Official figures spark political firestorm

During Question Hour, former Chief Minister and Leader of the Opposition Bhupesh Baghel sought detailed information on custodial deaths over the preceding 13 months. He asked whether judicial inquiries — mandatory in custodial deaths and guided by National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) protocols — had been completed in all cases, as reported by The Hindu.

Responding on behalf of the government, Deputy Chief Minister Vijay Sharma, who also holds the Home portfolio, confirmed that 66 inmates, including convicted prisoners, had died in custody during the specified period. He stated that:

• 18 cases have completed magisterial inquiries, and
• 48 cases remain under investigation.

Sharma assured the House that investigations were being conducted as per procedure and that action would follow if negligence was established.

However, the confirmation of the figures did little to calm tensions.

Opposition alleges overcrowding and healthcare breakdown

Baghel launched a sharp critique of the state’s prison administration, arguing that the figures pointed to a systemic crisis rather than isolated incidents.

According to him, prisons in Chhattisgarh are functioning at approximately 150% of their sanctioned capacity, severely undermining access to medical care and essential services. He questioned how such a high mortality figure could be divorced from structural conditions inside jails.

“How has law and order deteriorated to this extent?” Baghel asked in the House. “How many deaths have occurred in the last year, and what are the reasons?”

He further alleged that serious crimes — including murder, robbery, and extortion — had risen by nearly 35%, contending that rising crime rates coupled with prison overcrowding signal a deeper governance breakdown.

Opposition members argued that overcrowding, stretched medical infrastructure, and inadequate monitoring mechanisms could be contributing to preventable custodial deaths. They demanded immediate structural reforms, urgent strengthening of prison healthcare systems, and independent oversight.

The death of tribal leader Jeevan Thakur

The debate intensified when Baghel raised the case of tribal leader Jeevan Thakur, who died on December 4, 2025, while in judicial custody — a case that has drawn protests across Bastar, as reported by The Hindu.

According to Deputy CM Sharma’s statement in the House:

• Thakur was initially lodged in a jail in Kanker district.
• He was later shifted to a prison in Raipur following a court order.
• After his health deteriorated, he was admitted first to the Raipur district hospital and subsequently to the state-run Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Memorial Hospital, where he died during treatment.

Sharma said the jail superintendent informed the District Judge as per procedure, following which a committee was constituted to conduct an inquiry.

However, Baghel alleged that Thakur — described as a tribal community leader — had been falsely implicated in a case. He further claimed that Thakur was diabetic and did not receive timely medication or proper medical care in custody. According to the Opposition, there were complaints that medical advice was ignored by prison authorities.

Baghel emphasised that tribal communities in Bastar had staged protests demanding accountability and insisted that a magisterial inquiry was insufficient. He demanded that the matter be investigated by a House committee of the Legislative Assembly.

Sharma declined to comment directly on the demand for a legislative panel but maintained that the ongoing judicial inquiry should be allowed to conclude before further action is considered.

Bedlam, slogans, and walkout

As the exchange grew sharper, Congress MLAs stood up, raised slogans against the government, and disrupted proceedings. The Speaker attempted to restore order, but the protest escalated into a walkout by Opposition members.

The confrontation underscored a broader and recurring national concern: the condition of prisons, compliance with NHRC guidelines in custodial deaths, and the adequacy of medical care for inmates — especially undertrial prisoners and members of vulnerable communities.

Larger questions raised

The controversy raises multiple structural questions:

• Are judicial and magisterial inquiries sufficient safeguards in custodial death cases? Do these institutional checks and balances against state abuse which are available statutorily actually happen?

Judicial and magisterial inquiries into custodial deaths are not optional safeguards — they are statutorily mandated. Under Section 176(1A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate must conduct an inquiry in cases of death, disappearance, or rape in custody, in addition to the regular police investigation. The provision was introduced to address the inherent conflict of interest in police investigating themselves. Its equivalent now exists under Section 196 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, thereby continuing the mandatory judicial oversight framework. On paper, this creates a layered accountability mechanism: FIR registration, police investigation, post-mortem examination, and independent magisterial inquiry — a structure intended to function as a check against state abuse.

However, the real question is not whether safeguards exist, but whether they operate meaningfully. Magisterial inquiries are often delayed, limited in scope, and heavily reliant on official records; their reports are rarely made public, and prosecutions do not automatically follow. Without transparency, time-bound completion, and clear consequences for negligence or abuse, these inquiries risk becoming procedural formalities rather than substantive accountability tools. The statutory framework under Section 176 CrPC and Section 196 BNSS is therefore institutionally sound in theory, but its effectiveness depends entirely on implementation, independence, and follow-through — without which the promise of checks and balances remains fragile.

• Is overcrowding directly contributing to preventable fatalities?
• Does the state’s prison healthcare infrastructure meet constitutional standards under Article 21 jurisprudence?
• Should legislative oversight mechanisms supplement judicial inquiries in sensitive cases?

While the government has assured procedural compliance and ongoing reforms, the Opposition has framed the 66 deaths not as statistical coincidence but as evidence of systemic strain.

As reported by The Hindu, the matter remains politically charged, with demands for accountability continuing both inside and outside the Assembly.

The numbers — 66 deaths in 13 months — now stand not merely as a legislative disclosure, but as the focal point of a deeper debate about custodial responsibility, institutional capacity, and the state’s duty of care toward those in its custody.

Related:

Counting the Caged: What India’s prison data refuses to see

A System Under Strain: India’s police and prisons in crisis shows Indian Justice Report 2025

Under trial Prisoners: MHA directs States/UTs to implement section 479 of BNSS

‘End discriminatory regimes of colonial era,’ SC declares provisions of State Prison Manuals unconstitutional

The post 66 Deaths in 13 Months: Uproar in Chhattisgarh Assembly by opposition over prison conditions and custodial accountability appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As per a report in LiveLaw, the Division Bench comprising Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla and Justice Alok Awasthi, while disposing of a habeas corpus petition on February 23, 2026, held that her continued stay in a detention centre — as opposed to a regular jail — was justified in view of the pending trial and the “present international scenario.” However, the Court directed the State prosecution to conclude the long-pending trial within six months.

The Petition: Bail granted, yet detained

The petitioner, identified in the order as Lima @ Riya Sheikh, a Bangladeshi national, approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking multiple reliefs, including:

• Immediate release from what she termed “illegal and unconstitutional detention.”
• Expedited conclusion of the trial.
• Declaration that her continued detention despite bail violated Articles 14 and 21.
• Directions for coordination with the concerned Embassy and authorities for repatriation.
• Compensation and inquiry into alleged unlawful detention.

The case against her arises out of Crime No. 70 of 2020 registered in Indore. She faces charges under the Indian Penal Code — including Sections 346, 347, 323, 364-A, 506 and 34 — as well as under Sections 14(a), 14(b) and 14(c) of the Foreigners Act and provisions of the Passports Act, 1967. The allegations include kidnapping for ransom, wrongful confinement, assault, criminal intimidation, and illegal stay in India with forged or invalid travel documents.

Crucially, she had already been granted bail in the criminal case. Yet, she continued to remain confined in a detention centre established within the District Jail premises in Indore.

State’s Stand: Detention under foreigners’ law

The State, represented by the Additional Advocate General, argued that although bail had been granted, the petitioner could not be released into the general public domain because she is a foreign national whose trial remains pending.

The State relied on provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners Order, 1948. It submitted that the competent authority — the District Magistrate, Indore — had passed an order permitting her temporary stay in the detention centre until the conclusion of the trial. A letter from the Assistant Police Commissioner, Heera Nagar Zone, Indore, was also produced before the Court.

The Court’s Reasoning: Presence required, safety considered

The Bench refused to grant relief directing her release. It observed:

“It is not in dispute that the trial is still pending and the presence of the petitioner may be required at any time during the trial and considering the present international scenario, it is for her safety to keep her in detention centre.” (Para 4)

The Court emphasised that she was in a detention centre and not in jail, implicitly drawing a distinction between penal incarceration and administrative detention under foreigner-regulation laws.

At the same time, the Bench acknowledged that the trial has remained pending for over six years. Taking note of the delay, the Court directed the State counsel to ensure that the prosecution expedites the trial within six months from receipt of the certified copy of the order, including by producing witnesses without further delay.

“However, so far for relief No.7(b) is concerned, considering the fact that the trial is pending for more than six years, we observe that the counsel for the State will direct the prosecution agency to expedite the trial within a period of six months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order by producing the witnesses etc. However, if there is no progress in the trial within the aforesaid period, then liberty is granted to the petitioner to file a fresh petition in this regard for expediting the trial.” (Para 4)

If no substantial progress occurs within this period, liberty has been granted to the petitioner to approach the Court again.

A six-year trial and constitutional questions

The order brings into focus a recurring constitutional tension: whether a person — particularly a foreign national — can remain in custody through executive detention mechanisms despite being granted bail by a competent court.

The petitioner had argued that prolonged detention after bail amounts to arbitrariness and violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. While the Court did not expressly engage in an extended constitutional analysis, it effectively upheld the legality of detention under the Foreigners Act framework, prioritising trial presence and “safety” considerations linked to the international context.

The phrase “present international scenario,” though not elaborated upon in the order, appears to have played a persuasive role in the Court’s assessment of risk and prudence.

The final direction

Disposing of the habeas corpus petition, the High Court:

• Refused immediate release from the detention centre.
• Directed the prosecution to conclude the trial within six months.
• Granted liberty to the petitioner to re-approach the Court if the trial does not progress.
• Ordered that a copy of the decision be placed before the concerned trial court.

The matter thus stands at a constitutional crossroads: a foreign national on bail, confined not as a convict but under administrative authority, awaiting a trial that has already spanned six years — with judicial patience now formally limited to six more months.

The complete order may be read here.

Related:

Policing Identity: Maharashtra’s birth certificate crackdown and the politics of belonging

From Permanent Refuge to Perpetual Limbo: Why Sri Lankan Tamil refugees remain without citizenship even as electoral assurances reshape belonging in Bengal

From D-Voter Tagging to Citizenship Declaration: Anowara Khatun’s case before the foreigners’ tribunal

12 Bengali migrant workers murdered in 6 states, Maharashtra tops the crime list

The post Bail Granted, Freedom Denied: Madhya Pradesh High Court upholds detention of Bangladeshi woman citing “international scenario” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As per a report in LiveLaw, a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Arun Dev Choudhury directed issuance of notice to the Union of India, the State of Assam, the Director General of Police, and the Chief Minister. The Bench also issued notice on the prayer for interim relief but declined to pass an immediate restraining order at this stage. The matters are now listed in April, after the Bihu holidays.

Allegation of inaction and “climate of impunity”

The PIL, filed by noted Assamese scholar Hiren Gohain and two others, alleges that despite the existence of publicly available videos of the Chief Minister’s alleged speeches, the Assam Police has not registered a suo-moto FIR.

According to the petitioners, this inaction fosters a “climate of impunity” and produces a chilling effect on minorities. They argue that when statements are made by a constitutional functionary occupying the highest executive office in the State, the threshold of accountability must necessarily be higher.

Earlier in February, the Supreme Court of India had asked petitioners who had directly approached it seeking action against Sarma to move the High Court instead, following which the present proceedings were instituted.

Arguments made before the bench

1. Violation of oath, secularism, and constitutional morality

Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi, appearing for one of the petitioners, argued that the Chief Minister’s speeches reflect a “consistent, continuous, and habitual” pattern of conduct incompatible with his constitutional oath.

Singhvi contended that the alleged remarks violated the principles of equality under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, as well as the Preamble’s commitments to secularism and fraternity. He further invoked provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), alleging that the speeches attracted penal consequences.

Referring to earlier statements allegedly made in 2023 in Chhattisgarh concerning “love jihad” and unlawful religious conversions, Singhvi argued that the Chief Minister’s rhetoric had “pan-India implications.” He criticised what he described as an invocation of Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy of civil disobedience while targeting a specific community, asserting that such reinterpretation was constitutionally impermissible.

Singhvi concluded by urging the Court to direct registration of an FIR and to restrain further speeches of a similar nature.

2. Alleged remarks targeting ‘Miya Muslims’

Senior Advocate Chander Uday Singh, appearing for Dr. Hiren Gohain, submitted that the petitioners had approached the Court with “great anguish,” emphasising that the Chief Minister represents every citizen of the State.

Singh referred to remarks allegedly made since 2023 concerning “Miya Muslims” — a term historically associated with Bengali-origin Muslims in Assam. He cited a February 8, 2024 speech in the Assam Legislative Assembly during discussions on the “Mission Basundhara” scheme, where the Chief Minister allegedly stated that those forcibly converted to Islam during the Mughal period could regain indigenous status by returning to their “original identity.”

He further submitted that references to the “Bangladesh issue” functioned as a “dog whistle,” converting ethnic and linguistic anxieties into religious polarisation.

Among other allegations cited before the Court were statements describing alleged “flood jihad” in relation to flooding in Guwahati and comments referring to certain university architecture as “Mecca-like.” Singh argued that such remarks stigmatise a community and erode constitutional fraternity.

The petitioners also alleged statements concerning deletion of “four to five lakh Miya voters” during special revision of electoral rolls in Assam and remarks allegedly encouraging social and economic harassment of the community. These submissions were presented to demonstrate what counsel described as a pattern of denigration.

3. Reliance on Supreme Court precedents

Counsel relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Amish Devgan v. Union of India, which underscored that when hate speech is made by influential persons, police authorities have a duty to act suo motu and not await formal complaints.

Reference was also made to the so-called “Ghooskhor Pandit” film matter, in which Justice Ujjal Bhuyan observed that public figures holding high constitutional offices must refrain from targeting communities on the basis of religion, caste, language, or region, as such conduct would violate constitutional values. Detailed report may be read here.

Connected Petition: Law and order concerns

Senior Advocate Meenakshi Arora, appearing in a connected matter, argued that a sitting Chief Minister cannot make statements that create a law-and-order situation. She referred to an alleged response by Sarma to remarks made by former U.S. President Barack Obama in 2023 about minority rights in India, submitting that the Chief Minister’s response was dismissive and polarising.

Arora further alleged that statements blaming “Miya” Muslims for rising vegetable prices and demographic projections lacked evidentiary backing and contributed to community stigmatisation. She also cited an incident where the Chief Minister allegedly targeted a journalist’s religious identity during a press interaction.

According to Arora, such statements, when made by the head of the State government, could incite hostility and must be restrained in keeping with constitutional morality.

Reliefs sought in the PIL

The petition seeks:

• Registration of an FIR under Sections 196 (promoting enmity), 197 (imputations prejudicial to national integration), and 353 (statements conducing to public mischief) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita;
• Constitution of an independent Special Investigation Team (SIT);
• Appointment of a commission chaired by a former High Court judge to monitor the SIT probe;
• A declaration that the Chief Minister has violated his constitutional oath of office.

The petitioners argue that the High Court’s intervention is necessary to dispel the perception that hate speech in Assam operates with “complete impunity.”

Court’s Observations: Notice issued, interim relief deferred

During the hearing, Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar orally remarked that the statements read out before the Court appeared to reflect a “fissiparous tendency”, as reported by LiveLaw. However, when the petitioners pressed for an ad-interim order restraining the Chief Minister from making further statements, the Bench responded:

“At this stage, let notices be issued first. It will be a normal restraint while this petition is pending consideration. Notice for both the main prayers and ad-interim prayers. We will keep it after the Bihu holidays.”

The Court also clarified that issuing notice to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was not necessary at this stage.

Next hearing

With notice now issued to the Union, State, DGP, and the Chief Minister, the matter will be taken up in April. The Court has not passed any interim restraining order but indicated that the issue of interim relief will be considered after responses are filed.

Related:

Supreme Court asked to intervene as petitions flag “normalisation of hate” in Assam CM’s public speeches

When Protest becomes a “Threat”: Inside the Supreme Court hearing on Sonam Wangchuk’s NSA detention

Hate Speech Before the Supreme Court: From judicial activism to institutional closure

CJM who ordered FIR against police for 2024 Sambhal violence case transferred by Allahabad HC, new trend?

The post Alleged Pattern of Denigration: High Court seeks response from Himanta Biswa Sarma on PIL against his alleged hate speeches appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Next day, today, Friday 27, fourteen of hundreds of protesting students from the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) were sent to Tihar Jail after the late night brutal lathi charge by the Delhi police, attacking a student protest and long march aimed to march towards the Ministry of Education yesterday. Protesters have been demanding the resignation of Vice Chancellor (VC) JNU Ms Pandit who had made derogative remarks against Dalits and Blacks recently and also the restoration of the UGC Guidelines of 2026.

On Thursday (February 26), Jawaharlal Nehru University Students’ Union (JNUSU), along with other student organisations, organised a “long march” from the university to the Ministry of Education in Delhi. Students alleged that soon after their march began, Delhi Police lathi-charged them near the main gate of the campus. They said several students were detained and taken to the Kapashera and Sagarpur police stations. Videos and photographs that surfaced on social media showed that many students, including women, were injured in the police action.

The students’ march began around 3 pm from Sabarmati Dhaba inside the campus. Students joined the rally in large numbers, including members of JNUSU, All India Students’ Association (AISA), Students’ Federation of India (SFI), Democratic Students’ Federation (DSF), National Students’ Union of India (NSUI), All India Students’ Federation (AISF) and other student bodies.

You can cut all the flowers but you cannot keep spring from coming

14 JNU students sent to TIHAR JAIL
the state’s cowardice is on full display. They think iron bars break spirit, they are WRONG
​fight against BJP & Shantishri’s casteist regime will only INTENSIFY#JNU #jnusu pic.twitter.com/qJTC3DamOD

— Anjali (@anjali__27) February 27, 2026

जेएनयू में हज़ारों छात्र जब यूजीसी रेगुलेशन के पक्ष में और जातिवादी वाईस चांसलर की बर्खास्तगी की माँग के साथ शिक्षा मंत्रालय की तरफ़ बढ़े।
तब पूरी सरकार में कंपकंपी मच गई। दिल्ली पुलिस ने छात्रों के हाथ से बाबा साहब भीम राव अंबेडकर की तस्वीर छीन ली, हाथों में अपने… pic.twitter.com/2JyjjTrb8m

— Dhananjay (@SathiDhananjay) February 26, 2026

This protest began amid heavy deployment of security forces, including Delhi Police, across the campus. The main gate was completely barricaded to prevent the students from moving forward.

Before the march started, JNUSU president Aditi Mishra had told The Wire: “Our call today was directed at the Ministry of Education. We are demanding that the UGC Equity Regulations be implemented on the lines of the Rohith Act. We are also demanding the resignation of our Vice-Chancellor, Shantisree Dhulipudi Pandit, over her remark that ‘Blacks and Dalits are permanently drugged with victimhood’. We believe such a statement is unacceptable. We are also asking for the restoration of funds [to JNU and other universities], because continuous financial cuts are weakening public universities and affecting students directly.”

She had then added, “What we are seeing instead is a heavy police security presence. The university has been turned into what feels like a cantonment, with barricades placed every few metres, the Rapid Action Force deployed and water cannons and tear gas kept ready. FIRs are being filed against students simply for protesting.”

Despite the heavy police and security force presence and the main gate of the JNU being sealed off, the students remained firm on continuing their march. Around 4 pm, students moved the barricades placed outside the main gate and attempted to proceed with their march. Soon after this, police began detaining students participating in the march. During the process, scuffles broke out between them and the police.

The allegations of brutality included male persons, accused of masquerading as men in uniform assaulting women with pins and other weapons in gendered violence. Hundreds of police, paramilitary and other personnel were brought in to simply “handle a student’s protest.”

It was the obstruction of free movement by the Delhi Police who blocked and locked the JNU gates that began the altercation and thereafter police repression.

Danish, joint secretary, JNUSU, said, “We called for a peaceful march from JNUSU to the Ministry of Education. However, Delhi Police blocked JNU gates, putting locks on them. Around 500 to 700 policemen were deployed with heavy barricading, lathis, tear gas and water cannons. When students broke the locks and marched, the police launched a brutal lathi charge.

“Many students were hurt. Women students were dragged and their clothes torn. They [police] detained at least fifty of us and took us to Kapashera Police Station. Even now, many students, including me, are injured but have not received any first aid. There were also people in civil dress beating students brutally alongside the police. Students are still protesting at the main gate, and the police continue to beat them.”

Dhananjay, former JNUSU President speaks of this police brutality here

On Sunday, 22 February, a “Samta Rally” was organised on the JNU campus to protest against alleged anti-Dalit remarks made by Vice-Chancellor Shantishree Pandit. At the march, students demanded implementation of the new University Grants Commision (UGC) equity guidelines, and asked for the Vice-Chancellor to resign and issue a public apology for her statements.

However, after that march, tensions escalated and clashes broke out between two student groups. Left student organisations and JNUSU members accused members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) offshoot, student body Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), of pelting stones during the confrontation.

On Monday (February 23), the university administration registered a case against JNUSU office bearers over the “Samata Rally” and the alleged violence during the previous night’s protest Thereafter, JNUSU announced another march, and that was the one to be held on 26 February.

The Jawaharlal Nehru University Teachers’ Association (JNUTA) also condemned the police action, describing it as brutal use of force against students at the JNU gate.

In a statement issued on today February 26, JNUTA said several students, including women, were injured and many detained, including two JNUSU office bearers. It raised concerns over reports that women detainees were taken to undisclosed locations and alleged that they faced further mistreatment in custody.

JNUTA said the police action appeared to be aimed at preventing students from exercising their democratic right to march to the Ministry of Education, and demanded the immediate release of all detained students, action against the officials involved and the withdrawal of police personnel from the campus gates.

The text of the JNUTA statement issued by Surajit Mazumdar (President) and Meenakshi Sundriyal (Secretary) reads:

“The JNUTA strongly condemns the brutal use of force by the Delhi Police against JNU students and the detention of several of them, including two JNUSU Office bearers. Reports indicate that several students, including women, have been severely injured in the police action at the JNU gate in which even the laws prohibiting male policemen from acting against women were brazenly flouted. The JNUTA is also extremely concerned at the wellbeing of those detained. There are several women among them and they have been taken to unconfirmed locations that are far away from the campus. Reports are also coming of them being subjected to further police beatings while in custody.

The police action today, and they also came armed with weapons, had the sole objective of preventing come what may the students from exercising their democratic right to march to the Ministry of Education. Prohibition of such marches, and then prosecuting those who march, and use of excessive force against them, have become part of the standard routine for the Delhi Police. In the process, it has become an instrument of not law enforcement but of authoritarianism and the curbing of constitutionally guaranteed democratic rights.

The JNUTA knows that the bankrupt JNU Administration led by the VC cannot be expected to discharge its duty as guardian of the students’ interests. After all, it is its own actions that have led to the current situation. The continuing refusal to act against her and even today’s police action, however, raises serious questions about whether her infamous casteist remarks and other actions in fact have the endorsement of the Ministry of Education. Is it that the Ministry did not want to answer the uncomfortable questions it would have had to face from JNU students?

The JNUTA demands immediate release of all the detained students and strict action against the police officials reponsible for transgressing the laws they are themselves bound by while enforcing them. The Police which is still at the campus gates must also leave immediately. We appeal to JNU teachers to remain vigilant and speak up against this violence and onslaught on democracy.”

Just a few days ago former JNUSU President, Dhananjay filed a complaint against the VC with the NCST. This may be read here.

Related:

JNU: Former JNUSU President complains against Vice Chancellor’s casteist & racist remarks

The Double Stage on Campus: Caste, crisis & UGC equity regulations (2026) controversy

UGC Guidelines 2026: AISA Protest at Delhi University followed by sexual abuse allegations amid police presence

The post JNU Students Lathi-charged, Injured, first detained during protest over V-C remarks, UGC Equity guidelines, now Jailed appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At first glance, the dispute appeared narrow. The petitioner objected to the proposed film title “Ghooskhor Pandat”, arguing that it equated a caste identity with corruption and thereby stereotyped and denigrated an identifiable community. The relief sought included restraint on the release and exhibition of the film and a direction to the certification authority to re-examine it.

However, before the matter could proceed into a contested adjudication, the producer unequivocally withdrew the impugned title and undertook before the Court that any future title would neither resemble nor evoke the earlier one. On that basis, the writ petition was formally disposed of.

Yet the constitutional significance of the case did not end there.

Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, concurring in the disposal, authored a separate opinion — not because a judicial determination on facts was required, but because the constitutional issues implicated were too important to leave unarticulated. In doing so, the Court seized the opportunity to restate foundational principles governing the limits of community vilification and the scope of free expression in a constitutional democracy that is now more than seventy-five years old.

The opinion is remarkable not for dramatic judicial intervention, but for its clarity of constitutional vision. It situates the controversy within the Preamble’s promise of fraternity, the fundamental duties under Article 51A, and the long line of precedents safeguarding freedom of expression. It addresses a contemporary reality where speech — whether delivered from political platforms, circulated as memes, expressed through satire, or embodied in cinema — can both challenge and wound.

Importantly, the Court did not allow the language of fraternity to become a tool for censorship. Nor did it allow the language of free speech to become a shield for collective denigration. Instead, it reaffirmed that constitutional democracy demands maturity: the maturity to tolerate critique, and the discipline to refrain from vilification.

What emerges from the judgment is not merely guidance on film titles. It is a reaffirmation of constitutional character — that India’s constitutional order protects dignity without suffocating dissent, and safeguards expression without permitting hate.

The restatement of principles in this case therefore assumes a resonance that extends well beyond cinema. It speaks to public discourse more broadly — to political rhetoric, social media expression, and artistic experimentation — reminding all actors, State and non-State alike, that constitutional freedoms and constitutional responsibilities are inseparable.

Detailed analysis of the judgment is below.

Fraternity: The republic’s moral spine

The judgment begins where the Constitution itself begins — with the Preamble.

Fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation, is not decorative prose. It is, as the Court emphasized, part of the Constitution’s guiding philosophy. Article 51A(e) further imposes a fundamental duty on every citizen to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood transcending religious, linguistic, regional, and sectional diversities.

“One of the solemn objectives of our Constitution which finds mention in the Preamble is to promote amongst all the citizens of India fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation. This is the guiding philosophy of our Constitution. Article 51A reminds every citizen of India that it shall be their duty to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions. More specifically, Article 51A(e) says that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities.” (Para 11)

Justice Bhuyan invoked Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s constitutional vision, reminding that liberty, equality, and fraternity were conceived as an inseparable trinity. Fraternity, he noted, is essentially an attitude of respect and reverence toward fellow human beings.

“Dr. Ambedkar highlighted the concept of fraternity and bracketed it with liberty and equality. According to him, these three fundamental concepts together form the bedrock of democracy. It is essentially an attitude of respect and reverence towards fellow human beings. Thus, cultivating a sense of brotherhood and respecting fellow citizens irrespective of caste, religion or language is a constitutional dharma each one of us must follow.” (Para 12)

“Dr. Ambedkar’s introduction of the term ‘fraternity’ into the constitutional Preamble reflects his persistent efforts towards eradicating caste discrimination, his advocacy for unity and brotherhood which mirrors his commitment to inclusivity. Unlike the West, in India, fraternity is distinctly perceived as a vital instrument for realising equality and harmonizing the diverse segments of society. It serves as a conduit for transcending societal disparities and working towards collective well-being. Therefore, in the Indian constitutional context, fraternity assumes a dynamic and inclusive role, aligning with the broader goals of social justice, equality and upliftment.” (Para 13)

The Court drew doctrinal support from the Constitution Bench decision in in Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, where fraternity was described as a collective bond meant to cultivate brotherhood across all segments of society — not confined to any one group.

From this foundation, the Court articulated a categorical constitutional position:

“It is therefore constitutionally impermissible for anybody, be it the State or non-state actors, through any medium, such as, speeches, memes, cartoons, visual arts etc. to vilify and denigrate any community. It will be violative of the Constitution to target any particular community on the basis of religion, language, caste or region by whosoever he or she may be. This is particularly true for public figures occupying high constitutional o4ce who have taken the solemn oath to uphold the Constitution.” (Para 14)

This was not framed as a matter of statutory interpretation, but as a constitutional command.

The Court underscored that targeting any community on the basis of religion, caste, language, or region violates the Constitution’s ethos. The warning was especially sharp for those holding high constitutional office. Public figures who have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution bear heightened responsibility; when they engage in divisive or denigrating speech, the breach is not merely rhetorical — it is constitutional.

Free Speech: The republic’s lifeblood

Yet the judgment does not tilt toward suppression. On the contrary, Justice Bhuyan turns with equal force to the constitutional guarantee under Article 19 (1) (a).

Freedom of speech and expression, the Court reiterated, is a foundational democratic right. It enables dissent, critique, satire, artistic creation, and social reform. It cannot be stifled merely because some groups find expression uncomfortable or offensive.

The Court methodically reaffirmed established precedent:

• In S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, it was declared that freedom of expression cannot be suppressed due to threats of demonstration or violence. Yielding to such pressure would amount to surrendering the rule of law.
• In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, liberty of thought and expression was described as a cardinal constitutional value.
• In Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, the Court cautioned that a mature Republic cannot be seen as so fragile that it feels threatened by artistic or poetic expression. (A detailed report on the judgment may be read here.)
• In Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon, the Court emphasised that depiction of social evil in art cannot be prohibited merely because it portrays disturbing realities.
• In Viacom 18 Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, it was reaffirmed that once a film is certified by the statutory authority, States cannot prohibit exhibition on speculative law-and-order grounds.

The doctrinal thread is clear: Expression must be judged from the standpoint of a reasonable, strong-minded, and prudent viewer, not hypersensitive individuals predisposed to perceive insult.

The Cinematograph Act entrusts certification to an expert body. Once certification is granted, courts must be slow to interfere. Restrictions must fall squarely within Article 19(2), justified by necessity — not public discomfort.

Justice Bhuyan cautioned that if creative freedom is stifled beyond permissible limits, the casualty is not merely artistic autonomy, but democratic vitality itself.

The constitutional equilibrium

What makes this judgment remarkable is not that it chooses one value over the other — but that it refuses to. It does not permit the language of fraternity to become a pretext for censorship. It does not allow the language of free speech to become a shield for communal vilification. Instead, it restores balance.

Fraternity demands that communities are not collectively degraded. Freedom demands that art, satire, and dissent are not smothered by intolerance. The Constitution, the Court reminds us, protects both.

Justice Bhuyan concluded by noting that though no adjudication was strictly required, it was necessary to restate these first principles “lest there remain any lingering misconception.” The message is unmistakable: constitutional democracy requires both mutual respect and intellectual courage.

A republic neither fragile nor permissive of hate

Seventy-five years into constitutional governance, India cannot be so brittle that it fears artistic expression. Nor can it be indifferent to attacks on community dignity.

This decision stands as a doctrinal reaffirmation that:

• Vilification of communities is constitutionally impermissible.
• Creative expression enjoys robust constitutional protection.
• Courts must guard against both communal denigration and populist censorship.
• Fraternity and freedom are not adversaries — they are co-equal pillars of the constitutional order.

In closing the controversy over a film title, the Supreme Court has opened a larger constitutional conversation — reminding that the Republic’s strength lies in its ability to protect dignity without suffocating dissent.

It is, in essence, a judgment about the character of constitutional democracy itself.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

Free Speech in India 2025: What the Free Speech Collective report reveals about a year of silencing

Free speech, even in bad taste, is protected if no incitement to violence: HP HC

Between Free Speech and Public Order: Dissecting the complaint against Anjana Om Kashyap

Recalibrating Free Speech: The Supreme Court’s constitutional turn in the digital age

Mixed Messaging: Free speech jurisprudence from the Supreme Court

The post A Republic Must Tolerate Art — But Not Denigration: Supreme Court reasserts fraternity as a constitutional boundary appeared first on SabrangIndia.

By an opinion dated November 27, 2025, Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 5, Goalpara, presided over by Member N.K. Nath, declared that Anowara Khatun is an Indian citizen, answering the reference made by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Goalpara, in the negative.

The order brings to a close the said proceedings that originated over two decades ago and highlights persistent structural issues in Assam’s citizenship determination framework, particularly its impact on poor and marginalized women.

Team CJP Assam sits to discuss the case with Anowara Khatun and family outside their home in Assam

From IMDT to Foreigners’ Tribunal: A case born of institutional suspicion

Anowara’s case originated as far back as 2004, when the Superintendent of Police (Border), Goalpara referred her name under the now-defunct Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, alleging that she had illegally entered India between 1966 and 1971. The referral admitted that the “doubt” arose because she could not immediately produce documents during verification — a familiar and deeply flawed basis used against the poor and illiterate.

Following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India (2005), which struck down the IMDT Act as unconstitutional, Anowara’s case was mechanically transferred to Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 5, Goalpara under the Foreigners Act, 1946, shifting the entire burden of proof onto her under Section 9.

Who is Anowara Khatun?

Anowara Khatun was born and raised in Kharda Manikpur (also recorded as Kharija Manikpur), Goalpara, Assam. She is the daughter of Late Alom Shah, a lifelong resident of Assam, and Korimon Nessa, and the granddaughter of Late Rose Mamud Shah. Documentary evidence showed that her father, Alom Shah, purchased land in Assam in 1947, 1952, and 1959. His name, along with that of Anowara’s mother, appears in the electoral rolls of 1966 and 1970, demonstrating their presence in Assam prior to the relevant cut-off dates.

Anowara studied up to Lower Primary level at Majgaon LP School, married Saiful Hussain of Mamudpur Part-I, and later settled in Sidhabari Part-II, where she has lived for decades. She first voted in 1985, and her name consistently appears in electoral rolls for 1985, 1997, 2005, 2011, and 2015.

Despite this, she was eventually marked a “D-Voter”, stripped of voting rights, and subjected to relentless suspicion — a fate shared by thousands of Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam.

Her personal circumstances make the cruelty of this process even more stark. Anowara suffers from mental imbalance and chronic health issues, lives in extreme poverty, has no proper bedding, and struggles daily for food and medical care. She and her husband survive on daily labour, entirely unequipped to navigate a legal system designed to break the poor.

CJP Steps In: Building a case where the State saw only suspicion

Recognising the grave injustice involved, Assam Team CJP took up Anowara’s case, committing to pursue it despite the enormous evidenti and procedural hurdles.

On behalf of Anowara, Advocate Ashim Mubarak, assisted by Advocate Shofior Rahman, and supported by CJP’s para-legal and community teams, presented a meticulous defence before the Tribunal.

Four defence witnesses were examined:

• DW-1: Anowara Khatun herself
• DW-2: Her brother, Kurban Ali
• DW-3: Her sister, Ambia Bibi
• DW-4: The Land Record Assistant, Matia Revenue Circle

CJP placed before the Tribunal a comprehensive documentary trail, including:

• Three registered land sale deeds executed in 1947, 1952, and 1959 in her father’s name
• Electoral rolls of 1966 and 1970, recording her parents as Indian voters
• Subsequent voter lists (1979, 1985, 1997, 2005, 2011, 2015) showing uninterrupted electoral presence
• Jamabandi and citha records proving inheritance of ancestral land in Assam

The Tribunal explicitly accepted that the land deeds were over 30 years old and required no further proof, and relied heavily on the voter lists of 1966 and 1970 to establish her father’s citizenship.

Even when Anowara’s deteriorating mental health made her continued presence difficult, CJP persisted with evidence and arguments, ensuring the case did not collapse under procedural cruelty.

Anowara Khatun with her husband and CJP Team Assam outside her home in Assam

The Tribunal’s Finding: Citizenship proven, suspicion rejected

After a detailed appreciation of evidence, the Tribunal held that:

• Alom Shah, Anowara’s father, was conclusively established as an Indian citizen, present in Assam since at least 1947
• Anowara, being his daughter, cannot be treated as a foreigner
• The state failed to rebut the overwhelming documentary record

The reference was therefore answered in the negative, and Anowara Khatun was declared not a foreigner, with directions issued to inform the Superintendent of Police (Border), Goalpara.

Anowara Khatun holding up the FT order outside her home in Assam

A system designed to break the poor

Anowara Khatun’s case is not an aberration — it is a window into a larger architecture of state oppression. Instruments such as D-Voter tagging, Foreigners’ Tribunals, NRC, detention camps, “push-backs,” the Passport Act, SR and SIR exercises operate together to produce statelessness among workers, farmers, minorities, and Bengali-speaking communities.

Assam has long served as a pilot project for citizenship stripping, but the same logic is now visible across India. Behind this bureaucratic machinery lie document-wars, midnight detentions, suicides, custodial deaths, and families torn apart — all in the name of identifying “Bangladeshis.”

India’s constitutional promise of secularism, dignity, and equality collapses when impoverished citizens are tortured for papers they were never equipped to preserve.

CJP’s Role: Law as resistance

At a time when the Chief Minister of Assam openly targets Muslims, spreads communal suspicion, and legitimises exclusion under the rhetoric of “illegal migration,” CJP continues to fight case by case, restoring citizenship through evidence, law, and persistence.

In the first week of February, members of Team CJP — State In-Charge Nanda Ghosh, DVM Goalpara Zeshmin Sultana, Community Volunteer Hasunir Rahman, and Office Driver Ashikul Hussain — stood by Anowara and her family, reaffirming that justice is not charity, but resistance.

Anowara Khatun’s victory is not just hers. It is a reminder that citizenship in India is increasingly something the poor must fight to prove, and that without sustained legal intervention, countless others will disappear into detention camps, deportation attempts, or silent graves.

This case stands as another testament to what determined legal solidarity can achieve — even in the face of a system designed to erase.

The complete order may be read here.

Related:

CJP flags Zee News broadcast ‘Kalicharan Maharaj vs 4 Maulanas’ for communal framing before NBDSA

The case of “pushback” of Doyjan Bibi and the quiet normalisation of undocumented deportations

Communal Dog-Whistles in an Election Season: CJP flags hate speech by BJP’s Ameet Satam to election authorities

From Hate Speech to State Action: How communal vigilantism at Malabar Hill continues unchecked

The post From D-Voter Tagging to Citizenship Declaration: Anowara Khatun’s case before the foreigners’ tribunal appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Hearing a petition filed by Khan’s 69-year-old mother, Mehrunissa Shamim Khan, a division bench of Justices Anil Kilor and Raj Wakode observed that the demolition appeared, prima facie, to have been carried out without adhering to binding procedural safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court of India. The civic body has been directed to file a clear response by March 4 stating whether it will reconstruct the structure or offer monetary compensation.

The question posed by the bench was pointed: if due process was not followed, how will the State repair the damage?

The Demolition: Swift action, lasting consequences

Fahim Khan, 38, was arrested following communal violence that broke out on March 17, 2025 in Nagpur’s Mahal area. The unrest followed alleged inflammatory remarks concerning the tomb of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar.

Within days of Khan’s arrest, the NMC issued notices under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and demolished his three-storey residence in Sanjaybagh Colony on March 25, 2025. Although an urgent plea was moved before the high court and a stay was granted by a bench led by Justice Nitin Sambre, the structure had already been razed by the time the interim protection came into effect.

The demolition left the family without shelter. They have maintained that no meaningful opportunity to respond was provided and that the property had secured necessary permissions as early as 2003, with no objections raised for over two decades.

Khan, who had contested the 2024 Lok Sabha election against Union minister Nitin Gadkari, denies the riot allegations and claims the action was arbitrary. Of the more than 120 persons arrested in the riots case, a majority have since been granted bail or anticipatory bail.

Supreme Court’s anti-demolition safeguards

The high court proceedings turn crucially on a November 13, 2024 judgment of the Supreme Court of India delivered by a bench led by former Chief Justice Bhushan Gavai. In that ruling, the apex court categorically held that demolitions cannot be used as a punitive measure merely because a person is accused in a criminal case.

The Supreme Court mandated:

• Issuance of prior notice,
• A minimum of 15 days to respond,
• Strict adherence to statutory procedure independent of criminal proceedings.

Detailed report may be read here.

Counsel for the petitioner argued that the March 21, 2025 notice violated these safeguards and that the demolition amounted to unconstitutional executive overreach.

Notably, during earlier hearings, Nagpur Municipal Commissioner Abhijeet Chaudhari tendered an unconditional apology before the high court, stating that officials were unaware of the Supreme Court’s specific directions governing demolitions in such contexts.

More Than One House: A constitutional test

While the immediate dispute concerns a single property, the implications extend far beyond Sanjaybagh Colony.

The court’s framing of the issue — rebuild or compensate — shifts the discourse from mere procedural lapse to state accountability. If the demolition is ultimately found to have violated Supreme Court guidelines, the remedy may not be limited to declaratory relief. Reconstruction or financial compensation would signal judicial willingness to impose tangible consequences for executive overreach.

The case also reopens the broader national debate around so-called “bulldozer action,” where demolition drives have followed criminal accusations, particularly in communally sensitive contexts. Courts across the country have repeatedly underscored that urban planning enforcement cannot morph into retributive punishment.

At stake are foundational constitutional principles:

• Article 14 — equality before the law and protection against arbitrary state action,
• Article 21 — protection of life and personal liberty, which judicial interpretation has long held to include the right to shelter and dignity,
• The doctrine of due process, which restrains executive discretion.

If municipalities are permitted to demolish properties immediately after arrests without strict procedural compliance, the line between law enforcement and punishment blurs dangerously.

The March 4 hearing will likely determine whether the NMC acknowledges procedural violations and what corrective mechanism it proposes. The court may require compensation, order reconstruction, or lay down further guidelines to ensure compliance with Supreme Court directions.

Whatever the outcome, the case is poised to become a benchmark in assessing the enforceability of anti-bulldozer jurisprudence. A clear order mandating restoration or compensation would reinforce that constitutional safeguards are not advisory — they are binding. Conversely, a weak remedy could dilute the deterrent effect of the Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling.

Related:

Hate Crime: Abdul Naeem’s school built with private money on his land demolished by bulldozers in Madhya Pradesh

When the Rule of the Bulldozer Outpaces the Rule of Law: One year after this landmark judgment

From Words to Bulldozers: How a Chief Minister’s rhetoric triggered and normalised punitive policing in Bareilly

“Bulldozer Justice” rebuked: Orissa High Court orders 10 lakh compensation for illegal demolition of community centre

Bulldozer Justice: you can’t just roll in with bulldozers and demolish homes overnight: SC

“Bulldozer barbarism”: Demolition drive in Surat after stones thrown at Ganesh pandal

The post Rebuild or Compensate: Nagpur HC confronts NMC over ‘bulldozer’ demolition in riot case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The order delivered by Hon’ble Justice Pankaj Bhatia on 9 February 2026 in Application under Section 528 BNSS No. 1980 of 2025, Kamalesh Agnihotri @ Kamal & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh is one such intervention. What begins as a seemingly mundane disagreement over parking regulations and penalties within a residential society unfolds into a judicial inquiry into the ethics of investigation, the limits of criminal process, and the constitutional dangers inherent in its misuse.

The Court’s judgment is not confined to resolving a private dispute. It undertakes a careful and methodical examination of whether allegations of extortion and harassment levelled against the Resident Welfare Association (RWA) could, in law, attract offences under Sections 308(2), 351(2) and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. In doing so, the Court situates the controversy within a larger constitutional framework, reaffirming that criminal law must remain an instrument of justice—not a device for coercion, intimidation, or personal score-settling.

What lends the judgment its distinctive moral force is the Court’s concluding observation: “With great powers come great responsibility.” This is not a rhetorical flourish. It is directed squarely at Opposite Party No. 2, who sought to invoke his association with the RSS, a highly disciplined cultural organisation, to browbeat elected members of the RWA. The Court censures this conduct, noting that the misuse of institutional affiliation not only corrodes democratic functioning at the grassroots but also brings disrepute to the organisation itself. While the Court consciously refrains from entering into questions of the RSS’s internal discipline, its message is unequivocal-no institutional or social association can confer license to misuse the criminal process. In this sense, the judgment transcends technical adjudication and enters the realm of ethical responsibility in public life.

The decision is further strengthened by its engagement with a formidable body of Supreme Court jurisprudence, making it a veritable treatise for students and practitioners of criminal law—each authority cited deserving close reading, particularly by younger members of the Bar.

Drawing from State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma (1992 Supp (1) SCC 222), the Court reiterates that investigation is a search for truth, not a quest for convictions. Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254 is relied upon to emphasize impartiality and to caution against investigative harassment. In Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali (2013) 5 SCC 762, fair investigation is defined as one that is unbiased and truth-oriented, while Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI (2013) 6 SCC 348 underscores the need to balance the rights of the accused with those of the victim.

The Court invokes Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary (2014) 2 SCC 532 to reaffirm that an investigation is fundamentally a quest for truth, and uses Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat (2014) 4 SCC 626 to stress that the criminal justice system must ensure that no innocent person suffers. The constitutional imperative of police impartiality, articulated in Rajiv Singh v. State of Bihar (2015) 16 SCC 369, and is reinforced alongside the warning issued in Suresh Chandra Jana v. State of West Bengal (2017) 16 SCC 466 against perfunctory and mechanical investigations. The judgment also draws upon Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab (2009) 1 SCC 441 to affirm fair investigation as a fundamental right, and Azija Begum v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 3 SCC 126 to link it directly with the guarantee of equality under Article 14.

Ultimately, the judgment stands as a cautionary marker in a time when the boundary between grievance and vendetta is increasingly blurred. It reiterates that criminal law is neither an instrument of intimidation nor a shortcut to settle civil or social disputes, and certainly not a weapon to be sanctified by invoking proximity to power or institutional affiliation. For investigating agencies, it is a reminder that fairness is not a procedural luxury but a constitutional obligation. For individuals, it is a warning that stature—real or claimed—cannot legitimize abuse of process. And for advocates, students of law, academics, and judges alike, this decision endures as a moral and constitutional compass, demonstrating how procedural fairness, judicial restraint, and ethical responsibility must together anchor the criminal justice system.

About Author

Advocate Syed Mohammad Haider Rizvi

Advocate Syed Mohammad Haider Rizvi is an alumnus of Jamia Millia Islamia (1998) and a Gold Medallist in LL.M. from Lucknow University. An advocate with extensive experience working with government departments, PSUs, and corporate organisations, he is widely known for his public-interest litigation, including a landmark case protecting Lucknow’s cultural heritage. He played a key role in introducing online RTI processes in Uttar Pradesh and in amending the Allahabad High Court’s 10-day bail rule. He is currently pursuing doctoral research on Right to Life and Personal Liberty under RTI.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post When Criminal Law Becomes a Weapon: Justice Bhatia’s Reminder on Power, Process and Fairness appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At the centre of this legal moment is Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, whose public utterances over the last five years—now exhaustively catalogued before the Court—are alleged to represent not isolated political rhetoric but a sustained pattern of communal vilification, exclusionary exhortation, and legitimisation of social and economic discrimination against Muslims, particularly Bengali-origin Muslims in Assam.

The petitions—filed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), CPI leader Annie Raja, a group of twelve citizens comprising former IAS, IFS officers, diplomats, academics and civil society actors, and Islamic clerics’ body Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind—seek criminal accountability, independent investigation, and for the first time, judicially enforceable standards governing the speech of constitutional functionaries.

“Point Blank Shot”, “No Mercy”: The video that triggered urgency

The immediate trigger for the CPIM and Annie Raja petitions is a video uploaded on February 7, 2026, from the official X (formerly Twitter) handle of BJP Assam.

The video depicts Chief Minister Sarma firing a gun at animated images of two men shown within a crosshair, portrayed as Muslims. As the gun discharges, the figures are struck repeatedly. The visuals are overlaid with phrases such as “Point blank shot” and “No mercy”, culminating in slogans that read:

• “Foreigner-free Assam”
• “Community, land, roots first”
• “Why did you go to Pakistan”
• “No forgiveness for Bangladeshis”

The video ends with a stylised, cowboy-like portrait of the Chief Minister himself.

Although the video was deleted following widespread outrage, the petition stresses that it continues to circulate widely, amplified by unofficial accounts and political messaging networks. The petition describes it as the most explicit and violent crystallisation of an already entrenched political narrative, one that frames an entire community as legitimate targets of exclusion and hostility.

Urgent mentioning before the Supreme Court

Senior Advocate Nizam Pasha mentioned the CPIM and Annie Raja petitions before Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, seeking urgent listing.

“We seek urgent intervention of this Court with respect to disturbing speeches made by the sitting Chief Minister of Assam. Complaints have been filed, but no FIRs have been registered,” Pasha submitted, as per LiveLaw, specifically referring to the February 7 video and earlier speeches.

The Chief Justice remarked that electoral seasons increasingly see political disputes entering constitutional courts, observing that “part of the elections is fought inside the Supreme Court.” However, the Court indicated that it would examine the matter and grant a date.

Details of the petition filed by the CPIM

1. Not an Isolated Video: A five-year pattern of exclusionary speech

Crucially, the petitions insist that the February 7 video cannot be viewed in isolation.

The CPIM petition places before the Court a detailed chronology stretching from 2021 to February 2026, documenting a steady escalation in the Chief Minister’s public rhetoric. These include statements that allegedly:

• Conflate illegal immigration with Muslim identity
• Repeatedly deploy the slur “Miya” to refer to Bengali-speaking Muslims
• Call for denial of land, employment, transport, and livelihoods
• Advocate social and economic boycott framed as “civil disobedience”
• Encourage harassment through electoral roll objections
• Suggest removal of voting rights for members of a religious community

One of the most striking passages cited urges citizens to create conditions in which Muslims “cannot stay in Assam” by denying them rickshaws, shops, vehicles and land. Another openly exhorts supporters to short-pay rickshaw pullers belonging to the targeted community so that they are compelled to leave.

The petition argues that when such statements emanate from the head of the elected executive, they do not remain rhetorical—they acquire coercive force, shaping behaviour on the ground.

2. From Speech to Social Harm: “Acting on the CM’s directions”

What distinguishes these petitions from earlier hate speech challenges is the emphasis on documented social consequences.

The CPIM petition cites reports of daily-wage workers being harassed, rickshaw pullers being deliberately underpaid, and individuals being confronted and asked to vacate neighbourhoods for being “Bangladeshi Muslims.” In several instances, videos circulating online allegedly show perpetrators explicitly stating that they are acting in accordance with the Chief Minister’s directions.

The petition warns that this marks a dangerous constitutional threshold: the translation of executive rhetoric into informal, decentralised enforcement by citizens, blurring the line between State authority and vigilante conduct.

3. Immigration, NRC and the charge of deliberate conflation

A central legal argument advanced is that the Chief Minister’s rhetoric deliberately collapses the distinction between illegal immigration and Muslim identity.

The CPIM petitions point out that immigration is religion-neutral under Indian law, and that NRC data demonstrates that a majority of those excluded were non-Muslims. The selective focus on Muslims, therefore, is argued to expose the communal intent underlying the speeches.

What is framed publicly as demographic anxiety or border security, the petition contends, operates in effect as religious profiling and collective punishment, incompatible with Articles 14, 15 and 21.

4. Constitutional oath and misfeasance in public office

The CPIM petition anchors its challenge in the constitutional oath taken by ministers to uphold sovereignty, integrity, fraternity and equality.

Relying on decisions such as Manoj Narula v Union of India, State of Maharashtra v SS Chavan and Daulatmal Jain, the petition argues that repeated, deliberate use of State authority to stigmatise and exclude a community constitutes misfeasance in public office and a breach of constitutional trust.

The petition further invokes the Supreme Court’s continuing mandamus in the hate speech batch (Qurban Ali, Shaheen Abdulla), which mandates suo motu registration of FIRs in cases attracting Sections 153A, 153B, 295A and 505 IPC (now reflected in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita). The complete absence of FIRs, despite repeated complaints, is characterised as systemic executive impunity.

5. Reliefs Sought: FIRs, SIT, transfer of investigation

Given that the alleged offender is a sitting Chief Minister, the petition seeks:

• Mandatory registration of FIRs under the BNS
• Constitution of an independent Special Investigation Team
• Transfer of all related investigations to an independent authority

The petition argues that State and Central agencies cannot reasonably be expected to act independently when the subject of investigation occupies the apex of political power.

Other petitions filed

1. A Parallel Constitutional Question: Who regulates the speech of the powerful?

Running alongside the CPIM petition is a broader writ petition filed by twelve citizens—former civil servants, diplomats, academics and public intellectuals—which raises a distinct but connected constitutional concern: the complete absence of standards governing the public speech of constitutional authorities.

As per LiveLaw, this petition highlights not only the Assam CM’s remarks on “Miya Muslims,” “flood jihad,” “love jihad,” and voter removal, but also similar patterns across states and offices—references to “land jihad,” “infiltrators,” “anti-nationals,” and exhortations to “avenge history.”

The petition argues that while individual statements may fall short of statutory hate speech thresholds, their cumulative effect corrodes constitutional morality, erodes fraternity, and legitimises discriminatory governance.

Drawing on Navtej Singh Johar, Joseph Shine, and Government of NCT of Delhi, the petition contends that constitutional morality must operate as a restraint on those who exercise public power.

“Holders of public office are not ordinary speakers,” the petition emphasises. Their words carry the imprimatur of the State, shape administrative behaviour, and have a chilling effect on vulnerable communities—even absent explicit incitement.

The petition seeks declaratory relief that official speech must conform to constitutional values, and urges the Court to lay down guidelines that regulate conduct without curtailing free speech. Detailed report may be read here.

2. Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind: Hate speech, disguised and normalised

Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind has reinforced these concerns by flagging Sarma’s January 27 statement that four to five lakh “Miya voters” would be removed during electoral roll revision.

According to the report of LiveLaw, the clerics’ body argues that many such utterances function as disguised hate speech, escaping prosecution due to selective enforcement and unchecked police discretion.

Relying on India Hate Lab data, Jamiat notes a 74% rise in hate speech incidents in 2024, with nearly 98% targeting Muslims, and links this surge to rising hate crimes against minorities.

A Common Grievance: Police inaction and the charge of selective enforcement

Across petitions, a common grievance emerges: law enforcement’s pick-and-choose approach.

While FIRs are swiftly registered against minorities, complaints against powerful public officials remain unattended. This, the petitioners argue, violates Article 14 and hollow out the rule of law.

Invoking Lalita Kumari, Tehseen Poonawalla, Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan and Kaushal Kishore, petitioners urge the Court to exercise its powers under Article 142 to impose binding accountability mechanisms.

A constitutional crossroads

Taken together, these petitions force the Supreme Court to confront a profound constitutional dilemma:

• Can holders of constitutional office weaponise speech without consequence?
• Does repetitive exclusionary rhetoric itself constitute unconstitutional governance?
• Can constitutional morality be judicially enforced against executive speech?
• When does silence and inaction by institutions become complicity?

With judgment reserved in the broader hate speech matter, the Assam CM petitions may well shape the next doctrinal chapter on hate speech, executive accountability, and the constitutional limits of political power.

Related:

When Genocide is provoked from the Stage: Raebareli hate speeches, Bhagalpur dog whistles, and a delayed FIR

The Politics of Processions: How the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra amplified hate speech in plain sight

The Orchestrated Extremism: An analysis of communal hate speech in India’s election cycle (2024–2025)

CJP urges NCM action against hate speech campaign vilifying Bengali Muslims as ‘Infiltrators’

‘Islamophobia dominates Indian hate speech’: Equality Labs report on Facebook India

The post Supreme Court asked to intervene as petitions flag “normalisation of hate” in Assam CM’s public speeches appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Wangchuk was detained on September 26, 2025, under the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA), following weeks of protests in Ladakh demanding statehood and Sixth Schedule protection—a movement that later spiralled into violence, leading to the deaths of four civilians.

A Bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice P. B. Varale is hearing the Article 32 habeas corpus petition filed by Wangchuk’s wife, Dr Gitanjali Angmo, which challenges the legality of his continued detention. Proceedings have been closely tracked by LiveLaw and other media.

Union’s core defence

1. Court’s review is procedural, not substantive

Opening arguments for the Union, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta emphasised that judicial scrutiny in preventive detention matters is narrowly circumscribed. The Court, he argued, is not entitled to examine whether the detention was “justified”, but only whether statutory and constitutional procedures were followed so as to ensure fairness to the detenue.

Mehta relied on established precedent to submit that once the detaining authority records subjective satisfaction, courts must exercise restraint.

He further underscored the “inbuilt safeguards” within the NSA:

• The District Magistrate’s detention order must be confirmed by the State Government; and
• The detenue has a right to make a representation before an Advisory Board headed by a former High Court judge.

Crucially, Mehta pointed out that Wangchuk has not independently challenged either the confirmation order or the Advisory Board’s opinion, a submission clearly aimed at narrowing the scope of judicial interference.

2. Dispute Over Supply of Materials: Union calls allegations an “afterthought”

Responding to the petitioner’s contention that four video clips relied upon in the detention order were not supplied to Wangchuk, Mehta rejected the claim as factually incorrect and a belated fabrication.

According to the Union, the service of the detention order itself took nearly four hours, during which a senior police officer personally went through each page of the grounds and the video material, a process that was videographed.

“The DIG Ladakh sits with him, shows him every page, every clip, and asks if he is satisfied. He answers in the affirmative,” Mehta told the Court, offering to place the recording on record if required.

3. “Borrowed satisfaction” argument rejected

When the Bench raised the argument that the detention order was based on borrowed or mechanically reproduced material, Mehta countered that this misunderstands the nature of preventive detention.

He argued that a District Magistrate is not expected to personally witness each incident but is entitled—indeed required—to rely on inputs placed before him by law enforcement agencies to arrive at subjective satisfaction.

“What the authority must assess is the speech as a whole,” Mehta said, warning against isolating references to non-violence or Gandhian philosophy while ignoring the allegedly inflammatory core.

4. Union alleges “hope for riot-like situation” in Ladakh

The centrepiece of the Union’s case lies in its reading of Wangchuk’s speeches. According to Mehta, Wangchuk deliberately invoked foreign protest movements to emotionally mobilise young people in Ladakh—a region that shares borders with volatile and geopolitically sensitive areas.

He referred to Wangchuk’s alleged references to:

• Nepal’s youth-led protests,
• Political upheavals in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and
• The Arab Spring, where multiple governments were overthrown following mass unrest.

“What is the relevance of Nepal and Ladakh?” Mehta asked. “You are not addressing Gen-Z in isolation—you are hoping for a Nepal-like situation.”

The Solicitor General dismissed Wangchuk’s invocation of Mahatma Gandhi as a rhetorical façade. “Gandhi was resisting an imperial power. He was not instigating violence against his own democratic government,” Mehta argued.

5. Alleged security concerns and references to self-immolation

The Union further alleged that Wangchuk attempted to create distance between civilians and Indian security forces by lamenting the deployment of armed personnel in Ladakh.

“Security forces become ‘they’, and the people become ‘we’—this is dangerous in a border region,” Mehta submitted.

The most serious allegation concerned Wangchuk’s references to self-immolation, drawn from the Arab Spring narrative.

“This is an invitation to bloodshed,” Mehta claimed, arguing that such examples could incite impressionable youth to extreme and irreversible acts.

Petitioner’s response

1. Non-consideration of crucial exculpatory material

On behalf of the petitioner, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal mounted a systematic dismantling of the detention order in earlier hearings.

Sibal argued that the September 24 speech, in which Wangchuk broke his hunger strike and publicly appealed for peace after violence erupted, was the most proximate and relevant material—yet was never placed before the detaining authority.

Its suppression, he argued, vitiates the very foundation of subjective satisfaction, particularly when the speech was publicly available and known to authorities.

2. Failure to supply relied-upon materials violates Article 22(5)

Sibal further submitted that four key videos, explicitly relied upon in the detention order, were never supplied to Wangchuk along with the grounds of detention, in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 8 of the NSA.

Without access to the complete material, Wangchuk was denied the right to make an effective representation—not merely before the Advisory Board, but also before the government itself.

3. Section 5A cannot rescue a composite detention order

Rejecting the Union’s reliance on Section 5A of the NSA, Sibal argued that the provision applies only where distinct and independent grounds of detention exist.

Here, he said, the detention rests on a single composite ground, stitched together through selective videos, stale FIRs, and allegedly distorted interpretations.

Relying on Attorney General of India v. Amratlal Prajivandas (1994), Sibal submitted that a chain of events cannot be artificially severed to salvage an otherwise unlawful detention.

4. Stale FIRs, copy-paste orders, and non-application of mind

Sibal also pointed out that:

• Several FIRs relied upon date back to 2024,
• Many are against unknown persons, and
• Even the FIR registered after the Ladakh violence does not name Wangchuk.

He further demonstrated that the District Magistrate reproduced the Superintendent of Police’s recommendation verbatim, betraying a mechanical exercise of power rather than independent application of mind.

5. Allegations of anti-army rhetoric and plebiscite “completely false”

Addressing allegations that Wangchuk discouraged civilians from assisting the Indian Army during wartime, Sibal said the claim was entirely false, arising from mistranslation or deliberate distortion.

He quoted Wangchuk as urging Ladakhis not to mix political grievances with national defence, and to stand by the country during any external conflict.

Similar distortions, Sibal argued, were made regarding:

• Alleged support for plebiscite, and
• Claims of disrespect toward a Hindu goddess—both of which he described as manufactured narratives, widely debunked by fact-checkers.

Health, custody, and court-ordered medical care

Amidst these proceedings, concerns over Wangchuk’s health have also engaged the Court’s attention.

On January 29, the Supreme Court directed that Wangchuk be examined by a specialist gastroenterologist at a government hospital, after he complained of persistent stomach pain during his detention.

He was subsequently taken to AIIMS Jodhpur on January 31, where he underwent medical tests. While jail authorities claimed he had been examined 21 times, the Court accepted that specialist care was warranted and sought a report by February 2.

Voices Outside Court: Gitanjali Angmo speaks

Speaking to The News Minute at the Mathrubhumi International Festival of Letters in Thiruvananthapuram, Dr Gitanjali Angmo framed her husband’s detention as an attempt to silence a sustained and principled critique of how Ladakh is being governed after the abrogation of Article 370. She suggested that Sonam Wangchuk’s insistence on environmental safeguards and public participation in decision-making had increasingly placed him at odds with a governance model driven by centralised authority rather than local consent.

Dr Angmo emphasised that Ladakh’s demands for statehood and Sixth Schedule protection were neither sudden nor radical, but rooted in the region’s fragile ecology, high-altitude geography, and distinct cultural identity. With temperatures plunging to sub-zero levels and ecosystems highly vulnerable to disruption, she argued that policies designed for the rest of India cannot be mechanically applied to Ladakh without severe consequences for both people and environment.

She cautioned against what she described as a “one-size-fits-all” approach to governance, warning that excessive centralisation risks erasing India’s constitutional commitment to diversity and federal balance. India, she noted, has historically functioned as a plural federation, united not by uniformity but by accommodation of difference—a principle she fears is being steadily undermined.

Rejecting any suggestion that Wangchuk’s activism was anti-national, Dr Angmo characterised his work as firmly anchored in constitutional values and long-term national interest. She alleged that his speeches were selectively excerpted and stripped of context, while his repeated appeals for peace and unity were ignored, creating a distorted narrative that portrayed dissent as a security threat.

In Dr Angmo’s account, the case transcends the legality of one preventive detention and raises a deeper question about the health of Indian democracy. When region-specific political demands and environmental concerns are met with the extraordinary power of preventive detention, she suggested, it signals a troubling intolerance for dissent—particularly from India’s geographic and political margins.

A growing constitutional unease

As the hearings unfold, the case has come to symbolise a broader constitutional tension: the use of preventive detention laws against political dissent, particularly in regions demanding greater autonomy and constitutional safeguards.

At its core lies a troubling question—can references to global protest movements, stripped of context and divorced from subsequent calls for peace, justify the extraordinary power of preventive detention?

Wangchuk, notably, was detained two days after publicly calling for calm, breaking his fast, and dissociating himself from violence. The leap from that moment to the conclusion that he posed an imminent threat to national security remains at the heart of the Court’s scrutiny.

In a constitutional democracy, where preventive detention is meant to be the exception rather than the rule, the outcome of this case may well define the line between legitimate security concerns and the impermissible criminalisation of dissent.

Further hearings are awaited.

Orders of the said case may be read below.

Related:

How the Centre used a ‘Draconian’ law to silence Sonam Wangchuk and Ladakh’s aspirations

A victory for Ladakh’s voices: Sonam Wangchuk and Ladakhi activists break 16-day fast as union government agrees to renew talks on demands

Centre cancels FCRA licence of Sonam Wangchuk’s NGO, cites violations including study on ‘sovereignty’

Gen‑Z’s furious stand for Ladakh statehood, centre blames Sonam Wangchuk for violence incitement

The post When Protest becomes a “Threat”: Inside the Supreme Court hearing on Sonam Wangchuk’s NSA detention appeared first on SabrangIndia.