1. Facts

The matter before the Supreme Court arose from an interim order passed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in an appeal connected to a civil defamation suit. The original suit, CS (OS) No. 524/2024, was filed by ANI Media Private Limited (plaintiff/respondent) against Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (appellant) and others. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief to restrain the publication of allegedly false and defamatory content on Wikipedia, a platform maintained by the appellant Wikipedia, and also sought the removal of existing content.

The chain of events leading to the Supreme Court’s intervention began on August 20, 2024, when a single judge of the High Court, hearing the defamation suit, passed an interim order. This order directed Wikimedia to disclose the subscriber details and IP addresses of certain platform administrators (editors) identified as defendants in the suit. This directive, which aimed to unmask pseudonymous online contributors, became a point of public discussion.

Following this order, on September 17, 2024, an opinion piece was published in the Indian Express newspaper and subsequently hosted on a Wikimedia platform. The article, titled “why the case against Wikipedia in India is a challenge to freedom of speech and information,” was critical of the court’s directive to disclose editor details. It argued that such an order could chill free expression and set a dangerous precedent. On October 10, 2024, the news agency Medianama published a video that further analysed the case, discussing its potential implications for safe harbour protections for intermediaries in India.

Wikimedia appealed the single Judge’s disclosure order. During the appellate hearing before a Division Bench on October 14, 2024, counsel for ANI brought these publications to the court’s attention, arguing they were intended to “pressurise the learned Single Judge.” The situation was further compounded on the same day by the creation of a “talk page” on Wikimedia’s platform, a standard feature for discussing edits, which in this instance was used for public discussion of the ongoing court proceedings.

Two days later, on October 16, 2024, the Division Bench passed the impugned order. The Bench formed a prima facie view that the commentary constituted “interference in Court proceedings” and that the principle of sub-judice had been “violated with impunity.” The Bench noted that its own observations from the previous hearing had been “‘opened up for discussion’ on Wikimedia Foundation Inc. website which, according to us, complicates and compounds the issue at hand.” Concluding that the content “borders on contempt,” the Division Bench issued a direct and non-appealable directive ordering Wikimedia to “take down/delete the said pages and discussion” within 36 hours. It was this takedown order that the appellant challenged before the Supreme Court.

2. Issues

The primary legal and constitutional issues before the Supreme Court were:

1. Whether the High Court’s interim order directing the takedown of online content constituted a legally valid prior restraint on speech, consistent with the requirements of Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
2. Whether the High Court correctly applied the legal principles governing matters that are sub-judice and the law of contempt of court when issuing a mandatory takedown directive.
3. Whether the High Court’s order was a proportionate response to the perceived interference with the administration of justice.

3. Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the Delhi High Court dated October 16, 2024. The Court held that the Division Bench had “reacted disproportionately” in issuing the takedown directive. It found the order to be an impermissible prior restraint on speech because it was not supported by adequate reasoning and failed to meet the established constitutional tests for such a restriction. The immediate effect of the judgment was the restoration of the online pages and discussions that had been ordered to be removed.

4. Reasoning of the Court

The Supreme Court’s reasoning was grounded in a detailed analysis of several established legal principles, which it systematically applied to the facts of the case.

• The Test for Prior Restraint: The Court’s analysis began with the appellant’s primary contention that the takedown order was an unconstitutional prior restraint. The Court referred to the definitive test laid down by the Constitution Bench in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. SEBI.[1] In that case, the Court held that a court-ordered postponement of publication is a “neutralizing device” to be used only in rare cases. The party seeking such an order must satisfy a stringent two-part test: first, demonstrate a “real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to the proper administration of justice,” and second, show that “reasonable alternative methods will not prevent the risk.” The Supreme Court found the High Court’s order to be entirely devoid of this essential analysis. It contained no reasoning as to how the online commentary, which was based on publicly available information, posed a real and substantial risk to proceedings being conducted by a professional judge, who is trained and presumed to be immune to media pressure. The High Court had not articulated what specific prejudice would be caused or why less intrusive measures would be insufficient.
• The Principle of Open Justice: The Court emphasized that open justice is a foundational constitutional value, not merely a procedural formality. It drew upon the nine-Judge Bench decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, which had observed that a “public trial in open court is undoubtedly essential for the healthy, objective and fair administration of justice.”[2] The Court powerfully reiterated this by stating that a “trial held subject to the public scrutiny and gaze naturally acts as a check against judicial caprice or vagaries and serves as a powerful instrument for creating confidence of the public.” This principle was further reinforced by citing Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India, which laid down clear guidelines to regulate the live streaming and enabled people’s right to access justice under Article 21.[3] The Court framed public scrutiny not as a threat, but as an essential safeguard for the institution itself, quoting Jeremy Bentham’s observation that publicity “keeps the Judge himself, while trying, under trial.”
• The Law on Contempt of Court: The Court examined the narrow contours of criminal contempt and prescribed the appropriate judicial temperament when faced with criticism. This was a direct response to the High Court’s prima facie finding that the content “borders on contempt.” The Court drew heavily upon the jurisprudential wisdom of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer’s celebrated opinion in In Re S. Mulgaokar, which advised a “wise economy of use” of the contempt power and cautioned judges against being “hypersensitive.”[4] Justice Iyer’s opinion stressed that judges should “deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing, condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude.” The Supreme Court also referred to Lord Denning’s approach, quoting him as saying, “We will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity… We do not fear… criticism, nor do we resent it.” By invoking these authorities, the Supreme Court indicated that the High Court’s reaction was not in line with the recommended standard of judicial fortitude and restraint.

In summary, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court’s order was disproportionate because it failed to apply the correct legal test for prior restraint and was inconsistent with the principles of open justice and judicial restraint in contempt matters. The Court also made the general observation that “it is not the duty of the court to tell the media: delete this, take that down,” signalling a clear disapproval of judicial censorship.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Wikimedia v. ANI clarifies and reinforces the high constitutional threshold required for issuing takedown orders or other forms of prior restraint against publications concerning sub-judice matters. The decision serves as a significant precedent, reaffirming that any such restriction on speech must be rigorously justified by demonstrating a “real and substantial risk” of prejudice to the administration of justice, a test that will be difficult to meet in cases involving professional judges.

The ruling underscores the constitutional importance of open justice, framing public discussion of court proceedings not as an obstacle but as a vital component of judicial accountability. It also provides important normative guidance for the judiciary, encouraging an institutional culture of resilience and restraint in the face of public criticism. For media organizations, journalists, legal commentators, and digital platforms, the decision provides a strong precedent to resist takedown orders that are not supported by a detailed, reasoned, and constitutionally compliant analysis.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] CURATIVE PETITION (C) NO.85 OF 2013 in REVIEW PETITION (C) NO.2332 OF 2012 in CIVIL APPEAL NO.9813 OF 2011

[2] AIR 1967 SUPREME COURT 1

[3] AIR 2019 SC (CIV) 194

[4] 1978 AIR 727

Related:

Recalibrating Free Speech: The Supreme Court’s constitutional turn in the digital age

Mixed Messaging: Free speech jurisprudence from the Supreme Court

India’s Free Speech Crisis Deepens: 329 violations recorded in just four months of 2025

The post Reaffirming Open Justice: The Supreme Court on speech and contempt appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“An Election Commission bent on striking off names is bound to disenfranchise large sections of undocumented and vulnerable citizens,” he said, adding that this undermines trust in the fairness of elections.

Pointing out that the credibility of the Commission has historically been the backbone of India’s democratic resilience, he criticised the current system of appointing Election Commissioners, where the government retains decisive control, despite the Supreme Court recommending the inclusion of the Chief Justice of India in the process. “If the Commission is seen as partisan, the public will view elections as a fixed match,” Mr. Hegde warned.

The lecture traced the historical background to Citizenship and why the election commission’s doings first in Assam (over the exclusions in the National Register of Citizens –NRC and now the SIR) in Bihar are now spreading a fear and panic. The ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process since June 2025 has faced criticism politically and even in the Courts, where judicial orders have had to be resorted to, to ensure a measure of accountability and inclusion.

Journalist Dinesh Amin Mattu described the current controversies surrounding electoral processes as “symptoms” of a deeper malaise within India’s election system. Speaking on electoral accountability, he noted that while debates once centred on EVMs and now on voter rolls, the underlying problem was the lack of structural reform. “The real issue is not just in Bihar or elsewhere; it is the larger disease that has crept into the system,” Mr. Mattu said.

In the panel discussion that followed, activists and civil society representatives voiced concerns over large-scale exclusions from electoral rolls in Bihar and the continuing uncertainty around the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam. Participants flagged the notification of a “special intensive revision” of voter lists in Bihar as deeply flawed, noting that it seeks to weed out “illegal immigrants” — a mandate that goes beyond the Election Commission’s role. Concerns were also raised about privileging certain groups such as bureaucrats and sportspersons while subjecting ordinary citizens, especially minorities, women, and migrant workers, to scrutiny. Teesta Setalvad, co-convenor of Vote for Democracy (VFD) led the panel discussion with participation from Tara Rao from Edelu Karnataka.

A lively discussion on what lay in store for Indian democracy followed. Opposition parties from Bihar like the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and Indian National Congress (INC) have over the past two and a half weeks been conducting a ‘Voter Adhikar Yatra’ in Bihar. Meanwhile independent journalists and Digital Platforms, including You Tubers have been reporting on the ground on gross anomalies and errors in the manner in which the SIR that has –initially excluded a staggering 65 lakh persons—been conducted. The Supreme Court is currently still hearing the matter. On claims of ‘weeding out 3 lakh illegal immigrants’ and those who are ‘dead’ or ‘permanently shifted’, or have ‘duplicate voter cards’ in fact, marginalised communities –Dalits, Muslims and women from across the spectrum face the serious threat of being denied their constitutional right to Universal Adult Franchise under Article 326 of the Constitution.

Journalist Gauri Lankesh’s immediate family, Kavitha Lankesh and her neice Esha Lankesh were present on the occasion.

Related:

From Whispers to Shouts: How India’s voter roll irregularities are finally being heard

Rahul Gandhi alleges ‘Vote Chori’ in 2024 polls, accuses BJP-ECI nexus of systematic electoral fraud

Election Commission of India says voters’ names not to be removed without prior notice

The post Election Commission seriously risks losing all credibility: senior advocate Sanjay Hegde appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As per the report of LiveLaw, the petition underscores that preparation of a “correct and error-free NRC” is a matter of national security and one that has already been under the close supervision of the Supreme Court. The petitioner submits that several “omissions and commissions” have taken place during the updation exercise, warranting the Court’s intervention for corrective action.

On August 22, a bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar issued notice in the matter.

Who is the petitioner?

As reported by LiveLaw, the plea has been filed by Hitesh Dev Sarma, a retired IAS officer, who has approached the Court both in his personal capacity and as a representative of a “large section of indigenous people of Assam.” He argues that the flawed NRC process has compromised the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19, 21, 25 and 29 of the Constitution.

Sarma brings insider knowledge to the petition, having served as Executive Director, NRC Assam (2014–2017) and later as State NRC Coordinator (2019–2022), until his retirement. He claims to have been directly involved in framing verification protocols during the updation process.

Background of the NRC process

• The complete draft NRC was published on July 30, 2018.
• The supplementary list was released on August 31, 2019.
• The final NRC is yet to be published by the Registrar General of India.

According to LiveLaw, the petition refers extensively to official communications, verification reports, IT vendor documents, cyber security audits, and the CAG’s findings, all of which, according to the petitioner, expose grave flaws in the NRC exercise.

Key grounds raised in the petition

1. Exclusion of eligible persons
   • Out of 40,07,719 persons excluded from the draft NRC, around 3,93,975 did not submit claims.
   • Of this group, about 50,695 appeared eligible for inclusion but were left out, according to the petitioner.
2. Incorrect marking of Originally Inhabitants (OI)
   • The Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup reported on June 28, 2019, that 64,247 applicants were marked as OI in Chamaria Circle.
   • Verification later revealed that 14,183 of them were not eligible.
   • Special verification of 30,791 persons found 7,446 ineligible, including declared foreigners, descendants of foreigners, doubtful voters, and persons with pending Foreigners Tribunal cases.
3. Absence of speaking orders
   • During claims and objections, 5,06,140 decisions were made by Disposing Officers (DOs).
   • Yet only 4,148 decisions were backed by speaking orders.
   • Shockingly, names of 43,642 persons shifted from ‘reject’ to ‘accept’, while 4,62,498 shifted from ‘accept’ to ‘reject’, all without hearings or speaking orders.
4. Errors in Family Tree Matching
   • A sample check indicated that 943 names were wrongly entered in the draft NRC due to flawed family tree matching.
   • This suggested a high error rate and absence of adequate quality control mechanisms.
5. Financial irregularities
   • The CAG report (year ending March 31, 2020) flagged irregularities worth ₹260 crore.
   • It recommended fixing accountability on the then State NRC Coordinator.

Supporting documents cited

The plea relies on:

• Letters issued by the State Coordinator, NRC Assam
• Reports of verification teams
• Communications from IT vendor Bohniman Systems Pvt. Ltd.
• Findings of a cyber security consultant concerning safeguards for NRC data.

Prayer before the Court

The petitioner urges the Court to direct a fresh reverification of the draft NRC and supplementary list, arguing that large-scale errors and systemic lapses have compromised the exercise and risk undermining the integrity of the final NRC.

The plea is filed through Senior Advocate Manish Goswami and Advocate-on-Record Rameshwar Prasad Goyal.

Related:

Supreme Court halts deportation of woman declared foreigner, issues notice to union and NRC coordinator

CJP EXCLUSIVE: How the Union of India took a giant step towards both NPR & NRC in 2015 without informed consent

Even the Dead Are Not Spared: A Tragic Tale of NRC’s Heartless Grip on Assam

CAA-NPR-NRC: The Law Is Being Weaponised Against the Constitution

The post Supreme Court issues notice on plea for time-bound reverification of Assam NRC over “large-scale errors” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The verdict covers the bail applications of Umar Khalid, Sharjeel Imam, Athar Khan, Khalid Saifi, Mohd Saleem Khan, Shifa-Ur-Rehman, Meeran Haider, Gulfisha Fatima, and Shadab Ahmed.

Another coordinate bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar pronounced a separate order denying bail at 2:30 pm on the bail plea of co-accused Tasleem Ahmed. The Delhi High Court on Tuesday dismissed the bail plea filed by Tasleem Ahmed, accused in the UAPA case alleging larger conspiracy in the commission of 2020 North-East Delhi riots.

All of these accused had challenged orders of the trial court which had consistently denied them bail under FIR 59 of 2020, registered by the Delhi Police Special Cell. 

Background of the Case

The Northeast Delhi riots of February 2020 left 53 people dead and over 700 injured. The Delhi Police alleged that the violence was not spontaneous but the result of a “deep-rooted conspiracy” linked to protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA).

• FIR 59 of 2020 was lodged on March 6, 2020 by the Special Cell.
• Multiple chargesheets – five in total – were filed between September 16, 2020 and June 7, 2023.
• The prosecution invoked provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA).
• Out of the 18 originally arrested, 12 remain in custody. The case is presently at the stage of arguments on charge, with over 897 witnesses cited.

The Delhi Police’s case rests on:

1. WhatsApp group chats (notably Muslim Students of JNU (MSJ), Jamia Coordination Committee (JCC), and Delhi Protest Support Group (DPSG)).
2. Protected witness statements.
3. CCTV footage and digital records.

According to the Special Cell, the accused coordinated protests across 23 sites near mosques and main roads in Muslim-majority areas, which were to escalate into a “chakka jam” during then US President Donald Trump’s February 2020 visit — allegedly to embarrass India globally. 

Accused persons and key bail arguments

Umar Khalid

• Represented by Senior Advocate Trideep Pais.
• Submitted that merely being part of WhatsApp groups without posting messages is not criminality.
• Argued that no recovery was made from him and that the alleged “secret” meeting on February 23–24 was not clandestine.
• Stated that no witness statement specifically attributes terrorism-related acts to him.
• Claimed parity with co-accused who had graver allegations but were granted bail.

Sharjeel Imam

• Represented by Advocate Talib Mustafa.
• Stated he was disconnected from co-accused and not part of conspiracy meetings.
• The last act attributed to him was a speech in Bihar on January 23, 2020, predating the riots.
• Argued entitlement to statutory bail under Section 436A CrPC, since he had already spent more than 4 years in custody (over half of the 7-year maximum for UAPA Section 13).

Khalid Saifi

• Represented by Senior Advocate Rebecca John.
• Questioned reliance on “innocuous messages” under UAPA.
• Invoked parity with three co-accused granted bail in June 2021.
• Submitted that chakka jams were a common protest tool, not terrorism.

Shifa-Ur-Rehman

• Said he had already spent more than 5 years in custody.
• Highlighted that participation in protests/meetings cannot be criminalised.
• Argued delay in trial and inconsistencies in witness statements.

Gulfisha Fatima

• Contended she had no active participation in the alleged conspiracy.
• Argued for bail on grounds of parity with those already released.

Meeran Haider

• Echoed parity and delay arguments.
• Asserted that protected witness statements only indicated protest participation.

Mohd. Saleem Khan

• Argued bail on parity and prolonged incarceration.

Athar Khan

• Argued on parity with co-accused already released.

Tasleem Ahmed

• Represented by Advocate Mehmood Pracha.
• Argued delay in trial; over 5 years in custody without seeking adjournments.

Shadab Ahmed

• Plea heard separately; argued contradictions in witness statements and parity with other bail orders.

Prosecution’s Case (Delhi Police)

Represented by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta and Special Public Prosecutor Amit Prasad, the State opposed all bail pleas.

• Mehta described the probe as one of the “finest investigations” carried out.
• Claimed the riots were “pre-planned, well-organised and sinister,” aimed at dividing the nation on religious lines.
• Alleged that the accused intended to globally embarrass India during Trump’s visit by triggering violence.
• Cited Sharjeel Imam’s speeches, claiming they set a timeline for escalating protests.
• Emphasised that this was not a case of “mere riots” but a premeditated attack on sovereignty.
• Highlighted use of a large iron “gulel” (catapult) as evidence of violent preparation.
• Alleged fake documents used for SIM cards and reference to financial irregularities.
• Stressed that long incarceration cannot justify bail in UAPA cases of national security.

During the hearing, according to LiveLaw, SG Mehta said that “If you are doing something against the nation, then you better be in jail till you are acquitted or convicted.”

Related:

How the Delhi riots case remains stagnant with close to a dozen student leaders incarcerated

5 Years of Delhi Riots: Some Punished, Some Rewarded!

Delhi Riots 2020: Umar Khalid withdraws plea from Supreme Court citing “change in circumstances”

Brinda Karat on the Third Anniversary of Delhi Riots- “Cannot Abandon Struggle for Justice”

Hate speeches amplified by television, incited targeted violence against Muslims: CCR Report, Feb ‘20 Delhi riots

The post Delhi High Court dismisses bail pleas of Umar Khalid, Sharjeel Imam, and others in 2020 Riots Conspiracy Case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On August 18, during the hearing on connected writ petitions, Justice Sanjay Kumar Medhi expressed his strong reservations, remarking:

“3,000 bighas! The entire district? What is going on? 3,000 bighas allotted to a private company? We know how barren the land is… 3,000 bighas? What kind of decision is this? Is this some kind of joke or what? Your need is not the issue—the public interest is the issue.”

According to LiveLaw, the counsel for Mahabal Cement argued that the land allotted comprised only barren areas and was required for the company’s operations. However, the bench did not accept this contention and directed the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council (NCHAC) to produce the records and policy basis for granting such an unusually large tract of land.

The court underscored that Dima Hasao is a Sixth Schedule district under the Constitution of India, where priority must be given to safeguarding the rights and interests of the tribal communities. It further observed that the proposed allotment site in Umrangso falls within an environmentally sensitive zone, home to hot springs, migratory bird habitats, and diverse wildlife.

In its order, the Court noted:

“A cursory glance into the facts of the case would reveal that the land which has been sought to be allotted is about 3000 bighas which itself appears to be extraordinary.”

The real story is tribal land rights in Assam

Several users, including the official handles of the Congress and CPI(M), claimed that the land was being handed over to the Adani Group. The conglomerate was forced to issue a formal statement on August 18, calling the claims “baseless” and clarifying that it has no connection with the cement company in question.

This misattribution, however, distracted attention from the real conflict: the struggle of tribal villagers in Sixth Schedule areas of Assam against land allotments that threaten their customary rights.

Notably, Newslaundry had earlier documented local opposition to other projects in Dima Hasao, including Ambuja Cement’s limestone mining project, spread over 1,200 bighas and linked to the Adani Group, which too has faced stiff protests from villagers fearing displacement.

The Company at the Centre: Mahabal Cement

The dispute at the heart of the viral video involves Mahabal Cement Pvt. Ltd., which received an allotment of around 3,000 bighas in Umrangso – an environmental hotspot known for its hot springs, migratory bird stopovers, and diverse wildlife.

As per a report in Newslaundry, since December 2024, 22 residents of Nobdi Longku Kro and Chotolarpheng villages have been challenging the allotment in court. They allege that the Dima Hasao Autonomous Council (DAHC) granted the land without following due process.

A sixth schedule district and tribal land customs

Dima Hasao, established as a Sixth Schedule district in 1951, is administered by the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council (NCHAC), which manages land rights and governance for the predominantly tribal population.

The district contains both surveyed and un-surveyed land. While surveyed land falls under council administration, un-surveyed land is governed by tribal customs, where gaon buras (village headmen) distribute land and collect taxes on behalf of the council.

As per the report in Newslaundry, the petitioners contend that their families have lawfully cultivated and lived on these lands since 1975, paying taxes through gaon buras. The land, they say, is communal property under tribal custom.

But in 2024, villagers were informed by revenue officials that their land had been acquired for Mahabal Cement. Some residents claim that the local patwari coerced them into signing No Objection Certificates (NOCs) and accepting cheques of ₹2 lakh as compensation.

On May 16, 2024, residents of Nobdi Longku Kro submitted a formal objection letter to the DAHC, accusing officials of using “coercion” and “disinformation” to force through an “involuntary acquisition.”

The court battle

The legal fight over the land began earlier. In November 2024, a PIL filed by an activist on behalf of the villagers was disposed of by the Gauhati High Court, which said residents could return if new circumstances arose. By December, villagers filed a fresh petition.

• On February 2, 2025, the High Court directed authorities to explain how such a vast tract of land – 3,000 bighas – was allotted to Mahabal Cement. It also asked the DAHC to update the court on land demarcation related to the allotment.
• By April 2025, the DAHC submitted an affidavit stating that a resolution had been passed in January to provide alternate land to the affected residents. A March 6 notification confirmed the re-allotment of plots about 500 meters away, in equal proportion to what was acquired, along with compensation for agricultural use.
• Meanwhile, Mahabal Cement filed a separate writ petition, complaining of “disruption” of its cement project. The court later clubbed both petitions for joint hearing.

It was during the August 12 hearing of the merged petitions that Justice Medhi’s remarks went viral. The court observed:

“A cursory glance into the facts of the case would reveal that the land which has been sought to be allotted is about 3,000 bighas, which itself appears to be extraordinary.”

The Bench also stated:

“This Court directs Shri C. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, NCHAC to obtain the records containing the policy to allot such a huge chunk of land measuring 3000 Bighas to a factory. The aforesaid direction has been given by taking into account that the district is a 6th Scheduled District under the Constitution of India where the priority has to be given to the rights and interest of the tribal people residing there. Further, the area involved is Umrangso in the district of Dima Hasao which is known as an environment hotspot containing hot spring, stop over for migratory birds, wild life etc.”

While the company claimed the land was granted through a tender-based mining lease, the bench questioned whether such a decision was compatible with Sixth Schedule protections for tribal rights and the ecological sensitivity of the area.

The matter has now been listed for September 1, 2025, with the court directing the NCHAC to produce the full policy records behind the allotment.

The complete order may be read here.

Shutdown called in Tinsukia as tribal groups resist state cabinet move

As per a report of The Hindu, massive protests broke out in Diphu, the headquarters of Karbi Anglong district, on Wednesday (August 20) as tribal groups opposed the Assam government’s move to hand over tribal land to large corporate houses.

Karbi Anglong is one of three districts in Assam governed under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, which safeguards tribal rights and provides autonomy to local councils.

The protest in Diphu was led by All-Party Hills Leaders Conference president Jones Ingti Kathar, with demonstrators raising slogans against Tuliram Ronghang, the BJP-led Chief Executive Member of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous District Council area.

Assam Jatiya Parishad president Lurinjyoti Gogoi, who joined the rally, accused Mr. Ronghang of colluding with corporate houses and “betraying the interests of tribal and indigenous communities.” He contrasted the “₹200-crore mansion” allegedly linked to Mr. Ronghang with the “makeshift huts” where hill tribals continue to live, accusing the BJP of endangering the cultural and economic survival of these communities, according to The Hindu report.

Related:

Assam government to withdraw ‘Foreigner’ cases against Non-Muslims under Citizenship Amendment Act

Banasha Bibi, Bengali-speaking Muslim woman with disability, declared Indian in CJP-Led Legal Win

“She Can’t Just Disappear”: Gauhati High Court told as state fails to produce handover certificate in Doyjan Bibi “pushback” case

The post Gauhati High Court questions allotment of 3000 Bighas of land to private cement company in Assam appeared first on SabrangIndia.

MCOCA is among a class of ‘special laws’ enacted to combat grave threats to the social order. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of MCOCA notes that the existing legal framework was deemed “inadequate” to “curb or control the menace” of organized crime. To address this, the act introduces a set of bail conditions under Section 21 that depart significantly from the standard provisions of the Bhariyay Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) by shifting the burden of proof to the accused. Rider: The BNS 2023, under Section 479 also contains very stringent conditions for statutory bail. The said section limits the conditions for granting statutory bail to under trials.

[Section 436A of the CRPC provides for the procedure to be adopted in case the under trial is to be given statutory bail after spending a particular period under detention. In the older CrPC, if an under trial has spent half of the maximum period of imprisonment for an offence in detention, they must be released on a personal bond (not to be applied to offences which are punishable by death) BNSS, 2023 however, retains the said provision, and makes it further stringent. [1]

The stringent bail conditions under MCOCA and other special laws creates a tension between the presumption of innocence and the State’s power to restrict liberty. In Naresh Kumar, the High Court observes that the Supreme Court has consistently held that where trials under special laws are unduly delayed, the rigour of strict bail provisions must yield to the constitutional promise of liberty. The Court ruled that even the special provisions of MCOCA “cannot be construed in a manner that forecloses judicial scrutiny under Article 21.”

The complete judgment delivered in Naresh Kumar @ Pahelwan v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025) can be read here.

The eight long years of Naresh Kumar’s pre-trial detention are far from an anomaly. The indiscriminate use of special laws has created a situation where the promise of a speedy trial is, more often than not, the exception not the rule. The trajectory of the 2020 Delhi Riots cases continues to haunt public memory, where the infamous 17,000 page FIR 59/2020 charged 18 student activists with instigating communal violence as part of a larger “terror conspiracy.” They were arrested under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), a draconian special law which has bound together the politics of protest with the law’s harshest instruments. As of mid-2025, only six have been released on bail. Not a single charge has, five years down, been framed. A detailed analysis of the incarcerations in this FIR may be read here.

This legal resource traces the jurisprudence on the contradiction between and the incarceration under stringent bail statutes and fundamental right to liberty under Article 21. The judicial trend from Satender Kumar Antil v Central Bureau of Investigation (2022) to Vernon Gonsalves v State of Maharashtra (2023) to the latest decision in Naresh Kumar demonstrates a clear and consistent position: the label of a “special law” does not justify indefinite pre-trial detention. Our analysis demonstrates that the more severe the bail restrictions, the greater the obligation on the State to ensure swift adjudication.

The Constitutional Imperative

 “Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as Fundamental Rights [are] concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India.”
— Satender Kumar Antil vs Central Bureau Of Investigation (2022)

Article 21 of the Constitution of India reads:

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”

The Apex Court has consistently affirmed the ‘Golden Triangle’ of fundamental rights which sustain and nourish each other^[2]: Article 14 (Right to Equality), Article 21 (Right to Life), and Article 19 (Freedom of Speech). Consequently, any legal procedure that deprives an individual of the most fundamental of their rights must be just, fair, and reasonable, that is, a procedure which promotes  speedy trial^[3]. This principle has been foundational to a series of decisions which establish the right to a speedy trial as implicit in the broad sweep of Article 21.

The Inherent Right to a Speedy Trial

“Arrest is not a draconian measure to be used at the whims of the police officer.”

— Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal (2007)

That the right to a speedy trial is an integral part of the fundamental right to life and liberty was first enunciated all the way back in 1979. In Hussainara Khatoon v Home Secretary, State of Bihar, the Supreme Court reasoned that for a legal procedure to be just under Article 21, it must ensure “a reasonably expeditious trial” to determine the guilt of an accused. Since then, this ratio has been affirmed and re-affirmed without a single dissenting note.

The Constitutional guarantee was further developed by the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay v R.S. Nayak (1992), which recognised that the violation of this right may even demand the “quashing of a criminal proceeding altogether.” In Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (2001), the Supreme Court observed that the right to ‘default bail’ under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (now Section 187(2) of BNSS) is “nothing but a legislative exposition of the constitutional safeguard under Article 21.” The Bench held that if the accused is ready to furnish bail, and the prosecution has failed to file the charge sheet within the stipulated period, then the former has an indefeasible right to be released on bail. A decade later, the Court in Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2011), recognising the hardship of pre-trial detention, ruled that the act for holding an accused in custody must be based on ‘necessity’ and not ‘punishment.’

Recasting Bail under Special Acts: The Supreme Court’s Mandate

The principles established in these seminal judgments were decisively applied to ‘special acts’ in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2022), which sought to provide clear guidelines for lower courts to give effect to the maxim that ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception.’

Confronting the crisis of India’s overflowing jails and the “continuous supply of cases seeking bail,” the Supreme Court detailed a comprehensive framework to realign the judicial balance between legislative strictures and individual rights. To enlarge the scope and ease the process of bail, the Court devised a four-fold classification of offences, reproduced below:

• Category A Offences: Punishable with imprisonment of 7 years or less
• Category B Offences: Punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for more than 7 years
• Category C Offences (Special Acts): Punishable under Special Acts containing stringent provisions for bail like NDPS (S.37), PMLA (S.45), UAPA (S.43D(5)), Companies Act, (S.212(6)), etc.
• Category D Offences: Economic offences not covered by Special Acts

Among these, Category C specifically addresses offenses under special acts that contain stringent bail provisions, such as Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), National Security Act, 1980 (NSA), Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS), and various Gangster Acts.

Significantly, the Court extended the constitutional mandate of a speedy trial to cases under special laws, stating that “the general principle governing delay would apply to these categories also.” The Court added that Section 436A of CrPC (now Section 479 of BNSS), which limits the detention of undertrial prisoners to half of the maximum prescribed sentence, would apply to special acts in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary.

In a pivotal declaration, the Court directly linked the severity of a statute to a heightened obligation for a speedy trial, holding that “more the rigor, the quicker the adjudication ought to be.”

The complete judgment delivered in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2022) can be read here.

The guidelines laid out in Satender Kumar are the culmination of judicial reasoning on special acts which echoes as far back as Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India (1996). In that landmark ruling, the Court acknowledged the legislature’s decision to sacrifice some personal liberty for the sake of protecting the community, but stipulated that this very sacrifice makes it “all the more necessary that investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an adequate number of Designated Courts are set up,” to ensure that “persons ultimately found innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”

This jurisprudence has continued to evolve through the decades, with P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2019) cautioning against a “mechanical application of a statute” to deny bail, and Mohd. Enamul Haque v. Enforcement Directorate (2024) holding that prolonged incarceration will “inure to the benefit of the accused for bail” when the delay is not attributable to him.

Read collectively, these cases demonstrate a clear judicial trend: the more severe the statutory bail restrictions, the greater the obligation on the State to ensure a speedy trial, and the more likely that a delay will lead to the accused’s release.

Can Bail be the Exception? The Judicial Approach to Special Laws

The Paradox of Preventive Detention

Aniket is a 24-year-old law student from Madhya Pradesh. On 14 June 2024, he raised his voice against the inappropriate behaviour of a professor towards a female student belonging to a Scheduled Caste. The professor retaliated by assaulting him and registering an FIR against him on a variety of charges, ranging from rioting to attempt to murder.

On recommendation of the Station House Officer and the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate charged Aniket with Section 3(2) of the National Security Act. This order of preventive detention was served to him while he was already lodged in Bhopal Central Jail. His representation against the order was rejected by the same District Magistrate who issued the order, and subsequent appeals were dismissed by the Advisory Board and the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Instead, the order was extended thrice, leading to his pre-trial detention for over a year. These extensions were approved despite Aniket being granted bail for the underlying charge all the way back in January 2025.

Aniket filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court, submitting that his alleged offence amounted to nothing more than simple assault and criminal intimidation, charges which have no proximity to demand the draconian measure of preventive detention. The prosecution, however, insisted that the detention was necessary due to Aniket’s “potential to disturb public order.”

The bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and K. Vinod Chandran, aghast at the total “non-application of mind” of the police and lower courts, ruled that his preventive detention under NSA was “wholly untenable.”

The reasoned order by Justice Bhuyan carefully analysed NSA Section 3(2) to conclude that a person can only be taken into preventive detention if his activities are prejudicial to the security of the State, maintenance of public order, or maintenance of essential supplies and services. The Bench observed that the preventive detention order was issued with the intent to prevent the appellant from acting in a manner “prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order.” This, however, is a much broader ambit than “public order” which requires an impact to “the community or the public at large” (Ram Manohar Lohia v State of Bihar, 1965). The inability of the police to handle a law and order situation cannot be an excuse to invoke preventive detention (Nenavath Bujji v State of Telangana, 2024).

Reprimanding the authorities, the Court observed that “the entire intent appears to continue the detention of the appellant since he was likely to get bail in the criminal case, which, in fact, he got.” However, preventive detention is not intended to deny rightful bail to an accused charged with a regular criminal offence. The Apex Court ruled that:

“Preventive detention being a hard law, it is axiomatic that an order of preventive detention should be strictly construed. It is the duty of a constitutional court like the High Court to minutely scrutinize an order of preventive detention to ensure that the order of preventive detention squarely falls within the four corners of the relevant law and that the liberty of a person is not unlawfully compromised.”

 The reasoned order in Annu @ Aniket Through His Father As Next Friend Krupal Singh Thakur v. Union of India (2025) may be read here.

The UAPA Conundrum: Reclaiming Judicial Discretion from Statutory Veto

Within the landscape of India’s special laws, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act occupies a uniquely terrifying position. Enacted in the same year as Naxalbari peasants’ uprising, the Act’s stated purpose is to prevent unlawful and terrorist activities which are prejudicial to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State. But overbroad definitions, sweeping investigative powers, and impossibly stringent bail provisions have transformed the legislation into an instrument of terror itself – whereby suspicion becomes conviction and pre-trial detention becomes punishment.

Cartoon by Arun Ferreira | Source: Colours of the Cage

The human cost of this statute is staggering. Based on the data from the National Crime Records Bureau, 8,136 persons were arrested under the UAPA from 2015 to 2020. A mere 2.8% were convicted.^[4]

With the vast majority of cases ending in acquittal or withdrawal, bail becomes the only remedy that stands between an individual and a decade in jail without trial. However, Section 43D(5) of the Act has turned the oft-quoted maxim over on its head – making jail the rule and bail the exception.

Section 43D(5) reads:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release:

Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.”

In simple terms, Section 43D (5) forbids the Court from granting bail if the prosecution makes out a preliminary case. The defence, at this stage, is at a significant disadvantage: it can neither submit exculpatory evidence of its own, nor cross-examine the prosecution’s evidence. When judicial discretion is replaced by a prosecutorial veto, how, then, is a Court to grant bail?

The Supreme Court’s judgment in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) is the starting point for the modern jurisprudence on this question. The Court overruled a bail order granted to the accused by the Delhi High Court, stating that its analysis “[bordered] on being perverse, as it has virtually conducted a mini trial…and even questioned the genuineness of the documents relied upon by the Investigating Agency.” The judgment placed extraordinary weight on the accusatory narrative of the police and practically barred trial courts from examining the merits and demerits of the evidence.

The Court held that:

• Statutory mandate of a prima facie assessment requires a lighter degree of satisfaction. The evidence collated by the investigating agency must be presumed true.
• At the bail stage, courts must not engage in a “detailed analysis of evidence” or discard any material being placed before it as inadmissible.

The Watali judgement has cast a long shadow over the evolution of bail jurisprudence under the UAPA, widely and often blindly cited by High Courts in several bail rejection orders. It not only cements the “jurisprudence of suspicion,” but equates the degree of satisfaction required to reject bail to the level of the one necessary to frame charge^[5].

Such an interpretation of ‘prima facie true’ criteria raises a fundamental contradiction: if the allegations of the investigative agency are to be taken at face-value, what is the need or purpose of the Judiciary?

Union of India vs K.A. Najeeb (2021) offers a modest pushback^[6]. The case involved an accused who had been incarcerated for more than five years, without a trial even having commenced. Relying on the ratio of Shaheen Welfare Association, the Kerala High Court held that such protracted incarceration violates the respondent’s right to speedy trial and access to justice, regardless of limitations under special enactments. The State’s appeal relied on Watali to argue that the High Court erred in granting bail without adhering to the statutory rigours of Section 43­D(5).

The Apex Court dismissed the appeal, holding that:

• Section 43­D (5) is not the sole metric, but “merely…another possible ground” for the Court to deny bail. It is to be considered alongside factors like gravity of the offence, possibility of evidence or witness tampering, chance of absconsion, etc.
• The rigours of a provision like Section 43­D (5) will “melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.”

Read a detailed comparative analysis of Watali and Najeeb here.

Though the Najeeb ruling partially reads down the ‘prima facie true’ argument, it refrains from confronting Watali head-on, finding that the latter deals with an “entirely different factual matrix.” A direct challenge appears for the first time in Vernon vs State of Maharashtra (2023).

Trade unionist Vernon Gonsalves and Advocate Arun Ferreira were two of the accused in the Bhima Koregaon case. Based upon a combination of inferences drawn from letters in the nature of hearsay, statements from ‘protected witnesses,’ and third-party communication, the Prosecution wove a narrative alleging that the two were part of a ‘conspiracy’ to overthrow the State.

In granting their bail application, Supreme Court Justices Aniruddha Bose and Sudhanshu Dhulia recalibrated the standard set in Watali. The Court held that:

• A “surface-level analysis of the probative value of evidence” is essential when assessing whether the case is prima facie true under Section 43D (5) of UAPA.
• Though an ordinary bail petition precludes a scrutiny of evidence, the “restrictive provisions” of Section 43D (5) make “some element of evidence-analysis…inevitable.”

Affirming the guideline in Satender Kumar Antil, the Court ruled that “when the statutes have stringent provisions the duty of the Court would be more onerous. Graver the offence, greater should be the care taken to see that the offence would fall within the four corners of the Act.”

The Court also acknowledged Najeeb noting that at the time of the judgment, the accused had spent five years in jail, while further clarifying Article 21 can be invoked due to prolonged incarceration, even if the period is less than half of the maximum sentence.

 By requiring courts to assess some believability in the evidence (and not merely its existence), the Vernon ruling opens the door for meaningful judicial engagement at the bail stage^[7].

The complete judgment delivered in Vernon vs State of Maharashtra (2023) can be read here.

Advocate Gautam Bhatia’s analysis of the jurisprudence on bail under UAPA, culminating in Vernon, distils three judicial principles^[8]:

1. The definitional clauses of the UAPA must be given a strict and narrow construction.
2. The allegations in the chargesheet must be individualised, factual, and particularistic.
3. Bail cannot be denied when the Prosecution’s evidence is of “low probative value.”

However, the jurisprudence on this point remains ambiguous. Since Watali, Najeeb, and Vernon were delivered by benches of equal strength, lower courts are free to selectively rely on either approach. The Delhi High Court, for instance, has had multiple opportunities to apply Vernon and Najeeb in the context of FIR 59/2020, but has betrayed a caution verging on abstention^[9].

While we wait for the Supreme Court to explicitly resolve this interpretive conflict, Professor Hany Babu and Advocate Surendra Gadling (two other accused in the Bhima Koregaon case who continue to be in pre-trial detention) present an elegant argument^[10] which may lift the ominous

shadow of Watali. A close reading of Section 2 (d) of UAPA defines “Court” as a criminal court with jurisdiction to try offenses under the Act. This means that the restrictions on bail in Section 43D (5) were intended to apply only to trial courts, and not to constitutional courts.

Such an interpretation renders Watali per incuriam, and frees Constitutional Courts from the statutory constraint altogether – restoring the power of the Constitutional promise of liberty to override a statutory bail provision, no matter how special the law.

Stringency and Snails: The PMLA Recalibration

In the lead-up to the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act was shrewdly maneuvered to disrupt the electoral playing field. The Enforcement Directorate (ED) initiated raids on a number of prominent opposition figures, including Hemant Soren (Jharkhand Mukti Morcha), D.K. Shiva Kumar (Indian National Congress), and Abhishek Banerjee (All India Trinamool Congress). In the high-profile ‘Delhi Liquor Scam’ case, the arrests of Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal (Aam Aadmi Party) and K. Kavitha (Bharat Rashtra Samithi party) came in step with the Election Commission’s announcement of the Lok Sabha poll schedule.

The arrests brought two recurring themes into popular discourse: the weaponisation of the ED’s powers of arrest, and the draconian nature of the PMLA’s bail conditions.

The first of these finds its roots in Section 19 of the PMLA, which grants ED officials the power to arrest individuals if they have “reason to believe” that a person is “guilty of an offence punishable under this Act.” The Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022) upheld this provision, reasoning that unlike police officers who are only tasked with investigating offences, ED officers have an added responsibility to “prevent” money laundering. Operating under the PMLA as a ‘special’ investigative agency, the ED is exempt from many procedural safeguards and oversight mechanisms that apply to the police under BNSS. By vesting the power to arrest entirely within the ED’s internal hierarchy without prior judicial sanction, the provision allows the agency to be the sole judge of its own “reason to believe.”

The second concerns the twin bail conditions under PMLA. Section 45(1) of the Act reads:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no person accused of an offence under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless:

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail”

In 2017, the two-judge Bench in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v Union Of India had struck down an earlier version of Section 45(1), holding that it inverted the presumption of innocence. The Parliament amended the provision in 2018, replacing the offence threshold with the phrase “under this Act” but retaining the twin conditions. A subsequent challenge to the amendment in Vijay Madanlal was rejected by the Court, which held that the revised provision is “reasonable” and has a “direct nexus” with the purpose of the PMLA.

In “deferring to the wisdom of the Parliament” and upholding the constitutionality of Section 45 (1), Section 19, and several other contested provisions of the PMLA, the judgment in Vijay Madanlal entrenches a legal architecture that cements the unfettered powers of the ED while severely restricting the grant of bail^[11].

However, the stringent statutory framework upheld in Vijay Madanlal was soon confronted with the practical realities of indefinite incarceration. Subsequent decisions reveal a recalibration, with the judicial trend deferring to the right to liberty in the face of prolonged proceedings.

The Constitutional imperative of a speedy trial was the fulcrum for granting bail to former Deputy Chief Minister of Delhi Manish Sisodia, arrested in the Delhi liquor policy scam in February 2023. The Supreme Court noted the ‘snail’s pace’ of the proceedings^[12] (17 months without trial commencement) and the scale of the case (493 witnesses, thousands of pages of records and over a lakh pages of digitised material), making near-term completion unrealistic. Reinforcing the ratios of Sanjay Chandra, which emphasised the ‘necessity’ test, and Satender Kumar Antil, which mandated Article 21 protections for Category C offences, the Court ruled that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. “The reason is that the constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is the basic right of the person charged of an offence and not convicted, that he be ensured and given a speedy trial,” wrote (now, Chief) Justice B.R. Gavai.

The complete judgment in Manish Sisodia v Directorate of Enforcement (2024) can be read here.

Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024) further expanded the scope of judicial scrutiny at the bail stage. It held that “all material and evidence that can be led in the trial and admissible, whether relied on by the prosecution or not, can be examined,” since guilt “can only be established on admissible evidence to be led before the court.” Recognising that the ED’s power of arrest under the PMLA constitutes a drastic curtailment of liberty under Article 21, the Court emphasised that the Special Court must “independently apply its mind, without being influenced by the opinion recorded in the ‘reasons to believe.’”

The bail order in Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024) can be read here.

The Human Cost of Procedural Delay

Mohd. Muslim was 23 years old when he was arrested under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, a drug trafficking case involving 180 kilograms of ganja. Though he was not found in possession of any narcotic drugs (his name having surfaced only in a co-accused’s statement), he was charged with the production, possession, and criminal conspiracy in a drug offence. By 2023, he had spent over seven years in prison with the trial barely at its halfway stage.

Section 37 of the NDPS Act restricts the grant of bail through twin conditions similar to the PMLA. It requires that the court records its satisfaction that the accused might not be guilty of the offence and that upon release, they are not likely to commit any offence. In Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court observed that the Section 37 requirement to be “satisfied” of the twin conditions can only mean a “prima facie determination,” since all evidence is not yet before the court. It reasoned that a literal or mechanical reading would leave judicial discretion “within a very narrow margin,” effectively excluding bail altogether and amounting to punitive detention. To remain within constitutional limits, the Court stressed that this prima facie assessment must be applied “reasonably” based on the materials available at the time of the bail hearing.

The judgment further clarified that undue delay in trial is an independent ground for bail in light of Section 436A CrPC (Section 479 BNSS), which is not fettered by Section 37. Holding that prolonged incarceration, particularly where the delay is not attributable to the accused, must weigh heavily in favour of release regardless of the gravity of the alleged offence, the Court granted bail.

Before parting, the Court reflected on special laws and their stringent bail conditions, warning that if trials are not concluded in time, then the “injustice wrecked on the individual is immeasurable.” Drawing from A Convict Prisoner v. State of Kerala (1993), it recognised imprisonment as a “radical transformation” whereby the prisoner completely loses his identity: known by a number, stripped of personal possessions and relationships, engulfed by psychological scars from a complete loss of freedom, status, and dignity. The impact is especially acute for those from the weakest economic strata, where detention means an immediate loss of livelihood, disintegration of family, and alienation from society. The judgment stressed that courts must remain sensitive to these irreparable harms and ensure that trials, particularly under special laws with stringent bail thresholds, are taken up and concluded with urgency.

The judgment delivered in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) can be read here.

The Long Wait for Justice

Across four decades of jurisprudence, Constitutional Courts from Naresh Kumar to Vernon Gonsalves to Manish Sisodia have articulated a consistent judicial trend: the Constitution does not carve out exceptions to liberty simply because a statute is labelled “special.” The more severe the bail restrictions, the greater the obligation on the State to ensure a swift and fair adjudication.

The key principles accepted by the judiciary to grant bail in special statutes are outlined below:

• Undue Delay as a Constitutional Trigger: Prolonged pre-trial detention is a direct violation of the right to liberty under Article 21. Even under special laws with stringent bail provisions, undue delay in trial, particularly when not attributable to the accused, in trial is per se a valid bail ground for securing bail.
• The ‘Prima Facie’ Contradiction”: A mechanical interpretation of the statutory condition that a court must be ‘prima facie’ satisfied of an accused’s innocence would make bail illusory. Courts must apply a reasonable interpretation of this condition, avoiding a pre-emptive determination of guilt and ensuring the presumption of innocence is not inverted.
• Scrutiny of Evidence: While avoiding a mini-trial, courts must exercise meaningful scrutiny of evidence at the bail stage. Special courts must demonstrate an independent application of mind, free from the influence of prosecuting and investigative agencies, to assess whether the material has some probative value. Guilt can only be established on admissible evidence.
• “Graver the offence, greater the scrutiny”: An order of preventive detention should be strictly construed. It is the duty of a constitutional court to ensure that such an order falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant statute.
• Length of Detention: The mandate to grant bail when an undertrial has served half the maximum possible sentence (BNSS Section 479) applies equally to special laws, unless expressly excluded. Under Article 21, prolonged incarceration can itself justify bail, even if the period served is less than half the maximum sentence.
• “Constitutional mandate is the higher law.” The judiciary’s ultimate deference is to the supremacy of the Constitution. The constitutional mandate of Liberty is the highest law of the land, and must unequivocally trump any and all statutory restrictions.

“In a democracy, there can never be an impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually opposite to each other” (Satender Kumar Antil).

Inside the courtrooms, judges may eloquently espouse democratic ideals as counsel spar over whether Article 21 is an administrative indulgence. But on the outside, the endless adjournments of the bail hearings for Surendra Gadling, Hany Babu, Sharjeel Imam and Gulfisha Fatima, among countless others incarcerated under ‘special laws’, betray a different reality. Alongside with the sweeping, often unchecked, powers of agencies like the NIA and ED, the ‘impression’ continues to tilt uncomfortably towards indefinite preventive detention masquerading as prosecution.

Cartoon by Arun Ferreira | Source: Colours of the Cage

The promise of a speedy trial has emerged as the judiciary’s primary safeguard against indefinite detention under draconian statutes. But a safeguard that is invoked only after years of confinement or ladders of appeals is no safeguard at all. The Constitutional imperative demands that it must be enforced with unflinching consistency, from the highest constitutional courts to the lowest trial courts, and the burden must be on the State to justify every continued moment of incarceration.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this legal resource has been worked on by Raaz)

Footnotes

[1] Naresh Kumar @ Pahelwan v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025)

[2] Now, under Section 479, the provision of granting bail to under trial prisoners will now be limited to those undertrials who are first-time offenders if they have completed one-third of the maximum sentence. Since charge sheets often mention multiple offences, this may make many under trials ineligible for mandatory bail. Furthermore, through the said provision, the prohibition of getting bail under the said section had also been expanded to those offences that are punishable with life imprisonment. Therefore, the following under trials are barred from applying for statutory bail under the said section if: offences punishable by life imprisonment, and persons who have pending proceedings in more than one offence.

[3] Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v Union of India (1994)

[4] Union of India v K.A. Najeeb (2021)

[5] ‘UAPA: Criminalising Dissent And State Terror’(People’s Union of Civil Liberties, September 2022)

[6] ‘When Najeeb meets Watali – On the statutory restrictions on grant of bail under UAPA’ (Hany Babu and Surendra Gadling, Issues in Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 2025)

[7] ‘Bail under UAPA: Does the new SC judgment offer a ray of hope?’ (Sanchita Kadam, Citizens for Justice and Peace, 2021)

[8] ‘How the Delhi riots case remains stagnant with close to a dozen student leaders incarcerated’ (SabrangIndia, 2025)

[9] ‘Recovering the Basics: The Supreme Court’s Bail Order in Vernon Gonsalves’ Case’ (Gautam Bhatia, Issues in Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 2023)

[10] Supra, 7

[11] Supra, 5

[12] ‘Challenges to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act | Judgement Summary’ (Sushovan Patnaik, Supreme Court Observer, 2024)

[13] ‘“A game of snake and ladder”: Tracing Manish Sisodia’s 17-month journey to bail’ (Sushovan Patnaik and Advay Vora, Supreme Court Observer, 2024)

The post Liberty on Hold: Delays turn the promise of justice into punishment appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The case was heard by Justice N. Anand Venkatesh, who was responding to a writ petition filed by Venkatesan, seeking permission for himself and fellow community members to worship and perform rituals during the temple festival—an event traditionally open to the local public.

Despite resistance from certain quarters, including the submission by a Special Government Pleader that the temple was not under the administration of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (HR&CE) Department, the Court maintained that religious access cannot be determined by departmental control but by the principles of constitutional equality and human dignity.

Caste and community are creations of human beings; God is always neutral: HC

In his order, Justice Venkatesh observed that any temple open to the public acquires the status of a public temple, regardless of whether it is managed by the HR&CE Department or not.

In such a scenario, the judge said, “irrespective of the caste or community of the devotees, they must be permitted to offer their prayers to God. Caste and community are the creations of human beings; God is always considered to be neutral.”

The court further emphasised that denying access to a place of worship on the basis of caste is not only unconstitutional but an affront to human dignity. It violates the foundational values of the Indian Constitution and the spirit of inclusiveness in Hinduism.

“This can never be permitted in a country governed by the rule of law,” the Court stated, firmly anchoring its view in legal precedent and social justice.

Referring to Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Temple Entry Authorisation Act, 1947, the judge reiterated that “Every Hindu, irrespective of the caste or sect to which they belong, shall be entitled to enter any Hindu temple and offer worship therein—notwithstanding any law, custom, or usage to the contrary.”

All classes of Hindus are permitted to enter into the temple and participate in the festival: HC

The Court went on to clarify that any restriction imposed on entry based on caste constitutes an actionable wrong—one that can invite both civil and criminal liability. Justice Venkatesh reminded that “the Act was brought into force as a policy decision by the State Government to remove the disabilities imposed on certain classes of Hindus with respect to entry into Hindu temples.”

The High Court directed the concerned authorities to ensure that all Hindus, irrespective of caste or community, are allowed full access to the temple and its associated rituals during the festival. The Court made it clear that any obstruction or discrimination must be met with immediate legal action.

It also instructed the local administration to ensure law and order is maintained, and that no disturbance is created under the guise of religious custom or tradition.

This ruling is not just a legal order, but a reaffirmation of the principle that faith transcends caste. In a time when discrimination still exists in subtle forms, the Court’s stand serves as a reminder of India’s constitutional promise—that equality and dignity are not privileges but rights for all.

The Order of Madras High Court Dated 17.07.2025 can be read here:

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A bench comprising Justices Rajesh Bindal and Manmohan described such pre-publication restraints as “super injunctions”, stressing that they are permissible only in extremely rare circumstances in a democratic, free country.

The petition was filed by Harshendra Kumar D., Secretary of the Dharmasthala Temple management body, who alleged that defamatory content targeting the temple’s managing family was being widely circulated online, particularly on YouTube. According to his submission, around 8,000 YouTube channels were carrying material that defamed the hereditary head of the temple, Veerendra Heggade, and other members of the managing trust.

While refusing to pass any immediate restraining orders, the Supreme Court directed the Karnataka trial court to reconsider Kumar’s plea afresh, with all supporting evidence placed on record. The bench clarified that it was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the defamation claim, as per a report of Hindustan Times.

Karnataka High Court’s Intervention: August 1, 2025

This Supreme Court development came just a week after the Karnataka High Court bench comprising Justice M. Nagaprasanna set aside a sweeping gag order issued on July 18, 2025 by a Bengaluru civil court in Kumar’s earlier defamation suit.

That order had restrained reportage on the Dharmasthala burial allegations and directed 390 media houses to remove nearly 9,000 online links, including news articles, videos, and posts, related to the case. The gag order was granted ex parte, without hearing the affected media outlets, and despite there being no FIR naming Kumar or temple officials in connection with the allegations.

The High Court criticised the indiscriminate nature of such injunctions, noting that restrictions on reportage in matters of significant public interest should be exceptional, narrowly tailored, and supported by strong prima facie grounds.

Origins of the Current Case: Whistle blower’s complaint of July 3, 2025

The present controversy began more than a month earlier, when on July 3, 2025, a former sanitation worker of the Shri Dharmasthala Manjunatheshwara Temple lodged a six-page complaint with the Superintendent of Police, Dakshina Kannada district.

The whistle-blower, a Dalit man who worked for the temple between 1995 and 2014, alleged that during his employment, he was forced to bury hundreds of murder victims on temple premises and surrounding lands. He claimed that many of the victims were minor girls who had been sexually assaulted before being killed.

The worker stated that he had been threatened with death if he ever spoke about these events. He fled Dharmasthala in 2014, remaining silent for 11 years, before deciding to come forward out of guilt, as per a report in Frontline Magazine.

Historical Context: Dharmasthala’s unsolved cases

The allegations immediately gained national and international attention, in part because they appeared to connect to a long-standing history of unsolved murders and disappearances in Dharmasthala.

• 1987 – Padmalatha case: Rape and murder of a 17-year-old girl; no arrests made.
• 2012 – Soujanya case: Rape and murder of another 17-year-old girl; case remained unresolved for over a decade and was officially closed in 2023.

Families of several victims and activists have repeatedly alleged that these crimes were linked to Veerendra Heggade, the hereditary head of the temple and a Rajya Sabha MP since 2022. Past investigative reporting pointed to poor police investigations allegedly influenced by powerful individuals.

Mounting public pressure and SIT formation

Following the whistle-blower’s testimony and growing public anger, the Karnataka government, on July 19, 2025, announced the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by Director General of Police Pranab Mohanty.

Acting swiftly, the SIT identified 13 suspected burial sites. According to Indian Express, exhumations began on July 29, 2025, in challenging conditions — heavy monsoon rains, forested terrain, and proximity to the Netravathi River.

By August 4, 2025:

• Site No. 6: Partial human skeleton recovered.
• Site No. 11-A: Skeletal fragments recovered; unclear if they form complete skeletons.
• One location: PAN card found belonging to a man reportedly deceased in 2025.

Families and witnesses come forward

The SIT’s work encouraged families of past victims to step forward:

• Soujanya’s parents expressed hope that the case will finally lead to justice.
• Mother of Ananya Bhat (medical student missing since 2003) filed a fresh complaint in hopes her daughter’s remains might be identified.
• Additional witnesses provided accounts of other secret burials in and around Dharmasthala.

According to Frontline Magazine, some families and activists have called for the case to be handed over to a national agency such as the NIA, citing the gravity of the allegations and potential local influence over the investigation.

Threats, attacks, and evidence destruction concerns

Despite the High Court’s lifting of the gag order, independent journalists and YouTubers reporting on the case have faced threats and physical violence. According to Hindustan Times, on August 6, 2025, two YouTubers were attacked while filming in Dharmasthala.

In a major revelation was also present in the report raising concerns of evidence destruction, the Belthangady police station admitted in early August to having deleted records of unidentified deaths from 2000–2015 — a period covering many of the alleged crimes.

Political and institutional responses

Political reactions have largely been muted, with many leaders avoiding direct comment on the allegations against Heggade:

• G. Parameshwara (Home Minister, Karnataka): Said a “thorough investigation” must precede any conclusions and confirmed SIT’s mandate.
• R. Ashok (BJP Leader of Opposition): Dismissed the allegations as a conspiracy; falsely claimed the whistle blower was Muslim.
• B.S. Yediyurappa (former CM, BJP): Called the charges baseless but welcomed the SIT’s formation.

Heggade has made no public statement. A temple spokesperson has said the administration supports the SIT’s investigation.

Forensic challenges

Forensic experts warn that identifying the skeletal remains will be complex due to:

• Advanced decomposition.
• Possible disturbance of burial sites.
• Requirement for DNA matching with living relatives.

Despite this, victim families remain hopeful that the investigation will deliver closure after decades of unanswered grief.

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When Courts Fail Survivors: How patriarchy shapes justice in sexual offence against women cases

The post Supreme Court rejects gag order plea in Dharmasthala mass burial case, orders fresh Trial Court review appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Allegations of irregularities and opaque process

The case was brought to the Court’s attention through an application filed by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR). According to Live Law, ADR’s counsel, Prashant Bhushan, contended that the ECI had not disclosed the identities of the 65 lakh voters whose names were removed. He further alleged that the ECI failed to specify whether these voters were deceased or had migrated, a crucial detail for ensuring the integrity of the electoral roll.

Bhushan also raised concerns about the process itself, stating that political parties were not given the lists at the block level, a step he claimed was essential for transparency. He also highlighted a lack of clarity on whether the inclusions and omissions in the list were based on the recommendations of the Booth Level Officers (BLOs).

Appearing before a bench of Justices Surya Kant, Ujjal Bhuyan, and NK Singh, advocate Prashant Bhushan stated that “We have filed an IA…the draft roll they have published says 65 lakh voters’ names have been omitted…they have not given list of those names…they have said people are dead, have migrated…they should disclose who are the 65 lakhs, who are dead, who have migrated…secondly, the BLOs when forwarding the forms have said this person is/is not recommended by BLO…they have not published for rest of the people that means out of 8 crores minus 65 lakhs, whether BLOs have recommended or not recommended…this information will be very important. IA may be listed tomorrow or day after” as reported by Live Law.

Bhushan also claimed that a significant number of voters were included in the list even though they were not recommended by the BLOs. He argued that these voters had failed to submit the required 11 documents, and in many cases, BLOs themselves had filled out the forms without any supporting documentation.

“Even those who have been included, BLOs have not recommended. Vast majority, more than 75%, have not submitted these 11 documents. BLOs have themselves filled up the forms and there are no documents in any of them. Among those, they are now saying BLOs have not recommended. About 12% in 2 constituencies have not been recommended,” Bhushan said, as reported by Live Law.

ECI’s defence and the Court’s directive

In response, the counsel for the ECI refuted Bhushan’s claims, stating that the submissions were “incorrect.” He asserted that the draft list was indeed shared with representatives of political parties before its publication. When asked by the bench, comprising Justices Surya Kant, Ujjal Bhuyan, and NK Singh, why the ECI couldn’t put this information in a formal reply, the counsel was directed to do so.

“Why can’t you say all this in a reply? If you have supplied, please give a list of political parties to whom you have supplied, so that Mr Bhushan’s client can collect information from those authorized representatives. File your reply by Saturday,” Justice Kant said

Justice Kant also pointed out that since this was only a preliminary list, the reasons for the deletions would be provided later, along with the final list. He also emphasised the importance of ensuring that every affected voter’s information is duly considered. The Court has scheduled the next hearing on the petitions challenging the Bihar SIR for August 12.

Background of the Bihar SIR process and SC hearings

The SIR in Bihar is an exercise undertaken by the ECI for updation in electoral rolls. On June 24, the ECI announced the SIR for Bihar ahead of the state’s assembly elections. This process required voters, particularly those whose names weren’t on the 2003 electoral roll, to re-verify their details by submitting new enumeration forms with supporting documents. The ECI cited the need to remove duplicate entries, deceased voters, and migrated individuals from the rolls.

The legality and methodology of this exercise were swiftly challenged in the Supreme Court by ADR and other petitioners, including political parties and social activists. The petitioners argued that the SIR could disenfranchise a large number of genuine voters, especially from marginalised communities, due to the stringent documentary requirements and a tight deadline. They also questioned the ECI’s authority to conduct such a revision so close to an election.

The Supreme Court has been hearing the matter since July 10. During the initial hearings, the Court refused to halt the SIR but urged the ECI to “consider” accepting additional documents like Aadhaar, Voter ID, and Ration Cards for voter verification, which were initially excluded from the ECI’s list of 11 acceptable documents. The Court also expressed its concern about the potential for “mass exclusion” of voters and warned that it would intervene if any irregularities were found. 

The ECI, in turn, defended its actions by stating it had the constitutional authority to carry out the SIR and that the process was being conducted transparently in collaboration with political parties’ Booth Level Agents (BLAs). The current hearing on August 6 is a follow-up to these earlier proceedings, triggered by the publication of the draft electoral roll with the significant deletion of 65 lakh names.

Related

Bihar SIR: 65 Lakh electors flagged for deletion, SC said “if there is mass exclusion, we will immediately step in”

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The post SC to ECI: Explain alleged irregularities in deletion of 65 lakh voters from Bihar’s draft electoral rolls appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Somnath Suryawanshi was arrested in December 2024 for allegedly participating in protests and riots that erupted in Parbhani district on December 11, following the desecration of a replica of the Indian Constitution. A resident of Pune and a student at a law college in Parbhani, Somnath was taken into custody and, after a brief remand, shifted to judicial custody. He died on December 15, allegedly as a result of injuries sustained from police torture during his time in lock-up.

Mother’s plea ignored for months

His mother, 60-year-old Vijayabai Venkat Suryawanshi, has been waging a determined legal battle since December 18, 2024, when she filed a formal complaint demanding registration of an FIR against the officers responsible for her son’s death. In her statement, Vijayabai recalled receiving a phone call informing her that Somnath had died of a “heart attack.” But what followed only deepened her suspicion.

While she was en-route to Parbhani, officials told her the body had already been shifted to the Aurangabad Government Medical College and Hospital (GMCH). On the way, she was intercepted by the Parbhani police and taken to the SP’s office, where she alleges a senior officer told her: “We didn’t kill your son. He died of a heart attack. We can help you. If you take the body, we’ll offer police training to one of your sons.” 

She refused the offer and proceeded to Aurangabad, where a post-mortem was conducted. Social activists at the hospital informed her that the autopsy indicated multiple injuries consistent with custodial torture — contradicting the state’s version of a natural death due to illness.

Bombay HC recognises prima facie brutality

On July 4, 2025, the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court, acknowledging “prima facie material indicating custodial brutality and violation of constitutional rights”, directed the police to register an FIR within a week. However, the Mahayuti-led Maharashtra government under Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis failed to comply. Instead, the state challenged the order before the Supreme Court. The apex court, however, upheld the High Court’s directive on July 30, observing that the FIR was not optional but necessary for enabling an impartial criminal investigation.

As per the report of The Statesman, the Supreme Court Bench, comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh, clarified that registration of an FIR should not be interpreted as assigning guilt but as initiating a fair investigation under the law.

Presented facts and successfully argued in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India for Vijaybai Vyankat Suryawanshi.

The Supreme Court maintained the order of the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court to file FIR and launch investigation as per the application made by Vijaybai on… pic.twitter.com/m8CdCtfqh2

— Prakash Ambedkar (@Prksh_Ambedkar) July 30, 2025

On July 4, The Aurangabad Bench of the Hon’ble Court of Bombay had ordered to register an FIR against the police responsible for the custodial death of Somnath Suryavanshi and the brutality in Parbhani.

But the State of Maharashtra appealed against the order of High Court in the… pic.twitter.com/DhG6PHRvmU

— Prakash Ambedkar (@Prksh_Ambedkar) July 30, 2025

Detailed report may be read here and here.

Allegations of torture and postmortem findings

In her FIR, Vijayabai has alleged that Somnath was subjected to three days of continuous custodial torture at the New Mondha police station. Activists have also corroborated her account, noting that the post-mortem report documented fractured bones and internal injuries, directly contradicting earlier government statements that claimed he had pre-existing respiratory issues and died of chest pain.

This claim was echoed by Chief Minister Fadnavis in the legislative assembly shortly after the new Mahayuti government was sworn in. He maintained that Somnath had a “serious respiratory illness” and had died of “natural causes.” However, these claims were debunked when the post-mortem revealed evidence of blunt force trauma, broken shoulder bones, and signs of sustained physical assault.

Detailed report may be read here and here.

Prakash Ambedkar’s legal intervention and political fallout

The case received a significant boost when Prakash Ambedkar, chief of the Vanchit Bahujan Aghadi (VBA) and grandson of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, took up the cause and personally argued the matter before the courts. “Somnath shed his blood for the Constitution of this country. He was murdered for standing up for its values,” Ambedkar said in a press briefing after the SC order.

He added that the FIR will pave the way for a broader investigation into custodial violence in Maharashtra. “This case may become a benchmark for custodial death investigations. We are now demanding that the JJ Hospital doctors who issued secondary medical opinions without court orders also be made accused. The role of doctors must not be overlooked in shielding police impunity,” he said.

Ambedkar also questioned the legality of the “combing operation” carried out in Parbhani after the desecration incident, during which multiple Dalit homes were raided, and arrests made without due process. “All officers who were part of that illegal operation must be investigated,” he added.

मुंबई उच्च न्यायालयाच्या औरंगाबाद खंडपीठाने सोमनाथ सूर्यवंशी हत्येप्रकरणी एका आठवड्याच्या आत पोलिसांवर एफआयआर दाखल करण्याचा स्पष्ट आदेश दिला होता. मात्र, आजपर्यंत तो एफआयआर दाखल झालेला नाही. त्यामुळे आता पोलीस आणि प्रशासनवर कोर्टाच्या अवमानाच्या (Contempt of Court) अंतर्गत… pic.twitter.com/uizaD3wmSC

— Prakash Ambedkar (@Prksh_Ambedkar) July 30, 2025

What lies ahead?

With the FIR now registered under Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which replaced IPC Section 302 (murder), attention is shifting toward the constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) or a Judicial Commission. Activists and lawyers have demanded that the probe be conducted independently of the Maharashtra police to avoid conflict of interest, given that police officials are the primary accused.

The delay in FIR registration — despite the HC’s clear order and the absence of any stay by the Supreme Court — has also raised questions about contempt of court and executive resistance to judicial directives, showing that the Parbhani police’s inaction between July 4 and August 1 could expose them to proceedings for wilful non-compliance.

Related:

Bombay High Court orders FIR in Somnath Suryawanshi custodial death case, slams police for delay and bias

Biased and Preconceived: Bombay HC criticises police inquiry into Parbhani custodial death of Somnath Suryawanshi

Magistrate probe indicts Parbhani police in Somnath Suryawanshi custodial death: MSHRC

State-sanctioned brutality? Dalit communities targeted in Parbhani “combing operations”, women, children abused

Judicial Setback: Supreme Court dilutes Bombay HC’s bold stand on police accountability in custodial killing in Badlapur case

The post Custodial Death of Dalit Law Student Somnath Suryawanshi: FIR registered after Supreme Court upholds Bombay HC directive appeared first on SabrangIndia.