to the respondents in April 2025, and their objections were filed in June 2025.

The revenue authorities contended that the land forms part of the Collectorate campus and is recorded in official revenue records as government property. According to the petition, the building originally functioned as a rest house for litigants visiting the Collectorate, but was subsequently occupied by the respondents, who allegedly converted portions of it into a mosque.

The petition further alleged that rooms on both the ground and first floors had been occupied, namaz was being offered there, several rooms had been rented out for residential purposes, and rent was being collected from tenants as well as from a post office operating from the premises.

Authorities also alleged that unauthorised construction had been carried out to convert part of the government building into a religious structure. The inquiry reportedly concluded that the occupants possessed no licence, permission or legal authority either to occupy the premises, allow third parties to reside there, or convert the building into a place of worship.

The revenue department further challenged the respondents’ reliance on a purported communication issued by the Sunni Central Waqf Board, Lucknow, alleging that the document was forged. It argued that the property has consistently been recorded in revenue records as Kachahri (Collectorate) and Kothiyat land, rather than as waqf or religious property.

The authorities also maintained that the Sunni Central Waqf Board has no legal authority to declare government land as waqf property. Although the respondents claimed to be the mosque’s mutawalli and maulvi, the petition asserted that they failed to produce documentary evidence establishing either their status or ownership rights over the property.

In addition to seeking eviction, the petitioner requested recovery of rent allegedly collected from tenants, penal rent, and all income allegedly earned through the unauthorised occupation, together with 12 per cent compound interest, to be deposited into the government treasury.

Mosque committee disputes government’s claim

The respondents denied the allegations and argued that the State had failed to establish ownership of the disputed property. They contended that the revenue records relied upon by the authorities merely reflected the physical nature or classification of the land and did not conclusively determine title.

They further alleged that the proceedings were initiated with the intention of unlawfully taking possession of the mosque and its adjoining land. According to the respondents, the petitioner had suppressed material facts, withheld relevant revenue records, and attempted to mislead the court.

Mutawalli Tanveer Ahmed maintained that the mosque is approximately 150 years old and stated that the management committee intends to challenge the order by filing a revision petition.

Court finds occupation unauthorised

After considering the material placed before it, the City Magistrate held that the respondents had failed to establish any lawful right or title over the disputed property. The court observed that Khasra No. 539 has consistently been recorded in revenue records as Collectorate/Kachahri land since Fasli Years 1324 and 1359, as well as in earlier records. On that basis, it concluded that the land belongs to the State government and that occupation without legal authority amounts to unauthorised occupation under the 1972 Act.

Taking into account the prolonged occupation of the 315-square-metre parcel, the court directed that compensation be calculated for a period of 70 years, commencing from Fasli Year 1359, in accordance with the prescribed statutory formula. The resulting amount was assessed at approximately ₹6.41 crore.

City Magistrate Kuldeep Singh told The Indian Express that the occupants have been granted 30 days to vacate the premises, failing which the administration will proceed with eviction.

Part of wider disputes over religious structures

The Saharanpur order comes amid a series of disputes involving religious structures alleged to have been constructed on public land in Uttar Pradesh. Last month, according to The Indian Express, the Varanasi Division of Northern Railways issued a notice directing the removal of a mosque located near Gate No. 1 of Kashi railway station, asserting that the structure stands on railway land. The mosque’s managing body, Anjuman Intizamia Masajid Varanasi, has challenged the notice, describing the proposed action as illegal.

The controversy also follows earlier demolition proceedings concerning the Madni Mosque in Kushinagar district. In February 2025, authorities demolished a portion of the mosque after alleging that it had been constructed on encroached land. The mosque committee disputed the allegation, asserting that the land had been lawfully purchased and had secured interim protection from the High Court until the expiry of the stay.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued notice to the Uttar Pradesh authorities in contempt proceedings alleging that the demolition violated the Court’s November 13, 2024 directions restraining demolition drives across the country without prior notice and an opportunity of hearing. The proceedings remain pending.

Related:

Public Purpose and Places of Worship: Allahabad HC’s Dalmandi verdict

Rebuild or Compensate: Nagpur HC confronts NMC over ‘bulldozer’ demolition in riot case

Faiz-e-Ilahi Masjid, Turkman Gate: A court-ordered demolition, midnight policing, stone-pelting, arrests, and the ongoing legal battle

“Bulldozer Justice” rebuked: Orissa High Court orders 10 lakh compensation for illegal demolition of community centre

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The Odisha State Sentence Review Board has recommended his release from jail on ground of “good behaviour.” On July 14, 2026, a bench comprising of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi of the Supreme Court through its order had asked the Odisha Government to take a decision on the premature release of Singh by August 19. Reportedly, the bench also made an oral observation that, “You take a decision by August 15. Let him also celebrate Independence Day by then.” Reported the Hindustan Times.

Singh, who is said to be associated with the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Bajrang Dal, is serving life imprisonment not only for the murder of Australian missionary Graham Staines and his two sons, but also for the 1999 murder of Catholic priest Arul Das, who was shot with an arrow while fleeing a building that had been set on fire. Reported the new Indian Express. He was also convicted for the murder of Shaikh Rahman, a Muslim garment merchant, who was brutally assaulted, had his hands severed, and whose body and garment stall were set ablaze.

In July 2024, the Supreme Court had sought the Odisha government’s response on a plea filed through advocate Vishnu Shankar Jain seeking Singh’s remission of sentence and release, asserting that he met the state government’s criteria for granting remission (i.e. 25 years). The reformative theory of Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer was invoked and reliance was placed on the Court’s 2022 judgment permitting the premature release of the convict in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.

The current remission, therefore reflects a broader pattern in India of state governments ruled by the incumbent-BJP granting remission to those convicted in cases of gross communal violence. One such earlier instance was the release of the convicts in the 2002 Bilkis Bano gang rape and family murder case, a decision that remained in force until it was struck down by the Supreme Court.

It is worth noting that prior to this; Singh’s plea for remission has been evaluated on five separate occasions, and has been turned down each time, with the most recent rejection occurring in February 2024.

How the Remission Was Filed and Processed

Singh’s possible release has drawn political attention in the past. During a campaign for his release in 2022, when the BJD government was in power, Sudarshan TV editor-in-chief Suresh Chavhanke attempted to meet him in prison but was denied permission. Mohan Charan Majhi, (now the Chief Minister of Odisha), had also joined a protest outside the jail demanding Singh’s release. However, the Board’s consideration of Singh’s case was based on the prescribed remission process and the reports submitted by the relevant authorities. This clearly establishes that organised political demand for Singh’s release predates, by a considerable margin, the administrative process that has now produced it.

At its September 2025 meeting, the Board considered 107 cases. It recommended the release of 18 life convicts, rejected 75 applications, and deferred 14, including Singh’s. Singh’s case remained pending because the Board required a fresh report from his home district.

According to The Hindu, the State Sentence Review Board met in the first week of July 2026 to consider the premature release of eligible life convicts. Among the cases reviewed was that of Dara Singh. In his petition before the Supreme Court, he stated that he deeply regretted the offences committed over two decades earlier and sought an opportunity to “give back to society” through service-oriented work.  He also claimed that he bore no personal animosity towards the victims and described his actions as the result of “youthful rage.” Singh was 37 years old at the time of his arrest!

Under Odisha’s 2022 premature-release guidelines, a convict whose sentence has been commuted from death to life becomes eligible for remission consideration after 25 years in custody, subject to a recommendation from the State Sentence Review Board (SSRB) and government approval. Five out of six members of the SSRB belong to the executive branch of government. The presence of ruling-party legislators, when the CM has supported Singh’s release, on the deciding panel raises questions whether the government will independently apply its mind.

Comparison with the Bilkis Bano Case

Setting the two cases side by side is useful because they involve a similar factual pattern. In both instances, persons convicted of life imprisonment in communal hate-crime cases were considered for or granted premature release.

The release in Bano’s case followed a plea filed by one convict, Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, who argued he had already served over 15 years and sought early release. Shah had first tried this route in Gujarat, where the Gujarat High Court itself had indicated that Maharashtra, the state where his trial was actually conducted after the Supreme Court moved it there on Bano’s plea, was the appropriate government to decide his remission, not Gujarat. On May 13, 2022, Supreme Court order directed Gujarat (rather than Maharashtra) to decide the remission question. Acting on the Court’s direction, the Gujarat government formed a committee, which went on to recommend that the sentences of all 11 convicts in the case be remitted. The panel that granted remission included BJP legislators, the same party that governed Gujarat at the time of the riots. One of those legislators publicly defended the convicts by remarking that some of them were “Brahmins” with good values. Reported NDTV.

Several activists, along with Bilkis Bano herself petitioned the Court in November 2022. On January 8, 2024, Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan quashed the remission, holding that Gujarat was never the appropriate government and that the May 2022 order directing Gujarat to decide had itself been obtained by concealing material facts. The convicts were ordered back to prison within two weeks.

In Bano’s case, when the Gujarat government had released eleven convicts on August 15, 2022, they were welcomed with sweets and had their feet touched by supporters. Singh has for years been celebrated by sections of the Hindu right. Organisations such as the Dharmarakhyak Sri Dara Singh Bachao Samiti and Dara Sena have publicly campaigned for his release and portrayed him as a defender of Hinduism.

Given this, especially when the incumbent Odisha Chief Minister has also, before assuming office, expressed support for Singh’s release, there is a significant possibility that Singh’s release too will receive a public welcome similar to that accorded to the Bano’s convicts. The repeated public glorification of individuals convicted in cases of communal violence by organisations affiliated with or aligned to the BJP-RSS ecosystem raises serious concerns about the social and political messaging such releases convey.

While concealment of material facts was the decisive ground in Bano’s case, the Court also separately described Gujarat’s orders as stereotyped and passed without application of mind. Odisha’s Sentence Review Board considered Singh’s file within a batch of dozens of prisoners in a single sitting arguably meets the same structural vulnerability.

Five factors were decided in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India (2000), to decide on pre-mature release of convicts, namely:

i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large?

ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime?

iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime?

iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more?

v) Socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.

The first factor alone arguably requires reckoning with the fact that his is not a single offence but three separate convictions, spanning roughly a year, each targeting a different religious minority.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this judgement primer has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

Remembering the Graham Staines Murder

Bilkis Bano gets Justice: Supreme Court strikes down remission

De-coding the historic Bilkis Bano verdict

The post Dara Singh, convicted in string of 1999 communal killings, likely set for release by August 15 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Karat had originally approached the Supreme Court after the Delhi High Court upheld the refusal of an Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM) to direct registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). She had sought criminal action against Thakur and Verma for offences under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), alleging that their speeches promoted enmity between communities and incited hatred during the polarised campaign surrounding the anti-CAA protests.

The complaint stemmed from BJP MP Anurag Thakur’s election rally on January 27, 2020, where he led the crowd in chanting the slogan, “Desh ke gaddaron ko, goli maaron saalon ko” (“Shoot the traitors”). It also challenged speeches delivered by BJP leader Parvesh Verma, who described Shaheen Bagh protesters as “infiltrators” and claimed they would “enter your homes, rape your daughters and sisters, and kill them” if elected to power.

On April 26, a Bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta dismissed Karat’s appeal, agreeing with the Delhi High Court’s conclusion that no cognisable offence was made out. The Court reasoned that the speeches did not explicitly target any identifiable religious or other protected community and therefore did not attract the penal provisions invoked.

Detailed report may be read here.

While the Supreme Court overruled the Delhi High Court on one significant legal question—holding that prior sanction under Section 196 CrPC is not required before a Magistrate directs registration of an FIR under Section 156(3)—it nevertheless endorsed the conclusion that the speeches disclosed no cognisable offence.

The review petition contends that this conclusion amounts to an “error apparent on the face of the record.” According to Karat, neither the Magistrate nor the Delhi High Court had examined the substantive allegations of hate speech. Instead, both courts confined themselves to the procedural question of whether sanction under Section 196 CrPC was a prerequisite for directing investigation.

The petition points out that the Delhi High Court had expressly recorded that the ACMM had not entered into the merits of the allegations. It had also clarified that its observations were limited to the issue of sanction and would not prejudice any future adjudication on whether the speeches constituted criminal offences.

However, despite partly allowing Karat’s appeal by reversing the High Court’s interpretation of Section 196 CrPC, the Supreme Court, in paragraphs 136 to 138 of its judgment, went on to hold that it agreed with the ultimate conclusion that no cognisable offence was made out. The review petition argues that the Court effectively decided the substantive criminal liability of the BJP leaders without the parties having addressed detailed arguments on the merits of the alleged hate speech.

As per the LiveLaw report, Karat further relies on contemporaneous findings of the Election Commission of India (ECI), which had taken action against both BJP leaders during the 2020 Delhi Assembly election campaign. The ECI found that the speeches violated the Model Code of Conduct, had the potential to aggravate existing differences between religious communities and promote mutual hatred. Acting on these findings, the Commission removed both leaders from the BJP’s list of star campaigners and imposed temporary campaign bans.

The review petition also questions the reliance placed on the police status report submitted before the trial court. The police had concluded that no cognisable offence was disclosed, reasoning that Thakur’s slogan did not refer to any specific community and that Verma’s remarks on the Shaheen Bagh protests amounted to political criticism rather than criminal hate speech. According to Karat, the Supreme Court reproduced this reasoning without independently evaluating the material on record, including video recordings of the speeches and the Election Commission’s findings.

Arguing that the issue was never subjected to a full judicial examination, the review petition urges the Supreme Court to recall its finding that no cognisable offence was disclosed and to adjudicate the hate speech allegations afresh after hearing the parties on the merits. The petition has been filed through Advocates Sylona Mohapatra, Tara Nirula and Adit Pujari.

Related:

Nazia Elahi Khan faces multiple FIRs over alleged hate speech

CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal

Hate Speech Before the Supreme Court: From judicial activism to institutional closure

The Supreme Court blinks when it comes to Hate Speech

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On June 15, Praful Vaniya, Superintendent of Police (Intelligence) in the Gujarat State Police Service (SPS), issued a notice announcing the arrival of the new Anti-Radicalisation Cell (ARC). The notice also provides a step-by-step identification, prevention, detection, intervention and re-integration checklist that the police has in mind.

The SOP for Gujarat’s newly operationalised ARC claims to lay down ways to assess and decode behavioural indicators for identifying ‘radicalised’ individuals – but the details listed seem exclusively focused on Muslim radicals, conflate Muslim religious practices with security threats, and are silent on any markers of Hindu radicalism of the kind the state witnessed in 2002 and after or the rest of India has witnessed over the past decade.

From monitoring beards and niqabs to seeing Middle East travels as suspicious, from questioning the use of Signal for messaging to watching those supporting Muslim rights on social media, the SOP appears designed to penalise common Muslims – and is silent on the violent activities of cow vigilantes and the calls by Hindutva radicals for the boycott and even killing of Muslims.

Who is a ‘radicalised person’?

“A radicalised person refers to an individual affecting law and order in the State who, driven by extremist (‘kattarpant’) ideologies, engages in anti-national activities to harm the unity and integrity of the nation, creates an atmosphere of fear among the people, and try to manipulate a sane/rational person to get them to convert their religion” – these are the exact words of the notice, seen by The Wire.

Further, the notice flags “Suddenly keeping a beard, wearing a niqab, frequent use of Arabic words, reducing contact with friends and family, expressing intense protest/resentment against events happening to the Muslim community globally, praising terrorists, or showing a change in behaviour after traveling abroad (e.g., Afghanistan, Middle East)”. Next, the notice asks officers to trace purchase activity of ‘radicalised indviduals’ – “Purchasing fertilisers containing potassium nitrate, sulphur, or ammonium nitrate; acquiring LPG cylinders; making frequent visits to forest-like areas; making frequent contact with individuals residing in the Gulf, PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), or Afghanistan through encrypted apps; or withdrawing large amounts of cash”, the notice says, .

Even downloading VPN apps or using Signal or Element messengers have been listed as signs to watch out for. Other listed criteria includes ‘being members of extremist Telegram groups; following ISIS/AQ (Al-Qaeda) accounts, sharing Nasheeds, Dabiq/Rumiyah magazines; or using cryptocurrency (especially Monero) without any apparent source of income’.

Those ‘visiting extremist networks or Arabic colleges/madrasas’, performing a religious ritual like Itikaf (seclusion in a mosque) before planned activities, ‘suddenly leaving their education or employment citing Islamic duty’, or ‘visiting ‘kattarvad’ leaders after being released from prison’ are also flagged as potentially radicalised. It also orders officers to obtain complete details of maulanas teaching in madrasas, prepare a directory, and gather information/records on ‘whether they maintain contact with organisations holding extremist ideologies’.

The SOP recommends the monitoring of ‘extremist preachers, communal organisations, radicalised individuals who are or have been in prisons’, and specifically names those belonging to Salafi and Wahhabi school of Islamic thought within Sunni Islam.

Under the SOP’s ‘Intervention – Counselling and Guidance’ stage, the ARC is directed to identify and verify influential community leaders, social media influencers, NGOs, religious scholars, psychologists and educational experts who can assist in de-radicalisation efforts. It calls for counselling sessions involving family members, religious experts and psychiatrists, while requiring that the identity of individuals undergoing counselling be kept confidential. The SOP also instructs authorities to help such individuals reintegrate into education and employment and maintain regular contact with them. However, it states that if an individual commits or prepares to commit a cognisable offence after undergoing counselling, legal action should be initiated under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, with all such actions reported to the state headquarters.

While the Gujarat ARC has formally taken shape only this year, its origins date back over a decade. The idea of a dedicated deradicalisation mechanism first gained traction in 2015, at a Directors General and Inspectors General of Police conference in Gujarat’s Rann of Kutch, where the Telangana Police’s deradicalisation model was presented as a template for states grappling with online radicalisation.

In 2020, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Union home minister Amit Shah at the annual conference of DGPs and IGPs, recommended the idea of this cell.

The BJP subsequently promised to establish an ARC in its 2022 Gujarat assembly election manifesto, and began operationalising the proposal. Following the recommendations, a task force including a faculty head of the Gandhinagar-based Rashtriya Raksha University and police officials of the state Anti-Terrorism Squad, Crime Branch and Ahmedabad Central Jail was set up. But the project reportedly could not take off because of “lack of funds”.

On June 15, the SOP was circulated to district and commissionerate offices and laid out the ARC’s functioning – from identifying individuals deemed vulnerable to radicalisation and maintaining dossiers on them to counselling, rehabilitation and post-intervention monitoring. The SOP states that the ARC will function in coordination with district police units, the Special Operations Group (SOG), prison authorities and state Intelligence Bureau officers.

Communally targeted policing

Barrister Arif Ansari believes that this SOP is an open violation of the very basic fundamentals of the Constitution. “Article 14, 19, 21, 25, all are being buried under the kind of surveillance the state wants to impose on Muslims. This is state-sanctioned stereotyping and appears to be clearly motivated for electoral gains. India’s founding fathers made sure that all religions had equal respect and rights, but for Muslims, the morning begins with demolitions and evening ends with law being deployed against us,” Ansari told The Wire.

“After the 1980s, Gujarat became the laboratory of communal fascism. And the manufacturers of this policy were successful in planting this ideology in the state. Then we saw 2002, and the same politicians would be elected again and again,” Hiren Gandhi, a social activist, told The Wire.

While Gandhi recalls how post the 1980s, anti-Muslim leaders, policies and politics became the norm in Gujarat, he believes that the ARC should be placed in the broader context of how politics and sentiments have evolved in the BJP-run state.

“This kind of a mechanism is absolutely wrong but understand that it is nothing new. This is happening in ways and methods across India. During Covid-19, the same kind of radicalism rhetoric was peddled against the Tablighi Jamaat, they were dehumanised using their religion. This is a disgusting kind of politics killing democratic rights,” Gandhi said.

The SOP has also drawn political criticism. In a July 14 letter to Gujarat chief minister Bhupendra Patel, CPI(M) Rajya Sabha MP John Brittas urged the state government to keep its implementation in abeyance pending an independent review, arguing that several of its reported provisions risk conflating ordinary manifestations of Muslim religious identity with indicators of radicalisation.

“While intelligence agencies may legitimately monitor unlawful activities based on credible information, any framework that enables surveillance or profiling primarily on the basis of religion, appearance, language, dress or religious observance would raise profound constitutional concerns. Such measures, if undertaken without clearly defined legal thresholds, objective safeguards and judicial oversight, would be inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of equality before law, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, dignity and privacy,” Brittas writes.

“Our constitutional jurisprudence has emphasised that the State cannot proceed on the basis of stereotypes or collective suspicion. Equality before law requires that every citizen be assessed on the basis of credible evidence of unlawful conduct, not on the basis of faith, cultural identity, attire, language, appearance or lawful religious practices. Any institutional framework that creates an impression of profiling a particular community would be inconsistent with the constitutional promise of equal protection of laws. Effective intelligence depends upon trust between citizens and law-enforcement agencies. Policies that appear to stigmatise an entire community undermine that trust, discourage cooperation with investigative agencies, and risk alienating precisely those citizens whose partnership is indispensable in combating extremism,” he continues.

Human rights campaigner Shabnam Hashmi asked why other kinds of radicalisation – often openly visible in today’s India – find no place in the SOP. “See, I will not dispute the fact that radicalisation is happening in different communities. But this opens up the gates to harass and pick up anyone they want to, and mainly people who have dissenting voices. That is that is what it will be used for. Secondly, if we are talking of radicalisation, what about the Hindu radicalisation? What about the threats which are being distributed openly? What about the Dharam Sansads, which are giving open calls to kill Muslims, to make India Islam-free, is that no radicalisation? This is very selective profiling of the Muslim community,” she told The Wire.

Hashmi added that while today, this Cell is targeting Muslims, “Tomorrow, it’ll target maybe Dalits, or Adivasi, or Christians.”

Former Chhattisgarh Special DGP R.K. Vij said that while radicalism is defined very widely in the SOP, the sub steps with regard to one community seem to be mentioned as an example. “This may also be understood whether Gujarat Police is mentioning the community owing to their past experience in the field,” Vij said.

The Wire reached out to Gujarat’s Deputy Inspector General of Police, Dr Sudhirkumar J. Desai, to ask about the phrasing used in the SOP and allegations of it being communally motivated. This article will be updated when a response is received.

With inputs from Sharmita Kar.

Tarushi Aswani is an independent journalist.

Courtesy: The Wire

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The Indian Constitution was never conceived merely as a framework for governing an independent nation. Constitutional historian Granville Austin famously described it as an instrument of a “social revolution”; a document intended to transform Indian society by replacing entrenched hierarchies with the principles of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. This distinction lies at the heart of the debate surrounding the place of ancient Indian texts such as the Manusmriti in legal education.

Socio-political critic and columnist Solomon Mubash argues in his recent essay, From Constitutional Morality to Brahmanical Logic: Judicial Violence and Power, that the controversy extends far beyond curriculum design or the study of history. Instead, he contends that it reflects a deeper contest over the moral and ideological foundations of the Indian republic. Whether or not one agrees with every aspect of his argument, the questions he raises extend far beyond the classroom.

At stake is not whether students should read the Manusmriti. Any serious student of law, history, religion or sociology must engage with texts that have shaped the intellectual traditions of the subcontinent. The real question is how such texts should be situated within a constitutional democracy founded on equal citizenship.

History and heritage are not the same thing.

History seeks to understand the past—its achievements as well as its contradictions. Heritage often seeks to celebrate it. Confusing the two risks turning scholarly inquiry into cultural endorsement. Ancient texts deserve academic engagement because they reveal how societies understood law, authority and social order. They do not automatically acquire normative authority simply because they are old.

The Manusmriti occupies a distinctive and contested place in India’s intellectual history. As Indologist Patrick Olivelle, whose translation remains among the most authoritative, notes, it is one of the most influential Dharmashastra texts prescribing norms of social and legal conduct. Historians have also pointed out that while its actual legal authority varied across regions and historical periods, its prescriptions articulated a social order organised around hereditary hierarchy.

The text differentiates duties, privileges and punishments according to caste and gender. Women, Shudras and those placed outside the varna order occupy unequal positions within its normative framework. Scholars including B.R. Ambedkar, Nicholas Dirks and Christophe Jaffrelot have therefore interpreted the Manusmriti as a powerful symbol of graded social inequality, even while recognising that lived social practises were often more complex than any single text could capture.

Recognising this historical reality is not an act of hostility towards Indian civilisation. It is an acknowledgement that every civilisation contains traditions worthy of preservation alongside institutions that deserve critical scrutiny.

It is precisely this distinction that informed Dr B.R. Ambedkar’s understanding of constitutional morality. In his final address to the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1949, Ambedkar warned that political democracy could not survive unless it rested upon social democracy founded on liberty, equality and fraternity. He cautioned that India was entering “a life of contradictions”, where political equality would coexist with deep social and economic inequality unless constitutional values transformed society itself.

For Ambedkar, constitutional morality was therefore not blind allegiance to a legal document. It was a civic ethic that required citizens and institutions to judge inherited customs against constitutional principles rather than treating tradition as the ultimate source of legitimacy.

His public burning of the Manusmriti during the Mahad Satyagraha in 1927 has generally been understood by historians as a symbolic rejection of scriptural sanction for caste hierarchy—not a rejection of Indian civilisation itself. His later leadership of the Constitution’s Drafting Committee represented an attempt to replace birth-based status with equal constitutional citizenship.

That constitutional commitment found concrete expression in Articles 14, 15 and 17 of the Constitution, which guarantee equality before the law, prohibit discrimination on specified grounds and abolish untouchability. A Dalit labourer, a Brahmin scholar, an Adivasi woman and a member of a religious minority stand equal before the law not because tradition confers equal worth upon them, but because the Constitution does.

That was the revolutionary promise of the Republic.

Mubash argues that a continuing tension exists between constitutional morality and what he describes as Brahmanical social logic. Regardless of whether one adopts that terminology, the broader constitutional question remains relevant. The tension between constitutional ideals and entrenched social hierarchies continues to surface whenever caste-based discrimination is defended in the language of tradition, women’s autonomy is subordinated to customary norms, or inherited privilege seeks legitimacy through appeals to civilisational continuity rather than constitutional principle.

The danger lies in confusing antiquity with authority. No constitutional democracy derives its legitimacy from the age of its ideas. Its legitimacy derives from the justice of its institutions.

Constitutional morality asks a different question from historical tradition. It asks not whether a practice is ancient but whether it is just; not whether it is customary but whether it respects the equal dignity of every citizen. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle in decisions such as Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) and Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018), holding that constitutional morality must prevail where social morality infringes fundamental rights.

Yet the constitutional transformation envisioned by Ambedkar remains incomplete. Ambedkar himself distinguished between political democracy and social democracy, warning that the former could not endure without the latter. More than seven decades after Independence, the continued incidence of caste-based atrocities, manual scavenging, honour killings and structural exclusion—documented in reports of the National Crime Records Bureau, the National Human Rights Commission and successive government agencies—demonstrates that constitutional equality has not fully displaced social hierarchy.

The response to this challenge cannot be historical amnesia. Ancient texts should be read, debated and critically examined. But they must be approached as historical artefacts rather than constitutional guides. Legal education should encourage students not only to understand what such texts prescribed but also to examine who benefited from those prescriptions, who was excluded by them, and why independent India consciously chose a different constitutional path.

Every civilisation possesses traditions worth preserving. Every intellectual tradition contains ideas worthy of study. But no tradition becomes immune from criticism merely because it is ancient.

The Constitution occupies a unique place in India’s public life because it represents a conscious normative departure from systems that assign human worth by birth. As Granville Austin argued, it sought to facilitate a peaceful social revolution through democratic institutions rather than through coercion. It is therefore not merely a legal document but an aspirational framework for building a society in which liberty is not restricted by caste, equality is not constrained by status and fraternity is not defeated by inherited divisions.

The Constitution is not a mirror reflecting India as it was. It is a blueprint imagining India as it could be, and ought to be.

The real challenge before Indian institutions is not that they have forgotten their roots. It is that they sometimes forget the purpose of the constitutional project itself. That project was never about recovering an idealised past. It was about constructing a more equal future.

The future of Indian democracy will not ultimately be determined by how frequently it invokes its civilisational inheritance. It will depend on whether its institutions continue to uphold the constitutional vision articulated by Ambedkar, embedded in the Constitution and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. India’s civilisational inheritance deserves careful study. Its Constitution deserves primacy. The Constitution is not the antithesis of Indian civilisation; it is arguably the Republic’s most profound civilisational achievement.

Oindrila Dasgupta is a doctoral researcher at Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University and teaches Social Inclusion and Journalism. Her work focuses on role of journalism in terms of social justice praxis and pedagogy in India.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

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According to The Indian Express, Justice Suraj Govindaraj directed the FRRO to verify the identity of Abdul Rahim and ascertain whether he is the same individual who was convicted by a sessions court in Uttar Pradesh in a case alleging illegal entry from Bangladesh. The conviction is currently under challenge before the Allahabad High Court.

In an interim order, the copy of which is yet to be made available, the court restrained the authorities from deporting Rahim until the next date of hearing, fixed for July 14. The court also directed the FRRO to obtain instructions regarding the pending proceedings before the Allahabad High Court and determine whether those proceedings relate to the same person against whom the present deportation order has been passed.

Detained during verification drive

As reported by Indian Express, Rahim stated in his petition that he was born on April 14, 1979, in New Seemapuri, Delhi, and has lived and worked in India throughout his life. He was detained on March 5, 2026, by the Parappana Agrahara police during a drive to identify suspected undocumented Bangladeshi migrants and was subsequently handed over to the FRRO.

On the same day, the FRRO passed an order under Section 7(2)(f) of the Foreigners Act, 2025, read with Paragraph 8 of the Immigration and Foreigners Order, restricting his movement and directing that he reside at the Utile Foundation detention centre in Kothanur, Bengaluru. The FRRO order identified him as “Md. Rahim Howladar, son of Md. Motaleb Howladar,” and proceeded on the assumption that he was a foreign national.

Citizenship documents produced before court

Appearing for Rahim, advocate Clifton D. Rozario argued that his client is an Indian citizen by birth and produced several public documents, including a birth certificate, passport, voter identity card, Aadhaar card, PAN card, driving licence and records relating to his family members.

The petition contended that the detention order was passed without notice, without an opportunity of hearing and without any meaningful inquiry into his citizenship status. It alleged violations of Articles 14, 15, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and stated that the detention had disrupted Rahim’s livelihood and caused hardship to his wife and infant child.

Connection to Uttar Pradesh conviction

The case has an additional layer of complexity because Rahim was convicted in 2012 by an Additional District and Sessions Judge in Ghaziabad under Section 14A(b) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, for allegedly entering and residing in India without valid documents. In that case, he was identified as “Abdul Rahim, son of Shah Jamal, resident of Bagerhat, Bangladesh.”

According to the petition, Indian Express reported, the conviction was largely based on the statutory burden under the Foreigners Act requiring the accused to establish citizenship, and on the finding that the documents produced were not satisfactory. Rahim appealed the conviction before the Allahabad High Court in 2012, where the appeal was admitted and he was granted bail. The appeal remains pending.

Rozario argued that the present detention and deportation proceedings amount to double jeopardy, prohibited under Article 20 of the Constitution, which protects individuals from being prosecuted and punished more than once for the same offence.

Business and family life in Bengaluru

Rahim told the court that he moved from Delhi to Bengaluru in 2014 and established a waste management and scrap trading business through a government-registered proprietorship. He also holds a GST registration certificate issued under the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

As reported by Times of India, he argued that he has built his family and economic life in Bengaluru and that the deportation proceedings were initiated without even issuing him a prior notice.

Court seeks identity verification before deportation

Observing that the petition raises issues requiring factual verification, the Karnataka High Court directed the FRRO to ascertain Rahim’s identity before taking any coercive action. The court’s interim protection will remain in force until the matter is heard again on July 14.

According to the report of Scroll, the petition seeks quashing of the FRRO order and Rahim’s release from custody, while the court’s immediate focus remains on determining whether the detainee is indeed the same person involved in the pending Uttar Pradesh proceedings and whether the deportation order has been issued against the correct individual.

Related:

Gauhati High Court upholds foreigner declaration, rejects mental illness plea

Gauhati HC upholds foreigner declaration, reasserts harsh reverse burden under colonial-era Foreigners Act

No ‘Inherited’ Foreigner Status: Gauhati HC protects children from automatic declaration

Gauhati High Court directs State to file affidavit on alleged deportation of Doyjan Bibi without due process

When a Spelling Error Can Cost Citizenship: Supreme Court stays deportation of five Assam women

From Forest Settlers to ‘Encroachers’: The eviction crisis in Assam’s Taungya Villages

Assam, the third state to pass UCC: Gender justice or targeted communalism the aim?

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Background of the case and procedural history

 The appellants, Mayadhar Nayak and Baina Nayak, were daily wagers belonging to the Scheduled Castes, who served the Government Treasury Branch of SBI in Bhubaneswar as cleaners and sweepers for approximately three decades, starting in 1994 and 1995, respectively.

The appellants had previously approached the Court in 1999 regarding non-regularisation of service and denial of pay on par with temporary employees. This produced an interim protective order on October 28, 1999 where the Court said, “If there is work for the Petitioners, they may not be retrenched.” The Court had directed the Bank to pay them remuneration under the Minimum Wages Act and be allowed to continue working as long as work was available, without being substituted by new hands. The Court also asked the bank to consider their cases for regularisation if any vacancies arose.

In 2007, the appellants again approached the Court claiming that the Bank was seeking to fill up the posts of Sweepers and other menial staff without considering their claim for appointment. This time too, the Court asked the bank to consider their cases for regularisation if any vacancies arose, keeping in view the length of their engagement and the services.

In terms of the above order, Appellants were paid on September 17, 2021 the arrears of minimum wages quantified at Rs.1, 61,619/- , each, for the period between April, 2017 & June, 2021.

Around five years later, in 2012, the appellants filed another petition for their recognition as temporary employees, pay parity under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, release of bonus for the financial year 2011–12, and extension of all temporary service benefits as granted to similarly situated employees of the Bank.

In 2020, the appellants another petition seeking regularisation of their services, contending that the Bank had regularised the services of a similarly situated employee engaged as a ‘Liftman’ at the time, the appellants were receiving a consolidated monthly remuneration of Rs.16,406/- while other temporary employees of the Bank were receiving Rs.27,443/-.

On June 20 2025, a single judge bench Justice S.K. Panigrahi which was hearing both the petitions together dismissed the appellants’ writ petitions finding all their claims unsustainable. The judgment read:

“While this Court does not disregard the long and uninterrupted service rendered by the petitioners, it is well-settled that mere length of service does not by itself confer a right to regularisation. The consistent position in law is that engagement on a daily wage or casual basis, however prolonged, cannot mature into a claim for regular appointment in the absence of sanctioned posts and adherence to a lawful selection process.” (Para 18).

In 2022, the Bank had sought permission to retrench the Appellants as being surplus workers.

On July 19, 2025, the appellants were retrenched by the bank as surplus workers under Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and were paid roughly Rs. 3.31 lakh each as statutory compensation and payment due to a policy shift toward outsourcing driven by IT developments in banking.

The division bench presently hearing the case, had to decide whether

• the appellants, after nearly 30 years of service were entitled to regularisation and consequential monetary benefits,
• the previous court orders, which only directed the payment of minimum wages and conditional consideration for vacancies, barred the appellants’ current claims for regularisation, and
• what constitutes fair ‘remediable and reparative justice’ for manual labourers in an era of outsourcing and AI, when regularisation might impose an excessive financial burden on the employer.

High Court’s intervention

 The Division Bench partially allowed the appeals and set aside the order of the Single Judge through an order on May 18, 2026. In that it said:

“There appears to be a prima facie case for granting relief to the Appellants herein, who admittedly have put in service as Sweepers, first Appellant from 1994, and the second from 1995. The law, as it now stands in the June of its life, tilts in favour of the Appellant’s herein, inasmuch as, arguably, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge has missed the march”

• Declined Regularisation

The Court declined to order regularisation. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court’s rulings in Jaggo v. Union of India (2024), and Shripal v. Nagar Nigam (2025) but the Court noted it would cause the Bank to bear the brunt of losing huge money and that the appellants’ prior cases only resulted in a direction for minimum wages. At the same time, the Court observed that the appellants’ earlier rounds of litigation had not secured them much real benefit, since those orders only directed payment of minimum wages, which SBI had already paid. Because of this, the Bench held that the regularisation claim in the present appeals was, to an extent, barred by the principle of res judicata.

The Court then referred to a coordinate Bench’s order in Secretary, Berhampur Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. v. Bhaba Sundar Dalai (2026), where Rs 10 lakh had been awarded as compensation in lieu of regularisation. However, the Bench distinguished that case as there was no res judicata bar in it, and the employees’ service was comparatively shorter.

The Court took note of two mitigating factors specific to the present appellants, that they had roughly ten years left before superannuation, and that both belonged to Scheduled Castes, as relevant considerations in shaping the final relief.

• Justification for the Compensation Amount

In the May order, the Court had suggested both the sides to negotiate a settlement with fairness and justice. The SBI proposed to pay a lump sum compensation of Rs. 5 lakh to each of the appellants to settle the dispute. However, the appellants rejected the bank’s offer and during a personal interaction with the Court, they stated they would settle for Rs. 25 lakh each

The Court evaluated both proposals and described the Bank’s Rs. 5 lakh offer inadequate. It said:

“Rupees 5 lakh offer made by the Bank as compensation is too frugal to be mentioned, when bread is costlier than blood, Rupee value now-a-days dwindling down. The Appellants, who have given their sweat & blood, cannot seek gainful employment elsewhere at their present declining age. They were working only as sweepers with not much education nor with due social status.” (Para 7.3.2)

Instead, the Court awarded a lump sum compensation of Rs. 20, 00,000 (Twenty Lakh) to each appellant in lieu of regularisation and continued service.

While deciding the compensation amount, it remarked:

“In the AI era, we are not sure that they would be able to eke out their livelihood, having spent prime of their life blood in the menial job all these years. Even Rs.10 lakh compensation awarded by the Coordinate Bench to the workmen of a Cooperative Bank would not constitute a solid yardstick for determining what should be paid to these poor persons. Should Appellants be regularized in service, it would incur more expenditure than otherwise.” (Para 7.3.2)

The Bank was ordered to pay the total Rs. 40 lakh within eight weeks. Any delay would trigger an interest penalty (1% for the first month and 2% thereafter), which the Court directed should be recovered personally from the erring bank officials.

The full judgment may be read here:

Why Regularisation Never Came

 The Fifth Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, that designates certain practices as unfair labour practices includes:

 “10. To employ workmen as “badlis”, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.”

 For thirty years, and over 240 days annually, the appellants discharged their duty in continuity. For context, the Government Treasury Branch of the Bank occupies more than 11,000 square feet, spread over three levels comprising the upper basement, ground floor, and first floor. The premises include eight toilets and six urinals. The Appellants had been performing cleaning duties in the said premises along with outsourced employees.

The denial of regularisation and long-term benefits to contractual or temporary workers is a heavily litigated issue in India, and not unique to the present case. In Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) the Court clarified that temporary, daily wage, or contractual employees do not possess a legal or fundamental right to be made permanent. It held that a court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to make a worker permanent because the worker has no enforceable legal right to such a status, and the State has no legal duty to provide it outside of established rules. However, the Court also provided a narrow exception as a one-time measure for workers who have completed at least 10 years of service. Regularisation, it held, may be permitted where the appointment was irregular (meaning it suffered from a procedural flaw) but not illegal.

In Jaggo v. Union of India (2024), the Supreme Court said that the appellants’ long and uninterrupted service, for periods extending well beyond ten years, cannot be brushed aside merely by labelling their initial appointments as part-time or contractual. The essence of their employment must be considered in the light of their sustained contribution, the integral nature of their work, and the fact that no evidence suggests their entry was through any illegal or surreptitious route. The judgment read:

“The claim by the respondents that these were not regular posts lacks merit, as the nature of the work performed by the appellants was perennial and fundamental to the functioning of the offices. The recurring nature of these duties necessitates their classification as regular posts, irrespective of how their initial engagements were labelled. It is also noteworthy that subsequent outsourcing of these same tasks to private agencies after the appellants’ termination demonstrates the inherent need for these services. This act of outsourcing, which effectively replaced one set of workers with another, further underscores that the work in question was neither temporary nor occasional.” (Para 13)

In Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers Union (2024), the Court held that workers engaged to perform work of regular and perennial nature cannot be treated as contract labour.

Similarly, last year, in Shripal vs Nagar Nigam (2025), the Supreme Court while acknowledging the precedence in Umadevi, emphasised that workers performing duties that are integral, ongoing, and perennial to an institution’s functions should not be relegated to perpetual daily-wage status. The judgment authored by Justice Vikram Nath said:

“While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-serving employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It categorically held that employees in irregular appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for more than ten years, should be considered for regularization as a one-time measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases where their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural formalities.” (Para 26).

“Indian labour law strongly disfavours perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing municipal requirements year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a genuine contractor agreement.” (Para 15).

To continue extracting regular labour for decades while pleading a lack of sanctioned strength is a position the Court found legally and morally unsustainable in Dharam Singh vs State of UP (2025).

In January this year, in Bhola Nath vs The State Of Jharkhand (2026), the Court while finding the State’s refusal to regularise the workers who had served for over a decade to be a clear derogation of equality principles, directed the State to forthwith regularise the appellants against the sanctioned posts they were initially appointed to, granting them all consequential service benefits

Hence, while long service alone does not guarantee automatic regularisation, the Supreme Court has ruled that continuing workers in identical, perpetual roles on temporary wages while denying them benefits can be considered arbitrary and discriminatory.

During the litigation, the appellants in present case- Mayadhar Nayak supported his wife, two children, and a father aged about 80 years. On the other hand, Baina Nayak was the sole caretaker of a mentally and physically disabled child and another son, all of whom dependent on his meagre income of about Rs 16,000.

On paper, the Nayaks had reason to expect a better outcome. They approached the High Court as early as 1999 where a coordinate bench even secured them protection against retrenchment in 1999, and in 2007 the Court directed SBI to consider them if sweeper vacancies were filled. Yet each of these interventions never fruitioned into regularisation.

When two vacancies did arise after the 2007/2008 orders, SBI chose to outsource the cleaning function rather than fill the posts departmentally citing a policy shift attributed to changes in banking operations. Because this outsourcing decision was never independently challenged, it stood, and it extinguished the very condition on which the appellants’ continued engagement depended. Rather than terminating long-serving casual workers outright, the restructuring of the underlying work itself dissolved the employee’s along with the post. By the time the Division Bench heard the 2025 appeals, it held that the earlier 2007/2008 orders had already adjudicated.

Compensation and Delayed Justice

 Regularisation would have given the appellants a pension, medical benefits, promotional prospects, and crucially continued income until superannuation. A one-time payment, however large, is a terminal substitute.

 None of this is to say compensation is worthless. Rs20 lakh each is a materially significant, life-altering sum, and the Court’s insistence on interest for delay and personal liability of erring officials for that interest is a genuinely useful enforcement mechanism. But as a systemic remedy for decades of institutionalised casualisation, compensation calculated case-by-case, in peculiar facts and circumstances, explicitly disclaiming precedential value, plausibly should not substitute for either a binding regularisation scheme or statutory reform that removes employers’ incentive to keep essential, perennial work permanently temporary! While salary or lump-sum compensation prevents destitution, it does not cure systemic exploitation. Compensation is at best a consolation, and workers deserve justice, not just money. Compensation does little to restore lost career opportunities, dignity and security.

 “The Appellants have been fighting the legal battles since about three decades, complete justice eluding for one or the other reason,” acknowledged the Orissa High Court in the present case.

This is not unusual. Delay is a common feature of our judicial system. Labour disputes in India typically take somewhere between seven to ten years to reach a final judgment. Pendency of labour disputes in general for long period of time leads to frustration among workers.

The Delhi High Court recently flagged this delay directly, describing the backlog of pending labour matters before constitutional courts as a “sorry state of affairs” in the constitutional courts where the “poor labourers are forced to fight tooth and nail to get justice for themselves”. Reported the Indian Express.

Labour Law in the AI-era

 Tucked into the judgment’s compensation calculus, the Bench doubted the appellants could “eke out their livelihood… in the AI era,” having spent their working lives in menial labour with little education. This, on one level, was an acknowledgment that older, low-skilled workers pushed out of long-term employment have genuinely diminished prospects of re-entering the labour market. But it is worth reading as part of a broader, nascent judicial awareness that automation and technological change will compound the harm of insecure employment for low-skill, manual roles.

A public employer that outsources or automates a function bears a one-time restructuring cost but the displaced worker bears a lifetime cost, often without the education or capital to pivot into new work. The Court’s remark implicitly recognises this asymmetry, even if it does not translate it into a legal standard.

“Perennial nature of work” as a legal test may itself be eroding. Much of the jurisprudence on regularisation and contract labour assumes that if work is genuinely permanent, it should attract permanent labour protections. But work that was perennial for thirty years can be redefined as time-limited or eliminable through outsourcing plus technology, without ever being tested against the perennial nature standard in a contested proceeding.

Indian courts have long tied the right to livelihood, and by extension dignity, to Article 21. It would perhaps be an overreach to describe this as an emerging AI-era jurisprudence. But future litigants representing displaced casual workers in automating sectors like banking, toll collection, municipal sanitation may well cite this observation as an early judicial acknowledgment that technological displacement deserves distinct legal weight. The judges however have made it clear that this order is based on the facts of this case and they do not intend to make it a binding precedent or a Rule of Parity.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this judgement primer has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

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Lucknow: Caste hierarchies & contract labour exploitation among sanitation workers

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Read the judgment primer by CJP here.

“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” wrote the historian Lord Acton. Critics argue that legal protections governing the prosecution of offences by uniformed personnel have fostered a culture of impunity by making accountability more difficult. Over the years, members of India’s armed, paramilitary and police forces have been implicated in a range of serious offences against civilians, including rape, extrajudicial killings, staged encounters, culpable homicide, enforced disappearances, illegal detention, and custodial torture.

The 1991 in the villages of Kunan and Poshpora in Kashmir, the army personnel allegedly raped over 23 women in Kashmir (Human Rights Watch assessed the number of survivors at up to 100). It is gut wrenching but it is by no means the only one. In 2004, a 32-year old activist Thangjam Manorama was allegedly raped and murdered by the Indian paramilitary unit 17th Assam Rifles in Manipur. Following this, around twelve elderly women staged a naked protest outside the Assam Rifles headquarters. Their banner read: ‘Indian Army Rape Us.’

CREDIT: BBC News

In 2009, two women from Shopian in Kashmir were allegedly abducted, repeatedly gang-raped by soldiers, and murdered. Their bodies were recovered from a river.

In 2010, a 16-year-old Zahid Farooq Sheikh was shot and killed by BSF personnel as he was walking home from playing cricket with friends in Srinagar.

In 2015 and 2016, a National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST) fact-finding report documented three instances of mass sexual violence including gang-rapes, physical assault, and looting by police and paramilitary personnel deployed on anti-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh. The victims were Adivasi women, subsistence farmers. The report concluded that there had been a breakdown of discipline among the forces concerned.

In 2021, soldiers from the 21 Para Special Forces army unit shot and killed six coal miners in Nagaland’s Mon district, for mistaking the miners for militants.

These are only a few cases that reached the media. The structure of the law and the barriers to FIR registration in conflict areas means that for every case that surfaces, an unknown number do not.

In 2018, over 350 army personnel filed a petition in the Supreme Court to protect the AFSPA from being diluted. Its defenders argue that soldiers operating in counter-insurgency environments face split-second, life-or-death decisions. They are trained not to open fire unless they are fired upon, attacked, or have reasonable grounds to believe an attack is imminent. AFSPA was enacted in 1958 to enable the deployment of the armed forces in areas where the civil administration had failed to maintain law and order.  The legal protection under AFSPA is therefore justified, they contend, because actions taken during combat cannot be judged with the benefit of hindsight.

The criticism, however, is not that soldiers acting in good faith during genuine combat operations should be prosecuted. It is that the shield of prior sanction has repeatedly been invoked to protect those accused of abusing that power.

For instance, in Manorama’s case mentioned before, the post-mortem revealed injuries consistent with torture, including bullet wounds on her vagina. Most significantly, the Central Forensic Science Laboratory detected human semen on her clothing, suggesting that she had been sexually assaulted before her death. Yet the Assam Rifles invoked Section 6 of AFSPA to argue that no legal proceedings could continue without prior sanction from the Central Government. Manorama’s family questioned how acts such as rape, torture and the killing of an unarmed woman could ever be considered actions taken ‘in aid of civil power’ or in the exercise of official duty.

The full Human Rights Watch report can be accessed here.

Put very simply, there is no operational rationale for extending immunity to those who have abused the power, and specifically in the offence of rape. Unlike the use of force during an armed encounter, rape can never be characterised as a split-second military judgment or an act committed in good faith in the discharge of official duties. It is an intentional criminal act. The law offers no convincing explanation for why allegations of rape should be subject to the same procedural immunity as decisions taken during armed engagement.

According to Margot Walstrom, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, “[Sexual violence] is a way of demonstrating power and control. It inflicts fear on the whole community. And it is unfortunately a very effective, cheap and silent weapon with a long lasting effect on every society.”

A 2019 paper titled ‘Violence against women by the army personnel’ reads, “Many in Mizoram do not even talk about those days when such trauma was so prominent as to bring gushes of trauma to them. Those instances have been simply called “troubles” and no discussion takes place, such is the trauma that has been inflicted on people.”

In India’s conflict zones, sexual violence has long been dismissed as ‘collateral damage.’ As an unfortunate but inevitable cost of maintaining order in disturbed areas. However, it arguably is a documented, recurring pattern of abuse that is shielded by law and enabled by institutional silence.

The severity and persistence of the reports surrounding rapes by uniformed personnel compelled the Justice Verma Committee constituted in the wake of the 2012 Nirbhaya gang-rape to specifically examine the position of women in conflict areas and recommend a review of the AFSPA. The committee explicitly said that women in conflict areas are entitled to all the security and dignity that is afforded to citizens in any other part of our country.

That was over fifteen years ago.

In the intervening period, India has overhauled its criminal law framework wholesale, replacing the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Evidence Act with new statutes  expressly on the ground that the old laws were colonial relics. But the provisions of AFSPA, the Border Security Forces (‘BSF’) Act, the Army Act 1950, and the Disturbed Areas Act 1992 that shield uniformed personnel from prosecution for crimes committed against civilians remain untouched.

The Legal Architecture

Several statutory provisions form the backbone of security force immunity in India.

Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 218 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita ) requires government sanction before a court can prosecute judges and public servants, including armed forces and police officials, for offenses committed while discharging official duties unless the Central Government first grants sanction for prosecution. The Ministry of Home Affairs is vested with the authority to grant sanction for prosecution of public servants.

Section 47 of the BSF Act provides that BSF personnel accused of serious civil offences including  murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder, or rape against civilians cannot ordinarily be tried by an internal Security Force Court, unless the offence was committed on active duty, outside India, or at a location specifically notified by the Central Government. Read alongside the sanction requirement, this provision can operate as a gap between two forums where civilian courts are barred without sanction and military courts barred by the section itself.

Similarly, Section 70 of the Army Act, 1950 specifies when military personnel cannot be tried by a court-martial for certain serious crimes against civilians.

According to section 6 of the AFSPA no prosecution, suit, or legal proceeding may be brought against any person acting under AFSPA without the prior sanction of the Central Government. This provision has operated in parts of the Northeast since 1958 and in Jammu and Kashmir since 1990.

How have the Courts acted?

In Sebastian Hongray v. Union of India (1984), the petitioner, a student from the Naga community contended that two men were unlawfully detained by the 21st Sikh Regiment during a combing operation in Huining village of Manipur. The Army could not produce or account for two men taken into custody and asserted that the men had left the army camp alive and that an extensive search, including a CBI enquiry, had failed to locate them in Manipur. The Court applied habeas corpus directly against the Union of India and later imposed exemplary costs. The Court said:

“As we are inclined to direct registration of an offence and an investigation, we express no opinion as to what fate has befallen to Shri C. Daniel and Shri C. Paul, the missing two persons in respect of whom the writ of habeas corpus was issued save and except saying that they have not met their tragic end in an encounter as is usually claimed and the only possible inference that can be drawn from circumstance already discussed is that both of them must have met an unnatural death. Prima facie, it would be an offence of murder. 

….

 It is not necessary to start casting a doubt on anyone or any particular person. But prima facie there is material on record to reach an affirmative conclusion that both Shri C. Daniel and Shri C. Paul are not alive and have met an unnatural death. And the Union of India cannot disown the responsibility in this behalf.”

A decade later, in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993), the Supreme Court confronted the death of a man after arrest by the police. With characteristic directness, the Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity used to shield the State from civil liability has no place in proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights and that:

“There is a great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life. His liberty is in the very nature of things circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement and therefore his interest in the limited liberty left to him is rather precious. The duty of care on the part of the State is strict and admits of no exceptions.”

“A reading of the morning newspapers almost everyday carrying reports of dehumanising torture, assault, rape and death in custody of police or other governmental agencies is indeed depressing,” was the Court’s observation in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1996) in which it issued a comprehensive set of binding guidelines governing arrest, documentation, medical examination, and notification of family members, and held that violation of these guidelines would render police officers personally liable for contempt of court. The Court reiterated that defence of sovereign immunity is not available to the State for the tortious act of the public servants and for the established violation of the rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

In Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1997), the Supreme Court constitutionally upheld the validity of AFSPA. It also curated a list of ‘Do’s and Don’ts,’ in which the use of excessive force or retaliatory force by the Manipur Police or the armed forces of the Union was not permissible.

However, the provision that ASPA’s protection was not absolute and that it did not grant a ‘licence to kill indiscriminately’ remained a judicial aspiration rather than an enforceable limit.

Significantly in 2012, a division bench of Justices BS Chauhan and Swatenter Kumar while hearing the Pathribal case at the Supreme Court orally remarked that AFSPA gave very limited protection confined to action in discharge of duty and that rape and murder committed by its personnel should be considered a normal crime. The Court said that there is no question of sanction from the government before prosecution of offenders in such cases. Reported The Indian Express.

“You go to a place in exercise of AFSPA, you commit rape, you commit murder, then where is the question of sanction? It is a normal crime which needs to be prosecuted, and that is our stand,” the bench said.  However, ultimately the Court held that where AFSPA’s protection applies, prior sanction from the Central Government is required before the criminal court can take cognizance of the offence but if the competent Army authority opts for trial by court-martial, no such sanction is needed.

In 2013, the Supreme Court affirmed that the power of the armed forces to seek trial before a General Security Force Court is not unlimited. In the case concerning the killing of a teenager by BSF personnel, a Bench of Justices Chandramauli Prasad and Ibrahim Kalifulla set aside a Jammu and Kashmir High Court order that had transferred the trial to a General Security Force Court under the BSF Act, 1968. The Court described the allegations against the accused as “very distressing” and held that merely because the personnel were on active duty in a disturbed area did not automatically entitle the BSF to claim jurisdiction. The Court also held that the commanding officer’s discretion to seek trial before a security force court was not absolute and had been exercised without considering the statutory restrictions requiring such a course to be necessary in the interest of discipline.

In Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) v. Union of India (2016), the Court examined 1,528 alleged encounter killings by police and armed forces in Manipur between 1979 and 2012. A court-appointed Justice Hegde Commission investigated six cases and concluded that none were genuine encounters and that the security forces had exceeded their powers.

While hearing the case, a bench of Justices Madan B Lokur and U U Lalit rapped the Army for silence over the allegations and questioned the state government for not proceeding with these cases against them. “Don’t you want to inquire even if somebody makes such allegations against your people (Army personnel)? Are you saying whatever was done was legitimate,” the bench asked. “The reports clearly suggest that the girl was subjected to rape. You are creating a stonewall and you do not want to break that stonewall. You have not tried anything. You have not asked the Army to handover the custody of the alleged culprits,” the Court added.

In its 2017 judgment, the Supreme Court held that even in a disturbed area under AFSPA excessive or retaliatory force is prohibited and ordered every death caused by the armed forces or police to be thoroughly enquired into.

“It does not matter whether the victim was a common person or a militant or a terrorist, nor does it matter whether the aggressor was a common person or the State. The law is the same for both and is equally applicable to both,” the order read.

The EEVFAM litigation remains alive as a continuing mandamus.

Still, it is relatively uncommon for allegations of rape against armed forces personnel to culminate in prosecution before ordinary civilian criminal courts. Instead, cases have often been dealt with through the military courts, if dealt at all. When convictions have resulted from court-martial proceedings, civilian High Courts have generally examined them in the exercise of judicial review rather than hearing the criminal case at first instance.

In Captain Vinod Kumar vs State of J&K (2012), the Jammu and Kashmir High Court heard the case of two members of the 8th Battalion JAKLI who allegedly broke into a residential house in Poonch and repeatedly raped two women, aged 18 and 24, in front of the victims’ young children. The Army’s Commanding Officer initially opted in 1999 for the accused to be tried by a civil criminal court rather than a Court-martial. However, the petitioners challenged this. The Court ruled that the trial should not be abandoned and rejected the idea that army personnel should go ‘Scott free’ due to procedural errors. It famously noted that “Crime does not die in this manner” and emphasized that the seriousness of a rape charge outweighs technical procedural wrangles.

In 2014, a division bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court upheld the sentence by the Summary General Court Martial which found four army personnel guilty of rape and sentenced them to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and dismissal from service. The Court ruled that Court Martial proceedings can only be invalidated if there is a breach of fundamental procedural rules that renders the trial illegal. The Court emphasized that there cannot be “any compromise with the standards and maintenance of discipline in the army. They are not only the sentinels of the frontiers of the country but are also sacred guards of the rights of the people. Any invasion of the rights of the people by this kind of force cannot be tolerated.”

Where the Courts have deferred.

Despite this increasingly robust jurisprudential framework limiting blanket immunity under AFSPA, accountability has remained elusive. More than three decades after the alleged mass rapes in Kunan and Poshpora, judicial and investigative orders have been repeatedly challenged, stayed, or left unresolved. In 2015, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court stayed the Magistrate’s order directing further investigation after objections by the Army. Separately, the State challenged the recommendation of the Jammu and Kashmir State Human Rights Commission awarding compensation to the survivors before the Supreme Court. In its report, the Commission observed that the Director General of Police had attempted to “push the collective crime committed by the army personnel under the carpet” and that the medical evidence pointed towards gang rape. Following the abrogation of Article 370, the State Human Rights Commission itself ceased to exist, while the compensation proceedings remain pending before the Supreme Court and the criminal proceedings continue to languish without final adjudication. Reporter The Outlook.

The litigation in Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) continues as a court-monitored process nearly a decade after the Supreme Court’s landmark rulings. Thangjam Manorama Devi’s case, despite forensic evidence suggestive of sexual assault and repeated judicial scrutiny, has similarly failed to result in criminal prosecution. In these cases justice has been deferred through prolonged litigation, jurisdictional objections, repeated appeals, and institutional inaction. The consequence is much the same that is the promise of accountability remains suspended indefinitely.

According to Rishika Arora and Iyina Grover, there is a requirement for a new protocol for protecting the women in an armed conflict. Women’s participation in the drafting of future laws and their appointment as judicial officers in army tribunals are essential steps. The concept of the court martial must be women-oriented.

The Justice Verma Committee recommendations are as follows:

1.  Sexual violence against women by members of the armed forces or uniformed personnel must be brought under the purview of ordinary criminal law;
2. Special care must also be taken to ensure the safety of women who are complainants and witnesses in cases of sexual assault by armed personnel;
3. There should be special commissioners – who are either judicially or legislatively appointed – for women’s safety and security in all areas of conflict in the country. These commissioners must be chosen from those who have experience with women’s issues, preferably in conflict areas. In addition, such commissioners must be vested with adequate powers to monitor and initiate action for redress and criminal prosecution in all cases of sexual violence against women by armed personnel;
4. Care must be taken to ensure the safety and security of women detainees in police stations, and women at army or paramilitary check points, and this should be a subject under the regular monitoring of the special commissioners mentioned earlier;
5. The general law relating to detention of women during specified hours of the day must be strictly followed;
6. Training and monitoring of armed personnel must be reoriented to include and emphasize strict observance by the armed personnel of all orders issued in this behalf;
7. There is an imminent need to review the continuance of AFSPA and AFSPA-like legal protocols in internal conflict areas as soon as possible. This is necessary for determining the propriety of resorting to this legislation in the area(s) concerned; and
8. Jurisdictional issues must be resolved immediately and simple procedural protocols put in place to avoid situations where police refuse or refrain from registering cases against paramilitary personnel.

Those recommendations remain unimplemented.

The Supreme Court has already suggested that AFSPA’s protection is limited to acts conducted in the line of duty, and that offences such as rape and murder are ordinary crimes that do not require special courts. The incorporation of these suggestions remains awaited because the nation will not fully deliver on its constitutional promise until its laws place all citizens, including those in its border areas and conflict zones, on an equal footing before justice.

“The primary task of the armed forces of the Union is to defend the country in the event of war or when it is face with external aggression. Their training and orientation defeat the hostile forces. A situation of internal disturbance involving the local population requires a different approach. Involvement of armed forces is handling such a situation brings them in confrontation with their countrymen. Prolonged or too frequent deployment of armed forces for handling such situations is likely to generate a feeling of alienation among the people against the armed forces who by their sacrifices in the defence of their country have earned a place in the hearts of the people,” said the Court in  Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights in 1997.

Nearly three decades later, that warning remains as relevant as ever.  The Mizoram conviction in the 2017 case is still, in this landscape, a welcome anomaly even though it took the Court nine years to reach a decision because it shows what the system is capable of.  The guarantee that every woman in a conflict area who files a complaint will have her case heard by a court that is independent of the institution she is accusing is perhaps the minimum that the Constitution already promises and what the Mizoram court, in its judgment of June 2026, briefly delivered.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this judgement primer has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

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The post Promising Principles Poor Outcomes: What the judicial record on security force accountability actually shows appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The statement has elaborated on the provisions of international humanitarian law that recognises that even in times of war, humanity must prevail, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols grant special protection to hospitals, ambulances, medical personnel, and rescue workers, recognising that those who dedicate their lives to saving others must never become targets of armed conflict. These fundamental and noble principles have been repeatedly and systematically violated by Israel, the occupying Power, says the statement.

“The destruction of healthcare infrastructure has reached catastrophic proportions. Hospitals have been bombed, besieged, and rendered inoperable. Ambulances have been attacked while attempting to rescue the wounded. Doctors, nurses, and paramedics have been killed, injured, or detained while performing their humanitarian duties.

“As of today, only 19 of Gaza’s 34 hospitals remain partially operational, operating under impossible conditions, while severe shortages of medicines, medical equipment, fuel, electricity, and clean water continue to push the healthcare system toward total collapse. In the occupied West Bank, repeated military incursions, restrictions on movement, and shortages of essential medicines have severely disrupted healthcare delivery, with approximately 11,000 surgical procedures reportedly postponed, placing thousands of patients’ lives at further risk.

“This humanitarian catastrophe is not an inevitable consequence of war; it is the result of Israel’s systematic dismantling of the Palestinian healthcare system upon which millions of Palestinian civilians depend for their survival.

“The world witnessed the tragic fate of six-year-old Hind Rajab, who was targeted by the Israeli army after remaining trapped for hours. The Palestine Red Crescent ambulance sent to rescue her, despite prior coordination with Israeli authorities, was also attacked, killing the two paramedics. A recent United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry found reasonable grounds to believe that Israeli forces deliberately targeted both the family vehicle and the ambulance.

“Similarly, on March 23, 2025, the international community watched in horror as video evidence emerged documenting the Israeli killing of Palestinian rescue workers in Rafah while carrying out their humanitarian mission. These were not isolated tragedies, but part of a systematic pattern documented by the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and numerous international humanitarian organizations, and they represent only the tip of the iceberg.

“Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya, Director of Kamal Adwan Hospital and a respected paediatrician, has become the face of the resilience and humanitarian commitment of Palestinian healthcare workers. As northern Gaza’s healthcare system collapsed under repeated military assaults and siege, he chose to remain with his patients, refusing to abandon those who depended on his care.

“His personal sacrifice became even more profound when he lost his own son, Ibrahim, who was killed during the assault on Kamal Adwan Hospital. Despite this devastating personal tragedy, Dr. Abu Safiya returned almost immediately to caring for his patients, embodying the highest ideals of the medical profession.

“On December 27, 2024, following the assault on Kamal Adwan Hospital-the last functioning hospital in northern Gaza-Israeli forces detained Dr. Abu Safiya, together with members of the medical staff and patients, under Israel’s Unlawful Combatants Law. Since then, he has remained in Israeli detention. His continued detention has become a matter of grave international concern.

“Yesterday, July 8, 2026, United Nations Special Rapporteurs and independent human rights experts called for Dr. Abu Safiya’s immediate release, expressing serious concern over credible reports that he has been subjected to torture, other forms of ill-treatment, prolonged solitary confinement, denial of adequate medical care, and a severe deterioration in both his physical and psychological condition. The experts further emphasized that his detention appears to be arbitrary and urged his immediate release unless internationally recognized criminal charges are promptly brought against him.”

It is in light of these dire and precarious circumstances that the Palestinian embassy has issued the statement and appeal. The appeal calls on all Indians to support and join the call for the immediate and unconditional release of Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya; advocating for the protection of Palestinian healthcare workers, hospitals, ambulances, and medical facilities in accordance with international humanitarian law; supporting independent international investigations and accountability for attacks against medical personnel and healthcare infrastructure; and backing urgent international efforts to restore and strengthen the Palestinian healthcare system while ensuring the unhindered delivery of essential medical supplies and humanitarian assistance.

The continued detention of Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya is not merely the case of one physician. It symbolizes the broader assault on the Palestinian healthcare system and the humanitarian principles that underpin international law. Wider support can make a meaningful difference in defending these universal values.

Related:

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Illegality of the Israeli Occupation of Palestine

The post The arbitrary detention of Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya: A call for justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Despite a sewer, death happening every 45 hours in the country, shameless governments have chosen to remain in criminal silence. Needless to say, Dalit lives don’t matter for government and they have been turned into a new normal. How widespread this practice is can be understood by this simple fact that this year sewer and septic tank deaths have been reported from 16 states across the. Increase in number of deaths in sewers and septic tanks have been alarming over the last decade. While in 2016 only 39 deaths were reported, this figure jumped by 350% next year in 2017 to a staggering 137 deaths.

After various Supreme Court Judgments and the subsequent passage of the ‘Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act’, 2013, one would have expected the governments to be proactive. However, SKA has documented 1726 deaths since the new act came into force. Among them 1203 deaths came just from seven states—Tamil Nadu (332), Gujarat (216), Delhi-NCR (157), Maharashtra (155), Uttar Pradesh (148), Haryana (104) and Bihar (91). Despite such high numbers, none of these states have taken even a single step to stop these deaths.

NAMASTE (National Action for Mechanised Sanitation Ecosystem) scheme was launched by the Modi government in July 2023. The scheme had an allocation of Rs. 349.73 Cr though for building toilets. While, under Swachh Bharat scheme, government had already spent Rs 19 thousand Cr for building 12 Cr toilets. However, neither was the sanitation ecosystem mechanised, nor were dry toilets completely eliminated.

Ironically and unfortunately, all these years ministers in the Modi government kept denying these sordid facts in Parliament, stating, shockingly, that there were no deaths in the country due to Manual Scavenging. Clearly, the act meant or means nothing for them. It also shows, how much government values the lives of Safai Karmacharis, who are still considered to be untouchables.

The SKA has demanded that the Prime Minister intervenes immediately to announce a complete full stop to deaths inside sewers and septic tanks. The press release has been issued by Bezwada Wilson, National Convenor, SKA.

Related:

58 reported deaths in Gujarat in last 5 years: Union Govt data reveals deaths due to cleaning of sewers and septic tanks

Continuing deaths of sewer workers reveals a cynical culture of impunity

941 deaths while cleaning sewers, septic tanks: Centre informs Rajya Sabha

The post Though sewer deaths have crossed the 100 mark this year, government is silent: SKA appeared first on SabrangIndia.