This matters deeply.

For years, those of us who have spoken out against Hindutva have been told that we are overreacting, being divisive, or unfairly naming an ideology and its institutions. But what communities on the ground, journalists, scholars, and human rights advocates have documented again and again is that the assault on religious freedom in India is not random. It is not marginal. It is not merely the work of a few extremists acting alone. It is structural, ideological, and sustained. USCIRF’s naming of the RSS makes clear that this reality can no longer be dismissed as rhetorical excess or partisan framing.

The RSS is not a fringe body. It is one of the central engines of Hindu nationalist ideology and organizing in India. Its influence has helped shape a political climate in which Muslims, Christians, Dalits, Adivasis, Sikhs, and dissenters of many kinds face deepening exclusion, fear, and vulnerability. When a U.S. government body focused on religious freedom calls for sanctions on the RSS by name, it is acknowledging something many have paid a high price to say aloud: that religious freedom violations in India are being enabled and normalized by powerful institutions, not just individual bad actors.

It is important to be precise. USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan advisory body; its recommendations are not automatic policy. But that does not make this symbolic or disposable. These reports shape policy conversations, public understanding, and the terms of international scrutiny. The fact that USCIRF now recommends targeted sanctions on the RSS marks a new threshold in how the crisis in India is being recognized.

There is also a deeper moral truth here. Religious freedom is too often invoked selectively, stripped of context, or reduced to a talking point. But religious freedom means very little if it does not include the courage to name systems that terrorize minorities while wrapping themselves in the language of tradition, nation, and civilization. What is at stake in India is not simply abstract pluralism. It is whether people can live, worship, organize, speak, love, and dissent without fear. It is whether democracy can survive the steady sanctification of exclusion.

For those committed to a liberatory, plural, and ethical vision of Hinduism, this moment should not be read as an attack on Hindus. It is a warning about the consequences of allowing Hindu identity to be captured by supremacist politics. Hindutva does not speak for all Hindus, and the RSS does not represent the only possible Hindu public life. Many of us have spent years insisting that a faith rooted in dignity, interdependence, and moral courage must stand against domination, not sanctify it.

USCIRF’s recommendation does not deliver justice on its own. But it does mark something important: a widening refusal to look away. It tells us that the stories communities have carried, the abuses people have risked so much to document, and the warnings advocates have repeated for years are breaking through denial.

Now the real question is whether policymakers will act, whether media will take this seriously, and whether international civil society will finally reckon with the scale of what religious minorities and democracy defenders in India have been facing.

This should not pass quietly. It should be read, shared, and understood for what it is: a major acknowledgment that the machinery of religious freedom violations in India includes powerful institutions that must be named and challenged.

Read the report here:https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2026-03/USCIRF_2026_AR_3326_NEW.pdf

Related:

USCIRF signals alarm in India’s ‘Increased Transnational Targeting’ of religious minorities 

Umar Khalid’s incarceration: USCIRF Commissioner expresses concern over use of anti-terrorism laws to silence activists

USCIRF recommends India be designated Country of Particular Concern for third straight year!

The post USCIRF’s Call for Sanctions on the RSS Is a Major Moral and Political Marker appeared first on SabrangIndia.

– Poem by Amir Aziz

It is increasingly evident that Muslims in India are being robbed of their legitimate space and place within a nation that was once imagined as their collective constitutional dream. A vast majority chose to stay back in India after the 1947 bloody Partition, believing in existential roots, lived coexistence and constitutional equality. There have been riots and communal clashes in past decades post-Independence, but rarely was their very belonging to the nation so openly questioned and at grave risk. Rarely was their loyalty publicly doubted, their religion brazenly mocked.

It was uncommon for a sitting Chief Minister to pull a woman’s headscarf[1] simply because of her cultural choice, she donned a headscarf. It was unheard of for a Chief Minister to post violent and provocative imagery (video) depicting him shooting at Muslims[2]! What once manifested as communal ‘push and pull’ now appears to have been hardened and legitimised into something more systemic, an institutionalised propagation of directed othering, hatred and violence. 

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the persons propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

Accidental to Institutional

 This messaging is not confined to political speeches only. It is reinforced through ‘mainstream’ cinema; films marketed as if “based on real events,” filled with questionable, even repulsive and inflammatory depictions that amplify suspicion and hostility towards the Muslim. These narratives shape public imagination. In one disturbing instance, children living on the streets of South Mumbai were heard using hateful language against Muslims. When asked where such sentiments originated, they reportedly said that “aunts and uncles” take them to watch films, one of the few outings they can afford, as their parents earn meagre incomes selling roses on Marine Drive. Hatred, it seems, is being curated and consumed.

Policy, too, reflects this exclusion. Measures such as the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise—executed by the Election Commission of India (ECI) though this has been strongly legally contested—have clearly resulted in the disproportionate removal of Muslim names from electoral rolls, raising concerns about potential disenfranchisement. Legislative developments have added to these anxieties. Under the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 (CAA), which came into force last year, members of specified persecuted minorities from neighbouring countries who entered India on or before 31 December 2014 were made eligible for Indian citizenship. Muslims were excluded from this framework. Not only has the Supreme Court of India kept the substantive legal challenges to this much criticised amendment (CAA 2019) in cold storage, the court will only now hear the batch of 250 petitions in early May 2026 (May 5-7, 2026).[3]

More recently, an order issued under the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025 extended relief to individuals particularly Hindus from Pakistan, who crossed into India after 2014, with officials stating that the cut-off has effectively been expanded by a decade due to the continued cross-border migration of persecuted minorities. This privileges one community over others in fast-tracked citizenship.

Taken together, these measures have intensified debate over whether citizenship policy is being recalibrated along religious lines, especially when viewed alongside voter roll revisions and public rhetoric framing Muslims as “infiltrators.”

‘Torching’ the lawn

Attempts by Hindutva affiliates to enter Masjids, incidents of mob lynching targeting Muslim vendors, mobs stopping individuals to demand proof of nationality, these have become disturbingly common. In Varanasi, “Operation Torch” was launched to identify so-called illegal migrants.

The forcible closure of Muslim-owned businesses under varying pretexts points toward the economic marginalisation of a community already made vulnerable. The cumulative effect suggests a systematic relegation of Muslims to second-class citizenship within their own country.

On the frontline of this targeting –in 2025-206 at least –are Bengali Muslim migrants—often daily wage labourers, domestic workers, and small vendors struggling for survival.

Direct Violence

“I am very poor, and my family is deeply worried about our future. Why did they beat me? I never forced anyone to buy my food.”

— Riyajul Sheikh, Food vendor from West Bengal

“I am a poor man. I earn a living for my family by selling utensils. After this incident, how will I go out and work?”

— Akmal Hussain, assaulted in Bihar in January 2026

On May 24, 2025, in Aligarh, four Muslim men Arbaz, Aqeel, Kadim, and Munna Khan, were brutally attacked by a mob of cow vigilantes over allegations of beef smuggling. The assailants set their vehicle on fire, blocked a highway, and assaulted them with sharp weapons, bricks, and sticks. One unconscious victim was seen being dragged from a police vehicle. This was reportedly the second attack on the same group at the same location within 15 days, suggesting targeted violence. A forensic report from a government laboratory in Mathura later confirmed that the meat was not beef, debunking the allegations. Police arrested four individuals under provisions of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita for rioting, attempt to murder, extortion, and dacoity.

Riyajul (December 2025) was beaten by a mob and his goods were destroyed. He sells patties by walking through the streets of Kolkata. In one such incident from West Bengal, he was allegedly asked whether he had chicken patties in his box. When he replied in the affirmative, the assault began. When they heard his name, the violence intensified as reported by The Wire. It seems that, for many, the only fault is being Muslim. Such initiative feeds into a larger narrative of suspicion.

Source: Maktoob Media

Didar Hossain, a rickshaw puller from Agartala, was assaulted by a mob that attempted to burn him alive. He was robbed of his entire day’s earnings and severely beaten.

On December 22, in Basti, Uttar Pradesh, Akhilesh Singh, a leader of the Vishva Hindu Mahasangh, along with members of the group, harassed and threatened a Muslim chicken vendor for operating his shop near a temple. He described the butcher’s knives as “weapons” that could be used to kill people and threatened to file a police complaint for possessing them.

On December 30, in Madhubani, Bihar, approximately 40–50 Hindu nationalist supporters brutally assaulted and paraded a Muslim construction worker. He was falsely branded a Bangladeshi and forced to chant “Jai Shri Ram” and “Bharat Mata ki Jai.” The attackers allegedly threatened to sacrifice him at a Kali temple. Each incident may appear geographically scattered in Odisha, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Tripura but the pattern is chillingly consistent.  The slogans are the same. The accusations are similar. The humiliation is public. The violence is performative. And the message is unmistakable: belonging is conditional.

On January 7, 2026, in Jharkhand, a 45-year-old Muslim man was killed by a mob after being accused of cattle theft.

On January 1, 2026, in Bhonkhera, Sikandrabad, Uttar Pradesh, threats were reportedly left inside the homes of Muslim residents in the region, creating an atmosphere of fear at the very threshold of their private spaces.

On January 14, 2026 in Sahada, Balasore, Odisha, cow vigilantes lynched Sheikh Makandar Mohammed, a 35-year-old Muslim helper on a pickup van. He was repeatedly forced to chant “Jai Shri Ram” and “Cow is my mother.” Police later took him to the hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries.

On January 22, 2026, a Bengali Muslim vendor from West Bengal was brutally beaten in Odisha by right-wing extremists who accused him of being a Bangladeshi infiltrator. A similar instance occurred the very next day, another Muslim vendor from Birbhum district, West Bengal, was allegedly forced to produce his Aadhaar card, made to chant religious slogans, and threatened with death if he did not leave Odisha.

Such attacks and atrocities have increasingly been framed as expressions of “patriotism.”

According to Akmal Hussain assaulted in Bihar, January 22 2026 (quoted above) the incident began when a woman showed interest in buying utensils and asked him to come near her home. When he arrived, a man confronted him, called him a Bangladeshi, and demanded identity documents. As he attempted to retrieve his phone, a crowd gathered and began assaulting him. He sustained injuries to his head, arms, and legs. Following the attack, he left the city and returned to his hometown in Hooghly, deeply traumatised.

These are not isolated events. There have been multiple incidents of Muslims being beaten to death and forced to chant slogans such as “Jai Shri Ram” and “Gai humari mata hai” before, during, or after being assaulted.

Institutions of prejudice

The University of Delhi found itself at the centre of controversy after its undergraduate admission form listed inappropriate caste-related entries in the “mother tongue” section. Instead of languages such as Urdu, Maithili, Bhojpuri and Magahi, the form reportedly included terms such as Cham***Mazdoor, Dehati, Mochi, Kurmi, Muslim and Bihari, as reported by The Wire and Hindustan Times.

The inclusion of “Muslim” as a language and the removal of Urdu triggered outrage on social media. Bengali was also allegedly absent. The episode raised concerns about institutional insensitivity and the normalisation of caste and religious stereotyping within academic processes.

Meanwhile, in Jammu and Kashmir, educational spaces became a communal flashpoint.

On January 6, hundreds of police and paramilitary personnel were deployed outside the Civil Secretariat in Jammu to prevent protests by a BJP-backed outfit opposing what it called a “biased” reservation system at the SMVD Institute of Medical Excellence in Reasi district.

The protest, led by the youth wing of the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi (SMVD) Sangharsh Samiti and supported by Hindu right-wing groups, centred on the admission of Muslim and other non-Hindu students. Protesters demanded cancellation of their admissions or closure of the college.

“The presence of non-Hindus on the campus and their style of eating and worship is bound to hurt the sentiments of Hindus… The government should cancel their admission or shut down the college,” a protester stated as reported by The Wire.

The agitation is expected to intensify ahead of the J&K Assembly’s winter session beginning February 2. Colonel Sukhvir Singh Mankotia announced a ‘Sanatan Jagran Yatra’, a hunger strike, a signature campaign, and demonstrations on January 8 and January 10, warning of a shutdown across the Jammu division.

The Chief Minister maintained that the college, established through an Act of the J&K Assembly, does not restrict admissions on religious grounds. However, BJP Leader of the Opposition Sunil Sharma stated that only students “who have faith in Mata Vaishno Devi” should be admitted.

All 50 students were admitted on the basis of NEET rankings. The controversy erupted after only eight Hindu students appeared in the first batch, with the remaining 42 being Muslims from the Kashmir Valley. The issue was allowed to take a sharply communal turn, with right-wing affiliates raising slogans demanding the expulsion of non-Hindu students. Following the outrage countrywide and also by the ruling party and opposition in Kashmir and Jammu, on January 26 this year, the Jammu and Kashmir Board of Professional Entrance Examination (BOPEE) was compelled to “adjust” these 50 excluded students in seven government-run medical colleges across J&K based on NEET-UG merit and their preferences. Read more here

At Jamia Millia Islamia, another controversy unfolded. On December 23, 2025 when the university suspended Professor Virendra Balaji Shahare of the Department of Social Work over a question in an end-semester examination paper titled Social Problems in India, set for BA (Honours) Social Work, Semester I, 2025–26. The query attempted a discussion on the plight of the Muslim minority in India (see below).

Source: The Wire

Algorithm for and by Hate

Elected officials, sitting in constitutional positions directing hate. This has been a singular feature of the past close to a dozen years and 2025 and early 2026 were no exception.

A video circulated by the Assam BJP in 2025 intensified concerns about the normalisation of dehumanising rhetoric in mainstream politics and even more specifically within law enforcement.

Source ; The Wire, X deleted video

The footage appeared to show Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma handling an air rifle, interspersed with AI-generated visuals depicting bullets striking images of men wearing skull caps and beards widely recognised as markers of Muslim identity. The clip portrayed Sarma as a Western-film hero, overlaid with the slogan “foreigner free Assam” and captioned “point blank shot.” Reports stated that Assamese text in the video included phrases such as “no mercy,” “Why did you not go to Pakistan?” and “There is no forgiveness to Bangladeshis.”

The imagery echoed Sarma’s earlier public remarks. On January 25, during a press conference, he declared: “Only ‘Miyas’ are evicted in Assam. Which Hindu has got notice? Which Assamese Muslim has got notice? We will do some utpaat [mischief], but within the ambit of law.” On January 27, he said: “This Special Revision is preliminary. When the SIR comes to Assam, four to five lakh Miya votes will have to be deleted in Assam.” A day later, he added: “Whoever can give trouble [to Miyas] should. If a rickshaw fare is Rs.5, give them Rs.4. Only if they face troubles will they leave Assam. Himanta Biswa Sarma and the BJP are directly against Miyas.” He has earlier stated that his job was to “make the Miya people suffer.”

Multiple petitions were subsequently filed before the Gauhati High Court seeking action against Sarma for alleged hate speeches targeting Muslims in the state. On Thursday, a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Arun Dev Choudhury issued notices to the Chief Minister, the Central government and the Assam government. The matter is scheduled for hearing on April 21.

The petitions were filed by the Indian National Congress, Assamese scholar Hiren Gohain and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), after the Supreme Court advised them to approach the High Court. Senior advocates including Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Chander Uday Singh and Meenakshi Arora argued that Sarma’s remarks were provocative and threatening, particularly his references to the “miya” community , a term often used in Assam as a pejorative for Bengali-speaking or Bengali-origin Muslims, though the Chief Minister has described it as referring to “illegal immigrants.” The rhetoric has not been confined to one state.

BJP MLA Nitesh Rane posted a tweet on August 5, 2025 asking: if Hindus were being attacked in Bangladesh, why should Indians spare a single Bangladeshi in their country? He added that they would hunt down and kill every Bangladeshi living in India. The tweet was later deleted after controversy.

In January 2024, during the Ram Mandir Pran Pratishtha procession in Mira Road, Mumbai, amid communal tensions, Rane made a similar incendiary statement threatening to hunt down individuals. Hate speeches by senior BJP leaders, including Devendra Fadnavis and others, have also drawn criticism, with opposition parties and rights groups alleging a pattern of majoritarian mobilisation. Concerns have extended beyond the executive to the judiciary.

On December 8, 2024, a year before at a lecture on the Uniform Civil Code in Prayagraj organised by the Vishva Hindu Parishad, Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav of the Allahabad High Court made remarks widely criticised as Islamophobic. Among other statements, he said: “My country is one where the cow, the Gita, and the Ganga form the culture, where every idol embodies Harbala Devi, and where every child is like Ram.” He added: “Here, from childhood, children are guided towards god, taught Vedic mantras, and told about non-violence. But in your culture, from a young age, children are exposed to the slaughter of animals. How can you expect them to be tolerant and compassionate?”

Justice Yadav also used the term ‘kathmullah’, a slur used against Muslims, and stated that “this country and law will function as per the wishes of the majority.” Lawyers’ bodies renewed calls for an in-house inquiry into his remarks.

Stark and questionable has it been that the higher constitutional courts have taken no action against Justice Yadav for this.

But what does the data reveal?

Parallel to this rhetoric, data-driven reports corroborate these patterns of violence.

In November 2025, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom released an India-specific issue update describing what it termed systemic religious persecution. The report cited the “interconnected relationship” between the Bharatiya Janata Party and the RSS, linking it to citizenship, anti-conversion and cow slaughter laws. It noted that hundreds of Christians and Muslims have been arrested under anti-conversion laws, with 70% of India’s inmates being pre-trial detainees and religious minorities disproportionately represented. In its 2025 Annual Report, USCIRF recommended that the U.S. Department of State designate India as a Country of Particular Concern, or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations.

According to a CSSS report, released in early February 2026, mob violence against Muslims formed a significant category of harm in 2025. Fourteen lynching incidents were reported during the year, resulting in eight recorded deaths. These cases were often linked to allegations of cattle-related offences, suspicions of illegal immigration, and claims of “love jihad,” with some incidents reportedly involving forced religious slogans.

Among the cases cited were the killing of migrant worker Juel Sheikh in Sambalpur, Odisha; multiple lynching incidents in Bihar’s Nawada district; deaths linked to cattle theft accusations in Jharkhand; killings in Maharashtra, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh; an attack on a Muslim migrant in Kerala; and a case involving a student subjected to slurs in Dehradun. Reported by NDTV.

A separate analysis by India Hate Lab recorded 1,318 hate speech incidents in 2025, of which 98 per cent were stated to have targeted Muslims. These reportedly occurred at public rallies, religious gatherings, street events and across social media platforms. Human rights workers quoted in the study argued that such rhetoric had become routine, creating an atmosphere of insecurity despite constitutional guarantees of equal protection.

The CSSS report further raised concerns regarding uneven policing and prosecution, asserting that action appeared swifter in cases involving Hindu victims, while Muslims faced disproportionate arrests or police scrutiny. It also alleged that post-riot narratives sometimes attributed responsibility to Muslims without publicly available evidence.

The study concluded that the violence extended beyond physical attacks to what it described as heightened assertion of majoritarian cultural identity through religious symbols and festivals, alongside marginalisation of Muslim cultural expression. It stated that the cumulative effect was increased impunity for vigilante groups and a deepening sense of insecurity among Muslim citizens.

CSSS noted that its findings were based on monitoring national and regional publications including The Indian Express, The Hindu, The Times of India, Sahafat and Inquilab. Read more on this here.

Conclusion

In a recently released report by Human Rights Watch in February 2026, it was stated that,

“India’s slide to authoritarianism under the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – led government continued, with increased vilification of Muslims and government critics. Authorities illegally expelled hundreds of Bengali-speaking Muslims and Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh, some Indian citizens among them, claiming they were “illegal immigrants.” [page no. 215 ]

The demolition of homes belonging to poor, underpaid and hardworking people has become a recurring image of this moment. The victims, in most cases, are among the most economically vulnerable Muslim families. Hindu extremist groups, critics argue, have increasingly operated with overt or tacit support from segments of the government, administration and, in some instances, judicial authority, a development they attribute to the ideological leanings of the Modi government.

At the same time, India’s deepening political ties with Netanyahu’s Israel invoked here specifically as Netanyahu’s Israel to acknowledge that many Israelis oppose the policies of his regime are seen by some observers as reflective of a broader hardening of majoritarian statecraft.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has warned of a “well-thought-out conspiracy” to alter India’s population composition, referring to “these infiltrators.” Such language, when deployed by the country’s highest elected office, carries consequences. It reinforces the framing of a section of Indian citizens not as equal stakeholders in the republic, but as demographic threats.

When eviction drives, voter roll deletions, hate speeches, vigilante violence and institutional silences converge, they create not just isolated incidents but an atmosphere.

The question that inevitably arises is not only legal or political, but existential: What does it feel like to be a Muslim in Modi’s India?

For many, the answer lies in the steady normalisation of suspicion in the knowledge that citizenship can be questioned, belonging debated, and dignity negotiated.

And that, perhaps, is the deeper crisis beneath the data.

[During the research of this article an overwhelming number of incidents were found, it was difficult to cut down and mention a few. That in itself shows the horrendous state of minorities in our country.]

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Natasha Darade)

[1] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/12/india-chief-ministers-removal-of-womans-hijab-demands-unequivocal-condemnation/

[2] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DUiu9zZin8u/; https://scroll.in/latest/1090625/himanta-sarmas-shooting-at-muslims-video-left-parties-move-supreme-court

[3] https://www.scobserver.in/reports/citizenship-amendment-act-supreme-court-schedules-final-hearings-in-may-2026/; https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-to-hear-caa-petitions-from-may-5/article70651374.ece

Related

India Hate Lab Report 2025: How Hate Speech has been normalised in the public sphere | CJP

CJP 2025: a constitutional vanguard against hate and coercion during elections | SabrangIndia

The post Evicted, Accused, and Deleted: The shrinking space for Muslim citizenship appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In this written reply to the state Assembly, the Chief Minister also detailed that the highest number of cases of communal riots, 24, were reported in Balasore district, followed by 16 cases in Khurda district, which includes the state capital Bhubaneswar.

Absent in the Chief Minister’s reply, was any mention or reference to the communal clash that occurred in Cuttack during Durga Puja immersion and thereafter. In October 2025, in an incident that had few precedents in the city, Cuttack saw a curfew for around three days following communal violence that started with a clash during Durga Puja immersion. Days later, members of the VHP clashed with police and indulged in vandalism and arson.

The discussions saw stormy repartees in the State Assembly as Opposition parties targeted the government, alleging a sharp increase in cases of hate crimes and communal clashes. The Chief Minister defended his administration saying that steps are being taken to coordinate with different communities through peace committees under various police stations and through the local administration.

In the past 20 months, half a dozen towns in Odisha have seen imposition of curfew and Internet suspension over communal incidents, including the lynching of Bengali-speaking Muslims. In most cases, the accused have been members of right-wing outfits. Officials conceded that some cases may have gone unreported, especially when victims are daily wagers hesitant to approach police.

The Opposition has criticised the government over the alleged spread of “communal tension” in the state, where the BJP formed its first solo government in June 2024.

The National Crime Records Bureau puts the number of communal or religion-based incidents in Odisha at 10 in 2021, 44 in 2023 (pre-election year), and 15 in 2025. Data shared by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs in Parliament said that Odisha saw nine communal incidents in 2018 and zero in 2019.

Citizens for Justice and Peace has consistently reported on this spiral in targeted violence in the state over the past 18 months. This report detailed the humiliation and attack on a pastor in Dhenkaal district in early January 2026. The irregular detentions of migrant workers, Bengali, in the state were also questioned by the Court. Worse, was the systemic and consistent attacks on churches and vendors (daily wage earners) selling Christmas goods across Odisha, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh in late December 2025.

Related:

Publicly Tortured, Forced to Eat Cow Dung: No arrests in Odisha Pastor assault case

Odisha: Man forced to chant religious slogan, lynched by cow vigilantes

MP, Odisha, Delhi, Rajasthan: Right-wing outfits barge into 2 churches ahead of Christmas, attack vendors selling X’mas goodies, tensions run high

The post Odisha: 18 months, 54 incidents of communal hate crimes, 7 mob lynchings appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The media reported that Indian captain Surya Kumar Yadav, head coach Gautam Gambhir, and ICC Chairman Jay Shah visited a Hanuman temple in Ahmedabad soon after the victory celebrations. News agency ANI posted a short video on Twitter in which the skipper is seen entering the temple while holding the trophy.

Surya, along with Gambhir and Shah, went to the temple and offered prayers. The foreheads of Surya and Shah were marked with a tika (a vermilion mark), which Hindu devotees usually apply on their foreheads while visiting a temple. They also received prasad (blessed food) after offering their prayers.

Do Hindus not have the right to visit a temple? If they do, then why am I raising an issue about it? Let me clarify that I am not asking Hindus, Muslims, or people of any faith to give up their religious beliefs. Nor am I suggesting that one should not visit temples or mosques, or refrain from performing religious rituals. In fact, I have often accompanied my family members to temples and even purchased flowers and prasad for them. Just as I have respected their faith, they have never imposed their particular ways of performing rituals upon me. Should not an individual be left alone to reflect on questions of faith?

As a student of political science, I am aware that religious freedom lies at the core of the Indian Constitution. Citizens are free to profess any religion of their choice. The state has no business interfering in the personal beliefs of an individual. The freedom to practise a religion of one’s choice, to give it up and embrace another faith, or not to practise any religion at all, is guaranteed under the Fundamental Rights.

Going by these constitutional provisions, one may argue that Surya, Shah and Gambhir went to the temple as part of their personal faith. Therefore, I may be accused of finding fault with them and, by doing so, revealing my “Hindu-phobic” mind-set.

In my defence, I would first state that criticising the mixing of religion and politics is not an act of being a “Hindu-phobic”. My argument here is not to oppose any religion—be it Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc.—but to highlight the threat that religious nationalism and majoritarianism pose to a democratic polity.

Majoritarian politics often hides itself under the garb of nationalism, religiosity, and popular culture. The shrewdness of right-wing leaders lies in their ability to promote religious nationalism through sports, festivals, songs, films, and public celebrations. None other than Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the messiah of the downtrodden and the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution of India, cautioned the people against the danger of religious nationalism when he said: “If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, no doubt, be the greatest calamity for this country.”

When cricket, the most popular sport among more than a billion Indians, is used as a tool to promote religious nationalism, one has to take it very seriously. If Surya, Gambhir, and Shah had visited the Hanuman Temple as devotees of Hanuman, they would have gone there simply as devotees and not as celebrities. There would have been no triumphal images been circulated. The difference between ordinary devotees visiting a religious place and celebrities rushing to a temple is significant. Devotees keep their faith at a personal level. Celebrities, however, often perform such acts in the presence of cameras and PR teams, turning a private expression of faith into a public spectacle.

While devotees perform religious rituals as part of their faith and sincerely believe in what they do, celebrities often visit religious places to serve their political interests. They know very well that their interests are best served if they publicly display their acts of performing pooja. Politicians, a smart group among celebrities, often begin their electoral campaigns by visiting temples. They also ensure that their visits to temples are circulated to every household through news stories, photographs, videos, and other media.

In a representative democracy, where governments are often formed through majority votes, there is a strong tendency among politicians to equate the majority religion with the “national” one and even with a “way of life”. In contrast, even a minor display of the religious or cultural symbols of minority communities is often demonised as the rise of “fundamentalism”. Even those who work for the human rights of minorities and show solidarity with their culture—often suppressed under the weight of majoritarianism—are branded as “anti-Hindu.

That is why, there is a strong case to argue that the temple visit of Indian captain, coach and ICC chairman is not simply a matter of personal faith. In fact, it is a case of using popular sport indirectly to reinforce the politics of religious majoritarianism. Since cricketers are one of the biggest icons for the youth of the country, their visit to temple and the viral video afterwards seemed to be carefully planned to equate the national cricket team of secular and democratic republic with “Hindu” India.

The temple visit incident should also not be seen as an isolated event. Over the years, the process of mixing religion and cricket has intensified. Some cricket fans who go to the stadium to cheer for Team India often chant aggressive nationalist slogans and display overt religious symbols. Some of them even pass inappropriate comments on the supporters of the opposing team and sometimes get into fights with them.

Even TV commentators, particularly those in the vernacular broadcasts, frequently use highly jingoistic and sometimes misogynistic idioms. It is beyond comprehension why English commentary tends to remain relatively measured, while vernacular commentaries often turn into acts of shouting and whipping up passion. Worse still, social media influencers, as well as some former cricketers-turned-commentators, do not miss an opportunity to indulge in Pakistan-bashing. While their criticism may be directed at “the poor performance” of Pakistani cricket, their choice of words and tone often ends up feeding communal polarisation.

A quick look at the official jersey of the Indian cricket team reveals the prominent use of the colour, saffron. Is this selection arbitrary, or is it part of a careful design? As a cricket fan, I remember the older Indian jerseys where the tricolour was prominently represented on the T-shirt. Should this shift in the choice of colour be seen as merely random, or does it reflect a deliberate change—and perhaps even a shift in the political equation?

These trends are dangerous at least for two reasons.

First, the instrumental use of cricket to promote religious nationalism has the potential to weaken national unity. We should never forget that the Indian team as well as Indian supporters do not belong to one religion. Those who believe that the temple visit by the Indian captain, coach, and ICC chairman is a normal act should also reflect on how such gestures appear to millions of citizens who belong to different faiths.

Those who think that Surya’s visit to the temple is a “normal” matter should also ask themselves whether they would consider it equally normal if, instead of Surya, a Muslim cricketer had been the captain of India and, after winning the match, had gone straight to a mosque with the trophy and the video of it had gone viral.

Pakistani cricketers are often seen invoking religious expressions while speaking to commentators before or after a match. However, the example of Pakistan may not be appropriate for India, as our Constitution envisions a secular polity. In a multicultural society like India, the state itself has no religion, nor should public institutions be used to promote any particular faith.

Indian cricket is watched by millions of people, and the cricket board should ensure that it maintains the image of a secular institution and remains free from political pressure. As the Chairman of the ICC, Jay Shah carries the hopes of cricket fans around the world. They expect him to work for the promotion of cricket globally and to allow the BCCI to independently carry out the responsibility of managing Indian cricket.

(The author is has recently published book, Muslim Personal Law: Definitions, Sources and Contestations (Manohar, 2026). Email: debatingissues@gmail.com)

Related:

Sikh cricket player dubbed “Khalistani” for dropping catch

Love cricket? Make sure you celebrate only when Team India wins!

Baby bowls over India, Pakistan cricket teams

The post Why Cricket should remain above religious nationalism appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Panikkar, affectionately called KN by his colleagues, was one among a select group of historians such as Bipan Chandra, Sabyasachi Bhattacharya and S Gopal who created a strong department of modern Indian history at JNU’s Centre for Historical Studies. Among other achievements, his course on the history of ideas in India in the 19th century was pioneering.

The Indian History Congress, has, in a statement expressed its deep sorrow and loss upon the demise of K.N. Panikkar, an esteemed historian and public intellectual of India, whose profound impact on historical scholarship and advocacy for secularism has left a lasting legacy. The Indian History Congress has expressed its heartfelt condolences to his family, colleagues, students, and admirers. His scholarship and example are poised to continue inspiring future generations of historians.

As a member of a remarkable generation of historians, Professor Panikkar significantly influenced the study of modern Indian history in the post-independence era. Through meticulous research, pedagogical endeavours, and consistent public discourse, he exemplified the manner in which historical inquiry could elucidate the intricate dynamics of colonialism, culture, and ideology that have shaped Indian society. His scholarly work was distinguished by rigorous archival investigation complemented by a nuanced understanding of the intellectual and cultural facets of historical transformation.

KN was one among the legendary historians who was accessible to students, activists and academia alike, firm in the belief that history and its methods—historiography—must and should be understood by the citizenry. At a time in the early 1990s when history was the contested site for the extreme, far right—Hindu ‘nationalist’—take-over of the public discourse KN’s contributions through lectures and workshops went a long way in ensuring a more nuanced and mature understanding of both past and present.

His work, including books like Against Lord and State: Religion and Peasant Uprisings in Malabar; Culture and Consciousness in Modern India; Culture, Ideology and Hegemony – Intellectuals and Social Consciousness in Colonial India, and Before the Night Falls were the subject matter of wide study and debate. He was also appointed by the government of Kerala as chairman of an Expert Committee that looked into the complaints raised from various quarters concerning new textbooks introduced to state-supported schools. The committee submitted its report in October 2008.

Trained in Kerala and subsequently affiliated with Jawaharlal Nehru University, Professor Panikkar played a pivotal role in fostering a thriving academic community. His seminal writings on colonialism, social movements, and the cultural politics of nationalism introduced novel perspectives on the interplay between power, ideology, and popular consciousness. Notably, his influential studies on peasant resistance in Malabar and the cultural underpinnings of colonial dominance remain crucial for scholars of modern India.

However, far beyond his academic contributions, Professor Panikkar was esteemed as a public intellectual known for his articulate and courageous stance on issues concerning historical interpretation and the role of historians. Amidst the increasing politicisation of historical narratives, he steadfastly championed the autonomy of historical scholarship and the imperative of evidence-based historiography, thereby contributing significantly to the preservation of India’s plural and secular historical narrative.

Professor Panikkar also made substantial contributions to Indian academia through various institutional roles, including his tenure as Vice-Chancellor of Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, where he endeavoured to enhance research and teaching in the humanities. His dedication to intellectual discourse, academic freedom, and the societal relevance of scholarship garnered him widespread admiration.

The demise of Professor Panikkar is a profound loss to the community of historians, who benefited from his intellectual rigor and moral integrity during a formative period in the discipline’s development. His work and legacy continue to inspire historians committed to rigorous inquiry, intellectual openness, and the defense of secular historiography.

For us at Sabrang and especially KHOJ—Education for a Plural India¸ K.N. Panikkar was among those rare breed of historians who were always available for workshops for school teachers and activists. In 1997, at a work organised in Mumbai’s National College, Bandra, four historians participated and among them, on Modern India, was KN Panikkar. The others included Romila Thapar on early India, Keshavan Velluthat on the Early Medieval period and Anirudha Ray on the Medieval Period.

At this workshop, the theme of KN Panikkar’s lecture was “Grown of Hindu and Muslim Communalisms was a parallel process.” Excerpts from the texts of all the lectures may be read here.

Other in-depth writing on the communalisation of education during the NDA government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1999-2004) may be read here, here and here. All these explorations were as a result of the intense research carried on by the KHOJ team under its director, Teesta Setalvad.

We reproduce, in tribute, the text of KN Panikkar’s lecture below as a tribute:

Khoj (Archived from Communalism Combat, March 1997 – Cover Story)-Growth of Hindu and Muslim communalisms was a parallel process

— Prof K. N. Panikkar, Jawahar Lal Nehru University, New Delhi

In 1997, Khoj education for a plural India programme held a workshop that enabled interaction
between in India’s leading historians and school teachers in Mumbai. This article is the edited transcript of the lecture by professor K. N Panikkar.

Modern India

For the British, as rulers trying to understand and control Indian society, it was important to develop an understanding of what Indian society is. It was through this process that the category of a community of Hindus and a community of Muslims began to be widely and increasingly used.

This use of community terminology became part of our scholastics and analysis. What we need to ask ourselves is: does this category as a category of analysis give us the whole picture?

Conversion, both as a continuing and a historical phenomenon is an important facet that is constantly brought to bear on communal discourse. The most important aspect to remember when we look at the issue of conversion historically is that the largest concentrations of Muslim population are not in states where there was a Muslim ruler or dynasty; quite the contrary. What does this tell us?

For example, in the Malabar Coast in Kerala, large scale conversions to Islam did not take place during the invasion by Tipu Sultan. The largest conversions to Islam on the Malabar Coast were during the period 1843-1890 and were directly linked to the fact that in 1843 slavery was abolished in this region. As a result, large numbers of formerly oppressed castes bonded in slavery by upper caste Hindus moved over to Islam which they perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a religion of equality and justice.

Religious stigmatisation also, unfortunately affects our reading and interpretation of the reigns of specific historical rulers like say Tipu Sultan or Shivaji. Do we know, that it was during the reign of Tipu Sultan that a Maratha Sardar, a good believing Hindu, invaded Mysore several times and during one such attack plundered and destroyed the Sringeri Math.

Who was responsible for the reconstruction of the math and the pooja that was performed before the reconstruction? Tipu Sultan. We need to ask ourselves what a “good, secular Hindu Sardar” was doing destroying the Math and how come a “fanatical Muslim ruler” restored it?

During the invasion of the same Tipu Sultan of Kerala, there were hundreds killed, not because they were Hindus but because the people of Kerala resisted his invasion.

There are hundreds of such examples in history. We need to search them out and examine in the right perspective what were the motives of the rulers of those times for such actions. What were the politics and the historical processes behind the destruction and plunder of temples, the invasion of new territories and kingdoms and the conversion to a different faith?

Another aspect critical to the study of Modern Indian History is the counter positions of communalisms, Hindu Communalism and Muslim communalism that have so dramatically affected the politics of the subcontinent. We must be very conscious when we read and interpret this period to understand that the development of both communalisms was a parallel process that is not rooted in the second or third decades of the 20th century (the birth of the Muslim League or the Hindu Mahasabha) but must be traced back to the middle of the 19th century.

This critical juncture in the communalisation process (mid-19th century) has to be more closely examined by us: it will reveal how these processes occurred in parallel, how the Arya Samaj that began as a reform movement turned communal and similarly the Aligarh movement that began as a movement for internal reform also became communal.

Another critical aspect to a non-communal approach to the study of modern Indian history is rooted in understanding the development of the concept of Indian nationalism that was always characterised by its anti-colonial thrust.

We have through the early part of this century distinct trends visible that go beyond the anti-colonial, negative thrust, and moving towards a positive understanding of Indian nationalism. One is Anantakumar Swamy’s ‘Essays on Nationalist Idealism’ that explores the real essence of a nation as being not politics but culture. The other is Gandhi’s ‘Hind Swaraj’ which explains the essence of nationalism as civilizational. Both these thinkers did not link the concept of nationalism with religion.

Yet another contribution in this area was by Radhakumar Mukherjee who in his works, ‘Fundamental Unity of India’ and ‘Culture and Nationalism’ tried to conceptually trace the relationship of nationalism to the ancient period of history. He sought to link culture with religion.

In 1924, Veer Savarkar’s ‘Hindutva’ forcefully pushed this link, between culture and religion. The compositeness and plurality of Indian tradition was overlooked completely when Savarkar explained how the Indian nation evolved. In his chapter ‘The Six Glorious Epochs of India’ where his key questions were: How did India become a nation? How did Hindus become a nation? The book, forcefully written, is based on an erroneous interpretation of facts.

But the important thing for us to understand is why Savarkar did this given his own history of being a revolutionary. In his earlier work written some years earlier, ‘National War of Independence’ the same Savarkar describes the 1857 War of Indian Independence as the combined efforts of Hindus and Muslims and the rule of Bahadur Shah Zafar in New Delhi as its culmination as “five glorious days of Indian history.”

Related:

Batra’s Textbook Project: Undoing Democratic-Secular India, the RSS Way

Again, Gujarat State Board Class IX Hindi textbook calls Jesus demon

Resisting Saffronisation of Textbooks: Karnataka’s Success Story

History in South Asia

Education with values

How textbooks teach prejudice

The post A history that teaches, a historian that shared, in Memoriam: Professor K.N. Panikkar appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Human rights—especially the liberation of women—have long been invoked as moral justification for military interventions aimed at regime change in countries deemed hostile to the West’s vision of global order. As we witness the slow demise of the liberal international global order, with the retreat of USA from multilateral internationalism and the implementation of Trump’s grand plan of a US-led imperial order where both war and peace will be orchestrated by the same actors (especially with Trump’s favourite genocide-loving buddy state, Israel), one realises some vestiges of the moral rhetoric of the dying order persist. While Trump himself appeared unsure which rationale to foreground for the unlawful war on Iran, he nevertheless echoed his predecessors—who cloaked interventions in the faux benevolence of democracy—by announcing that for Iranians, “the hour of their freedom is near”. His friend, Bibi Netanyahu, in Israel’s 2025 attack on Iran, had more clearly invoked the rights of Iranian women to justify the unjustifiable. In an interview with Iran International, he had said, “They have impoverished you, they have given you misery. They have given you death, They shoot down your women, leaving this brave, unbelievable woman, Mahsa Amini, to bleed on the sidewalk for not covering her hair”. In the brutal genocide committed by Israel on Gaza, we had seen how ‘pinkwashing’ was deployed as a justification to attack the Palestinians, which led queer Palestinians to assert that ‘there is no pride in occupation’.

The ‘Us vs Them’ rhetoric, which Netanyahu had used against Palestine, terming them as modern-day Amalek, the nation which is depicted in Torah as having gone to war against the Israelites, is now extended to describe Iran. However, the ‘Us Vs them’ rhetoric was also deployed in his address to the protesting Iranians as a decoy to incite support for regime change through foreign invasion. Women’s rights have now reemerged in discussions and debates on the legitimacy of the war. There is widespread reporting in American media on the celebrations by Iranian women on Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death. However, Iranian activists are also putting forward nuanced arguments that refuse to couple their struggle for rights in Iran with the US-Israel-led invasion. Recently, the video of Spanish politician Manuela Bergerot, vehemently arguing against the depiction of war on Iran as being a magnificent victory for feminism, has been shared widely by feminists and others alike. She asserts that her position against the war is being put forward as a feminist. She joins a long line of feminists who have opposed the “imperialist feminist” position—the claim that certain wars are morally justified because they supposedly rescue women in the “rest” of the world from oppressive states. The imperialist feminist position, which coopts the conceptual language of feminism to justify the current war on Iran as saving the Iranian women from a repressive government, is by no means a new strategy. It was used with disastrous results in Iraq and Afghanistan, wars which had grossly misused the rhetoric of human rights, especially women’s rights and democracy promotion, to justify invasions. This rhetoric of rescuing women is a close corollary of the practice of terming countries as ‘failed’ states and ‘rogue’ states, as well as the earlier colonial use of the ‘Women’s Question’ to justify colonialism, which Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak had described as “white men saving brown women from brown men.”

It is useful to remember the ‘War Against Terrorism’ launched against Afghanistan with huge domestic support in the US, support which was garnered by the use of the rhetoric of women’s rights and the support of women’s organisations in the US. In a widely cited Radio address, Laura Bush had announced that “The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women”. Such ‘Rescue’ narratives tend to depict women in non-Western societies as passive, non-agential beings who need to be saved. Anthropologist and feminist scholar Lila Abu Lughod wrote, questioning this logic in her influential article ‘Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?’, which went on to become a prescribed text in most courses on feminism and gender studies. She urges us in her work to move beyond the rhetoric of saving and instead pay attention to and appreciate the differences among women in the world, including their different conceptions of freedom, choice, and justice. To assess how deceptive the rhetoric of women’s rights was in justifying the war in Afghanistan, one just has to look at the contemporary condition of Afghan women’s rights, most recently further eroded by the new Criminal Procedural Regulation. The war fought, citing the presence of active Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq (active only in the imagination of the USA), was no different. Bush had back then exhorted the Iraqi women to be the midwives of a new liberated Iraq. After more than twenty years of the invasion, as Nadje Al- Ali, Iraqi feminist and scholar, describes, women have come out as the biggest losers of the invasion. While before the invasion, Iraqi women had enjoyed the highest levels of education, labour force participation, and a certain degree of political involvement, women in post-invasion Iraq have seen a steady erosion of their rights along with a rise in conservatism.

The selective nature of caring for women’s rights in countries where the USA wants regime change is no coincidence. Also, the saving women rhetoric is a strategic diversion from not dealing with women’s rights within the USA. Like Bush who talked about the rights of women in Iraq and Afghanistan, but cut off funding to international family planning organisations that offered abortion and counselling services, Trump who talks about caring for Iranians, announcing to Iranians in his social account about ‘Making Iran Great Again’ has systematically cut down the rights of many American citizens under the guise of ‘Making America Great Again’. In In the Name of Women’s Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism, Sara Farris shows how women’s rights have been co-opted by anti-Islam, anti-migration, and xenophobic campaigns to justify exclusionary policies—diverting attention from the real violence faced by women and the erosion of their autonomy. The withheld Epstein files that incriminate Trump have been released and are beyond horrific in what it reveals, while ICE has detained immigrant women in detention in deplorable conditions. In contrast, feminists who have spoken against the stereotyping of non-Western women have not been silent on the issues of women or held back in their criticism of repressive regimes they live in, but as Abu-Lughod has written, “is mindful of complex entanglements in which we are all implicated, in sometimes surprising alignments.” Iranian activists who were on protests deserved support and engagement from around the world, including from the USA, but they definitely didn’t need a US-Israel invasion that ended up bombing an elementary school for girls. Egyptian feminist Nawal el Saadawi had famously suggested, when asked what the people in the US can do to support the revolution in Egypt, “Make your own revolution and change your government for us”. It is perhaps time feminists and citizens in the United States heed her advice.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post Wars Fought in The Name of Women’s Rights appeared first on SabrangIndia.

An ASI survey in November 2024 on court orders had triggered a violent clash between locals and police in which four people died of bullet wounds. The court had been hearing a plea by Hindus claiming that the mosque was built by demolishing a Shiva temple during the rule of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. There had been allegations that some of those accompanying the survey team were chanting “Jai Shri Ram”, nettling the area’s minority population.

Several people are still in jail in connection with the violence.

A commission appointed by the Sambhal district court had reportedly said in a report in 2024 that symbols associated with Hinduism had been found at Sambhal’s Shahi Jama Masjid, protected by the ASI since 1920.

Now, in an RTI application, Sambhal resident Satya Prakash Yadav had sought to know whether the Mughal-era mosque was built by demolishing any ruins or on vacant land, along with the name of the landowner at the time and the documents granting ownership rights.

The ASI, in its reply, stated that “no such information is available in this office”. On questions relating to the nature of constructions at the site at the time the mosque came under the ASI’s protection, any subsequent constructions, and past disputes associated with the shrine, the ASI said such information was not available in its records.

However, during the first appeal proceedings before the Central Information Commission, the ASI had said that although no new construction is permitted within a centrally protected monument, an “illegal” steel railing was being erected at the Jama Masjid site in 2018 and that the department had issued orders to stop the work.

The applicant had also asked about the period of construction of the mosque. The ASI replied that according to its records, “Jama Masjid Sambhal was constructed in the year 1526”, and referred to supporting material.

On whether the structure was known by any other name earlier, the department said the mosque has been protected by the ASI under the same name. In response to a query on the present nature of the structure, the ASI stated: “At present, it exists as a mosque.” It further said the Jama Masjid was taken under the protection of the ASI in 1920, citing a gazette notification.

During the hearing before the Central Information Commission, the appellant had argued that key information had been wrongly denied on the ground of non-availability. The ASI maintained that it had provided all information available on record and that it could not be compelled to create or collect information not maintained by it.

Upholding the ASI’s stand, the commission observed that the RTI Act obliges public authorities to disclose only existing records and does not require them to generate fresh information. It cited judicial precedents to underline that a public authority cannot be directed to furnish information not held by it.

Finding no grounds for further intervention, the commission dismissed the appeal, holding that the ASI’s replies — including its statement of having no records on whether the mosque was built over ruins or vacant land — were in accordance with the law.

Sabrangindia has consistently reported on the issue, and its reports may be read here, here and here.

According to Masjid Committee President Zafar Ali, the protest on November 24, 2024 was peaceful until CO Anuj Chaudhary responded to concerns with verbal abuse and an unprovoked lathi charge. The police, allegedly led by CO Anuj Chaudhary, responded with verbal abuse, a lathi charge, and then tear gas. As people began to flee, the police escalated, firing live ammunition. Tear gas followed, and then live rounds were fired. The crowd began to disperse, but police pursued them into lanes and homes. Eyewitnesses reported police using slurs, destroying property, and shooting indiscriminately.

Five Muslim men were killed, including a minor:

• Kamran (17), shot in the chest.
• Nasir, Abbas, Basim, and Nabeel—each with fatal injuries, many allegedly from police bullets.

Related:

Supreme Court blocks execution of Nagar Palika’s order regarding well near Sambhal Mosque, prioritises peace and harmony

Uttar Pradesh’s new tactics for harassment: Electricity theft charges, strategic revival of temple, opening up of 1978 Sambhal communal riots cases

Sambhal Mosque, Ajmer Dargah: how deep do we plunge into the abyss?

Sambhal Violence: State crackdown intensifies, thousands accused, and allegations of police misconduct ignite a political and communal crisis in Uttar Pradesh

Sambhal’s darkest hour: 5 dead, scores injured in Mosque survey violence as UP police face allegations of excessive force

The post Sambhal, UP: ASI has no records to prove that Shahi Jama Masjid was built after demolishing earlier structure appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Police said Mohammed Arif, 25, and Syed Imran, 31, were allegedly attacked while they were out for a walk. Deputy police superintendent Madolappa said five suspects were arrested in connection with the assault. “The accused were reportedly under the influence of alcohol,” Madolappa said. Names of the accused have not been released by the authorities.

Unfortunately, the news reports are based only on police sources. HT reports that the police said the incident took communal colour as the Muslim community alleged it was a targeted attack. They cited the complaint filed in the case and said that six to seven assailants made death threats and attacked Arif and Imran with stones, causing head injuries.

Further, the newspaper also reported that the police stated that tensions escalated when protesters gathered outside the station. Some protesters allegedly attacked police personnel, including assistant sub-inspector Mukhtar Patel, and threw stones. “Another case has been registered against 49 Muslim community members for attempting to lay siege to the police station, assaulting Patel, other police staff, and throwing stones,” Madolappa said.

Though the situation was reportedly brought under control thereafter, the original assault on teachers who happened to be Muslim and the motive of the attackers remains a mystery, unreported.

Related:

Why Communal Tension in Tamil Nadu’s Thiruparankundram is Another Warning Signal

Communal Tensions Erupt in Bihar’s Jamui: Alleged stone-pelting during religious procession leads to violence

Attempts to create communal tension reported during Ram Navami celebration in parts of Bengal and UP

The post Bidar, Karnataka: Two school teachers assaulted in Karnataka’s Bidar, triggering communal tensions appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The vandalism and violence by members of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) against a proposed discussion on February 24, 2026, by “Spark”, an informal student reading group of Azim Premji University (APU), Bangalore, are symptomatic of the increasing repression in campuses across the country, where dissent is criminalised and free debate and discussion is shut down. The proposed discussion was on the anniversary of the mass rapes in Kunan Poshpora in 1991.

On February 24, around 25 members of the ABVP, the student wing of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) vandalised the “Kabira” space, a designated location for cultural activities in the Sarjapur campus of the university and the venue of a discussion on Kunan Poshpora by the Spark Reading Group. They tore down posters and assaulted a student and a member of the university’s security staff.

While police arrested 25 members of the ABVP on charges of assault, vandalism and trespass., they were granted bail the next day.

However, police also registered an FIR, based on a complaint by the APU Registrar Rishikesh BS, against office-bearers and members of the Spark Reading Circle. The complaint against the group’s Instagram handle on the event was registered under Sec 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023, on charges of deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, a cognisable and non-bailable charge with a penalty of up to three years imprisonment.

The FIR also cites charges under Sec 66 (e) (violation of privacy by intentionally capturing, publishing, or transmitting images of a person’s private areas without their consent) and 67 (publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form) of the Information Technology Act,2000.

The APU Registrar’s complaint states that no permission was sought or granted for the event and that the group had no official connection with the university. The complaint further blames the reading group for seeking to host the event and said that, by “issuing such invitations, hostility arose between two groups, resulting in activists forcefully entering our campus and creating a disturbance.”

In a statement, the Student Council of Azim Premji University expressed concern over the FIR filed by the university against members of the ‘Spark Reading Circle’, stating that the matter should have been addressed through internal disciplinary mechanisms rather than criminal proceedings.

Indeed, the excessively punitive reaction of the APU administration towards the student reading group for merely planning to hold a discussion on the Kunan Poshpora incident is highly disturbing. A purely administrative and logistical issue of permissions for an event on campus became the basis of a complaint to the police to seek criminal action against a reading group and its members. The complaint against the group’s account on a social media platform amounts to an open invitation to police the academic lives of students. In the guise of a criminal investigation, it allows for surveillance of electronic devices of students and seeks to police their space and time outside the classroom.

Why don’t they want people to remember Kunan Poshpora?

 The ABVP’s protest against the Spark Reading Group’s discussion over Kunan-Poshpora seeks to erase and invisibilise the crucial process of recollection and analysis of painful and sensitive incidents, thereby silencing a historical record.

February 24, 2026, marked the 35th anniversary of the mass rape and torture of women of the villages of Kunan and Poshpora in Jammu and Kashmir by the Indian Army. The allegations of rape and torture were denied by the army and the Indian government.

However, the testimonies of women of the two villages and the extensive records and interviews by researchers Essar Batool, Ifrah Butt, Munaza Rashid, Natasha Rather and Samreena Mushtaq, who documented the incident and its aftermath in their book “Do You Remember Kunan Poshpora?” continue to challenge official narratives even as they persist in the struggle to seek justice and accountability. The book was among the 25 academic books banned in Kashmir last year.

Systematic censorship of academia

The violence by the right wing ABVP, the student wing of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the ominously repressive measures taken by the APU administration result in the censorship and curbs on free discussion and debate on important issues. They are only the latest in the growing list of instances of censorship in academia.

Right-wing students are emboldened and weaponised by the ruling political dispensation. Regrettably, university administrations, including vice chancellors who are unabashed champions of right-wing ideologies, speedily crack down on students who dare to ask questions.

Last year, Free Speech Collective’s annual report “Free Speech in India 2025: Behold the Hidden Hand” documented at least 16 noteworthy instances of censorship in academia, including the criminalisation of student protests, the Delhi University Vice-Chancellor Yogesh Singh’s openly political exhortations to faculty and staff to push the ruling BJP’s agendas and the arrest of Prof Ali Khan Mahmudabad of Ashoka University over posts on Operation Sindoor even as the denial of permission for academic seminars on “sensitive subjects” became routine.

Now, barely two months into 2026, there are already more than six instances of censorship in academia in India.

At least 14 students of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) were arrested for protesting the casteist remarks of the university’s Vice Chancellor Shantisree Dhulipudi Pandit. Granted bail by a Delhi court on February 27, the students continued to remain in jail till late evening on Sunday (March 1) as police took their time to complete the verifications of their permanent addresses. It took the court to direct their immediate release stating that procedural formalities could not be the excuse for their continued detention after bail had already been granted.

Earlier, on February 17, 2026, the Proctor Office of Delhi University (DU) issued an order stating that “public meetings, processions, demonstrations, and protests of any kind are strictly prohibited within the university campus for a period of one month.”

On January 29, 2026, Sarover Zaidi, an associate professor at OP Jindal Global University in Sonepat, was suspended for one semester (February 1 to July 31) for allegedly comparing Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Adolf Hitler. BJP MP from Kurukshetra Naveen Jindal is the founding chancellor of the university.

The action arose after a hearing in the Haryana Human Rights Commission (HHRC) on a complaint by Vishav Bajaj, father of Vikhyaat Bajaj, a first-year undergraduate student of the Jindal School of Design & Architecture, that on November 7, 2025, during a lecture on the course “Politics of Representation” taught by Zaidi, repeated remarks were made in class that were “politically derogatory, inflammatory and deeply disturbing”.

Bajaj alleged that PM Modi was compared to Adolf Hitler, national security operations such as Operation Sindoor were described as “gimmicks” and “branding exercises,” civilian deaths were trivialised and official accounts of terrorism were questioned. Audio recordings made by Vikhyaat were also submitted to the HHRC.

The student had also complained against another assistant professor, Ekta Chauhan, alleging their statements against the RSS. But Chauhan refuted the allegations and described herself as a “devout and practising” Hindu. Her family was associated with RSS-linked social service traditions since 1972, she said in a written statement.

The trend of disinvitation of distinguished persons from campus events continued unabated. In Banaras Hindu University, a lecture by scholar Kedar Mishra, scheduled for January 20, 2026, was cancelled allegedly under government pressure In Mumbai, actor Naseeruddin Shah was disinvited from an academic literary event at Mumbai University on January 31, 2026.

In Mumbai, an SRFTI (Satyajit Ray Film & Television Institute) student film “Da’Lit Kids” was pulled out of the Animela Film Festival at Whistling Woods after it was reportedly denied permission for screening by the Ministry for Information and Broadcasting. In protest, film-makers of all the SRFTI films scheduled for screening at the festival pulled out but the festival went ahead.

The Animela Festival is an international Animation, VFX, Gaming, Comics & XR Festival run by a non-profit organisation – the Aniverse and Visual Arts Foundation (AVAF). While there is no clarity why government permission was sought for the films being screened, the festival website lists multiple sponsors, including the Maharashtra government, embassies of France and Australia and corporate support from sponsors like Adani.

All these instances of censorship further circumscribe the space for the free exchange of information and diverse viewpoints. APU prides itself on being “a space for social change” and a space for higher education that “can create critical and reflective practitioners with an understanding of the social impact of education, the law and development”. Instead of criminalising students, APU needs to ensure that its campuses remain safe spaces that nurture the spirit of enquiry. For a truly transformative educational institution, a climate of free discussion needs to prevail over censorship by vandals and vigilantes.

Courtesy: Free Speech Collective

The post The Throttling of Free Discussion in Academia: Strong-arm Tactics by ABVP and Cave in by Azim Premji University appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In his over, one-hour recitation cum talk Naseeruddin Shah introduced the audience to the charm and possibilities of Urdu and recited from many of the greats like Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Mirza Ghalib, Sahir Ludhianvi, Allama Iqbal and Imtiaz Ali Taj. Through narration, reflection and dramatic nuance Naseeruddin Shah revisited an era when literature shaped social thought and human values, celebrating poetry that spoke of love, injustice, hope and collective dreams

The Lectures That Needed to Happen series by Mumbai for Peace provides a platform to deserving lectures and events that are cancelled due to uncalled & non democratic interference by the State or non-state actors. “Mumbai for Peace” is a citizens’ platform formed by concerned Mumbaikars committed to safeguarding the city’s plural character and nurturing communal harmony.

Preet Nagar was a presentation that was scheduled in Mumbai University on February 1 but was unceremoniously cancelled at the last minute with no explanation. Earlier MFP had collaborated with other organisations to hold the Father Stan Swamy Memorial Lecture by Fr. Prem Xalxo that was similarly cancelled

Related:

450+ Citizens from all walks of life stand by Javed Akhtar, Naseeruddin Shah

Why ‘Progressive’ Muslims are wrong in Condemning Naseeruddin Shah’s Anti-Taliban Video

Naseeruddin Shah & backlash for Hijacked Political Narrative of Muslims

The post Censorship Broken: Naseeruddin Shah speaks on the Urdu language at Kalina, Mumbai & recites from its rich poetry appeared first on SabrangIndia.