By an opinion dated November 27, 2025, Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 5, Goalpara, presided over by Member N.K. Nath, declared that Anowara Khatun is an Indian citizen, answering the reference made by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Goalpara, in the negative.

The order brings to a close the said proceedings that originated over two decades ago and highlights persistent structural issues in Assam’s citizenship determination framework, particularly its impact on poor and marginalized women.

Team CJP Assam sits to discuss the case with Anowara Khatun and family outside their home in Assam

From IMDT to Foreigners’ Tribunal: A case born of institutional suspicion

Anowara’s case originated as far back as 2004, when the Superintendent of Police (Border), Goalpara referred her name under the now-defunct Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, alleging that she had illegally entered India between 1966 and 1971. The referral admitted that the “doubt” arose because she could not immediately produce documents during verification — a familiar and deeply flawed basis used against the poor and illiterate.

Following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India (2005), which struck down the IMDT Act as unconstitutional, Anowara’s case was mechanically transferred to Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 5, Goalpara under the Foreigners Act, 1946, shifting the entire burden of proof onto her under Section 9.

Who is Anowara Khatun?

Anowara Khatun was born and raised in Kharda Manikpur (also recorded as Kharija Manikpur), Goalpara, Assam. She is the daughter of Late Alom Shah, a lifelong resident of Assam, and Korimon Nessa, and the granddaughter of Late Rose Mamud Shah. Documentary evidence showed that her father, Alom Shah, purchased land in Assam in 1947, 1952, and 1959. His name, along with that of Anowara’s mother, appears in the electoral rolls of 1966 and 1970, demonstrating their presence in Assam prior to the relevant cut-off dates.

Anowara studied up to Lower Primary level at Majgaon LP School, married Saiful Hussain of Mamudpur Part-I, and later settled in Sidhabari Part-II, where she has lived for decades. She first voted in 1985, and her name consistently appears in electoral rolls for 1985, 1997, 2005, 2011, and 2015.

Despite this, she was eventually marked a “D-Voter”, stripped of voting rights, and subjected to relentless suspicion — a fate shared by thousands of Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam.

Her personal circumstances make the cruelty of this process even more stark. Anowara suffers from mental imbalance and chronic health issues, lives in extreme poverty, has no proper bedding, and struggles daily for food and medical care. She and her husband survive on daily labour, entirely unequipped to navigate a legal system designed to break the poor.

CJP Steps In: Building a case where the State saw only suspicion

Recognising the grave injustice involved, Assam Team CJP took up Anowara’s case, committing to pursue it despite the enormous evidenti and procedural hurdles.

On behalf of Anowara, Advocate Ashim Mubarak, assisted by Advocate Shofior Rahman, and supported by CJP’s para-legal and community teams, presented a meticulous defence before the Tribunal.

Four defence witnesses were examined:

• DW-1: Anowara Khatun herself
• DW-2: Her brother, Kurban Ali
• DW-3: Her sister, Ambia Bibi
• DW-4: The Land Record Assistant, Matia Revenue Circle

CJP placed before the Tribunal a comprehensive documentary trail, including:

• Three registered land sale deeds executed in 1947, 1952, and 1959 in her father’s name
• Electoral rolls of 1966 and 1970, recording her parents as Indian voters
• Subsequent voter lists (1979, 1985, 1997, 2005, 2011, 2015) showing uninterrupted electoral presence
• Jamabandi and citha records proving inheritance of ancestral land in Assam

The Tribunal explicitly accepted that the land deeds were over 30 years old and required no further proof, and relied heavily on the voter lists of 1966 and 1970 to establish her father’s citizenship.

Even when Anowara’s deteriorating mental health made her continued presence difficult, CJP persisted with evidence and arguments, ensuring the case did not collapse under procedural cruelty.

Anowara Khatun with her husband and CJP Team Assam outside her home in Assam

The Tribunal’s Finding: Citizenship proven, suspicion rejected

After a detailed appreciation of evidence, the Tribunal held that:

• Alom Shah, Anowara’s father, was conclusively established as an Indian citizen, present in Assam since at least 1947
• Anowara, being his daughter, cannot be treated as a foreigner
• The state failed to rebut the overwhelming documentary record

The reference was therefore answered in the negative, and Anowara Khatun was declared not a foreigner, with directions issued to inform the Superintendent of Police (Border), Goalpara.

Anowara Khatun holding up the FT order outside her home in Assam

A system designed to break the poor

Anowara Khatun’s case is not an aberration — it is a window into a larger architecture of state oppression. Instruments such as D-Voter tagging, Foreigners’ Tribunals, NRC, detention camps, “push-backs,” the Passport Act, SR and SIR exercises operate together to produce statelessness among workers, farmers, minorities, and Bengali-speaking communities.

Assam has long served as a pilot project for citizenship stripping, but the same logic is now visible across India. Behind this bureaucratic machinery lie document-wars, midnight detentions, suicides, custodial deaths, and families torn apart — all in the name of identifying “Bangladeshis.”

India’s constitutional promise of secularism, dignity, and equality collapses when impoverished citizens are tortured for papers they were never equipped to preserve.

CJP’s Role: Law as resistance

At a time when the Chief Minister of Assam openly targets Muslims, spreads communal suspicion, and legitimises exclusion under the rhetoric of “illegal migration,” CJP continues to fight case by case, restoring citizenship through evidence, law, and persistence.

In the first week of February, members of Team CJP — State In-Charge Nanda Ghosh, DVM Goalpara Zeshmin Sultana, Community Volunteer Hasunir Rahman, and Office Driver Ashikul Hussain — stood by Anowara and her family, reaffirming that justice is not charity, but resistance.

Anowara Khatun’s victory is not just hers. It is a reminder that citizenship in India is increasingly something the poor must fight to prove, and that without sustained legal intervention, countless others will disappear into detention camps, deportation attempts, or silent graves.

This case stands as another testament to what determined legal solidarity can achieve — even in the face of a system designed to erase.

The complete order may be read here.

Related:

CJP flags Zee News broadcast ‘Kalicharan Maharaj vs 4 Maulanas’ for communal framing before NBDSA

The case of “pushback” of Doyjan Bibi and the quiet normalisation of undocumented deportations

Communal Dog-Whistles in an Election Season: CJP flags hate speech by BJP’s Ameet Satam to election authorities

From Hate Speech to State Action: How communal vigilantism at Malabar Hill continues unchecked

The post From D-Voter Tagging to Citizenship Declaration: Anowara Khatun’s case before the foreigners’ tribunal appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Hearing a petition filed by Khan’s 69-year-old mother, Mehrunissa Shamim Khan, a division bench of Justices Anil Kilor and Raj Wakode observed that the demolition appeared, prima facie, to have been carried out without adhering to binding procedural safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court of India. The civic body has been directed to file a clear response by March 4 stating whether it will reconstruct the structure or offer monetary compensation.

The question posed by the bench was pointed: if due process was not followed, how will the State repair the damage?

The Demolition: Swift action, lasting consequences

Fahim Khan, 38, was arrested following communal violence that broke out on March 17, 2025 in Nagpur’s Mahal area. The unrest followed alleged inflammatory remarks concerning the tomb of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar.

Within days of Khan’s arrest, the NMC issued notices under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and demolished his three-storey residence in Sanjaybagh Colony on March 25, 2025. Although an urgent plea was moved before the high court and a stay was granted by a bench led by Justice Nitin Sambre, the structure had already been razed by the time the interim protection came into effect.

The demolition left the family without shelter. They have maintained that no meaningful opportunity to respond was provided and that the property had secured necessary permissions as early as 2003, with no objections raised for over two decades.

Khan, who had contested the 2024 Lok Sabha election against Union minister Nitin Gadkari, denies the riot allegations and claims the action was arbitrary. Of the more than 120 persons arrested in the riots case, a majority have since been granted bail or anticipatory bail.

Supreme Court’s anti-demolition safeguards

The high court proceedings turn crucially on a November 13, 2024 judgment of the Supreme Court of India delivered by a bench led by former Chief Justice Bhushan Gavai. In that ruling, the apex court categorically held that demolitions cannot be used as a punitive measure merely because a person is accused in a criminal case.

The Supreme Court mandated:

• Issuance of prior notice,
• A minimum of 15 days to respond,
• Strict adherence to statutory procedure independent of criminal proceedings.

Detailed report may be read here.

Counsel for the petitioner argued that the March 21, 2025 notice violated these safeguards and that the demolition amounted to unconstitutional executive overreach.

Notably, during earlier hearings, Nagpur Municipal Commissioner Abhijeet Chaudhari tendered an unconditional apology before the high court, stating that officials were unaware of the Supreme Court’s specific directions governing demolitions in such contexts.

More Than One House: A constitutional test

While the immediate dispute concerns a single property, the implications extend far beyond Sanjaybagh Colony.

The court’s framing of the issue — rebuild or compensate — shifts the discourse from mere procedural lapse to state accountability. If the demolition is ultimately found to have violated Supreme Court guidelines, the remedy may not be limited to declaratory relief. Reconstruction or financial compensation would signal judicial willingness to impose tangible consequences for executive overreach.

The case also reopens the broader national debate around so-called “bulldozer action,” where demolition drives have followed criminal accusations, particularly in communally sensitive contexts. Courts across the country have repeatedly underscored that urban planning enforcement cannot morph into retributive punishment.

At stake are foundational constitutional principles:

• Article 14 — equality before the law and protection against arbitrary state action,
• Article 21 — protection of life and personal liberty, which judicial interpretation has long held to include the right to shelter and dignity,
• The doctrine of due process, which restrains executive discretion.

If municipalities are permitted to demolish properties immediately after arrests without strict procedural compliance, the line between law enforcement and punishment blurs dangerously.

The March 4 hearing will likely determine whether the NMC acknowledges procedural violations and what corrective mechanism it proposes. The court may require compensation, order reconstruction, or lay down further guidelines to ensure compliance with Supreme Court directions.

Whatever the outcome, the case is poised to become a benchmark in assessing the enforceability of anti-bulldozer jurisprudence. A clear order mandating restoration or compensation would reinforce that constitutional safeguards are not advisory — they are binding. Conversely, a weak remedy could dilute the deterrent effect of the Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling.

Related:

Hate Crime: Abdul Naeem’s school built with private money on his land demolished by bulldozers in Madhya Pradesh

When the Rule of the Bulldozer Outpaces the Rule of Law: One year after this landmark judgment

From Words to Bulldozers: How a Chief Minister’s rhetoric triggered and normalised punitive policing in Bareilly

“Bulldozer Justice” rebuked: Orissa High Court orders 10 lakh compensation for illegal demolition of community centre

Bulldozer Justice: you can’t just roll in with bulldozers and demolish homes overnight: SC

“Bulldozer barbarism”: Demolition drive in Surat after stones thrown at Ganesh pandal

The post Rebuild or Compensate: Nagpur HC confronts NMC over ‘bulldozer’ demolition in riot case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The order delivered by Hon’ble Justice Pankaj Bhatia on 9 February 2026 in Application under Section 528 BNSS No. 1980 of 2025, Kamalesh Agnihotri @ Kamal & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh is one such intervention. What begins as a seemingly mundane disagreement over parking regulations and penalties within a residential society unfolds into a judicial inquiry into the ethics of investigation, the limits of criminal process, and the constitutional dangers inherent in its misuse.

The Court’s judgment is not confined to resolving a private dispute. It undertakes a careful and methodical examination of whether allegations of extortion and harassment levelled against the Resident Welfare Association (RWA) could, in law, attract offences under Sections 308(2), 351(2) and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. In doing so, the Court situates the controversy within a larger constitutional framework, reaffirming that criminal law must remain an instrument of justice—not a device for coercion, intimidation, or personal score-settling.

What lends the judgment its distinctive moral force is the Court’s concluding observation: “With great powers come great responsibility.” This is not a rhetorical flourish. It is directed squarely at Opposite Party No. 2, who sought to invoke his association with the RSS, a highly disciplined cultural organisation, to browbeat elected members of the RWA. The Court censures this conduct, noting that the misuse of institutional affiliation not only corrodes democratic functioning at the grassroots but also brings disrepute to the organisation itself. While the Court consciously refrains from entering into questions of the RSS’s internal discipline, its message is unequivocal-no institutional or social association can confer license to misuse the criminal process. In this sense, the judgment transcends technical adjudication and enters the realm of ethical responsibility in public life.

The decision is further strengthened by its engagement with a formidable body of Supreme Court jurisprudence, making it a veritable treatise for students and practitioners of criminal law—each authority cited deserving close reading, particularly by younger members of the Bar.

Drawing from State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma (1992 Supp (1) SCC 222), the Court reiterates that investigation is a search for truth, not a quest for convictions. Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254 is relied upon to emphasize impartiality and to caution against investigative harassment. In Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali (2013) 5 SCC 762, fair investigation is defined as one that is unbiased and truth-oriented, while Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI (2013) 6 SCC 348 underscores the need to balance the rights of the accused with those of the victim.

The Court invokes Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary (2014) 2 SCC 532 to reaffirm that an investigation is fundamentally a quest for truth, and uses Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat (2014) 4 SCC 626 to stress that the criminal justice system must ensure that no innocent person suffers. The constitutional imperative of police impartiality, articulated in Rajiv Singh v. State of Bihar (2015) 16 SCC 369, and is reinforced alongside the warning issued in Suresh Chandra Jana v. State of West Bengal (2017) 16 SCC 466 against perfunctory and mechanical investigations. The judgment also draws upon Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab (2009) 1 SCC 441 to affirm fair investigation as a fundamental right, and Azija Begum v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 3 SCC 126 to link it directly with the guarantee of equality under Article 14.

Ultimately, the judgment stands as a cautionary marker in a time when the boundary between grievance and vendetta is increasingly blurred. It reiterates that criminal law is neither an instrument of intimidation nor a shortcut to settle civil or social disputes, and certainly not a weapon to be sanctified by invoking proximity to power or institutional affiliation. For investigating agencies, it is a reminder that fairness is not a procedural luxury but a constitutional obligation. For individuals, it is a warning that stature—real or claimed—cannot legitimize abuse of process. And for advocates, students of law, academics, and judges alike, this decision endures as a moral and constitutional compass, demonstrating how procedural fairness, judicial restraint, and ethical responsibility must together anchor the criminal justice system.

About Author

Advocate Syed Mohammad Haider Rizvi

Advocate Syed Mohammad Haider Rizvi is an alumnus of Jamia Millia Islamia (1998) and a Gold Medallist in LL.M. from Lucknow University. An advocate with extensive experience working with government departments, PSUs, and corporate organisations, he is widely known for his public-interest litigation, including a landmark case protecting Lucknow’s cultural heritage. He played a key role in introducing online RTI processes in Uttar Pradesh and in amending the Allahabad High Court’s 10-day bail rule. He is currently pursuing doctoral research on Right to Life and Personal Liberty under RTI.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post When Criminal Law Becomes a Weapon: Justice Bhatia’s Reminder on Power, Process and Fairness appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At the centre of this legal moment is Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, whose public utterances over the last five years—now exhaustively catalogued before the Court—are alleged to represent not isolated political rhetoric but a sustained pattern of communal vilification, exclusionary exhortation, and legitimisation of social and economic discrimination against Muslims, particularly Bengali-origin Muslims in Assam.

The petitions—filed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), CPI leader Annie Raja, a group of twelve citizens comprising former IAS, IFS officers, diplomats, academics and civil society actors, and Islamic clerics’ body Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind—seek criminal accountability, independent investigation, and for the first time, judicially enforceable standards governing the speech of constitutional functionaries.

“Point Blank Shot”, “No Mercy”: The video that triggered urgency

The immediate trigger for the CPIM and Annie Raja petitions is a video uploaded on February 7, 2026, from the official X (formerly Twitter) handle of BJP Assam.

The video depicts Chief Minister Sarma firing a gun at animated images of two men shown within a crosshair, portrayed as Muslims. As the gun discharges, the figures are struck repeatedly. The visuals are overlaid with phrases such as “Point blank shot” and “No mercy”, culminating in slogans that read:

• “Foreigner-free Assam”
• “Community, land, roots first”
• “Why did you go to Pakistan”
• “No forgiveness for Bangladeshis”

The video ends with a stylised, cowboy-like portrait of the Chief Minister himself.

Although the video was deleted following widespread outrage, the petition stresses that it continues to circulate widely, amplified by unofficial accounts and political messaging networks. The petition describes it as the most explicit and violent crystallisation of an already entrenched political narrative, one that frames an entire community as legitimate targets of exclusion and hostility.

Urgent mentioning before the Supreme Court

Senior Advocate Nizam Pasha mentioned the CPIM and Annie Raja petitions before Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, seeking urgent listing.

“We seek urgent intervention of this Court with respect to disturbing speeches made by the sitting Chief Minister of Assam. Complaints have been filed, but no FIRs have been registered,” Pasha submitted, as per LiveLaw, specifically referring to the February 7 video and earlier speeches.

The Chief Justice remarked that electoral seasons increasingly see political disputes entering constitutional courts, observing that “part of the elections is fought inside the Supreme Court.” However, the Court indicated that it would examine the matter and grant a date.

Details of the petition filed by the CPIM

1. Not an Isolated Video: A five-year pattern of exclusionary speech

Crucially, the petitions insist that the February 7 video cannot be viewed in isolation.

The CPIM petition places before the Court a detailed chronology stretching from 2021 to February 2026, documenting a steady escalation in the Chief Minister’s public rhetoric. These include statements that allegedly:

• Conflate illegal immigration with Muslim identity
• Repeatedly deploy the slur “Miya” to refer to Bengali-speaking Muslims
• Call for denial of land, employment, transport, and livelihoods
• Advocate social and economic boycott framed as “civil disobedience”
• Encourage harassment through electoral roll objections
• Suggest removal of voting rights for members of a religious community

One of the most striking passages cited urges citizens to create conditions in which Muslims “cannot stay in Assam” by denying them rickshaws, shops, vehicles and land. Another openly exhorts supporters to short-pay rickshaw pullers belonging to the targeted community so that they are compelled to leave.

The petition argues that when such statements emanate from the head of the elected executive, they do not remain rhetorical—they acquire coercive force, shaping behaviour on the ground.

2. From Speech to Social Harm: “Acting on the CM’s directions”

What distinguishes these petitions from earlier hate speech challenges is the emphasis on documented social consequences.

The CPIM petition cites reports of daily-wage workers being harassed, rickshaw pullers being deliberately underpaid, and individuals being confronted and asked to vacate neighbourhoods for being “Bangladeshi Muslims.” In several instances, videos circulating online allegedly show perpetrators explicitly stating that they are acting in accordance with the Chief Minister’s directions.

The petition warns that this marks a dangerous constitutional threshold: the translation of executive rhetoric into informal, decentralised enforcement by citizens, blurring the line between State authority and vigilante conduct.

3. Immigration, NRC and the charge of deliberate conflation

A central legal argument advanced is that the Chief Minister’s rhetoric deliberately collapses the distinction between illegal immigration and Muslim identity.

The CPIM petitions point out that immigration is religion-neutral under Indian law, and that NRC data demonstrates that a majority of those excluded were non-Muslims. The selective focus on Muslims, therefore, is argued to expose the communal intent underlying the speeches.

What is framed publicly as demographic anxiety or border security, the petition contends, operates in effect as religious profiling and collective punishment, incompatible with Articles 14, 15 and 21.

4. Constitutional oath and misfeasance in public office

The CPIM petition anchors its challenge in the constitutional oath taken by ministers to uphold sovereignty, integrity, fraternity and equality.

Relying on decisions such as Manoj Narula v Union of India, State of Maharashtra v SS Chavan and Daulatmal Jain, the petition argues that repeated, deliberate use of State authority to stigmatise and exclude a community constitutes misfeasance in public office and a breach of constitutional trust.

The petition further invokes the Supreme Court’s continuing mandamus in the hate speech batch (Qurban Ali, Shaheen Abdulla), which mandates suo motu registration of FIRs in cases attracting Sections 153A, 153B, 295A and 505 IPC (now reflected in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita). The complete absence of FIRs, despite repeated complaints, is characterised as systemic executive impunity.

5. Reliefs Sought: FIRs, SIT, transfer of investigation

Given that the alleged offender is a sitting Chief Minister, the petition seeks:

• Mandatory registration of FIRs under the BNS
• Constitution of an independent Special Investigation Team
• Transfer of all related investigations to an independent authority

The petition argues that State and Central agencies cannot reasonably be expected to act independently when the subject of investigation occupies the apex of political power.

Other petitions filed

1. A Parallel Constitutional Question: Who regulates the speech of the powerful?

Running alongside the CPIM petition is a broader writ petition filed by twelve citizens—former civil servants, diplomats, academics and public intellectuals—which raises a distinct but connected constitutional concern: the complete absence of standards governing the public speech of constitutional authorities.

As per LiveLaw, this petition highlights not only the Assam CM’s remarks on “Miya Muslims,” “flood jihad,” “love jihad,” and voter removal, but also similar patterns across states and offices—references to “land jihad,” “infiltrators,” “anti-nationals,” and exhortations to “avenge history.”

The petition argues that while individual statements may fall short of statutory hate speech thresholds, their cumulative effect corrodes constitutional morality, erodes fraternity, and legitimises discriminatory governance.

Drawing on Navtej Singh Johar, Joseph Shine, and Government of NCT of Delhi, the petition contends that constitutional morality must operate as a restraint on those who exercise public power.

“Holders of public office are not ordinary speakers,” the petition emphasises. Their words carry the imprimatur of the State, shape administrative behaviour, and have a chilling effect on vulnerable communities—even absent explicit incitement.

The petition seeks declaratory relief that official speech must conform to constitutional values, and urges the Court to lay down guidelines that regulate conduct without curtailing free speech. Detailed report may be read here.

2. Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind: Hate speech, disguised and normalised

Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind has reinforced these concerns by flagging Sarma’s January 27 statement that four to five lakh “Miya voters” would be removed during electoral roll revision.

According to the report of LiveLaw, the clerics’ body argues that many such utterances function as disguised hate speech, escaping prosecution due to selective enforcement and unchecked police discretion.

Relying on India Hate Lab data, Jamiat notes a 74% rise in hate speech incidents in 2024, with nearly 98% targeting Muslims, and links this surge to rising hate crimes against minorities.

A Common Grievance: Police inaction and the charge of selective enforcement

Across petitions, a common grievance emerges: law enforcement’s pick-and-choose approach.

While FIRs are swiftly registered against minorities, complaints against powerful public officials remain unattended. This, the petitioners argue, violates Article 14 and hollow out the rule of law.

Invoking Lalita Kumari, Tehseen Poonawalla, Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan and Kaushal Kishore, petitioners urge the Court to exercise its powers under Article 142 to impose binding accountability mechanisms.

A constitutional crossroads

Taken together, these petitions force the Supreme Court to confront a profound constitutional dilemma:

• Can holders of constitutional office weaponise speech without consequence?
• Does repetitive exclusionary rhetoric itself constitute unconstitutional governance?
• Can constitutional morality be judicially enforced against executive speech?
• When does silence and inaction by institutions become complicity?

With judgment reserved in the broader hate speech matter, the Assam CM petitions may well shape the next doctrinal chapter on hate speech, executive accountability, and the constitutional limits of political power.

Related:

When Genocide is provoked from the Stage: Raebareli hate speeches, Bhagalpur dog whistles, and a delayed FIR

The Politics of Processions: How the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra amplified hate speech in plain sight

The Orchestrated Extremism: An analysis of communal hate speech in India’s election cycle (2024–2025)

CJP urges NCM action against hate speech campaign vilifying Bengali Muslims as ‘Infiltrators’

‘Islamophobia dominates Indian hate speech’: Equality Labs report on Facebook India

The post Supreme Court asked to intervene as petitions flag “normalisation of hate” in Assam CM’s public speeches appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Wangchuk was detained on September 26, 2025, under the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA), following weeks of protests in Ladakh demanding statehood and Sixth Schedule protection—a movement that later spiralled into violence, leading to the deaths of four civilians.

A Bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice P. B. Varale is hearing the Article 32 habeas corpus petition filed by Wangchuk’s wife, Dr Gitanjali Angmo, which challenges the legality of his continued detention. Proceedings have been closely tracked by LiveLaw and other media.

Union’s core defence

1. Court’s review is procedural, not substantive

Opening arguments for the Union, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta emphasised that judicial scrutiny in preventive detention matters is narrowly circumscribed. The Court, he argued, is not entitled to examine whether the detention was “justified”, but only whether statutory and constitutional procedures were followed so as to ensure fairness to the detenue.

Mehta relied on established precedent to submit that once the detaining authority records subjective satisfaction, courts must exercise restraint.

He further underscored the “inbuilt safeguards” within the NSA:

• The District Magistrate’s detention order must be confirmed by the State Government; and
• The detenue has a right to make a representation before an Advisory Board headed by a former High Court judge.

Crucially, Mehta pointed out that Wangchuk has not independently challenged either the confirmation order or the Advisory Board’s opinion, a submission clearly aimed at narrowing the scope of judicial interference.

2. Dispute Over Supply of Materials: Union calls allegations an “afterthought”

Responding to the petitioner’s contention that four video clips relied upon in the detention order were not supplied to Wangchuk, Mehta rejected the claim as factually incorrect and a belated fabrication.

According to the Union, the service of the detention order itself took nearly four hours, during which a senior police officer personally went through each page of the grounds and the video material, a process that was videographed.

“The DIG Ladakh sits with him, shows him every page, every clip, and asks if he is satisfied. He answers in the affirmative,” Mehta told the Court, offering to place the recording on record if required.

3. “Borrowed satisfaction” argument rejected

When the Bench raised the argument that the detention order was based on borrowed or mechanically reproduced material, Mehta countered that this misunderstands the nature of preventive detention.

He argued that a District Magistrate is not expected to personally witness each incident but is entitled—indeed required—to rely on inputs placed before him by law enforcement agencies to arrive at subjective satisfaction.

“What the authority must assess is the speech as a whole,” Mehta said, warning against isolating references to non-violence or Gandhian philosophy while ignoring the allegedly inflammatory core.

4. Union alleges “hope for riot-like situation” in Ladakh

The centrepiece of the Union’s case lies in its reading of Wangchuk’s speeches. According to Mehta, Wangchuk deliberately invoked foreign protest movements to emotionally mobilise young people in Ladakh—a region that shares borders with volatile and geopolitically sensitive areas.

He referred to Wangchuk’s alleged references to:

• Nepal’s youth-led protests,
• Political upheavals in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and
• The Arab Spring, where multiple governments were overthrown following mass unrest.

“What is the relevance of Nepal and Ladakh?” Mehta asked. “You are not addressing Gen-Z in isolation—you are hoping for a Nepal-like situation.”

The Solicitor General dismissed Wangchuk’s invocation of Mahatma Gandhi as a rhetorical façade. “Gandhi was resisting an imperial power. He was not instigating violence against his own democratic government,” Mehta argued.

5. Alleged security concerns and references to self-immolation

The Union further alleged that Wangchuk attempted to create distance between civilians and Indian security forces by lamenting the deployment of armed personnel in Ladakh.

“Security forces become ‘they’, and the people become ‘we’—this is dangerous in a border region,” Mehta submitted.

The most serious allegation concerned Wangchuk’s references to self-immolation, drawn from the Arab Spring narrative.

“This is an invitation to bloodshed,” Mehta claimed, arguing that such examples could incite impressionable youth to extreme and irreversible acts.

Petitioner’s response

1. Non-consideration of crucial exculpatory material

On behalf of the petitioner, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal mounted a systematic dismantling of the detention order in earlier hearings.

Sibal argued that the September 24 speech, in which Wangchuk broke his hunger strike and publicly appealed for peace after violence erupted, was the most proximate and relevant material—yet was never placed before the detaining authority.

Its suppression, he argued, vitiates the very foundation of subjective satisfaction, particularly when the speech was publicly available and known to authorities.

2. Failure to supply relied-upon materials violates Article 22(5)

Sibal further submitted that four key videos, explicitly relied upon in the detention order, were never supplied to Wangchuk along with the grounds of detention, in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 8 of the NSA.

Without access to the complete material, Wangchuk was denied the right to make an effective representation—not merely before the Advisory Board, but also before the government itself.

3. Section 5A cannot rescue a composite detention order

Rejecting the Union’s reliance on Section 5A of the NSA, Sibal argued that the provision applies only where distinct and independent grounds of detention exist.

Here, he said, the detention rests on a single composite ground, stitched together through selective videos, stale FIRs, and allegedly distorted interpretations.

Relying on Attorney General of India v. Amratlal Prajivandas (1994), Sibal submitted that a chain of events cannot be artificially severed to salvage an otherwise unlawful detention.

4. Stale FIRs, copy-paste orders, and non-application of mind

Sibal also pointed out that:

• Several FIRs relied upon date back to 2024,
• Many are against unknown persons, and
• Even the FIR registered after the Ladakh violence does not name Wangchuk.

He further demonstrated that the District Magistrate reproduced the Superintendent of Police’s recommendation verbatim, betraying a mechanical exercise of power rather than independent application of mind.

5. Allegations of anti-army rhetoric and plebiscite “completely false”

Addressing allegations that Wangchuk discouraged civilians from assisting the Indian Army during wartime, Sibal said the claim was entirely false, arising from mistranslation or deliberate distortion.

He quoted Wangchuk as urging Ladakhis not to mix political grievances with national defence, and to stand by the country during any external conflict.

Similar distortions, Sibal argued, were made regarding:

• Alleged support for plebiscite, and
• Claims of disrespect toward a Hindu goddess—both of which he described as manufactured narratives, widely debunked by fact-checkers.

Health, custody, and court-ordered medical care

Amidst these proceedings, concerns over Wangchuk’s health have also engaged the Court’s attention.

On January 29, the Supreme Court directed that Wangchuk be examined by a specialist gastroenterologist at a government hospital, after he complained of persistent stomach pain during his detention.

He was subsequently taken to AIIMS Jodhpur on January 31, where he underwent medical tests. While jail authorities claimed he had been examined 21 times, the Court accepted that specialist care was warranted and sought a report by February 2.

Voices Outside Court: Gitanjali Angmo speaks

Speaking to The News Minute at the Mathrubhumi International Festival of Letters in Thiruvananthapuram, Dr Gitanjali Angmo framed her husband’s detention as an attempt to silence a sustained and principled critique of how Ladakh is being governed after the abrogation of Article 370. She suggested that Sonam Wangchuk’s insistence on environmental safeguards and public participation in decision-making had increasingly placed him at odds with a governance model driven by centralised authority rather than local consent.

Dr Angmo emphasised that Ladakh’s demands for statehood and Sixth Schedule protection were neither sudden nor radical, but rooted in the region’s fragile ecology, high-altitude geography, and distinct cultural identity. With temperatures plunging to sub-zero levels and ecosystems highly vulnerable to disruption, she argued that policies designed for the rest of India cannot be mechanically applied to Ladakh without severe consequences for both people and environment.

She cautioned against what she described as a “one-size-fits-all” approach to governance, warning that excessive centralisation risks erasing India’s constitutional commitment to diversity and federal balance. India, she noted, has historically functioned as a plural federation, united not by uniformity but by accommodation of difference—a principle she fears is being steadily undermined.

Rejecting any suggestion that Wangchuk’s activism was anti-national, Dr Angmo characterised his work as firmly anchored in constitutional values and long-term national interest. She alleged that his speeches were selectively excerpted and stripped of context, while his repeated appeals for peace and unity were ignored, creating a distorted narrative that portrayed dissent as a security threat.

In Dr Angmo’s account, the case transcends the legality of one preventive detention and raises a deeper question about the health of Indian democracy. When region-specific political demands and environmental concerns are met with the extraordinary power of preventive detention, she suggested, it signals a troubling intolerance for dissent—particularly from India’s geographic and political margins.

A growing constitutional unease

As the hearings unfold, the case has come to symbolise a broader constitutional tension: the use of preventive detention laws against political dissent, particularly in regions demanding greater autonomy and constitutional safeguards.

At its core lies a troubling question—can references to global protest movements, stripped of context and divorced from subsequent calls for peace, justify the extraordinary power of preventive detention?

Wangchuk, notably, was detained two days after publicly calling for calm, breaking his fast, and dissociating himself from violence. The leap from that moment to the conclusion that he posed an imminent threat to national security remains at the heart of the Court’s scrutiny.

In a constitutional democracy, where preventive detention is meant to be the exception rather than the rule, the outcome of this case may well define the line between legitimate security concerns and the impermissible criminalisation of dissent.

Further hearings are awaited.

Orders of the said case may be read below.

Related:

How the Centre used a ‘Draconian’ law to silence Sonam Wangchuk and Ladakh’s aspirations

A victory for Ladakh’s voices: Sonam Wangchuk and Ladakhi activists break 16-day fast as union government agrees to renew talks on demands

Centre cancels FCRA licence of Sonam Wangchuk’s NGO, cites violations including study on ‘sovereignty’

Gen‑Z’s furious stand for Ladakh statehood, centre blames Sonam Wangchuk for violence incitement

The post When Protest becomes a “Threat”: Inside the Supreme Court hearing on Sonam Wangchuk’s NSA detention appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta indicated that all matters in the batch would be closed, while explicitly preserving the liberty of parties to pursue other remedies under law. One case alone—Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.—was kept pending, limited to monitoring the progress of trial and allied proceedings arising out of a 2021 alleged hate crime against a Muslim cleric in Noida.

The January 20 hearing was not merely procedural. It functioned as a consolidated reckoning—bringing together nearly every strand of hate-speech litigation that has occupied the Court since 2020, and laying bare the Court’s evolving understanding of its own role, the limits of judicial supervision, and the persistent failures of enforcement.

The Beginning: 2020 and the turn to the Supreme Court

The present batch of cases originated in 2020, at a moment when hate speech entered the Supreme Court not as a marginal criminal issue, but as a structural constitutional concern.

The immediate triggers were:

• The “Corona Jihad” campaign during the COVID-19 pandemic, which communalised disease and cast Muslims as biological and civic threats; and
• Sudarshan TV’s “UPSC Jihad” programme, which alleged a conspiracy by Muslim candidates to infiltrate the civil services.

Petitioners argued that these narratives violated equality, dignity, and fraternity, and that State authorities had either failed to act or were complicit through inaction.

In 2020, the Supreme Court intervened to restrain the telecast of the “UPSC Jihad” programme, marking an early acknowledgment that certain forms of hate speech—especially when amplified through mass media—implicate constitutional values beyond ordinary criminal law.

This was the Court’s first decisive signal that hate speech would not be treated merely as offensive expression, but as conduct capable of restructuring social hierarchies and legitimising exclusion.

Expansion of the Docket: Dharam Sansads and genocidal speech (2021–2022)

The hate-speech docket expanded dramatically in 2021–22, following Dharam Sansad events and religious gatherings where speakers openly called for:

• Violence against Muslims,
• Economic boycotts,
• Armed mobilisation, and
• Genocide.

Petitions by Qurban Ali, Major General S.G. Vombatkere, journalists, civil liberties organisations, and religious bodies highlighted a disturbing pattern:

• Hate speech events were openly announced,
• Police often granted permission or remained passive, and
• FIRs, if registered at all, rarely resulted in arrests or prosecutions.

This phase forced the Court to confront not isolated speeches, but a systemic failure of enforcement.

October 2022: The Court steps in

In October 2022, the Supreme Court issued what remains its most consequential intervention on hate speech.

The Court directed that police authorities must register FIRs suo moto in cases involving:

• Promotion of communal hatred, or
• Offending religious sentiments,

without waiting for a formal complaint. Failure to act, the Court warned, would invite contempt proceedings.

The reasoning was explicit: Hate speech strikes at fraternity, corrodes secularism, and threatens constitutional morality. It cannot be left to the discretion of local authorities who may be unwilling to act.

This order marked the Court’s shift from reactive adjudication to supervisory constitutional enforcement.

2023: Nationwide application and preventive policing

In April 2023, the Supreme Court extended its October 2022 directions to all States and Union Territories, making clear that:

• The obligation to act was nationwide;
• Enforcement must be religion-neutral; and
• Police must act proactively, not defensively.

Throughout 2023, the Court:

• Passed preventive orders ahead of announced rallies,
• Directed videography of events,
• Required status reports on FIRs and investigations,
• Entertained contempt petitions alleging non-compliance.

The Court also began drawing upon its Tehseen Poonawalla (2018) jurisprudence on mob lynching, exploring whether similar preventive, remedial, and punitive frameworks could be adapted to hate speech.

Yet even as directions multiplied, enforcement remained uneven—setting the stage for judicial introspection. Across these six years, the Court was not operating in an evidentiary vacuum. Ground-level documentation repeatedly entered the record, including through material placed by Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) under its Hate Watch (HW) programme. These compilations drew from verified complaints filed by CJP across multiple States before police authorities, district administrations, minority commissions, and other statutory bodies. The same may be accessed here.

During various hearings, this data—reflecting patterns of non-registration of FIRs, selective enforcement, delayed action, and repeat offending by the same speakers—was intermittently brought to the Court’s attention. The material served a dual function: it both corroborated petitioners’ claims of systemic enforcement failure and demonstrated that hate speech was not episodic, but embedded in everyday administrative practice. While the Court acknowledged these inputs at different stages, their presence underscored a recurring tension in the proceedings: between empirical evidence of ground-level inertia and the Court’s increasing reluctance to continue long-term supervisory engagement.

Recalibration: “We cannot monitor the entire country” (2024–2025)

By late 2024 and 2025, a notable shift occurred.

Benches—including Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta—began articulating concern that the Supreme Court:

• Could not act as a permanent national monitoring authority;
• Could not substitute itself for police stations, magistrates, and High Courts; and
• Would not legislate from the bench in the absence of parliamentary action.

This was not a repudiation of earlier orders, but a recognition of institutional limits: judicial directions had reached their ceiling without corresponding executive will. The trajectory of this batch of litigation—from its inception as a broad constitutional intervention to its present narrowing—mirrors a discernible shift in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence when confronted with complex societal harms. What began as a wide-ranging judicial attempt to frame hate speech as a threat to fraternity, secularism, and constitutional morality gradually contracted into a posture of institutional restraint, marked by repeated assertions of jurisdictional and functional limits.

Over time, the Court’s role evolved from norm-setting and preventive oversight to a more confined emphasis on statutory remedies, executive responsibility, and case-specific adjudication. The impending closure of most petitions reflects not a denial of the harm caused by hate speech, but a judicial recalibration—signalling that the enforcement deficit cannot indefinitely be remedied through continuing mandamus. This recalibration forms the immediate backdrop to the January 20 hearing.

January 20 Hearing: A comprehensive closing of the docket

The January 20 hearing brought together every unresolved dimension of the hate-speech litigation. At the outset, the Bench indicated that it was inclined to:

• Close all connected matters, and
• Leave parties free to pursue statutory and constitutional remedies elsewhere.

The sole exception would be Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani, which involved a concrete hate crime and an ongoing criminal process.

Arguments of the petitioners

1. The problem is enforcement, not law: Advocate Nizam Pasha, appearing for Qurban Ali, made a central submission:

The crisis is not legal inadequacy, but institutional reluctance—especially when alleged offenders are linked to the ruling establishment.

He argued that:

• Hate speech events are often advertised in advance;
• When the Court previously intervened, events were cancelled or toned down, proving the effectiveness of oversight;
• The same habitual offenders operate across States;
• FIRs are registered but arrests and follow-up are absent, enabling repetition.

Pasha also referred to an application seeking takedown of an AI-generated video, allegedly circulated by the BJP’s Assam unit, portraying Muslims as poised to overtake the State if the party lost elections. He argued that hate speech frequently prefigures hate crime, calling for precisely the acts that later occur.

2. Hate speech as a constitutional tort: Advocate Sharukh Alam, appearing in Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani, urged the Court to reject the framing of hate speech as merely a law-and-order problem.

She argued that:

• Hate speech entrenches discrimination and exclusion;
• It should be understood as a constitutional tort, engaging Articles 14, 15, and 21;
• In the Noida case, the Maulana was stripped and assaulted because of his religious identity.

The State of Uttar Pradesh denied the hate-crime characterisation, stating that:

• A chargesheet had been filed,
• Trial was underway, and
• Departmental action had been taken.

The Bench decided to retain this matter alone, limited to monitoring progress.

3. The sanction question: Senior Advocate Siddharth Aggarwal, appearing for Brinda Karat, raised a distinct legal issue: Whether prior sanction is required at the FIR stage, a view adopted by a Magistrate and upheld by the Delhi High Court.

Aggarwal argued that:

• Sanction is required only at the cognisance stage, not for FIR registration;
• The issue is pending reference in Manju Surana.

Justice Vikram Nath asked him to submit a brief note, recognising the issue’s doctrinal importance.

4. Media, elections, and civil liberties:

• Senior Advocate M.R. Shamshad (Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind) highlighted the growing targeting of religious personalities, with FIRs refused on erroneous sanction grounds.
• Advocate Amit Pai cited failure to register FIRs even in cases of casteist speech by elected officials.
• Senior Advocate Sanjay Parekh (PUCL) recalled the Court’s earlier reliance on Tehseen Poonawalla, while acknowledging the need for adaptation.
• Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, as amicus curiae, posed a structural question: Can hate speech be meaningfully curbed when social-media and broadcast platforms profit from virality?

State and institutional responses

• ASG S.V. Raju claimed substantial compliance, stating FIRs were registered in most cited cases.
• NBDA sought to be heard, citing self-regulatory guidelines.
• Election Commission, through Senior Advocate Dama Seshadri Naidu, stated it already had enforcement mechanisms and was open to strengthening them.

The court’s direction

After hearing all parties, the Bench:

• Directed brief written notes within two weeks,
• Reserved orders,
• Ordered closure of all matters except Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani, which will continue on the next date.

Conclusion: What January 20 ultimately signals

From restraining a television programme in 2020, to mandating suo motu FIRs nationwide, to threatening contempt, the Supreme Court spent nearly six years attempting to compel the State to confront hate speech as a constitutional harm.

The January 20 hearing marks an institutional conclusion: the Court has articulated the law; enforcement must now occur elsewhere.

Yet the decision to keep Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani alive—and to seek notes on unresolved legal questions—suggests that the Court has not abandoned the field entirely. It has instead stepped back from continuous supervision, leaving behind a dense jurisprudential trail that future courts, litigants, and lawmakers will have to grapple with.

As matters stand, the Supreme Court has reserved orders, directed the filing of brief notes, and indicated closure of all but one surviving case. Final orders are imminent, and with them, a formal conclusion to one of the Court’s longest-running engagements with hate speech as a constitutional issue. Whether this moment comes to be seen as a principled withdrawal in deference to institutional boundaries—or as a premature retreat from constitutional guardianship—will depend less on the text of the final order, and more on what follows on the ground. Whether this represents constitutional restraint or constitutional retreat is a question that will outlive this batch of cases.

Detailed reports of these matters may be read here and here.

Related:

When Genocide is provoked from the Stage: Raebareli hate speeches, Bhagalpur dog whistles, and a delayed FIR

The Politics of Processions: How the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra amplified hate speech in plain sight

The Orchestrated Extremism: An analysis of communal hate speech in India’s election cycle (2024–2025)

CJP urges NCM action against hate speech campaign vilifying Bengali Muslims as ‘Infiltrators’

The post Hate Speech Before the Supreme Court: From judicial activism to institutional closure appeared first on SabrangIndia.

We have been observing the systemic normalisation of public shaming—a practice where police, not the judiciary, effectively deliver a public verdict. This is not due process; it is a coercive performance of degradation, rendering the principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ a fiction in practice. The evidence compiled herein is clear, suspects, who should still be shielded by the presumption of innocence, are paraded before cameras and crowds. They are forced into women’s clothes in a calculated act of gendered humiliation. Their heads are forcibly shaved. They are marched down roads with visible and severe injuries; limping on fractured legs or, in some cases, even made to crawl on the road!

This conduct is not the sporadic egregious misconduct of a few officers. It is a defiant, systemic practice that stands in direct contravention of established law. It squarely violates the unambiguous prohibitions set by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) SCC (3) 526.  It is a profound violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees every person—accused or not—the right to life and human dignity.

Significantly, this recurring illegality continues in open defiance of advisories from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Rajasthan DGP’s own circulars forbidding these very acts. The state’s top police leadership, by failing to enforce its own directives, has transitioned from silent spectator to complicit enabler. This resource is a legal examination of this practice. It details how the instruments of law are being perverted to enact a form of public justice, replacing the sanctity of the courtroom with the irreversible, prejudicial judgment of the crowd.

A map of humiliation: the state-wide trend of extra-legal parades

The colonial practice to parade accused before public and media as some hunted animal trophy is worst form of abuse of human rights of an individual. The British adopted this practice to ensure that the people of India remain fearful and subservient to handful of foreign rulers (who’s police forces were trained to turn against their own). In large part, they were successful in ensuring brute control, but that such tendencies should spiral in free ‘democratic India?

Shockingly, these extra-legal “arrest rituals” are not isolated incidents but part of a systemic practice across Rajasthan this past year that our team has documented. We present a detailed legal analysis.

1. Gendered humiliation as punishment

Few practices reveal the collapse of constitutional restraint more starkly than the police’s resort to gendered humiliation as a tool of punishment. Across Rajasthan, police officers have repeatedly turned to misogynistic tropes—forcing accused men into women’s clothing, half-shaving their heads, and parading them before jeering crowds—as instruments of moral retribution rather than lawful procedure. These acts, staged in full public view were documented through 2025. Often, they were visually documented for social media dissemination. These unlawful acts are not by any means, spontaneous lapses of discipline. They represent a conscious performance of power—where masculinity, shame, and violence are choreographed into public spectacle.

Even when the police claim that the accused were found disguised in women’s clothes at the time of arrest, such an explanation cannot justify their public parading in the same attire. The act of displaying them before crowds in those clothes—long after custody has been secured—serves no investigative purpose. It is an act of deliberate humiliation, stripped of any legal rationale, and therefore per se illegal. It transforms supposed evidence of arrest into a spectacle of degradation, meant to mock rather than prosecute.

The incidents that follow demonstrate how the police have systematically weaponised gender stereotypes to degrade the accused. In Sikar, Udaipur, Nagaur, Jhunjhunu, and Dausa, law enforcement transformed arrests into orchestrated parades of humiliation, targeting not only the individual’s liberty but their dignity itself. Each case exposes how gendered humiliation has evolved into an informal yet recurring mode of punishment—public, performative, and patently unlawful.

• Sikar: After arresting two men for allegedly killing a bull by running it over with an SUV on October 1, 2025, Nechwa police subjected them to such degradation. Claiming the men were found hiding in women’s clothes, officers half-shaved their heads and then paraded them through the public market, forcing them to wear women’s nightgowns. This spectacle was designed to incite public anger, with crowds reportedly shouting for the men to be hanged. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar 

Departmental endorsement of Sikar Police’s illegal parade

This defiance of law is not merely a station-level anomaly, it is amplified by a glaring departmental contradiction, perfectly captured by the Sikar parade incident.

This illegal parade, designed to incite public anger, was then officially endorsed by the force’s public relations arm. Despite internal directives from the DGP (such as the detailed SOP dated September 21, 2023) explicitly forbidding such acts of humiliation, the official @PoliceRajasthan social media handle broadcast a video of this very parade. It was framed as a righteous act, captioned, “Rajasthan Police: A befitting reply to human cruelty”, thereby publicly celebrating a blatant violation of law as a policy success.

• Udaipur: Five men arrested by Hathipole police for rioting and assault with a sword were paraded on November 1 in a manner clearly intended to humiliate. Justifying the act with the claim that the accused were planning to flee in female attire, police forced all five to dress in women’s clothes. To amplify the shame, they were made to wear placards around their necks with slogans like “I am a burden on society” and “I am a criminal” as they were marched through the city. (Report in The Mooknayak).

Image Credit: The Mooknayak

• Nagaur: On August 1, in Merta town, three men accused of a lottery scam—a crime they allegedly committed while disguised in female attire—were subjected to a multi-layered shaming ritual. Police shaved their heads and then marched them from the bus stand to the court while forcing them to wear the women’s salwar suits. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

Throughout the parade, officers forced the men to keep their hands folded and repeatedly chant, “We made a mistake.”

• Jhunjhunu & Dausa: This tactic of weaponising an accused’s disguise was repeated across districts. In Surajgarh (Jhunjhunu), on July 20, the SHO paraded a man accused of attacking a sarpanch in the salwar suit he was allegedly wearing while in hiding. (Reports in Dainik Bhaskar and Patrika).

Image Credit: Rajasthan Patrika

Similarly, in Dausa, police arrested two men for attacking officers. After finding them hiding in women’s clothes, police paraded them through the village in that same attire, forcing them to walk with folded hands and issue a public warning that “No one should do this, or they will face the same consequences.” (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

2. Parading the injured accused/suspects: spectacles of cruelty

In several cases, police have paraded accused. Several of these accused were visibly and severely injured, turning a “spot verification” or “Medical Examination” procedure into a public display of suffering.

• Kota: On May 22, in a shocking parade from Kanwas, police paraded two murder accused who were severely injured, allegedly from fleeing arrest. Both men had their legs in plaster casts. Media reports explicitly described one accused, Atiq, whose both legs were broken, crawling or ‘dragging himself’ on the road. The second accused, Deepak, limped painfully alongside on a crutch. The Kota Rural SP justified this as “spot verification.” He said that “action was taken to have the accused verify the scene and to prepare a site map of the incident. Since both had sustained injuries, they were taken to the spot on foot” as ETV Bharat Rajasthan reported. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: ETV Bharat Kota

• Jaipur: On January 23, Vidhyadharnagar police paraded five men accused in a high-profile robbery and murder case. Two of the men had sustained fractured legs from falling in a ditch and were in plaster casts. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

Police forced these injured men to walk, limping and supported by officers, from the police vehicle to the crime scene and even to the victim’s house.

• Tonk: On September 30, The Times of India reported that the Tonk Police arrested three men for allegedly molesting a 13-year-old girl and threatening her with an acid attack. During the public “spot verification,” one of the accused, unable to walk, was filmed dragging himself on the road, while the other two limped beside him as locals cheered. During the parade, a large crowd gathered and chanted slogans of “Tonk Police Zindabad.” (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

• Kotputli: On July 1, four men accused of murdering a liquor contractor were arrested after a police “encounter” in which all four were shot in the legs. Immediately following their medical treatment, police paraded the injured accused, limping from their fresh gunshot wounds, in a “procession” through the town.

• Karoli: On February 25, two men accused of firing over a payment dispute at a salon were arrested after being injured, allegedly by falling on stones while fleeing. Police then paraded the two men, who were visibly limping, and forced them to walk through the city with folded hands, apologising to the public. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

3. Rituals of degradation: shaving, placards, and drums

Beyond gendered humiliation, police employ other theatrical methods of degradation designed to shatter an accused’s self-respect.

• Baran: On June 3, demonstrating that even an alleged intent to commit a crime warrants public degradation, police arrested 12 men for planning a robbery at a petrol pump. Before any trial, police shaved the heads of the accused and paraded them through the city market, forcing them to join their hands and publicly apologise. (Report in NDTV Rajasthan).

Image Credit: NDTV Rajasthan

• Pali: On October 28, the Pali Police orchestrated a highly theatrical shaming procession for three murder accused. Officers hired dhols (drums) to beat as they marched the men from Ambedkar Circle to the court. The accused, who were visibly limping, were forced to wear clothes with the label ‘Hardcore History-sheeter’ printed on them and beg for forgiveness.

During the parade, a woman tried to reach the accused to slap them, but the police stopped her

• Hanumangarh: On October 30, the Gogamedi police arrested six men, alleged to be members of a criminal gang. As a form of summary punishment, police forcibly cut their hair and then paraded them through village. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

The men were seen limping and attempting to hide their faces in shame during the procession.

Footage Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

• Udaipur: On October 5, combining multiple forms of humiliation, Bhupalpura police paraded two men accused of a stabbing. The men were forced to walk while visibly limping from injuries sustained during their arrest, and police had half-shaved their heads to maximise their public disgrace.

The accused men were marched in this state for approximately two kilometers to “recreate the scene.”

4. General parades: “sport verification” as public spectacle

Even in cases without overt torture, the routine practice of parading suspects for “spot verification” is used as a pretext for public shaming.

• Jodhpur: On August 20, after arresting suspects in a firing case, Jodhpur police paraded the accused on foot from the police station to the nearby crime scene in the middle of the market, justifying it as the “last day of remand” and a “spot inspection.” (Report in Amar Ujala.

Image Credit: Amar Ujala

• Bikaner: On July 28, Lunkaransar police paraded six men, accused of attacking a shopkeeper, through the same market where the incident occurred, forcing them to walk to the hospital. The parade drew a large crowd, which turned the procession into a “julus” (spectacle). (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

• Jaipur: In a separate Vidhyadharnagar case, on June 3, two men arrested for allegedly trying to free a suspect from police custody and tearing a constable’s uniform were paraded at the scene of the incident, where they were forced to fold their hands and apologise. (Report in Patrika).

Image Credit: Patrika

• Churu: On September 21, Taranagar Police paraded a young man accused of allegedly stabbing a female student. He was marched from the police station through the main market and bus stand to “send a message.” According to Dainik Bhaskar, the SHO was quoted as saying, “This is the fate of those who commit crimes.”

Link: https://dai.ly/x9qx8kw

The statutory framework: due process vs. public spectacle

The statutory framework governing arrest, detention, and investigation in India is exhaustive and focuses entirely on procedural correctness, investigative necessity, and the rights of the accused. This framework is designed to protect the individual from the arbitrary exercise of state power.

Conspicuously absent from the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), and its predecessor, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is any provision, power, or procedure that legitimises the public parading, shaming, or forced humiliation of an accused or suspect. The police actions documented in Rajasthan are not a mere over-extension of authority but they are in direct contravention of black-letter law.

The limited and defined powers of arrest

The police’s power to arrest is not absolute. It is narrowly defined, primarily under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 (which corresponds to Section 41 of the CrPC, 1973). This section outlines the specific circumstances under which a police officer may arrest without a warrant. The entire purpose of this power is to prevent the commission of further offenses, ensure a proper investigation, or secure the accused’s presence at trial. It does not grant any power to inflict summary punishment or public humiliation.

The manner of arrest is detailed in Section 43 of the BNSS, 2023:

(1) In making an arrest the police officer or other person making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action:

Provided that where a woman is to be arrested, unless the circumstances indicate to the contrary, her submission to custody on an oral intimation of arrest shall be presumed and, unless the circumstances otherwise require or unless the police officer is a female, the police officer shall not touch the person of the woman for making her arrest.

(2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest.

(3) The police officer may, keeping in view the nature and gravity of the offence, use handcuff while making the arrest of a person or while producing such person before the court who is— (i) a habitual or repeat offender; or (ii) a person who escaped from custody; or (iii) a person who has committed offence of organised crime, terrorist act, drug related crime, illegal possession of arms and ammunition, murder, rape, acid attack, counterfeiting of coins and currency-notes, human trafficking, sexual offence against children, or offence against the State.

While Sub-section (3) introduces specific grounds for handcuffing, its legal basis remains tied to preventing escape and ensuring safety—not for public display. The parading of an accused in handcuffs, often when they are already subdued or injured, serves no legitimate custodial purpose.

The absolute prohibition on unnecessary restraint

The most blatant statutory violation in these public parades is the breach of Section 46 of the BNSS, 2023 (mirroring Section 49 of the CrPC). This provision is not ambiguous and leaves no room for discretion. It mandates:

“The person arrested shall not be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape.”

Forcing an accused to wear women’s clothing, shaving their head, hanging a placard around their neck, or forcing them to limp through a market while injured is, by any definition, “more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape.” These acts are illegal, punitive, and fall entirely outside the police’s lawful authority.

Provisions pertaining to the use of handcuffing

The legal framework governing handcuffs in India was historically undefined, with no explicit provision in the previous CrPC, 1973. Their use was permissively shaped only by Supreme Court directives, notably in Prem Shanker Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) SCC (3) 526 and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) guidelines (2010), which strictly limited it to a measure of last resort for securing restraint—not as a routine tool.

The new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), in Section 43(3), for the first time codifies this power, but only for exceptionally narrow and grave circumstances, such as for a habitual or repeat offender, a person who escaped custody, or one who has committed specified serious offences like organised crime, terrorism, murder, or rape.

While police may justifiably argue that handcuffs are necessary to secure an accused during spot verifications, medical examinations, or production before the court, the incidents documented across Rajasthan tell a different story. The visual evidence shows handcuffs being weaponised not for legitimate restraint, but as a prop for public shaming—an integral part of the illegal parade. This unnecessary, performative demonstration of power is a per se unconstitutional and illegal act, designed to inflict humiliation rather than uphold the law.

Zoological strategies repugnant to Article 21: SC’s definitive mandate in Prem Shankar Shukla

The foundational and most authoritatively-violated law on this matter remains the Supreme Court’s 1980 judgment in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) SCC (3) 526. This ruling did not just restrict handcuffing; it condemned the entire mindset behind public degradation as an affront to the Constitution. The Court declared that handcuffing is “prima facie inhuman” and “arbitrary,” calling it a “zoological strategy” that is “repugnant to Article 21.”

Addressing the exact ritual of parading, the Court observed:

“But to bind a man hand-and-foot, fetter his limbs with hoops of steel, shuffle him along in the streets and stand him for hours in the courts is to torture him, defile his dignity, vulgarise society and foul the soul of our constitutional culture.” (Para 22)

The Court established that the “convenience of the custodian” (Para 24) is irrelevant. Handcuffing is not a routine procedure but an “extreme measure” (Para 25) that can only be justified as the “last refuge, not the routine regimen” (Para 25). The bench explicitly rejected the idea that the “nature of the accusation” (Para 31) is a valid criterion. Instead, the only determinant is a “clear and present danger of escape” (Para 31), which must be based on “clear material, not glib assumption” (Para 31).

Crucially, the judgment set a non-negotiable procedural safeguard: police cannot act unilaterally. Even in those rare, extreme cases, the officer must:

“…record contemporaneously the reasons for doing so… The escorting officer, whenever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in court, must show the reasons so recorded to the Presiding Judge and get his approval. Otherwise… the procedure will be unfair and bad in law.” (Para 30)

The Court concluded by condemning the practice as a “barbarous bigotry” and “an imperial heritage, well preserved” (Para 33), making it clear that such “animalising” (Para 23) displays are summary punishments “vicariously imposed at police level” (Para 31) and have no place under the Constitution.

The judgement of Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) can be read here

Police duty is arrest, not punishment: the Omprakash judgment

In Omprakash and Ors. v. State of Jharkhand (2012) 12 SCC 72, the Supreme Court stressed the fundamental limits of police duty. The Court observed that the police designated role is not to deliver summary punishment, stating “It is not the duty of the police officers to kill the accused merely because he is a dreaded criminal. Undoubtedly, the police have to arrest the accused and put them up for trial.” (Para 42).

This observation highlights the principle that the police’s sole, lawful function is to bring an accused before the judiciary, not to usurp the judicial role by inflicting punishment—be it through extra-judicial killings or, by extension, through acts of public degradation.

The judgement of Omprakash and Ors. v. State of Jharkhand (2012) 12 SCC 72 can be read here

A Parallel Trial: Supreme Court on the illegality of media parades of accused

The Hindu reported that on August 28, 2014, the Supreme Court directly condemned the practice of police parading suspects before the media, viewing it as a serious threat to the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. During the 2014 hearings for the Public Union for Civil Liberties & another v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (CDJ 2014 SC 831), a three-judge bench led by then-Chief Justice R.M. Lodha expressed strong disapproval of this practice. The Chief Justice was unequivocal, stating:

“Media briefings by investigating officer during on-going investigations should not happen. It is a very serious matter. This issue touches upon Article 21 [right to life and liberty including fair trial].”

The bench, which also included Justice Kurian Joseph, noted that this conduct prejudices the accused before they are even charged. Justice Joseph observed that by releasing unproven statements, “a parallel trial is run in the media,” which affects the fundamental rights of the accused and creates an indelible stigma.

Home Ministry’s advisory on media policy and ban on public parading of accused persons

The systemic defiance of legal norms is further evidenced by the police’s flagrant disregard for binding directives from the Union Government itself. As far back as April 1, 2010, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) issued a comprehensive “Advisory on Media Policy of Police” (F. NO.15011/48/2009-SC/ST-W) to all states. This advisory explicitly mandates precautions to protect the dignity of those in custody. Guideline VI(a) of the memorandum is unequivocal that “arrested persons should not be paraded before the media.”

Para (VI) reads as follow;

“Due care should be taken to ensure that there is no violation of the legal, privacy and human rights of the accused/victims.

1.  Arrested persons should not be paraded before the media.
2.  Faces of arrested persons whose Test Identification Parade is required to be conducted should not be exposed to the media.”

It further instructs that “due care should be taken to ensure that there is no violation of the legal, privacy and human rights of the accused/victims.” The MHA advisory, which forms the basis for subsequent state-level circulars, also directs that any deviation “should be viewed seriously and action should be taken against such police officer/official.”

The recurring spectacles in Rajasthan are therefore a direct violation of these long-standing, explicit instructions from the very ministry overseeing internal security.

The MHA advisory dated April 1, 2010 can be read here

Section 29 of the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007

The very statute governing the state’s police, the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007, establishes a clear, affirmative obligation for officers to follow the law. Section 29 of the Act details the duties and responsibilities of every police officer. Crucially, Section 29(i) mandates that an officer shall “perform such duties and discharge such responsibilities as may be enjoined upon him by law or by an authority empowered to issue such directions under any law.” This provision makes adherence to all legal mandates—including constitutional protections, Supreme Court judgments, and internal departmental circulars—a fundamental and non-negotiable component of an officer’s statutory duty.

Circulars/advisory issued by the DGP, Rajasthan

This reported illegality is not just a violation of MHA advisories but also a direct contravention of the Rajasthan Police’s own internal guidelines. On October 18, 2013, the Director General of Police (DGP), Rajasthan, issued a specific advisory to all District Police Superintendents and G.R.P. Ajmer/Jodhpur regarding police-media relations. This directive explicitly aimed to prevent the very practices now seen across the state. Para (vi) of the advisory clearly mandates:

“It should always be kept in mind that; (a) the arrested person should not be paraded before the media. (b) The face of the accused whose identity is to be paraded should not be shown to the media.”

The DGP, Rajasthan’s instructions dated October 18, 2013 can be read here

Rajasthan Police’s SOP strictly prohibits using handcuffs for “public ridicule, harassment, or humiliation”

On September 21, 2023, the Additional Director General of Police (Crime), Rajasthan, issued a detailed Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) acknowledging that handcuffing and displaying accused was being done “routinely,” a practice that “humiliates a person,” “hurts their self-respect,” and “tarnishes the image of the police.”

Citing the Rajasthan High Court’s 2023 order (supra) and the Supreme Court’s mandate in Prem Shankar Shukla (supra), the SOP strictly prohibits using handcuffs for “public ridicule, harassment, or humiliation” or merely for the “convenience of the escort team.”

The SOP mandates that handcuffs are a last resort, to be used only in “exceptional circumstances” (e.g., the prisoner is violent, dangerous, or a high escape risk) and requires prior court approval. The reasons for their use must be meticulously recorded in the police station’s daily diary (Roznamcha Aam) before application.

The SOP also explicitly forbids the routine handcuffing of “Satyagrahis, persons holding dignified positions in public life, journalists, [and] political prisoners,” and states that even if justifiably handcuffed, they must not be paraded. It directs senior officers (IGPs and SPs) to ensure “verbatim” compliance with these instructions.

The ADGP, Rajasthan’s directive dated September 21, 2023 can be read here

“Will not conduct a public parade”: DGP’s January 2025 SOP directly bans shaming rituals

The legal prohibitions against these practices were reinforced with the issuance of a new “Standard Operating Procedure for the use of handcuffs” by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, on January 15, 2025. This SOP was issued to align with Section 43(3) of the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, which codifies the power to use handcuffs for specific, grave offenses (e.g., habitual offenders, terrorism, murder, rape, organised crime).

However, the directive unequivocally states that even for these accused, handcuffs are only permissible in “exceptional circumstances” where there is a “clear and present danger” of escape or violence, and the reasons must be “clearly recorded.” Most significantly, the 2025 SOP directly confronts and bans the very rituals this resource documents. It explicitly commands:

“The police officer, after handcuffing, will not conduct a public parade of the prisoner.”

Furthermore, it directly targets the police practice of broadcasting these events, instructing officers to: “…take special care that after handcuffing, photos or videos of the prisoner are not uploaded to social media.”

This latest directive from the state’s top police office leaves no ambiguity, explicitly forbidding the exact conduct of parading suspects and disseminating the footage.

The directions of DGP, Rajasthan dated January 15, 2025 can be read here

Rajasthan High Court’s condemnation on illegal handcuffing

On May 26, 2023, the Rajasthan High Court’s order (Jodhpur Bench) in D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 156/2023, the Court, while disposing of the petition, issued several key directives. The operative part of the order mandates the respondents to conduct an expeditious inquiry into the incident and against the delinquent officers, including those already suspended. The Court directed that the Inspector General of Police (IGP) must personally monitor the progress of this inquiry.

Furthermore, the Court explicitly ordered the IGP to ensure that the directions issued by the Supreme Court [notably in Prem Shanker Shukala v. Delhi Administration (1980) SCC (3) 526, which prohibit routine handcuffing, are followed “in letter and spirit” throughout his jurisdiction.

The High Court’s take on the handcuffing was one of strong condemnation. It found the action of handcuffing the petitioner’s son—who was not formally arrested and was hospitalised with a fractured leg, rendering him unable to walk—to be “inhuman” and “absolutely illegal and unconstitutional.” The Court noted that the very presence of handcuffs at the general ward bed of an unarrested accused, who alleged he was fettered at night, “firmly established” the illegality and was a clear violation of constitutional mandates, dismissing the suspension of officers as an “eye-wash.”

The order dated May 26, 2023 of the Rajasthan High Court can be read here

The judicial condemnation of public parades extends beyond a single state

Apart from the Rajasthan High Court, this concern is also shocking courts across the country as well, as the Gujarat High Court, in R/WPPIL/153/2018, Bhautik Vijaybhai Bhatt v. Director General of Police, addressed this issue directly. The Public Interest Litigation sought a writ of mandamus to stop police from “taking out procession of accused persons by handcuffing them… and beat such accused persons in public place.” In response, the Additional Director General of Police filed an affidavit assuring the Court of “proposed draft instructions” to be issued to all officers.

The High Court’s order dated May 7, 2019, specifically recorded that these new instructions would ensure that accused persons are “not parading them in public at large” or given any “maltreatment.” The affidavit, accepted by the Court, affirmed that accused must be “protected from mob violence” and taken to the police station or Magistrate “in a dignified manner by protecting their individual status.” The Court disposed of the PIL by directing the state to issue this circular, reinforcing that legal guidelines must be “strictly complied with.”

The order of Gujrat High Court dated May 7, 2019 can be read here

No parading of accused/suspects: Hyderabad High Court (Telangana HC)

The New Indian Express reported that on June 21, 2018, a division bench of the Hyderabad High Court comprising Chief Justice Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta and Justice PV Sanjay Kumar recently expressed their “extreme displeasure” over parading of accused in front of media and television channels. The observation has evoked a positive response and won accolades from different walks of life. The judges asserted that the bench would pass orders prohibiting the practice.

Subsequently, the High Court refused a request to grant the DGP, Andhra Pradesh, two weeks to file an affidavit in the case. The bench, demonstrating its urgency on the matter, strongly remarked that “You are treating the accused-suspects as animals that is why you are allowing them before the media without any respect to their Right to Privacy which is a fundamental right. We will grant only a week’s time to you to file the affidavit as per our earlier direction” as the Deccan Chronicle reported

Rights of the accused: protection and fair trail, not degradation

The law, far from sanctioning humiliation, builds a wall of protection around the accused. Section 38 of the BNSS, 2023 (mirroring Section 50 of the CrPC), mandates that when any person is arrested and interrogated by the police, he shall be entitled to meet an advocate of his choice during interrogation, though not throughout interrogation.

Furthermore, Section 51 of the BNSS, 2023 (regarding the medical examination of the accused), shows the law’s intent:

…it shall be lawful for a registered medical practitioner, acting at the request of any police officer… to make such an examination of the person arrested as is reasonably necessary in order to ascertain the facts which may afford such evidence…

The purpose of a medical examination is evidentiary—to find trace evidence on the accused or document injuries relevant to the crime. This provision is perverted when police parade suspects with injuries (like fractured legs), turning a procedure meant for legal and medical documentation into a spectacle of cruelty.

The core jurisprudential breach

These police conduct tears at the very fabric of Indian criminal jurisprudence.

1. Violation of Article 21 (Dignity): The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to live with human dignity. Public shaming, forced haircuts, and gendered humiliation are a profound assault on that dignity.

Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the “right to live with human dignity.” This is the “most precious right” afforded to “every person,” a guarantee that is not suspended upon accusation or arrest. As the Supreme Court has affirmed in PUCL v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 1255 of 1999] that, “even the State has no authority to violate that right.” (Para 7)

The judgement of PUCL v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 1255 of 1999] can be read here

The only exception under Article 21 is that liberty can be curtailed, but only subject to the “procedure established by law”—which means through a fair trial, investigation, and conviction by a competent court. However, the police’s summary “punishments” in the name of spot verification and medical examination are per se illegal and a gross violation of the Constitution, as police have no authority to adjudicate guilt or inflict penalties.

This practice also fundamentally subverts Article 20(2) of the Constitution, which prohibits double jeopardy. When police inflict this public degradation, they are administering a “punishment” before any trial. Should the accused later be convicted by a court, they would have been subjected to two punishments—first, the illegal, irreversible public shaming by the police, and second, the judicial sentence. This police action is a brazen usurpation of judicial power, rendering the presumption of innocence a nullity.

In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 488, the Supreme Court even condemned the inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners, particularly the use of solitary confinement and held that fundamental rights do not end at the prison gates. It was emphasised that prison authorities must respect the dignity and rights of inmates under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. Thus, ‘human dignity’, which is apparently not a fundamental right was read as a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The judgement of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1980) can be read here

In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 this Court affirmed right to privacy as a fundamental right under the Constitution, which was read as a right and a part of ‘life and liberty’ under Article 21. It was held that privacy encompasses autonomy, dignity, and the freedom to control their own personality.

The judgement of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) can be read here

2. Violation of Article 20(3) (Self-Incrimination): Forcing an accused to walk with folded hands and publicly chant “I made a mistake” is a form of compelled confession, obtained through duress and humiliation. It is a flagrant violation of the right against self-incrimination.

“I Made a Mistake”: forced confessions and the death of Article 20(3)

A core constitutional safeguard, enshrined in Article 20(3) of the Constitution, dictates that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” This right against self-incrimination is so foundational that the law of evidence, both in Section 25 of the former Indian Evidence Act and its successor Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, explicitly states that “No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.” These laws exist precisely because of the inherent risk of coercion in police custody.

The police rituals documented across Rajasthan—forcing accused men to chant “We made a mistake” or publicly apologise to crowds—are a flagrant and theatrical violation of these very safeguards. Such a “confession,” whether genuinely given in the privacy of a station or compelled by police pressure, is legally worthless and inadmissible as evidence.

Therefore, the only purpose of this public performance is extra-legal, to inflict humiliation, satisfy public anger, and enact a summary punishment. This practice is a performative and compelled act of self-incrimination. It does not matter if an accused has confessed; the police have no authority to broadcast this, let alone force its re-enactment as a public spectacle. By forcing an accused to apologise on camera, the police are not conducting an investigation; they are staging a verdict and illegally compelling a person to be a witness against himself, not before a court of law, but before a roadside mob.

3. Destruction of the Presumption of Innocence: The accusation has to be proven in a court of law. When investigating authorities “play to the gallery,” they usurp the role of the judiciary. They declare the person guilty before a trial, inflicting an irreversible public sentence that no subsequent acquittal can ever undo. This damages the credibility and integrity of the entire justice system.

The D.K. Basu mandate: a judicial blueprint against custodial abuse

The most foundational legal standards for arrest and detention were established by the Supreme Court in its landmark judgment, D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) 1 SCC 416]. The Court, deeply concerned with custodial violence and the abuse of police power, formulated a set of 11 mandatory requirements. These guidelines are not suggestions but “preventive measures” designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and the protection of an arrestee’s fundamental rights under Article 21. They create a non-negotiable procedural blueprint that stands in stark contrast to the arbitrary rituals of public shaming. The Court directed in Para 35 of the judgement that requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures.

These directives establish procedures to protect the rights of individuals during arrest and detention. Police officers must wear clear identification, and their details must be registered. An “Arrest Memo” must be prepared at the time of arrest, detailing the time and date, witnessed by a family member or local respectable person, and countersigned by the arrestee.

The arrestee must be informed of their right to have one friend or relative notified of their arrest and custody location. If this person lives out-of-district, police must notify them via the Legal Aid Organisation within 8-12 hours. The arrestee has the right to an injury inspection at arrest, recorded in a signed “Inspection Memo,” and must receive a medical examination by an approved doctor every 48 hours. They may also meet their lawyer during interrogation.

All arrest details must be recorded in a station diary, with copies of documents sent to the Magistrate. Furthermore, the district/state police control room must be informed of the arrest and custody location within 12 hours and display this information publicly.

The judgement of DK Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) can be read here

No action from SHRC and DGP Rajasthan’s office

Despite an unambiguous legal framework, the compiled evidence reveals a systemic collapse of every accountability mechanism. The Rajasthan State Human Rights Commission (RSHRC), armed with suo moto powers to protect fundamental rights from illegal police practices, has remained a silent spectator. This inaction persists even as these “arrest rituals” have escalated since 2025, transforming from sporadic abuses into a monthly, viral spectacle of state-endorsed degradation.

This open defiance is amplified, not punished, with official police social media handles celebrating the violations. The institutional failure is absolute as the Rajasthan High Court has not taken suo motu cognizance, and the Director General of Police, despite his own clear directives (Jan 2025) forbidding these parades, has proven unable or unwilling to enforce them. The result is a state of perfect impunity, where the Constitution is openly defied, and the law, judiciary, and human rights commissions have, by their collective silence, become complicit enablers.

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The post Parade of Public Shaming: How Rajasthan police’s illegal “arrest rituals” replace due process with public defilement appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This was the thirteenth occasion on which the petitions have been listed before the Supreme Court. The proceedings arise from a group of writ petitions pending since 2020, raising substantial constitutional questions concerning the scope of freedom of conscience, personal liberty, equality, and the extent of State power to regulate religious conversion and interfaith marriages. Senior Advocate Chander Uday Singh, Advocate Srishti Agnihotri and Advocate Sanjana Thomas are representing CJP, the first and lead petitioner in the case.

Origin and expansion of the challenge

The challenge was first initiated in January 2020, when the Supreme Court issued notice on petitions questioning the constitutional validity of laws enacted by certain States to regulate religious conversion. These early petitions focused on statutes in Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh.

Over time, similar laws were enacted in additional States. In 2023, the Supreme Court permitted Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP)—the lead petitioner in the batch—to amend its writ petition to bring within the scope of the proceedings comparable statutes enacted in Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka. As a result, the present batch now concerns nine State enactments, each styled as a “Freedom of Religion” or “Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion” law.

The petitions contend that although framed as measures to prevent forced or fraudulent conversions, the impugned statutes impose criminal, procedural, and administrative burdens on the exercise of individual choice in matters of faith and marriage.

Hearing of April 16, 2025: Applications for early hearing and interim relief

A significant procedural development occurred on April 16, 2025, when the Supreme Court heard applications filed by Citizens for Justice and Peace seeking (i) an early hearing of the long-pending petitions and (ii) interim relief in light of continued enforcement of the impugned laws.

The matter was heard by a Bench comprising then Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar. The applications were filed against the backdrop of the ongoing operation of the anti-conversion statutes across several States and subsequent legislative amendments, including amendments enhancing penalties and expanding the scope of offences.

Appearing for CJP, Senior Advocate Chander Uday Singh submitted that the interim applications were necessitated by the manner in which the laws were being implemented on the ground. It was urged that certain provisions—particularly those relating to prior declarations before conversion, criminalisation of conversion associated with marriage, third-party complaints, and reversal of burden of proof—were resulting in repeated invocation of penal provisions against consenting adults. Singh requested the Court to issue notice on the interim relief application and to stay the operation of the most consequential provisions pending final adjudication.

On behalf of the Union of India, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta contested the submission that there were instances of misuse warranting interim relief. In response, the Bench directed Attorney General R. Venkataramani to examine the applications and indicate the Union’s position on the various prayers raised therein, including identifying aspects that may not be opposed.

The Court further directed that States and non-applicants file responses to the interim applications, even in the absence of a formal notice, with a view to ensuring that pleadings are completed expeditiously. The matter was directed to be listed on a non-miscellaneous day, signalling the Court’s intent to take up the applications in a substantive manner.

Details of the proceedings may be read here.

Proceedings of September 16, 2025: Directions on pleadings and de-tagging

The batch of petitions, along with the pending interlocutory applications, came up for consideration on September 16, 2025, before a Bench comprising then Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran.

At this stage, the Court directed nine respondent States—Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka—to file detailed responses to the applications seeking interim stay of their respective statutes.

The Court granted four weeks’ time to the States to file affidavits in reply and indicated that the matter would be taken up for consideration of interim relief after completion of pleadings. To facilitate the preparation of common compilations and streamline submissions, the Court appointed Advocate Srishti Agnihotri as nodal counsel for the petitioners and Advocate Ruchira Goel as nodal counsel for the respondents.

During the same hearing, the Court considered a separate Public Interest Litigation filed by Advocate Ashwini Upadhyay, which sought directions for a pan-India law to criminalise religious conversions carried out through deceit or coercion. The Bench clarified that the subject matter of that petition was distinct from the constitutional challenge to existing State enactments and accordingly de-tagged the Upadhyay petition from the present batch.

Detailed proceedings may be read here.

Nature of the impugned statutes

Across the nine States, the impugned laws generally contain provisions that regulate religious conversion through a combination of prior declarations, criminal penalties, and procedural presumptions. The petitioners have argued that these provisions, taken together, create a legal regime in which conversion is treated as inherently suspect, particularly when it occurs in the context of interfaith relationships or marriage.

A central feature of many of the statutes is the requirement that a person intending to convert must give prior notice to a District Magistrate or other designated authority. In several States, this declaration is followed by a police inquiry or verification process, and in some cases, the declaration is required to be publicly displayed. The petitions argue that such requirements subject the exercise of freedom of conscience to prior executive approval, thereby altering the constitutional relationship between the individual and the State.

Another significant feature is the manner in which conversion associated with marriage is addressed. Several statutes presume that conversion undertaken for the purpose of marriage is suspect and may amount to conversion by force, fraud, or allurement. According to the petitioners, this effectively places consensual interfaith marriages under criminal scrutiny, even in the absence of any allegation by the individuals concerned.

The statutes also commonly permit persons other than the allegedly aggrieved individual to lodge complaints, thereby enabling third-party intervention in private relationships. In addition, many of the laws reverse the burden of proof, requiring the accused to demonstrate that a conversion was voluntary, and impose stringent bail conditions that can result in prolonged incarceration.

During the course of the hearings, CJP (petitioners) drew the Court’s attention to legislative amendments and judicial developments relating to individual State statutes.

Particular reference was made to amendments introduced by the State of Uttar Pradesh in 2024 to its Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act. It was submitted that these amendments enhanced the penal consequences under the statute, including the introduction of minimum sentences extending to long terms of imprisonment and the imposition of bail conditions similar to those found in special statutes. It was also pointed out that the amendments expanded the category of persons who may lodge complaints under the Act.

The petitioners (CJP) also relied on interim orders passed by High Courts in challenges to similar laws. The Gujarat High Court has stayed the operation of certain provisions of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act on the ground that they impinge upon the right of consenting adults to marry. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has stayed provisions requiring prior declaration to the District Magistrate. Appeals against these interim orders are presently pending before the Supreme Court.

Related proceedings and de-tagging of a connected petition

During the September 16, 2025 hearing, the Supreme Court also addressed the status of a petition filed by Advocate Ashwini Upadhyay, which sought directions for the enactment of a central law regulating religious conversions. The Court directed that this petition be de-tagged from the present batch, observing that its subject matter was distinct from the challenge to the constitutional validity of existing State enactments.

Submissions on personal liberty and gender concerns

In addition to CJP, several interveners have placed submissions on record. The National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) has raised concerns regarding the impact of these laws on women’s autonomy, particularly in cases involving interfaith relationships. It has been contended that the statutory framework tends to treat adult women as lacking agency in matters of choice, thereby inviting State and familial intervention.

Position as of the latest listing

As of the listing on January 28, 2026, the Supreme Court has not yet heard arguments on the interlocutory applications seeking interim relief, nor has it commenced final hearing on the constitutional validity of the impugned statutes. The matter now stands listed for February 3, 2026.

The outcome of the forthcoming proceedings will determine whether interim directions are issued pending final adjudication of questions that bear on the interpretation of Articles 14, 21, and 25 of the Constitution, and on the extent to which the State may regulate religious conversion without infringing upon personal liberty and freedom of conscience.

Below is a table, computed for the CJP’s 2020 petition and presented to the Court, which provides the most egregious sections of the law in some of these states:

Detailed reports may be read here and here.

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The post Hearing in batch of CJP-led petitions challenging state Anti-Conversion laws defers in SC; Interim relief applications pending since April 2025 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As per Bar & Bench, the order was passed by a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi, while hearing a batch of three writ petitions challenging the 2026 Regulations. Though interim in nature, the order is notable both for the breadth of constitutional concerns flagged by the Court and for the decision to suspend a regulatory framework expressly designed to address caste-based discrimination in higher education.

What follows is not merely a recounting of the proceedings, but a critical examination of why a stay was granted, whether settled principles governing interim interference were adhered to, and how the Court’s reasoning engages—sometimes uneasily—with the constitutional understanding of caste, equality, and structural disadvantage.

Background: From the 2019 PIL to the 2026 Regulations

The 2026 Regulations were framed pursuant to proceedings in a 2019 writ petition filed by Radhika Vemula and Abeda Salim Tadvi, the mothers of Rohit Vemula and Payal Tadvi, both of whom reportedly died by suicide after facing sustained caste-based discrimination within their educational institutions. According to LiveLaw, the PIL sought the creation of a robust institutional mechanism to address caste discrimination on campuses, contending that existing safeguards—particularly the 2012 UGC Regulations—had proved insufficient.

The petition may be read here.

Over the years, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasised the need for a stronger, more effective framework, even inviting stakeholder suggestions while the draft regulations were under consideration. After this consultative process, the UGC notified the 2026 Regulations in January 2026, expressly superseding the 2012 framework.

A close reading of the orders passed in that matter reveals a judicial trajectory that sits in visible tension with the later decision to place the 2026 Regulations in abeyance.

1. January 3, 2025: Court acknowledges systemic failure and demands data, enforcement, and redesign

In its order dated January 3, 2025, the Court expressly recognised that adjudication could not proceed without assessing how universities had implemented the 2012 Equal Opportunity Cell Regulations, and whether those mechanisms had actually worked in practice.

The order may be read below:

Crucially, the Bench:

• directed the UGC to collate nationwide data on Equal Opportunity Cells,
• sought disclosure of complaints received and Action Taken Reports, and
• required the UGC to place its newly formulated draft regulations on record.

This was not a neutral procedural step. It reflected a judicial acknowledgment that formal regulatory existence had not translated into substantive protection for marginalised students. The Court was, at this stage, explicitly concerned with implementation failure, not over breadth or misuse.

2. April 24, 2025: The Court permits notification — and treats the Regulations as additive, not suspect

By April 24, 2025, the Court went further. While disposing of an application seeking to restrain the notification of the draft regulations, the Bench refused to halt the regulatory process. Instead, it clarified that the UGC was free to notify the regulations and that they would operate in addition to the recommendations of the National Task Force constituted in Amit Kumar v. Union of India.

The order may be read below.

Two aspects of this order matter for present purposes:

First, the Court expressly noted that the steps taken by the UGC pursuant to the Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula petition were “in the right direction,” signalling judicial approval of a stronger, institutionalised framework to address discrimination, harassment, and mental health crises in universities.

Second, the Court treated the regulations as iterative and corrigible—open to additions, deletions, and refinement based on stakeholder input and the Task Force’s findings. There was no suggestion that the very idea of a caste-conscious equity framework was constitutionally suspect.

3. September 15, 2025: Court endorses a robust, explicitly caste-conscious regulatory vision

The September 15, 2025 order is perhaps the clearest articulation of what the Court itself considered necessary to remedy caste-based discrimination in higher education.

The order may be read below.

After recording detailed submissions by senior counsel Indira Jaising, the Court flagged — without rejection — a set of far-reaching structural safeguards, including:

• a clear prohibition on all known forms of discrimination,
• an express ban on segregation based on rank or performance,
• grievance redressal bodies with mandatory representation from SC/ST/OBC communities,
• personal liability of institutional heads for negligence,
• caste-sensitive mental health counselling,
• NAAC-linked audits and social data collection, and
• withdrawal of grants for non-compliance.

What is striking is that many of these proposals go well beyond the minimal guarantees under the 2012 framework. The Court did not characterise them as excessive, divisive, or constitutionally dubious. Instead, it treated them as necessary correctives to entrenched structural discrimination.

The contradiction: Seen in this light, the later stay of the 2026 Regulations marks a sharp doctrinal and institutional turn.

In the Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula petitiom, the Court:

• acknowledged caste-based discrimination as systemic and institutional,
• accepted that neutrality and general anti-ragging norms were inadequate,
• encouraged regulatory expansion and refinement, and
• emphasised accountability, representation, and enforceability.

Yet, in staying the 2026 Regulations, the Court shifted focus to concerns of vagueness, misuse, and over breadth—without explaining why these concerns could not be addressed through interpretation, amendment, or guidelines, the very tools it had earlier endorsed.

This creates a deeper constitutional unease: how does one reconcile a jurisprudence that recognises caste as a structural axis of harm with an interim order that treats caste-specific regulation as inherently suspect? The stay order appears to privilege abstract equality concerns over the lived realities that animated the original petition — the deaths of students failed by institutional indifference.

The Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula proceedings were premised on the understanding that caste discrimination in universities is not episodic, but embedded in evaluation systems, hostel allocation, disciplinary processes, and grievance mechanisms. The Court’s own directions repeatedly moved towards differentiated, targeted protections.

Against that record, the suspension of the 2026 Regulations risks flattening constitutional analysis into a question of formal symmetry—treating all students as equally situated—precisely the approach that the Court itself had earlier found wanting.

It is against this backdrop—of Court-monitored reform aimed at addressing demonstrable institutional failures—that the interim stay assumes particular significance.

The Present Proceedings: What transpired before the Court

The challenge to the Regulations came by way of three writ petitions, filed by Mritunjay Tiwari, Advocate Vineet Jindal, and Rahul Dewan. The principal target of challenge was Regulation 3(1)(c), which defines “caste-based discrimination” as discrimination on the basis of caste against members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes.

According to LiveLaw, the petitioners contended that:

• The definition is restrictive and exclusionary, as it does not recognise caste-based discrimination against persons belonging to non-reserved or “general” categories;
• This exclusion renders such persons remediless, even if subjected to caste-linked harassment or institutional bias;
• The provision violates Article 14 by creating an unreasonable classification lacking a rational nexus with the stated objective of promoting equity.

From the outset, the Bench subjected the Regulations to close scrutiny. Three issues dominated the hearing:

1. The dual definitions of “discrimination” (Regulation 3(1)(e)) and “caste-based discrimination” (Regulation 3(1)(c));
2. The omission of ragging from the 2026 Regulations, despite its inclusion in the 2012 framework; and
3. The use of the term “segregation” in Regulation 7(d), particularly in relation to hostels, classrooms, and mentorship groups.

The Court repeatedly remarked that the Regulations appeared vague, capable of misuse, and potentially productive of social division rather than cohesion.

The Interim Order: What the Court did

By its interim order dated January 29, 2026, the Supreme Court:

• Issued notice to the Union of India and the UGC, returnable on March 19, 2026;
• Directed that the 2026 Regulations be kept in abeyance; and
• Exercising powers under Article 142, ordered that the UGC Regulations of 2012 would continue to operate in the meantime.

As per Bar&Bench, the Court framed four substantial questions of law, broadly concerning:

• The rationality and necessity of defining “caste-based discrimination” separately;
• The impact of the Regulations on sub-classifications within backward classes;
• Whether “segregation” envisaged under the Regulations violates constitutional equality and fraternity; and
• Whether the omission of ragging constitutes a regressive and unconstitutional legislative choice.

While these questions undoubtedly merit careful adjudication, the grant of an interim stay itself demands closer scrutiny.

Why was a stay granted — and was it justified?

Ordinarily, courts exercise considerable restraint while staying statutory or delegated legislation, especially when such legislation is aimed at addressing systemic discrimination. The established standard requires a strong prima facie case, demonstrable irreparable harm, and a balance of convenience favouring suspension.

In the present case, the Court relied primarily on:

• Ambiguity in drafting,
• Possibility of misuse, and
• The perceived exclusion of general category individuals from the definition of caste-based discrimination.

However, ambiguity and potential misuse have traditionally been treated as grounds for interpretation, not suspension, particularly in the context of welfare or protective legislation. The order does not demonstrate how the continued operation of the Regulations would cause irreversible harm sufficient to justify a blanket stay. Notably absent is any engagement with the harm caused by suspending a framework designed to respond to caste-based exclusion—an exclusion that is neither hypothetical nor speculative.

The Court’s reliance on the revival of the 2012 Regulations as a safeguard also assumes that the earlier framework was adequate, despite the fact that the 2019 PIL itself was premised on its failure to prevent institutional discrimination.

The Conceptual Problem: What is “caste-based discrimination”?

At the heart of the Court’s concern lies an unresolved conceptual question: is caste-based discrimination symmetrical?

The petitioners — and, to some extent, the Court — appear to approach caste as a neutral identity marker, capable of disadvantaging any individual depending on circumstances. This framing overlooks the constitutional understanding of caste as a structural system of hierarchy, not merely a personal attribute.

Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently recognised that caste-based discrimination is not simply discrimination involving caste, but discrimination arising from historical, social, and economic subordination of specific communities. To ask why upper-caste individuals are not explicitly protected under a provision addressing caste-based discrimination is to ignore this asymmetry.

Importantly, the Regulations already define “discrimination” broadly and in caste-neutral terms. Any harassment, humiliation, or unfair treatment faced by individuals from non-reserved categories is squarely covered under this definition. The absence of a separate label of “caste-based discrimination” for such individuals does not render them remediless.

The Court’s concern, therefore, risks collapsing the distinction between structural oppression and interpersonal conflict, treating unequal social realities as constitutionally equivalent.

The Slippery Comparison: “Upper castes” and de-notified or extremely backward communities

As noted by legal scholar Gautam Bhatia, one of the petitioners has argued that the impugned regulation suffers from a constitutional flaw comparable to the presumption underlying the colonial Criminal Tribes Act, 1871, which stigmatised entire communities as inherently criminal and was later repealed for violating principles of equality and constitutional morality. This submission, however, appears to rest on an analogy that implicitly places socially dominant or ‘upper’ caste groups on the same constitutional footing as communities that were historically criminalised and later de-notified.

De-notified tribes, in particular, have faced:

• Colonial-era criminalisation;
• Persistent social stigma;
• Economic exclusion; and
• Institutional invisibility even within reservation frameworks.

To suggest that excluding general category individuals from the definition of caste-based discrimination creates an equal protection problem risk flattening historical injustice into abstract formalism. Constitutional equality does not require identical treatment of groups situated in radically unequal positions. Indeed, such an approach may itself violate the principle of equality by treating unequal’s alike.

The Court’s rhetorical invocation of a “casteless society,” while normatively appealing, sits uneasily with judicial precedent cautioning that claims of castelessness often precede, rather than follow, the dismantling of caste hierarchies.

Vagueness, misuse, and the burden on protective legislation

The Court’s repeated emphasis on the “possibility of misuse” raises a familiar but contested trope in Indian constitutional adjudication. It is well settled that: The possibility of abuse of a law is no ground to strike it down.

This principle assumes even greater importance in the context of protective regulations, which have historically been diluted through misuse arguments advanced by socially dominant groups. The order does not explain why ordinary safeguards—such as inquiry mechanisms, appellate review, and judicial oversight—would be insufficient to address misuse on a case-by-case basis.

By foregrounding speculative misuse over structural exclusion, the order risks imposing a higher justificatory burden on equity-oriented regulations than on other forms of delegated legislation.

Ragging, non-regression, and judicial overcorrection

The Court’s concern regarding the omission of ragging from the 2026 Regulations is doctrinally significant, particularly in light of Justice Bagchi’s invocation of the principle of non-regression, as reported by LiveLaw. However, even assuming the omission is a serious flaw, it is not self-evident that the appropriate response was to stay the entire regulatory framework, rather than:

• Read the Regulations harmoniously with existing anti-ragging norms;
• Issue interpretative directions; or
• Direct limited corrective amendments.

The chosen course reflects a form of judicial overcorrection, where legitimate concerns about incompleteness lead to wholesale suspension.

Article 142 and the revival of the 2012 Regulations

The use of Article 142 to revive the 2012 Regulations raises further questions. While intended to prevent a regulatory vacuum, the move effectively substitutes judicial preference for executive policy, without a finding that the earlier framework better advances constitutional values.

This is particularly striking given that the 2026 Regulations were framed pursuant to Court-monitored proceedings and stakeholder consultations following the 2019 PIL. The revival thus appears less as a neutral stopgap and more as a normative rollback, albeit temporarily.

What the Supreme Court Directed in the Payal Tadvi–Rohith Vemula PIL — and why the stay order sits uneasily with it

The Supreme Court’s interim stay of the UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 must be read against the backdrop of the Court’s own continuing supervision in Abeda Salim Tadvi v. Union of India—the petition arising from the institutional failures that culminated in the deaths of Payal Tadvi and Rohith Vemula.

Conclusion: interim caution or substantive retreat?

The Supreme Court’s interim order undoubtedly reflects a desire to prevent social fragmentation and regulatory excess. Yet, in its emphasis on neutrality, symmetry, and speculative misuse, the Court risks diluting the constitutional logic of substantive equality that has long justified differentiated protections for caste-oppressed communities.

The deeper danger lies not merely in staying one set of regulations, but in the judicial reframing of caste-based discrimination as a universally symmetrical phenomenon, detached from history and structure. Whether this framing endures at the final stage will determine whether the Court’s intervention is remembered as a moment of careful constitutional recalibration—or as a cautious but consequential retreat from the promise of transformative equality.

The complete order may be read below:

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The post The stay of UGC Equity Regulations, 2026: The interim order, the proceedings, and the constitutional questions raised appeared first on SabrangIndia.

When the Court sought the stand of the petitioner, the request was strongly opposed by Advocate Dr. Ujjwalkumar Chavhan, appearing for the petitioner, Dr. Sangram Patil, a UK-based doctor and YouTuber. Counsel submitted that the petitioner continues to be illegally restrained within India due to a Look Out Circular (LOC) that remains in force, despite no final adjudication on its legality. He further pointed out that during the previous hearing, the February 4 date had been fixed after confirming the availability and convenience of the Advocate General, Mr. Sathe, yet the State had failed to file its reply till date.

Emphasising the grave consequences of delay, Dr. Chavhan informed the Court that the petitioner is an MD in Anaesthetics and is employed in the United Kingdom, and that prolonged pendency of the matter is jeopardising his professional career and livelihood. He argued that continuing to restrain the petitioner’s travel without timely hearing effectively amounts to turning the legal process itself into punishment, a practice that runs contrary to established principles of criminal jurisprudence. In view of these submissions, he urged the Court not to entertain any further adjournment.

Accepting the objections raised by the petitioner, the Bombay High Court rejected the State’s request for adjournment, directing that the matter proceed as scheduled.

The case arises from an FIR registered against Patil at the NM Joshi Marg Police Station, Mumbai, based on a complaint filed by Nikhil Bhamre, head of the BJP’s Media Cell. The FIR, lodged on December 18, 2025, alleges that Patil shared or amplified “objectionable” content on social media that amounted to “disinformation” against the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its senior leaders. The content was allegedly hosted on a Facebook page titled “Shehar Vikas Aghadi.”

Based on the complaint, police invoked Section 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita (BNS), which penalises acts intended to spread false information so as to incite enmity between groups. The offence is classified as non-bailable.

Patil, a British national of Indian origin, had travelled to Mumbai from London on January 10, where he was detained by Mumbai Police upon arrival at the international airport. Subsequently, on January 19, immigration authorities prevented him from boarding a return flight to the UK, citing the existence of a Look Out Circular. He was eventually permitted to record his statement before the police on January 21, but continues to remain in India due to the travel restrictions.

On January 22, the Bombay High Court, presided over by Justice Ashwin Bhobe, issued notice to the State of Maharashtra on Patil’s plea challenging both the FIR and the LOC. The Court directed the State to file its reply by the next date of hearing.

Patil has approached the High Court through Senior Advocate Sudeep Pasbola, seeking quashing of the FIR and the Look Out Circular. He has also prayed for interim relief, urging the Court to stay the investigation and restrain the prosecution from taking any coercive steps, including filing a chargesheet, until further orders. Additionally, Patil has sought permission to travel back to the United Kingdom, where he is employed.

The matter is scheduled to be taken up next on February 4, with the High Court having made it clear that no further delay will be entertained.

Related:

Bombay HC: Notice to Maharashtra state, police on UK doctor, Sangram Patil’s petition seeking quashing of LOC & FIR

Dr Sangram Patil detained by Mumbai Crime Branch, move sharply condemned

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From Purola to Nainital: APCR report details pattern of communal violence in Uttarakhand

The post Bombay High Court rejects State’s adjournment plea in Sangram Patil case; hearing to proceed on February 4 appeared first on SabrangIndia.