The recent applications were filed in response to the ongoing misuse of anti-conversion laws by several states. The petition was heard by a bench comprising Chief Justice of India (CJI) Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar.

Within weeks of the ordinance being first enforced in Uttar Pradesh in 2020 and then being passed as a law (2021) incidents of assault, violence and intimidation against adult couples, especially those belonging to marginalised sections were reported, and these in the past four years plus, have only intensified.  Set in its path the Uttar Pradesh government however, further amended the law last year in 2024, amending sections to further enhance punitive measures, both monetary and penal for those that the state considers “offenders.” CJP’s present applications incorporate these developments.

Senior Advocate CU Singh, representing CJP, argued that the anti-conversion laws were being “weaponised” to target specific communities and interfaith couples, stressing that the laws were being misused repeatedly. Singh requested the bench to issue a notice on the application for interim relief to prevent further misuse of these laws, which he claimed were infringing upon individual freedoms, including the right to marry across faiths. He also urged that the most damaging sections be stayed until the final hearing of the matter.

In response, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta countered, stating that there were no instances of misuse to support the claims made by CJP. At this point, CJI Khanna instructed Attorney General R. Venkataramani to review the various petitions and instances being highlighted, and inform the Court which applications the Union government may not oppose, while also filing responses where objections existed. The Court directed that non-applicants submit their responses to the applications, even in the absence of a formal notice being issued. The matter has now been scheduled to be heard again on a non-miscellaneous day, ensuring that proceedings would move forward expeditiously.

The hearing that took place on April 16 formed part of a larger challenge to the constitutionality of anti-conversion laws, with CJP asserting that such laws violate individuals’ freedom of choice and the right to choose their religion. Additionally, Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind has also filed a transfer petition to have 21 cases pending in six High Courts consolidated before the Supreme Court. In Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, High Courts have granted partial stays to some sections. These interim orders have also been challenged by these state governments before the Supreme Court.

Details of the IA filed by CJP

The interim application (IA) filed by Citizens for Justice and Peace in the Supreme Court is aimed at emphasising how the practice of the law –over the past four years and more –has resulted in widespread mis-use, to further enhance the original argument on constitutionality of the statutes. The IA contains a detailed table of reported instances of mis-use and attacks on fundamental freedons of life and choice especially from Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh. The application specifically addresses the pattern of abuse of these laws to target women, couples and also to harass minorities, including Christians and Muslims, under the pretext of ‘regulating religious conversions.’

The CJP has contended that these anti-conversion laws, although allegedly framed to prevent forced conversions, are being weaponised by far right organizations and state authorities to falsely accuse individuals, create a climate of fear, and discriminate against minorities. One of the key concerns highlighted in the IA is the pattern of abuse by far right groups, who use these laws to initiate false complaints and pressure law enforcement to act against individuals or communities, often without any credible evidence. In several instances, these complaints are lodged by third parties with vested interests, such as organisations or individuals aligned with right-wing political agendas, rather than the individuals or families affected by the alleged conversions.

The application further argues that the laws do not provide adequate safeguards against misuse, with one of the major concerns being the tendency of state authorities to act on complaints without conducting any preliminary inquiry or verification. This has led to arbitrary arrests, detentions, and the imposition of social and legal stigma on the accused, particularly from minority communities. The CJP has urged that the Court issue detailed guidelines mandating a pre-FIR inquiry by competent authorities to prevent the misuse of these laws. The organisation has emphasised that such safeguards are necessary to ensure that the laws are not used for political or social persecution, which is the current trend in certain states.

CJP has also raised the concern that these laws violate fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of religion and the right to live with dignity. The application has cited multiple instances where individuals, particularly from marginalized communities, have been wrongfully accused under these laws, leading to their harassment, societal alienation, and even criminal charges based on unfounded allegations. This is particularly evident in Uttar Pradesh, where the law has been used extensively to target Muslim communities, despite there being no evidence of forced conversions.

A significant concern raised in the IA pertains to the 2024 amendment to the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act. This amendment removed a key safeguard that had previously limited the filing of complaints to the person whose conversion was allegedly coerced or their immediate family. Following the amendment, any individual—including politically motivated third parties or members of Hindutva groups—can now lodge a complaint, regardless of their relationship to the concerned parties. CJP has argued that this has legitimised and expanded the role of communal vigilantes, allowing them to misuse the law to harass consenting adults in interfaith relationships, often with the support or inaction of law enforcement agencies. Additionally, stringent punishments have also been introduced through the said amendment.

In light of these abuses, the CJP has requested urgent judicial intervention from the Supreme Court. Specifically, the IA seeks interim relief in the form of directions to the authorities to ensure that no FIR is registered under the anti-conversion laws without a thorough investigation and a genuine, evidence-based complaint. It has also urged the Court to consider issuing interim guidelines that would prevent the automatic registration of cases and would impose a more rigorous procedural requirement before such charges can be brought.

The application stresses that these anti-conversion laws, instead of protecting individual rights, have become tools for furthering divisive and discriminatory agendas, violating the constitutional guarantees of equality and religious freedom. By seeking these safeguards and judicial oversight, CJP hopes to curb the misuse of these laws and ensure that they are not used to further religious persecution or target specific communities under the guise of religious freedom.

Brief background of the petition

In February 2021 notice had been issued to Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. Then in 2023, the Supreme Court had issued notice to five states—Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka—following a renewed challenge to their anti-conversion laws. This petition, filed by Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), was a continuation of their previous challenge to similar laws in Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. 

The CJP writ petition, amended in 2023, challenged the constitutionality of anti-conversion laws passed by these states, arguing that these laws violate fundamental rights, particularly the freedom of individuals to marry and convert based on their personal choices. This renewed challenge followed CJP’s initial petition in 2020, which led to the issuance of notices by the Supreme Court. The Court had granted CJP permission to amend its original writ petition to include newer anti-conversion laws enacted in additional states. The petition contends that the laws have been weaponised to harass and intimidate interfaith couples, often under the guise of combating “Love Jihad.” According to CJP, the laws not only infringe on personal freedoms but also legitimize discriminatory and unconstitutional practices that target minorities, especially women, and exacerbate communal tensions.

This table, computed for the CJP’s 2020 petition and presented to the Court, computes the most egregious sections of the law in some of these states:

Central to CJP’s arguments has been the assertion that the anti-conversion laws create an atmosphere of suspicion around interfaith marriages, subjecting them to legal and social scrutiny. These laws equate conversion for marriage with coercion, fraud, or force, thus casting a shadow over consensual, interfaith unions. The petition had highlighted several troubling provisions, including mandatory prior and post-conversion reporting requirements, vague and overbroad definitions of “inducement” or “allurement,” and a reversed burden of proof, which forces individuals to prove that their conversion and marriage were not coercive. CJP has argued that such provisions violate key constitutional rights, including the right to privacy, autonomy, and the freedom of conscience under Articles 14, 21, and 25.

Moreover, CJP has contended that these laws disproportionately target interfaith couples, effectively deterring individuals from exercising their right to choose their partner and religion freely. The petition asserted that the laws, while ostensibly neutral, disproportionately affect certain religious communities and undermine the secular ethos enshrined in the Constitution. By criminalising conversions linked to marriage, the laws place unnecessary hurdles in the way of interfaith unions, undermining both personal freedoms and the very fabric of constitutional equality. As the matter progresses, the Court’s eventual decision could have significant implications for the legal treatment of religious conversions and interfaith marriages in India, potentially reshaping the boundaries of personal freedom and religious choice.

Detailed reports may be read here and here.

Related:

SC issues notice to 5 states in CJP’s renewed challenge to anti-conversion laws

CJP plea against anti-conversion laws: SC seeks to know status of cases challenging ‘anti conversion’ laws in HCs

CJP, other rights groups challenge Maharashtra Govt GR setting up a Committee to “monitor inter-faith marriages”

The post “Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP urges SC to curb misuse of anti-conversion statutes by states appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Recording the Centre’s assurance, the Supreme Court noted the following:

• No appointments of non-Muslims to the Waqf Boards or the Central Waqf Council will be made under the amended law until further orders.
• No steps will be taken to de-notify or disturb properties recognised as waqf—whether by user, by court declarations, or prior to the amendment.
• The matter is to be listed for further hearing on May 5, 2025. The union government has a week to file its reply, with rejoinders due within five days thereafter.
• The matter will now be heard under the title: “In Re: Waqf Amendment Act”, marking it as one of constitutional importance.

This order came in a batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 on grounds that it violates the rights of the Muslim community and undermines the legal framework governing religious endowments.

Court expresses constitutional doubts over the Act

The three-judge Bench led by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, with Justices Sanjay Kumar and KV Viswanathan, heard detailed arguments over two days, on April 16 and April 17, before recording the Union’s undertakings. The Court’s oral observations reflected deep concern over the potential impact of the amended provisions.

Among the first issues raised was the deletion of “waqf by user”, a legal principle long used to recognise religious endowments based on public use over time. CJI Khanna, during the hearing on April 16, observed that many prominent dargahs, graveyards, and mosques gained waqf status through community usage rather than written instruments. “You are erasing centuries of history,” he cautioned, noting the risk that thousands of such properties could be wiped off waqf registers.

Equally troubling to the Court was the amendment allowing non-Muslims to be appointed to the Waqf Boards and the Central Waqf Council. CJI Khanna pointedly asked the Solicitor General: “Would you allow a non-Hindu on a Temple Trust?”—emphasising that Article 26 of the Constitution grants religious denominations the right to manage their own institutions.

The Court also took issue with provisions enabling district Collectors to initiate de-notification of waqf properties, calling it “very dangerous.” CJI Khanna questioned whether executive officials could be empowered to override judicial orders or undermine waqf declarations made by statutory bodies or courts.

Union backtracks under pressure, assures status quo

Faced with sharp judicial scrutiny, on April 17, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta gave repeated assurances that the government would not take any action under the amended Act that could adversely affect the waqf community until the Court decides on interim reliefs. He undertook that:

• No non-Muslim members would be appointed to any Waqf Board or the Central Waqf Council.
• The government would not de-notify waqf lands, including those identified through user or court proceedings.
• Any decision regarding future implementation would be deferred pending further orders of the Court.

Accepting these undertakings, the Court chose not to formally stay the legislation—respecting the presumption of constitutionality—but recorded the Union’s commitments in its judicial order. The matter will be next heard on May 5, 2025, and the Court directed the union government to file its counter-affidavit within a week. State governments who have also intervened will also place their stand on affidavit within the same days. Following that, all petitioners have been asked to file the rejoinder to the government within a subsequent five days.

Petitions raise fundamental challenges to the amendment

The petitions—filed by Members of Parliament (including from the Congress, AIMIM, DMK, RJD, CPI, IUML, and Samajwadi Party), religious bodies (All India Muslim Personal Law Board, Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind), and civil society groups (such as the Association for Protection of Civil Rights)—raise serious constitutional concerns.

They argue that the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025:

• Violates Article 26, by interfering in the management of religious institutions by permitting non-Muslims on waqf boards.
• Undermines Article 25 and 29, by curbing the rights of Muslims to preserve and manage their religious and cultural endowments.
• Breaches Article 14, by arbitrarily empowering administrative authorities to strip properties of their waqf status.

Among the most contentious provisions are:

• Deletion of “waqf by user”, potentially erasing the status of properties long treated as waqf by local communities.
• Administrative de-notification powers, allowing Collectors to initiate proceedings even where courts have declared properties as waqf.
• A new threshold for creation of waqf, limiting it to Muslims with five years’ standing.
• Reduced representation of women on Waqf Boards.
• Exclusion of waqf properties within scheduled areas and under ASI protection.

Senior advocates Kapil Sibal, CU Singh, and others, who appeared for the petitioners, had pressed for interim relief during the hearings and urged the Court to recognise the immediate threat posed by the law. They described the amendments as a “systematic attempt to dismantle waqf protections” and called it a State-led effort to dispossess the Muslim community of its religious and charitable properties.

The Court, while refraining from granting a stay, had sent a clear signal through its oral remarks and structured case management that it sees the matter as a constitutional test of legislative overreach into religious freedoms.

What lies Ahead

The next hearing in the week of May 5, 2025 will be crucial, as the Court will consider whether the undertakings given by the union are sufficient, or if formal interim orders are warranted. It is also expected to delve deeper into the core constitutional questions: Can the State interfere with the internal management of religious endowments? Does deleting “waqf by user” constitute historical erasure? Can administrative officers override judicial declarations?

In a political and legal climate increasingly hostile to minority rights, the Court’s intervention has come as a relief for many. However, this is only the beginning of a prolonged battle to safeguard minority rights in India.

Related:

“Urdu Is Not Alien”: Supreme Court reclaims the language’s place in the Indian Constitutional fabric

SC to UoI on Waqf Amendment: ‘Are you willing to allow Muslims on Hindu endowment boards?’

When Courts Fail Survivors: How patriarchy shapes justice in sexual offence against women cases

The post Waqf Amendment Act 2025: SC grants some time to Centre on condition no non-Muslims appointed to Board, Council & no change in any Waqf status appeared first on SabrangIndia.

What made the act even more egregious was its violation of a binding Supreme Court ruling in Re: Directions in the matter of Demolition of Structures, which clearly held, and reaffirmed the already granted fundamental rights of the citizens, that state authorities cannot demolish homes merely because the residents are accused or convicted of crimes. In its affidavit, filed through Executive Engineer (Slums) Kamlesh Chavan, the NMC astonishingly claimed it was unaware of the Supreme Court’s directions — a justification that prompted not only judicial rebuke but also public outrage. This case lays bare the persistent dangers of “bulldozer justice”, the misuse of urban planning laws to punish the marginalised, and the systemic failure of state machinery to uphold fundamental rights, especially the right to shelter.

What follows is a breakdown of the sequence of events, the High Court’s intervention, and a critical analysis of the NMC’s defence, including its shocking reliance on bureaucratic ignorance in the face of constitutional obligations.

Background: Demolition in the shadow of violence

On March 21, 2025, Jehrunissa Shamim Khan, mother of Fahim Khan — the accused in a recent incident of communal violence in Nagpur — received a demolition notice from the Nagpur Municipal Corporation (NMC). The notice, issued under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, sought to raze her two-storey home in Sanjay Bagh Colony, Yashodhara Nagar.

On March 24, despite the matter being mentioned before the Bombay High Court earlier that day, NMC authorities carried out the demolition amidst heavy police presence and drone surveillance. The action was described by the civic body’s counsel as a fait accompli, suggesting that the operation had already been concluded by the time legal redress could be effectively sought.

A division bench of Justices Nitin Sambre and Vrushali Joshi, however, took serious note of the NMC’s conduct and stayed further demolition action. It observed that the municipal authorities had prima facie acted in violation of the Supreme Court’s ruling which had clearly held that the State cannot demolish a person’s house merely because they are accused or convicted in a crime. The bench also noted that another accused, Abdul Hafiz, had received a similar notice and his house too was partially demolished. The High Court’s order stayed all further action under the March 21 notices.

The Court made clear that it would evaluate the legality of both the notice and the demolition upon submission of affidavits from the Municipal Commissioner and Executive Engineer.

Detailed report may be read here.

The NMC’s Defence: Unawareness and apology

In compliance with the Court’s direction, the NMC filed an affidavit before the High Court on April 15, 2025, through Kamlesh Chavan, Executive Engineer (Slums). The affidavit opened with an unconditional apology for acting contrary to the Supreme Court’s judgment.

As per a report in the LiveLaw, Chavan stated that “At the outset, I am tendering an unconditional apology to this Court to have made this Court to observe that the authorities have acted against the petitioner’s unauthorised construction in contravention to the judgment of the Supreme Court.”

Additionally, the affidavit claimed that the NMC and its officers were unaware of the Supreme Court’s 2022 judgment as no circulars or guidelines had been issued by the Maharashtra government or the Town Planning Department to that effect. The deponent maintained that no such communication was issued under the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act or by any state department. As such, the demolition was carried out under the provisions of the existing statute, not in conscious disobedience of apex court orders.

The affidavit added that on March 21, police authorities had sought details of the properties of those accused in the violence and asked NMC to act against any unauthorised structures. Upon examining documents, the civic body allegedly found that Khan and others could not furnish sanctioned building plans, leading to the issuance of a demolition notice with a one-day deadline.

The NMC insisted that there was no “malafide intention” in the action taken and that the steps were purely statutory.

‘Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse’: A hollow defence

The NMC’s claim of ignorance is not only legally untenable — it is deeply troubling. The principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse (ignorantia juris non excusat) is foundational to any legal system. This rule applies even more strictly to state actors and public authorities, whose job it is to uphold and implement the law in letter and spirit.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in the 2022 Demolition of Structures case was not an obscure judgment. It was delivered in response to widespread concern over the use of demolition as extrajudicial punishment, particularly against accused persons from minority communities. The Court had also directed all Chief Secretaries of states and Union Territories to issue necessary circulars to local authorities, ensuring dissemination and compliance.

That the NMC never received or acted upon such instructions reflects a systemic failure of governance and communication. But it does not absolve individual officers of responsibility. Civic bodies are expected to stay updated on legal developments, especially those concerning fundamental rights. Pleading ignorance in the face of an explicit and binding Supreme Court ruling reflects negligence at best, and wilful disregard at worst.

Loss of shelter, erosion of dignity

Beyond the legal infractions lies a far more serious human rights issue — the loss of the right to shelter. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution protects the right to life and personal liberty, which courts have interpreted to include the right to live with dignity and the right to shelter. The demolition of Jehrunissa Khan’s home was not just an administrative act; it was an act of dispossession — a violent stripping away of security and dignity from a citizen.

To issue a demolition notice with a mere 24-hour response window, without independent verification or due process, is a mockery of natural justice. That the demolition was carried out even as the matter was mentioned before a constitutional court, makes it all the more egregious.

This is not a case of poor documentation or regulatory lapse. It is a stark example of punitive governance, where bulldozers are deployed not to clear encroachments, but to send a message — one that criminalises not just individuals but entire families and communities. Such state behaviour creates a chilling effect, particularly for vulnerable groups, and sets a dangerous precedent where legal procedure is replaced with brute force.

Conclusion: Accountability, not apologies

The NMC’s apology, while noted, is wholly inadequate. A mere expression of regret cannot compensate for the unlawful demolition of a home, especially when that act violated Supreme Court directives and was executed in defiance of the High Court’s consideration. Accountability must go beyond symbolic contrition. The officers responsible for authorising and executing the demolition — in disregard of judicial pronouncements — must face disciplinary proceedings, if not contempt action. The Maharashtra government, too, must be held to account for its failure to issue the mandatory circulars despite the Supreme Court’s clear directions in 2014. This lapse enabled civic authorities to act in a legal vacuum, undermining the rule of law and exposing vulnerable citizens to irreversible harm.

This case should not be treated as an isolated aberration. It is a symptom of a larger, dangerous trend — where executive bodies bypass due process and enforce punishment outside the boundaries of law. Such practices threaten to hollow out constitutional protections, erode public trust in institutions, and institutionalise “bulldozer justice” as a state response to dissent and disorder. If courts do not intervene with clarity and firmness, these actions will set precedents that normalise illegality.

The right to shelter is not a favour bestowed by the state. It is a fundamental human right recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution. When that right is violated by state agencies acting with impunity, restitution must include not only accountability, but meaningful and adequate compensation. The destruction of a home cannot be undone — but justice demands that the state provide reparations for the physical, emotional, and psychological toll inflicted on affected citizens. Anything less would amount to tacit approval of executive lawlessness.

The path forward must not merely seek legal correctness — it must reassert the constitutional promise that no person will be deprived of life or liberty except by procedure established by law. That promise was shattered in this case. It now falls upon the judiciary to restore it — not just in courtrooms, but tangibly, on the ground.

Related:

Supreme Court slams Prayagraj demolitions, awards Rs. 10 lakh compensation to each six victims for violation of due process

Demolition of Fahim Khan’s house: A political message disguised as law enforcement

Maharashtra Human Rights Commission probes Malvan demolitions after suo moto cognisance

Supreme Court reinforces due process in demolition cases, lays down stringent guidelines to prevent arbitrary demolitions

The post ‘We Didn’t Know the Law’: NMC apologises after illegally demolishing Jehrunissa Khan’s home in Nagpur appeared first on SabrangIndia.

But this was not just a case about signage or statutory interpretation. It was about what place Urdu—and by extension, linguistic and cultural minorities—continue to hold in the Indian republic. Authored by Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, who presided over the bench of the Supreme Court along with Justice K. Vinod Chandran, the judgment blends legal clarity with cultural wisdom, and reads as much like a constitutional essay as a judicial opinion. It situates the question of language within the broader context of Indian history, identity, and fraternity—invoking not only statutory text but the spirit of the Constitution, the debates of the Constituent Assembly, and the lived realities of India’s multilingual people.

What emerges is not just a dismissal of an exclusionary petition, but a powerful defence of linguistic harmony, cultural coexistence, and the right of every Indian language—especially those spoken by minorities—to be seen, heard, and respected.

The judgment begins with a line from Mouloud Benzadi that sets the tone for what follows:

“When you learn a language, you don’t just learn to speak and write a new language. You also learn to be open-minded, liberal, tolerant, kind and considerate towards all mankind.”

Facts of the case

The petition was filed by Mrs Varshatai, a former member of the Municipal Council, who objected to the use of Urdu in any form, including on signage. Her argument was that the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022, permitted only Marathi. The Municipal Council had earlier rejected her plea by a majority resolution dated February 14, 2020, noting that the use of Urdu had been longstanding—since 1956—and that a significant portion of the town’s population was Urdu-speaking.

The appellant then moved an application under Section 308 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act, 1965, before the Collector, who allowed it, citing a government circular that mandated 100% use of Marathi in government proceedings. However, this was later set aside by the Divisional Commissioner, leading to a challenge before the Bombay High Court, which dismissed her petition. She then filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court.

During the pendency of the case, the 2022 Act came into force. In an earlier round, the Supreme Court disposed of the SLP, stating that the High Court order may not stand in light of the new law but leaving it open to the aggrieved party to seek appropriate remedy. The matter was then heard afresh by a division bench of the High Court, whose ruling in favour of the Municipal Council was challenged once again—bringing the issue back before the Supreme Court.

The final decision, delivered on April 15, 2025, rejected the challenge and upheld the High Court’s ruling.

The legal position and the Court’s reasoning

The Supreme Court first dealt with a procedural infirmity in how the challenge to the Municipal Council’s resolution was brought about. The appellant had approached the Collector under Section 308 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act, 1965, seeking suspension of the Council’s decision to retain Urdu on its signboard. However, a crucial amendment to Section 308 in 2018 had changed the law: after this amendment, the Collector can no longer act on complaints made by individuals or councillors, even if they were former members. The power to bring a resolution to the Collector’s attention rests solely with the Chief Officer of the Municipal Council.

The Court made this limitation clear:

“After the amendment… the Collector can exercise powers only when the Chief Officer of the Municipal Council brings it to the Collector’s notice… In this case, the application was admittedly not made by the Chief Officer… which should not have been entertained in the first place.” [Para 11]

In other words, the entire chain of proceedings initiated by the petitioner before the Collector was legally untenable from the outset, as she had no standing under the amended law to invoke the Collector’s jurisdiction. This aspect alone could have disposed of the case. However, given the persistence of the challenge and the deeper constitutional concerns it raised, the Court moved to examine the substance of the matter as well.

At the heart of the substantive issue was the interpretation of the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022—a law that declares Marathi as the official language for all local government bodies in the state. The petitioner’s argument hinged on a narrow and rigid reading of this Act—that once Marathi was declared the official language, the use of any other language, including Urdu, became impermissible.

The Court decisively rejected this interpretation, emphasising that the Act mandates the use of Marathi for official communication, but does not prohibit the use of additional languages for supplementary or public-facing purposes, such as signboards. It quoted the High Court’s clear reading of the law:

“All that [the Act] does, is to ensure that the business and affairs of the Council, are to be conducted in Marathi language… it does not prohibit use of an additional language… the use of an additional language… would not indicate any violation of the provisions of the Act of 2022.” [Para 14]

The Supreme Court agreed with this view, observing:

“The High Court to our mind rightly concluded that the 2022 Act, on which the appellant placed significant reliance, does not prohibit the use of an additional language, which is Urdu in the present case, on the signboard of the Municipal Council building.” [Para 15]

This distinction—between mandating a language and prohibiting others—is constitutionally important. The 2022 Act ensures that Marathi is used, but does not insist that it be used exclusively. As such, Urdu can co-exist on a signboard without violating the law.

Further, the Court reframed the debate entirely by shifting attention from legality to constitutional purpose. Why use Urdu at all? The Court’s answer was simple but deeply rooted in the values of inclusivity and effective governance:

“The purpose here for the use of Urdu is merely communication. All the municipal council wanted to do was to make an effective communication.” [Para 19]

This clarity of purpose is crucial. The use of Urdu on the signboard was not a political gesture or an assertion of religious identity. It was a functional, inclusive, and locally appropriate decision, intended to reach and welcome a section of the population that reads Urdu. The Court highlighted that this was neither new nor radical—Urdu had been used on the Patur Municipal Council’s signage since 1956.

Finally, in what is arguably the most important paragraph in terms of grounding the decision in the lived realities of governance and citizenship, the Court stated:

“Coming to the present case, it must be stated that a Municipal Council is there to provide services to the local community of the area and cater to their immediate day-to-day needs. If people or a group of people, residing within the area covered by the Municipal Council are familiar with Urdu, then there should not be any objection if Urdu is used in addition to the official language i.e. Marathi, at least on the signboard of the Municipal Council. Language is a medium for exchange of ideas that brings people holding diverse views and beliefs closer and it should not become a cause of their division.” [Para 46]

This is where the Court moved beyond a narrow legal resolution and reminded the petitioner—and the country—that language, at its best, is a bridge, not a barrier. The Municipal Council exists to serve the community—not to assert a singular linguistic identity at the cost of alienating others. If part of the community reads Urdu, there is no reason—legal, moral, or constitutional—to exclude it from a signboard.

By recognising this, the Court reclaimed the space of local governance as one that is responsive to local needs, identities, and realities, not one dictated by abstract notions of linguistic nationalism.

A powerful history lesson

Where this judgment truly shines is in its cultural, historical, and constitutional depth. The Court does not stop at interpreting a statutory provision or addressing procedural irregularities. It goes much further—into the idea of language as identity, as history, and as belonging. In doing so, it delivers a clear and courageous rebuke to the growing communalisation of Urdu and the false binaries that have been constructed around it.

The Court directly confronts the widespread tendency to associate Urdu with Islam, and to treat it as a foreign or sectarian language. It challenges this prejudice head-on by making a series of powerful and clarifying declarations. Perhaps the most quoted and impactful of them is this:

“Let our concepts be clear. Language is not religion. Language does not even represent religion. Language belongs to a community, to a region, to people; and not to a religion.” [Para 17]

This simple but profound line dismantles the politicised narrative that seeks to conflate Urdu with a religious identity. It restores to language its proper meaning—not as a marker of religious belonging, but as a tool of expression, identity, memory, and connection. Language, the Court reminds us, cannot be confined to a single group or cast as exclusive to one faith.

The Court deepens this point by offering a civilisational and cultural defence of Urdu, recognising it as a product of the ganga-jamuni tehzeeb—India’s long-standing tradition of cultural syncretism, particularly in the northern and central plains.

“Language is culture. Language is the yardstick to measure the civilizational march of a community and its people. So is the case of Urdu, which is the finest specimen of ganga-jamuni tahzeeb, or the Hindustani tahzeeb, which is the composite cultural ethos of the plains of northern and central India. But before language became a tool for learning, its earliest and primary purpose will always remain communication.” [Para 18]

By invoking this shared cultural history, the Court reclaims Urdu as Indian, not just linguistically but emotionally and historically. It reminds us that Urdu is not a cultural intruder—it is a civilisational creation, a language born out of coexistence, shared spaces, and mutual exchange. The judgment acknowledges that Urdu’s elegance, refinement, and poetic tradition are the legacies of this syncretic past, which the Constitution was meant to preserve, not erase.

The Court also situates this discussion in constitutional history, tracing how Hindi and Urdu were not seen as oppositional or incompatible during the freedom movement and in the early years of the republic. Instead, they were regarded as two forms of the same evolving language—Hindustani—that could serve as a common national medium. The Court draws on the work of Granville Austin, whose scholarship on the Constituent Assembly debates and post-independence linguistic compromise is widely regarded as authoritative.

Referring to the language debates before and after Partition, the Court notes:

“Partition killed Hindustani and endangered the position of English and the provincial languages in the Constitution.” [Para 34]

This line, taken from Austin, captures the tragic turning point at which a shared language—Hindustani, made up of both Hindi and Urdu—was discarded, and its components polarised. Urdu, in particular, bore the brunt of this rupture. The judgment acknowledges that post-Partition nationalism rejected Urdu not because of linguistic reasons but because of political and communal ones—a move that was neither just nor historically accurate.

The Court quotes Jawaharlal Nehru, who had been a staunch advocate of Hindustani as the people’s language—a bridge between Hindi and Urdu, and a language capable of uniting India’s many regions:

“Hindustani (Hindi or Urdu)… is bound to become the all-India medium of communication, not displacing the great provincial languages, but as a compulsory second language.” [Para 31]

This vision—of Hindustani as an inclusive, flexible, people’s language—was derailed by Partition, but the judgment shows that it remains constitutionally relevant even today. By citing Nehru, the Court not only restores this vision but places its ruling in a long constitutional arc that includes freedom movement ideals, the Constituent Assembly’s balancing act, and post-independence compromises.

The judgment also brings in Mahatma Gandhi, who warned against linguistic purism and the dangers of reducing language to a narrow, communal identity. Gandhi understood language as dynamic and inclusive, and his approach to Hindustani reflected this. The Court quotes him with quiet force:

“To confine oneself exclusively to Hindi or Urdu would be a crime against intelligence and the spirit of patriotism.” [Para 36]

Gandhi’s words underscore that linguistic plurality was never seen as a threat to national unity—it was the foundation of it. In quoting both Nehru and Gandhi, the Court implicitly argues that today’s efforts to banish Urdu from public spaces are not just unconstitutional—they are a betrayal of the nation-building vision of those who fought for India’s independence.

Together, these references and insights make this portion of the judgment a masterclass in cultural constitutionalism. It does not approach the question of language as a dry administrative matter, but as a living symbol of India’s diversity—something that must be protected not just by law, but by respect, memory, and a shared sense of belonging.

By restoring Urdu to its rightful place—as an Indian language, a people’s language, and a constitutional language—the Court reaffirms that inclusion, not exclusion, is the heart of our constitutional identity.

Debunking the myth that Urdu is alien

One of the most important contributions of this judgment is the way it confronts and dismantles the deep-rooted prejudice against the Urdu language—a prejudice that has been allowed to flourish in public discourse, often unchallenged. The Court recognises that the hostility towards Urdu is not grounded in linguistic fact, but in a political fiction, born out of Partition-era anxieties and perpetuated by majoritarian narratives.

In a critical passage, the Court squarely addresses and rebuts the idea that Urdu is somehow foreign or un-Indian:

“The prejudice against Urdu stems from the misconception that Urdu is alien to India… Urdu, like Marathi and Hindi, is an Indo-Aryan language. It is a language which was born in this land.” [Para 27]

This statement is not only accurate in terms of linguistic classification—Urdu, like Hindi and Marathi, evolved from Prakrit and Apabhramsha and belongs to the same Indo-Aryan family—but also essential in its rejection of the false notion that Urdu is inherently Islamic. The Court affirms what should be a basic and accepted truth: that Urdu is Indian in its origins, Indian in its development, and Indian in its usage.

It goes further to remind us that Urdu arose from real, lived interactions among people in India—particularly in the north and centre of the country—where different communities needed to communicate across linguistic and cultural lines. Over centuries, this led to the development of a sophisticated, inclusive, and adaptable language, enriched by multiple traditions and serving as a lingua franca in many regions. In fact, it was not born out of exclusivism, but out of coexistence.

The Court then makes a subtle but powerful observation about the everyday presence of Urdu, especially in the speech of people who may not even recognise its origins:

“Even today, the language used by the common people of the country is replete with words of the Urdu language, even if one is not aware of it.” [Para 37]

This insight challenges the idea that Urdu is used only by a particular religious or social group. On the contrary, the vocabulary of Urdu has become so woven into the fabric of everyday Hindi and Indian speech that it is impossible to separate the two without distorting both. From the language of friendship and affection to politics and cinema, Urdu has left a profound mark.

The Court also offers a striking example of how deeply entrenched Urdu is in the Indian legal system. It lists several key legal terms that are of Urdu origin and are still widely used in courts across the country—even in the Supreme Court, where the official language is English. The judgment notes:

“Urdu words have a heavy influence on Court parlance… Adalat, halafnama, peshi, vakalatnama, dasti…” [Para 38]

These are not minor or incidental terms. They are core procedural and functional terms used in both civil and criminal proceedings, known to every lawyer, judge, and litigant across India. ‘Adalat’ (court), ‘halafnama’ (affidavit), ‘peshi’ (appearance), ‘vakalatnama’ (power of attorney), and ‘dasti’ (by hand)—these are foundational building blocks of legal vocabulary.

This point is underscored further in the next line:

“Even though the official language of the Supreme Court… is English, yet many Urdu words continue to be used in this Court till date.” [Para 38]

In making this observation, the Court underlines an important irony: Urdu is being spoken, written, and relied upon at the highest levels of India’s judiciary, even as efforts continue in some quarters to stigmatise it. This lived reality gives lie to the claim that Urdu is somehow alien or inappropriate for official or legal use.

Together, these points form a comprehensive and compelling rebuttal of the misconceptions surrounding Urdu. The Court not only reaffirms that Urdu is as Indian as any other regional language, but also that it remains active, visible, and essential—not just culturally, but administratively and judicially.

Language as a bridge—not a weapon

In one of the segments of the judgment, the Court engages deeply with linguistic scholarship to challenge the idea that Hindi and Urdu are separate languages. This part of the judgment goes beyond the immediate question of signage and moves into the realm of intellectual history and sociolinguistics, showing how the binary between Hindi and Urdu was not a natural evolution but a consciously created political divide.

To support this, the Court draws on the works of prominent scholars such as Gyan Chand Jain, Amrit Rai, Ram Vilas Sharma, and Abdul Haq—all of whom have extensively studied the origins, development, and mutual influence of Hindi and Urdu.

“It is absolutely clear that Urdu and Hindi are not two separate languages… Even though Urdu literature and Hindi literature are two different and independent literatures, Urdu and Hindi are not two different languages.” [Para 41]

“Hindi-Urdu are not two separate languages; they are basically one and the same… There are no two other languages in the world whose pronouns and verbs are one hundred per cent the same.” [Para 42]

This is an emphatic and almost scientifically framed observation—what unites Hindi and Urdu is not merely poetic sentiment but the structural bedrock of language. The judgment notes that while their scripts differ (Devanagari for Hindi, Perso-Arabic for Urdu), and while each has drawn vocabulary from different classical sources (Sanskrit for Hindi, Persian and Arabic for Urdu), their spoken forms remain nearly indistinguishable in everyday use across north India.

In referencing Amrit Rai’s influential work, the Court aligns itself with the understanding that Hindi and Urdu emerged from the same linguistic root—Hindavi or Hindustani—and that the divide between them was sharpened over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, not by natural evolution but by colonial language policies and post-Partition communal politics. Amrit Rai’s thesis, A House Divided, showed how political forces came to assign communal identities to languages that had once coexisted fluidly.

The judgment does not stop at historical analysis—it goes further to expose the consequences of this artificially constructed divide. By making language a marker of religious identity, a shared cultural and linguistic inheritance was fractured. Urdu came to be falsely viewed as “Muslim”, and Hindi as “Hindu”—a split that ignored centuries of shared grammar, mutual influence, and bilingual expression in the public sphere.

These scholarly citations give the judgment a rare academic depth. It is unusual—though deeply welcome—for the judiciary to cite literary historians and linguists so prominently. And yet, in doing so, the Court performs a vital task: it returns the conversation about language to the terrain of fact, scholarship, and nuance, rather than leaving it to be defined by prejudice and politicised emotion.

And then, poetry

The judgment ends with a poetic flourish, quoting Iqbal Ashhar’s nazm where Urdu speaks for itself:

““urdu hai mirā naam maiñ ‘Khusrav’ kī pahelī

kyuuñ mujh ko banāte ho ta.assub kā nishāna

maiñ ne to kabhī ḳhud ko musalmāñ nahīñ maanā

dekhā thā kabhī maiñ ne bhī ḳhushiyoñ kā zamāna

apne hī vatan meñ huuñ magar aaj akelī

urdu hai mirā naam maiñ ‘Khusrav’ kī pahelī” [Para 48]

“Urdu is my name, I am the riddle of ‘Khusrav’

Do not hold me for your prejudices

I never considered myself a Muslim

I too have seen happier times

I feel like an outsider in my homeland today

Urdu is my name, I am the riddle of ‘Khusrav’”

The Court then reflects:

“Let us make friends with Urdu and every language. If Urdu was to speak for herself, she would say…” [Para 48]

A verse that speaks of belonging, alienation, and identity—reminding the reader that Urdu, like any other Indian language, asks not for supremacy, but for space to exist.

Why this judgment is important

This is more than a legal ruling—it is a profound affirmation of India’s constitutional soul. It reasserts that the Constitution protects not only freedom of religion, but freedom of language, identity, and culture. India’s commitment to pluralism is not merely symbolic—it is embedded in its constitutional text and historical experience. This judgment operationalises that commitment with clarity and courage.

It is important because:

• It clarifies the law, confirming that there is no legal bar on using additional languages like Urdu on public signboards under the 2022 Act.
• It safeguards linguistic and cultural rights, especially of minority communities, and affirms that state recognition does not require the exclusion of others.
• It dispels the myth that Urdu is alien, asserting its deep roots in India’s linguistic heritage and constitutional imagination.
• It confronts majoritarian narratives, refusing to allow language to be communalised or weaponised.

This judgment stands out for its clarity, depth, and conviction. It does not merely interpret a statute or settle a procedural flaw—it reaffirms foundational constitutional values. By recognising the legitimacy of linguistic diversity and rejecting efforts to erase or marginalise a language rooted in India’s soil, the Court has underscored that governance must serve all, not just the dominant voice. In doing so, it reminds us that the Constitution protects not just rights in the abstract, but the dignity of communities, cultures, and the many languages in which India speaks.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

When Courts Fail Survivors: How patriarchy shapes justice in sexual offence against women cases

A Judgement of Conscience: Bombay High Court orders SIT Probe into alleged fake encounter in Badlapur

Supreme Court slams UP police for criminalising civil disputes, calls it a ‘complete breakdown of rule of law’

Uttarakhand HC orders unsealing of Madrassa, SC steps in to hear Jamiat’s petition against Dhami govt’s crackdown against Madrassa

The post “Urdu Is Not Alien”: Supreme Court reclaims the language’s place in the Indian Constitutional fabric appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Senior Advocate Navroz Seervai, appearing for Kamra, argued that none of the offences mentioned in the FIR were made out and asserted that the criminal justice process was being weaponised to harass and intimidate the comedian for his political satire. The FIR, he submitted, was registered merely 70 minutes after the complaint was lodged—without a preliminary inquiry as mandated under Section 173 (3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), and thus amounted to a procedural violation.

The bench took note of the submissions and concluded arguments on the matter. The Court reserved its order but made it clear that Kamra shall not be arrested in the meantime. This interim relief came in the backdrop of the prosecution’s concession that the summons issued to Kamra was under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, which explicitly provides that arrest is not required in such cases. “In that background, the question of arresting the petitioner does not arise,” the Court noted, as per LiveLaw.

Kamra’s plea also drew attention to the police’s insistence on his physical presence for questioning in Mumbai, despite credible death threats against him. The comedian, who resides in Villupuram, Tamil Nadu, had initially approached the Madras High Court for anticipatory bail, which was granted till April 17. He later moved the Bombay High Court seeking to quash the FIR entirely. His petition further alleged that over 500 threats had been received via email and messages following his performance of a parody song during his recent stand-up act titled “Naya Bharat”, which reportedly included the term “gaddar” in reference to Eknath Shinde’s political defection from Uddhav Thackeray’s Shiv Sena to the BJP-led alliance.

The FIR was registered under Sections 353 (1) (b), 353 (2), and 356 (2) of the BNSS, which pertain to speech that allegedly incites or disrupts public order. Kamra, however, maintained that his comments were well within the bounds of artistic and political expression protected by Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. He contended that the case against him was a misuse of state machinery to suppress dissent and artistic freedom.

The Court’s interim relief underscores a critical adjudication on free speech, misuse of criminal law, and procedural safeguards intersect. The outcome of the case is likely to set an important precedent on the extent to which political satire can be legally challenged in contemporary India.

Related:

Comedian Kunal Kamra faces state-sponsored intimidation over satirical remarks on Deputy CM Eknath Shinde

SC: Recent judgment in the Imran Pratapgarhi case, what are police powers under section 173 (3) BNS?

When Courts Fail Survivors: How patriarchy shapes justice in sexual offence against women cases

Torn Pages, Broken Bones – The Violent Suppression of Teachers’ Voices

A Judgement of Conscience: Bombay High Court orders SIT Probe into alleged fake encounter in Badlapur

The post ‘No arrest of Kunal Kamra’ Bombay High Court grants interim protection in ‘Gaddar’ remark case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Among the suggestions outlined by the Court at the end of the hearing are

1. The properties declared by Courts as Waqfs should not be de-notified as Waqfs, whether they are by Waqf-by-user or Waqf by deed;
2. The proviso in the 2025 Act, under r which a Waqf property will not be treated as a Waqf in the period where the Collector is conducting an inquiry on whether the property is a Government land, will also be included in the interim stay.
3. All members of the Waqf Boards and Central Waqf Council must be Muslims, except the ex-officio members.

CJI Sanjiv Khanna said: “Our interim order will balance equities. We will say that whichever properties were declared by the court to be Waqf will not be denotified or be treated as non-Waqf… Whether it’s Waqf by user or not. Collector can continue with proceedings… But the proviso will not be given effect to. Regarding board and council… Ex officio members can be appointed. But the other members have to Muslims”

At the end of the hearing, the Chief Justice also expressed great concern at the violence that had broken out in West Bengal reportedly over the amended law. As CJI Khanna was in the process of dictating the order, it was Solicitor General of India, Tushar Mehta who asked for more time and the Court posted the matter tomorrow. 

The Waqf (Amendment) Act 2025 was passed by the Parliament earlier this month. The bill was passed in the Lok Sabha on April 3 with 288 members in favour and 232 against it, and in the Rajya Sabha on April 4, with 128 members voting in support and 95 opposing it.

A bench of Chief Justice of India Sanjeev Khanna, and Justices Sanjay Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan was hearing a batch of 10 pleas filed by AIMIM chief Asaduddin Owaisi, AAP leader Amanatullah Khan, Association for the Protection of Civil Rights, Arshad Madani, Samastha Kerala Jamiathul Ulema, Anjum Kadari, Taiyyab Khan Salmani, Mohammad Shafi, Mohammed Fazlurrahim and RJD leader Manoj Kumar Jha. 

Meanwhile, fresh pleas filed by TMC MP Mahua Moitra and Samajwadi Party leader Zia-ur-Rahman Barq were also listed.

Senior advocates Kapil Sibal, Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Rajeev Dhawan, CU Singh and others are representing the petitioners in the Waqf (Amendment) Act hearing. 

The bench comprising Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Sanjay Kumar and KV Viswanathan, which heard the matter for over two hours today, raised specific concerns about some of the provisions as follows:

1. Whether all Waqf-by-user properties have ceased to exist as Waqf?
2. How can Waqf-by-user properties, existing for many centuries, be asked to register? CJI gave the example of the Jama Masjid in Delhi.
3. Is it fair to say that a property will not be regarded as a Waqf till the government’s authorised officer completes the enquiry into the dispute whether it is a government property?
4. How can Section 2A (Amended Act) proviso override the Court’s judgments which declare properties to be Waqf?
5. Whether after the new amendments, the majority of the members of the Central Waqf Council and the State Waqf Boards will be Muslims? 

The Court also proposed to transfer to the Supreme Court the petitions from High Courts which challenge the Waqf Act 1995 for being heard together.

The omission of ‘Waqf by User’ provision, inclusion of non-Muslim members in the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Board, limiting the inclusion of women members to two in the Council and Boards, pre-condition of 5 years as practising Muslim for create of Waqf, diluting Waqf-alal-aulad, renaming ‘Waqf Act, 1995 to “Unifed Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency and Development,” appeal against the Tribunal’s order, allowing Government to disputes regarding encroachment of government property, application of Limitation Act to Waqf Act, invalidating Waqf created over ASI protected monuments, restrictions on creating Waqfs over scheduled areas etc., are some of the provisions under challenge.

Court room proceedings

When the hearings began, at the outset, CJI Khanna said, “Two aspects we want to ask- whether we should entertain the writ petitions or relegate to the High Court. Second, what are the points you want to argue? The second aspect may help us decide the first issue.” Since there were several petitioners involved, CJI said that he would call out the names of the lawyers to argue to maintain decorum. While the court first requested senior counsel, Rajeev Dhawan, given his age, Dhawan deferred to senior counsel Kapil Sibal to start.

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, began the submissions for the petitioners and summarised the argument as follows: “Through a Parliamentary Act, interference is made on the essential and integral parts of the faith. Many of these provisions violate Article 26 of the Constitution.” He then referred to Section 3(r) of the Act (as amended), which introduces a condition that a person should establish that he was following Islam for at least 5 years to create a Waqf and that there was no “contrivance” in the dedication of the property. “If I want to set up Waqf, I have to show the State I am practising Islam for 5 years. If I am born Muslim, why would I do that? Will the State decide how good or bad a Muslim I am? My personal law will apply.” He also flagged the omission of ‘Waqf-by-user’. “Who are you to say there can’t be a Waqf-by-user?” Sibal asked.

This is nothing short of “Parliamentary usurpation of the Right to Faith of 250 (Muslims) in this country,” stated Sibal.

Sibal also then flagged Section 3A (on Waqf-Al-Aulad). “Who is the State is to decide how the inheritance should happen?” Sibal asked. CJI Khanna then pointed out that as regards Hindus, the Parliament has enacted the Hindu Succession Act. “Article 26 does not bar the legislature from enacting laws. 26 is universal, secular, applies across all communities. Hindu Succession Act, Hindu Guardianship Act, etc, have been enacted,” CJI Khanna said. Sibal said that inheritance applies only after the death of the person, and here, the State was interfering with the aspect during the life of the person.

Next, Sibal referred to the provision (Section 3C) in the amended act which states that once a property identified as a Government property would not be a Waqf property and that the Government’s authority would decide the dispute. “An officer of the Government will be a judge in his own cause. This is per se unconstitutional,” Sibal said. Thereafter, Sibal elaborated on Section 3D in the amended Act which invalidates the creation of Waqf over ASI-protected monuments under the ASAMR Act. CJI then pointed out that as per the provision, if the property was a protected monument at the time of the creation of a Waqf, then such Waqf would be invalid. “How many of such cases will be there? “CJI Khanna asked. “Jama Masjid,” Sibal replied. However, CJI said that the Jama Masjid was notified as a protected monument later, long after it had been declared Waqf property.

“On my reading, the interpretation is in your favour. If it’s declared as a Waqf, before it was declared as an ancient monument, it would not make any difference. It will remain Waqf, you should not be objecting unless after it’s declared as protected, it cannot be declared as Waqf. Most of the monuments, the ancient mosques, they will not be hit by this clause,” CJI said.

The next provisions (Sections 9, 14) flagged by Sibal were regarding the nomination of non-Muslims in the Central Waqf Council and the State Waqf Boards, which he said was a direct violation of Article 26. He said that the central law regarding Sikh Gurudwaras and many State laws on Hindu Religious Endowments do not permit the inclusion of persons of other faiths in the respective Boards. “It is a parliamentary usurpation of the faith of 200 million persons,” he said. Also, after the amendment, the CEO of the Board need not be a Muslim. Sibal said that these provisions allow a “complete takeover of the Boards through nomination.”

Objections were taken to the provisions mandating registration. “What is wrong with it?,” CJI asked. Sibal said that presently, Waqf-by-User can be created without registration. “You can register a Waqf which will also help you to maintain a register,” CJI said. Justice Viswanathan also weighed in saying, “If you have a deed, there won’t be any bogus or false claims.”

“They will ask us if there was a Waqf created 300 years ago, and to produce the deed. Many of these properties were created hundreds of years ago, and there won’t be any documents,” Sibal said. Sibal added that when the British came, many Waqf properties were entered in the register as belonging to the Governor General and after independence, the Government is staking claim over such properties.

Sibal also took exception to the application of the Limitation Act to the Waqf Act. CJI Khanna however, said, “You can’t really say if you impose a period of limitation, it would be unconstitutional.” Sibal said that the provision will legitimise encroachers of Waqf properties as they can now claim adverse possession.

Senior Advocate Rajeev Dhavan, for another set of petitioners, said that Waqf is an essential and integral part of Islam, as charity is an essential and integral part of the faith. Senior Advocate AM Singhvi said that deletion of ‘Waqf-by-user’ is dangerous, as about four lakh out of eight lakh properties are Waqf-by-user, which have now become illegal with “one stroke of the pen.”

CJI Khanna then said, “We have been told the Delhi High Court building is in Waqf land, the Oberoi hotel is in Waqf land. We are not saying that all Waqf-by-User properties are wrong. But there are some genuine areas of concerns too.”

Singhvi replied, “These are individual cases of abuse. But you can’t throw the baby out with the bathwater.” He argued that Waqf-by-user has been judicially recognised in many decisions and without removing the basis of these decisions, the Parliament has deleted the concept. Singhvi also prayed for a stay of the Amendment Act, saying that some of the provisions are “pernicious” which would disturb the status quo continuing for many years.

Senior Advocate CU Singh said that if the Government lays a claim over a 300-year-old Waqf property, then till the time the designated officer decides the dispute for 20-30 years, the property cannot be used as Waqf. Senior Advocates Sanjay Hegde, Rajeev Shakdher, Huzefa Ahmadi, Nizam Pasha, Shadan Farasat and P Wilson also made supporting arguments. Union’s arguments

Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta, for the Union, highlighted that the law was enacted after an elaborate exercise by the JPC, which held meetings in different parts of the country and took views of stakeholders. SG emphasised that both houses of the Parliament passed the bill after a long debate.

CJI asked SG, “Are you now saying that Waqf-by-user, even if established by judgments of the Courts or otherwise without dispute, are void now?”

In reply, SG started giving a background about the concept of ‘Waqf’. “Waqf under the Islamic law means dedication of property to Almighty Allah for a charitable purpose. There has to be a waqif, who will say property has to be managed by a muttawali…this law does not come into the picture there. Waqf Board is different. This amendment does not touch the Waqf itself,” SG said.

Advocate Sanjay Hegde gave the Bench the instance of how, for decades the Golden Temple at Amritsar was administered by non-Sikhs and that it took a long Akali movement to ensure that Golden Temple was thereafter administered by Sikhs alone.

 “Some of these pernicious provisions have come into force immediately. We are seeking a stay on some of this…not the entire Act,” he added.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, representing the Union government, defended the legislation saying it was cleared by a joint parliamentary committee and went to both parliament houses before the law was passed.

Bench questions SG about status of Waqf-by-user

Justice Viswanathan said that the closest example to Waqf is the Hindu Charitable Endowments Act. “Whenever it comes to Hindu endowments, it would be Hindus who would be governing,” Justice Viswanathan said. SG said that the control would be by a Board which may consist of Hindus or non-Hindus. Justice Sanjay Kumar then asked the SG to give an example and said that the Tirupati temple board has no Hindus. SG then answered, “Charity Commissioner.” Justice Kumar said that the bench is not talking about general trusts but religious endowments.

CJI then pointed out the provision regarding disputes with government and asked why the property should not be deemed as a Waqf till the dispute is decided. “Why will it not remain a Waqf property? Let the civil court decide that,” CJI said. 

“Mr Tushar Mehta, tell us. Waqf-by-user, if accepted prior to 2025 Act, is it now declared to be void or non-existent?” CJI asked pointedly.

“If registered, no (they will remain as Waqf if they are registered),” SG answered.

CJI then sought clarity about the conditions – which the property must not be in “dispute”. “Before the Britishers came, we did not have any registration. Many of the masjids are created in 14th or 15th centuries. To require them to produce a registered deed is impossible. Most of the cases, say Jama Masjid Delhi, the Waqf will be Waqf-by-user,” CJI said.

“What prevented them from registering?” SG asked.

Justice Viswanathan then asked, “What if Section 3C is invoked by the Government saying it is government land?” CJI Khanna flagged the provision which says that the property won’t be a Waqf the moment the Collector starts investigating if it is a government land. “Is that fair?,” CJI Khanna asked.

SG said that the use as a Waqf is not stopped, and the provision only says that it won’t get the benefits as a Waqf in the meantime. “So if the property is generating rents, to whom the rent has to be paid?” CJI asked. SG said that the remedies before the Tribunal and the writ courts are available to the aggrieved party, and the provision only deals with the revenue entries. Every order passed under the Act is subject to judicial review, SG said.

CJI Khanna again repeated his question. “Is Waqf-by-user now valid or not?”

SG said that if they are registered, they will be recognised and that registration was mandatory since 2013.

Unconvinced, CJI asked: “This will be undoing something established by law. How will you register a Waqf-by-user? There will be no registered documents. It will be difficult to register. You may have a point that it is misused. But there are genuine Waqf-by-user also. I have gone through judgments of the Privy Council from 1920. If you are going to denotify Waqf-by-user properties, it will be an issue.”

Bench questions the amendment overriding Court declarations

CJI also questioned the SG about the proviso inserted to Section 2A, which says that a trust property won’t be covered by the Waqf Act, notwithstanding any judgment of the Court.

“The legislature cannot declare any judgment or decree of court as void, you can remove the basis of law but you cannot declare any judgment or declare as not binding,” CJI said.

“I don’t know why those words have come. Ignore that part. There is a large section of Muslims who don’t; want to be governed by Muslim Board. If a Muslim wants to do charity, he can do that through Trust,” SG replied.

Bench questions inclusion of non-Muslims in Boards

CJI Khanna also asked about the provisions allowing the nomination of non-Muslim members to Waqf Boards. While taking the bench through the provision, SG made a comment which clearly bothered he bench. SG said “Going by their logic, then your lordships can’t also hear this matter.”

CJI Khanna sternly said, “When we are sitting here to adjudicate, we lose our religion. We are talking about a Board which is managing religious affairs. Let’s say in Hindu temple, all are Hindu in the Governor Council. How are you comparing this with judges?”

SG asserted that the majority of the composition of the Board would be Muslims and the non-Muslims wouldn’t be more than 2. Justice Kumar, however said that the proviso to the Section does not say that only two members would be non-Muslim and stated that the SG’s argument was “militating against the statute.”

SG stated that he would file an affidavit and said that the present composition of Boards will continue till the end of their term.

CJI also raised concerns about the proviso to Section 2A. “Where public trust has been declared as Waqf, say 100 or 200 years back, you turn about and say it is not Waqf…You cannot rewrite the past of 100 years back!,” CJI Khanna said.

More than 70 petitions have been filed challenging the 2025 Act, and one petition has been filed challenging the Parent Act, the Waqf Act, 1995, Intervention applications have been filed by five BJP-led States: Assam, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Haryana and Maharashtra, supporting the legislation.

The first ten petitions that were initially listed for hearing are by AIMIM MP Asaduddin Owaisi, Delhi AAP MLA Amanatullah Khan, Association for Protection of Civil Rights, Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind President Arshad Madani, Samastha Kerala Jamiatul Ulema, Anjum Kadari, Taiyyab Khan Salmani, Mohammad Shafi, Mohammad Fazlurrahim and RJD MP Manoj Kumar Jha.

The post SC to UoI on Waqf Amendment: ‘Are you willing to allow Muslims on Hindu endowment boards?’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Across these three cases—ranging from the grant of bail in a rape case involving an intoxicated college student, to the dilution of charges in a case of sexual assault against a minor, to the careless granting of bail in a child trafficking racket—the High Court’s orders have come under sharp scrutiny. The apex court has not merely disagreed with the legal reasoning offered, but has gone a step further to publicly chastise the judges involved for passing orders that reflect a “lack of sensitivity,” “misapplication of law,” and “casualness in handling crimes against the most vulnerable.”

At the heart of this moment lies a much-needed reckoning with the gendered biases and prejudices that continue to shape how courts interpret the law. These cases have also reignited the debate on judicial accountability, particularly around how courts often reproduce social hierarchies and fail to protect those most in need of their constitutional mandate. The Supreme Court’s recent responses mark a significant intervention, one that reasserts the need for justice systems to be empathetic, victim-centric, and alive to the unequal social realities within which violence and exploitation occur.

• Victim-blaming in a rape case involving an intoxicated college student

In one instance, the Supreme Court criticised Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh of the Allahabad High Court for observations made while granting bail to a man accused of raping a college student. The High Court, in a shockingly regressive comment, held that the woman “invited trouble” and was herself “responsible” for the alleged sexual assault. The victim, who had met the accused at a bar in Delhi, claimed she was intoxicated and had accompanied the man to rest at his house but was instead taken to a relative’s flat and raped.

Justice Singh dismissed her allegations by pointing to her torn hymen—while also noting the medical report didn’t explicitly state sexual assault—and further added that as an MA student, the woman should have understood the “morality and significance of her act.” These remarks sparked immediate outrage for their blatant victim-blaming and for perpetuating rape myths that have no place in judicial reasoning. The Supreme Court firmly stated that while the granting of bail lies within judicial discretion, such gratuitous and damaging observations against the complainant are wholly unwarranted and erode public trust in the justice system. As per LiveLaw, Justice BR Gavai expressed his displeasure at such comments being made, and remarked, “What is this discussion that ‘she invited trouble’? Judges must be more careful, especially when it comes to such cases.”

• Diluting sexual offences against a minor

In a second and even more alarming case, the Supreme Court took suo-motu cognisance of another order by the Allahabad High Court where it diluted the charges in a case involving the sexual assault of a child. The High Court had originally altered a lower court’s summoning order, replacing charges under Section 376 IPC (rape) and Section 18 of the POCSO Act (attempt to commit an offence) with lesser charges under Section 354-B IPC (assault with intent to disrobe) and Sections 9/10 of the POCSO Act (aggravated sexual assault).

Justice Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra reasoned that although the accused had grabbed the child’s breasts and attempted to pull down her pyjamas before being stopped, such conduct did not indicate a “determination” to commit rape. This interpretation drew strong disapproval from the Supreme Court, which found the High Court’s minimisation of the assault deeply problematic. The apex court had earlier stayed this order, highlighted the disturbing lack of judicial sensitivity and asserted that the judgment did not appear to be a “spur of the moment” lapse but a serious judicial misstep. The matter was taken up after the women’s rights group We the Women of India flagged the order, prompting the Supreme Court to seek responses from the Union and the Uttar Pradesh governments.

• Bail granted in child trafficking case without due diligence

In a separate matter involving child trafficking, the Supreme Court came down heavily on the Allahabad High Court once again, this time for granting bail in a child trafficking case in a casual and negligent manner. The apex court found that the High Court failed to impose even basic conditions on the accused, such as requiring them to mark their presence at police stations. As a result, many of the accused absconded, severely compromising the investigation and posing a grave risk to society.

The case involved the trafficking of a new-born, who was sold for ₹4 lakh to a couple desperate for a male child. The Supreme Court ordered the immediate surrender of all accused and cancellation of bail, directed the appointment of special public prosecutors, and mandated the trial to proceed on a day-to-day basis, with a timeline of six months for conclusion. The Bench, comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan, also issued far-reaching directives to all States and High Courts to expedite child trafficking trials and take punitive action against hospitals involved in such crimes.

The Court’s disappointment was palpable: “We are thoroughly disappointed with how the State of UP handled this. There was no seriousness worth the name,” it observed, as per BarandBench. Taking cognisance of a Times of India report, the Court also directed the police to report on steps taken to dismantle trafficking gangs.

A Larger Pattern: Biases in the judiciary

These three cases are not isolated judicial lapses. They reflect a larger, structural pattern of gender bias, moralism, and caste–class insensitivity within sections of the judiciary. Whether it is disbelieving women who speak up about sexual violence, minimising the trauma of minors, or failing to acknowledge the societal menace of child trafficking, the judiciary has often been found wanting.

When High Court judges pass orders that reinforce patriarchal tropes—by blaming victims for their clothing, choices, or social behaviour—they not only fail in their legal duty, they do serious harm to the broader struggle for gender justice and equality. Judicial commentary, especially in bail orders, has a real and chilling effect: it silences survivors, deters reporting, and normalises impunity for perpetrators.

The Supreme Court’s recent interventions are therefore significant not only because they correct individual injustices but because they send a strong message to the judiciary. They reaffirm that judicial reasoning must be guided by constitutional morality, not personal prejudices; that courts must be spaces of redress and empathy, not shame and suspicion.

A call for structural reform and judicial sensitisation

These cases point to an urgent need for systemic reform within the judiciary. Mandatory gender sensitisation training for judges, stricter accountability for prejudicial orders, and mechanisms for survivor feedback must form part of the legal reform agenda. Additionally, there must be structural checks on moralistic and casteist reasoning that creeps into court judgments.

The Supreme Court, by publicly pulling up the Allahabad High Court, has sent a rare but powerful message—that justice must not only be done but must be done with sensitivity, dignity, and constitutional fidelity. 

Related:

2024: Love Jihad – A Socio-Political Weapon: Caste, Endogamy, and Hindutva’s Grip on gender and social boundaries in India

Supreme Court takes action amid outrage following Karnataka Judge’s anti-Muslim and gender-insensitive comments in court

Removing Hijab ban is a step forward, for gender justice & pluralism

The post When Courts Fail Survivors: How patriarchy shapes justice in sexual offence against women cases appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Glad to report: The Mumbai Police has now registered an FIR against the organisers of this Ram Navami rally. https://t.co/i0HxGHuh2I

— Kunal Purohit (@kunalpurohit) April 12, 2025

Purohit, who was present at the procession near the Airport Road metro station, posted the videos on April 7, capturing disturbing scenes of participants engaging in inflammatory speech. The footage showed chants such as “Aurangzeb Ki Kabr Khudegi, Maa Ch*degi, Maa Ch*degi,” along with other offensive lyrics that openly incited violence against Muslims

Spent a few hours in #RamNavami processions outside Mumbai’s International Airport:

*Slogans like ‘Aurangzeb Ki Kabr Khudegi, Maa Ch*degi, Maa Ch*degi’.
*Songs with words: Bharat Mein Jo Desh Drohi Hai, Unki Ma Ka Bh*sda.
*Songs that threaten brutal violence against Muslims. pic.twitter.com/3AnpzlTdtQ

— Kunal Purohit (@kunalpurohit) April 7, 2025

The procession, attended by thousands, featured a crowd mostly consisting of young men in their 20s and 30s, but also included some women and older individuals. Purohit described how the songs were widely known, with the crowd singing along to the chants, and the energy escalating whenever a song specifically targeted Muslims. The event was filled with repeated slogans calling for violence, including calls for the expulsion of Muslims from the country. Despite the presence of numerous police officers, Purohit observed no action taken to intervene or curb the hateful rhetoric being broadcasted publicly.

While the police were present in large numbers throughout the procession, it took the authorities several days to take action. The FIR against the organisers, filed on April 12, includes charges under sections 296 and 3(5) of the BNS Act, which address the use of offensive and inflammatory language during public events. Speaking to IndiaToday, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone 8, Maneesh Kalwaniya, confirmed that the case has been registered, but authorities have not yet disclosed whether they have identified or arrested the individuals responsible for leading the slogans.

This delay in filing the FIR raises important questions about the role of law enforcement in addressing hate speech, as well as the challenges faced by the authorities in responding to such incidents swiftly. The incident also highlights the growing concern over the lack of accountability for those who incite communal hatred in public spaces, even as law enforcement has been slow to act.

While Purohit’s videos led to action against organisers, Purohit had previously shared a screenshot from X (formerly Twitter), revealing that the Mumbai police had requested the platform to take down the videos, which depicted the hate speech and violence.

Dear @MumbaiPolice: fight hate, not journalism.

Received this notice from @X about taking down my videos of Mumbai’s hate-filled #RamNavami rally.

Documenting hate is journalism. I won’t be taking down these videos.

I have asked @Support to provide me a copy of the notice. pic.twitter.com/Ef0tgpmvQV

— Kunal Purohit (@kunalpurohit) April 11, 2025

Kunal Purohit refuses to remove videos, calls out police action

In a separate development, Purohit has been at the centre of controversy over Mumbai police’s attempts to remove his posts documenting the hate speech during the Ram Navami procession. On receiving a takedown notice from X, the social media platform, Purohit took to X (formerly Twitter) to share his defiance, calling out the police’s attempt to suppress journalism. He posted:

“Dear @MumbaiPolice: fight hate, not journalism. Received this notice from @X about taking down my videos of Mumbai’s hate-filled #RamNavami rally. Documenting hate is journalism. I won’t be taking down these videos. I have asked @Support to provide me a copy of the notice.”

Purohit’s response underscores his belief that his role as a journalist is to document events like these, especially when they involve hate speech that can incite violence. He argued that removing these videos would only serve to suppress the truth and prevent the public from understanding the full extent of the rhetoric that unfolded during the procession. His decision to stand firm on this issue highlights the growing tension between the criminalisation of journalism and the need to combat hate speech in public discourse.

This episode raises important questions about the role of law enforcement and social media platforms in the fight against hate speech. While the police are tasked with taking action against hate speech, the suppression of journalism in the process could send a chilling message to those documenting and exposing hate. Purohit’s stance also draws attention to the increasingly polarised nature of media reporting in India and the potential risks faced by journalists who report on sensitive or controversial topics.

Broader Implications: Law enforcement, journalism, and free speech

The case involving the Ram Navami rally organisers and the removal of Purohit’s videos highlights the ongoing struggles between ensuring public safety and protecting journalistic freedoms. It also raises questions about the broader impact of these actions on the media landscape in India. As journalists increasingly face pressure to remove content that challenges prevailing narratives or exposes hate speech, the role of media in documenting and holding those in power accountable becomes ever more important.

At the same time, the police’s delayed action in addressing the hate speech at the Ram Navami rally — despite the presence of law enforcement officers during the event — points to a larger issue regarding the failure to curb hate speech in a timely manner. This incident serves as a reminder of the urgent need for law enforcement to take a proactive approach to tackling hate speech and promoting accountability in cases where harmful rhetoric incites violence or division.

Related:

From Protectors to Perpetrators? Police assaulted women, Children, Christian priests in Odisha: Fact-finding report

Telangana BJP MLA Raja Singh booked for threat remarks against police during Ram Navami rally: ‘I’ll hit you with the same baton’, he has several, previous FIRS on hate speech

Bombay HC directs two police commissioners to personally examine videos of speeches delivered by BJP MLA Nitesh Rana, Geeta Jain and T. Raja Singh

Another case filed against T Raja Singh as he calls for fighting war against religious conversion

The post Mumbai Police file FIR against Ram Navami rally organisers over hate speech, target journalist Kunal Purohit’s videos separately appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Reportedly, the police had raided a nearby village on reports of alleged cultivation of marijuana cultivation. This escalated to tensions and an ensuing conflict between the people and police; the police retreated back facing resistance. There was seemingly a peace compromise between both parties. Juba village is an entry to the neighbouring villages.

Key findings of the report:

1. Desecrating the Church

Preparations were on, at the Juba Church, on March 22, 2025 for the next day’s Sunday Prayers and worship. Four young Adivasi women from Kondh tribal group, two young women, 20 and 18 years old and two minors aged 12 years were among those engaged in the task. According to the report this is when police, numbering around 15 personnel, barged into the Catholic Church around 1.30 pm before the young women could sense anything. The aggressive policemen broke the cleaning instruments, and desecrated the sacred space of the Church. 

Legal and constitutional violations: It is alleged that Police entered the Catholic Church premises without a warrant and desecrated the sacred space in violation of Article 25– Right to Freedom of Religion, which includes the right to manage religious affairs and violation of sec 298 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Samhita (BNSS), 2023 – Injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult the religion. 

2. Assault, abuse, molestation of young women

The two young women belonging to the Kandh tribal group, were beaten with sticks within the Church and then dragged almost 300 meters away to a police bus, being beaten all the way. Seeing this, the two other minor girls ran for their life towards the presbytery. Crying inconsolably, and in shock, the girls asked for help from the Priests who were in their residence within the compound.

Another young woman cook, aged 38 belonging to the Sabar tribal group, who was in the Residence came out to the portico hearing the cries of the minor girls and was also beaten badly. Two male police caught hold of her neck and gave a strong blow to the face, tore the kurtis (upper clothes) of the woman pulling at the neck without any concern that they were outraging the modesty of the woman.

It is reported that even the children from an adjacent village, some of whom were in the arms of their mothers, were not spared. The children and women were taken in the bus to a distance and left there, forcing them to walk the long distance back. A couple of mobile phones were snatched from the women, and are yet to be returned to them.

Legal and constitutional violations: Beatings and molestation of tribal women occurred in and around the church compound in violation of sec 74 of BNSS – Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty and violation of art 21 and POCSO Act, 20212 given that minors were involved and in violation of art 15 (3 &4) – Prohibits discrimination and calls for affirmative protection of women and tribal communities.

3. Brutal Assaults on the two Catholic Priests

After violating the sacred space of the Catholic Church, the police followed the young girls towards the Priests’ Residence. Hearing the cries of the children and women, two Catholic Priests had come out from their residence where they had been resting after attending a funeral service in the village. In a flash, a lady police officer attacked the priest with her cane.

Father JG (name has been withheld to protect identity, age 56 is a native of Pala/ Kottayam in Kerala. He has been working for the development of tribal and Dalit communities that inhabited in the hills for last 40 years.  Father DN (name has been withheld to protect identity, a native of Gajapati district was taken aback at the assault on him by the police. Both priests were dragged in two different directions; being beaten by the police all the way to the police buses some 300 to 400 meters away. The Priests were accused of being “Pakistanis” and converting the people.  Fr. DN, who was ordained a priest only three months ago and had joined as assistant priest in the Church, was to celebrate his birthday that day. Father DN was grievously injured with a fractured shoulder blade. At one time, he fainted & fell, but was dragged on to the bus.

While the priests were being beaten, the children and women forgot their own trauma and protested to the police on why they were beating the religious men. The police then thrashed the cook for speaking up for the priests. Meanwhile, a group of police personnel also entered the presbytery, drank the water; and reportedly took away 40,000 in currency notes from the priests’ residence.

The brutal attack, led by a lady police officer apparently filled with hate, was carried on without concern for human dignity or any sense of respect toward the tribal community, and the states of the priests as religious minorities.

Legal and constitutional violations: Unprovoked assault on unarmed priests within a religious compound in violations of arts 19 (1)(a) and (d)– Right to freedom of speech and movement as well as of the Indian Police Act, 1861, Section 23 – Duty of police to prevent offences and maintain decorum.

4. Wife and minor daughter were assaulted in midst of mourning

MM (name has been withheld to protect identity)  aged 62 had lost her husband the previous night, and had just returned from the burial ground around 10.00 am; and was mourning along with her family and relatives. At the police assault, her relatives and others ran away; while she and her minor daughter RM, aged 17 years, stayed back. Both of them were beaten with sticks; the police didn’t care that this family had just buried their beloved one, and were in mourning. The widowed mother and her minor daughter were dragged physically while being abused & beaten with the lathis carried by the police to the police bus.

Legal and constitutional violations: Beating and dragging of a grieving widow and her minor daughter in sec 5 of JJ Act, 2015– Punishment for cruelty to child and violation of art 39 (e+f) – Duty of the state to protect children and ensure their development.

5. Assaults on Vulnerable Christians

The team members were told the police forcibly entered and damaged the homes of the residents; approximately 20 motorcycles were destroyed, as TV sets, whole foods supplies including rice, paddy, chickens and eggs, were destroyed.

It was evident that the police were targeting Christians as they also broke and desecrated the status of Jesus and Mary. Destruction of homes, food supplies, desecration of religious icons.

Legal and constitutional violations: All these actions are violations of Article 14 and 21- Right to Life and Equality before the Law and equal protection of laws and SCST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, sec 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), and 3(2)(vii) – Offences of insults and damage to property of Scheduled Tribes.

Our Observations:

Gajapati District is one of the lowest on the Human Development Index; in fact, ranked 27^th out of 30 districts.  Gajapati is recognised as only one among 30 districts as a minority concentrated district with 38% of Christians. Gajapati is also one of the very few districts that has above 50% tribal population. The violence hit Mohana block is one of the least developed blocks in the district and 2^nd largest block in Odisha with 37.11% female literacy rate and 93% people living in rural areas.

As per Census 2011 out of total population, 7% people live in urban areas while 93% live in the rural areas. The ST male and female literacy rates are 55.4% and 32.8% respectively

Gajapati district has the population belonging to both socially and religious ethnic minorities; at disadvantages at multiple levels. The district police and the general administration need to introspect itself of its policies/decisions vis addressing the issues of Adivasi, Dalit and religious minorities in the district in spirit of constitutional, secular and democratic values.

It is unfortunate that the incidence of this nature has taken place, where innocents suffer at the hands of the police.

1. There are no complaints so far lodged even if it is more than 20 days since brutalities against children and women from tribal communities, and violation of multiple laws
2. There is no information received by the priests on the complaints filed by the priest in Mohana police station as he has not been given any acknowledgement of the complaints. However, it is reported that complaints have also been made to the Superintendent of Police, Gajapati.
3. The grievously injured priest Fr. DN is in a state of shock and trauma along with the senior clergy. The fact that the finding tram could not interview him. There is palpable fear, insecurity and disbelief among the children, women and including the priest as the protectors have turned into perpetrators. This does not sound good for the administration.
4. This is the first time that the catholic priests are being targeted, beaten and paraded while showering lathis and abuses by the police in Odisha known history. This speaks for itself. The blatant violations of Articles 21, 25 and 29 of Indian constitution.
5. The team believes it is handiwork of some identified communally biased police personnel towards religious minorities, and / or with a casteist mind-set towards tribal groups, and with no sense of human rights and dignity for children and women; even not allowed to mourn the loss of the beloved family members with scant regards to Art 21 (Right to life & liberty, a basic dignity accorded to the dead person)
6. The team could not come across pro-active community and civil society to take note of the incidents of brutalities here and facilitate the victims’ survivors to address the grievances and seeking justice; could be ignorance or trust deficit of statutory bodies like N/OSCPCR, Women Commission, National/Odisha State Human Rights Commission/Scheduled Tribe Commission/National Commission for Minorities, New Delhi
7. Team did not get any report; or even from Media on the brutalities of incidences and attacks on the children and women.

Recommendations for the state administration

1. Identify & take stringent action against criminal elements among the police having communal and caste bias towards women, Adivasi’s and religious minorities. Immediate application of SC/ST (PoA) Act, POCSO Act, applicable sections of BNSS and Fundamental Rights enshrined in the constitution.
2. Activate community policing; recruiting police from diverse backgrounds; grounded them in laws on SC ST Prevention Act, POCSO, Women and Minority protection laws; as well inculcate the spirit of respect for all religious spaces; temples, churches and mosques
3. Train the police with constitutional and secular values & principles to respect marginalised and religious minority communities; respect for all religious traditions & beliefs. Implement Mandatory Human Rights Training for Law Enforcement under National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) protocols.
4. Focus on holistic development programmes and open legal cells to support citizen centric schemes for the region and encourage and facilitate civil society to work along the administration towards truth & reconciliation
5. The state administration should ensure that the police turned into vengeance; The police damaging the house, properties, livelihoods nor rob food supplies and livestock of the poor whose lifetime savings; thus losing trust and credibility among the citizens.
6. Needed interface between law enforcement agencies, district administration and civil/community leaders; whereby trust of the communities restored; development processes fastened
7. Media could play its role in augmenting as watchdog expected in democratic set ups bringing into light of the plight and brutalities.

Conclusion:

The aim of the report is to document and make it public in order to avoid the repeat of such incidents and bring about peace and harmony. The report based on the testimonies narrated by the victims’ survivors, whose names have been withheld.

Related:

Persecution of Christians: Women leaders appeal to President Murmu

Arunachal Christians gird up to face a challenge from Sangh and the government

Missing the Mark: Inviting PM Modi to a Christmas Reception Ignores the Plight of Persecuted Christians

The post From Protectors to Perpetrators? Police assaulted women, Children, Christian priests in Odisha: Fact-finding report appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Violent punishment by mobs to the suspects of cow slaughter was justified to either a “great” or “some” extent. Close to two in every five respondents –police personnel surveyed across 18 states — (that is a 38% of the total of 8,276 subjects) also believed this, that violent punishment by mobs to “suspects of cow slaughter” was somewhat justified. This is similar to the finding from a previous survey of police personnel published in the Status of Policing in India Report 2019 where a similar question was asked about their support for mob violence in cases of cow slaughter—35 percent of police personnel justified such mob violence (15% “to a large extent” and 20% “to some extent”) (SPIR, 2019). More than a quarter of the police personnel surveyed (see details below), who from IPS-level ranks supported mob violence to a great degree (Figure 2.8, Table 2.8)

These are only some of the worrying findings from a recent study on the ‘Status of Policing in India Report’ (SPIR 2025) conducted by Lokniti, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in collaboration with Common Cause that read together, shed light on this grim reality. The study, which analysed responses from 8, 276 police personnel across 82 locations in 17 States including Delhi, provides insights into the culture of abuse behind closed doors.

When asked if it is acceptable for the police to use violence against suspects of serious offences for the greater good of society, nearly two out of three police personnel (63%) surveyed, agreed. Of them, 22% strongly agreed and 41% moderately agreed. A notable 35% of the officers opposed the idea. Support for violence against suspected serious offenders remained consistent across ranks.

When surveyors asked policemen and women about torture, a significant number of police personnel expressed strong support for its use in interrogations across various crime categories. The highest support was for cases related to national security, such as terrorism, with 42% strongly backing torture. Over a third (34%) also strongly supported its use in cases of rape, sexual assault, and serious violent crimes such as murder (Table 2.6). Additionally, 28% strongly agreed that torture must be used against history-sheeters.

Mob violence involves targeted acts of violence perpetrated by a large group of individuals who perceive that they are administering punishment to a suspected wrongdoer, bypassing the rule of law entirely. It is very alarming that such a significant proportion of police personnel justify mob violence. For law enforcement officers to support open violence which entails suspension of the law itself, as a means of delivering so- called punishment to a person, is an absolute negation of the constitutional oath they swear to uphold. Similar to the support shown by police respondents to impermissible measures towards crime control, this significant support for mob violence signals police propensities towards violence and unbridled power. Incidents of the police not only overlooking such violence, but their active complicity have been reported on multiple occasions.[1]

Among other key findings in the over 200 page study are that

• One in 10 police personnel believes that couples displaying affection in public places should be detained!!
• More than half of the police personnel believe that hijras/transgenders/ homosexual people are a bad influence on society and the police need to deal with them strictly.

• Police personnel strongly support the use of more preventive arrests of ‘anti-social elements’ (48%) and forming special squads that can detain people indefinitely (43%). Both measures disregard legal standards.
• Twenty-percent of the police personnel feel that it is very important for the police to use tough methods to create fear amongst the public, another 35 percent think it’s somewhat important.
• One in four police personnel strongly justify mob violence in cases of sexual harassment (27%) and child lifting/kidnapping (25%). Across various categories of crime, constabulary and IPS officers are the most likely to justify mob violence, and upper subordinate officers are the least likely to do so. Police personnel from Gujarat showed the highest support, while those from Kerala showed the least support for mob violence.
• Twenty-two percent police personnel feel that the rich and powerful are “naturally prone” to committing crimes to a great extent, and 18 percent feel that Muslims are “naturally prone” to committing crimes to a great
• The survey was conducted across 17 states and UTs. State-level trends mirrored the all- India findings of the highest number of arrests in minor offences, also falling foul of the law. Police personnel in Odisha reported the highest proportion of arrests (46%) for the crimes of theft and extortion, followed by Nagaland (38%) and West Bengal (37%). The data further shows that police respondents from Punjab (60%) reported the most arrests – that is, six in every ten – against the crime of loitering and public nuisance, distantly followed by Nagaland and Maharashtra (29% and 25% respectively)
• The police responses also reveal that the highest proportions of arrests conducted for bodily crimes (such as murder, assault and kidnapping) were reported in Assam (30%), closely followed by Gujarat (28%), Maharashtra (26%) and Jharkhand (26%). Further, as per the survey, police personnel from Uttar Pradesh (UP) reported the highest proportion of arrests (25%) for crimes against women, followed by West Bengal, Jharkhand, and Madhya Pradesh in equal proportions (22% each). In terms of arrests, the official data corresponds with the survey finding that the highest proportion of arrests for crimes against women was made in UP (1,01,754, as per Crime in India 2022).
• Almost half of the police respondents believed that mob violence was justified to either “a great extent” or “some extent” in the cases of sexual harassment and assault (49%), child lifting or kidnapping (47%) and petty theft like pick-pocketing or chain-snatching (46%).

As was evident in studies conducted in previous years, anti-Muslim bias is high among police personnel with the corresponding disregard for due process and justification for mob violence. In keeping with attitudes towards contempt for due process (preventive detention, procedure during arrests), coercion (torture, a large section of policemen and the officers of law enforcement agencies appear to have communal bias in their perception about Muslims, who they believe are “naturally prone” towards committing crime to a great extent. This is yet another finding of the “Status of Policing in India Report-2025” (SPIR), released in New Delhi recently, which has pointed to a clear display of prejudices among the police personnel.

In this extensive survey and analysis, the SPIR-2025 has explored the nature, causes and factors that contribute to the perpetuation of police violence and torture in the country. It seeks to understand the police’s attitudes towards torture and the normalisation of its use and includes the perspectives and experiences of other accountability actors, such as doctors, lawyers, and judges.

Previous studies may be read here and here.

In the study, a large number of police personnel in Delhi, Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Gujarat believe that Muslims have been analysed as naturally prone towards committing crime to a great extent. One in every five (19%) among the Hindu police personnel feels that to a “great extent”, Muslims are naturally prone to commit crimes, while one-thirds (34%) feel the same to “some extent”, while Sikh police officers were least likely to hold this opinion.

Out of the surveyed states, more than two-thirds of the police personnel in the states of Rajasthan (70%), Maharashtra (68%), Madhya Pradesh (68%), West Bengal (68%), Gujarat (67%) and Jharkhand (66%) held the opinion that the Muslim community is likely to be naturally inclined to committing crime to either a “great” or “some” extent. Police personnel from Delhi (39%) were most likely to believe that Muslims are naturally prone to committing crimes, followed closely by Rajasthan (35%), Maharashtra (34%) and Gujarat (34%).

The study also found that caste, religion, and political affiliation often play a decisive role in shaping the outlook of the police perception and influencing their actions. This bias not only shapes initial interactions but can also affect decisions on investigation, enforcement, and legal proceedings. The report according to the parameters of the study published in the report, surveyed a broad spectrum of law enforcement personnel, including constables, upper subordinate officers ranging from assistant sub-inspectors to deputy superintendents of police, and senior officials from the Indian Police Service (IPS).

The SPIR-2025 pointed out that Muslims are identified as one of the marginalised communities which are common targets of torture. Academic scholarship cited in the report suggested that torture tactics employed by the police against Muslim men suspected of terrorism deliberately target their religious identity and masculinity to humiliate the entire community.

Police respondents in states with harsh cow slaughter laws, such as Gujarat, Odisha, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra, showed high support for mob punishment in such cases. Besides, despite a significant proportion of police personnel believing that Muslims are predisposed to crime, a considerable percentage also perceive that Muslims are likely to get justice to a “great extent”.

Meanwhile however, the study also cautions that these are the police’s perceptions, which may be marred by pre-existing biases and could be contrary to the lived realities of Muslims. Independent analysis of prison statistics indicates the over-incarceration of Muslims, suggesting potential biases within the criminal justice system.

Disregard for due process

The report also highlights a significant disregard for the rule of law among a notable section of the police. Nearly one-third (28%) of police personnel believe the criminal justice system is too weak and slow, with a preference for extrajudicial measures over due process. Alarmingly, almost two out of five (38%) feel that for minor offences, police should give minor punishment instead of following legal trials.

One in four police personnel strongly justified mob violence in cases of sexual harassment (27%) and child lifting or kidnapping (25%). This suggests that about a fourth of India’s police personnel support the idea of the mobs acting as the judge, jury and executioner in matters they consider grave.

Across various categories of crime, constabulary and IPS officers are the most likely to justify mob violence, and upper subordinate officers are the least likely to do so. Police personnel from Gujarat showed the highest support, while those from Kerala showed the least support for mob violence.

Ignorance, lack of compliance for legal procedures

There also appeared to be a lack of compliance towards arrest procedures across states, according to the study. Only 41% of police personnel said these procedures were “always followed”, while 21% admitted to “rarely” or “never” complying with them. Karnataka fared the worst, with a staggering 70% of its officials acknowledging they “rarely” or “never” follow prescribed procedures, while Kerala police demonstrated the highest compliance, with 94% of officials adhering to proper arrest protocols.

Gujarat: high bias against marginalised

In Gujarat, police exhibited the highest level of bias in their perception of Dalits and Adivasis, who they believed were “naturally inclined to commit crimes”. Among its personnel, 68% hold this view about Dalits, while 56% believe the same about Adivasis. Among Delhi’s police, which comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs, a worrying 62% believe that Muslims are more “naturally inclined” towards crime.

About 30% of police personnel said that ‘third-degree methods’ are justified towards the accused in serious criminal cases, while 9% said they are justified in petty offences. IPS officers and those respondents who often conduct interrogations are the most likely to justify the use of third-degree methods. Besides, 11% of the police personnel feel that hitting or slapping family members of the accused is absolutely justified, and 30% said that it is sometimes justified.

Interviewees said that the victims of torture are mainly people from poor and marginalised communities. A lawyer described it as “all the faceless and voiceless” are targeted. The following groups are the common targets of torture: Muslims, Dalits, Adivasis, people who cannot read and write, and slum dwellers.

The report concluded with a strong call for strengthening institutional safeguards and fostering a greater commitment to the rule of law within the police force. It recommended more active engagement and interaction between Judicial Magistrates and arrested persons, along with ensuring medical examinations during custody. The study also underscored the urgent need for more comprehensive and consistent data collection on police torture and custodial violence.

How the police view and even justify custodial torture

Police personnel were also asked how justified is the use of certain coercive and violent acts towards the accused so that criminal cases can be solved. The data reveals a troubling acceptance of coercive tactics, ranging from verbal abuse and threats to slapping and third-degree methods. Nearly

Almost half (49%) said that verbally abusing or threatening suspects in cases of minor offences such as theft is justified, with 32% endorsing slapping and 9% even supporting the use of third-degree methods. Support for such violent methods increased dramatically in cases of serious crimes. Three in ten (30%) police personnel justified third-degree methods in cases such as rape and murder, while half (50%) approved of slapping suspects and more than half (55%) endorsed verbal abuse or threats.

Threats and slapping or using light force are common. About a quarter (26%) of police personnel said that suspects are threatened often, while 34% said that this happens sometimes. Similarly, nearly two in 10 (18%) said that slapping or using light force is common, with 28% saying it happens occasionally.

Regarding third-degree methods, one in 10 police personnel admitted that such extreme violence occurs often, and 16% said it happens sometimes. Additionally, one in three respondents reported that investigating officers frequently use coercive tactics.

The findings reveal that close to half, that is nearly four in 10 police personnel believe that reporting of custodial torture should be mandatory, while a similar proportion supported it being mandatory in some cases. Around one in 10 felt it should never be mandatory. While a majority supported mandatory reporting, the fact that the largest group favoured it only ‘sometimes’ suggests a level of hesitation or conditional acceptance. The data also shows that officers at the police station level favour mandatory reporting more than their senior counterparts.

When asked if junior police personnel would feel comfortable fi ling a complaint against their seniors for the use of violence, provided legal protection, over four in 10 of police respondents strongly agreed, while 36% agreed moderately.

Seventy percent of police personnel who have a high propensity to justify torture also believe that training on the prevention of torture is very important. (Table 6.8)

The entire report may be read here

Sabrangindia and Communalism Combat before that, have been assiduously analysing and campaigning around the issue of both representation of Indian Muslims in the police force and administration and also the attitudes of men in uniform Vis a Vis India’s largest minority.

An introduction to the Justice BN Srikrishna Commission Report into the Bombay 1992-1993 brute anti-minority pogrom published an introduction by journalist, educationist and activist, Teesta Setalvad. She has researched the various judicial commission reports into anti-minority violence. This section. Anti-Minority Bias in the Police Force may be read here. Ex-IPS officer, KS Subramanian’s essay ‘Babri Masjid 1992 – Gujarat 2002 – Kashmir 2016: How the Sangh Parivar has wrecked India’s secular social fabric by sustained anti-minority violence’ may be read here.

In February 1995, in the cover story of Communalism Combat (www.sabrang.com) Vibhuti Narain Rai gave an interview that turned the searchlight within, on the Indian Police Force. Setalvad had met him at the National PoliceAcademy where I had been asked to become part of a training given my work in the post Babri-Masjid demolition Bombay violence. In this explosive interview he had argued, cogently and with statistics about the deep-rooted bias within the Indian police. “No riot can continue for more than 24 hours unless the state wants it to continue,” he had said in an interview, that, after it appeared in the February 1995 issue of Communalism Combat was reproduced by 35 Indian publications in different languages. This seminal interview may be read here.

This poor representation of various sections of India’s marginalised, make it almost impossible for the social issues and crimes most plaguing the country today, to be taken seriously by the police. In fact, one witnesses that in many instances the police collude with the majoritarian community, namely Upper caste class Hindu male to perpetuate even more violence on those who are already persecuted.

Though some progressive judgments such as the one in which the SC upholds Karnataka law on Reservations in Promotions for Govt. employees provide a glimmer of hope, the implementation on the ground remains questionable.

[1] See civil society reports on mob lynching that document police apathy and complicity in cases (Citizens Against Hate, 2018 and Human Rights Watch, 2019).

Related:

Anti–minority bias in the Indian Police
Mayhem in Malegaon: A fact-finding team of human rights activists and lawyers that visited riot-hit Malegaon returns with disturbing evidence of a “complete communal-isation of the police and paramilitary forces”
Local Jharkand Police Used Communal Slogans: NCM on Latehar Hangings
Controversy: DIG claims he never said ‘Muslims follow religion of terrorists’

The post Mob violence, police torture justifiable practices feel a significant section of India’s police: Study appeared first on SabrangIndia.