The judgment did not come out of thin air. It followed months if not years of ‘instant justice’ enabled by bulldozers, in well-publicized incidents as far back as 2021 in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Delhi, and Haryana, almost always following communal incidents or protests. Many, most obviously in the named jurisdictions, were occurring at night, without rehabilitation, and impacted Muslim, Dalit, and migrant communities disproportionately.

A year has passed. The question to ask is whether these guidelines changed state practice, or whether bulldozers continued to operate in ways that undermined the rule of law – often ways that reinforced reports that we, at CJP and Sabrang India have already documented.

The Judgment that Promised a Reversal

When it rendered its decision in November 2024, the Supreme Court intended to firmly ground demolition practices within constitutional limits. The Bench reiterated that demolitions cannot occur without a statutory basis and must abide by the basic tenets of due process: individuals should be given a notice tailored specifically to them, an opportunity to respond promptly to the notice, a hearing at which to be heard in a meaningful way, and a speaking order evidencing the administrative rationale.

It also spoke to the absurdity of dealing with rehabilitation as an afterthought, especially when it involves vulnerable communities. While some of these principles had stalked Indian law before the decision, the judgment unified them all in one framework during a time when bulldozer-led punitive state action was becoming more commonplace. It indicated we would be seeing efforts to recalibrate the conduct of state institutions in the following year, while signalling to us that we should expect greater adherence to procedural safeguards.

A Year on the Ground: Patterns of Demolition Post the Gavai-Viswanathan verdict

Although in November 2024, the Supreme Court reiterated that demolition cannot take place without notice, a hearing, or rehabilitation, the next twelve months were characterised by a number of drives across states which showed a decidedly different reality on the ground: Demolitions were limited by varying degrees in reliance of this judgement and occurred in urban renewal, and post-arson and riot punitive acts, as reflected in CJP’s and Sabrang India’s reporting, the list below illustrates how state practice was inconsistent, replicating the very failure of procedures the Court had attempted to rectify.

• March 2025

Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh

A key legal development in the aftermath of the judgment occurred in Prayagraj when the Supreme Court awarded ₹10 lakh in compensation each to six residents whose homes were demolished without due process. As reported by Sabrang India in “Supreme Court slams Prayagraj demolitions…”, the Supreme Court found that the Prayagraj Development Authority did not adhere to the statutory due process when demolishing the homes, thus confirming the long-held position of the demolished families. While the Supreme Court’s intervention was valuable, it occurred years after the demolitions happened, indicating a trend where judicial relief is only provided after the damage has already been done.

• May 2025

Madrasi Camp, Delhi

In Delhi, the demolition of Madrasi Camp in Jangpura has once again raised questions about whether the municipality is conforming to the Supreme Court’s guidelines. As Sabrang India’s article, “Madrasi Camp demolition: CPIM Delhi demands halt…” states, residents asserted that they did not receive a substantial notice and were neither promised nor consulted about rehabilitation. The demolition was carried out with a significant police force present, raising apprehensions that evictions continued in the capital even after the verdict, without full compliance with procedural requirements.

• April – May 2025 

Chandola Lake, Ahmedabad

Ahmedabad’s anti-encroachment drive around Chandola Lake was one of the biggest demolitions in the post-judgment year. In Sabrang India’s coverage of the same event (“Gujarat HC refuses stay…”), it noted that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was clearing structures that were predominantly occupied by Muslim residents, under the Gujarat High Court judgment, as it pertained to reclaiming the lake. Though the recourse to the Gujarat High Court challenged the practice, it did not specifically cease the demolition of the houses, nor addressed the rehabilitation of families or just a simple notice.

• March – April 2025 

Nagpur, Maharashtra

The destruction of Fahim Khan’s home in Nagpur highlighted anxieties over punitive administrative action; residents of Nagpur argued that the short notice period of 24 hours did not provide adequate due process. Sabrang India’s report, “Demolition of Fahim Khan’s home…” noted the demolition was significant in the local political climate and raised even more questions over the motive and process in a post-judgement political landscape.

• January 2025 

Dwarka District Islands, Gujarat

In the Dwarka district, clearance operations ordered by the administration after floods impacted fishing communities and places of religious worship. As Sabrang India reported, houses, community shelters, and several mazars and a dargah were demolished. Residents reported that all notices received came too late to counter the action adequately, which instead made it one of the most significant coastal demolitions this year.

• November 2025 

Gurugram, Haryana

In Haryana, the demolition of a longstanding Dalit settlement located on Old Delhi Road exemplified how marginalized communities are still subjected to abrupt unilateral administrative action after the Supreme Court’s ruling. Residents argued that they had not been given the promises regarding rehabilitation, and that they were not given sufficient opportunity to contest the eviction.

• May 2025 

Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh

In Ujjain, the Ujjain Development Authority initiated a demolition campaign along Mahakal Road. Despite official claims that a notice had been issued months ahead of time, residents affected by the demolition vehemently disputed the timing and sufficiency of the notice. Although the High Court had engaged in surveillance of certain aspects of the proceedings, details of the operation also highlighted the disparity of attention to due process in these matters throughout the state.

• Other States Across 2025 

In addition to these key events, there were many additional demolitions, albeit smaller in scale, that further complicated the patterns of uneven compliance with the judgement safeguards. In Delhi, several slum clusters in Mangolpuri, Seemapuri, and near the Yamuna floodplains were partially demolished from June to September 2025. Residents in these areas contended that municipalities referenced notes in affidavits that had never been served individually to residents. Additionally, in UP, families were told that demolitions after flooding in Prayagraj and Varanasi were justified as “emergency measures.” Families maintained that, especially in Prayagraj, there appeared to be selective enforcement and confusion about categorizing the land as within the floodplain or “vacant.” In Kashmir, demolitions after counter-insurgency operations in the Pulwama region. Although families claimed there were no formal charges against them, the demolitions left families without a home, which drew civil liberties objections. Finally, in Punjab, demolitions associated with NDPS-related investigations were conducted, which resulted in a troubling blurring of the lines between crime-control and punitive administrative action. This suggests that bulldozer governance had begun to arrive in new legal categories, disjointed from purely communal-based incidents.

Cumulatively, these expanded incidents along this timeline show that although some agencies claimed procedural compliance, the reality in most cases still demonstrated the same post-incident demolitions, disputed notices, crude procedure, and inadequate rehabilitation, all features that were squarely inconsistent with the principles reaffirmed in the judgment.

Due Process and Rule of Law: What the Year Revealed

The demolitions conducted across states during the year following the judgment demonstrate how the gap between constitutional protections and public administration remains intact. The Supreme Court upheld the paramount importance of notice, hearing, and rehabilitation, yet in most reported drives the involuntary responses relied on notices that were either insufficiently raised, or disputed, sometimes delivered to affected households on the night before demolition or after machinery had arrived.

Hearings were virtually absent, and affected families were united in reporting that they were not afforded any opportunity to present a defence to an allegation of encroachment or illegality. Rehabilitation – outlined specifically by the Court for vulnerable groups – was rarely planned, and never actualized. The judicial responses, when they occurred, were often post-facto rather than pro-facto: the most direct orders, such as the imposition of the Supreme Court’s admonition of the Prayagraj demolitions, and the Orissa High Court ruling on the Cuttack community centre, came months, if not years, after the demolition. The High Court made efforts to call for affidavits or provide interim stays on demolitions, but without a method of enforcement, these steps amounted to little more than symbolic acknowledgment of demolition abuses. The judiciary did not have a mechanism for monitoring the demolitions or following up on the assurances to protect vulnerable families. In the absence of enforcement and in the absence of a court interceding pro-facto, routine use of bulldozing remains an option for administrative attention.

All of the incidents throughout the year show that while the courts have provided clarity of law, process continues to be treated by executive branch actors as a process of ritual and not of constitutional obligation that depends on and can range from excesses of the political or administrative context of where a demolition occurs to focusing on the time and nature of the demolition process, such as while in progress, an act undertaken to restore public order through law enforcement, through ordinary adjustments, including diminished due process for the loved ones of the deceased.

Judicial vs Executive Approaches: A Deepening Divide

In the year following Gavai, we saw an increasingly divergent distance between judicial statements of due-process standards and the executive branches’ practices of adhering to those standards. Courts certainly exhibited, especially in a few notable cases, a willingness to hold state actors accountable: Justice Abhay Oka’s Supreme Court Bench, for example, not only condemned Prayagraj’s unlawful demolitions, but also awarded damages and called for an inquiry to hold the officials accountable. Further still, the Orissa High Court ordered to recovery from the former officer in the Cuttack community-centre case. What emerged among a few courts was the express judicial acknowledgment that demolitions without notice and hearing were not simply “administrative” violations, but constitutional violations. Courts, however, did go so far as to issue contempt notices, such as was seen in the proceedings following the demolitions of the Goalpara community centre, in Maharashtra, and in Delhi, indicating that litigants and judges were considering the guidelines proposed in the judgement, as enforceable obligations. Exceptionally, of course, given how rarely an executive agency is sanctioned for non-adherence to due-process protections.

For most of the demolitions and drives in Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, and parts of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, no disciplinary investigations, prosecutions, or public censures were found. In a few cases, officers were transferred soon after a disputed demolition, but these were simply transferred and not punitive. Even when courts demanded accounts from officials or demanded affidavits, the lapses began to fade into the mass of administrative inertia without consistency or follow-up. The unpredictable but frequent comparisons between the court’s occasional harsh language and the executive branch’s nearly total impunity show the central tension of the post-Gavai year: the words could be said and stated clearly from the Bench, but they could easily be replaced by immediate political, policing, or developmental goals on the ground without a structural mechanism to enforce them.

Constitutional Lens: Articles 14, 21, and 300A

The demolitions conducted across states in the post-judgement timeframe repeatedly placed strain on the constitutional protections outlined in Articles 14, 21, and 300A. Article 14 had more visible effects, where enforcement patterns appeared uneven with bulldozers appearing fastest in Muslim-majority bastis, Dalit settlements, migrant clusters, and other communities with precarious housing. The patterns of the law, particularly the selective invocation of laws regarding encroachment, often within hours of community violence, politicians, and other events, suggested that the police powers were used in a discriminatory manner, informed less by planning considerations and more by the social makeup of neighbourhoods.

Article 21, which underpins the right to life and dignity, is equally undermined. Eviction of temporary structures without any notice does more than involve the destruction of premises; it obliterates the social architecture of family life—livelihoods, safety, and considerations of community. Reporting in The Indian Express of demolitions in Nagpur, Ujjain, Prayagraj, and Delhi were made in consideration of families rendered homeless overnight, with a complete lack of accommodation, with implications for precarious living conditions and a vulnerability to other harms, and dispossession, especially without provision for hearing or rehabilitation in cases of demolition, implicitly indicates a constitutional injury.

Article 300A of the Gavai judgment was arguably the most consistently breached. While state authorities cited legislative authority for demolition, the lack of a fair process, advance notice, and transparent decision-making weakened the “authority of law” mandated by the Constitution. The year’s data suggest that, notwithstanding a robust judicial restatement, the constitutional principles that seek to constrain state authority remain tenuous in the face of administrative urgency or political pressure.

When Landmark Judgments Remain Symbolic

The post-judgement reality reflects a larger trend in a defraying Indian constitutionalism, where even the most impactful judgments risk being reduced to mere symbols. The doctrine implemented in D.K. Basu did not stop custodial torture; Tehseen Poonawalla did not stop lynching; Shreya Singhal did not stop the ongoing usage of Section 66A years after its invalidation. Likewise, the decision, which celebrated the re-centering of due process in demolition practice, has not transformed the habitual behaviour of entrenched administratively.

One reason for this is structural: Indian courts, as a general rule, only intervene when something is brought before them, typically well after demolitions have occurred. As a number of petitions noted by LiveLaw in 2025 highlight, families only arrive in court because their homes are gone – effectively turning the judiciary into an after-the-fact remedial body instead of a preventative one. High Courts occasionally interject with some stern words, but even orders with some public interest stay orders only deal with the facts and circumstances of the individual case.

The political context is also important. In electoral and police discourse, bulldozers have gained a symbolic meaning, viewed as a form of “decisive/aggressive governance” against a select section, India’s marginalized, especially Dalits, Adivasis and the Muslim minority. This symbolism lessens the normative weight of judicial reasoning, giving officers the belief that constitutions are secondary to political mobility. In this context, even a decisive and pathbreaking judgment is susceptible to becoming a citation rather than a restraint.

What Will It Take to Replace the Rule of Bulldozer with the Rule of Law?

A significant transition from bulldozer-led governance to rule-of-law-based governance necessitates more than occasional judicial reprimands. It requires institutional mechanisms that facilitate the provision of procedural safeguards before building demolitions occurring, not after the fact. Mandatory reporting protocols, both before demolitions and immediately following demolitions, that include documentation of public notices, hearings, and rehabilitation plans would create a minimal record of accountability. The reports could be subject to audits by judicially appointed committees or independent agencies.

Courts may also be able to use some form of structured monitoring (as exists in certain environmental and prison-reform litigation) of the state parties in future cases. The state government could make periodic affidavits of compliance, with the threat of civil contempt for systemic non-compliance, and the high courts do registry tracking of demolition cases and violations of the judgement framework by the agency.

Furthermore, executive accountability should reach beyond symbolic shifts of power to committees that was entirely outside of the executive altogether; the state approximate automatic inquiries into demolitions that lack documented due process, the recorded public findings, along with other penalties, serve as deterrents. States may also want to consider codifying the norms in Statutes or regulations, or using agency policies, making these administrative actions defined offences for non-compliance. It is also necessary that rehabilitation be planned and adequately funded. Due process will only be administratively seen as part of the professional duty when officers are routinely and predictably held accountable for the compliant or non-compliant forms of their practice.

A Strong Judgment met With Structural Impunity

The judgment in November 2024 reiterated the core constitutional guarantees: no demolition without prior notice, an opportunity for a hearing and a fair process. It was a principled and timely expression of limits on the powers of the state, especially in the moment when bulldozers had been commonly adopted as some form of immediate administrative response. Yet the following year will demonstrate how even strong jurisprudence may wither away in a context of systemic impunity.

Policies of demolition continued across the states, with at times uneven practices or minimal respect for due process. In a great number of cases, the courts provided relief only after homes had been demolished or schools were turned into rubble. What usually accompanied these rulings were strong observations from the Supreme Court and some High Courts, and an order of compensation, but those decisions were usually either limited in nature or retrospective. State agencies suffered virtually no immediate consequences for their actions, and without institutions capable of monitoring enforcement, the guidelines remained aspirational.

The judgement also highlights the growing disconnect between constitutional principles and everyday executive decision-making. Without continued monitoring, transparent accountability, and meaningful legislative frameworks, a robust ruling cannot control entrenched bureaucratic practices. The promise we have enshrined in the Constitution is hanging in doubt so long as the bulldozer can demolish traditional patterns of adherence to due process.

The judgment may be read below –

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related: 

Encroachment or erasure? India’s demolition wave and the law

‘An eye for an eye’- new law of the land for the Muslim minorities in India?

Muslims in the new India: How one week showcases their escalating persecution

Bulldozer Justice: How Unlawful Demolitions are Targeting India’s Marginalised Communities

The post When the Rule of the Bulldozer Outpaces the Rule of Law: One year after this landmark judgment appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A division bench of Justices Subramonium Prasad and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar. Sengar was directed to furnish a personal bond of Rs 15 lakh along with three sureties of the same amount.

Several conditions were imposed by the high court on Sengar’s release. Among these, he has been barred from entering within a five-kilometre radius of the survivor’s residence and has been instructed not to threaten or contact the survivor or her mother. The court has also directed him to remain in Delhi during the period of bail and to report to the police every Monday. It stated that any violation of any of these conditions would result in cancellation of bail, LiveLaw reported.

The court held that at this stage the offence under section 5(c) of the POSCO Act was not made out. The judgement argued that at this stage the offence did not amount to aggravated sexual assault under Section 5 of the POSCO Act.

The Delhi High Court judgement overturns, in large part, the judgement dated December 16, 2019 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge – West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi [“learned Trial Court”] in Sessions Case No. 448/2019 arising out of FIR No. 96/2018 registered at Police Station Makhi, Unnao, Uttar Pradesh, reregistered as RC-08(S)/2018, PS CBI/ACB/Lucknow.

Sengar, reports The Hindu, who is currently lodged in prison, will, however, remain in jail as he is also serving a 10-year sentence in the custodial death case of the rape victim’s father. Sengar, it has been alleged, kidnapped the girl and raped her in 2017, when she was still a minor. The rape case and other connected cases were transferred to Delhi from a trial court in Uttar Pradesh on the directions of the Supreme Court in August 2019.

Now, following the December 23 order, the suspension of sentence will remain in force during the pendency of Sengar’s appeal challenging his conviction and sentence awarded by a Delhi trial court in December 2019. In that verdict, the trial court had convicted him for the rape of a 17-year-old girl and sentenced him to life imprisonment, along with imposing a fine of Rs 25 lakh. The trial court observed, that there were no mitigating circumstances and noted that Sengar, an elected public representative at the time, had breached public trust.

The rape case and three connected cases were transferred from Uttar Pradesh to Delhi by order of the Supreme Court on August 1, 2019 with directions for day-to-day hearings. The survivor was provided court-mandated protection measures following the conviction, including the option of a safe house and change of identity.

Sengar’s appeal against his separate conviction in the custodial death case of the survivor’s father is still awaiting a judicial outcome. In that case, he has been sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. He has sought suspension of sentence on the ground that he has already spent a substantial period in custody.

There is also a third case reports The Times of India– a collision on the road in which the survivor and her lawyer were critically injured and two of her aunts were killed – a separate case had been registered against Sengar. In December 2021, a Delhi court discharged him in that matter, holding that there was no evidence linking him to the incident.

Yesterday, Tuesday December 23, Delhi police detailed the protesting family members of the Survivor at India Gate. Visuals of the Delhi police manhandling protesters have been circulating on social media.

Rapist & former BJP MLA Kuldeep Singh Sengar:

>Raped a 17-year-old minor girl.
>Police did not act against him.
>Girl attempted self-immolation.
>Case was later taken up by CBI
>Killed victim’s father
>a court convicted him of rape.
>sentenced to life imprisonment.
>a truck of… pic.twitter.com/QPOFwaDfeb

— Mohit Chauhan (@mohitlaws) December 23, 2025

Unnao rape survivor protesting at the India gate against the Delhi High Court order suspending sentence of ex-UP BJP MLA Kuldeep Singh Sengar was bundled in a van by the police. pic.twitter.com/KPybock3LI

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) December 24, 2025

A battery of close two dozen advocates represented Kildeep Sengar in the Delhi High Court: these were N Hariharan Sr Adv, SPM Tripathi, Amit Sinha, Deepak Sharma, Rahul Poonia, Mr. Ambuj Singh, Ashish Tiwari, Gaurav Kumar, Saurabh Dwivedi, Ms. Punya Rekha, Ms. Angara, Ms. Vasundhara N, Aman Akhtar, Sana Singh, Vasundhara Raj Tyagi, Mr. Arjan Singh Mandla, Ms. Gauri Ramachandran, Manish Vashisht, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Aishwarya Sengar, Mr. Vedansh Vashisht and Mr. Swapan Singhal.

The judgement of the Delhi High Court may be read here.

Background

Sengar, from Bangarmau in Uttar Pradesh, was accused in connection with a 2017 case involving a teenage girl from Unnao district. An FIR was eventually registered against him under the criminal law and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act following the allegations. On April 3, 2018, the girl’s father was allegedly assaulted by individuals linked to Sengar and later died on April 8 after falling ill while in custody. A local shopkeeper, who had reportedly witnessed the assault gave a statement to the CBI and later died under unexplained circumstances on August 18, 2018.

The case drew national attention and outrage after the girl attempted self-harm outside the Uttar Pradesh chief minister’s residence and was subsequently critically injured in a road collision that resulted in the deaths of two family members. In 2019, the Supreme Court transferred the case and three related matters from Uttar Pradesh to Delhi and ordered expedited hearings. In December 2019, a Delhi trial court convicted Sengar in the main case. He was also sentenced separately to ten years’ imprisonment in the custodial death case relating to the girl’s father.

Now

On December 23, 2025, the Delhi High Court suspended Sengar’s life sentence and granted him bail pending the outcome of his appeal. The order was passed by Justices Subramonium Prasad and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, subject to Sengar furnishing a personal bond of Rs 15 lakh with three sureties.

The court directed that Sengar must not enter within a five-kilometre radius of the complainant’s residence, must not contact or intimidate her or her family, must remain in Delhi during the bail period, and must report to the police every Monday. It stated that any breach of these conditions would lead to cancellation of bail. To be precise, the high court has suspended the life sentence awarded to Sengar for the duration of the pendency of his appeal. The suspension is what legally allows the court to grant him bail.

Related:

Unnao rape case: Kuldeep Singh Sengar convicted

Ex-BJP MLA Kuldeep Sengar, brother convicted in Unnao rape survivor’s father’s death

Will Sangita Sengar talk about BJP’s beti bachao slogan when campaigning in UP?

The post Delhi HC grants bail pending appeal to Unnao rape convict Kuldeep Singh Sengar appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the news report, Additional District Judge Saurabh Dwivedi also directed that the case be categorised as “most important” and heard on a daily basis. The Court also directed the prosecution to record evidence in the case at the earliest. The case will be heard next on January 6.

Akhlaq (50) was lynched by a mob over rumours of alleged cow slaughter and storing its meat at his home in Dadri’s Bisada village on September 28, 2015. This lynching, among the most prominent to dot the Modi era in Indian politics had caused a national outrage at the time.

Citizens for Justice and Peace has tracked the case closely and in this detailed legal overview questioned the state’s motive to withdraw the case, a decade after the shameful and ghastly lynching at Dadri in Western Uttar Pradesh. This analysis may be read here.

On October 15, the UP government had moved an application to withdraw prosecution in the case, citing reasons from ranged from allegedly “inconsistent statements by Akhlaq’s relatives” in naming the accused; the fact that no firearm or sharp weapon was recovered from the accused, to the lack of any enmity or hostility recorded between the accused and the victim.

Yesterday, the Indian Express had reported that the UP government has now made essentially the same argument that two of the accused had presented earlier. The Indian Express reported Monday that in its application to withdraw the case against the men accused of lynching Mohammad Akhlaq, the Uttar Pradesh government has made essentially the same argument that two of the accused had presented when they applied successfully for bail more than eight years ago

On September 28, 2015, a mob gathered outside his house after an announcement from the village temple alleged that he had slaughtered a cow. Akhlaq and his son Danish, who tried to intervene, were dragged out of their home and assaulted until they fell unconscious. Akhlaq later died at a Noida hospital, while Danish survived after suffering severe head injuries and undergoing major surgery.

Police had registered an FIR at Jarcha police station under sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC ) 302 (murder), 307 (attempt to murder), 147 (rioting), 148 (rioting with deadly weapon), 149 (unlawful assembly), 323 (assault), 504 (intentional insult to disturb peace), among others, based on a complaint by Akhlaq’s wife, Ikraman.

The state police filed the charge sheet on December 23, 2015, before the magistrate court in Surajpur, naming 15 people, including a minor, in connection with the lynching. All the accused are currently out on bail. However, the charge sheet had not specifically mentioned cow meat, as the final forensic report was not available at the time.

Related:

The Lynching of Mohammed Akhlaq

Victims of Gautankwad: Pehlu Khan

Victims of Gautankwad: Alimuddin Ansari

Lynched in India

The post Dadri lynching: UP Court rejects state govt plea to withdraw charges against Akhlaq murder accused appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to reports by LiveLaw, Navlakha had approached the High Court challenging a condition of his bail that restricted him to the territorial jurisdiction of Mumbai without prior permission of the special NIA court. He argued that continuing to reside in Mumbai—away from his family, home, and support system in Delhi—had become financially unsustainable, especially as the trial in the case has yet to commence, as reported by The Hindu.

When the matter was taken up, Additional Solicitor General Anil Singh, appearing for the National Investigation Agency (NIA), placed before the court a set of conditions that could be imposed if Navlakha were allowed to shift to Delhi. According to LiveLaw, these included depositing his passport, not leaving Delhi without the special court’s permission, reporting to the local police station every Saturday, and appearing before the special NIA court in Mumbai whenever directed. The bench accepted these conditions on record and indicated that a formal order permitting the relocation would be passed.

Brief about the previous proceedings

Senior advocate Yug Chaudhary, representing Navlakha, emphasised that the 73-year-old activist has been living in rented accommodation in Mumbai for nearly two years since being granted bail in 2023. As per Bar and Bench, Chaudhary told the court that Navlakha is a long-time resident of Delhi, owns a house there, and had lived there with his partner prior to his arrest. He also pointed out the difficulties Navlakha and his partner faced in securing accommodation in Mumbai due to the pendency of the case. With the trial nowhere in sight, Chaudhary warned that forcing Navlakha to remain in Mumbai could push him into financial ruin.

The defence assured the court that Navlakha would strictly comply with all conditions and attend proceedings whenever required. While suggesting that certain appearances could be made through video conferencing from the NIA office in Delhi, the bench made it clear—according to LiveLaw—that it was not inclined to allow participation in the trial from Delhi. However, it expressed openness to permitting him to stay in the capital until the trial formally begins.

The NIA opposed the plea, arguing that granting such relief could set an undesirable precedent, since several other accused in the case are also not residents of Mumbai and may seek similar permissions. Despite this, the bench noted that there had been no allegation or instance of Navlakha attempting to abscond or misuse his liberty. On December 15, the judges had observed that Navlakha appeared to feel “completely uprooted” from his social circle, friends, and family, and emphasised that he was a free person while on bail.

As reported by The Hindu, the court observed that forcing an accused to remain away from his home indefinitely, especially when the trial has not begun, raises concerns of fairness. “The applicant feels that he is forced to stay in Mumbai when his house is in Delhi. He has assured that he will come back to Mumbai when the trial begins,” the bench noted, adding that Navlakha’s conduct while on bail had been unblemished.

Navlakha had earlier approached the High Court after a special NIA court rejected his request on June 19 to relocate to Delhi. Under his existing bail conditions, he was required to remain within Mumbai’s jurisdiction, making any relocation subject to court approval

Background of the case

Navlakha is among 16 individuals arrested in connection with the violence that broke out on January 1, 2018, at Bhima Koregaon village near Pune, during commemorations marking the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Bhima Koregaon. The violence followed the Elgar Parishad conclave held a day earlier at Pune’s Shaniwar Wada. The prosecution alleges that speeches and activities linked to the conclave incited violence and promoted Maoist ideology. Navlakha, a long-time civil liberties advocate, has been accused of acting as a co-conspirator and of propagating Maoist ideology under the directions of leaders of the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist)—allegations he has consistently denied.

Detailed reports may be read here, here, here and here.

Why is this significant?

With the High Court now relaxing the restrictive bail condition, the order should be seen as a reaffirmation that bail conditions must not be so onerous as to become punitive, particularly when trials are indefinitely delayed. The order underscores the principle that conditions of bail must balance the interests of investigation and trial with the accused’s right to dignity, livelihood, and family life, especially in cases where incarceration has already been prolonged and the commencement of trial remains uncertain. The court’s emphasis on Navlakha’s age, financial precarity, clean conduct while on bail, and absence of flight risk reflects a growing judicial recognition that bail jurisprudence cannot be reduced to mechanical territorial restrictions. Instead, it must account for proportionality and the lived realities of undertrial accused, particularly in long-running UAPA prosecutions where delays have become endemic.

Related:

Gautam Navlakha’s letter on release from custody

Unjust detention: Gautam Navlakha’s bail victory highlights insufficient evidence

Bhima Koregaon accused Gautam Navlakha granted bail by the Bombay HC

Take accused Gautam Navlakha to hospital immediately, SC directs NIA

Taloja Jail denies new spectacles to visually challenged Gautam Navlakha!

The post Bombay High Court allows Gautam Navlakha to return to Delhi, relaxes restrictive bail condition in Bhima Koregaon Case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A division bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Gupta and Justice Arun Kumar had then observed the necessity of addressing the procedural lags that often hinder timely medical intervention for survivors of sexual assault incidents (In Re Framing Of Guidelines For Sensitizing All Concerned In Cases Of Termination Of Pregnancies-cause title). To assist the Court in this crucial and significant matter, the bench has also appointed Advocate Mahima Maurya as the Amicus Curiae.

On November 27, the Amicus Curiae and Additional Chief Standing Counsel Rajiv Gupta, appearing for the State, made submissions with various suggestions to sensitise authorities and streamline the process. The matter is listed next on January 13. The High Court is expected to deliberate further on the suggestions provided to ensure that appropriate guidelines are framed for sensitizing all concerned in cases of termination of pregnancies.

The first order in this case taking suo moto cognizance was passed on October 23, 2025 after which the matter was listed on October 16, October 30, November 7 (during which hearing Ms. Mahima Maurya Kushwaha, Amicus Curiae and Shri Rajiv Gupta, the additional chief standing counsel for the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) made submissions giving various suggestions). The matter was listed thereafter on December 15, 2025 when the last order was passed listing the matter on January 13, 2026.

Related:

In a special hearing, SC bench hears petition on termination of pregnancy, expresses dismay over lackadaisical approach of Gujarat HC

Married woman has the autonomy to choose termination of pregnancy, not medical board: Bombay HC

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act Failing Women Who Need It The Most

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In an almost routine manner, clearly meant to harass citizens, especially those from marginalised communities who may exercise their personal choices in faith practice or in relationships, the sections applied by the Sri Hemant Yadav, Sub Inspector, Jethwara Police station, district Pratapgarh in the First Information Report dated April 26, 2025 (registered as Case Crime No. 0081 of 2025) was under Sections 5 (1), 8 (2) & 8 (6) of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021.

Sub-Inspector Hemant Yadav, the complainant in the FIR alleged that the petitioner was involved in unlawful religious conversion. In a significant Order by a Constitutional Court, not only did the Judges quash the Order but, after getting to the root of the matter –which clearly appeared to be that a false and motivated FIR had been lodged by the instant Sub-Inspector– the Court held the Principal Secretary (Home), Uttar Pradesh to account directly him to explain this conduct through filing of a personal affidavit!  What cleared the matters for the Court, was the affidavit in counter filed by private respondents denying the allegations made in the FIR of any coercive conversions etc.

Interim Order of November 20, 2025

The first protective steps taken on November 20, 2025 in which interim Order the Court also stated that failure to file such affidavit before the next date, December 2, 2025 would require the Principal Secretary (Home) to appear in person, with all records of the case, before the Court. While doing so, the Court Observed that such urgent and stringent steps were required to hold the state administration at the highest level to account, as the contents of the FIR “are patently false” and aggrieved persons (citizens) are required to spend precious resources on seeking relief in patently false and motivated prosecutions. The Interim Order also protected the respondent private respondents from any harassment in any manner by the police or administration, warning of strict action were that to happen. (Para 18 of Interim Order)

Para 14 of the Interim Order dated November 20, 2025

Para 14. This Court requires the personal affidavit of the Principal Secretary (Home), Lucknow inasmuch as the Court is already deluged with the other matters which are coming before the Court and once the First Information Report is being filed by an officer of the State which prima facie appears to be false as such, this is a fit case in which the highest officer should file his affidavit indicating as to why the aforesaid First Information Report has been lodged by an officer of the State although the allegations levelled in the said First Information Report are prima facie patently false. However, the aggrieved persons are constrained to approach this Court for the redressal of their grievances whereby spending their valuable money and time and at the same time, the precious judicial time of the Court is also wasted in dealing with such cases which could have been nipped in the bud by the State itself. As such, personal affidavit would also indicate that in case such frivolous cases continue to come to the highest Court of the State as to why exemplary cost should not be imposed against the authorities who have not applied their mind while lodging the First Information Reports under the Act, 2021.

What was especially noteworthy about this case is that private respondents, alleged victims (Respondents No. 5 to 8) appeared before the High Court and filed a short counter affidavit in which they categorically stated that the allegations in the FIR were “absolutely false, concocted, baseless and without any substance“. They submitted, on record, that no incident of inducement, allurement or coercion had taken place and that they were following their religion “as per their own free will”. Details of this counter-affidavit have been recorded by the Allahabad HC in its interim order in the case dated November 20, 2025 (Paras 7 and 8), also reproduced in part in the final order in the matter dated December 2, 2025.

Paras 7 and 8 of the Interim Order of the Allahabad High Court in the Sabir Ali Case:

Para 7. Taking note of the same, in its earlier detailed order [dated N7. On the other hand, Sri Alok Pandey, Advocate who has filed a short counter affidavit today in Court on behalf of the respondents no. 5 to 8 states on the basis of averments contained in the short counter affidavit that the allegations as made in the impugned First Information Report are absolutely false, concocted, baseless and without any su any substance and no incident of religious conversion, inducement, allurement, pressure or coercion has ever taken place with the petitioner or with any of the other alleged victims.

Para 8. It is further submitted that all the private respondents have already been following their religion, social custom and traditions as per their own free will, independently and without interference or pressure from any corner. At no point of time has any of them adopted any other religion as alleged in the impugned First Information Report nor has any such step ever been undertaken or considered by them.

On that date, November 20, 2025, the Court had also expressed strong displeasure over the facts of the case. It also made a prima facie observation that the FIR lodged by the State officer appeared “patently false”. The Bench had then observed that it was ‘deluged’ with such matters and questioned why citizens should be constrained to approach the Court, spending money and time, for cases that “could have been nipped in the bud by the State itself“.

Final Order Quashing the FIR

Finally on December 2, 2025, 14 days ago, the Division Bench recorded in Para 3 that the personal affidavit of the Principal Secretary (Home), Government of UP had been filed. Significantly, the Court observed that, in Para 4 of the Final Order, that, the State of UP conceived that the FIR may be quashed!

Para 4. Even before the averments contained in the said personal affidavit could be considered by the Court, Dr. V.K. Singh, learned Government Advocate, states that the FIR itself may be quashed by this Court.

Considering the aforesaid statement made by Dr. V.K. Singh, the Court quashed the motivated FIR and observed, in a strong observation in Para 7 of the final order dated December 2, 2025, the Allahabad High Court observed:

“However, considering the detailed order of this Court dated 20.11.2025 a note of caution is issued to the State authorities that being the special Act and having it’s stringent provisions the authorities should have to be more cautious in future while registering the FIRs in mimeographic style under the provisions of the Act, 2021”.

(Para 7)

Counsel for the petitioners are/were Akhand Kumar Pandey, Abhishek Singh

Citizens for Justice and Peace (cjp.org.in, CJP) is the lead petitioner in the draconian ‘anti-conversion laws’ passed by those state ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Today, December 16, 2025 the hearing in this matter (WP Criminal Nos 428/2020 and Nos 14/2023) is expected to address the prayer for interim stay on the most egregious provisions. In the 2025 hearings, first on April 16, 2025, and thereafter in September 2025, hearing on the main prayer of the writ petition for declaring the laws passed unconstitutional (early hearing on cases pending since December 2020) and another application filed by CJP, seeking interim relief. After first challenging the 2020-2021 amended laws of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, the CJP had, in 2023, amended their plea to include similar laws passed in Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka. CJP is the lead petitioner in this matter.

The Interim Order of the Allahabad HC dated November 20, 2025 may be read here

The Final Order of the Allahabad HC dated December 2, 2025 may be read here.

[1] Mimeographic refers to “photo-copy” type documents, or documents from a duplicating machine which produces copies from a stencil, now a photo-copier!

Related:

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

United Christian Forum petitions UP Governor Anandiben Patel, express concerns over recent amendment to UP anti-conversion law

Anti-Conversion Laws: Are forced conversions a myth or reality?

The post Allahabad HC: Quashes FIR under draconian UP ‘Anti-Conversion Act’, warns state authorities against lodging ‘Mimeographic Style’ FIRs appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Supreme Court also directed a special court to conduct trial on a day-to-day basis to record the statements of the nine remaining witnesses. Langa has been ordered to extend full cooperation with the proceedings and seek no adjournment on the ground that his petition seeking the case be quashed is pending. The Enforcement Directorate (ED) has been directed to file a status report on compliance with these directions. The matter has been listed for further consideration on January 6.

Langa had been arrested by the Gujarat Police last year in a case involving allegations of Goods and Services Tax (GST) fraud and was subsequently booked in multiple cases. The ED later registered a case against him under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). It was senior advocate Kapil Sibal appeared for Langa. Opposing the plea, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta alleged that Langa had extorted money, claiming that threats were made to publish adverse material if payments were not made. “A journalist is found to be extorting money… We want to file an additional counter,” Mehta told the court.

Sibal objected to the move, stating that the ED was seeking to change its stand. He argued that allegations of “Rs 68-crore fraud” were exaggerated, asserting that “it is not even Rs 68 lakh.” Sibal further pointed out that no charge sheet had been filed in the predicate offence forming the basis of the PMLA case. “I have been in custody since October 2024. For what offence? It is not murder,” he submitted, calling allegations of influencing witnesses “shocking”.

Sibal also alleged that crucial documents had not been furnished to the defence, stating that there was no supplementary complaint and that the prosecution could not “have it both ways”. Finally after heated exchanges in court and taking note of the fact that only nine witnesses remain to be examined, the court granted interim bail. During a brief exchange after the order, Mehta reiterated the allegation of extortion, to which Sibal responded by suggesting that industrialists were targeting journalists. Mehta denied any political motive, stating that the prosecution was acting purely in a professional capacity. When the exchange escalated, the CJI intervened, stressing that the trial must not be delayed and cautioning Langa against misusing his position as a journalist. Sibal responded that any such violation would be grounds for cancellation of bail.

The Gujarat high court had denied bail to Langa following which he had approached the Supreme Court.

Related:

“This system breaks the body when it cannot break the spirit” — Ipsa Shatakshi on her jailed husband, journalist Rupesh Kumar Singh

One more attack on the Media: Local journalist thrashed and urinated upon by railway police, UP

SC’s denial of bail to journalist Rupesh Singh once again showcases how the Court looks at bail under UAPA, with varying consistency

The post Interim bail to Gujarat journalist Mahesh Langa: SC appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Court’s perspective on this issue brings to bear a number of important constitutional issues that need to be addressed immediately. Firstly, having access to content related to “obscenity” linked to the Aadhaar number will also mean that all online anonymity will cease to be protected and, in effect, this will increase the amount of control given to the government regarding what individuals are allowed to view and/or post online. Secondly, since the meaning of “obscenity” has always been subject to personal opinion and moral bias, if the Court continues to follow a technological enforcement of this concept, it will result in an enormous increase in the amount of government control over online spaces such as YouTube and other OTT platforms and, ultimately, over independent creators.

From the Ranveer Allahabadia Matter to Systemic Control

The Court’s changing view can be traced back to a case involving Ranveer Allahabadia, a YouTuber accused of producing “obscene” and “immoral” video content. This case raised the question of whether the legal rules and regulations currently in effect were sufficient to govern such content. As stated in the Supreme Court Observer respectfully, it appeared as though the Court was more concerned with the potential risks posed by unregulated digital content than with determining whether the petitioner was harmed by the defendant’s content. A similar finding was reported in the Global Freedom of Expression case report from Columbia University, which stated that the petitioner did not present evidence of legal harm, but instead framed the issues through the lens of moral panic.

Following this, the positions taken by the Supreme Court became increasingly broad, culminating in a March 2025 request by the Court to the Union government to think about enacting a law creating a national standard for “online obscenity”. In doing so, the Court transitioned from addressing the content grievance in a singular context to calling for a systematic legislative approach to achieve the same. The Court stated that India lacked a neutral, independent regulatory authority to oversee online content.

In late 2025, the ongoing confusion within the legal framework surrounding Aadhaar culminated in the formulation of a very specific concept regarding how Aadhaar should be used as the basis for age verification for the purposes of preventing minors from accessing pornographic materials. This was not simply a passing comment or procedural matter but was rather a comprehensive strategy of linking an individual’s access to online material directly to an individual’s biometric identity through Aadhaar’s use as an age verification mechanism.

The March 2025 Direction and the Government’s Parallel Initiatives

The Supreme Court’s March 2025 directive to the Executive branch of the Union Government came at a time when the Executive branch had been assessing the types of control that it might use to regulate digital content. Witnesses described that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was looking into creating regulations that would provide new rules for the regulation of “perverse user-generated content,” which was echoed by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, who had testified to the Supreme Court.

At the same time, there was an effort on behalf of the Central Government to push out an Influencer Code, resulting in concern over the lack of public consultation. The Internet Freedom Foundation recorded those concerns in its report and called for a consultation on the matter. The report can be read here.

Many parties were warning that the Supreme Court’s strong push for new legislative enactments could have a chilling effect on legitimate online speech, with reports in The Hindu explaining this matter and how it combined with the earlier actions by the Executive branch indicating an increasing amount of judicial interest in the regulation of social media, and the ability of the Supreme Court to regulate online speech.

Therefore, what once appeared to be one case of litigation has been seen to be braided into a more significant regulatory push. The Supreme Court and the Executive branch are seen to mutually reinforce each other’s concerns regarding digital content.

Obscenity as a Legal Category: Colonial Morality in Digital Form

India’s obscenity doctrine has its origins in the pre-constitutional era. The Interpretation of Section 292 in the IPC has been based on the moral standards of Victorian England, in how sexual expression was viewed as corruptive. Although the Supreme Court has attempted to modernize the definition of “obscene” in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal by moving from the Hicklin test to current community standards, the concept of obscenity remains the most unclear and controversial definition in Indian Law.

Traditionally, the word “obscene” has been a means to censor the expression of LGBTQ+ individuals, feminists, those providing information about reproductive health, those who produce artistic works and literature, and people who provide sex education. By using the same definition of obscenity to create and regulate content within the digital space, these definitions will encompass many types of legitimate speech, i.e., queer content, experimental art, sex education content being made on YouTube, and narratives of survivors.

Because spaces for digital creators, i.e., YouTube and OTT platforms, are some of the only ways that individuals can currently communicate with large audiences that are not already censored within the media through either governmental control or the NBDSA, independent creators possess the unique ability to produce their content on these platforms without any type of government interference. By establishing obscenity regulations, the autonomy that independent creators currently possess would be lessened, allowing the government to indirectly suppress dissent, satire, and criticisms of the established cultural/ethical norms of society, under the guise of “protecting” minors.

Aadhaar-Based Age Verification: The Constitutional Faultlines

The Court’s finding that the Aadhaar system could be used as an age gate for virtual media raises significant constitutional issues.

Article 19 (1) (a) grants individuals a right to receive information as well as to express themselves. Using Aadhaar to authenticate access to digital content destroys the ability to remain anonymous and connects people’s viewing patterns with their biometric identity. Because of this linkage, individuals may feel deterred from viewing and/or interacting with material that is sensitive in nature, including material related to political criticism, mental health, LGBTQ resource issues, and sexual education.

Article 21 requires that any encroachment upon an individual’s right to privacy must meet the proportionality tests outlined in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. Aadhaar-based verification of an individual’s age does not meet these criteria as it is neither required nor proportionate. Alternative methods of age verification that do not require individuals to disclose their identities, such as anti-fraud age verification or token-based confirmation of age, may serve as less invasive methods.

Article 14 addresses the issue of classification. Because obscenity is a subjective classification and is inconsistently applied across jurisdictions, an identity-linked filtering system allows arbitrary and disparate restriction of content. Thus, material labelled as “immoral” or “perverse” can disproportionately affect marginalized producers of content, as well as LGBTQ related materials, political satire, or criticisms of majority morality.

Globally, similar types of legislation have been challenged and have been ruled unconstitutional in court. In the U.S., age-verification laws in Utah, Arkansas, and Texas were found to violate an individual’s right to privacy by imposing a chill on lawful speech. Additionally, the Digital Economy Act in the U.K. abandoned the use of age verification due to privacy concerns and the difficulty of implementing that scheme. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the EU presumes large-scale identity verification in order to access content as a violation of existing privacy law. Finally, Aadhaar-based filtering is significantly more intrusive than any other methodology described above and places India outside the realm of established international norms based on rights.

Who Classifies Obscenity?

In what is likely the most important question raised by the Court’s recent remarks, the issue of determining what constitutes obscenity remains unresolved. While the Court has suggested that a neutral and independent body should make this determination, the historical patterns of regulatory bodies in India indicate that there will be an ongoing struggle for executive supremacy over regulatory bodies. Even self-regulatory agencies are often placed under significant amounts of state pressure, as evidenced by SCObserver’s analysis of takedown jurisprudence found in Wikimedia Foundation v. ANI and pointing to the inherent risk that any regime to classify material as obscene will be manipulated by the political elite in a country where the lines between nationalism and morality have become increasingly unclear. Therefore, it is highly probable that any form of content that has been deemed ‘anti-national’, ‘anti-authority’, or ‘anti-Indian’ will likely be categorized with what is generally regarded as immoral.

The Political and Practical Risks: Can Balance Exist?

Although it is almost impossible to find a balanced approach to controlling minors from unlawful exposure to cyberspace content while at the same time protecting individuals’ right to free speech, the current regulatory developments within India indicate that finding a true balance is aspirational at best. Increasing pressure from the governing body and the continual expansion of the IT Rules, as well as significant interest in ensuring traceability of cyber content, lack of information regarding reasons for user information withdrawal, and draft regulations for influencer(s) will only serve to establish an overwhelming level of executive control over the speech and behaviour of individuals within cyberspace.

In this context, obscene content provides an excellent opportunity for state intervention by way of protecting children but ultimately provides an opening for vague state regulation of all forms of expression. Such an increase in state authority will rarely decrease, as has been pointed out by many authorities in constitutional law who cautioned against the expansion of state power.

Safeguards against a Moral-Political Regime

The Supreme Court’s development of a new anti-obscenity regime should include critical safeguards, including:

1. a transition from ‘moral’ definitions to ‘harm’ based definitions;
2. an independent and accountable regulatory authority not influenced or dominated by the Executive;
3. a requirement for all regulations to be developed with transparency and public consultations;
4. a strong commitment to continuing judicial review over takedown requests; and
5. a prohibition on access to content via Aadhar-based identity links.

If these safeguards are not implemented, India risks creating a system where the use of morality as a justification for censorship, identity as a currency for realizing one’s right to access information, and a re-definition of digital public spaces under the control of State powers occur.

The judgment in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal can be read here:

The judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in Wikimedia Foundation v. ANI can be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related

The Sentinel and the Shift: Free speech in the Supreme Court

Free Speech in the Digital Age: A doctrinal analysis of four recent Supreme Court cases on Article 19(1)(a)

Ranveer Allahbadia: A “victim” of selective outrage?

Don’t cross the line: Courts on media trials and erring conduct of anchors

Free Speech Upheld: Bombay HC strikes down IT (Amendment) Rules, 2023 as unconstitutional

The post When Morality Meets Surveillance: The court’s push toward state-regulated digital content appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Bench was hearing a writ petition seeking quashing of an FIR that accused the petitioners of organising a Christian prayer meeting, distributing Bibles, and attempting to convert Dalits and poor persons. Alongside the conversion charges, the FIR also invoked Sections 352 and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. The Court not only cast serious doubt on the FIR, but also reproached the police for swiftly arresting all accused on the very day the FIR was lodged, despite no victim having come forward at that time.

No Victim, No Conversion: FIR has no legal backbone, says Court

The FIR, registered on 17 August 2025 by one Manoj Kumar Singh, alleged that the petitioners had organised a prayer meeting, preached Christian tenets through an LED screen, distributed Bibles, and attempted to convert Dalits and economically vulnerable persons.

However, the Bench—after a close reading of the FIR—observed that:

• No individual had come forward on 17 August 2025 to claim they were being converted.
• The FIR merely recorded that an LED screen and Bibles were present at the site.
• There was no reference to force, misrepresentation, coercion or allurement at the time of registration.

The judges emphasised that distribution of Bibles is not a crime, and preaching a religion is not criminalised anywhere in law. In its order, the Bench held unequivocally that:

“Learned AGA has failed to indicate and obviously would not be able to indicate that distribution of Bible is a crime. Further, even preaching of a religion has not been prescribed as a crime anywhere. Thus, the sine-qua-non to invocation of Section 3 of the Act, 2021 prima facie would be coming forward of a ‘person’ to allege that either he has been converted to any other religion or is being coerced or given some allurement to convert to some other religion which is patently missing at the time of lodging of the FIR.” (Para 15)

Crucially, the judges emphasised that Section 3 of the 2021 Act requires the presence of an actual ‘person’ who alleges coercion, force, undue influence, misrepresentation or allurement. This foundational requirement, they held, was “patently missing” on the date of the FIR.

Two-month silence from alleged victims raises red flags

The State attempted to rely on the supplementary statement of a purported victim recorded on October 25, 2025, claiming that he later mentioned being given an “allurement” to convert.

But the Court underlined two troubling facts:

1. His first statement on September 4, 2025 said nothing about conversion,
2. The allegation surfaced only after more than two months of the FIR.

The witness’s wife also recorded her statement only on 25 October 2025, mirroring the same unexplained delay.

The Court found this chronology deeply questionable, noting that the very offence alleged in the FIR “has only been supported after more than two months.”

“Interestingly, in the initial statement of Sri Ram Dev recorded on 04.09.2025 he has not indicated anything about any attempt being made to convert him or any allurement etc. having been given which has only come in the subsequent/supplementary statement recorded on 25.10.2025 wherein he has indicated about the allurement. Thus, it is apparent that the offence under the Act, 2021 as indicated in the FIR lodged on 17.08.2025 has only been supported after more than two months on 25.10.2025!” (Para 16)

“Interestingly, even the statement of wife of the witness Sri Ram Dev namely Smt. Nisha had been recorded on 25.10.2025 i.e. after a period of more than two months of the date of the alleged incident indicating the accused asking the petitioners to convert.” (Para 17)

HC: Police “bent themselves backward” to arrest petitioners without any basis

What particularly troubled the Bench was the immediate arrest of all petitioners on the same day the FIR was filed. At that time, there was:

• no victim complaint,
• no allegation of coercion,
• no evidence of conversion, and
• only a recovery of the Bible and an LED screen—neither of which is unlawful.

The judges remarked:

“Even more interesting is that fact that immediately on lodging of the FIR on 17.08.2025 the petitioner(s) have been arrested on the same date. As already indicated above, the statement of the alleged victim has been recorded more than two months later to indicate the alleged offence. Although an FIR is not expected to be an encyclopaedia containing all the facts of the entire evidence rather it is only meant to set the criminal law in motion yet considering that the Act, 2021 is a special Act as such at least the authorities should have applied their mind to the fact that on the date the said incident is committed i.e. 17.08.2025 there was nothing to indicate the commission of the said offence. Thus, it is prima facie apparent that the authorities have bent themselves backward in order to arrest the petitioner(s) even though it is not known as to how the complainant had got information about any offence as alleged in the FIR having come to his knowledge. These are all strange facts which need to be explained by the authorities more particularly when it is the life and liberty of the petitioner(s) which is involved.” (Para 18)

The Court reminded the State of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P. (2025), stressing that the 2021 Act is a special law requiring strict, not presumptive, compliance.

Court turns spotlight on complainant’s conduct; issues notice with tough questions

In a rare and telling move, the High Court has issued notice to the complainant—Manoj Kumar Singh—directing him to file a counter-affidavit answering pointed questions:

1. Where did you get information about the alleged offence?
2. How did you gather a group of people to accompany you?
3. If you barged into a private home, what offence did the petitioners commit by stopping you?
4. How do offences under Sections 352 and 351(3) BNS apply at all?
5. What is your criminal history, if any?

This line of inquiry signals the Court’s concern about possible vigilantism, motivated complaints, and misuse of the conversion law to target religious minorities.

A Clear Judicial Message: Anti-conversion laws cannot be used lightly

Importantly, the Bench issued notice to complainant Manoj Kumar Singh (respondent no. 4) and required him to file a detailed counter-affidavit responding to a series of sharp questions:

1. Source of information: From where did he learn of the alleged conversion activity?
2. Mobilisation of crowd: How did he gather a group of people to accompany him to the petitioners’ home?
3. Unlawful entry: If he forcibly “barged into” a third person’s residence with others, what offence were the petitioners committing by trying to stop him?
4. Applicability of BNS charges: How can Sections 352 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace) and 351(3) (criminal intimidation causing threat of death or grievous hurt) be justified against the accused in such circumstances?
5. Criminal history: The Court specifically asked for disclosure of the complainant’s criminal antecedents, if any.

This shift in judicial focus—from accused to complainant—signals the Court’s concern about possible misuse of the conversion law and potential vigilantism. By demanding explanations from both the State and the complainant, the High Court has effectively signalled that the criminal process cannot become a tool for harassment or intimidation in the name of controlling conversions.

Strict Interpretation of Section 3: Conversion requires a specific person alleging harm

The Court reaffirmed that for an offence under Section 3 of the 2021 Act, there must be:

• A person claiming, they were subjected to force, fraud, coercion, undue influence, or allurement;
• A complaint indicating actual or attempted conversion;
• Immediate and credible allegations, not delayed statements recorded months later.

The Court reiterated that:

• Preaching Christianity, installing an LED screen, or holding a prayer meeting does not amount to conversion.
• Distributing the Bible is not an offence.

In the absence of a named victim at the time of the FIR, the statutory ingredients were missing.

Order and next steps

The Court has granted:

• 4 weeks to the State to file its counter-affidavit,
• 2 weeks to the petitioners to file a rejoinder thereafter, and
• will hear the matter afresh after completion of pleadings.

Pending this, the Bench’s observations stand as a significant judicial caution against the weaponisation of conversion laws and arbitrary arrests, while also curbing attempts by private actors to take the law into their own hands.

The complete order may be read here:

Related:

Survey of Churches, anti conversion laws only empower radical mobs: Archbishop Peter Machado

Rajasthan: Civil Society demands arrests, rule of law and end to minority targeting under anti-conversion law

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP urges SC to curb misuse of anti-conversion statutes by states

The post Allahabad HC slams overzealous police action, says distributing Bibles or preaching Christianity is not an offence under UP conversion law appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Justice M.R. Mengdey, delivering a detailed judgment in Navdeep Mathur & Ors. v. State of Gujarat on December 4, 2025, has not only quashed all the impugned prohibitory orders, including a 2025 notification under Section 37 of the Gujarat Police Act, but also issued binding directions to the State: future prohibitory orders must be widely publicised through social media and other accessible platforms, as publication only in the official gazette is inadequate and inaccessible to the public. He held that the State had “clearly circumvented” legal protections designed to prevent exactly this kind of prolonged, opaque restriction on public assembly.

Section 144 cannot be a “standing order”: Court questions years of continuous restrictions

The petitioners, peaceful protestors against the Citizenship Amendment Act in 2019, argued that they were prosecuted for violating Section 144 — a provision they never knew had been imposed. The reason became clear once the Court examined the records: from 2016 to 2019, Ahmedabad Police issued one Section 144 order after another, often overlapping, ensuring the city was almost perpetually under prohibitory restrictions. The Court found this argument fully substantiated.

The Court found this deeply problematic:

• No material facts were recorded in the orders
• No emergent circumstances were demonstrated
• No prior inquiry, as required by law, was carried out
• No notice was issued to affected citizens except in supposed “emergencies”
• No attempt was made to use less restrictive measures

This, the Court said, reduced a temporary emergency provision into a standing administrative tool — precisely what Supreme Court precedents warn against.

The judgment shows a clear concern: Ahmedabad Police had normalised an emergency provision, issuing one order after another—sometimes even overlapping—and effectively creating a continuous bar on public assembly for years. As the Court held:

“The material available on record indicates that the Respondent authorities continued to issue Notifications under S.144 of the Code one after the other. Learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner is right in contending that, on occasions, the subsequent Notification was issued even when the earlier notification was holding the field.” (Para 13)

Such a practice, the Court said, circumvented Section 144(4), which caps the duration of an order at two months unless extended by the State Government. Notably, the State never once invoked its power to extend any of these notifications; instead, the police simply kept reissuing fresh ones.

“No reasons, no facts, no transparency”: Judicial scrutiny exposes procedural vacuum

Justice Mengdey emphasised the principles laid down in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, Gulam Abbas v. State of UP, and Acharya Jagdishwaranand. The law requires:

1. Material facts to be recorded
2. Reasoned satisfaction of the need for immediate action
3. Prior inquiry, unless a genuine emergency prevents it
4. Temporary, tightly-tailored restrictions

But the Court found that none of the Section 144 notifications examined contained reasons, factual foundations, or evidence of emergent circumstances.

“As per the settled legal position, these powers being amenable to the judicial review and scrutiny, exercise of it, requires to appear reasonable and therefore, the authorities exercising these powers are also required to give their reasons for the same. The Notifications questioned in the present petition do not bear any reasons given by the authorities for issuing the same. When, by exercise of powers under S.144 of the Code, the fundamental rights or constitutional rights of a class of citizens are being affected, the exercise needs to be transparent. The scheme of the provision of S.144 of the Code itself makes it clear that the authority exercising these powers is required to come to a conclusion that it is necessary to exercise these powers to prevent disturbance to public peace and tranquillity.” (Para 9)

“The impugned notifications do not mention any such material facts. The safeguards and procedure prescribed in the Section are not an empty formality. Their strict adherence is mandatory as the impugned notifications propose to impose restrictions upon the citizens affecting their fundamental rights.” (Para 9)

By affecting fundamental rights without a factual basis, the State had acted in “utter disregard of the safeguards” built into the law.

Failure to use other lawful measures: State cannot label every gathering a threat

A crucial aspect of the judgment is the Court’s reminder that dissent—peaceful protest—is a constitutionally protected exercise of democratic freedom. Section 144 may be imposed only when other methods fail and only as a last resort. Before invoking it, authorities must try less intrusive methods of maintaining public order. Yet the State could not produce evidence showing any such effort.

The Court made this explicit:

“Therefore, prior to resorting to exercise of powers under S.144 of the Code, it was incumbent upon the Respondent authorities to take recourse to the other measures available to them under the law for maintenance of peace and tranquillity and it was only when those measures were found to be insufficient, the powers in question could have been exercised. There is nothing on record to indicate that the Respondent authorities had even taken recourse to the other measures and it was only upon their failure that the powers in question were exercised.” (Para 12.1)

The repeated, blanket restrictions therefore failed the test of proportionality, necessity, and reasonableness.

Court also strikes down the 2025 Ahmedabad Police Commissioner’s order under Section 37 of the Gujarat Police Act

The judgment goes beyond the Section 144 regime. Petitioners pointed out that even after the practice of constant Section 144 orders was discontinued, the State simply switched to issuing equally broad prohibitions under Section 37 of the Gujarat Police Act.

The Court closely examined the Commissioner’s November 3, 2025 notification, which cited vague allegations of violent gatherings in “certain police station areas” but did not specify which areas, when the incidents occurred, or why the entire city needed to be restricted.

The Court concluded the State had:

• Provided no nexus between the facts alleged and the sweeping prohibition imposed
• Curtained legitimate protest across Ahmedabad
• Failed to target actual offenders, instead opting for a city-wide ban that punished peaceful citizens

The same violated principles set out in George Fernandes v. State of Maharashtra, which requires a proximate, rational connection between the threat perceived and the restrictions imposed. Blanket bans fail this test.

“These observations would apply to the facts of the case on hand as well as the authorities concerned have miserably failed in demonstrating any such rationale and proximate connection or nexus between the prohibition sought to be imposed with the necessity for prevention of public order.” (Para 20)

“The aforesaid discussion would make it clear that the powers have been exercised by the respondent authorities in utter disregard of the safeguards provided for exercise of the powers in question. Therefore, the exercise of powers by the authorities appears to be arbitrary in the present case. Therefore, the notification in question including the notification of the Police Commissioner dated 3^rd November 2025, are violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioners and therefore, are liable to be quashed and set aside.” (Para 21)

Adjudication despite expiry of orders

The State argued that all the notifications had “expired” and therefore no adjudication was necessary. The Court rejected this. Justice Mengdey emphasised that citizens were still facing prosecution for alleged violation of these notifications, and therefore the validity of the orders directly impacted their liberty.

“It is argued that the Notifications have lived their lives. However, there would be many including the Petitioners, who would be facing prosecution for violation of these Notifications. Therefore, even if the Notifications have lived their lives and are no more in force today, their validity is required to be considered, as, if the same is not done, the Petitioners and many others, would be facing prosecution for violation of the Notification which stands declared arbitrary. Therefore, these Notifications were required to undergo the judicial scrutiny even after their expiry.” (Para 23)

This ensures that criminal proceedings arising from unconstitutional notifications do not continue.

Publicity failure: Official gazette is not enough in the digital era

One of the most important directions in the judgment relates to transparency.

The State claimed that the orders were “widely publicised.” The Court disagreed, noting that the petitioners had demonstrated that the public had no meaningful way to know such orders were in force at all.

Justice Mengdey observed:

“In the present era, mere publication of such Notifications or orders in the official gazette would not be sufficient. Moreover, the public at large has no access to such official gazette. In the era, where several modes of mass communication, including social media platforms are available, it is incumbent upon the Respondent authorities to publish such Notifications / Orders by using such modes. While quashing and setting aside the Notifications impugned in the present petition as well as the Notification dated 3.11.2025 issued by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City being violative of fundamental rights of the citizens, the Respondent Authorities are hereby directed that, in future, while exercising such powers available under BNSS or Section 37 of the G.P.Act, due care shall be taken for adhering to the procedural aspects and the inherent safeguards required for exercising such powers and the Notifications / Orders issued under these provisions shall be given wide publicity on social media to make the public at large aware about it.” (Para 25)

The Court therefore directed:

• Mandatory publication of all Section 163 BNSS / Section 37 GP Act orders
• On social media, websites, and modern communication platforms
• In addition to regular modes
• To ensure actual public awareness and compliance

This is a major structural direction that significantly alters how prohibitory orders must be disseminated in Gujarat going forward.

A corrective moment for democratic policing

The judgment is a firm reminder that:

• Section 144 cannot be normalised
• Perpetual restrictions on peaceful assembly are unconstitutional
• The State must provide reasons, facts, inquiry, and evidence
• Blanket city-wide bans are disproportionate
• Citizens must be informed through accessible means
• Transparency and accountability are essential before curtailing democratic freedoms

The High Court’s intervention decisively pulls back an executive practice that had been allowed to operate unchecked for nearly a decade.

Conclusion: A decisive reaffirmation of democratic freedoms

By quashing the impugned notifications—both under Section 144/163 and Section 37—the High Court has sent a clear signal that public order powers cannot be used casually or mechanically to stifle dissent.

The ruling enhances procedural safeguards, demands transparency, and restores constitutional balance at a time when administrative reliance on prohibitory orders has become routine across many Indian cities.

The Gujarat High Court’s directions will now require every future invocation of Section 163 BNSS or Section 37 GP Act to satisfy:

• Reason-based scrutiny
• Evidence-based justification
• Prior exploration of lesser restrictive alternatives
• Wide public dissemination for awareness

A crucial precedent, the judgment stands as a robust defence of the right to protest and the constitutional promise that emergency powers must remain exceptional, temporary, and accountable—not a default policing mechanism.

The complete judgment may be read here:

Related:

Does imposition of Sec. 144 indicate Saffronisation of TN state machinery?

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