The poem did not name any religion or community but lamented injustice, questioned state power, and called for non-violence as a means of resistance. The complaint alleged it incited religious hatred and disturbed social harmony.

What was at stake was far greater than one poem or one politician—it was the scope of criminal law in regulating political speech, the meaning of “incitement”, and whether popular offence can override constitutional values.

Background: A poem, a platform, and a prosecution

On December 29, 2024, during a mass wedding programme in Jamnagar, Gujarat, organised by a local councillor, Imran Pratapgarhi recited a poem that was later posted as a video on his verified social media account on the platform ‘X’. The poem included verses such as:

“ए ख़ून के प्यासों बात सुनो
गर हक़ की लड़ाई ज़ुल्म सही
हम ज़ुल्म से इश्क़ निभा देंगे…”

Translated broadly:

“O you blood-thirsty, listen!
If the fight for rights brings injustice,
We will meet that injustice with love…”

The FIR accused the appellant of promoting enmity between communities and disturbing national harmony. Shockingly, he was charged under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57 and 3(5) of the BNS—provisions dealing with incitement, hate speech, religious disharmony, and even abetment of violence. Through the FIR, it was alleged that the spoken words of the poem incite people of one community against another, and it hurts a community’s religious and social sentiments. It was further alleged that the song had lyrics that incited people of other communities to fight for the community’s rights. It was claimed that the video posted by the appellant created enmity between two communities at the national level and hatred towards each other. It was further alleged that it had a detrimental effect on national unity.

Key observations of the Court

1. Constitutional Voice vs. State Machinery: A foundational tension

At the heart of this judgment lies an old constitutional paradox: the State is both the guarantor and violator of fundamental rights. Justice Oka, with characteristic candour, begins by confronting this tension head-on:

“This case shows that even after 75 years of the existence of our Constitution, the law enforcement machinery of the State is either ignorant about this important fundamental right or does not care for this fundamental right.” (Para 1)

In this opening salvo of the judgment, Justice Abhay S. Oka sets the tone for a judgment that is as much an indictment of institutional apathy as it is a reaffirmation of constitutional values. The observation that even after 75 years of constitutional existence, law enforcement remains either ignorant of or indifferent to the fundamental right to freedom of expression, reveals a profound structural dysfunction. This remark is not made in passing—it is a judicial rebuke aimed squarely at a State apparatus that defaults to coercion over constitutional engagement. By framing the issue as one of institutional disrepair rather than individual excess, the Court shifts the spotlight from the accused citizen to the accuser state, raising critical questions about how routinely—and with what legal illiteracy—criminal law is weaponised to suppress dissent.

What emerges from this framing is the Court’s role not as a mere adjudicator of facts, but as a constitutional conscience-keeper. Rather than balancing “free speech” against “law and order,” the judgment asserts that the State’s repeated resort to criminal prosecution for expressive acts is itself an affront to the constitutional order. This is not just about a misreading of a poem—it is about the State’s deep discomfort with metaphor, criticism, and resistance. The Court’s insistence that the rule of law includes a duty to respect rights, not merely regulate them, transforms the case into a referendum on how faithfully the State embodies the very freedoms it claims to guarantee. In doing so, the Court subtly but powerfully reclaims constitutional morality as an active, living principle—not a hollow preamble.

2. A Theory of Free Speech: From libertarian tolerance to affirmative protection

This judgment doesn’t merely shield speech—it underlines its necessity. Justice Oka, who had authored the judgment on the behalf of the Bench, frames Article 19(1) (a) as not merely a right but as a structural precondition for human dignity and democratic engagement, thereby locating it within the broader penumbra of Article 21:

“Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups of individuals is an integral part of a healthy, civilised society. Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected.” (Para 38)

This convergence of Articles 19 and 21 reflects a distinctly substantive conception of liberty, moving beyond formal non-interference toward affirmative obligation. The State (including the police and judiciary) is thus required not just to refrain from suppressing speech but to actively ensure its flourishing.

“The reasonable restrictions provided for in Article 19(2) must remain reasonable and not fanciful and oppressive. Article 19(2) cannot be allowed to overshadow the substantive rights under Article 19(1), including the right to freedom of speech and expression.” (Para 29)

3.  The law’s elasticity: From ambiguity to abuse

The charges levelled against Pratapgarhi under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, and 57 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita represent an alarming instance of legal overbreadth being used as a political weapon. The BNS, like its predecessor IPC, contains clauses so capaciously worded (e.g., “feelings of enmity”, “disharmony”, “outraging religious beliefs”) that they leave room for subjective interpretation and state-led abuse.

Justice Oka (and J Bhuyan) cut through this ambiguity:

“By no stretch of imagination does it promote enmity… The poem refers to injustice and offers non-violence as a response. It cannot be seen as a cause of communal disharmony.” (Para 10)

This is a clear attempt to re-inscribe constitutional interpretation over statutory vagueness, requiring any criminal allegation under these sections to pass a high threshold of intent, clarity, and demonstrable harm.

4. From Lalita Kumari to BNSS: Rethinking FIR registration

The Court’s discussion on Section 173(3) of the BNSS is an important departure from earlier CrPC jurisprudence under Lalita Kumari.

Where Lalita Kumari limited the police’s discretion, the BNSS introduces a structured preliminary inquiry model for offences punishable by 3–7 years—like many speech-related provisions.

The Supreme Court insists that in all speech-related cases where this discretion is available, it must be exercised:

“If an option under sub-Section (3) is not exercised by the police officer in such a case, he may end up registering an FIR against a person who has exercised his fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a) even though clause (2) of Article 19 is not attracted. If, in such cases, the option under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is not exercised, it will defeat the very object of incorporating sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS and will also defeat the obligation of the police under Article 51-A (a).” (Para 29)

This means the police must now interpret the text of the speech itself, not just the complaint—an approach that, while normatively sound, places interpretive responsibility on officers often untrained in the subtleties of metaphor, political critique, or artistic licence.

5. Institutional analysis: The High Court’s abdication and the Supreme Court’s role as rights sentinel

The Gujarat High Court, by deferring to the early stage of the investigation, abdicated its constitutional responsibility to scrutinise rights violations at the threshold.

The Supreme Court rebuked this stance:

      “We fail to understand how the High Court concluded that the message was posted in a manner that would certainly disturb social harmony. Thereafter, the High Court gave a reason that the investigation was at a nascent stage. There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS. When the High Court, in the given case, finds that no offence was made out on the face of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere even though the investigation is at the nascent stage.” (Para 37)

This reaffirms that judicial intervention in the early stages of political or speech-related prosecutions is not just permissible but necessary. The longer the case proceeds, the more the process itself becomes punishment. This view counters a dangerous trend: judicial evasion in politically sensitive matters, often under the guise of deference to procedure. Here, the Court restores its duty as a constitutional firewall, refusing to be paralysed by formalism.

6. The Reasonable Reader standard: Sedition, hate Speech, and judicial empathy

A key analytical move in the judgment is the revival of the “reasonable, strong-minded” observer standard from Bhagwati Charan Shukla:

“When an offence punishable under Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strongminded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds. The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.” (Para 33)

This interpretive lens displaces subjective offence with an objective, resilient baseline, thereby protecting robust discourse. It delegitimises state action based solely on hurt sentiments or perceived disrespect to power. This is especially important in India’s contemporary climate, where claims of communal hurt are often wielded as instruments of political repression.

7. Literature as democratic praxis: The place of poetry in the Constitutional Order

In recognising the poem’s form and context, the Court refrains from sterilising language into literalism. Justice Oka honours the metaphorical richness of poetic expression and its political function:

“…the poem does not encourage violence. On the contrary, it encourages people to desist from resorting to violence and to face injustice with love. It states that if our fight with injustice results into the death of our near and dear ones, we would be happy to bury their bodies.” (Para 10)

Poetry here is not ornamental—it is political speech in its most potent, imaginative form. The Court recognises that to penalise such speech is to criminalise dissent itself. This judgment contributes to an emerging jurisprudence where art is recognised as both speech and constitutional engagement, not as a diluted cousin of prose but as its fiercest challenger.

8. Toward a doctrine of “Constitutional offence”

Perhaps the most striking analytical thread is the Court’s suggestion that some state actions themselves verge on a constitutional offence:

      “Even while dealing with the performance of an obligation under sub-Section (1) of Section 173, where the commission of the offence is based on spoken or written words, the police officer concerned will have to keep in mind the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) read with an exception carved out under clause (2) of Article 19. The reason is that he is under an obligation to abide by the Constitution and to respect the ideals under the Constitution. The Constitution is more than 75 years old. By this time, the police officers ought to have been sensitized about their duty of abiding by the Constitution and respecting the ideals of the Constitution.” (Para 30)

Here, Justice Oka (and Justice Bhuyan) aren’t merely interpreting law—they are charging the State with constitutional delinquency. In doing so, they lay the groundwork for a potential doctrine where misuse of criminal process to silence dissent could itself be a rights violation subject to public law remedy.

This is not explicitly framed in the language of compensation or tort—but it hints at a growing judicial recognition that abuse of power is not neutral—it is a rights violation in itself.

Legal analysis of offences under BNS: A systematic dismantling

In the judgment, the Supreme Court, has also meticulously analysed the ingredients of each alleged offence and found all of them legally untenable.

1. Section 196 (Promoting enmity between groups)

      “The poem does not refer to any religion, caste or language. It does not refer to persons belonging to any religion. By no stretch of imagination, does it promote enmity between different groups. We fail to understand how the statements therein are detrimental to national unity and how the statements will affect national unity. On its plain reading, the poem does not purport to affect anyone’s religious feelings.” (Para 12)

Based on precedent (Manzar Sayeed Khan, Patricia Mukhim, Javed Ahmad Hajam), the Court reaffirmed that criminalising speech requires a showing of deliberate intent (mens rea). Without it, the mere content of speech, however provocative to some, is not criminal.

      “Mens rea will have to be read into Section 196 of the BNS… it is impossible to attribute any mens rea to the appellant.” (Para 34)

2. Section 197 (Prejudicial to national integration)

Therefore, as the Supreme Court, read both facts and the law, the poem by Imran Pratapgarhi did not attract the offence under Section 197 as it:

• Did not cast doubt on the loyalty of any group.
• Did not assert the denial of citizenship rights.
• Did not jeopardise national unity.

      “…the poem does not make or publish any imputation and is not concerned with any religious, racial, language, regional group, caste, or community. It does not suggest that any class of persons have been denied rights as citizens because they are members of a religious, racial, language, regional group, caste, or community. It does not make or publish any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal likely to cause disharmony or feeling of enmity or hatred or ill will. The poem does not publish or make any false or misleading information.” (Para 16)

3. Section 299 & Section 302 (Religious insult or wounding religious sentiment)

The Court termed these charges “ridiculous”:

      “To say the least, it is ridiculous to say that the act of the appellant is intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. The poem only tells the rulers what the reaction will be if the fight for rights is met with injustice.” (Para 17)

4. Section 57 (Abetment by public)

      “We fail to understand, even if it is assumed that the appellant has committed some offence, how he has abetted the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of persons exceeding ten.” (Para 19)

The Supreme Court’s systematic dismantling of the charges against Imran Pratapgarhi reflects a jurisprudence grounded in constitutional fidelity and statutory precision. In addressing Section 196 of the BNS—concerning promotion of enmity between groups—the Court reiterates a long-standing doctrinal principle: that the mere capacity of speech to provoke cannot substitute for a demonstrable, deliberate intent to incite enmity. Drawing from precedents like Manzar Sayeed Khan, Patricia Mukhim, and Javed Ahmad Hajam, the Court makes it clear that mens rea—a deliberate, malicious state of mind—is essential for liability. The poem in question, devoid of any reference to religion, caste, or community, could not be interpreted as promoting group enmity, and to criminalise it would be a distortion of both the statute and the Constitution. The Court’s reading imposes a constitutional filter on the BNS provision, ensuring it cannot be misused to punish subjective offence or perceived disrespect.

This logic extends seamlessly to the rejection of charges under Sections 197, 299, 302, and 57. Under Section 197, which deals with acts prejudicial to national integration, the Court’s reasoning is particularly illuminating. Justice Oka dissects the elements of the offence and finds none fulfilled: the poem neither impugns any group’s loyalty nor suggests the denial of citizenship rights, nor does it propagate disinformation. Similarly, the invocation of Section 299 and 302 for religious insult is dismissed as “ridiculous,” with the Court recognising that the poem critiques state injustice, not religious belief. Most striking is the Court’s incredulity at the Section 57 charge—abetment by the public—highlighting not only the absence of any instigated act but also the absurdity of imagining that poetic expression could be interpreted as a generalised call to criminal conduct. This cluster of analyses reveals not only the hollowness of the FIR but also the deeper pathology of criminal law’s misuse: charges laid without regard for statutory thresholds, constitutional limits, or evidentiary plausibility. Justice Oka and Justice Bhuyan’s reasoning is a potent reminder that law, especially criminal law, cannot be driven by sentiment, conjecture, or political expediency—it must be anchored in demonstrable harm, clear intent, and legal fidelity.

The Court as guardian of the Republic’s imagination

Imran Pratapgarhi judgement is not merely about poetry—it is about power, protest, and the place of dissent in India’s constitutional framework. This judgment revitalises the meaning of free speech in an age where criminal law is increasingly wielded to silence opposition. It teaches us that:

• Law is not merely a set of punishments but a moral language.
• Courts must defend expression, even if the State finds it discomforting.
• Poetry, critique, and satire are not seditious—they are the scaffolding of a free republic.

In this moment, the Supreme Court does not merely defend a poem—it defends the possibility of dissent itself. And that makes it one of the most important judgments on freedom of speech in recent Indian history.

To borrow the Court’s own words:

      “Courts, particularly the constitutional Courts, must be at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. It is the bounden duty of the Courts to ensure that the Constitution and the ideals of the Constitution are not trampled upon.” (Para 39)

Conclusion: A Constitutional anthem for the right to dissent

The Imran Pratapgarhi judgment stands as a powerful reaffirmation that the Constitution of India is not a brittle document to be bruised by sentiment, nor a tool to be twisted by the might of the State. It is, instead, a living charter that guarantees not only the right to speak, but the right to disturb, to provoke, and to dissent—particularly through art, poetry, and political expression. Justice Oka’s reasoning does not merely rescue one man from a legally untenable prosecution; it reclaims the constitutional promise that the State cannot demand silence in exchange for citizenship.

By scrupulously dismantling every charge brought under the BNS and holding law enforcement accountable to constitutional ideals, the judgment delivers a rare, lucid defence of free speech in an era when such freedoms are frequently under siege. It goes beyond the judicial role of error correction and enters the moral terrain of democratic defence. This case is not just precedent—it is a call to conscience for the police, for the lower judiciary, and for civil society. In drawing a firm constitutional line between law and power, it sends an unequivocal message: poetic dissent is not criminal, and the Constitution does not flinch before uncomfortable truths.

Ultimately, this is not merely a judgment about the legality of a poem—it is a resounding assertion of the Republic’s constitutional soul. It reminds us that the true test of democracy is not how the State treats speech that flatters, but how it responds to speech that resists. On that test, the Supreme Court has spoken with uncommon clarity and courage.

The complete judgment may be read below.

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The post A Republic That Listens: The Supreme Court’s poetic defence of dissent through Imran Pratapgarhi judgment appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“In our opinion, the comments were highly irresponsible and reflect a penchant to attract attention by casting aspersions on the Supreme Court of India and the Judges of the Supreme Court. This apart, the statements show ignorance about the role of the constitutional courts and the duties and obligations bestowed on them under the Constitution.” (Para 5)

The observations came in response to a writ petition filed under Article 32 read with Article 129 of the Constitution by Advocate Vishal Tiwari. The petition sought the initiation of suo-moto criminal contempt proceedings against Dubey for making scandalising remarks against the Court and the CJI, and also sought directions to the Ministry of Home Affairs to register FIRs under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, against political leaders delivering provocative speeches related to the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025.

While the Court ultimately refrained from issuing notice or initiating contempt proceedings, it delivered a strong and detailed order that firmly asserted the judiciary’s role and constitutional mandate, and simultaneously condemned hate speech in the strongest terms.

Dubey’s remarks intended to scandalise, Court asserts

The Court scrutinised the content of Dubey’s public remarks, in which he accused Chief Justice Khanna of being “responsible for all the civil wars happening in India” and claimed that “it is only and only the Supreme Court that is responsible for inciting religious wars in the country.” The bench unequivocally held that such statements “tend to scandalise and lower the authority of the Supreme Court of India” and exhibit an intent to obstruct the administration of justice.

“We have examined the contents of the assertions made by respondent no. 4, which no doubt tend to scandalize and lower the authority of the Supreme Court of India, if not interfere or tend to interfere with the judicial proceedings pending before this Court, and have the tendency to interfere and obstruct the administration of justice.” (Para 4)

The Court noted that these statements amounted to a direct imputation of motives to a sitting bench of the apex court. It also clarified that the statutory exemptions under Sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971—which relate to fair and accurate reporting or innocent publication—did not prima facie apply in this case. It added with emphasis, “There is no civil war in India.”

“The statements made reflect the clear intent to impute motives to the Bench itself by naming the Chief Justice of India as “responsible for all the civil wars happening in India” and “in order to incite religious wars in this country, it is only and only the Supreme Court that is responsible”. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act carve out exceptions which, prima facie, are not attracted. There is no ‘civil war’ in India.” (Para 4)

Despite this, the Court chose not to initiate contempt proceedings, noting that judicial power must be exercised with discernment and restraint.

“We, therefore, refrain from taking any action. This Court in, In Re S. Mulgaokar,3 observed that the judiciary is not immune from criticism, but when criticism is an obvious distortion or a gross misstatement, which is made in a manner designed to lower the respect of the judiciary and destroy public confidence, it should not be ignored. However, the power to initiate contempt is discretionary in its unsheathed exercise.” (Para 6)

Referring to the landmark precedent In Re: S. Mulgaokar [(1978) 3 SCC 339], the Court acknowledged that while the judiciary is not immune from criticism, the exercise of contempt powers is a matter of judicial discretion—not compulsion.

“…we are of the firm opinion that courts are not as fragile as flowers to wither and wilt under such ludicrous statements. We do not believe that the confidence in and credibility of the courts in the eyes of the public can be shaken by such absurd statements, though it can be said without the shadow of doubt that there is a desire and deliberate attempt to do so.” (Para 5)

Judiciary draws strength from constitutional values, not coercive power

In defending its decision to not invoke contempt powers, the Court issued a profound reaffirmation of the role of courts in a constitutional democracy. It stressed that judges are guided by values, not ego, and derive legitimacy from transparency, open proceedings, and reasoned judgments—not force.

“Judges are judicious, their valour non-violent and their wisdom springs into action when played upon by a volley of values, the least of which is personal protection.” (Para 6)

The Court underlined that institutions are accountable not through suppression of criticism, but through reasoned decisions, transparency, and public trust. It observed that decisions are made in open court, subject to scrutiny, appeal, review, and even curative jurisdiction, which are all mechanisms that ensure accountability in a democratic society.

“Surely, courts and judges have shoulders broad enough and an implicit trust that the people would perceive and recognize when criticism or critique is biased, scandalous and ill-intentioned.” (Para 6)

Judicial review is a constitutional mandate, not judicial activism

Responding to the broader climate of political criticism targeting judicial review—particularly in the context of the Waqf Amendment Act—the Court categorically stated that constitutional courts are not acting beyond their remit. Judicial review is not merely a power but a constitutional duty, expressly enshrined under Articles 32 and 226.

“Each branch of the State in a democracy, be it the legislature, executive or the judiciary, especially in a constitutional democracy, acts within the framework of the Constitution. It is the Constitution that is higher than all of us.” (Para 7)

The Court reaffirmed that the role of constitutional courts is to test the legality and constitutionality of statutes and executive actions, not on political, religious or community grounds, but strictly according to legal principles. It cautioned that to deny this role would be tantamount to rewriting or nullifying the Constitution itself.

“To deny the power of judicial review to the courts would be to rewrite and negate the Constitution, as the power of judicial review is one of the cornerstones of democracy. This power is conferred in express terms by Articles 32 and 226 by the framers of the Constitution and hinges on the system of checks and balances.” (Para 9)

Reasserting the foundational role of constitutional courts in a democracy, the Supreme Court emphasised that judicial decisions are grounded in legal reasoning, not influenced by political, religious, or communal considerations. The Court clarified that when citizens approach it seeking the exercise of judicial review, they do so to vindicate their fundamental or legal rights—not to invite the judiciary into political debates. In entertaining such pleas, the Court is not overstepping its role but performing its constitutional duty. This clear articulation serves as a reminder that judicial review is a core element of the constitutional structure—intended not to oppose the legislature or executive, but to ensure that all state action adheres to constitutional mandates.

“Judicial decisions are made in accordance with legal principles and not in keeping with political, religious or community considerations. When citizens approach the court praying for exercise of the power of judicial review, they do so in furtherance of their fundamental and/or legal rights. The court’s consideration of such a prayer is the fulfilment of its constitutional duty.” (Para 9)

Hate speech must be dealt with an ‘iron hand’

While the petition was dismissed, the Court did not leave the issue of hate speech unaddressed. In a pointed and unambiguous observation, the bench declared that any attempt to incite communal disharmony through hate speech must face resolute legal consequences.

“While we are not entertaining the present writ petition, we make it clear that any attempt to spread communal hatred or indulge in hate speech must be dealt with an iron hand. Hate speech cannot be tolerated as it leads to loss of dignity and self-worth of the targeted group members, contributes to disharmony amongst groups, and erodes tolerance and open-mindedness, which is a must for a multi-cultural society committed to the idea of equality. Any attempt to cause alienation or humiliation of the targeted group is a criminal offence and must be dealt with accordingly.” (Para 10)

Such speech, the Court affirmed, is not protected expression. Rather, it causes alienation and humiliation, making it a criminal offence that the State must deal with “accordingly” and decisively.

Conclusion: A judicious defence of Constitutional authority in divisive times

Though the Supreme Court ultimately chose not to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against Nishikant Dubey, the gravity and clarity of its reasoning left little ambiguity. The judgment stood as a powerful affirmation of judicial strength—not through punitive reaction, but through principled restraint. The Court made it clear that while it will not dignify absurd provocations with prosecution, it equally will not allow such provocations to go unanswered when they attempt to delegitimise the judiciary or inflame public sentiment through falsehood and communal rhetoric.

By firmly denouncing the baseless allegations against the Chief Justice and the institution of the Supreme Court, the bench sent an unmistakable signal: constitutional courts are neither weak nor indifferent. They are resilient, guided by law and reason, and capable of distinguishing between fair criticism and deliberate attempts to undermine the judiciary’s credibility. Crucially, the Court’s strong condemnation of hate speech—and its declaration that such divisive rhetoric must be met with an iron hand—also reflects its acute awareness of the growing threats to social cohesion and democratic integrity.

At a time when public discourse is increasingly polluted by communal polarisation and institutional mistrust, the judgment reinforced the judiciary’s dual role: as a guardian of constitutional values and as a bulwark against intolerance and authoritarianism. In choosing wisdom over outrage and clarity over confrontation, the Court not only upheld its dignity but reminded the nation that the rule of law, not the rule of noise, remains the bedrock of Indian democracy.

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The post Not Fragile, Not Silent: SC chooses principle over punishment in response to BJP MP Dubey’s outburst, reasserts role as Constitutional check appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The facts were damning. The deceased was in police custody. It was undisputed that he died of gunshot wounds inflicted by a police officer. A Magistrate’s inquiry had concluded earlier that the five policemen’s use of force was “unjustified” and noted that there were no fingerprints of the deceased on the weapon he was allegedly using. Yet, the SIT, formed by the court on April 7 under a senior, independent officer (Joint Commissioner Lakhmi Gautam), claimed it could not lodge an FIR because the victim’s father had declined to pursue the case—citing loss of faith in the system. The High Court had to remind the State that in a cognisable offence, the police are duty-bound to file an FIR suo moto. (Details of the April 7 order may be read here.)

“We all have some responsibilities. Do not let the faith of the public in the system erode,” Justice Mohite-Dere had sternly warned. Ultimately, after public embarrassment and judicial prodding, the State agreed to file an FIR by May 3, with a nominated officer from the SIT acting as complainant.

But just days later, on May 5, the Supreme Court dismantled the very framework that made the High Court’s intervention effective. Responding to a Special Leave Petition filed by the State, a bench led by Justices Bela M. Trivedi and P.B. Varale removed Joint Commissioner Gautam from the supervisory role and handed the investigation back to the Director General of Police (DGP)—a move that effectively returns control of the case to the highest ranks of the same police force being accused.

May 5: Supreme Court dilutes Bombay High Court’s SIT directive, hands probe back to police hierarchy

In a move that raises serious concerns about police accountability in custodial and encounter deaths, the Supreme Court on May 5 significantly diluted a Bombay High Court order that had mandated a court-monitored probe into the alleged fake encounter in Badlapur involving five policemen. The High Court’s order, notable for its insistence on institutional independence, had directed the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the supervision of a specific officer—Lakhmi Gautam, Joint Commissioner of Police, Mumbai. The Supreme Court has now modified that order, transferring supervisory control of the SIT to the Director General of Police (DGP), effectively returning the investigation to the top of the same law enforcement hierarchy implicated in the matter.

The bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and P.B. Varale was hearing a Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Maharashtra objecting to the High Court’s decision to name a specific officer to lead the investigation. Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, representing the State, insisted that the State had no objection to the formation of an SIT but took issue with the High Court’s direction to place the probe under Joint Commissioner Gautam. SG Mehta contended that the DGP should be the supervisory authority, citing procedural norms and the need for institutional oversight.

In its order, the Court noted that “The petitioners state of Maharashtra has approached this Court by filing SLP being aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the order to the extent of constituting the SIT in the manner directed in para 32, that is, under the supervision of Lakhmi Gautam, the Joint Commissioner of Police, Mumbai. It is submitted by learned SG Mr. Mehta that the State has no objection with the SIT being constituted, but let it be constituted under the supervision of DGP, having regard to the litigations made. Since the respondent-complaint has already withdrawn himself before the High Court, we don’t see any reason to issue notice to the Respondent.”

In response, Justice Trivedi suggested a compromise—allowing either the DGP or a nominee to head the SIT. Justice Varale went further, implicitly critiquing the High Court by observing that it should not have selected specific officers for the probe.

“Under such circumstances, having regard to the nature and seriousness of the allegations and concerns expressed by the High Court, we modify the order to the extent of constituting the SIT. We direct the SIT to be constituted by the DGP and officers selected by the DGP as deemed fit. The State shall do the needful in handing papers to DGP. We may clarify that the complaint, if he has any grievance, may approach the competent court that is the concerned magistrate or sessions court for appropriate relief. As a consequence, order dated April 30 or any order passed subsequently shall also stand modified. SLP stands disposed,” the order states.

What this line of judicial reasoning ignores, however, is precisely what necessitated the High Court’s intervention in the first place: a lack of faith in the Maharashtra police to investigate its own. The allegations involved custodial abuse and a suspected staged encounter. In such cases, courts have a duty to ensure an independent investigation that does not merely recycle command structures of the same force under scrutiny. By overturning a key portion of the High Court’s order—while ostensibly upholding the idea of an SIT—the Supreme Court has gutted the central safeguard meant to ensure impartiality.

The apex court’s order notes that since the complainant had already withdrawn from the High Court proceedings, there was no need to issue notice to him in the SLP. But this legal formality sidelines the broader public interest concern in the case—the right to life and protection against extrajudicial killings, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

In its final direction, the Court modified the Bombay High Court’s order to state that the SIT shall be constituted by the DGP, who may select officers as deemed fit. The State is directed to hand over all relevant case documents to the DGP. It further notes that the complainant, if aggrieved, can approach the magistrate or sessions court for relief—an impractical suggestion, given that systemic police impunity is precisely what triggered the demand for a more credible probe.

This development reflects a broader trend of courts increasingly deferring to state institutions—even those implicated in serious misconduct—under the guise of procedural propriety. It signals judicial hesitancy to disturb the command structure of the police, even when there are credible allegations of rights violations by officers in that very structure.

By shifting the supervision of the SIT from a court-appointed officer to the DGP—who remains an administrative appointee of the State—the Supreme Court has diluted a rare instance of judicial courage shown by the Bombay High Court. The result is a probe that now risks becoming a bureaucratic formality rather than a meaningful pursuit of truth and accountability.

The complete order may be read here.

April 30: Maharashtra Police finally agrees to file FIR in the Badlapur fake encounter case

On April 30, after prolonged delays and repeated non-compliance, the Maharashtra Police finally informed the Bombay High Court that an FIR would be registered in the Badlapur ‘fake encounter’ case by Saturday, May 3. The assurance came during a hearing before a division bench comprising Justices Revati Mohite-Dere and Dr Neela Gokhale, which had been monitoring the progress—or lack thereof—in the investigation into the death of a man in police custody.

The commitment to file the FIR was made by Public Prosecutor Hiten Venegavkar after the court issued a stern warning to both the State Police and the court-appointed Special Investigation Team (SIT). The bench expressed serious displeasure at the continued defiance of its April 7 order, which had directed the constitution of an SIT to investigate the involvement of five police officers in what was strongly suspected to be a custodial killing disguised as an encounter. The court had emphasised that the case warranted a thorough and independent investigation, especially since it was an undisputed fact that the deceased had died from bullet wounds inflicted by a police officer while he was in custody.

Justice Mohite-Dere, during the earlier order, had observed that crimes of this nature not only affect the individual victim but also shake the public’s faith in the justice system and society at large. The bench had then directed that the SIT be led by Joint Commissioner of Police Lakhmi Gautam, who was authorised to pick his own team, to be headed by a Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP). The State CID was instructed to hand over all relevant documents and case materials to the SIT within 48 hours.

Despite these clear directions, during the April 25 hearing, the court was shocked to learn that the CID had failed to transfer the necessary documents. It was only after a full day of tense proceedings—and threats of contempt action—that the CID finally agreed to comply. However, by April 30, it emerged that the SIT had still not registered an FIR. Venegavkar attempted to explain that the SIT was waiting for the father of the deceased to lodge a formal complaint.

The bench firmly rejected this reasoning, reminding the prosecution that the father had already declined to file a complaint, citing delayed justice and emotional exhaustion. The judges reiterated that it was now the duty of the SIT to proceed suo moto—on its own authority—and file the FIR without further delay. They made it unequivocally clear that the court expected nothing less than a fair, impartial, and independent investigation.

Venegavkar then sought to delay matters further, stating that the SIT needed either a formal complaint or the inquiry documents relied upon by the Magistrate, who had already concluded that the force used by the police was excessive and unjustified. The Magistrate’s report also noted that the deceased’s fingerprints were not found on the weapon allegedly used to fire at the police and questioned the police’s claim of self-defence, describing it as “suspicious and unjustified.”

These arguments did not go down well with the bench. The judges forcefully reminded the prosecutor that the SIT was fully empowered to act independently and had no excuse not to lodge an FIR when a cognisable offence had clearly been committed. “We only want an independent, fair, and impartial probe not influenced by anyone,” Justice Mohite-Dere said, as per a report in the LiveLaw, warning that the credibility of the justice system was at stake.

According to this report, Justice Gokhale, clearly frustrated, stated, “These are very sorry state of affairs… You ought to have complied with our orders. We have no option but to initiate contempt proceedings.” Justice Mohite-Dere added that the situation was “sheer misuse of the court’s time.”

Following these sharp admonishments, Venegavkar requested a short adjournment to consult with senior police officers. After the break, he returned with the submission that an SIT officer, Mangesh Desai, would be appointed as the formal complainant. Based on his complaint, the FIR would finally be registered.

April 25: Bombay High Court slams Maharashtra CID for brazen defiance, warns of criminal contempt

On April 25, the Bombay High Court had come down heavily on the Maharashtra Police, particularly the State CID, for wilfully defying its April 7 order directing the transfer of investigation in the Badlapur ‘fake’ encounter case to a court-appointed Special Investigation Team (SIT). A division bench comprising Justices Revati Mohite-Dere and Dr Neela Gokhale strongly criticised the State for what it called a “brazen violation” of its orders, warning that such conduct amounted to criminal contempt of court.

Notably, on April 7, the High Court had constituted an SIT under the leadership of IPS officer Lakhmi Gautam, the Joint Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, and directed the State CID to hand over all investigation papers to the SIT within two days. Despite the clear directive, the CID failed to comply.

During the April 25 hearing, amicus curiae and senior advocate Manjula Rao informed the court that the CID had not yet transferred the case papers. The bench further learned from a letter sent by a State-constituted Judicial Commission to the High Court Registry that it too had not received the relevant documents, exposing the extent of non-compliance.

Visibly irate, Justice Gokhale warned the CID of potential criminal contempt proceedings, stating unequivocally that orders of the court must be followed irrespective of whether the State agrees with them. According to the report in the LiveLaw, she noted that although the State had filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court challenging the April 7 order, there was no stay on the order, making it binding. “The rule of law must be followed,” she said. “Whether you agree with the order or not, you have to comply with it. Otherwise, we will be constrained to issue contempt of court proceedings.”

Justice Gokhale remarked that the CID’s refusal to act constituted a “fit case” for contempt proceedings. She emphasised that if the State was so aggrieved by the order, it should have urgently moved the Supreme Court for relief—something it had failed to do despite almost a month having passed since the order. “Speaking for myself,” she said as a report in the LiveLaw, “this is actually a brazen violation of our orders.”

Justice Mohite-Dere echoed the same concern. She noted that merely filing an SLP does not suspend the effect of a court’s directive and that State authorities cannot ignore binding orders on that basis. “What prevents you from transferring the papers?” she asked, as per LiveLaw’s report. “Is there any sanctity to our orders or not? Are you not in contempt?” She further held the SIT chief, Lakhmi Gautam, accountable for not informing the court about the non-compliance, adding that he too was potentially in contempt.

The court ordered both Gautam and a senior CID officer to appear post-lunch. When the hearing resumed, Public Prosecutor Hiten Venegavkar urged the bench to defer the matter until the Supreme Court heard the SLP. But Justice Gokhale remained unimpressed, saying: “We just cannot be waiting endlessly. You can always seek urgent listing in the apex court. It is not as if you have never done it before.”

Venegavkar then attempted to mitigate the situation by informing the court that Gautam had constituted his SIT team. However, Justice Mohite-Dere interjected sharply: “What is the use of constituting a team when they do not have the papers? What will they do—just sit around?”

Justice Gokhale added that the failure to hand over the documents was not only deliberate but also conveyed a dangerous message to the public. “What message are you giving to the citizens? That court orders are passed just for show?” she asked. “Either hand over the documents or face contempt.”

The court then directly questioned Prashant Waghunde, Superintendent of CID, Navi Mumbai, about why the documents hadn’t been handed over. Waghunde said he was acting under instructions from his superiors, but refused to name them. This evasiveness frustrated the bench further. As per the LiveLaw report, Justice Mohite-Dere said, “Your officer may be helpless, but we are not. We’re trying to protect him, but he refuses to name his superior. We didn’t want to make him a scapegoat, but he’s leaving us no choice.”

The matter was passed over multiple times to allow senior officers to reconsider. Finally, Prashant Burde, the Additional Director General of Police (State CID), appeared virtually. He apologised for the events that had transpired and assured the court that the documents would be handed over to the SIT. The judges, accepting this assurance, held back from initiating contempt proceedings—for now.

This hearing marks a critical juncture in the Badlapur ‘fake’ encounter case, highlighting serious concerns about institutional accountability, the enforcement of judicial orders, and the State’s duty to uphold the rule of law. The court’s intervention underscores its determination to ensure that justice is neither delayed nor denied, especially in cases implicating custodial killings and potential abuse of power by law enforcement officers.

Background of the case

On April 7, 2025, the Bombay High Court had ordered the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to probe the alleged fake encounter of a young man in Badlapur. The court observed that the case warranted a thorough investigation since it was undisputed that the deceased died of bullet wounds inflicted by a police officer while in custody. Emphasising that crimes committed by law enforcement impact not just individuals but the entire society, the bench warned against brushing aside the public’s legitimate interest in such investigations.

The SIT was to be led by Mumbai’s Joint Commissioner of Police, Lakhmi Gautam, who was granted the autonomy to handpick officers for the probe, which would be supervised by a Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP). The Maharashtra CID was directed to transfer all relevant documents to the SIT within two days.

The case originated from a petition filed by the parents of the accused in the 2024 Badlapur school sexual assault case, who was allegedly killed in a staged police encounter on September 23, 2024. The parents claimed that their son was murdered in custody.

During initial hearings, the High Court had criticised the State for its superficial investigation. The judges remarked that it was difficult to believe that the five police officers present in the van with the deceased were unable to restrain him and even suggested that the alleged shootout could have been avoided.

A significant development came in January 2025 when a Magistrate submitted a report under Section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The report squarely blamed the five police officers for using excessive and unjustified force. It pointed out that there were no fingerprints of the deceased on the firearm he allegedly used, and dismissed the police’s claim of acting in private defence as suspicious and unsubstantiated.

However, in a surprising turn, the deceased’s parents sought to withdraw their petition in February, citing repeated delays in the justice process. On February 6, they told the court they no longer wished to pursue the case. Notably, in December 2024, they had informed the bench that their pursuit of justice had led to their expulsion from their village, forcing them to live on the streets and beg for survival.

The very next day, on February 7, the High Court expressed shock after learning that a Thane sessions court had stayed the Magistrate’s report—one that had validated the parents’ claims and found substance in the allegations of a fake encounter. (Detailed reports may be read here, here, here and here)

Why the Bombay High Court’s orders were essential?

The Bombay High Court’s interventions in the Badlapur fake encounter case were not merely judicial oversight—they were a necessary assertion of constitutional accountability in the face of systemic police impunity. The facts were damning: the deceased was in police custody, died of bullet injuries, and a judicial inquiry found the police action unjustified. And yet, despite this, the Maharashtra Police showed blatant resistance to lodging an FIR—one of the most basic procedural requirements in any cognisable offence. It was only under sustained judicial pressure, including threats of contempt that the State relented.

The Court’s insistence on constituting a Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the direct supervision of a specific senior officer—Joint Commissioner Lakhmi Gautam—was a deliberate choice. It was designed to break the vicious cycle of internal shielding that often accompanies custodial violence cases, where the same force accused of wrongdoing is entrusted with investigating itself. The High Court recognised that institutional independence was not an abstract virtue but a practical necessity to ensure truth, justice, and public confidence in the rule of law. Its actions served as a critical check on executive inaction and obstruction.

The Supreme Court’s decision to dilute this framework—by handing the SIT back to the Director General of Police—undermines that very goal. The DGP remains the head of the police force in Maharashtra, which includes the accused officers. While technically adhering to the idea of an SIT, this move defeats its intended purpose: an independent and impartial investigation. It signals a return to hierarchical control, where influence and pressure may once again stifle accountability.

The Bombay High Court’s orders were essential because they embodied the judiciary’s duty under Article 21—to protect the right to life and dignity, especially when the violator is the State itself. In a country where custodial deaths and fake encounters are far too common and justice remains elusive, these orders were a rare moment of institutional resolve. Diluting them not only weakens the probe in the present case but sets a troubling precedent that may discourage lower courts from taking similarly bold steps in future cases of State excess.

Ultimately, the Bombay High Court did what the law demands: it held the State to its constitutional responsibilities. Its orders were essential because they confronted not just the facts of one death, but the structure of impunity that enables many more. The Supreme Court’s retreat from that framework is not just a legal recalibration—it risks becoming a moral failure.

Related:

A Judgement of Conscience: Bombay High Court orders SIT Probe into alleged fake encounter in Badlapur

Bombay High Court directs filing of a First Information Report (FIR) against the 5 cops held responsible for death of accused in Badlapur Sexual

Biased and Preconceived: Bombay HC criticises police inquiry into Parbhani custodial death of Somnath Suryawanshi

The post Judicial Setback: Supreme Court dilutes Bombay HC’s bold stand on police accountability in custodial killing in Badlapur case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

I. Policing at a Breaking Point: Undermanned, undertrained, and underprepared

The India Justice Report 2025 presents a sobering assessment: India’s policing system, crucial to the delivery of justice and maintenance of public trust, remains trapped in a cycle of chronic under-capacity, neglect of training, weak diversity, and mounting public distrust.

At the national level, India’s police-population ratio remains alarmingly low at 155 police personnel per 100,000 population, well short of the sanctioned strength of 197.5 and far below the United Nations’ recommended minimum of 222. The disparities are even more troubling at the state level: Bihar, for instance, deploys just 81 police personnel per lakh, leaving communities drastically underserved.

This shortage is amplified by high vacancy rates. As of 2023, 22% of sanctioned posts across all ranks were vacant nationally, with states like Uttar Pradesh facing a vacancy rate exceeding 25%. Recruitment drives have been sporadic and insufficient, with training capacities unable to keep up with even existing personnel needs.

Training, the backbone of effective policing, is gravely underfunded. States on average allocate only 1.25% of their police budgets to training, with only four states exceeding the 2% threshold. Further, only five states possess fully accredited police training academies. Specialised training in crucial areas such as cybercrime investigation, gender sensitisation, juvenile justice, and forensic handling remains thin and inconsistent across the country.

The crisis in forensic staffing exacerbates poor investigative quality: Half of all sanctioned forensic posts nationally remain vacant. Without adequate forensic support, investigations falter, leading to delayed trials, wrongful acquittals, or even wrongful convictions.

Infrastructure modernisation, while visible in patches, remains uneven.

• 83% of police stations now have at least one CCTV camera, yet compliance with Paramvir Singh Saini Supreme Court standards is inconsistent.
• 78% of police stations have set up women’s helpdesks, yet no state or UT meets its internal reservation targets for women in police, where the national average stands at a low 12%. Only Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chandigarh, Ladakh, and Tamil Nadu show movement towards the 33% target.

Urban-rural divides sharpen the challenges: Between 2017 and 2022, urban police stations increased by 4%, while rural police stations declined by 7%. In rural areas, each station covers an average of 300 square kilometres, compared to just 20 square kilometres for urban stations — dramatically limiting police accessibility for rural citizens.

Community policing initiatives — vital for building local trust — remain poorly institutionalised. Few states maintain dedicated community policing units or trained officers, and even where they exist, budgetary support is minimal.

Digitisation efforts such as the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS) and the Interoperable Criminal Justice System (ICJS) have made gains.
However, infrastructural bottlenecks — poor internet, electricity issues, and limited digital literacy among police — undermine their potential.

Gender diversity: The national benchmark for women’s representation in the police is 33 per cent, as advised by the central government in 2009. As of January 2023, the overall representation of women in the police (the civil police, District Armed Reserve [DAR], Special Armed Police Battalion, and Indian Reserve Battalion [IRB]) across all states and UTs stood at only 12.3 per cent, a modest rise from 11.7 per cent in January 2022. Among the large and mid-sized states, Bihar, at 24 per cent, now leads in women’s representation in the police, surpassing Andhra Pradesh (22%). Bihar also recorded the highest growth, from 21 per cent in 2022 to 24 per cent in 2023. Conversely, nine states/UTs,49 including Telangana, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal, saw declines, and seventeen states/UTs still report women’s representation below 10 per cent. Multiple MHA advisories have recommended three women Sub-Inspectors (SI) and 10 women constables in each police station. With little change over 2022, except Delhi, no state/UT meets this benchmark for SIs

Caste representation: Representation of under-represented caste groups are set by each state in line with its population mix. As of January 2023, Karnataka stands out as the only state to consistently achieve its targets across all three reserved groups, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Castes, both at the officer and the constabulary levels.

• Scheduled caste- Only four states (Gujarat, Manipur, Karnataka, and Himachal Pradesh) met their SC quotas at both officer and constabulary levels. Goa is the only other state to meet its target at the officer ranks. Sikkim, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Kerala met their quotas only at the constabulary level. Uttar Pradesh (61%), Rajasthan (52%), Tripura (47%), and Bihar (42%) faced the largest deficits in SC officer appointments.
• Scheduled Tribes- Several states have made significant strides in improving Scheduled Tribe (ST) representation within their police forces, with Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, and Karnataka demonstrating good performance by meeting their ST targets across both officer and constabulary ranks. However, Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Tripura exhibit the highest shortfalls among ST Officers. Punjab has a 25 per cent quota for STs; it records only 3 ST Officers, equivalent to a 0.11 per cent representation or a shortfall of 99.8 per cent.
• Other Backward Classes: Nine states/UTs63 among those with quotas64 for Other Backward Classes (OBC) at the officer level have successfully met their targets. Tamil Nadu, Sikkim, and Kerala have over 40 per cent reservation for OBCs; in this instance, Tamil Nadu has exceeded its quota but Kerala and Sikkim have shortfalls of 7 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively.

The India Justice Report concludes bluntly: Without radical investment in human resources, serious upgrading of forensic and digital capacities, targeted gender inclusion and caste diversity, and strengthening rural policing, India’s policing system risks becoming increasingly irrelevant, reactive, and distrusted.

II. Prisons in Freefall: Overcrowded, underserved, and forgotten

India’s prison system, already strained, has now reached crisis proportions.
The India Justice Report 2025 reveals a sector overwhelmed by overcrowding, underfunding, systemic understaffing, and the abandonment of rehabilitation as a serious goal. Over the past decade, India’s prison population has expanded by almost 50%, while corresponding increases in infrastructure, medical care, or staffing have remained grossly inadequate. The national average prison occupancy stands at a shocking 131%, and 176 prisons operate at 200% occupancy or more. Several prisons house four times their sanctioned capacity.

Even more troubling is the composition of the prison population: 76% are undertrials — individuals who have not yet been convicted but are imprisoned due to sluggish police investigations, delayed trials, or systemic barriers to bail. In 20 states and UTs, more than 20% of undertrials have been detained between one to three years, without being found guilty.

Period of Detention: On average undertrials are spending more time than ever before in pre-trial detention. At the end of 2022, 11,448 or 2.6 per cent had spent more than five years in pretrial detention. This is considerably higher than the 5,011 in 2019 and 2,028 in 2012. Worryingly, Uttar Pradesh alone accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the undertrials who had spent more than five years in detention.

Infrastructure and healthcare deficits are appalling:

• According to the Supreme Court-appointed Amitava Roy Committee, only 68% of inmates have access to basic sleeping space.
• Health services are grossly underprovided: many prisons have one doctor for several hundred prisoners, whereas standards require one doctor for every 300 inmates.
• Mental health services are practically absent: out of 5.7 lakh prisoners, there are only 25 sanctioned psychologists or psychiatrists nationally, and 25 states/UTs have sanctioned none.

Staffing shortages exacerbate the situation:

• Nationally, over 33% of sanctioned prison posts remain vacant.
• Guard-to-inmate ratios in many states are as high as one guard per 80–100 prisoners, against the recommended 1:6 ratio, compromising safety and order.

Welfare spending is neglected: Less than 1% of prison budgets are allocated for rehabilitation, education, vocational training, or prisoner welfare. Funds earmarked for these purposes are often underutilised or redirected toward basic administrative costs.

Despite the adoption of forward-looking policies like the Model Prison Manual 2016 and the Model Prison and Correctional Services Act 2023, real transformation remains minimal. While 86% of prisons have introduced video conferencing facilities for court appearances, this has not significantly reduced trial delays or undertrial detention periods.

Legal aid services inside prisons are patchy:

• Only 67% of prisons have functional legal aid clinics.
• Where available, lawyers are poorly compensated (between ₹500–₹1000 per case), leading to low commitment and high absenteeism.

Open prisons — proven internationally to reduce recidivism — exist in only 16 states, covering a minuscule fraction of eligible inmates.

The situation for women prisoners is even worse:

• Sanctioned budgets for maternity and childcare are inadequate.
• Many prisons lack gender-sensitive facilities like private counselling spaces or sufficient women staff.

Deaths in custody, both natural and unnatural, have risen between 2017 and 2022 — a grim indicator of the system’s growing brutality.

The India Justice Report warns unambiguously: Until governments prioritise prison reforms with serious budgetary commitment, robust healthcare staffing, expanded rehabilitation services, and genuine decongestion measures, prisons will continue to be spaces of injustice, suffering, and lost human potential.

Conclusion: A justice delivery chain under threat

India’s police and prison systems form two vital links in the chain of justice.
Today, both are stretched to breaking point — one unable to protect citizens effectively, the other compounding injustice by warehousing them indefinitely.

The India Justice Report 2025 demands nothing less than a structural overhaul:

• Massive recruitment drives and specialised training
• Scientific and gender-diverse policing
• Investment in forensic and digital infrastructure
• Aggressive decongestion of prisons
• Rehabilitation-driven prisoner management
• Guaranteeing legal aid access and prison healthcare

The complete report may be read here.

Related:

India’s Free Speech Crisis Deepens: 329 violations recorded in just four months of 2025

Underfunded, Overburdened, and Unjust: The national verdict from the India Justice Report 2025

Echoes of Hate: Online anti-Muslim hate spreads against Muslim businesses and workers after Pahalgam attack

The post A System Under Strain: India’s police and prisons in crisis shows Indian Justice Report 2025 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The petitioner, who had already been declared an Indian citizen by a Foreigners Tribunal in 2016, was again dragged into a fresh proceeding on the same allegation without any new material—exposing her to renewed trauma and the looming threat of statelessness. The Supreme Court’s decision to quash this second proceeding not only provides much-needed relief in her individual case but also sets an important precedent against the misuse of the Foreigners Act, 1946, as a tool for repeated harassment. This ruling strikes at the heart of Assam’s flawed citizenship adjudication process and re-establishes critical safeguards against bureaucratic overreach.

Citizenship cases: Double jeopardy, a tool used by the state in Assam

The order concerns Tarabhanu Khatoon @ Tarabhanu Bibi, a resident of Nalbari district in Assam, who became the subject of repeated proceedings under the Foreigners Act, 1946. She was first served notice in FT Case No. 269/2016 before the Foreigners Tribunal, Nalbari (at Mukalmua), on the suspicion that she was an illegal migrant from Bangladesh, having allegedly entered India after the cutoff date of March 25, 1971—a date fixed by the Assam Accord and adopted into Section 6A of the Citizenship Act.

In her defence, Tarabhanu submitted strong documentary evidence, including:

• Names of her father and grandfather in the 1966 and 1970 electoral rolls, predating the 1971 cutoff.
• Her own name appearing in voter lists since 1985.
• Oral testimony corroborating her ancestry and residence in India.

Crucially, the State failed to lead any evidence—no witness appeared, and no documentation proving illegal entry was produced. Consequently, the Tribunal on August 31, 2016 declared her to be not a foreigner, effectively affirming her Indian citizenship.

Despite this adjudication, she was again issued a notice on December 15, 2018 in FT Case No. 695/2018, accusing her of being a Bangladeshi national—based on the same allegation and without any fresh material evidence. This triggered a fresh round of litigation and mental trauma, prompting her to challenge the second proceeding.

The Gauhati High Court’s Error: Failure to quash repetitive proceedings

The matter was first heard by the Gauhati High Court, which refused to quash the second FT proceedings, instead stating that she was free to raise her defence before the Tribunal again. The High Court appeared to treat the second notice as if it were procedurally valid, overlooking the fact that a final and binding decision had already been passed in 2016 on the very same issue.

This approach effectively undermined the principle of legal finality, suggesting that citizenship could be questioned ad infinitum, thereby exposing individuals to repeated harassment, legal costs, and potential detention.

Supreme Court’s Ruling: Finality, fairness, and res judicata in citizenship adjudication

A bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice K.V. Viswanathan delivered a decisive ruling in favour of the appellant. It held that once a Foreigners Tribunal had given a final finding after providing due opportunity to both sides, the State could not initiate a second proceeding unless it had either:

1. Challenged the original order before the High Court, or
2. Sought a recall of the Tribunal’s order on valid legal grounds.

As no such challenge or recall was made, and no provision for review had been brought to the Court’s attention, the earlier 2016 order stood final. The Supreme Court cited its own precedent in Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India (2019), reiterating that Foreigners Tribunal decisions have binding effect and attract the doctrine of res judicata.

“Once it is not in dispute that on a previous reference the Tribunal after giving opportunity to both sides, on appraisal of evidence, found the appellant not a foreigner, the only course available for the respondent was either to challenge the order before the High Court or seek for its recall on grounds permissible for recall. As no provision for review exists, at least not shown to us, so long the earlier order stands, it is not open to initiate fresh proceedings as the same would be hit by principles of res judicata as held by this Court in Abdul Kuddus.” (Para 9)

In scathing terms, the Court stated in its order that:

“…the subsequent proceedings were nothing but an abuse of the process of law, and therefore, the High Court ought to have interdicted the same.” (Para 9)

The Court’s key observations include:

• There is no provision in the Foreigners Act or allied rules that allows the government to reopen a decided case without following due legal procedures.
• The Tribunal’s 2016 decision was final and binding, having been rendered after due process and full opportunity of hearing to both parties.
• The Supreme Court reaffirmed its precedent in Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India (2019), where it had held that Tribunal orders are quasi-judicial in nature and attract the doctrine of res judicata.

The order rejected the Assam government’s argument that the earlier order was “cryptic”, observing that even if the State found the Tribunal’s reasoning inadequate, its remedy lay in challenging the order legally—not by launching a parallel proceeding. The Court emphasised that allowing multiple and unregulated proceedings on the same issue would destroy the rule of law and severely erode individual liberties.

The complete order may be read here.

Wider significance: A critical check on state overreach in citizenship verification

This order is pivotal, especially in the context of Assam’s fraught citizenship verification machinery, which includes:

• Thousands of cases of double or multiple notices being issued against the same person.
• Use of ex parte orders when individuals fail to appear, sometimes due to lack of notice or financial hardship.
• Detention centres housing individuals for years based on flawed or unchallenged tribunal findings.
• Misuse of Border Police references, often without investigation, disproportionately targeting Bengali-speaking Muslims and other minorities.

It is essential to note that the State of Assam had every opportunity to challenge the 2016 order of the Tribunal, either by filing a review, a recall, or a writ petition, but did none of these. By clearly articulating that re-litigation is impermissible unless prior orders are overturned through proper legal avenues, the Supreme Court has sent a strong message to both the State of Assam and the Foreigners Tribunals to operate within constitutional bounds.

Moreover, this ruling reaffirms that citizenship is a fundamental right, not a bureaucratic uncertainty, and legal finality must be respected to ensure dignity and security of individuals. It also strengthens the rule of law in an area often marked by arbitrariness, communal bias, and procedural irregularities.

Conclusion: A shield against bureaucratic harassment

The Supreme Court’s decision in Tarabhanu Khatoon is more than just a personal victory for the petitioner—it is a significant verdict that draws a firm line against state overreach in citizenship determination. It ensures that once nationality is established, it cannot be questioned endlessly, especially by the same state machinery that failed to prove its case in the first instance.

In a region where identity, citizenship, and belonging have become matters of constant suspicion and state scrutiny, this order restores an essential balance between state power and individual rights, laying down that citizenship cannot be treated as a moving target—especially for India’s most vulnerable.

Related:

Uttarakhand High Court slams police and authority for failure in maintain law and order

Foreigner in Life, Indian in Death: The cruel end of Abdul Matleb in assam’s detention camp

28,000 cases withdrawn or votes secured? Assam CM’s move to drop ‘Foreigner’ cases against Koch Rajbongshi promise under scrutiny

Assam govt to SC: 33/63 of those marked for ‘deportation’ are contesting ‘foreigner’ status in courts

The post “Nothing but an abuse of the process of law”: SC bars second Foreigners Tribunal case against same person, reinforces finality of citizenship verdicts appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Case in Brief: From suspension to the Supreme Court

Ramadas K.S., a first-generation learner from a Dalit family in Kerala, first joined TISS in 2015 to pursue a Master’s in Media and Cultural Studies. In 2021, he enrolled in the integrated MPhil-PhD programme in Development Studies. His academic record earned him a National Fellowship for Scheduled Caste candidates in 2023, awarded by the Union Ministry of Social Justice following his successful performance in the UGC-NET examination.

In April 2024, Dalit PhD scholar Ramdas was suspended for two years by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), sparking widespread concern about academic freedom and political expression on Indian campuses. The disciplinary action was triggered by his participation in a protest against the BJP government and the National Education Policy during a Parliament March in Delhi, organised under the banner of the Progressive Students’ Forum–TISS (PSF–TISS). The institute claimed that by using the name “TISS” in posters and slogans, Ramdas had given the impression that the institute endorsed the protest, thereby bringing it into disrepute.

The institute also cited past instances of activism, including an overnight protest outside the TISS Director’s residence and a social media post encouraging students to watch Ram Ke Naam, a documentary critical of Hindutva politics. According to TISS, this pattern of “repetitive misconduct” and prioritising political activity over academics justified the suspension. Ramdas, who was on a scholarship from the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, also had his fellowship withheld.

In May 2024, Ramdas challenged the suspension before the Bombay High Court, arguing that it violated his fundamental rights, particularly his freedom of expression and association. However, in a verdict delivered in March 2025, the High Court upheld the suspension, stating that while Ramdas had a right to his political views, he had crossed the line by linking those views with the institute’s name. The judgment has since raised alarm among student groups and civil society over its implications for dissent in academic spaces. Pursuant to the judgment delivered by the High Court, Ramdas had moved the Supreme Court.

Detailed analysis of the Bombay HC order may be read here.

Before the Supreme Court: Arguments and considerations

At the Supreme Court, the petitioner was represented by Senior Advocate and Former Chief Justice of Orissa High Court Dr. S. Muralidhar, who pressed for immediate relief and reinstatement. As per LiveLaw, the counsel had argued that the disciplinary proceedings lacked fairness and transparency, and that the two-year suspension imposed on a student nearing the completion of his PhD would irreparably harm his academic career. It was submitted that a student’s future should not be sacrificed for alleged procedural lapses, especially when adequate time had passed and there had been no recurrence of misconduct.

On the other side, Advocate Mr. Rajeev K. Pandey represented TISS. According to the report of LiveLaw, the institute maintained that it had acted within its rights, asserting that the Code of Conduct was binding on all students, and that institutional autonomy in disciplinary matters should be respected by the courts. TISS did not appear to offer any concessions during the hearing, nor did it appear inclined to revoke the suspension voluntarily.

Supreme Court’s Reasoning: Pragmatism over prolonged punishment

The Supreme Court Bench, comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, took a notably restrained and equitable approach. In its brief but effective order, the Court consciously chose not to delve into the factual or legal merits of the suspension or the underlying allegations. Instead, it focused on the broader question of what justice required at this stage.

Acknowledging that more than a year had passed since the suspension order, the Court observed that “interest of justice would be best served if the said order does not continue to operate any longer.” This key observation, reported by LiveLaw, reflects a pragmatic judicial philosophy: once sufficient time has elapsed, and where the balance of convenience shifts in favour of a student’s rehabilitation, the punitive aspect of suspension should not be allowed to frustrate academic aspirations.

The Bench further noted that their intervention was being made without expressing any opinion on the original suspension decision or on the validity of the High Court’s ruling. This hands-off approach allowed the Court to grant relief without undermining the autonomy of the educational institution or setting a precedent of judicial overreach in disciplinary matters.

“Without examining the claims and counter-claims on merits, we feel that TISS having suspended the petitioner on 18th April, 2024 and lapsing of more than a year since then, interest of justice would be best served if the order of suspension is not continued further and he be permitted to pursue the PhD course in TISS” the Court stated in its order.

The complete order may be viewed here.

Final directions of the court

Accordingly, the Supreme Court issued the following directions:

1. The suspension order dated 18 April 2024 was set aside prospectively, i.e., it would no longer remain in operation from the date of the Supreme Court’s order.
2. Ramadas was permitted to resume his PhD course at TISS with immediate effect.
3. He was directed to “faithfully observe the Code of Conduct” of the institution during the remainder of his academic tenure.
4. The institute was granted liberty to take appropriate action should there be any further breach of conduct in the future.

Why this order matters

This ruling is important on multiple counts. First, it signals the judiciary’s role in protecting students from unnecessarily harsh and extended disciplinary actions that could cause disproportionate harm. The Supreme Court chose not to scrutinise the conduct allegations or institutional procedures in depth. Instead, it applied a time-sensitive, equity-based lens, recognising that the ultimate objective of educational discipline must be reformative—not vindictive.

Second, the case shows a subtle but important rebalancing of power between students and universities. While the Court did not curtail the institution’s authority to impose discipline or to revisit misconduct in the future, it sent a clear message: institutional autonomy cannot become a shield for actions that deny students the opportunity to complete their education, particularly when the situation is remediable and the student expresses a willingness to comply with norms.

Third, the decision upholds a compassionate and constructive vision of higher education. It recognises that students are not beyond redemption and that access to education is a fundamental pathway for growth, especially in a public institution like TISS, known for its role in nurturing social science scholarship and public service.

Reactions and significance of the verdict

The Supreme Court’s intervention has been widely hailed by student and rights-based organisations as a critical reaffirmation of campus democracy and educational equity. The Dalit Shoshan Mukti Manch (DSMM) and Jati Ant Sangharsh Samiti-Maharashtra (JASS) welcomed the verdict as a corrective to the “arbitrary” and “discriminatory” action of the TISS administration.

In a joint statement, they described the verdict as a “victory for student rights” and a strong message in favour of protecting the rights of students from marginalised communities who voice dissent against state policies. “Denying education to students is not merely a personal setback—it’s a fundamental rights issue,” they asserted.

As per a report of The Wire, Ramadas echoed this sentiment in a heartfelt Facebook post following the verdict, stating:

“On the 366th day of legal proceedings since approaching the High Court, I am officially a student again – from today – at the very institution that denied me education 380 days ago. This fight was never just about one student. It was about the fundamental rights of many and the soul of campus democracy.”

“Surviving in a city like Mumbai without access to education and financial support is not easy, but challenging the suspension was the only way forward. I’m happy that I can now return to my studies,” he told EdexLive.

He also expressed solidarity with student struggles at other universities including Jamia Millia Islamia, Jadavpur University, and Ambedkar University Delhi.

Ramadas acknowledged the significance of this solidarity, “I’m grateful for the support I received from the student community, including those at TISS and various student organisations across India. Human rights activists, writers, journalists, and others in civil society all stood in solidarity with me. It meant a lot.”

However, he also emphasised the darker side of his battle. “I cannot forget the cyberbullying and slander campaigns that took place, and the threats I received in different languages. I hope this ends now,” he added, while speaking to EdexLive.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s order in Ramadas KS’s case is an instructive example of judicial pragmatism and humaneness. Without interfering with the autonomy of academic institutions or opening a floodgate for challenges to disciplinary actions, the Court crafted a path that allowed a student to return to his studies without formally ruling on the merits of the dispute.

In a time when student rights and institutional discipline often find themselves in conflict, this judgment reminds us that the pursuit of justice sometimes lies not in prolonged legal battles, but in timely, balanced, and forward-looking solutions.

Related:

Revoke suspension of Dalit scholar, Ramadas: TISS action condemned

Dissent Under Siege: Police action, suspensions, and the shrinking democratic space at TISS

2025 NCERT Textbooks: Mughals, Delhi Sultanate out; ‘sacred geography’, Maha Kumbh in

The post “Let the Suspension Not Continue Further”: Supreme Court allows Dalit scholar to resume PhD at TISS appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Petition filed by accused’s wife against demolition notice

The Court was hearing a petition titled Husan Begum v State of Uttarakhand, [WPCRL/419/2025], filed by the accused’s wife, Husan Begum. She challenged a three-day demolition notice issued by the local municipal body for their family home, where she stated they have been residing for over 20 years without ever receiving any encroachment notice prior to this.

Her plea also raised alarm over ongoing communal violence and threats to her family, citing the urgency of police protection in the volatile atmosphere. She argued that the short notice period made it impossible to respond, especially since all documentation related to the house was managed by her husband, who is currently in custody.

HC flags violation of Supreme Court orders on demolitions

The High Court expressed grave concern over the issuance of the demolition notice, deeming it a direct violation of the Supreme Court’s directives aimed at preventing unlawful demolitions of properties belonging to accused individuals. Citing a landmark ruling from November 2024, the Supreme Court had clearly stated that no demolition should occur without a prior show cause notice—returnable either as per local laws or within 15 days, whichever is later.

The High Court sternly warned, “We are issuing contempt and we are taking it up seriously. You cannot violate the Supreme Court order. It was not passed eons ago… The Supreme Court has been very clear: if you want to demolish a house, what is the procedure…” as Bar and Bench reported

[BREAKING] “Incompetent”: Uttarakhand High Court slams police for communal violence in Nainital after rape of minor; pulls up municipal body for bid to demolish house of accusedhttps://t.co/4c1UDtxEmL

— Bar and Bench (@barandbench) May 2, 2025

Administrative failure and police incompetence in maintaining law & order

The Bench criticised the district administration and Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) PS Meena for failing to prevent mob attacks and vandalism in the market area housing Usman’s office. The judges noted with concern the destruction of property—including that of unrelated individuals like a woman named Bimla Devi—and questioned the police’s apparent inability to contain the situation, Bar and Bench reported.

“Your incompetence leads to all these problems and you want to cover it up. Shops belonging to everybody… some Bimla Devi, why was her shop ransacked?” the Court asked pointedly, emphasising the systemic failure of the law enforcement apparatus, as reported

Demolition amidst mob violence: legal and ethical violations

According to Live Law, taking oral note of the “disturbing” series of events, the Bench lambasted the municipal council for flouting Supreme Court orders. “Tell us why we should not initiate suo moto contempt against you?…The Supreme Court has considered all these kinds of issues, especially in this background and you all go on a rampage like this, what is this?… We will take up contempt seriously,” the Court remarked.

The municipal body’s counsel responded by tendering an unconditional apology and assured the Court that the demolition notice would be withdrawn. “Immediately, all the notices will be withdrawn. We can only proceed as per the Supreme Court’s order,” the counsel submitted.

Communal violence following rape allegation against 76-years-old Muslim man

Sabrang India reports that communal violence erupted on May 1, a day after the police registered a complaint alleging the rape of a 12-year-old girl by Muhammad Usman. Right-wing protesters took to the streets demanding swift action, which soon escalated into targeted attacks and destruction of property in Nainital. The accused’s wife subsequently approached the Court not only to challenge the demolition notice but also to seek police protection amidst threats to her family.

The Court was also informed of an altercation that occurred when the accused was produced before the trial court, during which his lawyer faced interference. The judges were quick to condemn the incident. “How can lawyers prevent anybody from representing anyone…” They added that the entire situation was avoidable had the police exercised due vigilance, and inquired, “What action have you taken against arsonists?”

Administration urged to remain unemotional, act lawfully

The Bench made an indirect reference to the aftermath of the recent Pahalgam terror attack in Jammu & Kashmir, particularly citing the dignity and restraint shown by Himanshi Narwal, wife of slain Navy Lieutenant Vinay Narwal. She had publicly rejected hatred against Muslims and Kashmiris, calling only for peace.

Quoting her implicitly, the Court remarked, “Can somebody access the Times Of India… that wife of that slain Navy officer, please read her statement… please read that statement… The Naval officer, who was killed… See public may get emotional, can the administration get emotional?” as per Live Law report.

The Court advised the government counsel not to get swayed by emotion but to act strictly in accordance with law, reinforcing the principle that legal procedures cannot be abandoned under the pressure of public outrage.

Advocate Dr. Kartikeya Hari Gupta appeared for the petitioner, Husan Begum. The matter is scheduled for further hearing on May 6. The Court reiterated that the actions of the authorities would continue to be scrutinized, especially in light of Supreme Court precedent and the ongoing threat to the rule of law posed by emotionally driven administrative decisions.

Related:

Nainital on communal edge after 75-year-old Muslim man booked for alleged rape of minor girl

Supreme Court halts nationwide demolitions through interim order, emphasising the ethos of the Constitution

Supreme Court reinforces due process in demolition cases, lays down stringent guidelines to prevent arbitrary demolitions

The post Uttarakhand High Court slams police and authority for failure in maintain law and order appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Somnath Suryawanshi, a 35-year-old aspirant who had travelled from Pune to Parbhani to appear for a law entrance examination, was among the 50 individuals detained by the Parbhani police on December 11 and 12, 2024, in connection with the violence that erupted after the desecration of a replica of the Constitution on December 10. Suryawanshi was allegedly picked up by the police on December 11. He died four days later, on December 15, while in judicial custody. According to police accounts, he collapsed due to shock from multiple injuries and was taken to a government hospital after complaining of chest pain inside the Parbhani district central prison.

However, a magisterial inquiry concluded on March 20, 2025, had clearly held the police responsible for Suryawanshi’s custodial death. In response, the Maharashtra State Human Rights Commission had issued notices to top state officials, including the Chief Secretary, Additional Chief Secretary (Home), Additional Director General of Police (CID – Crime), and the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Parbhani, seeking comprehensive reports.

Representing the petitioner Vijayabai Vyankat Suryawanshi, the deceased’s mother, advocate Prakash Ambedkar, assisted by advocates Sandesh More and Hitendra Gandhi, strongly argued for immediate registration of an FIR against the police officers allegedly responsible. The petitioner further demanded the constitution of a court-monitored Special Investigation Team (SIT) to ensure an independent and impartial probe into the custodial death. Advocate Gandhi questioned the credibility of a police-led inquiry in a case where the police are themselves accused, asserting that continuing the current investigation would only further erode public trust in the system.

Drawing parallels with the precedent set in the 2023 Badlapur custodial death case, where the Bombay High Court had ordered an SIT to probe the custodial killing of Akshay Shinde—an accused in a sexual assault case allegedly killed in a staged encounter—advocate Gandhi urged the court to issue similar directions in Suryawanshi’s case. In the Badlapur matter, Justices Revati Mohite Dere and Neela Gokhale had ordered an SIT led by Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime), Mumbai, Lakhmi Gautam, and allowed him to form his own team, led by a Deputy Commissioner of Police, with officers from any department of his choosing.

During Tuesday’s proceedings, public prosecutor A.B. Girase, representing the Maharashtra government, informed the court that the state intends to file an affidavit in response to the concerns raised.

The court’s restraint order, along with its strong observations, underscores a growing judicial intolerance toward the mishandling of custodial death investigations. It also signals a potential shift towards stricter judicial oversight in such cases. If the court accedes to the petitioner’s demand for an SIT and guidelines for handling custodial deaths, the outcome of this case could have far-reaching consequences for accountability mechanisms in police custody cases across the state.

Related:

Magistrate probe indicts Parbhani police in Somnath Suryawanshi custodial death: MSHRC

Parbhani police under scrutiny: Fact-finding report exposes allegations of brutality, illegality, and constitutional violations

Massive all-party march in Parbhani demands justice for Dalit youth’s custodial death

Special Report: ‘They came like monkeys; they came like Nazis.’ Ambedkari Bastis in Parbhani face the traumas of police brutality

The post Biased and Preconceived: Bombay HC criticises police inquiry into Parbhani custodial death of Somnath Suryawanshi appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The proceedings for these arrests, six in total,   including three retired teachers and a government employee, for various social media posts—ranging from questioning government failures to allegedly defaming Prime Minister Narendra Modi– in the context of the Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir were made in quick moves,  while  no strict and concrete actions  have been taken against those openly calling for violence against minorities, secular persons, and Opposition party members,  is the allegation against the police and their policies.

The recent arrests reportedly came after some ‘Hindu activists’, identifying themselves as ‘sanatanis’, marched the streets or lodged police complaints, even  branding the accused as “communists and anti-nationals”. They reportedly also unleashed a campaign for these arrests through online posts.

Among those arrested are:

Jahar Debnath, a retired teacher from Ambassa in the Dhalai district in Tripura, who is alleged to have questioned the “perceived silence of Hindu deities during the killing of Hindus in Pahalgam” in a social media post. In another post, he demanded punishment for supporters of the Pahalgam attackers: “Those who support the brutality of Pahalgam should be hanged publicly.” Before his arrest, Debnath could issue a statement saying: “If any of my posts hurt anyone, I apologize (in the context of questioning ‘silence’).”

Kuldip Mondol, a Students Federation of India (SFI) leader, from the same locality, was arrested for “supporting Debnath” and “expressing similar views”. Both were labelled as “communist” and “anti-national” by so-called ‘sanatanis’.

Debnath and Mandal have been charged under stringent Sections 152 and 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and others. Section 152 criminalises inciting secession or rebellion against India, punishable by life imprisonment. Section 299 punishes deliberate insults to religious feelings, carrying up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine. Both are under five days of judicial custody.

Sajal Chakraborty, a retired teacher from a northern Tripura sub-division, Dharmanagar, is said to have questioned intelligence failure in a social media post, suggesting similarities of Pahalgam with the Pulwama attack and its possible electoral implications. He demanded the resignation of Home Minister Amit Shah for the “lapses”. In a comment on someone else’s post, he also  suggested that with elections due in Uttar Pradesh, Assam, West Bengal and Kerala, such an incident appeared “an attempt to gather support”.

Chakraborty has been charged under BNS Sections of 196, 352 and 353, for allegedly promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintaining harmony. Section 196 criminalises actions or speech that incite hatred or disharmony between communities. Section 353 addresses statements or information that could lead to public mischief, fear, or harm, particularly when they incite hatred or enmity between different groups. Section 352 addresses the offense of intentional insult with the intent to provoke a breach of peace. It penalizes individuals who deliberately insult others, knowing or intending that their actions will incite a person to disturb public order or commit a crime.

Prabir Chaudhuri, another retired teacher from Dharmanagar, was arrested in follow-up action after a group of BJP kariyakartas complained against him a day after Chakraborty’s arrest, for commenting “right” etc., on a post by Chakraborty.

Mansoor Ali, a government employee in the state fire department, was arrested by the Dharmanagar police for posting images “defaming PM Modi, HM Amit Shah, and Assam CM Himanta Biswa Sarma.”

In all the cases, certain saffron brigade  or BJP leaders are said to have filed cases or complaints.

Jahirul Islam from Sonamura, a religious minority-predominated sub-division in the Western Tripura, was arrested for a social media post for allegedly issuing a warning of violence against the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. He has been granted bail.

The R K Pur police of the Gomati district arrested one Sadek Miah at his home from another district in an ‘wee hours operation’  for allegedly posting defaming content against the Prime Minister, said an police officer adding that there is another accused of the same kind, and the youths might have been misguided.

The arrests come in the backdrop of members of some saffron-aligned groups openly spreading hate against a religious  minority community.  For instance, Tripura Yuba Morcha (a ruling BJP affiliate) state spokesperson Amlan Mukherjee, in his posts, has labelled members of the religious minority community as “terrorists”. He has allegedly called upon ‘Bengali Hindus’ to stop donating blood (for patients), and vowed not to donate blood to ‘*****’.  In another post, the BJP youth leader has even reportedly made derogatory remarks “connecting the birth of ‘secular Left and Congress’ activists”. Mimicking the colonial British paraphrase of “Dogs and Indians…”, he has displayed a poster on his Facebook page, “Dogs and ****** are not allowed.”

It may be mentioned that BJP is in alliance with two Scheduled Tribe- based parties, IPFT and Tipra Motha, and has been running the state government.

In contrast to the arrests, questions are being raised as to why the police are yet to take firm action against those spreading hate  against the minority community and  attempting to promote  enmity among different communities via social media posts and videos. For instance, a purported video circulating on social media openly threatens gory physical violence against Muslims and secular voices, posted by one Chandan Debnath of Belonia in South Tripura.

In the wee hours, the police reportedly took Debnath to the police station and released him on a personal bond. This reporter spoke to the OC, who said they prosecuted him under BNSS 126 and BNSS 129. Several lawyers, who have been watching these proceedings,  opining to the action that came  after days from postings of the alleged video,  commented, ” Too little” and “Too late”.

The retired teachers or a youth, who raised questions, and demanded the Home Minister’s resignation for “lapses” or saw the possibility of national tragedies turning into electoral gains, are being prosecuted in almost a lightning speed.

Those lawyers pointed, ” Jahar Debnath, Kuldip Mondol were arrested within 24-hours after they wrote those posts, and under stringent sections, while Chandan Debnath got  a walk-in and go home chance.”

No action has also been taken against several persons affiliated with Sangh   outfits, such as one Pranab Das, a teacher from Sabroom, a southern sub-division, who called for violence against minorities  as well as “Secular Hindus, Congress, Trinamool and CPI(M)” in a social median post.

“No ****** can live in our Tripura and India. If you see any ****** kill them and also kill Secular Hindus, Congress, Trinamool and CPI (M),” he reportedly wrote.

The crackdown drive by Tripura Police seems to have mainly focused on those questioning the State’s failures, crticising BJP leaders,  or  religious narratives disliked by the saffron brigade. BJP youth leader Mukherjee’s communal posts continue without facing any legal action.

A right wing  group at the Gomati district headquarters had  been staging demonstrations  from the morning blocking a highway bridge  demanding the arrest of a youth who, according to them, made inappropriate remarks against a deity. They chanted slogans like, “We will peel off skin,” and, “Wherever he is on this planet, he should be arrested.” However, there have also been alleged derogatory remarks against other religious figure.The police gave them an undertaking to arrest the accused in a time bound manner by completing tasks of  deporting him from abroad!

A section of people perceived to be from the intellectual class, such as physicians and journalists, are also highly  active in hate-mongering.

The complaint leading to the arrest of Jahar Debnath and Kuldip Mandal was filed by Parashar Biswas, a local press reporter. Ironically, Biswas himself had recently posted inflammatory content suggesting that “tip-clipped” (circumcised?) people from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and ‘here’ should be killed. No police action has been taken against him either.

An influential leader of government doctors in Tripura, Dr. Ajoy Biswas, mocked ‘Bapu’ in a post, writing: “If Bapu were alive today, he would have gone on a hunger strike unto death, for stopping  the water supply to Pakistan.”

In a separate post on April 20, Dr. Biswas wrote: “Hindus do not block roads because they respect the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court does not respect Hindus because they do not block roads.”

Both the journalist and the doctor are evidently aligned with the saffron ideology.

These are only a few instances amid the flood of posts and comments in social media after the Pahalgam terror incident. But, targeting secular and liberal persons seems to have become ‘normal’ in the state.

Two days ago,  two CPI(M) party offices, in Dharmanagar and Dukli, were attacked, including the personal car of a state-level Left leader.  A district-level Left leader Haridhan Debnath is recuperating in hospital after being allegedly attacked.

According to political observers, the crackdown on social media posts appears to have been triggered by the demands made by certain saffron  groups, and silence on  or absence of actions to hate-speech targeting  seculars, minorities  stand in sharp contrast to Prime Minister Modi’s statements: “We are secular not because the word was added in our Constitution. Secularism is in our blood. We believe in Sarva Pantha Sambhava.” He tweeted these in 2014.

Meanwhile, CPI(M)’s Jitendra Chowdhury, who is Leader of Opposition in the Tripura Assembly, has reacted sharply to the recent events in the state.

“This is not the time for allegations and counter-allegations. It is a time of crisis when the whole nation must unite to fight terrorism, whether it is outside or inside the country, this is not the time for mudslinging. Unfortunately, I am seeing that ruling party workers and supporters are directly inciting violence.”

Chowdhury cited a teacher from Manubazar “openly saying that Muslims should not be allowed to stay in India and that CPI(M), Congress, and secularists should be attacked. Where are the police? Where is the cyber cell? Sadly, a retired teacher and a youth have been arrested in Ambassa for peaceful calls to unite people against terrorism. It is not a crime to call for peace. Why is there no action against ruling party leaders giving threats on social media?”

The CPI(M) leader urged the Chief Minister and DGP: “Please remember that the administration has no political party. If the administration acts with one eye closed, terrorists will be encouraged. This is not the right way to fight terrorism. Those writing such things on social media must refrain. The unity of the people of India is essential.”

Despite repeated attempts by this reporter, police authorities did not respond to queries. Messages and emails to IGP (Law and Order) Manchak Ippar and SP (Police Control) Ranadhir Debbarma remained unanswered. Only AIGP (Law and Order) Ananta Das responded, stating that he was on leave and could not comment, and advised contacting Debbarma, who is in-charge—but those attempts too yielded no response. Other police sources were tight-lipped when asked how the police were viewing the matter overall, including social media comments and counter-comments related to the Pahalgam incident. Some of the queries were: How many people have been arrested in total? Names and details? Exactly what charges have been filed against them, and under which sections? Regarding the posts that led to their arrests, what exactly was written? Some alleged obscene remarks about ‘Tripureshwari’ have circulated on social media, though the person in question posted an apology—has he been arrested? Also, a post demanding this person be ‘sacrificed’ has surfaced. A seemingly retaliatory post to his contains alleged derogatory remarks about another religious entity. Has any action been taken in these cases? Posts advocating violence against a particular community, Opposition party members, and secularists have appeared. Has any action been taken in these contexts? If not, surely there must be some reasons. What are those reasons? However, no response has been received from any officer, even after a considerable time has elapsed.

Meanwhile, the Tripura Police has issued a warning against forwarding communal content—similar to statements made during the 2018 mob lynching spree, which resulted in few or no concrete actions.

Also, the Chief Minister convened a meeting with the SPs and DMs, reportedly to identify foreigners staying in the state illegally. No Pakistanis have been found in the state so far, claimed a source.

The writer is a freelancer based in Tripura. The views are personal.

Courtesy: Newsclick

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The IJR 2025 delivers a sobering yet illuminating portrait of the state of justice delivery across the country. Drawing from government data across police, judiciary, prisons, legal aid, and human rights commissions, it presents a powerful call to action. Despite pockets of progress, the national picture remains dominated by chronic capacity deficits, deep systemic inequalities, and a sluggish pace of reform.

A System Under Strain: Deficits and gaps

Across the pillars of justice, major structural weaknesses persist. Police forces nationwide allocate a mere 1.25% of their budget to training, a clear indicator that human capital development remains a low priority. Alarmingly, no state or union territory meets its own reserved quotas for women in the police, exposing deep gender disparities at the very frontline of law enforcement.

The forensic science ecosystem, crucial to modern crime detection and fair trials, is also buckling. Half the sanctioned forensic staff positions across the country remain vacant, paralysing investigations and exacerbating delays. In prisons, conditions continue to deteriorate: 176 prisons report occupancy rates of 200% or more, while over 20% of undertrial prisoners have been incarcerated for one to three years without conviction — an indictment of both police investigation and judicial functioning.

Judicial backlogs have reached staggering heights, with over five crore cases pending across court levels, reflecting a crippling burden on the system. Meanwhile, the promise of judicial dynamism is undermined by the fact that only 4% of cases are initiated suo motu — a marker of proactive judicial intervention — leaving citizens heavily dependent on individual litigation to seek redress.

In the realm of legal aid, there has been a disheartening drop in the number of paralegal volunteers since 2019, and access to basic legal advice in rural and marginalised communities remains worryingly thin.

The crisis extends to prisoner welfare too. For a prison population exceeding 5.7 lakh, the country boasts just 25 sanctioned psychologists or psychiatrists, with 25 states and UTs sanctioning none at all. The absence of mental health support in overcrowded, violent environments exacerbates the cycles of trauma and criminality that prisons are supposed to break.

Green Shoots: Signs of progress

Yet, amidst these dismal findings, rays of hope shine through. A steady expansion of digital infrastructure and gender diversity points towards meaningful, if limited, gains.

By 2025:

• 83% of police stations have at least one CCTV camera, a critical tool for ensuring transparency and accountability in custodial settings.
• 78% of police stations now have women’s helpdesks, offering marginal improvements in gender-sensitive policing.
• 86% of prisons are equipped with at least one video-conferencing facility, easing prisoner access to courts without physical transfers.
• The share of women judges in the district judiciary has climbed to 38%, a vital step towards a more representative bench.

Notably, six states now meet the recommended benchmark of one woman medical officer for every 300 women inmates in prisons, addressing a long-standing neglect of gender-sensitive prison health services.

High courts have managed to maintain case clearance rates exceeding 100% annually since 2017, a promising trend suggesting some resilience even under extreme workload pressures.

Data based on the national findings:

1. Who Leads, Who Lags: Rankings across states

Large and mid-sized states (Map 1)

• Karnataka retains the top position among 18 large states, with a composite score of 6.78/10.
• Andhra Pradesh makes a remarkable jump to second place (6.32), up from fifth earlier.
• Telangana ranks third (6.15), showing consistent progress since 2019.
• Kerala and Tamil Nadu complete the top five.

At the bottom:

• Bihar, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal occupy the lowest ranks.
• West Bengal drops to the bottom (18^th place), swapping places with Uttar Pradesh.

Small states (Map 2)

• Sikkim remains the top-ranked small state (5.20/10).
• Himachal Pradesh and Arunachal Pradesh follow closely.
• Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Goa slide to the bottom ranks among the seven small states.

2. Scorecards of Change: Who improved? (Figure 1: Improvement scorecard)

The report measured whether states had improved between the 2022 and 2025 editions across 68 indicators.

Top improvers among large states:

• Bihar improved on 47 out of 68 indicators — the highest improvement rate.
• Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Rajasthan, and Karnataka also showed strong positive shifts (around 40 indicators each).

Among small states:

• Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim were the most consistent improvers.

Uttarakhand, Haryana, and Madhya Pradesh showed moderate improvements, while states like Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu showed worrying stagnation or decline.

3. Diversity and Representation: Still a distant goal?

Diversity rankings (Figure 2)

• Karnataka is the only large state to meet SC, ST, and OBC quotas in both police and judiciary.
• Caste-based diversity in judicial appointments is poor across most states, despite constitutional mandates.

Women’s representation (Figure 3–5)

• Five states — Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chandigarh, Ladakh, and Tamil Nadu — are moving steadily towards achieving 33% women’s representation in police.
• District judiciary has seen a steady rise in women judges, now at 38%, but High Courts and Supreme Court continue to show male domination.
• Projections suggest that even at the current pace, it will take decades for full gender parity.

4. Human Resources: Vacancies and gaps (Figure 7–9)

• Judge-to-population ratios remain poor across almost all states; subordinate courts suffer from 20% judicial vacancies on average.
• Police vacancies have barely improved since 2017.
• Forensics staffing is dangerously low, jeopardising the quality of investigations and trials; Out of nearly 10,000 sanctioned posts across states, nearly 50% remain vacant.

5. Justice system intent and budgets (Figure 10-11)

• Budgets for judiciary, legal aid, and police have increased — but primarily towards salaries, with little new investment in training, modernisation, or infrastructure.
• States’ contributions to legal aid budgets remain minimal, indicating a continued lack of political will.

6. Pendency of cases (Figure 12-15)

• Cases pending for more than three years account for a large proportion of the backlog in subordinate courts.
• Cases pending more than five years are also rising steadily — indicating systemic failures in ensuring timely justice.

Regional leaders and laggards

Southern states dominate the upper echelons of the justice delivery rankings. Karnataka leads among large states, followed closely by Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu. Karnataka stands out as the only state that meets Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, and Other Backward Classes quotas in both the police and judiciary.

Among smaller states, Sikkim has consistently retained its top position, followed by Himachal Pradesh and Arunachal Pradesh. In contrast, Goa, Mizoram, and Meghalaya have slipped to the bottom rungs.

At the lower end, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal continue to battle for last place among larger states, highlighting severe structural deficits.

Capacity challenges across the board

The findings also reveal that capacity-building remains elusive across pillars. Police forces struggle with low personnel numbers and training investments. Prisons remain overcrowded and under-resourced. Judicial strength and efficiency remain hostage to persistent vacancies and procedural rigidity. Legal aid services show shrinking outreach efforts. State Human Rights Commissions (SHRCs) display improved case disposal rates, but this masks a worrying trend: many SHRCs reject complaints at the outset rather than offering substantive resolutions, compromising their integrity and public trust.

Moreover, while technology adoption has expanded — with platforms like the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) and NALSA’s legal aid management system — poor internet access, patchy digitisation, and bureaucratic inertia hamper real transformation.

A call to action

The India Justice Report 2025 makes it starkly clear: without serious, sustained investment in the structural capacities of the justice system, without a genuine commitment to inclusion, transparency, and systemic reform, India’s vision of equitable, accessible justice will remain out of reach.

Data from the report underscores that while isolated improvements are visible, the system as a whole still falters. Fragmented, underfunded, and often discriminatory, India’s justice institutions need not just incremental changes but a concerted, well-resourced overhaul.

The findings are not just a mirror of current realities, but a roadmap for an ambitious, necessary transformation — one where justice, as promised by the Constitution, can become a lived reality for all.

The complete report may be read here.

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