According to reports by LiveLaw, Navlakha had approached the High Court challenging a condition of his bail that restricted him to the territorial jurisdiction of Mumbai without prior permission of the special NIA court. He argued that continuing to reside in Mumbai—away from his family, home, and support system in Delhi—had become financially unsustainable, especially as the trial in the case has yet to commence, as reported by The Hindu.

When the matter was taken up, Additional Solicitor General Anil Singh, appearing for the National Investigation Agency (NIA), placed before the court a set of conditions that could be imposed if Navlakha were allowed to shift to Delhi. According to LiveLaw, these included depositing his passport, not leaving Delhi without the special court’s permission, reporting to the local police station every Saturday, and appearing before the special NIA court in Mumbai whenever directed. The bench accepted these conditions on record and indicated that a formal order permitting the relocation would be passed.

Brief about the previous proceedings

Senior advocate Yug Chaudhary, representing Navlakha, emphasised that the 73-year-old activist has been living in rented accommodation in Mumbai for nearly two years since being granted bail in 2023. As per Bar and Bench, Chaudhary told the court that Navlakha is a long-time resident of Delhi, owns a house there, and had lived there with his partner prior to his arrest. He also pointed out the difficulties Navlakha and his partner faced in securing accommodation in Mumbai due to the pendency of the case. With the trial nowhere in sight, Chaudhary warned that forcing Navlakha to remain in Mumbai could push him into financial ruin.

The defence assured the court that Navlakha would strictly comply with all conditions and attend proceedings whenever required. While suggesting that certain appearances could be made through video conferencing from the NIA office in Delhi, the bench made it clear—according to LiveLaw—that it was not inclined to allow participation in the trial from Delhi. However, it expressed openness to permitting him to stay in the capital until the trial formally begins.

The NIA opposed the plea, arguing that granting such relief could set an undesirable precedent, since several other accused in the case are also not residents of Mumbai and may seek similar permissions. Despite this, the bench noted that there had been no allegation or instance of Navlakha attempting to abscond or misuse his liberty. On December 15, the judges had observed that Navlakha appeared to feel “completely uprooted” from his social circle, friends, and family, and emphasised that he was a free person while on bail.

As reported by The Hindu, the court observed that forcing an accused to remain away from his home indefinitely, especially when the trial has not begun, raises concerns of fairness. “The applicant feels that he is forced to stay in Mumbai when his house is in Delhi. He has assured that he will come back to Mumbai when the trial begins,” the bench noted, adding that Navlakha’s conduct while on bail had been unblemished.

Navlakha had earlier approached the High Court after a special NIA court rejected his request on June 19 to relocate to Delhi. Under his existing bail conditions, he was required to remain within Mumbai’s jurisdiction, making any relocation subject to court approval

Background of the case

Navlakha is among 16 individuals arrested in connection with the violence that broke out on January 1, 2018, at Bhima Koregaon village near Pune, during commemorations marking the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Bhima Koregaon. The violence followed the Elgar Parishad conclave held a day earlier at Pune’s Shaniwar Wada. The prosecution alleges that speeches and activities linked to the conclave incited violence and promoted Maoist ideology. Navlakha, a long-time civil liberties advocate, has been accused of acting as a co-conspirator and of propagating Maoist ideology under the directions of leaders of the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist)—allegations he has consistently denied.

Detailed reports may be read here, here, here and here.

Why is this significant?

With the High Court now relaxing the restrictive bail condition, the order should be seen as a reaffirmation that bail conditions must not be so onerous as to become punitive, particularly when trials are indefinitely delayed. The order underscores the principle that conditions of bail must balance the interests of investigation and trial with the accused’s right to dignity, livelihood, and family life, especially in cases where incarceration has already been prolonged and the commencement of trial remains uncertain. The court’s emphasis on Navlakha’s age, financial precarity, clean conduct while on bail, and absence of flight risk reflects a growing judicial recognition that bail jurisprudence cannot be reduced to mechanical territorial restrictions. Instead, it must account for proportionality and the lived realities of undertrial accused, particularly in long-running UAPA prosecutions where delays have become endemic.

Related:

Gautam Navlakha’s letter on release from custody

Unjust detention: Gautam Navlakha’s bail victory highlights insufficient evidence

Bhima Koregaon accused Gautam Navlakha granted bail by the Bombay HC

Take accused Gautam Navlakha to hospital immediately, SC directs NIA

Taloja Jail denies new spectacles to visually challenged Gautam Navlakha!

The post Bombay High Court allows Gautam Navlakha to return to Delhi, relaxes restrictive bail condition in Bhima Koregaon Case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A division bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Gupta and Justice Arun Kumar had then observed the necessity of addressing the procedural lags that often hinder timely medical intervention for survivors of sexual assault incidents (In Re Framing Of Guidelines For Sensitizing All Concerned In Cases Of Termination Of Pregnancies-cause title). To assist the Court in this crucial and significant matter, the bench has also appointed Advocate Mahima Maurya as the Amicus Curiae.

On November 27, the Amicus Curiae and Additional Chief Standing Counsel Rajiv Gupta, appearing for the State, made submissions with various suggestions to sensitise authorities and streamline the process. The matter is listed next on January 13. The High Court is expected to deliberate further on the suggestions provided to ensure that appropriate guidelines are framed for sensitizing all concerned in cases of termination of pregnancies.

The first order in this case taking suo moto cognizance was passed on October 23, 2025 after which the matter was listed on October 16, October 30, November 7 (during which hearing Ms. Mahima Maurya Kushwaha, Amicus Curiae and Shri Rajiv Gupta, the additional chief standing counsel for the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) made submissions giving various suggestions). The matter was listed thereafter on December 15, 2025 when the last order was passed listing the matter on January 13, 2026.

Related:

In a special hearing, SC bench hears petition on termination of pregnancy, expresses dismay over lackadaisical approach of Gujarat HC

Married woman has the autonomy to choose termination of pregnancy, not medical board: Bombay HC

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act Failing Women Who Need It The Most

The post Allahabad High Court registers suo moto PIL over delays in termination of pregnancy of rape survivors appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In an almost routine manner, clearly meant to harass citizens, especially those from marginalised communities who may exercise their personal choices in faith practice or in relationships, the sections applied by the Sri Hemant Yadav, Sub Inspector, Jethwara Police station, district Pratapgarh in the First Information Report dated April 26, 2025 (registered as Case Crime No. 0081 of 2025) was under Sections 5 (1), 8 (2) & 8 (6) of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021.

Sub-Inspector Hemant Yadav, the complainant in the FIR alleged that the petitioner was involved in unlawful religious conversion. In a significant Order by a Constitutional Court, not only did the Judges quash the Order but, after getting to the root of the matter –which clearly appeared to be that a false and motivated FIR had been lodged by the instant Sub-Inspector– the Court held the Principal Secretary (Home), Uttar Pradesh to account directly him to explain this conduct through filing of a personal affidavit!  What cleared the matters for the Court, was the affidavit in counter filed by private respondents denying the allegations made in the FIR of any coercive conversions etc.

Interim Order of November 20, 2025

The first protective steps taken on November 20, 2025 in which interim Order the Court also stated that failure to file such affidavit before the next date, December 2, 2025 would require the Principal Secretary (Home) to appear in person, with all records of the case, before the Court. While doing so, the Court Observed that such urgent and stringent steps were required to hold the state administration at the highest level to account, as the contents of the FIR “are patently false” and aggrieved persons (citizens) are required to spend precious resources on seeking relief in patently false and motivated prosecutions. The Interim Order also protected the respondent private respondents from any harassment in any manner by the police or administration, warning of strict action were that to happen. (Para 18 of Interim Order)

Para 14 of the Interim Order dated November 20, 2025

Para 14. This Court requires the personal affidavit of the Principal Secretary (Home), Lucknow inasmuch as the Court is already deluged with the other matters which are coming before the Court and once the First Information Report is being filed by an officer of the State which prima facie appears to be false as such, this is a fit case in which the highest officer should file his affidavit indicating as to why the aforesaid First Information Report has been lodged by an officer of the State although the allegations levelled in the said First Information Report are prima facie patently false. However, the aggrieved persons are constrained to approach this Court for the redressal of their grievances whereby spending their valuable money and time and at the same time, the precious judicial time of the Court is also wasted in dealing with such cases which could have been nipped in the bud by the State itself. As such, personal affidavit would also indicate that in case such frivolous cases continue to come to the highest Court of the State as to why exemplary cost should not be imposed against the authorities who have not applied their mind while lodging the First Information Reports under the Act, 2021.

What was especially noteworthy about this case is that private respondents, alleged victims (Respondents No. 5 to 8) appeared before the High Court and filed a short counter affidavit in which they categorically stated that the allegations in the FIR were “absolutely false, concocted, baseless and without any substance“. They submitted, on record, that no incident of inducement, allurement or coercion had taken place and that they were following their religion “as per their own free will”. Details of this counter-affidavit have been recorded by the Allahabad HC in its interim order in the case dated November 20, 2025 (Paras 7 and 8), also reproduced in part in the final order in the matter dated December 2, 2025.

Paras 7 and 8 of the Interim Order of the Allahabad High Court in the Sabir Ali Case:

Para 7. Taking note of the same, in its earlier detailed order [dated N7. On the other hand, Sri Alok Pandey, Advocate who has filed a short counter affidavit today in Court on behalf of the respondents no. 5 to 8 states on the basis of averments contained in the short counter affidavit that the allegations as made in the impugned First Information Report are absolutely false, concocted, baseless and without any su any substance and no incident of religious conversion, inducement, allurement, pressure or coercion has ever taken place with the petitioner or with any of the other alleged victims.

Para 8. It is further submitted that all the private respondents have already been following their religion, social custom and traditions as per their own free will, independently and without interference or pressure from any corner. At no point of time has any of them adopted any other religion as alleged in the impugned First Information Report nor has any such step ever been undertaken or considered by them.

On that date, November 20, 2025, the Court had also expressed strong displeasure over the facts of the case. It also made a prima facie observation that the FIR lodged by the State officer appeared “patently false”. The Bench had then observed that it was ‘deluged’ with such matters and questioned why citizens should be constrained to approach the Court, spending money and time, for cases that “could have been nipped in the bud by the State itself“.

Final Order Quashing the FIR

Finally on December 2, 2025, 14 days ago, the Division Bench recorded in Para 3 that the personal affidavit of the Principal Secretary (Home), Government of UP had been filed. Significantly, the Court observed that, in Para 4 of the Final Order, that, the State of UP conceived that the FIR may be quashed!

Para 4. Even before the averments contained in the said personal affidavit could be considered by the Court, Dr. V.K. Singh, learned Government Advocate, states that the FIR itself may be quashed by this Court.

Considering the aforesaid statement made by Dr. V.K. Singh, the Court quashed the motivated FIR and observed, in a strong observation in Para 7 of the final order dated December 2, 2025, the Allahabad High Court observed:

“However, considering the detailed order of this Court dated 20.11.2025 a note of caution is issued to the State authorities that being the special Act and having it’s stringent provisions the authorities should have to be more cautious in future while registering the FIRs in mimeographic style under the provisions of the Act, 2021”.

(Para 7)

Counsel for the petitioners are/were Akhand Kumar Pandey, Abhishek Singh

Citizens for Justice and Peace (cjp.org.in, CJP) is the lead petitioner in the draconian ‘anti-conversion laws’ passed by those state ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Today, December 16, 2025 the hearing in this matter (WP Criminal Nos 428/2020 and Nos 14/2023) is expected to address the prayer for interim stay on the most egregious provisions. In the 2025 hearings, first on April 16, 2025, and thereafter in September 2025, hearing on the main prayer of the writ petition for declaring the laws passed unconstitutional (early hearing on cases pending since December 2020) and another application filed by CJP, seeking interim relief. After first challenging the 2020-2021 amended laws of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, the CJP had, in 2023, amended their plea to include similar laws passed in Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka. CJP is the lead petitioner in this matter.

The Interim Order of the Allahabad HC dated November 20, 2025 may be read here

The Final Order of the Allahabad HC dated December 2, 2025 may be read here.

[1] Mimeographic refers to “photo-copy” type documents, or documents from a duplicating machine which produces copies from a stencil, now a photo-copier!

Related:

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

United Christian Forum petitions UP Governor Anandiben Patel, express concerns over recent amendment to UP anti-conversion law

Anti-Conversion Laws: Are forced conversions a myth or reality?

The post Allahabad HC: Quashes FIR under draconian UP ‘Anti-Conversion Act’, warns state authorities against lodging ‘Mimeographic Style’ FIRs appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Supreme Court also directed a special court to conduct trial on a day-to-day basis to record the statements of the nine remaining witnesses. Langa has been ordered to extend full cooperation with the proceedings and seek no adjournment on the ground that his petition seeking the case be quashed is pending. The Enforcement Directorate (ED) has been directed to file a status report on compliance with these directions. The matter has been listed for further consideration on January 6.

Langa had been arrested by the Gujarat Police last year in a case involving allegations of Goods and Services Tax (GST) fraud and was subsequently booked in multiple cases. The ED later registered a case against him under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). It was senior advocate Kapil Sibal appeared for Langa. Opposing the plea, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta alleged that Langa had extorted money, claiming that threats were made to publish adverse material if payments were not made. “A journalist is found to be extorting money… We want to file an additional counter,” Mehta told the court.

Sibal objected to the move, stating that the ED was seeking to change its stand. He argued that allegations of “Rs 68-crore fraud” were exaggerated, asserting that “it is not even Rs 68 lakh.” Sibal further pointed out that no charge sheet had been filed in the predicate offence forming the basis of the PMLA case. “I have been in custody since October 2024. For what offence? It is not murder,” he submitted, calling allegations of influencing witnesses “shocking”.

Sibal also alleged that crucial documents had not been furnished to the defence, stating that there was no supplementary complaint and that the prosecution could not “have it both ways”. Finally after heated exchanges in court and taking note of the fact that only nine witnesses remain to be examined, the court granted interim bail. During a brief exchange after the order, Mehta reiterated the allegation of extortion, to which Sibal responded by suggesting that industrialists were targeting journalists. Mehta denied any political motive, stating that the prosecution was acting purely in a professional capacity. When the exchange escalated, the CJI intervened, stressing that the trial must not be delayed and cautioning Langa against misusing his position as a journalist. Sibal responded that any such violation would be grounds for cancellation of bail.

The Gujarat high court had denied bail to Langa following which he had approached the Supreme Court.

Related:

“This system breaks the body when it cannot break the spirit” — Ipsa Shatakshi on her jailed husband, journalist Rupesh Kumar Singh

One more attack on the Media: Local journalist thrashed and urinated upon by railway police, UP

SC’s denial of bail to journalist Rupesh Singh once again showcases how the Court looks at bail under UAPA, with varying consistency

The post Interim bail to Gujarat journalist Mahesh Langa: SC appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Court’s perspective on this issue brings to bear a number of important constitutional issues that need to be addressed immediately. Firstly, having access to content related to “obscenity” linked to the Aadhaar number will also mean that all online anonymity will cease to be protected and, in effect, this will increase the amount of control given to the government regarding what individuals are allowed to view and/or post online. Secondly, since the meaning of “obscenity” has always been subject to personal opinion and moral bias, if the Court continues to follow a technological enforcement of this concept, it will result in an enormous increase in the amount of government control over online spaces such as YouTube and other OTT platforms and, ultimately, over independent creators.

From the Ranveer Allahabadia Matter to Systemic Control

The Court’s changing view can be traced back to a case involving Ranveer Allahabadia, a YouTuber accused of producing “obscene” and “immoral” video content. This case raised the question of whether the legal rules and regulations currently in effect were sufficient to govern such content. As stated in the Supreme Court Observer respectfully, it appeared as though the Court was more concerned with the potential risks posed by unregulated digital content than with determining whether the petitioner was harmed by the defendant’s content. A similar finding was reported in the Global Freedom of Expression case report from Columbia University, which stated that the petitioner did not present evidence of legal harm, but instead framed the issues through the lens of moral panic.

Following this, the positions taken by the Supreme Court became increasingly broad, culminating in a March 2025 request by the Court to the Union government to think about enacting a law creating a national standard for “online obscenity”. In doing so, the Court transitioned from addressing the content grievance in a singular context to calling for a systematic legislative approach to achieve the same. The Court stated that India lacked a neutral, independent regulatory authority to oversee online content.

In late 2025, the ongoing confusion within the legal framework surrounding Aadhaar culminated in the formulation of a very specific concept regarding how Aadhaar should be used as the basis for age verification for the purposes of preventing minors from accessing pornographic materials. This was not simply a passing comment or procedural matter but was rather a comprehensive strategy of linking an individual’s access to online material directly to an individual’s biometric identity through Aadhaar’s use as an age verification mechanism.

The March 2025 Direction and the Government’s Parallel Initiatives

The Supreme Court’s March 2025 directive to the Executive branch of the Union Government came at a time when the Executive branch had been assessing the types of control that it might use to regulate digital content. Witnesses described that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was looking into creating regulations that would provide new rules for the regulation of “perverse user-generated content,” which was echoed by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, who had testified to the Supreme Court.

At the same time, there was an effort on behalf of the Central Government to push out an Influencer Code, resulting in concern over the lack of public consultation. The Internet Freedom Foundation recorded those concerns in its report and called for a consultation on the matter. The report can be read here.

Many parties were warning that the Supreme Court’s strong push for new legislative enactments could have a chilling effect on legitimate online speech, with reports in The Hindu explaining this matter and how it combined with the earlier actions by the Executive branch indicating an increasing amount of judicial interest in the regulation of social media, and the ability of the Supreme Court to regulate online speech.

Therefore, what once appeared to be one case of litigation has been seen to be braided into a more significant regulatory push. The Supreme Court and the Executive branch are seen to mutually reinforce each other’s concerns regarding digital content.

Obscenity as a Legal Category: Colonial Morality in Digital Form

India’s obscenity doctrine has its origins in the pre-constitutional era. The Interpretation of Section 292 in the IPC has been based on the moral standards of Victorian England, in how sexual expression was viewed as corruptive. Although the Supreme Court has attempted to modernize the definition of “obscene” in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal by moving from the Hicklin test to current community standards, the concept of obscenity remains the most unclear and controversial definition in Indian Law.

Traditionally, the word “obscene” has been a means to censor the expression of LGBTQ+ individuals, feminists, those providing information about reproductive health, those who produce artistic works and literature, and people who provide sex education. By using the same definition of obscenity to create and regulate content within the digital space, these definitions will encompass many types of legitimate speech, i.e., queer content, experimental art, sex education content being made on YouTube, and narratives of survivors.

Because spaces for digital creators, i.e., YouTube and OTT platforms, are some of the only ways that individuals can currently communicate with large audiences that are not already censored within the media through either governmental control or the NBDSA, independent creators possess the unique ability to produce their content on these platforms without any type of government interference. By establishing obscenity regulations, the autonomy that independent creators currently possess would be lessened, allowing the government to indirectly suppress dissent, satire, and criticisms of the established cultural/ethical norms of society, under the guise of “protecting” minors.

Aadhaar-Based Age Verification: The Constitutional Faultlines

The Court’s finding that the Aadhaar system could be used as an age gate for virtual media raises significant constitutional issues.

Article 19 (1) (a) grants individuals a right to receive information as well as to express themselves. Using Aadhaar to authenticate access to digital content destroys the ability to remain anonymous and connects people’s viewing patterns with their biometric identity. Because of this linkage, individuals may feel deterred from viewing and/or interacting with material that is sensitive in nature, including material related to political criticism, mental health, LGBTQ resource issues, and sexual education.

Article 21 requires that any encroachment upon an individual’s right to privacy must meet the proportionality tests outlined in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. Aadhaar-based verification of an individual’s age does not meet these criteria as it is neither required nor proportionate. Alternative methods of age verification that do not require individuals to disclose their identities, such as anti-fraud age verification or token-based confirmation of age, may serve as less invasive methods.

Article 14 addresses the issue of classification. Because obscenity is a subjective classification and is inconsistently applied across jurisdictions, an identity-linked filtering system allows arbitrary and disparate restriction of content. Thus, material labelled as “immoral” or “perverse” can disproportionately affect marginalized producers of content, as well as LGBTQ related materials, political satire, or criticisms of majority morality.

Globally, similar types of legislation have been challenged and have been ruled unconstitutional in court. In the U.S., age-verification laws in Utah, Arkansas, and Texas were found to violate an individual’s right to privacy by imposing a chill on lawful speech. Additionally, the Digital Economy Act in the U.K. abandoned the use of age verification due to privacy concerns and the difficulty of implementing that scheme. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the EU presumes large-scale identity verification in order to access content as a violation of existing privacy law. Finally, Aadhaar-based filtering is significantly more intrusive than any other methodology described above and places India outside the realm of established international norms based on rights.

Who Classifies Obscenity?

In what is likely the most important question raised by the Court’s recent remarks, the issue of determining what constitutes obscenity remains unresolved. While the Court has suggested that a neutral and independent body should make this determination, the historical patterns of regulatory bodies in India indicate that there will be an ongoing struggle for executive supremacy over regulatory bodies. Even self-regulatory agencies are often placed under significant amounts of state pressure, as evidenced by SCObserver’s analysis of takedown jurisprudence found in Wikimedia Foundation v. ANI and pointing to the inherent risk that any regime to classify material as obscene will be manipulated by the political elite in a country where the lines between nationalism and morality have become increasingly unclear. Therefore, it is highly probable that any form of content that has been deemed ‘anti-national’, ‘anti-authority’, or ‘anti-Indian’ will likely be categorized with what is generally regarded as immoral.

The Political and Practical Risks: Can Balance Exist?

Although it is almost impossible to find a balanced approach to controlling minors from unlawful exposure to cyberspace content while at the same time protecting individuals’ right to free speech, the current regulatory developments within India indicate that finding a true balance is aspirational at best. Increasing pressure from the governing body and the continual expansion of the IT Rules, as well as significant interest in ensuring traceability of cyber content, lack of information regarding reasons for user information withdrawal, and draft regulations for influencer(s) will only serve to establish an overwhelming level of executive control over the speech and behaviour of individuals within cyberspace.

In this context, obscene content provides an excellent opportunity for state intervention by way of protecting children but ultimately provides an opening for vague state regulation of all forms of expression. Such an increase in state authority will rarely decrease, as has been pointed out by many authorities in constitutional law who cautioned against the expansion of state power.

Safeguards against a Moral-Political Regime

The Supreme Court’s development of a new anti-obscenity regime should include critical safeguards, including:

1. a transition from ‘moral’ definitions to ‘harm’ based definitions;
2. an independent and accountable regulatory authority not influenced or dominated by the Executive;
3. a requirement for all regulations to be developed with transparency and public consultations;
4. a strong commitment to continuing judicial review over takedown requests; and
5. a prohibition on access to content via Aadhar-based identity links.

If these safeguards are not implemented, India risks creating a system where the use of morality as a justification for censorship, identity as a currency for realizing one’s right to access information, and a re-definition of digital public spaces under the control of State powers occur.

The judgment in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal can be read here:

The judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in Wikimedia Foundation v. ANI can be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related

The Sentinel and the Shift: Free speech in the Supreme Court

Free Speech in the Digital Age: A doctrinal analysis of four recent Supreme Court cases on Article 19(1)(a)

Ranveer Allahbadia: A “victim” of selective outrage?

Don’t cross the line: Courts on media trials and erring conduct of anchors

Free Speech Upheld: Bombay HC strikes down IT (Amendment) Rules, 2023 as unconstitutional

The post When Morality Meets Surveillance: The court’s push toward state-regulated digital content appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Bench was hearing a writ petition seeking quashing of an FIR that accused the petitioners of organising a Christian prayer meeting, distributing Bibles, and attempting to convert Dalits and poor persons. Alongside the conversion charges, the FIR also invoked Sections 352 and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. The Court not only cast serious doubt on the FIR, but also reproached the police for swiftly arresting all accused on the very day the FIR was lodged, despite no victim having come forward at that time.

No Victim, No Conversion: FIR has no legal backbone, says Court

The FIR, registered on 17 August 2025 by one Manoj Kumar Singh, alleged that the petitioners had organised a prayer meeting, preached Christian tenets through an LED screen, distributed Bibles, and attempted to convert Dalits and economically vulnerable persons.

However, the Bench—after a close reading of the FIR—observed that:

• No individual had come forward on 17 August 2025 to claim they were being converted.
• The FIR merely recorded that an LED screen and Bibles were present at the site.
• There was no reference to force, misrepresentation, coercion or allurement at the time of registration.

The judges emphasised that distribution of Bibles is not a crime, and preaching a religion is not criminalised anywhere in law. In its order, the Bench held unequivocally that:

“Learned AGA has failed to indicate and obviously would not be able to indicate that distribution of Bible is a crime. Further, even preaching of a religion has not been prescribed as a crime anywhere. Thus, the sine-qua-non to invocation of Section 3 of the Act, 2021 prima facie would be coming forward of a ‘person’ to allege that either he has been converted to any other religion or is being coerced or given some allurement to convert to some other religion which is patently missing at the time of lodging of the FIR.” (Para 15)

Crucially, the judges emphasised that Section 3 of the 2021 Act requires the presence of an actual ‘person’ who alleges coercion, force, undue influence, misrepresentation or allurement. This foundational requirement, they held, was “patently missing” on the date of the FIR.

Two-month silence from alleged victims raises red flags

The State attempted to rely on the supplementary statement of a purported victim recorded on October 25, 2025, claiming that he later mentioned being given an “allurement” to convert.

But the Court underlined two troubling facts:

1. His first statement on September 4, 2025 said nothing about conversion,
2. The allegation surfaced only after more than two months of the FIR.

The witness’s wife also recorded her statement only on 25 October 2025, mirroring the same unexplained delay.

The Court found this chronology deeply questionable, noting that the very offence alleged in the FIR “has only been supported after more than two months.”

“Interestingly, in the initial statement of Sri Ram Dev recorded on 04.09.2025 he has not indicated anything about any attempt being made to convert him or any allurement etc. having been given which has only come in the subsequent/supplementary statement recorded on 25.10.2025 wherein he has indicated about the allurement. Thus, it is apparent that the offence under the Act, 2021 as indicated in the FIR lodged on 17.08.2025 has only been supported after more than two months on 25.10.2025!” (Para 16)

“Interestingly, even the statement of wife of the witness Sri Ram Dev namely Smt. Nisha had been recorded on 25.10.2025 i.e. after a period of more than two months of the date of the alleged incident indicating the accused asking the petitioners to convert.” (Para 17)

HC: Police “bent themselves backward” to arrest petitioners without any basis

What particularly troubled the Bench was the immediate arrest of all petitioners on the same day the FIR was filed. At that time, there was:

• no victim complaint,
• no allegation of coercion,
• no evidence of conversion, and
• only a recovery of the Bible and an LED screen—neither of which is unlawful.

The judges remarked:

“Even more interesting is that fact that immediately on lodging of the FIR on 17.08.2025 the petitioner(s) have been arrested on the same date. As already indicated above, the statement of the alleged victim has been recorded more than two months later to indicate the alleged offence. Although an FIR is not expected to be an encyclopaedia containing all the facts of the entire evidence rather it is only meant to set the criminal law in motion yet considering that the Act, 2021 is a special Act as such at least the authorities should have applied their mind to the fact that on the date the said incident is committed i.e. 17.08.2025 there was nothing to indicate the commission of the said offence. Thus, it is prima facie apparent that the authorities have bent themselves backward in order to arrest the petitioner(s) even though it is not known as to how the complainant had got information about any offence as alleged in the FIR having come to his knowledge. These are all strange facts which need to be explained by the authorities more particularly when it is the life and liberty of the petitioner(s) which is involved.” (Para 18)

The Court reminded the State of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P. (2025), stressing that the 2021 Act is a special law requiring strict, not presumptive, compliance.

Court turns spotlight on complainant’s conduct; issues notice with tough questions

In a rare and telling move, the High Court has issued notice to the complainant—Manoj Kumar Singh—directing him to file a counter-affidavit answering pointed questions:

1. Where did you get information about the alleged offence?
2. How did you gather a group of people to accompany you?
3. If you barged into a private home, what offence did the petitioners commit by stopping you?
4. How do offences under Sections 352 and 351(3) BNS apply at all?
5. What is your criminal history, if any?

This line of inquiry signals the Court’s concern about possible vigilantism, motivated complaints, and misuse of the conversion law to target religious minorities.

A Clear Judicial Message: Anti-conversion laws cannot be used lightly

Importantly, the Bench issued notice to complainant Manoj Kumar Singh (respondent no. 4) and required him to file a detailed counter-affidavit responding to a series of sharp questions:

1. Source of information: From where did he learn of the alleged conversion activity?
2. Mobilisation of crowd: How did he gather a group of people to accompany him to the petitioners’ home?
3. Unlawful entry: If he forcibly “barged into” a third person’s residence with others, what offence were the petitioners committing by trying to stop him?
4. Applicability of BNS charges: How can Sections 352 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace) and 351(3) (criminal intimidation causing threat of death or grievous hurt) be justified against the accused in such circumstances?
5. Criminal history: The Court specifically asked for disclosure of the complainant’s criminal antecedents, if any.

This shift in judicial focus—from accused to complainant—signals the Court’s concern about possible misuse of the conversion law and potential vigilantism. By demanding explanations from both the State and the complainant, the High Court has effectively signalled that the criminal process cannot become a tool for harassment or intimidation in the name of controlling conversions.

Strict Interpretation of Section 3: Conversion requires a specific person alleging harm

The Court reaffirmed that for an offence under Section 3 of the 2021 Act, there must be:

• A person claiming, they were subjected to force, fraud, coercion, undue influence, or allurement;
• A complaint indicating actual or attempted conversion;
• Immediate and credible allegations, not delayed statements recorded months later.

The Court reiterated that:

• Preaching Christianity, installing an LED screen, or holding a prayer meeting does not amount to conversion.
• Distributing the Bible is not an offence.

In the absence of a named victim at the time of the FIR, the statutory ingredients were missing.

Order and next steps

The Court has granted:

• 4 weeks to the State to file its counter-affidavit,
• 2 weeks to the petitioners to file a rejoinder thereafter, and
• will hear the matter afresh after completion of pleadings.

Pending this, the Bench’s observations stand as a significant judicial caution against the weaponisation of conversion laws and arbitrary arrests, while also curbing attempts by private actors to take the law into their own hands.

The complete order may be read here:

Related:

Survey of Churches, anti conversion laws only empower radical mobs: Archbishop Peter Machado

Rajasthan: Civil Society demands arrests, rule of law and end to minority targeting under anti-conversion law

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP urges SC to curb misuse of anti-conversion statutes by states

The post Allahabad HC slams overzealous police action, says distributing Bibles or preaching Christianity is not an offence under UP conversion law appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Justice M.R. Mengdey, delivering a detailed judgment in Navdeep Mathur & Ors. v. State of Gujarat on December 4, 2025, has not only quashed all the impugned prohibitory orders, including a 2025 notification under Section 37 of the Gujarat Police Act, but also issued binding directions to the State: future prohibitory orders must be widely publicised through social media and other accessible platforms, as publication only in the official gazette is inadequate and inaccessible to the public. He held that the State had “clearly circumvented” legal protections designed to prevent exactly this kind of prolonged, opaque restriction on public assembly.

Section 144 cannot be a “standing order”: Court questions years of continuous restrictions

The petitioners, peaceful protestors against the Citizenship Amendment Act in 2019, argued that they were prosecuted for violating Section 144 — a provision they never knew had been imposed. The reason became clear once the Court examined the records: from 2016 to 2019, Ahmedabad Police issued one Section 144 order after another, often overlapping, ensuring the city was almost perpetually under prohibitory restrictions. The Court found this argument fully substantiated.

The Court found this deeply problematic:

• No material facts were recorded in the orders
• No emergent circumstances were demonstrated
• No prior inquiry, as required by law, was carried out
• No notice was issued to affected citizens except in supposed “emergencies”
• No attempt was made to use less restrictive measures

This, the Court said, reduced a temporary emergency provision into a standing administrative tool — precisely what Supreme Court precedents warn against.

The judgment shows a clear concern: Ahmedabad Police had normalised an emergency provision, issuing one order after another—sometimes even overlapping—and effectively creating a continuous bar on public assembly for years. As the Court held:

“The material available on record indicates that the Respondent authorities continued to issue Notifications under S.144 of the Code one after the other. Learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner is right in contending that, on occasions, the subsequent Notification was issued even when the earlier notification was holding the field.” (Para 13)

Such a practice, the Court said, circumvented Section 144(4), which caps the duration of an order at two months unless extended by the State Government. Notably, the State never once invoked its power to extend any of these notifications; instead, the police simply kept reissuing fresh ones.

“No reasons, no facts, no transparency”: Judicial scrutiny exposes procedural vacuum

Justice Mengdey emphasised the principles laid down in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, Gulam Abbas v. State of UP, and Acharya Jagdishwaranand. The law requires:

1. Material facts to be recorded
2. Reasoned satisfaction of the need for immediate action
3. Prior inquiry, unless a genuine emergency prevents it
4. Temporary, tightly-tailored restrictions

But the Court found that none of the Section 144 notifications examined contained reasons, factual foundations, or evidence of emergent circumstances.

“As per the settled legal position, these powers being amenable to the judicial review and scrutiny, exercise of it, requires to appear reasonable and therefore, the authorities exercising these powers are also required to give their reasons for the same. The Notifications questioned in the present petition do not bear any reasons given by the authorities for issuing the same. When, by exercise of powers under S.144 of the Code, the fundamental rights or constitutional rights of a class of citizens are being affected, the exercise needs to be transparent. The scheme of the provision of S.144 of the Code itself makes it clear that the authority exercising these powers is required to come to a conclusion that it is necessary to exercise these powers to prevent disturbance to public peace and tranquillity.” (Para 9)

“The impugned notifications do not mention any such material facts. The safeguards and procedure prescribed in the Section are not an empty formality. Their strict adherence is mandatory as the impugned notifications propose to impose restrictions upon the citizens affecting their fundamental rights.” (Para 9)

By affecting fundamental rights without a factual basis, the State had acted in “utter disregard of the safeguards” built into the law.

Failure to use other lawful measures: State cannot label every gathering a threat

A crucial aspect of the judgment is the Court’s reminder that dissent—peaceful protest—is a constitutionally protected exercise of democratic freedom. Section 144 may be imposed only when other methods fail and only as a last resort. Before invoking it, authorities must try less intrusive methods of maintaining public order. Yet the State could not produce evidence showing any such effort.

The Court made this explicit:

“Therefore, prior to resorting to exercise of powers under S.144 of the Code, it was incumbent upon the Respondent authorities to take recourse to the other measures available to them under the law for maintenance of peace and tranquillity and it was only when those measures were found to be insufficient, the powers in question could have been exercised. There is nothing on record to indicate that the Respondent authorities had even taken recourse to the other measures and it was only upon their failure that the powers in question were exercised.” (Para 12.1)

The repeated, blanket restrictions therefore failed the test of proportionality, necessity, and reasonableness.

Court also strikes down the 2025 Ahmedabad Police Commissioner’s order under Section 37 of the Gujarat Police Act

The judgment goes beyond the Section 144 regime. Petitioners pointed out that even after the practice of constant Section 144 orders was discontinued, the State simply switched to issuing equally broad prohibitions under Section 37 of the Gujarat Police Act.

The Court closely examined the Commissioner’s November 3, 2025 notification, which cited vague allegations of violent gatherings in “certain police station areas” but did not specify which areas, when the incidents occurred, or why the entire city needed to be restricted.

The Court concluded the State had:

• Provided no nexus between the facts alleged and the sweeping prohibition imposed
• Curtained legitimate protest across Ahmedabad
• Failed to target actual offenders, instead opting for a city-wide ban that punished peaceful citizens

The same violated principles set out in George Fernandes v. State of Maharashtra, which requires a proximate, rational connection between the threat perceived and the restrictions imposed. Blanket bans fail this test.

“These observations would apply to the facts of the case on hand as well as the authorities concerned have miserably failed in demonstrating any such rationale and proximate connection or nexus between the prohibition sought to be imposed with the necessity for prevention of public order.” (Para 20)

“The aforesaid discussion would make it clear that the powers have been exercised by the respondent authorities in utter disregard of the safeguards provided for exercise of the powers in question. Therefore, the exercise of powers by the authorities appears to be arbitrary in the present case. Therefore, the notification in question including the notification of the Police Commissioner dated 3^rd November 2025, are violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioners and therefore, are liable to be quashed and set aside.” (Para 21)

Adjudication despite expiry of orders

The State argued that all the notifications had “expired” and therefore no adjudication was necessary. The Court rejected this. Justice Mengdey emphasised that citizens were still facing prosecution for alleged violation of these notifications, and therefore the validity of the orders directly impacted their liberty.

“It is argued that the Notifications have lived their lives. However, there would be many including the Petitioners, who would be facing prosecution for violation of these Notifications. Therefore, even if the Notifications have lived their lives and are no more in force today, their validity is required to be considered, as, if the same is not done, the Petitioners and many others, would be facing prosecution for violation of the Notification which stands declared arbitrary. Therefore, these Notifications were required to undergo the judicial scrutiny even after their expiry.” (Para 23)

This ensures that criminal proceedings arising from unconstitutional notifications do not continue.

Publicity failure: Official gazette is not enough in the digital era

One of the most important directions in the judgment relates to transparency.

The State claimed that the orders were “widely publicised.” The Court disagreed, noting that the petitioners had demonstrated that the public had no meaningful way to know such orders were in force at all.

Justice Mengdey observed:

“In the present era, mere publication of such Notifications or orders in the official gazette would not be sufficient. Moreover, the public at large has no access to such official gazette. In the era, where several modes of mass communication, including social media platforms are available, it is incumbent upon the Respondent authorities to publish such Notifications / Orders by using such modes. While quashing and setting aside the Notifications impugned in the present petition as well as the Notification dated 3.11.2025 issued by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City being violative of fundamental rights of the citizens, the Respondent Authorities are hereby directed that, in future, while exercising such powers available under BNSS or Section 37 of the G.P.Act, due care shall be taken for adhering to the procedural aspects and the inherent safeguards required for exercising such powers and the Notifications / Orders issued under these provisions shall be given wide publicity on social media to make the public at large aware about it.” (Para 25)

The Court therefore directed:

• Mandatory publication of all Section 163 BNSS / Section 37 GP Act orders
• On social media, websites, and modern communication platforms
• In addition to regular modes
• To ensure actual public awareness and compliance

This is a major structural direction that significantly alters how prohibitory orders must be disseminated in Gujarat going forward.

A corrective moment for democratic policing

The judgment is a firm reminder that:

• Section 144 cannot be normalised
• Perpetual restrictions on peaceful assembly are unconstitutional
• The State must provide reasons, facts, inquiry, and evidence
• Blanket city-wide bans are disproportionate
• Citizens must be informed through accessible means
• Transparency and accountability are essential before curtailing democratic freedoms

The High Court’s intervention decisively pulls back an executive practice that had been allowed to operate unchecked for nearly a decade.

Conclusion: A decisive reaffirmation of democratic freedoms

By quashing the impugned notifications—both under Section 144/163 and Section 37—the High Court has sent a clear signal that public order powers cannot be used casually or mechanically to stifle dissent.

The ruling enhances procedural safeguards, demands transparency, and restores constitutional balance at a time when administrative reliance on prohibitory orders has become routine across many Indian cities.

The Gujarat High Court’s directions will now require every future invocation of Section 163 BNSS or Section 37 GP Act to satisfy:

• Reason-based scrutiny
• Evidence-based justification
• Prior exploration of lesser restrictive alternatives
• Wide public dissemination for awareness

A crucial precedent, the judgment stands as a robust defence of the right to protest and the constitutional promise that emergency powers must remain exceptional, temporary, and accountable—not a default policing mechanism.

The complete judgment may be read here:

Related:

Does imposition of Sec. 144 indicate Saffronisation of TN state machinery?

Gujarat High Court Widened Anti-Conversion Law: ‘Victims’ can be prosecuted as offenders

The post Gujarat High Court calls out “routine emergency”, strikes down years of Section 144 orders, demands transparency in all future restrictions appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On 4 December 2025, a division bench of the Bombay High Court (BHC), comprising Justices A. S. Gadkari and Ranjitsinha R. Bhonsale granted bail to Hany Babu, more than five years after his arrest by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in July 2020. The court also refused the NIA’s request to stay the bail order pending appeal.

The bail has been granted principally on the ground of prolonged pre-trial incarceration without commencement of trial, and pending framing of charges or discharge applications. The bench relied on the ruling in UOI vs K.A.Najeeb, which held that the constitutional courts could grant bail, despite statutory restrictions under the UAPA when the fundamental rights are at stake. This decision, after repeated earlier bail rejections under the stringent anti-terror law Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) is widely seen as a watershed moment, and marks a potential turning point in how courts deal with prolonged UAPA detentions.

Case History: From 2018 onwards, the arrests

The flashpoint was the commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Koregaon Bhima (1818), an event of deep historical significance for Dalits. On 31 December 2017, a public event called Elgar Parishad was held at the historic Shaniwarwada Fort in Pune, reportedly attended by tens of thousands, with speeches, cultural performances, slogans, etc.

The following day, 1 January 2018, in an entirely unconnected sequence of events, violence broke out near the memorial at Koregaon Bhima, between sections of the far Hindu right Maratha and Dalit Communities, which led to stone-pelting, mob clashes, along with several injuries.  Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP)  has traced the actual sequence of events and the manner in which the narrative was twisted to protect supremacists. This may be read here. The initial and first crimes recorded in the FIRs were against Milind Exbote and other extremists, details of which may be read here.[1]

Ironically, a month later, in February 2018, the Supreme Court criticised the Maharashtra state government and probe agencies for the slow progress in their probe against Milind Ekbote, questioning the agencies’ claims that he was allegedly ‘untraceable’. At the time the BJP’s Devendra Phadnavis was Maharashtra Chief Minister and the Shiv Sena, an alliance partner.

Within weeks of the filing of the first FIR dated January 2, 2018, later that month, a Pune-based businessman with controversial leanings filed a First Information Report (FIR) blaming revolutionary speeches made at the Elgaar Parishad for the January 1 Bhima Koregaon violence, in which one person was killed. Youth leader and MLA from Gujarat, Jignesh Mevani and student leader, Umar Khalid, approached the Bombay High Court for quashing the FIRs filed against them. Details can be read here. On April 22, 2018, one of the key witnesses of the violence, a 19-year-old Dalit woman who had lost her house in the violence was found dead in a well. Her family alleged that she was being pressured to withdraw her statements in the case. What followed was a spate of arrests of activists and advocates including Professor Hany Babu. Details of the sequence of arrests may be read here.

While the immediate event was treated as anti-Dalit violence, later, even the police under the Fadnavis government and then the NIA investigations invoked an alternate narrative: that the Elgar Parishad was not a benign cultural gathering, but part of a broader “conspiracy aiming at destabilisation of the government.

After the first FIR in January 2018 by a ‘Pune-based businessman’, and on November 15, 2018 the Pune Police filed the first chargesheet. On January 24, 2020, the case was transferred to the NIA, which thereafter treated this as a terror/conspiracy case under UAPA, rather than as caste or communal violence.

Over time, a total of 16 individuals; a mixture of activists, academics, lawyers, and cultural performers; came to be known as the accused group in this case, widely referred to as “BK-16”.

These included: Hany Babu (associate professor at Delhi University), Ramesh Gaichor, Sagar Tatyarama Gorkhe, and other lawyers, socio-cultural activists from groups like Kabir Kala Manch (a Dalit cultural troupe), and writers/academics.

Timeline of Key Arrests and Legal Steps

The Allegations & Charges: What the State Has Claimed

The prosecution’s theory (as advanced by NIA), presented the Elgar Parishad event as a front for an “urban Maoist conspiracy” aimed at destabilising the State, fomenting caste-based violence, and reviving the banned CPI (Maoist). The accused (BK-16) were allegedly engaged in organising, recruiting, propagating ideology, and planning activities in consultation with Maoist leadership.

In Hany Babu’s case, Frontline reports that NIA alleged that he had “deep involvement” with CPI (Maoist) and purported front organisations such as Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF). They accused him of facilitating coordination, communication, and perhaps recruiting or organising under the guise of academic/social-justice work.

On July 28, 2020,  Hany Babu was arrested on the accusation for commission of offences punishable under Sections 121, (waging, attempting or abetting waging of war against the Government of India) , 124A (Sedition), 153A ( promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, place of birth, etc) , 115 (Abetment of offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life- if not committed), 120B (criminal conspiracy) of Indian Penal Code, 1872 and Sections 13 (punishment for unlawful activities), 16 (punishment for terrorist act), 18 (punishment for conspiracy), 18A (organising of terrorist camps), 20 (being member of terrorist gang or organisation), 38 (membership of terrorist organisation) and 39 (support given to terrorist organisation) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. (Read Sabrang’s previous coverage on Bhima Koregaon case: NIA court denies bail to Hany Babu and Kabir Kala Manch members)

On 19 September 2022, a division bench of the Bombay High Court (Justices N. R. Borkar and N. J. Jamdar) rejected Babu’s regular bail plea, alleging his ‘direct involvement’ in the.  Babu then filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court of India (SC). However, on 3 May 2024, he withdrew the SLP, opting instead to approach the Bombay High Court again, in light of changed circumstances, namely that several co-accused had since been granted bail.

After a reversal of order on 3rd Oct, 2025, BHC finally granted bail on 4th December, 2025.

Contentious Forensic Evidence

One of the most contentious and legally critical aspects of the case is the reliance on digital evidence, particularly materials allegedly recovered from the laptops/computers of the accused persons.

The Caravan, in an interview with Hany Babu, reports how only 2 books were seized from his bookshelf, which were books related to GN Saibaba’s arrest.

For analysing the integrity of the digital evidence, Independent forensic firms, notably a US-based firm, Arsenal Consulting, engaged by the defence, concluded that at least some of the devices seized were compromised well before seizure, via remote-access malware. In particular, the device of co-accused Rona Wilson was found to have been infected by a remote-access trojan (RAT) which could have allowed third-party actors (hackers) to plant incriminating files without the user’s knowledge.

Experts have also pointed to the absence of proper forensic safeguards: no contemporaneous hash-value recording at time of seizure, no secure chain-of-custody protocols, and repeated vulnerabilities in how the state forensic labs handled the data.

This raises a fundamental question: if evidence may have been planted remotely, can it form a reliable basis for charging people with terrorism, conspiracy or membership of banned organisations? Critics argue the answer should be no, or at least the court must insist on independent re-forensic audits. Many civil-society, digital-rights and human rights organisations, as well as academics, see the case as a stark example of “investigative overreach.”

Procedural History, Bail Denials and Relief to the Accused

Over the years, other accused have secured various forms of release: bail, medical bail, house arrest, or default bail. Some key examples:

• Sudha Bharadwaj — granted bail by special NIA court in December 2021 after over three years in jail.
• Varavara Rao (elderly poet-activist) — granted medical bail in May 2021.
• Anand Teltumbde — granted bail by Bombay High Court in November 2022.
• Gautam Navlakha — released on house arrest (later bail) per Supreme Court order in 2024.

These developments reflect a gradual, though uneven, judicial acceptance that indefinite pre-trial detention under UAPA may not be sustainable, especially given long delays, weak evidence, and possible procedural or forensic infirmities.

Significance of the 2025 Bail Order for Hany Babu – Legal & Political

The Bombay High Court’s decision to grant bail to Hany Babu represents a legally and politically significant moment in the Bhima Koregaon prosecutions, particularly given the long pattern of bail denials under the UAPA, where courts have often accepted the prosecution’s case at face value at the pre-trial stage. By intervening after years of prolonged incarceration, the order signals a renewed judicial willingness to treat personal liberty as a substantive constitutional guarantee rather than an abstract principle that must yield to the severity of the charges.

It also reinforces a growing line of jurisprudence visible in recent Supreme Court and High Court decisions that recognises that under UAPA, where trials can stretch over decades, pre-trial detention must not be permitted to operate as de facto punishment. Politically, the decision comes at a time when the foundational claims of the Bhima Koregaon investigation have been shaken by multiple independent digital forensic analyses indicating that key incriminating files on co-accused devices were likely planted through sophisticated malware attacks.

Against this backdrop, the bail order may be read as an acknowledgement of the dangers of excessive reliance on contested digital evidence and the need for heightened judicial scrutiny in cases built around electronic material. More broadly, the ruling underscores enduring constitutional anxieties around the criminalisation of dissent, surveillance-driven investigation, and the shrinking space for academic freedom and civil liberties. In doing so, it places the spotlight back on the core democratic concern that national security laws must not be used to stifle legitimate political expression or to detain individuals indefinitely without trial.

The bail order granting bail to Hany Babu may be read here.

Broader Constitutional and Human Rights Concerns

The Elgar Parishad case, and the recent bail order for Hany Babu, raise profound constitutional and human-rights questions:

1. Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty
   • The prolonged pre-trial detention of Hany Babu under the UAPA directly implicates Article 21, which has been repeatedly strained as incarceration stretches into years without trial.
   • The case underscores how UAPA’s stringent bail conditions risk converting pre-trial custody into punishment.
2. Article 22 – Protection Against Arbitrary Arrest & Detention
   • The heavy procedural restrictions under the UAPA dilute safeguards envisioned under Article 22, including timely production before a magistrate and meaningful opportunities to seek bail.
   • The difficulty of challenging the prosecution’s case at the bail stage restricts the accused’s ability to exercise constitutional protections.
3. Article 19(1)(a), (b), (c) – Freedom of Speech, Assembly & Association
   • Many accused, including Babu, were engaged in academic, human rights, or cultural work—activities protected under Article 19.
   • The characterisation of dissent, research, social justice advocacy, or association with civil liberties groups as “Maoist links” raises concerns about criminalising constitutionally protected expression.
4. Academic Freedom as Part of Article 19(1)(a)
   • Babu’s position as a university professor brings into focus the chilling effect such prosecutions have on academic inquiry and the freedom to engage with controversial or critical political ideas.
   • Criminalising academic networks or scholarly communication undermines the constitutionally recognised value of intellectual freedom.
5. Article 14 – Equality Before the Law & Protection Against Arbitrary State Action
   • Allegations of planted evidence and compromised digital devices raise serious questions about arbitrary or unfair investigative practices.
   • Article 14 requires investigations to be free of bias, fabrication, and selective targeting—standards potentially violated in the Bhima Koregaon probe.
6. Due Process & Fair Trial Rights (Articles 14 & 21 read together)
   • Extraordinary delays in filing chargesheets, framing charges, and commencing trial jeopardise the right to a fair and timely trial.
   • The case exemplifies systemic concerns over investigative overreach, reliance on contested digital evidence, and inadequate judicial oversight; issues that collectively erode due process protections.
7. Risk of Criminalising Dissent & Shrinking Civic Space
   • The prosecution narrative reflects a broader pattern where activists, lawyers, academics, and cultural workers face national-security charges for political or ideological opposition.
   • This drift signals a constitutional danger where UAPA becomes a tool to suppress dissent rather than genuinely combat terrorism.

In conclusion, the case highlights systemic faults in India’s criminal justice system when dealing with UAPA: over-broad charges, misuse of digital evidence, poor forensic standards, unlimited pre-trial detention, delayed trials, and weak institutional safeguards. While the Hany Babu bail marks a turning point in the history of pre-trial detention cases, the real challenge arises when the trial begins. Mere bail does not lead to acquittal. Ultimately, the case is emblematic of the tension between national security discourse and constitutional democracy: a test of whether India’s liberal democratic institutions can resist attempts to criminalise dissent.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

[1] This hate-spewing supremacist surfaced once again after a period of relative silence—17 years to be precise– on January 1, 2018 when the violence unleashed against peaceful Dalits assembled at Bhima Koregaon to commemorate 200 years of the battle, was reportedly provoked by the machinations of extremists of the Hindutva brigade. Ironically, a month later, in February 2018, the Supreme Court criticised the Maharashtra state government and probe agencies for the slow progress in their probe against Milind Ekbote, questioning the agencies’ claims that he was allegedly ‘untraceable’. At the time the BJP’s Devendra Phadnavis was Maharashtra Chief Minister and the Shiv Sena, an alliance partner.

Related:

Bhima Koregaon case: NIA court denies bail to Hany Babu and Kabir Kala Manch members

Bhima Koregaon case: Prof Hany Babu to remain in pvt hospital till June 15

Seek court’s permission before discharging Hany Babu: Bombay HC

Not Proscribed, Not Prima Facie: The labyrinth of bail under UAPA

The post Bombay HC bail for Hany Babu signals a critical reassessment of the Bhima Koregaon Case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, according to the report of LiveLaw, was visibly enraged as it confronted the record of the case. Justice Mehta rebuked Assam Police for what the Court described as a shocking and indefensible lapse: “This is appalling! Two years you are not filing a chargesheet and the man remains in custody? Whatever the stringent provisions may be, the UAPA does not authorise illegal detention. You consider yourself to be a premier investigative agency?”

The petitioner had been apprehended in July 2023 with ₹3.25 lakh and later taken into custody through a production warrant. The chargesheet surfaced only on 30 July 2025—well past the outer limit of 180 days, which itself requires a reasoned judicial extension under Section 43D(2) of the UAPA.

As per the LiveLaw report, the Supreme Court stressed that default bail is not a discretionary indulgence but an “indefeasible right” under Article 21, crystallizing the moment statutory timelines lapse: “By no stretch of imagination can custody extending beyond 180 days without a chargesheet—and without any valid extension order—be regarded as lawful. The detention is unconstitutional.”

The Gauhati High Court Order- What the Supreme Court found wrong

The Gauhati High Court’s December 20, 2024, order in Tonlong Konyak v. State of Assam rejected the petitioner’s plea for bail in a UAPA case by resting its decision almost entirely on the finding that he was a foreign national from Myanmar who had entered India illegally. The petitioner had been arrested on 26 August 2023 in connection with Sapekhati P.S. Case No. 29/2023, registered for offences under the IPC and multiple provisions of the UAPA. He argued that the State had failed to file its investigation report within the statutory period mandated under Section 173(2) CrPC / Section 193(3) BNSS, and therefore he had acquired an indefeasible right to default bail. Relying on Article 21 and key Supreme Court precedents, he submitted that co-accused had already been released and that neither the FIR nor the forwarding report contained any concrete incriminating material linking him to the alleged offences.

The State opposed the bail plea by placing the case diary before the Court, asserting that the petitioner was an active linkman for ULFA (I), facilitating extortion networks across Charaideo district. According to the prosecution, he was apprehended by Assam Rifles on 29 July 2023 with ₹3.2 lakh in extortion money, was in constant touch with persons aiding the banned organisation, and was responsible for carrying ransom amounts across the India–Myanmar border. The State further contended that he lacked any travel documents or passport, proving illegal entry, and argued that releasing him would result in an almost certain risk of absconding.

Justice Manash Ranjan Pathak’s order reproduces at length the allegations from the FIR and the case diary: the extortion demands made by ULFA (I), the pattern of ransom payments collected from tea-estate owners, and the role of intermediaries based in Charaideo. The Court recorded that the petitioner had allegedly contacted several linkmen arrested in the case, provided details of businessmen to ULFA (I), and transported extortion money to the organisation’s hideouts in Myanmar. It also noted that the petitioner faced additional cases in Borhat and Mon, and concluded that the materials showed active involvement with banned groups.

The crux of the High Court’s legal reasoning, however, turned on Section 43D(7) of the UAPA, a non-obstante clause that prohibits grant of bail to foreign nationals who enter India unauthorisedly, unless “very exceptional circumstances” are shown. The Court held that this provision overrides the default-bail regime under CrPC/BNSS. Since the petitioner was indisputably a foreigner who entered India without authorisation, and since he had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances, the Court held that he was categorically barred from seeking bail—even default bail.

In effect, the High Court treated illegal entry as a complete statutory bar that extinguishes the default-bail right. It reasoned that the gravity of allegations, the petitioner’s foreign nationality, and his alleged cross-border activities “amply justified” continued custody. Without examining whether the investigating agency had obtained any valid court order extending the statutory investigation period to 180 days, or whether the failure to file a chargesheet rendered custody unlawful, the Court concluded that statutory protections under Section 167 CrPC / 193(3) BNSS do “not apply” to such a foreign national accused under UAPA.

Ultimately, the High Court held that the petitioner could not claim the benefit of default bail due to the overriding effect of Section 43D (7), and dismissed the bail application. This reasoning—treating nationality and illegal entry as grounds to deny a constitutionally recognised procedural safeguard—became the central point of contention before the Supreme Court, which later corrected the position by holding that no statutory non-obstante clause can override the default-bail right when the State itself violates statutory timelines.

Where the High Court went wrong (and why the SC could not have upheld it):

1. The HC collapsed two distinct bail regimes—default bail and regular bail—into one: Section 43D (7) restricts regular bail to foreign nationals who have illegally entered India, unless very exceptional circumstances exist. But default bail is not regular bail.
   Default bail does not depend on:

• gravity of allegations
• nationality
• risk of absconding
• case diary materials
• exceptional circumstances

It depends only on whether the State complied with statutory timelines. The HC treated a constitutional right as if it were a discretionary privilege.

2. The HC placed Section 43D (7)’s non-obstante clause above the Constitution: The HC held that the 43D(7) non-obstante clause overrides the right to default bail.
   This is plainly contrary to the Supreme Court’s consistent jurisprudence (Uday Mohanlal Acharya, M. Ravindran, Rakesh Kumar Paul), which holds:

• Default bail arises directly from Article 21.
• No statutory non-obstante clause can override a constitutional guarantee.
• Once the right accrues, it is absolute.

The HC’s interpretation effectively allowed the State to nullify constitutional default-bail protection by merely alleging illegal entry, which is impermissible.

3. The HC relied extensively on allegations in the case diary—irrelevant for default bail: The attached order spends multiple paragraphs reproducing police allegations: alleged ULFA(I) links, extortion networks, border crossings, ransom collection, etc. These may be factors in a merits-based bail hearing, but they have zero bearing on whether the 90/180-day period expired without a chargesheet.

Default bail entitles the accused to release even if the allegations are grave, credible, or proven, because the right is triggered by State failure—not by innocence.

4. Illegality of entry cannot justify illegality of detention: The HC repeatedly asserted that the petitioner’s “unauthorised entry” bars him from bail. However:

• Illegal entry is a separate offence.
• It cannot legitimise detention that violates statutory timelines.
• The State cannot defend one illegality (custody) on the basis of another alleged illegality (entry).

5. The HC never examined whether there was a valid extension order under Section 43D(2): A fatal omission as the law requires:

• Written application by the Public Prosecutor,
• Detailed reasons showing progress of investigation,
• A judicial order extending time up to 180 days.

The HC’s order shows no such extension existed—yet it still rejected default bail. This omission could alone renders the order unsustainable.

The complete order of the Gauhati HC may be read here:

Why the Supreme Court intervened so strongly

The Supreme Court focused on the most fundamental issue: the petitioner’s detention was per se illegal, irrespective of nationality or the gravity of allegations. The Court’s reasoning reflects three constitutional anchors:

1. UAPA’s severity does not permit investigative complacency: The Act’s stringency heightens, not relaxes, the burden on the State to maintain strict procedural discipline.
2. Nationality is constitutionally irrelevant to default bail: The right protects any person in custody. Article 21 does not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens.
3. Default bail is a constitutional protection against State abuse: It exists precisely to prevent the scenario seen here: endless incarceration without trial.
4. Courts must not allow non-obstante clauses to amputate constitutional rights: The Supreme Court restored the correct position: Statutes cannot override the Constitution—ever.

Conclusion: A powerful reassertion of liberty in the UAPA era

The Supreme Court’s order is a striking reminder that even under the most severe national-security legislation, the State cannot suspend procedural safeguards. The ruling not only restores the petitioner’s liberty but also implicitly corrects the Gauhati High Court’s overly broad reading of Section 43D (7), which had the effect of collapsing the distinction between default bail and regular bail.

By granting bail and condemning the prolonged pre-trial incarceration, the Court reinforces a key constitutional principle: When the State violates statutory timelines, detention becomes illegal—no matter who the accused is, or what the allegations are.

Related:

Punjab & Haryana High Court refuses anticipatory bail to journalist accused of provocative, communal statements against Purvanchal community

Six Days Behind Bars After Bail: Patna High Court orders ₹2 lakh relief, flags state-wide pattern of illegal detention

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A New Silence: The Supreme Court’s turn toward non-interference in hate-speech cases

The post Supreme Court restores Article 21 safeguards, calls 24-month UAPA custody without charge sheet illegal; sets aside Gauhati HC’s reliance on Sec 43D(7) appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The decision came during the hearing of special leave petitions filed by the Union challenging two Calcutta High Court orders of September 26–27, which had directed the return of six individuals deported to Bangladesh and mandated an opportunity to them to establish their Indian citizenship. Sunali and her child are among those six deportees, whose removal from India has since raised troubling questions of due process, legality, and the treatment of vulnerable individuals caught in verification drives.

A family caught in a deportation sweep

The case originated from a habeas corpus plea filed by Bhodu Sekh, Sunali’s father, who told the High Court that his family hailed from West Bengal but had migrated to Delhi for better livelihood opportunities. According to Sekh, Sunali, her husband, and their son were detained on June 21 during an identity-verification campaign initiated under a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) notification dated May 2. Within five days, the family was produced before the Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) and deported to Bangladesh on June 26.

In its September rulings, the Calcutta High Court noted the “hot haste” of the proceedings and criticised the Union and Delhi Police for effecting deportation without a fair hearing or adequate inquiry. The court observed that the names of the deportees’ grandfathers appeared in the electoral rolls of West Bengal—an important indication of Indian lineage. It also highlighted that the May 2025 MHA memo allows immediate deportation only under emergent circumstances following proper inquiry, finding that such procedural safeguards were “conspicuously absent.”

Detailed reports on the said case may be read here, here and here.

Humanitarian Intervention by the Supreme Court

At the recent hearing, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta informed the Supreme Court that the Union had, after consultations, agreed to bring back Sunali and her child because of her advanced pregnancy and the need to avoid separation between mother and minor child. He clarified that the gesture:

• was not an admission concerning their citizenship,
• would not set a precedent,
• and would be accompanied by appropriate surveillance upon their return.

As the deportation was conducted formally through official channels, Mehta requested that the court incorporate the Union’s undertaking into its written order to expedite diplomatic coordination with Bangladeshi authorities. The Bench complied, ensuring that the repatriation process could begin without administrative obstacles.

Significantly, as per the report of Livelaw, the court remarked: “These are cases where law has to bend to humanity. Some of these cases require a different outlook.”

The order marks a crucial assertion of judicial discretion in situations where rigid enforcement risks inflicting disproportionate harm on vulnerable individuals.

Directions ensuring medical and social support

Accepting requests from senior advocates Kapil Sibal (appearing for the State of West Bengal) and Sanjay Hegde (for Bhodu Sekh), the Supreme Court directed that Sunali be allowed to reside temporarily in Birbhum district, where her family lives. As per Livelaw report, the Bench further ordered:

• Free and comprehensive medical care for Sunali, including all delivery-related services;
• Full assistance and day-to-day care for her minor son;
• Immediate coordination between the Union, West Bengal authorities, and medical officials to ensure safe return and treatment.

The Bench noted that since Sunali was picked up from Delhi, she may initially be brought back to the national capital before being shifted to her native district.

Citizenship Inquiry: Biological link may be pivotal

Justice Bagchi raised a crucial legal issue: if Bhodu Sekh is indeed an Indian citizen—as the High Court record suggests—then Sunali, as his biological daughter, and Sabir, as her child, would also qualify as Indian citizens. The Court urged the Union to undertake an inquiry into Sekh’s citizenship in accordance with principles of natural justice, signalling that the broader dispute over nationality remains very much alive.

Contempt proceedings and Union’s concerns

The Solicitor General informed the Court that a contempt petition was pending before the Calcutta High Court against the Union Government for non-compliance with the repatriation directions. While Mehta requested protection, the Bench said that since the Supreme Court was now seized of the matter, the High Court would not proceed independently. It declined to formally stay the contempt proceedings but indicated that the issue would not trouble the Union in light of ongoing Supreme Court supervision.

Remaining Deportees: Union maintains they are Bangladeshis

The Supreme Court also took note of the fact that four other deportees named in the High Court’s September orders remain in Bangladesh. Senior advocate Kapil Sibal requested that the Union take instructions regarding their return as well. The Solicitor General resisted, insisting that the remaining individuals were “Bangladeshi nationals” and that the Union had a serious contest to their claims of Indian citizenship.

The Bench has directed the Union to return with its instructions at the next hearing, signalling that the nationality dispute for the remaining individuals is far from settled.

Backdrop of procedural lapses

The High Court’s criticism of the June 2025 deportations remains a crucial backdrop. The Delhi Police, FRRO and central agencies executed the arrest-to-deportation timeline in five days, a speed the High Court deemed incompatible with fair procedure. It held that:

• no adequate inquiry was conducted,
• no meaningful opportunity to be heard was given,
• and the exercise violated the Union’s own procedural guidelines.

Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on these legal defects, its present orders focus on preventing further harm while preserving the Union’s right to contest the High Court’s findings.

A limited but crucial relief

While emphasising that its directions do not prejudice the Union’s legal arguments on the merits of the deportation, the Supreme Court made clear that humanitarian imperatives could not be ignored. The Court will resume hearing the matter on December 12, when it will also consider the status of the remaining deported individuals.

For now, the Court’s intervention ensures that a heavily pregnant woman and her young child will not be left without medical care or family support across an international border—sending a powerful message that judicial oversight remains vital where citizenship, deportation and human dignity intersect.

Order can be read here.

Related:

“All I Wanted Was Peace”: How 55-year-old widow Aklima Sarkar won back her citizenship

From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

Calcutta High Court strikes down arbitrary deportations of West Bengal residents, orders return from Bangladesh

Gauhati High Court seeks Centre’s May 2025 deportation notification as legality of re-detention of Abdul Shiekh and Majibur Rehman is scrutinised

Another Pushback Halted: SC stays deportation of woman declared foreigner, issues notice on challenge to Gauhati HC order

CJP Win! Gauhati HC stays deportation of Ajabha Khatun, will address bail demand on April 4

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