ADR has issued a clarification in response, presenting its version of events and reiterating its stated commitment to accuracy, transparency, and non-partisan public interest work

Background

During the hearing on October 9, 2025, senior advocate Rakesh Dwivedi, representing the Election Commission, alleged that ADR submitted incorrect and unverified information in its plea. Specifically, he pointed out a case where the person cited by ADR as having been excluded from the final voter list was not even included in the draft electoral roll. Further complicating matters, the details provided appeared to correspond to a different individual—a woman—raising questions about the accuracy of the information presented.

The Supreme Court Bench, led by Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi, expressed significant concern over ADR’s conduct, remarking, “We wonder if such a person even exists.”

Defending the submissions, ADR’s counsel Prashant Bhushan stated that the information had been provided by a “very responsible person” and suggested that the District Legal Service Authority could assist in verifying the claims. Despite this, the court remained unconvinced and declined to issue any blanket relief based on the affidavits, given their questionable nature.

Not filed, but shared on request, nature of the document clarified

On October 11, ADR clarified that the affidavit in question was not formally filed as part of court proceedings. Rather, it was tendered across the bar—a standard legal practice—only in response to a specific question from the Court.

The organisation emphasised that this distinction is important to prevent the mischaracterisation of its actions and intent during the hearing.

Verifiable details: voter information was accurate and public

The voter whose details were shared in the affidavit is a resident of 115, Shaheed Sthal Road, Gulzarbagh, Patna – 800007, with EPIC No. YHX3046307. His details appear at Serial No. 653 in Part No. 52 of the 184 Patna Sahib constituency, as recorded in the publicly available electoral roll on the ECI’s official website.

ADR asserts that every single detail furnished in the affidavit was accurate and verifiable through official ECI records—contradicting the claim that the elector was “fake” or improperly identified.

Draft roll confusion: same link, multiple versions

ADR further explained the likely source of the confusion. The elector or someone assisting him had probably checked his name in the “Draft Roll – 2025”, published by the ECI in January 2025, where his name was clearly listed.

The issue arose, ADR says, because the “Draft Roll – 2025” and the “SIR Draft 2025” are both hosted on the same webpage and dropdown menu on the ECI’s website. This technical overlap may have led to misunderstanding or misinterpretation in the courtroom.

“That with regard to the elector’s statement that his name appeared in the draft roll, it is clarified that the elector/someone on his behalf had possibly checked his name on the “Draft Roll – 2025” of January 2025 on which his name was duly mentioned.  It is to be noted that both the “Draft Roll- 2025” and “SIR Draft 2025” have been published by the ECI on the same web link and same drop-down menu (as shown in the image below) available at https://voters.eci.gov.in/download-eroll?stateCode=S04. His details are available on the Draft Roll – 2025 for AC 184 Part No. 52 at Serial No. 653, and every detail furnished in the affidavit matches that record” ADR stated

Screenshots of the elector’s name on Draft Roll – 2025, Final Roll – 2025, SIR Deleted List, and his current status

The records clearly show that the voter was listed in the Draft Roll and subsequently excluded—pointing to a possible procedural lapse, not misrepresentation.

Shahid Voter Status

Misleading allegations: ADR refutes claim of falsification

ADR called the ECI counsel’s claim—that the EPIC number belonged to another person or that the voter was non-existent—misleading and avoidable. The organisation pointed out that a simple EPIC number lookup on the ECI portal would have verified the details without ambiguity.

Instead, ADR says, an inaccurate assertion was made in court, which risked damaging its credibility and caused undue distress to the elector involved.

Voter under duress

ADR expressed serious concern over the treatment of the elector, who has allegedly been summoned, hounded, and threatened by officials following the court hearing.

Such action, the organisation warns, could discourage voters from speaking up about their deletion from rolls or from seeking redress when proper procedures—like speaking orders—are not followed by the authorities.

⁠”It is highly unfortunate that the said elector is being hounded, summoned, and threatened by the officials since the Supreme Court’s hearing dated 07.10.2025. This will further create more distrust, fear, and reluctance on the part of electors to come forward in case of their deletion from the electoral rolls or in case speaking orders have not been given to them” ADR said

We continue to stand by fact-based, non-partisan work: ADR

ADR concluded its statement by reaffirming its commitment to fact-based, non-partisan work. For over 25 years, the organisation has built trust among voters, civil society, and institutions by providing accurate, data-driven insights into electoral and governance issues.

ADR in its statement assured the Courts, lawyers, and voters that we continue to stand by fact-based, non-partisan work.

Related

The Erased Record: A constitutional challenge to the election commission’s 45-day data destruction mandate

India’s election system is being weaponised, will the Opposition act?

Bihar SIR: 65 Lakh electors flagged for deletion, SC said “if there is mass exclusion, we will immediately step in”

The post ADR refutes allegation of giving false voter affidavit in SC hearing appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The order, issued by the Senior Judicial Magistrate of the Sadar Court in Chapainawabganj on September 30, pertains to two families from Birbhum district, West Bengal, including 26-year-old Sunali (Sonali) Khatun, who is in her final trimester of pregnancy, her husband Danish Sheikh, their eight-year-old son Sabir, Sweety Bibi (32), and her two sons aged six and sixteen.

According to The Indian Express, the magistrate concluded that all six individuals are Indian citizens, citing their Aadhaar card numbers and residential addresses in West Bengal as documentary proof. The order was transmitted to the Indian High Commission in Dhaka for “appropriate diplomatic action.”

Families pushed out after police sweep in Delhi

As The Quint and The Times of India reported, the families were detained from Delhi’s Rohini area in June 2025, during a police drive against “illegal Bangladeshi immigrants.” Despite presenting identity documents, Delhi Police allegedly ignored their Aadhaar cards and work records, branding them as foreigners. They were then forcibly pushed across the border in Assam on June 26, where they were arrested for “unlawful entry” and have since remained in Chapai Nawabganj jail.

Sunali’s father, Bhodu Sheikh, had filed a habeas corpus petition before the Calcutta High Court, expressing fear that his daughter’s unborn child would be rendered stateless. On September 26, a Division Bench of Justices Tapabrata Chakraborty and Reetobroto Kumar Mitra held that the Centre’s deportation order was illegal, castigating authorities for acting in “hot haste” and ordering the government to bring the families back within four weeks.

In Bhodu Sheikh v. Union of India & Ors., the Calcutta High Court quashed the deportation of three West Bengal residents — Sunali Khatun, her husband Danish Sheikh, and their minor son Sabir — who had been picked up by the Delhi Police during an “identity verification drive” on June 24, 2025, and deported to Bangladesh within forty-eight hours. The petitioner, Bhodu Sheikh, a resident of Birbhum, argued that his daughter and her family were Indian citizens by birth with roots and landholdings in West Bengal, and that Sunali was pregnant when she was detained. He alleged that the deportation was carried out without any inquiry, in violation of the Ministry of Home Affairs memo dated May 2, 2025, which mandates a 30-day verification process through the home State before any repatriation.

The Union of India, through the Additional Solicitor General, contended that the detainees had confessed to being Bangladeshi nationals who had entered India illegally in 1998 and had failed to produce documents proving citizenship. Rejecting this defence, the Bench of Justices Tapabrata Chakraborty and Reetobroto Kumar Mitra held that “suspicion, howsoever high, cannot be a substitute of actual proof,” and that a confession before a police officer “without any safeguards would be a direct infringement of Articles 14, 20(3), and 21 of the Constitution.” The Court pointed out glaring contradictions in the interrogation reports, noting that Sunali’s Aadhaar and PAN cards showed she was born in 2000, making it impossible for her to have entered India “illegally” in 1998.

Holding that the MHA memo was blatantly disregarded, the Court described the deportation as having been carried out “in hot haste,” and ruled that such acts “cripple the constitutional grant of fairness and reasonableness.” It emphasised that “the lifestyle of the people shapes the profile of the law and not vice versa,” and warned that executive discretion cannot be unfettered or whimsical. Consequently, the Court set aside the detention and deportation orders dated 24.06.2025 and 26.06.2025, directing the Union, FRRO Delhi, and Delhi Police to repatriate the family within four weeks through the Indian High Commission in Dhaka. A plea for stay was considered and rejected outright, underscoring the Bench’s message that liberty once lost must be swiftly restored.

Details of the said case may be read here.

“The People We Branded Bangladeshi Have Been Declared Indian by Bangladesh”

Reacting to the Bangladesh court’s decision, Trinamool Congress Rajya Sabha MP Samirul Islam, who also heads the West Bengal Migrant Workers’ Welfare Board, said the verdict exposed the Central government’s anti-Bengal bias and linguistic profiling.

“The very people whom our own country tried so hard to brand as Bangladeshi have now been proven to be Indians — not by us, but by Bangladesh. In a landmark verdict, a Bangladeshi court has not only declared them Indian citizens but even cited their Aadhaar card numbers and residential addresses as proof. The court’s order has been officially sent to the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, directing that all of them — including the pregnant woman from Birbhum, Sonali Khatun — be safely sent back to India” Islam wrote on X, sharing a copy of the judgment.

His social media post may be read below:

Islam confirmed that his office arranged legal aid for the families in Bangladesh and that a copy of the judgment has already reached the Indian High Commission in Dhaka. However, he noted that the six remain jailed despite the clear directive for repatriation.

Pregnant woman’s plight deepens

Social worker Mofijul Sk, who has been coordinating their case from Chapainawabganj, told The Times of India that Sunali Khatun has been crying and pleading to return home. “She kept asking, ‘How long will I have to stay here? What is our fault? Please tell them I have a daughter waiting at home,’” Mofijul recounted.

Sunali reportedly fell and injured herself in jail but was denied an ultrasound since the prison hospital lacked adequate facilities. “She is depressed and physically weak,” said Mofijul, adding that the local Indian Deputy High Commission in Rajshahi has been informed of her condition.

Diplomatic delays and legal tangles

An Indian government official told TOI that repatriation may take time, arguing that “an Aadhaar card is not proof of Indian citizenship” and that a flag meeting between the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) will be necessary before the transfer.

However, lawyer Saikat Thakurata, representing Sunali’s family in the Calcutta High Court, said the process cannot be delayed on “technical excuses,” as a Bangladeshi court itself has verified their Indian nationality. “Diplomatic coordination is needed, but every day of delay worsens their suffering,” he said (TOI, Scroll).

Pattern of targeting Bengali-speaking migrants

As Citizens for Justice and Peace has noted, this case forms part of a broader pattern since May 2025 when thousands of Bengali-speaking workers—mostly Muslims—were rounded up across BJP-ruled states, including Delhi, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh, and asked to prove citizenship. Many were detained and deported without due process, based solely on linguistic identity.

Advocate Prashant Bhushan, appearing before the Supreme Court, had earlier described these deportations as “grossly unconstitutional.”

“This lady has been pushed out forcibly from the country while pregnant, without any proof that she is a foreigner,” Bhushan had argued before a bench of Justices Surya Kant, Joymalya Bagchi, and Vipul Pancholi. “Authorities are treating the Bengali language itself as evidence of foreignness.”

Detailed reports on such illegal deportations may be read here, here and here.

Families await return amid bureaucratic silence

Meanwhile, Sweety Bibi’s brother Amir Khan told The Quint that the families have not heard any official update. “All she does is cry helplessly. No one from our village now dares to go to Delhi for work. But if we stay here, there is no work either,” he said.

Civil society activists, including Arnab Pal of the Migrant Workers’ Unity Forum, have urged the Indian government to expedite the repatriation, warning that delay could amount to criminal negligence, especially with Sunali nearing childbirth.

Related:

Calcutta High Court strikes down arbitrary deportations of West Bengal residents, orders return from Bangladesh

Gauhati High Court seeks Centre’s May 2025 deportation notification as legality of re-detention of Abdul Shiekh and Majibur Rehman is scrutinised

Another Pushback Halted: SC stays deportation of woman declared foreigner, issues notice on challenge to Gauhati HC order

CJP Win! Gauhati HC stays deportation of Ajabha Khatun, will address bail demand on April 4

Assam’s New SOP Hands Citizenship Decisions to Bureaucrats: Executive overreach or legal necessity?

The post Bangladesh Court declares six deported Bengalis as Indian citizens, orders their repatriation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The NCRB’s data functions like gospel in courtrooms, reports, and media outlets. And yet, the authority of its findings relies on the assumption that the act of counting is not itself an act of power. Counting crime, however, is a political act masked in the bureaucratic detachment of its tables, graphs, and other representations of data. The political project is quiet but to present to the national imagination of justice the act of determining which crime, and more importantly, who’s suffering, is worth preserving in the record.

The Politics of Delay

The NCRB’s (National Crime Records Bureau) report of 2023, which detailed crime across the nation of India, including its 28 states and 8 Union Territories, was released in September 2025. The prior report (Crime in India 2021) took an entire 14 months to come out; this 2023 report has taken nearly 2 years. The Ministry of Home Affairs explanation for the delay, “data consolidation and verification”, is a common and routine bureaucratic response.

However, the timing matters. Delays distort accountability. By the time the data is in the public domain, it is no longer a measurement of the political moment it originally described. When hate crimes flare, when trends of custodial violence rise, when protests become suppressed – those realities have become lost within time. The NCRB’s silence is neither neutral nor impartial; instead, it is strategic.

The delay in the publication of ‘data’ in moments of political sensitivity turns ‘public data’ into a curated and managed narrative. That the 2023 report arrives late, after two national elections have already occurred, and several rounds of communal violence, is no coincidence; it is very evidently institutionalized amnesia.

Selective Vision: What the Numbers Hide

The most immediate observation for a careful reader is what is not recorded. Jammu & Kashmir, according to the NCRB, reported zero sedition cases in 2023 and zero cases of communal or religious violence. This is a region where expression is restricted, people have been detained en masse under the Public Safety Act, and the internet is repeatedly shut down. The data suggests order and harmony; however, lived experience reveals pervasive control.

Maharashtra, not to be outdone by Jammu and Kashmir, has also had well-publicized prosecutions under UAPA and sedition laws; it thus recorded only one case of indirect UAPA prosecution and one sedition FIR in the same year. For reference, independent observers track FIRs, and the media covered at least a dozen UAPA/sedition FIRs that occurred in that year.

The issue isn’t just about statistical erasure and representation; it’s how classification is used as a tool of governance. A sedition FIR can be reclassified as “public mischief,” or a hate-crime FIR as simply “rioting.” The very fabric of normalcy can be maintained by the State. With the examples from criminal law enforcement, the NCRB’s annual report provides further quantification and narrative control.

The Erasure of Hate

One of the most obvious gaps is still the absence of any hate-crime and lynching data. After the widespread of mob lynchings in 2017, which led to huge public outrage, the NCRB created a new category for “hate crime,” “honour killings” and “mob violence.” After a year, those categories dropped out of the tables. The government told Parliament that states were giving them “unreliable data.” In the years since, there has not been a single official record of hate crimes in India.

This bureaucratic erasure is particularly striking when independent monitoring shows supportive evidence of hate crimes. The India Hate Lab found in its 2025 Report that Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra together accounted for more than 50% of hate-speech incidents across India observed. Yet in looking at the NCRB 2023 tables of incidents of crime, it covers records of “rioting” and “offences against the state,” without any named hate.

As such, violence with a communal motive is folded into a generic “group clashes,” “public disorder,” or “arson.” The political becomes the statistical. The intentional becomes the invisible. By not naming hate, the state avoids evidence of their own complicity in enabling hate.

When ‘Marginal’ Means Massive

According to the NCRB report of 2023, crimes against women increased by 0.7% and crimes against children increased by 9.2%. All of the media accounts repeated news stories featuring the language: “Crimes up marginally.” But the word “marginal” itself conceals more than it reveals.

Domestic cruelty, the largest category of crime against women, remains at a staggering 31.4%, as assault and sexual harassment follow back-to-back. For children, sexual offences under POCSO comprise over 80% of all crimes documented. The adverse statistics of conviction rates leave much to be desired, with higher than 30% in many of the states, while pendency rates approach or exceed 90% in court systems.

The distortion lies in the flatness of the data itself. The data are counting incidents and not silences. Underreporting, arising from stigma, police refusal, or fear of retaliation, is widely accepted to be pervasive. When NCRB states that violence has levelled and/or stabilized, it is the institutional response that has levelled and not the violence itself.

Even in the absence of intersectionality in crime, intersectionality gets omitted in collectives. If a Dalit woman is raped by an upper caste person, the report lists the event as “crime against women,” not “crime against SC.” In addition, if a queer or disabled survivor is the victim, they have no collective statistical identity at all. The “blindness” of the system prevents the recognition of compounded vulnerability and fails to acknowledge the visibility of the crimes, which makes them least able to seek justice and experience the most victimization.

Free Speech without a Trace

The discrepancy between what is experienced on the ground and what is officially reported is perhaps most pronounced in cases involving freedom of speech. While the judiciary has made it clear, on numerous occasions, that dissent is a right in a democracy, the NCRB’s data from 2023 tells an entirely different story, one of perhaps complete calm—as if India has no crisis of free speech whatsoever.

A key event occurred in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India, which was decided by the Bombay High Court on August 22, 2024. The case challenged a provision of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023, namely Rule 3(1)(b)(v), which allowed a “fact-checking unit” that the government had notified to declare internet content “fake or false or misleading” about the business of the Central Government. Once identified, social media intermediaries would be required to remove or disable the content.

Kamra asserted that this provision amounted to the government being the sole truth authority, a prior restraint that violated Article 19(1)(a), and went beyond the limits of “reasonable restrictions” in Article 19(2).

Article 19(1)(a): (1) All citizens shall have the right— 

• to freedom of speech and expression; 

Article 19(2): (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

The Bombay High Court agreed and struck down the rule on constitutional terms. In strong words, Justices G.S. Patel and Neela Gokhale said the rule imposed a “chilling effect” on speech and “flipped the democratic relationship between citizen and State.” The judgment affirmed that free expression is not a privilege given by the government, but a freedom that constrains government authority itself.

Nevertheless, the NCRB’s section on “Offences Against the State” gives no trace of this struggle. There is no recognition of hundreds of FIRs against journalists, stand-up artists, and students, filed under vaguely stated sections of the IPC and the IT Act. The report indicates only 107 sedition cases and 361 UAPA cases, numbers that are significantly lower than independent counts. What results from this is a fictional statistic: on paper, dissent hardly exists, but in practice, dissent is policed every day.

The Illusion of Order: Data without Democracy

The NCRB’s credibility is cracking even in seemingly neutral categories. While the report indicates a drop in cybercrime cases of 11.7 in Mumbai, RTI data shows that only 2% of the complaints made through the National Cyber Crime Portal are even registered as FIRs. As an expert told The Times of India, this decline is “a statistical illusion”; the progressive appearance of reducing cases masked police reluctance to register cases. Fewer FIRs are better numbers; better numbers are better for political comfort.

The illusion is deepened inside India’s prisons. The Prison Statistics 2023 report states that there is a total population of 5.8 lakh, of which 77.9% are undertrials, people who have not committed any offence. Among undertrials, Dalits comprise 22%, Adivasis 13%, and Muslims 16%, all incredibly disproportionate to their representation in the population. The report also mentions 1,800 plus custodial deaths last year, but does not provide much detail about this, including state or cause. Women, approximately 4% of all inmates, still do not have access to basic sanitary and maternal care. The overall impression is that presenting data without any context turns structural injustice into bureaucratic routine.

In the meantime, the government has been pleased to note a 26% drop in “Offences against the State”, down from 7,128 in 2019 to only 5,272 cases in 2023. During this time, we are expected to assume, show that the nation remains stable. In this regard, the “decline” is merely a reclassification, not a reform, as the state is only quieter because it has erased dissent from the ledger, while journalists, activists, and students are now experiencing surveillance or detention.

In the end, what the NCRB provides is not an understanding but control of the narrative. Its lack of transparency converts governance into ideology; a system where what is not counted is overlooked and what is overlooked is, by design, absent.

Towards Data Justice

If recognition is the first step to justice, then the crime data of India requires a constitutional reboot.

The NCRB (National Crime Records Bureau) ought to be thought of as a public accountability office, and not just a bureaucratic appendage for record-keeping. Its processes should be opened to audit, its categories, a reflection of social reality rather than bureaucratic convenience. Independent auditing, by the National Human Rights Commission, specific Parliamentary Committees, or civil society organizations, should be made part of its function. Existing independent databases or projects documenting hate crimes should also be recognized as proper and legitimate data sources, existing in context that can fill official silences.

To put it more bluntly, police or peripheral agencies can also create invisibility and silence of their own. In the end, crime statistics are not just numbers; they are moral narratives. In particular, the NCRB report for 2023 speaks less about the status of crime and even more about the status of The State itself. In short, it reminds us that numbers can be used as a way to practice power- invisibility is engineered and silence is measurable.

As long as data is not democratized, justice will not be served.

The petition filed by Kunal Kamra can be read here:

The entire judgment in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India can be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:

NCRB’s Prison Statistics Report 2019 paints a bleak picture

Inexplicable delay in release of NCRB figures

India Hate Lab Report 2024: Unveiling the rise of hate speech and communal rhetoric

Holding power to account: CJP’s efforts to combat hate and polarisation

Free Speech Upheld: Bombay HC strikes down IT (Amendment) Rules, 2023 as unconstitutional

The post Crimes Uncounted: When Data Becomes the State’s Defence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Court ruled that a person can only be convicted under Section 149 if the prosecution establishes—either directly or through credible circumstances—that the accused shared the “common object” of the assembly that committed the offence.

The bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan delivered the verdict allowing two criminal appeals filed by ten individuals who had been convicted under Sections 302 (murder) and 149 (unlawful assembly) for a violent 1988 clash in Katihar district, Bihar, arising from a dispute over government-allotted agricultural land.

The appellants had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Katihar Sessions Court, and the Patna High Court had upheld the conviction in 2013. The Supreme Court, however, found that the evidence against the accused was “vague, omnibus, and insufficient to establish a shared common object.”

Background: The 1988 Katihar clash

The case originated from a violent altercation on November 20, 1988, in Katihar district, when two groups clashed over the harvesting of paddy on land distributed by the Bihar government. The prosecution alleged that a mob of 400–500 people armed with guns, spears, and sticks attacked the complainant Jagdish Mahato (PW-20) and his brother Meghu Mahato, killing Meghu and another villager, Sarjug Mahato.

Seventy-two individuals were named in the FIR, of whom twenty-four were charge-sheeted. The Katihar Sessions Court convicted twenty-one under Sections 302 and 149 IPC, while the Patna High Court in 2013 upheld the conviction of eleven. The remaining accused approached the Supreme Court, arguing that they were innocent villagers wrongly implicated merely for being present.

Supreme Court’s analysis

The limits of constructive liability: Justice Pardiwala, writing for the bench, clarified that Section 149 IPC cannot be invoked mechanically to hold all persons present at the scene guilty. The Court observed that presence and participation are not synonymous, and that criminal liability under Section 149 arises only when an accused shares the common object of the assembly.

“At the same time, mere presence at the scene does not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly, unless it is established that such an accused also shared its common object. A mere bystander, to whom no specific role is attributed, would not fall within the ambit of Section 149 of the IPC. The prosecution has to establish, through reasonably direct or indirect circumstances, that the accused persons shared a common object of the unlawful assembly.” (Para 54)

The seven-factor test for determining common object: To guide future courts, the Supreme Court formulated a seven-part test to determine whether a person’s presence amounted to participation in an unlawful assembly:

1. The time and place where the assembly was formed;
2. The conduct and behaviour of its members near the scene;
3. The collective conduct of the assembly, as distinct from that of individual members;
4. The motive underlying the crime;
5. The manner in which the incident unfolded;
6. The nature of weapons carried and used; and
7. The nature, extent, and number of the injuries inflicted, and other relevant considerations.

The Court emphasised that these indicators must be objectively applied to ensure that constructive liability does not turn into collective punishment.

“Rule of Caution” in mob prosecutions: In a pointed caution to trial courts, the bench noted that cases involving large mobs often carry a risk of over-implication and require “utmost care” to distinguish between actual participants and passive onlookers.

“The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that where there are general allegations against a large number of persons, the court must remain very careful before convicting all of them on vague or general evidence. Therefore, the courts ought to look for some cogent and credible material that lends assurance. It is safe to convict only those whose presence is not only consistently established from the stage of FIR, but also to whom overt acts are attributed which are in furtherance of the common object of the unlawful assembly.” (Para 61)

Citing Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964), the bench reiterated that in cases with numerous accused, courts should rely on at least two or three consistent and trustworthy witnesses before confirming guilt.

Justice Pardiwala underscored that this caution does not dilute the principle of constructive liability, but ensures its fair and judicious application, particularly in incidents arising from mob violence or communal tension.

“This Court, as a matter of caution, has enunciated parameters to safeguard innocent spectators or passive onlookers from being convicted merely on account of their presence. This cautionary rule, however, does not dilute the doctrine of constructive liability, under which proof of an overt act by each individual is not indispensable. Where the presence of a large number of persons is established and many are implicated, prudence mandates strict adherence to this rule of caution.” (Para 55)

Findings and acquittal

The Court found that the prosecution had failed to link the ten appellants to the common object of the mob or to any specific act of violence. The evidence, it said, was “vague, contradictory, and omnibus in nature,” insufficient to prove their participation beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court also expressed concern over the casual manner in which the investigating authorities had registered and pursued the case, noting inconsistencies between witness accounts and medical evidence.

“It cannot be said that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. A case attains that standard when all its links are firmly established and recognizable to the eyes of a reasonable person. In the present matter, the prosecution version does not appear to stem from a truthful narration of facts.” (Para 82)

Clarifying “Common Object”

The verdict further explained that the phrase “in prosecution of the common object” means that the crime must have been directly connected to or committed in furtherance of the assembly’s object. Liability arises only if members intended or knew that the offence was likely to be committed.

“While ascertaining this fact, it is of utmost importance to consider whether the assembly consisted of some persons who were merely passive onlookers who had joined the assembly as a matter of idle curiosity, without the knowledge of the common object of the assembly, since such persons cannot be said to be members of the unlawful assembly. We say so because, the nucleus of Section 149 is “common object”.” (Para 52)

Significance: A defining standard for mob liability

This judgment marks a major reaffirmation of individualised culpability in collective offences. It establishes that criminal responsibility cannot be imposed by association, and that courts must rigorously differentiate active participants from innocent spectators. The decision will have far-reaching implications for cases involving mob violence, communal clashes, and political protests, where mass arrests and omnibus charges are common.

By setting a structured evidentiary standard, the Court has not only clarified Section 149 IPC but also reinforced the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty against arbitrary criminal liability.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

CJP files complaint to Maharashtra DGP, SP Jalgaon over police participation in communal rally amid Suleman Pathan lynching probe

Violence & Sanatan Dharma: Now suspended lawyer defends shoe attack on CJI Gavai, claims it was a protest against ‘bulldozer’ remark”

Calcutta High Court quashes arbitrary deportation, orders return of West Bengal families from Bangladesh

Free speech, even in bad taste, is protected if no incitement to violence: HP HC

The post Mere Presence Does Not Imply Guilt: Supreme Court defines clear test for liability under unlawful assembly appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Indian Express reported that the video shows a man seated on a chair gripping a young boy by his hair, tearing out handfuls of it, and throwing the hair into a dustbin — all while laughing. The boy, visibly terrified, pleads for the abuse to stop. The person seen committing the act has been identified as a sanitation worker employed at the station, while the video was allegedly filmed by a police constable posted there.

Police have now registered an FIR under multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) — including Section 115(2) (voluntarily causing hurt), Section 198 (willful disobedience of law with intent to cause injury), and Section 54 (abetment while present). The case also invokes Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, which criminalises cruelty towards a child, according to The Indian Express.

The incident and the complaint

According to the FIR, the incident occurred last month after the boy — a minor — was detained in an assault case. The complaint, filed by his grandmother, states that he had been picked up by the police following a neighbourhood altercation that left one person injured in an alleged knife attack. The police then detained the boy and subsequently sent him to a juvenile remand home, where he remained for about 16–17 days before being released, as per Indian Express.

Initially, the youth did not disclose the abuse he suffered in custody. His grandmother told The Indian Express that he became withdrawn and fearful after being released. It was only when the video surfaced on social media several weeks later that he revealed the truth — that during his detention, he was humiliated, beaten, and had his hair forcibly pulled out while police officers looked on and one recorded the act on his phone.

The grandmother then approached community leaders for help, and together they drafted a formal complaint. This complaint named four persons: the sanitation worker, the constable, the station’s police inspector, and an Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP).

Community intervention and representation

Mujahid Nafees, Convener of the Minority Coordination Committee (MCC), wrote to Gujarat DGP Vikas Sahay on behalf of the family, demanding immediate disciplinary and criminal action against the officers involved. The application was formally forwarded to Rajkot Police Commissioner Brajesh Kumar Jha, reported The Indian Express.

With the assistance of local community members, the youth’s grandmother also submitted a separate written representation to the Police Commissioner. However, when the FIR was finally registered, it named only two accused — the constable and the sanitation worker — omitting the senior officers originally mentioned.

According to sources close to the family, reported The Indian Express, the police presented what they described as “convincing evidence” that both the Inspector and ACP were not present at the police station when the incident occurred. This led to their exclusion from the FIR, though activists have criticised the decision as premature and lacking transparency.

Official statements and inquiry

When contacted, Rajkot City Police Commissioner Brajesh Kumar Jha was unavailable for comment. DCP Zone-2 Rakesh Desai told The Indian Express that the FIR had been filed based on the grandmother’s complaint. “In the case of the video of a minor whose hair is being pulled out, his grandmother has given a complaint and we have filed an FIR,” Desai said. “The accused police constable has been transferred to headquarters, and the sanitation worker has been removed from his job.”

When asked about the inspector and ACP who were named in the initial complaint but not in the FIR, DCP Desai said, “Our inquiry has found that they were not involved.”

The preliminary inquiry has now been assigned to ACP (West) Radhika Bharai, who confirmed to The Indian Express that she has recorded statements from all involved and will submit her final report shortly. The criminal investigation into the FIR will be handled by a Police Sub-Inspector from another chowki under the same jurisdiction to ensure impartiality.

A second case of custodial torture against a minor

This latest incident in Rajkot comes on the heels of another horrifying case from Botad district, Gujarat, where four police constables were booked for the alleged torture and sexual assault of a 17-year-old boy in custody in August 2025. The case has attracted national attention due to the boy’s critical condition and the Supreme Court’s involvement.

According to the report of LiveLaw, the sister of the victim filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court, seeking an investigation by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) or the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). As provided in the petition, the boy was picked up by police officers of Botad Town on August 19, 2025, from a local fair on suspicion of theft. He was illegally detained for over nine days — from August 19 to August 28 — during which he was brutally assaulted and sexually abused by four to six officers.

The plea alleged multiple violations of procedural law:

• The minor was not produced before a Juvenile Justice Board or magistrate within 24 hours,
• No medical examination was conducted,
• His grandfather was also detained and tortured, and
• Officials later attempted to coerce the family into signing false statements.

On September 1, as per Bar & Bench, police told the family that the boy was suffering from an “insect bite” and required specialised medical attention. He was transferred to Zydus Hospital, Ahmedabad, where doctors found that he had suffered severe kidney damage requiring dialysis, temporary blindness, and seizures resulting from trauma.

The petition further stated that the boy remained in the ICU, and during this time, police officials allegedly forced his signature on certain documents and compelled family members to sign papers claiming that his injuries were due to a bicycle fall. The hospital refused to share the toxicology report or medical details with the family.

Supreme Court’s directions

The matter reached the Supreme Court in early October. A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard the petition on October 7, 2025. As per LiveLaw, the bench refused to entertain the case directly, directing the petitioner to first approach the Gujarat High Court for relief.

Justice Nath observed: “Our sympathy is with your case, but the proper way is to go to the High Court.” Justice Mehta added that the petitioner could return to the Supreme Court if the High Court failed to take adequate steps.

The petitioner’s lawyer, pleaded for urgent directions to preserve the CCTV footage of the police station and to constitute a medical board from AIIMS, citing fears that crucial evidence might be destroyed. The Court, however, declined to issue immediate orders, stating, “It won’t be destroyed if you go to the High Court timely.”

Civil society response and pattern of abuse

The Minority Coordination Committee (MCC), which has taken up both the Rajkot and Botad cases, has called for the immediate suspension of the accused officers, registration of additional offences under custodial violence statutes, and judicial monitoring of the investigations.

Human rights advocates and legal experts have expressed grave concern over the emerging pattern of police violence against minors, particularly Muslim youth from marginalized backgrounds. They point out that both cases involve illegal detention, denial of medical access, and attempts at cover-up, indicating a culture of impunity within the state’s policing system.

Bhatt, who represented the Botad victim’s family, told Bar & Bench that these incidents “demonstrate a systemic disregard for due process and a chilling normalisation of custodial violence against minors.”

Conclusion: The urgency of accountability

The two back-to-back incidents — in Rajkot and Botad — lay bare a disturbing continuity of abuse within Gujarat’s police system, particularly against young Muslim males. Both cases reveal a pattern of dehumanizing violence, institutional protectionism, and token disciplinary actions that stop short of real accountability.

While Rajkot police have limited their action to transferring one constable and dismissing a sanitation worker, such cosmetic measures do little to restore public faith. Rights organizations have called for:

• Independent investigations under judicial supervision,
• Immediate forensic preservation of CCTV footage and medical records,
• Prosecution of officers under sections related to custodial torture and juvenile protection, and
• Oversight by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)

As has been documented, these incidents are not isolated excesses — they are symptoms of a systemic crisis. Unless the Gujarat government ensures structural accountability and enforces zero tolerance for custodial brutality, these cases will fade into the familiar pattern of viral outrage followed by institutional silence.

Related:

CJP files complaint to Maharashtra DGP, SP Jalgaon over police participation in communal rally amid Suleman Pathan lynching probe

Cuttack plunged into chaos during Durga Puja, dozens injured as procession clashes spiral into violence

NBDSA pulls up India TV for communal, one-sided broadcast; upholds CJP complaint against broadcast

The Politics of Memory: Controversy over graves of Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhatt

The post Second Case in a Month: Another minor alleges torture in Gujarat police custody, cop and sanitation worker booked appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The appellants, Putai (Accused No. 1) and Dileep (Accused No. 2), were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow, on March 14, 2014, for offences under Sections 376(2)(g) (gang rape), 302 (murder), and 201 (destruction of evidence) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Putai was sentenced to death for the offense under Section 302 IPC, alongside rigorous life imprisonment for gang rape and seven years of rigorous imprisonment for destruction of evidence. Dileep received rigorous life imprisonment for both murder and gang rape. The Allahabad High Court subsequently confirmed Putai’s death penalty and dismissed the appeals on October 11, 2018.

The Supreme Court’s verdict to acquit the appellants, who had spent over a decade in custody, stands as an indictment of a criminal justice process plagued by systemic frailties, procedural negligence, and some parts of evidence characterized by the apex court as being “a piece of trash paper” due to no procedure having been followed. This article conducts an analysis of the Putai case, using it as a lens to expose the collapse of the evidentiary framework and the critical need for institutional accountability, particularly in capital punishment cases resting solely on circumstantial evidence.

Section I: The Collapse of the Evidentiary Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and the Burden of Proof

The prosecution’s case against Putai and Dileep was based on circumstantial evidence. In such trials, Indian jurisprudence requires an exceptionally high standard of proof, famously articulated in the Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra precedent, which demands the establishment of five “golden principles.” These principles mandate that the circumstances forming the conclusion of guilt must be fully established, must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the accused’s guilt, must be of a conclusive nature, must exclude every hypothesis except the one to be proved, and must form a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.

The Supreme Court, applying this rigorous standard, found that the prosecution in Putai failed to meet this high threshold at every turn. The Court recognised the critical distinction between circumstances that “may be proved” and those that “must be proved,” emphasising that the legal distance between the two “is small but has to be travelled before the prosecution can seek conviction of the accused”.[1]

A. The Failure to Establish Incriminating Circumstances

The prosecution sought to link Putai to the crime based on three core circumstantial elements: the recovery of the victim’s articles, the suspicious conduct of the accused, and the DNA evidence.

1. Dubious Recovery of Articles: The personal articles of the child victim—chappals, a water canister, and an underwear—were found in a field, which accused No. 1, Putai, was cultivating. While the State argued that this shifted the burden onto Putai to explain the circumstances under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court found the recovery itself doubtful.[2]

The father, Munna, in his initial complaint, mentioned finding the chappals, water canister, and blood stains, but was totally silent regarding the recovery of the victim’s underwear. The Court found it “impossible to believe” that the search party, which included the victim’s father and others would have noticed the minor details like the chappals and water canister, yet missed the underwear in the same field. This omission was deemed “far too significant to be overlooked”.[3] The Supreme Court concluded that the recovery of the underwear seemed to be a “planted recovery and a creation by the Investigating Officer intended to give succour to the prosecution case”.[4]

2. The Sniffer Dog Theory against Dileep: The prosecution’s case against accused No. 2, Dileep largely rested on the claim that a small male comb was recovered from a field, and a sniffer dog, after smelling the comb, led the police to Dileep’s house. The Court stated that this theory is “shrouded in a cloud of doubt and unacceptable on the face of record”.[5]

• Contradictory Identification: Multiple prosecution witnesses offered starkly conflicting testimonies regarding the comb’s colour: one said bluish-green, another said dirty and light red, another said sky-blue, and Investigating Officer said green. These contrasting versions made the recovery itself doubtful.
• Implausible Linkage: The claim that witnesses could identify the comb, an ordinary plastic item, as belonging to Dileep simply because they had seen him using it was found to be “absolutely farfetched and unbelievable”. The Court viewed this insistence as a “strong indicator” that the prosecution was “hell bent upon implicating the accused No. 2-Dileep in this case by hook or by crook”.[6]
• Procedural Failure: The entire sniffer dog procedure lacked contemporary documentation. Furthermore, the Investigating Officer claimed he had immediately sealed the comb at the spot, which logically meant it could not have been available for the sniffer dog to smell, rendering the entire theory unworthy of credence.

3. Suspicious Conduct of Putai: The High Court and Trial Court treated the testimony the victim’s mother, as incriminating. She claimed to have seen Putai rushing into his house, washing his hands and face, changing his clothes, and then going away on his cycle without inquiring about the commotion regarding the missing child.

The Supreme Court firmly rejected the inference of guilt. The Court observed that washing hands and changing clothes after returning from work was “absolutely natural” behaviour for a labourer or farmer, and would not raise suspicion.[7] Furthermore, Putai’s explanation in his Section 313 CrPC statement—that his parents were ill and hospitalised—provided an innocent context for his haste and preoccupation, a fact admitted by the victim’s in cross-examination.[8]

Section II: The Forensic Catastrophe: DNA Evidence and the Broken Chain of Custody

The handling of forensic evidence in the Putai case was so flawed that the Supreme Court described the resulting reports as “a piece of trash paper” and concluded they “pale into insignificance”. This systematic failure reveals catastrophic lapses in collection, preservation, and analysis that fall far short of established international standards.[9]

A. Inadmissible and Contradictory DNA Reports

The first DNA examination report dated January 18, 2014 was inconclusive, merely stating that a “male specific allele” was found in the victim’s slide and swab, with no opinion regarding the blood samples of Putai and Dileep.

Years later, during the High Court appeal, the prosecution produced a supplementary DNA report (dated December 2, 2014) via an affidavit dated April 12, 2017. This new report, generated using Y-Filer Kit and HID Kit tests, contradictorily claimed that the material from the victim’s slide matched the allele profiles of both Putai and Dileep.

The Supreme Court found this supplementary report to be “inconsequential and inadmissible” due to a host of fatal procedural flaws:

1. Denial of Rebuttal: The supplementary DNA report was never put to the accused-appellants under Section 313 CrPC, denying them the statutory right to explain or rebut the new incriminating material.[10]
2. Unexamined Expert: The scientific expert, who issued the reports, was not recalled or re-examined on oath to prove the contradictory supplementary report.[11]
3. Improper Use of Affidavit: The supplementary report was tendered via the affidavit of an officer (Deputy Director, FSL, Lucknow) who was not connected with the issuance of the report. The Court clarified that the DNA report is a substantive piece of evidence, not merely formal, and thus could not be tendered in evidence through an affidavit under Section 293 of the CrPC (now Section 329 of the BNSS, 2023).[12]
4. Breach of Sanctity: Given that the scientific expert did not state that any forensic material was preserved for further examination after the first report, the Court presumed the samples must have been opened or consumed. Once the samples were opened, their sanctity was breached, rendering any subsequent supplementary analysis unreliable.[13]

B. The Catastrophic Breakdown of the Chain of Custody

The most critical failure was the complete absence of proof regarding the chain of custody, which is essential to guarantee that evidence has not been contaminated or tampered with.[14] The specific failures were comprehensive:

• Collection Procedure: The blood samples of the accused were collected on November 26, 2012, nearly two and a half months after their arrest on September 7, 2012. The prosecution failed to provide any oral evidence or exhibit any document to prove the procedure, date, or time of drawing these blood samples.
• Consent: Although consent of the accused-appellants was purportedly taken before drawing the samples, no document proving such consent was exhibited in evidence.
• Post-mortem Samples Discrepancy: The medical professionals provided contradictory evidence regarding the collection of samples from the victim’s body. One stated she took two vaginal swabs and two smear slides but did not mention sealing them or the date of transmission. Another stated he took eight slides of smear and swabs, and claimed they were seized, sealed, and handed over to Constables. However, he failed to prove any document pertaining to this procedure, such as a memorandum of sealing.
• Transmission and Storage: The prosecution failed to examine the official(s) who carried the samples to the FSL or the malkhana (evidence room) In-charge.

Critically, not a single document pertaining to the safe keeping or transmission of the samples—including the malkhana register, roznamcha entry, forwarding letter, or the receipt issued from the FSL—was exhibited during the trial.

The Court concluded that the failure to prove the relevant documentation for collection and the “total lack of evidence regarding the chain of custody” of the blood samples made the entire exercise “farce and frivolous.”

Section III: A System on Trial: Investigative Incompetence and the Crisis of Accountability

The final acquittal was not merely due to weak evidence, but was a direct consequence of what the Supreme Court deemed a “lacklustre and shabby investigation and so also laconic trial procedure”. This institutional failure crippled the search for truth from the very outset.[15]

A. A Catalogue of Critical Investigative Omissions

The Court identified several fundamental errors that demonstrated either gross incompetence or deliberate fabrication:

• Failure to Send Crucial Evidence to FSL: The Investigating Officer seized the victim’s clothes, including the frock and the underwear, but inexplicably did not forward these crucial articles to the FSL for scientific analysis. The Court found it surprising that in a case of sexual assault and murder, the IO did not send these articles, giving rise to a “strong suspicion that the recovery of these articles was a planted recovery”.
• Failure to Search Accused’s House: Despite the prosecution’s own theory that Putai rushed home and changed his clothes, no extensive search of the accused-appellants’ house was made to look for incriminating evidence. This omission reinforced the Court’s view that the ‘suspicious conduct’ theory was an “exaggeration”.[16]
• Failure to Examine Neighbours: The incident occurred in open fields, accessible to “all and sundry”. Although the incident happened between 7:00 PM and 8:00 PM when darkness was beginning to fall, the police did not care to examine anyone from the neighbouring fields or locality. This failure created doubt regarding the bona fides of the police actions.[17]
• Failure to Identify Material Objects: The material objects (clothes, etc.) were exhibited in the evidence of the Investigating Officer, but were never shown to the victim’s parents, Munna and Chandravati, for identification when they testified.[18]

B. Capital Punishment and the Constitutional Imperative

The fact that Putai was awarded and confirmed a death sentence on the basis of such flimsy evidence demonstrates the profound risk within India’s capital punishment regime. The irreversible nature of the death penalty demands that it only be imposed in the “rarest of rare” cases, based on unimpeachable, cogent evidence. The Putai case serves as a terrifying example of how investigative incompetence and flawed judicial scrutiny at the lower court levels can lead to the gravest miscarriage of justice by extinguishing a human life irretrievably.

C. The Double Tragedy: Denial of Justice for the Victim

While the acquittal corrected the injustice against the accused, it simultaneously constitutes a a tragic failure of justice for the minor child victim and her family. The gruesome act of rape and murder remains unsolved. The investigation not only failed to secure a conviction but also likely destroyed the possibility of ever identifying and prosecuting the actual perpetrator.

This situation results in a “secondary victimisation” of the family, who are left without closure or justice, their faith in the system shattered due to institutional incompetence. The acquittal, in this context, is not an endpoint of justice but a marker of its complete absence, proving that a flawed investigation is the antithesis of both the accused’s right to a fair trial and the victim’s right to meaningful justice.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court demonstrated that the conviction, upheld by two lower courts, rested on a foundation of conjectures and procedural violations, where the fundamental principles governing circumstantial evidence were ignored and scientific evidence, vital in such cases, was rendered “worthless” due to an absolute lack of procedural rigor.

However, the tragedy of Putai lies in its double failure: it subjected the accused to a decade-long ordeal under the shadow of the death penalty, while simultaneously failing the minor victim and her family by making the accountability of the actual assailant impossible. The judgment is an urgent call for systemic overhaul. True justice for both the innocent accused and the grieving victim can only be achieved through a system built on a bedrock of scientific integrity, rigorous adherence to procedure, and unwavering accountability for all institutional actors.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] Para 69

[2] Para 37

[3] Para 43

[4] Para 56

[5] Para 36

[6] Para 38

[7] Para 32

[8] Para 35

[9] Para 75

[10] Para 66

[11] Para 66

[12] Para 75

[13] Para 64

[14] Para 65

[15] Para 73

[16] Para 71

[17] Para 74

[18] Para 68

Related:

Liberty, Evidence and Cooperation: A legal analysis of Jugraj v. State of Punjab

A Proposal on Collegium Resolutions: Towards a single comprehensive format

Free speech, even in bad taste, is protected if no incitement to violence: HP HC

The post SC acquits two men accused of rape of a minor; terms the case an example of shabby and lacklustre investigation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint, addressed to the DGP and copied to the Maharashtra Home Department and the National Human Rights Commission, argues that such conduct represents a gross violation of the oath of office, the Maharashtra Police Conduct Rules, and the constitutional principle of neutrality that underpins policing in a secular democracy.

CJP has urged immediate suspension of the concerned officers, transfer of the Suleman Pathan investigation to an independent agency, and a state-wide directive reaffirming police impartiality in communal and hate-crime cases.

The Crime: A lynching born of hate

On August 11, 2025, 20-year-old Suleman Khan Pathan, a resident of Betawad Khurd in Jalgaon’s Jamner taluka, was brutally lynched by a mob for being seen in a café with a Hindu girl. The café stands barely a minute’s walk from the local police station.

According to reports by Scroll.in, The Wire, Article 14, and NDTV, the mob dragged Suleman out, kidnapped and assaulted him for hours across multiple locations, and finally beat him to death in front of his family. His father, mother, and sister were also attacked when they tried to intervene.

The FIR, filed promptly under Sections 103(1) and 103(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (the mob-lynching provisions), named eight accused, four of whom — Aaditya Devre, Krushna Teli, Sojwal Teli, and Rishikesh Teli — were later confirmed to be active members of Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan, a Hindutva outfit led by Sambhaji Bhide, known for his anti-Muslim rhetoric and open rejection of India’s tricolour in favour of a saffron flag.

The accused were part of a local network that frequently mobilised against what they called “love jihad,” a discredited conspiracy theory used to demonise interfaith relationships.

The outfit and its ideology

Founded by Sambhaji Bhide in 1984, Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan has over the years built a reputation for hyper-nationalist, anti-constitutional, and communal rhetoric. Bhide’s speeches — including public calls to “chop down Muslim men” and to replace the tricolour with the saffron flag — have repeatedly drawn complaints under hate-speech provisions, though he has rarely faced legal consequences.

Investigations by Scroll.in and The Wire reveal that the outfit has actively expanded its base in northern Maharashtra, with hundreds of local youth being mobilised through cultural runs, martial displays, and social media campaigns steeped in communal imagery. Its members have glorified Suleman’s killers online, labelling the victim a “jihadi” and defending the lynching as “protection of Hindu women.”

The Procession: Police and accused ideologues march together

On Dussehra (October 2025), while the investigation into Suleman’s lynching was still ongoing, Jamner witnessed the Durga Mata Maha Daud — a massive public procession organised by Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan to mark the culmination of Navratri.

Thousands marched in saffron turbans, waving tridents, swords, and lathis, chanting incendiary slogans such as: “Durga ban, tu Kali ban, kabhi na burkhe wali ban” (Become Durga or Kali, but never a woman in a burkha.)

Among them were uniformed police officers, including Inspector Murlidhar Kasar, the original investigating officer in the Suleman lynching case. Videos published on social media show Kasar leading the procession, carrying the outfit’s saffron flag, and welcoming participants with tilaks and flower petals. The flag itself bore a plaque declaring it to be India’s “true national flag”, displaying a saffron map of “Akhand Bharat” that symbolically erases India’s constitutional tricolour. At that moment, the distinction between law enforcers and ideological actors collapsed entirely.

The video may be viewed here:

A betrayal of the police oath and constitutional duty

CJP’s complaint highlights that this conduct is a direct violation of the oath of office sworn by every Maharashtra Police officer — to “bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India” and to perform duties “without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.”

It also breaches the Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1979, particularly:

• Rule 3(1): Every government servant shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, and do nothing unbecoming of a government servant.
• Rule 5(1): No Government servant shall be a member of or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any organization which takes part in politics, nor shall he take part in, or subscribe in aid of, or assist in any other manner, any political movement or activity.
• Rule 24: No Government servant shall, by writing, speech or deed, or otherwise indulge in any activity which is likely to incite and create feelings of hatred or ill-will between different communities in India or religious, racial, regional, communal or other grounds.

By marching in uniform under a communal organisation’s banner, these officers have forfeited the appearance and substance of neutrality. As the complaint notes, “No investigation can be credible when the investigator marches beside those under investigation.” The police oath, the Constitution, and the spirit of secular law enforcement stand violated.

A compromised investigation

For the Pathan family, the participation of these officers has deepened their sense of betrayal.
They had earlier complained of intimidation, deliberate omissions in the FIR, and the police’s refusal to act on their statements naming key assailants. Now, with the same officers seen celebrating alongside members of the accused’s organisation, the family’s fears of bias have turned into certainty. They have indicated their intent to seek judicial monitoring of the case to ensure impartiality.

The legal and ethical context

The Supreme Court of India in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018) laid down a binding framework to combat mob lynching, directing that all investigations must be impartial, supervised, and shielded from communal influence. It further stated that any police officer found negligent or biased in such cases would face departmental and penal action.

CJP’s complaint invokes these guidelines, arguing that the conduct of the Jamner officers is in contempt of the Supreme Court’s directives and warrants immediate disciplinary inquiry.
It also references the National Police Commission’s Code of Ethics, which demands impartial behaviour and expressly forbids allowing personal or ideological beliefs to influence official actions.

CJP’s demands

In its submission to the DGP, CJP has sought the following immediate measures:

1. Suspension and departmental inquiry against all officers who participated in the Shiv Pratisthan rally, including Inspector Murlidhar Kasar;
2. Transfer of the Suleman Pathan lynching investigation to an independent agency such as the CID;
3. Public clarification from the Maharashtra Police regarding its position on the officers’ participation;
4. Statewide circular reaffirming that police personnel are prohibited from taking part in political, communal, or sectarian processions; and
5. Protection for Suleman’s family and witnesses, who have expressed fear and loss of faith in the current probe.

The Larger Issue: Policing and prejudice

Beyond the specifics of the Suleman case, the incident reflects a larger institutional drift where sections of the police appear to blur the line between law enforcement and ideological alignment. Maharashtra has, in recent years, witnessed a sharp rise in hate speech and communal offences — second only to Uttar Pradesh, according to India Hate Lab’s 2025 report.

In this environment, the neutrality of the police is not just desirable; it is existential.
A single image of an investigating officer carrying a saffron flag can undo decades of trust built between citizens and the state.

The complete complaint may be read here.

Image Courtesy: twitter.com

Related:

CJP calls for action by NCM against hate speeches at Dharam Sansad and Trishul Deekha events, files 2 complaints

CJP moves NCM against arms training camps, weapon distribution events in Assam and Rajasthan

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CJP moves NCM against Shiladitya Dev for targeting the ‘Miya Muslim’ community of Assam

The post CJP files complaint to Maharashtra DGP, SP Jalgaon over police participation in communal rally amid Suleman Pathan lynching probe appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A courtroom disrupted

The usual morning mention round in Supreme Court’s Court No. 1 turned chaotic within minutes. At around 11:35 a.m., an advocate in full courtroom attire stood, removed a shoe (or attempted to unroll a bundle), and sought to throw it toward the bench. The act was accompanied by a sharp slogan that “Sanatan Dharam ka Apmaan Nahi Sahega Hindustan.”

Lawyers present have recalled that the object barely reached the dais — security moved swiftly. The man was escorted out, the session halted briefly, and then resumed. Chief Justice Gavai, visibly composed, turned to the next advocate and said “Don’t get distracted. We are not distracted by this.” With that, the Court proceeded as though unshaken.

The man in the robe: Rakesh Kishore

The person behind the outburst was soon identified: Advocate Rakesh Kishore, aged 71, enrolled in the Bar Council of Delhi in 2009. He held multiple bar cards — including the Supreme Court Bar Association, Shahdara Bar Association, and BCD, as reported

According to the Indian Express, Kishore resides in Mayur Vihar Phase 1, Delhi, and over the years has been associated with disputes relating to his housing society. Residents say elections in his society have not been held in recent times; complaints against him include one over an alleged assault of a senior citizen in 2021. The Delhi Police that functions under the direct control of India’s dreaded Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) –and is known for its aggressive surveillance of ordinary citizens was surprisingly charitable with the offender. Charging protesting citizens with a draconian law, the UAPA, in this instance, the same force has chosen to go soft. Citing the “reason” that the SC Registry was not pressing charges, they released Kishore within hours, maintaining he had no prior criminal record. Since then, the offender has been widely interviewed by a government-friendly media.

“More offended by rule of law than religion?” Suspended advocate reacts to CJI’s Mauritius remark

Speculation was rife on the “motive” with media quick to attribute the contemptuous aggression at CJI Gavai’s reported remark to a petitioner who had prayed for “replacing” the deity of Vishnu at Khajurao, a UNESCO world site and under the jurisdiction of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI). The CJI had later clarified his remarks in the Khajuraho case, emphasising respect for all religions and saying social media misinterpretations had amplified the controversy.

However, suspended advocate Rakesh Kishore, after being released by Delhi Police, has expressed discontent—not over any religious sentiment, but in response to a public statement made by the Chief Justice of India (CJI) during a visit abroad.

In a statement to news agency ANI, he said he was deeply hurt by what he perceived as mockery from the judiciary—especially comments by the CJI in a case involving a damaged Vishnu idol at Khajuraho. He asserted he felt “no regret” and claimed his act was a reaction to what he viewed as contempt directed at believers of Sanatan Dharma.

Referring to the CJI’s remarks in Mauritius — “The Indian legal system is governed by the rule of law, not the rule of bulldozers” — Kishore responded, stating, “…The CJI should consider that, holding such a high constitutional position, he ought to understand the significance of ‘Milord’ and maintain its dignity… You go to Mauritius and say that the country will not run with a bulldozer. I ask the CJI and those opposing me: Is the bulldozer action by Yogi ji against those who encroached on government property wrong? I am hurt and will continue to be so…”

Further, Kishore invoked “divine guidance,” saying that he could not rest after what he believed was an insult. He reiterated that he was neither drunk nor under influence, but acting from emotional distress. His reaction appears rooted more in political alignment and perceived personal affront than in any specific legal principle or religious issue.

#WATCH | Delhi: Countered on his action against the highest position holder in judiciary, suspended Advocate Rakesh Kishore, who attempted to hurl an object at CJI BR Gavai, says, “…CJI should think that when he is sitting on such a high constitutional post, he should… pic.twitter.com/6WgPZmQjO7

— ANI (@ANI) October 7, 2025

The Trigger: a temple idol, a viral remark, and Mauritius speech on ‘Bulldozer Justice’

The roots of Rakesh Kishore’s outburst appear to lie in entrenched casteist hatred and perceived ideological insult. In September 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed a public interest petition seeking the reconstruction of a damaged Lord Vishnu idol at the Javari Temple in Khajuraho. When the bench — led by CJI B.R. Gavai — rejected the plea, the Chief Justice remarked, “Go and ask the deity itself to do something.”

While intended to highlight the Court’s view that the matter fell under the jurisdiction of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), the comment sparked a firestorm online. It was widely seen — and misrepresented — as flippant and disrespectful to religious sentiments. Social media amplified the controversy, framing it as an affront to Sanatan Dharma, giving rise to a charged narrative of judicial insensitivity.

Further CJI Gavai’s recent speech in Mauritius, where he invoked his 2024 ruling on illegal demolitions, reminding the world that the highest court in the land stands against injustice. In that judgment, the Court had clearly held that the executive cannot act as judge, jury, and executioner.

SC Judgment A Clear Message That India Governed By Rule Of Law & Not Rule Of Bulldozer : CJI BR Gavai In Mauritius#SupremeCourt #CJIBRGavai https://t.co/vxQzhxm2ir

— Live Law (@LiveLawIndia) October 3, 2025

Citing this principle abroad, the CJI said, “The Indian legal system is governed by the Rule of Law, not by the rule of the bulldozer.” Though meant to reaffirm constitutional values, this statement became another flashpoint. Critics like Kishore interpreted it as an indirect attack on certain state-level actions — particularly in Uttar Pradesh. Amid these twin provocations, Kishore claimed he acted out of emotional distress and divine compulsion, viewing both statements as cumulative insults to his faith and belief system.

There is a further twist to the tale. During the Dussehra vacation of the Supreme Court Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh (a state that has been one of the prime offenders in aggressive demolitions of minority properties and places of worship) saw a series of demolitions, including the ancestral home of Olympic Gold Medallist and Padma Shri Mohd. Shahid demolished in Varanasi Road widening drive, end September.

Online Hate Build-Up against CJI Gavai

The attack on CJI Gavai and his august office as also his identity did not happen in isolation. Weeks before far right platforms were airing interviews instigating violence against India’s first Buddhist Chief Justice. Right wing “influencer”, Ajeet bharti with Kaushlesh Rai and Editor of Opindia (another instigator rightwing digital platform), Anupam Singh can be heard inciting people to violence against the CJI. During the conversation, Kaushlesh says, “I’m a Gandhian. I don’t support violence. If I did, I would have said, ‘Look, if Gavai ji gets into a fight, he lives in the courthouse, and there are Hindu lawyers there. At least one Hindu lawyer should grab Gavai ji’s head and hit him hard against the wall, so that it breaks into two pieces. But I don’t support violence at all.’ During the conversation, Ajit Bharti had also suggested surrounding Justice Gavai’s car. Kaushlesh Rai goes on to say, “Oct 2nd is coming, what Godse did is beyond your capability, but you can become Gandhi. What is the max punishment for spitting in Gavai’s face under the IPC? Not more than Six months? It’s nothing more than that. Hindus can’t even do this?”

Bar Council of India suspends lawyer

Within hours of the shocking display of hate and contempt, the Bar Council of India (BCI) issued an interim suspension of Kishore’s license to practice. The BCI’s order — under the Advocates Act, 1961 — called his conduct “prima facie inconsistent with the dignity of the Court.”

#BREAKING| BCI suspends practice of Advocate Rakesh Kishore, who attempted to attack CJI BR Gavai today

The Council has also initiated disciplinary proceedings against Kishore #SupremeCourt #cjibrgavai pic.twitter.com/Pv4lvPYTaV

— Live Law (@LiveLawIndia) October 6, 2025

According to order, he has been barred from appearing, pleading, acting or practising in any court or tribunal across India. Courts, tribunals and bar associations were to be informed. A show-cause notice was issued, requiring Kishore to explain in 15 days why the suspension should not continue.

Courts and its pesky choices

To date, the Supreme Court Registrar General opted not to initiate criminal proceedings. The Delhi Police, after questioning Kishore for a few hours, released him, citing lack of a case file from the Court, as per reports

The Court itself stayed silent in public. It neither issued a press release nor filed an FIR. Some legal observers interpreted this as a strategic restraint—refusing to magnify the act by escalating it. Yet many felt a full judicial revulsion or contempt action would have better affirmed the Apex Court’s institutional strength.

Legal fraternity condemnation

Leading bar bodies and senior advocates were quick to speak out. The Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) called the act “unbecoming” of a lawyer and urged suo moto contempt proceedings. They argued the gesture threatened to “scandalise the office of the CJI” and damage public faith in the court.

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) passes resolution condemning the “unwarranted and intemperate gesture” of an advocate who allegedly disrespected the Chief Justice of India and companion judges, calling it an assault on judicial independence.#SupremeCourt pic.twitter.com/0PWFOq1lCl

— Bar and Bench (@barandbench) October 6, 2025

The Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) condemned the act in strong terms, stressing institutional dignity, decorum and constitutional duty.

It was senior counsel, Kapil Sibal’s tweet on X at around 5 p.m. yesterday, October 6 that pushed the moral bar high, commenting on the absence of any condemnation from either the Prime Minister, Home Minister or Law Minister.

CJI

The uncivilised behaviour of a member of the Supreme Court Bar must be publicly condemned by one and all since it is affront to the majesty of the court

The silence of the PM , the Home Minister and the Law Minister is to say the least surprising

— Kapil Sibal (@KapilSibal) October 6, 2025

Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) has unanimously condemned the “reprehensible act” by an advocate inside the courtroom of CJI Justice B.R. Gavai on Oct 6. Calling the conduct “utterly unbecoming of an officer of the court,” the SCBA said it strikes at the foundation of mutual… pic.twitter.com/VHcF3RNovh

— Bar and Bench (@barandbench) October 6, 2025

Senior advocate Indira Jaising went further, labelling the act “ideological and casteist” and calling upon the Attorney General to initiate contempt of court action. She urged the Supreme Court judges to issue a united statement rejecting ideological attacks on secular courts.

Attorney General should take action for contempt of court for an ideological castest attack on a secular court https://t.co/Fk4XrWTGOX

— Indira Jaising (@IJaising) October 6, 2025

The Solicitor General, Tushar Mehta, offered a more tempered take. He condemned the act as a product of misinformation and social media frenzy, praised the CJI’s composure, and warned that his restraint must not be mistaken for institutional weakness.

Attack on the CJI is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution: Rahul Gandhi

Rahul Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition, took to X to lambast the attack, “The attack on the Chief Justice of India is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution.”

The attack on the Chief Justice of India is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution.

Such hatred has no place in our nation and must be condemned.

— Rahul Gandhi (@RahulGandhi) October 6, 2025

Congress directed criticism at Prime Minister Narendra Modi, noting that for hours the PM’s office remained silent. In a post, Congress taunted the PM: “Your silence is deafening — it screams complicity.”

“India’s Chief Justice B.R. Gavai was brazenly attacked in the Supreme Court today. Yet, not one word of condemnation from the Prime Minister so far. Mr. Modi, your silence is deafening and screams of complicity. You must speak up.”

India’s Chief Justice B.R. Gavai was brazenly attacked in the Supreme Court today.

Yet, not one word of condemnation from the Prime Minister so far.

Mr. Modi, your silence is deafening and screams of complicity.

You must speak up. pic.twitter.com/vodFnPjMye

— Congress (@INCIndia) October 6, 2025

Sonia Gandhi, former party president, expressed “profound distress,” calling the act an “assault not just on the CJI, but on the Constitution.”

“No words are adequate to condemn the attack on the Honourable Chief Justice of India in the Supreme Court itself. It is an assault not just on him, but on our Constitution as well. Chief Justice Gavai has been very gracious but the nation must stand in solidarity with him unitedly with a deep sense of anguish and outrage” she said

Statement of CPP Chairperson Smt. Sonia Gandhi Ji

No words are adequate to condemn the attack on the Honourable Chief Justice of India in the Supreme Court itself. It is an assault not just on him, but on our Constitution as well.

Chief Justice Gavai has been very gracious… pic.twitter.com/3FgEk2q5gV

— Congress (@INCIndia) October 6, 2025

There is no place for such reprehensible acts in our society, utterly condemnable: PM Modi

Pressure mounted. Late evening on October 6, PM Modi posted a condemnation. He wrote, “Spoke to CJI BR Gavai. The act is utterly condemnable. Such reprehensible behaviour has no place in a civilised society.” He hailed the CJI’s composure as a testament to judicial dignity.

Despite this, critics noted that the PM’s response came only after public pressure escalated. The delay was spun as political hesitation.

“I appreciated the calm displayed by Justice Gavai in the face of such a situation. It highlights his commitment to values of justice and strengthening the spirit of our Constitution” PM Modi said

Spoke to Chief Justice of India, Justice BR Gavai Ji. The attack on him earlier today in the Supreme Court premises has angered every Indian. There is no place for such reprehensible acts in our society. It is utterly condemnable.

I appreciated the calm displayed by Justice…

— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) October 6, 2025

Underlying currents: caste, religion & polarisation

The act was not merely a shocking security breach — it looked like a violent manifestation of ideological, religious and caste bias.

CJI Gavai is a practising Buddhist from the Dalit community, and some spokespeople observed that targeting him via religious slogans—Sanatan Dharma—had distinct caste overtones. The fact that a lawyer in the name of religious pride attempted assault on a Dalit judge stirred discomfort.

In legal circles, there is now renewed urgency around access control as how did a man with a proximity card enter the courtroom and bring an item?

The attacker was in full uniform , wearing a proximity card and was carrying a bag as well along with a rolled up bundle of some papers. He apologized to J. Chandran saying that “it” was only for J. Gavai.

— Anas Tanwir (@Vakeel_Sb) October 6, 2025

The unflinching bench: how the chief justice responded

What has drawn admiration across the board is CJI Gavai’s restraint during the moment. As chaos briefly erupted, he paused, remained still, and directed his courtroom not to be distracted. That calmness — amid a surprise attack — was lauded inside and outside legal circles.

Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, commenting on an unusual incident, praised the CJI Gavai for maintaining a calm and composed demeanour throughout. He noted that such odd events are not unprecedented in the Indian judiciary. Recalling a similar episode from the past, he mentioned that CJI Hidayatullah, who was also from Nagpur, once had a shoe thrown at him by a disgruntled litigant.

Displaying remarkable composure and wit, Justice Hidayatullah reportedly said, “The man has lost his case, he should not lose his shoe as well.”

Full marks to the calm and composed demeanour with which the CJI continued the proceedings. Such odd events have happened before as well. CJI Hidayatullah, also from Nagpur had a shoe thrown by a disgruntled litigant. He ordered the shoe to be returned saying, “The man has lost… https://t.co/9XXfBjOwDV

— SANJAY HEGDE (@sanjayuvacha) October 6, 2025

Inside the court, no visible disruption followed the incident. The CJI continued hearing cases scheduled for the day, according to sources. His poise came to symbolise institutional durability in the face of provocation.

What comes next — contempt proceedings? Will the court act?

Legal bodies like SCAORA and senior advocates have urged the Supreme Court to take suo moto contempt notice, emphasising that any attempt to assault or scandalise the highest seat of justice cannot go unchecked.

While the CJI displayed remarkable composure, the judiciary now faces a crucial moment, whether to continue exercising restraint or to respond firmly to uphold its institutional authority.

Beyond contempt proceedings, the Court should consider imposing some penalty, and setting a clear precedent against courtroom misconduct—especially when it’s cloaked in ideological justification. Such steps would necessary for public trust, protect judicial dignity, and send a strong message that the sanctity of the courtroom is inviolable. The need for a unified condemnation of the incident by the whole of the Supreme Court is also the need of the hour.

The nation now watches: will the Supreme Court let the moment pass — or rise to define it?

Related:

“Bulldozer Justice” rebuked: Orissa High Court orders 10 lakh compensation for illegal demolition of community centre

Supreme Court rebukes “Bulldozer Justice,” plans to issue nationwide guidelines to prevent arbitrary demolitions

Supreme Court to hear urgent pleas against state-sanctioned bulldozer demolitions in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan

The post Violence & Sanatan Dharma: Now suspended lawyer defends shoe attack on CJI Gavai, claims it was a protest against ‘bulldozer’ remark” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The consistent tension between the state’s power to investigate crime and the individual’s fundamental right to liberty forms a fundamental pillar of criminal jurisprudence in any constitutional democracy. Within this dynamic, the judiciary serves as the final arbiter, tasked with balancing the imperatives of law enforcement with the sacrosanct principles of personal freedom. The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Jugraj Singh v. State of Punjab stands as an illustration of this tradition.[1] A bench comprising of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan, in its judgement stated that merely because nothing incriminating could be discovered would not mean that there is non-co-operation on the part of accused. While the case itself presents a common factual scenario—an individual implicated solely on the disclosure statement of a co-accused and the subsequent opposition to bail on grounds of non-cooperation—the Court’s treatment of these issues offers an important reaffirmation of established constitutional safeguards.

This article argues that the judgment in Jugraj is a crucial restatement of liberal bail jurisprudence, reiterating the foundational principles through a three-pronged analytical approach. First, it shows the inherent weakness of a co-accused’s confession as a basis for criminal implication, thereby demanding a higher threshold of prima facie evidence from the prosecution at the bail stage. Second, it narrowly and correctly defines the scope of “cooperation with the investigation,” aligning it with the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. Third, by scrutinising the investigative agency’s own diligence, the judgment implicitly critiques prosecutorial overreach and investigative inertia, reinforcing the judiciary’s role as a check on the executive’s power to curtail liberty.

The significance of Jugraj lies not in the creation of new legal doctrine. It is in its function as a necessary course correction. In an era where even politicians in power are being targeted on the pretext of not cooperating with the investigation by agencies like the ED, the Supreme Court’s decision serves as an important reminder to lower courts and law enforcement agencies. It shows that the foundational principles of liberty, articulated decades ago in landmark cases such as Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, remain undiluted and must be rigorously applied against any procedural practice that seeks to undermine them. This article will deconstruct the Jugraj judgment by analysing its factual and legal underpinnings, situating it within the broader jurisprudential context of evidence law and anticipatory bail, and exploring its implications for the rights of the accused and the obligations of the state.

The Judgment in Focus: Factual Matrix and Ruling in Jugraj v. State of Punjab

The case of Jugraj Singh presented a set of circumstances that are frequently encountered in trial courts across the country, making the apex court’s intervention particularly instructive.

Facts

The appellant, Jugraj Singh, sought anticipatory bail in connection with a case registered at Police Station Sadar Patti, District Tarn Taran. His implication in the case was not based on any direct evidence or recovery of incriminating material from his person or premises. Instead, the entire basis for his arraignment was a disclosure statement made by a co-accused, Rashpal Singh, from whom a recovery had been affected. This singular fact formed the crux of the appellant’s plea for pre-arrest bail.

Compounding the matter was a crucial detail that the Supreme Court found particularly relevant: the appellant had been “similarly implicated” in a prior case, also on the basis of a co-accused’s disclosure statement, and had been granted the protection of anticipatory bail in that instance. Despite this history and the nature of the evidence, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh rejected his anticipatory bail application on April 3, 2025, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court. Recognising the tenuous nature of the implication, the Supreme Court, on June 23, 2025, granted the appellant interim protection from arrest. This protection was made conditional upon a standard and vital requirement which states that he joins the investigation as and when called upon to do so by the Investigating Officer.

Arguments advanced by the Parties

The arguments before the Supreme Court centred on whether this interim protection granted on June 23, 2025, should be made absolute. The appellant’s case was straightforward, resting on fundamental principles of criminal law. He argued that his implication was false and malicious, stemming solely from the inadmissible statement of a co-accused. He emphasised that nothing incriminating had been recovered from him and pointed to the past instance of similar implication as evidence of a pattern of harassment. Implicitly, he contended that he had complied with the interim order by joining the investigation.

The State of Punjab, in its counter-affidavit, did not dispute the foundational premise. It conceded that Jugraj Singh’s implication was indeed based on the confessional statement of the co-accused. However, to oppose bail, the State levelled the allegation of non-cooperation. The sole basis for this serious charge was the appellant’s statement during questioning that he had thrown his mobile phone into a river.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning deconstructed

The Court first addressed and defined the concept of cooperation, holding that “Merely because nothing incriminating could be discovered would not mean that there is non-co-operation on the part of accused”. This observation delinks the outcome of an interrogation from the process of cooperation itself. The absence of a discovery cannot be retrospectively used to label the accused as non-cooperative.

Second, the court noted a glaring omission in the State’s counter-affidavit i.e., there was no mention of any independent effort made by the police to verify the appellant’s claim or to pursue alternative leads. The Court pointedly observed that the State had not stated “that any effort was made to trace out the mobile number of the appellant and collect the call detail records or that any raid was carried to find out whether he is in possession of any incriminating material”.

This is instructively significant. It establishes a direct relationship between the quality of the foundational evidence and the credibility of the prosecution’s subsequent procedural objections. The prosecution’s case rested exclusively on a co-accused’s statement, a form of evidence legally recognized as weak. Faced with this fragile foundation, the State’s only recourse to deny bail was the allegation of non-cooperation. The Court perceived this as an attempt to secure custody to compensate for the lack of substantive evidence. It was insufficient for the State to merely allege it; the State had to first demonstrate that it had exhausted its own investigative avenues. This implies a judicial principle: the weaker the prima facie case against an accused, the less weight a court will give to generic and unsubstantiated allegations of non-cooperation used to deny bail.

Ultimately, considering the nature of the evidence, the precedent of the appellant receiving similar protection, and the lack of substance in the non-cooperation claim, the Supreme Court made the interim bail order absolute, subject to standard conditions.

Foundation of implication: Deconstructing evidentiary value of a co-accused’s statement

The Supreme Court’s decision in Jugraj was heavily influenced by the evidentiary quality of the material used to implicate the appellant. A look into the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, reveals why a case built solely on the statement of a co-accused is considered fundamentally weak.

Legislative framework

The Indian Evidence Act treats confessions made to police with extreme caution, born from the recognition of the power imbalance between the accused and the state.

• Sections 25 and 26: Section 25 states that no confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Section 26 states that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. These sections create an absolute bar on proving confessions made to a police officer or by a person in police custody, unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. This is a safeguard against coercion.
• Section 27: This Section creates a narrow exception wherein when a fact is discovered as a consequence of information from an accused in custody, “so much of such information.as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” The discovery lends credibility to the information. In Jugraj, the State made no claim that any fact was discovered based on information from the appellant.
• Section 30: This is the most pertinent provision. It states that when multiple persons are tried jointly, a confession by one affecting himself and others can be “taken into consideration” against the others. However, jurisprudence is clear: such a statement is not substantive evidence. It is not given under oath, nor is it subject to cross-examination. As established in the landmark case of Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the confession of a co-accused is a matter of the highest caution and can only be used to lend assurance to other evidence.[2] It cannot be the sole basis for conviction. The rationale is that an accused person has a powerful incentive to implicate others to exculpate themselves or to receive a lighter sentence.

Connecting legislative framework to Jugraj

The implication of Jugraj Singh rested exclusively on Rashpal Singh’s disclosure statement. There was no independent corroboration, no recovery, and no other material linking him to the offence. This reliance on the weakest form of evidence, legally insufficient to sustain a conviction, made the State’s opposition to anticipatory bail untenable. The decision provides u and affirms a vital principle for bail jurisprudence: the court must examine the prima facie quality and admissibility of the evidence.

Shield of Liberty: anticipatory bail, the enduring legacy of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia

The legal instrument through which Jugraj Singh sought freedom was anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). His case is rooted in the jurisprudential history of this provision, benchmarked by Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab.[3]

Jurisprudential evolution of section 438 CrPC

Introduced in 1973 based on the 41st Law Commission Report, anticipatory bail was designed to protect individuals from harassment and wrongful incarceration through malicious accusations. It is a pre-arrest legal remedy, giving substance to the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Sibbia doctrine: Magna Carta of Anticipatory Bail

The scope of Section 438 was settled by a five-judge Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980). The Supreme Court emphatically rejected the restrictive approach taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which had sought to impose rigid conditions, such as limiting it to “exceptional cases” and importing the restrictions of regular bail under Section 437.

The key principles laid down in Sibbia are:

• Liberal Interpretation: The provision must be interpreted liberally in favour of personal freedom.
• No Inflexible Rules: The Court refused to lay down a “straitjacket formula.” The decision must be based on the specific facts of each case.
• Wide Discretion: The discretion vested in the higher courts is wide and should not be fettered by self-imposed, restrictive conditions.
• Reasonable Apprehension: The “reason to believe” an arrest is imminent must be based on reasonable grounds, not vague fears.

Modern Application and Jugraj

The pro-liberty ethos of Sibbia has been consistently reaffirmed, notably in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra (2010)[4] and the Constitution Bench decision in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020), which held that anticipatory bail is not by default time-bound.[5]

The judgment in Jugraj is a textbook application of the Sibbia doctrine. The Court faced a classic scenario Section 438 was designed to address: an individual facing arrest based on weak, potentially inadmissible evidence. By looking past the State’s procedural objections to the substantive merits, the Court exercised its wide discretion to protect the appellant’s liberty. The decision fulfils the very purpose for which Section 438 was enacted, acting as a vital shield for individual freedom.

Defining the Line: “Cooperation with Investigation” versus the Right against Self-Incrimination

The State’s primary argument against Jugraj Singh was his alleged “non-cooperation.” The Supreme Court’s handling of this issue firmly situates the concept of cooperation within the framework of the fundamental right against self-incrimination.

The Constitutional Bedrock: Article 20(3)

Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India provides that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” This right ensures that the burden of proving guilt lies squarely on the prosecution, which must gather evidence through its own independent efforts, not by coercing the accused. It represents a fundamental departure from an inquisitorial system of justice, where the accused can be questioned to extract truth, to an accusatorial system, where the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Judicial Interpretation of “Cooperation”

Cooperation involves an accused person adhering to the legal process: joining the investigation when summoned and making oneself available for questioning. Crucially, it does not mean admitting guilt or making a confession. The right to remain silent is a vital facet of the right against self-incrimination, and its exercise cannot be construed as non-cooperation.

Applying the Standard to Jugraj

The appellant had complied with the core requirement of the interim bail order: he joined the investigation. The State’s entire allegation of non-cooperation hinged on his statement about his mobile phone. Demanding that the appellant produce his phone, which could contain evidence against him, would be a textbook violation of Article 20(3).

Instead of focusing on the veracity of the appellant’s statement, the Court shifted the focus to the investigative agency’s own responsibilities. Its pointed observation about the State’s failure to trace the phone number or collect Call Detail Records (CDRs) is critical. This judicial manoeuvre implicitly redefines “non-cooperation.” It is not merely the accused’s silence but the prosecution’s failure to investigate. By highlighting what the police did not do, the Court reframed the issue. The State’s argument was, “The accused is not cooperating because he won’t give us the evidence.” The Court did not consider this because the State is supposed to find the evidence and not imply on the basis of someone’s acts or omissions.

It is important to distinguish this from genuine non-cooperation, such as absconding, tampering with evidence, or intimidating witnesses, which would warrant denial of bail. The appellant had done none of these; his refusal to self-incriminate was the exercise of a fundamental right.

Synthesis and Concluding Analysis

The judgment in Jugraj v. State of Punjab is a synthesis of three fundamental pillars of Indian criminal law: the rules of evidence, the principles of anticipatory bail, and the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The case began with a weak evidentiary foundation, necessitating the protective remedy of anticipatory bail. The State’s attempt to defeat this claim rested on an allegation of non-cooperation that was constitutionally impermissible. The Supreme Court, by seeing through this procedural gambit, wove these three threads together, affirming that liberty cannot be curtailed on weak evidence, and the shield of pre-arrest bail cannot be pierced by a flawed interpretation of cooperation.

Its value lies in its clear-headed application and forceful restatement of foundational principles. In a legal system where the process can often become the punishment, the judgment provides a much-needed reinforcement of the delicate balance between effective crime detection and the protection of constitutional rights.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 837

[2] MANU/SC/0031/1952

[3] MANU/SC/0215/1980

[4] MANU/SC/1021/2010

[5][5] MANU/SC/0100/2020

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Reaffirming Open Justice: The Supreme Court on speech and contempt

The post Liberty, Evidence and Cooperation: A legal analysis of Jugraj v. State of Punjab appeared first on SabrangIndia.

An earlier piece has already set out why collegium resolutions need to be more reasoned and how they can serve as a starting point for greater transparency in the higher judiciary. That was written in the backdrop of an unusual incident — an alleged half-burnt cash pile found at a judge’s residential bungalow complex after a fire broke out on March 14, 2025, and the developments that followed. This piece, unfortunately, argues that collegium resolutions need to be uploaded in full; if there is a dissent that needs to be uploaded too. It is unfortunate because a dissent not being recorded is an issue that sets back whatever progress the collegium purportedly made until now.

Collegium Dissents and the Need for Transparency

When two judges of the collegium oppose a proposal for elevation or re‑elevation, it is customary — and it has also been laid down by the Supreme Court in the Judges’ Cases — that the Chief Justice should not press for that appointment. In the present matter, going by reports, since it was only Justice B.V. Nagarathna who dissented, the recommendation was proceeded with.

There is no inherent problem in a rule being followed. The debate about whether such a rule is unfair or unjustified is a separate question. But if a rule is being followed, there must be transparency in its making, its mechanisms, and its application. If the practice is that a 4:1 majority carries the day, then the workings of that practice must be clear: who formed the majority, who dissented, and what reasons were recorded for the dissent. There could be ten things which tell an observer of Indian polity as to why appointment of certain judge is driven by executive zeal rather than judicial independence. It is expected of the executive to push for its agenda, but it is the imperative of the judiciary to withstand these attempts and stand tall upholding fairness and integrity, consistently.

Without a minimum level of disclosure, the most important thing a collegium requires — support of the public — steadily erodes. Public confidence is built not by secrecy, but by showing that rules are real, consistently applied, and open to scrutiny. And moreover, unlike the executive which, despite being popular, maintains its dominance by use of force, propaganda—the judiciary’s strength comes from the trust of a billion people. Omissions or actions that could result in the erosion of this trust from the people is concerning for all those who look at judiciary with hope.

This is not to throw mud at Justice Pancholi or any other Supreme Court judge. Imagine if the dissent was on the basis that there is no women representation in the Supreme Court and Justice B.V. Nagarathna batted for it and therefore dissented an elevation of someone 57^th on the seniority list. That would not make such dissent any less important. The resolutions of the collegium and the necessity for it to function transparently and fairly is not about the individual judges that constitute it or the judges it appoints. The question of whether it would be fair to judges if such dissent notes are made public or not, or whether collegium should appear to be broken or not are immaterial in the face of immense public interest that runs with the principle of transparency to which collegium should not be an exception.

What is to be done then?

The larger question raised by this report is not simply about one appointment, but about the collegium itself. If dissents exist, why do we not have a consistent way of recording and publishing them? Why should the style and detail of collegium resolutions change with every Chief Justice?

There is a straightforward solution. The next seven Chief Justices of the Supreme Court are already part of the Court today, if the convention of seniority is followed. The Supreme Court can come out with a comprehensive format of the resolution, frame rules for the format and mechanism of Collegium resolutions and follow them. This regime can be supported by the existing judges of the Supreme Court along with the future Chief Justices. Once that format is agreed upon, it should be binding not only on the present collegium but also on the successive Chief Justices and collegiums who will assume office in the coming years. In effect, the institution would set rules for itself — rules that endure beyond the preferences of a single Chief Justice.

Such a mechanism would bring predictability and credibility. It would ensure that future resolutions, whether on appointments or transfers, follow a consistent template, and that dissents are neither invisible nor dependent on the inclination of the Chief Justice of the day. This is not outside the scope of the Supreme Court. It is entirely possible — and necessary — for them to agree on a self-binding practice that strengthens the collegium’s transparency and stability.

The call for a uniform, enduring format for collegium resolutions is not merely a procedural plea but a constitutional necessity. As Montesquieu warned in The Spirit of Laws, “power ought to be a check to power”; opacity in judicial appointments allows concentrated discretion to escape that check. Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative would similarly demand that if transparency is a duty for one Chief Justice, it must be a duty for all — for justice is not episodic, it is systemic. The worth of an institution is measured by whether it pursues legitimacy or merely convenience. To neglect to record dissents is to betray the very spirit of law. The time has come, therefore, for the Supreme Court to rise above personalities and preferences and to bind itself in a framework of reasoned, transparent, and consistent resolutions. Anything less is an abdication of the Court’s moral authority to demand accountability from every other institution of the Republic.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

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