After this order, both will be released from custody in the case being probed by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). Gorkhe and Gaichor are required under the conditions laid down by the High Court, have to pay bail bond of ₹1 lakh with surety each and attend the NIA Mumbai office on the first Monday of every month.

A detailed order is yet to be published by the Court. Both Gorkhe and Gaichor were represented by senior lawyer Mihir Desai. This case, also known as the Elgar Parishad case, was earlier handled by the local Pune police and later taken over by the NIA.

The special NIA court in Mumbai had in February 2022 refused bail to Delhi University associate professor Hany Babu and Kabir Kala Manch members Gorkhe, Gaichor and Jyoti Jagtap, all arrested by NIA in 2020. It has taken four years since that refusal of bail for the Bombay High Court to grant this relief.

The special court had accepted prosecution’s case about the alleged role of the accused at the Elgar Parishad event and links to banned organisations attracted stringent UAPA provisions, and found no ground to depart from the statutory bar on bail in UAPA cases. Based on this reasoning, the court had rejected permanent bail to them though it granted interim bail to Sagar Gorkhe to enable him to prepare for and appear in his law examinations, noting his past compliance with bail conditions.

The Court allowed Gorkhe temporary release from November 20 to December 16, 2025 for the same. The accused then approached the High Court which allowed Gorkhe’s and Gaichor’s appeals today.

Hany Babu had secured bail in December last year.

Over a period of two years after the FIR was filed in 2018, sixteen persons were arrested in the Elgaar Parishad–Bhima Koregaon case, nine initially by Pune Police in 2018 and seven later by the NIA after it took over the probe. Of the 16, Jesuit priest and activist Father Stan Swamy died in custody in 2021. Swamy was 84 at the time of his death.

Most of the remaining 15 accused have secured bail or temporary bails from the Supreme Court and Bombay High Court. With today’s order by Bombay High Court, only lawyer Surendra Gadling would continue to remain in jail. Two others, tribal rights activist Mahesh Raut and cultural activist, Jyoti Jagtap are out on interim bails.

Charges in the case are yet to be framed and trial is yet to begin as discharge applications of the accused are being heard. The NIA is also yet to hand over electronic evidence, which it has claimed is key, to the accused persons. 

Trajectory of the arrests

Although named as an accused in the original FIR, Gorkhe and Gaichor were arrested two years after the others. Both Gorkhe and Gaichir have been associated with the Kabir Kala Manch, a cultural group involved in anti-caste campaigns in Maharashtra. In 2011, however, the then Congress- led government accused the organisation of being a front for the banned Naxal movement in the state. Ever since, any association with Kabir Kala Manch has been looked at as illegal by the law enforcement. Both Gorkhe and Gaichor have faced incarceration in the past and an earlier case is pending against them.

Related:

Bombay HC bail for Hany Babu signals a critical reassessment of the Bhima Koregaon Case

Bombay High Court grants bail to Rona Wilson and Sudhir Dhawale in Bhima Koregaon case

Bhima Koregaon case: 5 years on, charges not framed despite repeat extensions

Gautam Navlakha granted bail by Supreme Court in Bhima Koregaon case; orders him to pay 20 lakhs for the expenses incurred during his house arrest

The post BK16 Case: Bail for Sagar Gorkhe and Ramesh Gaichor, five years and five months after arrest appeared first on SabrangIndia.

For a country that saw the Bhopal Gas Tragedy and many such incidents where lack of regulation resulted in massive loss of human life and toll on victims that exists to date, this turnaround is rather surprising. That too, for it to have triggered by a judgement of the Supreme Court, an institution that has been a guardian of environment from the T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India case, where tree-felling and non-forestry activity in forests across the country was stopped by an order of the Supreme Court to the Niyamgiri hills case where indigenous Dongria Kondh tribe successfully fought against Vedanta Aluminium’s bauxite mining project, using the Forest Rights Act (FRA) 2006 to assert their cultural and religious rights over the sacred hills.[1]

Background: Tracing the Origins of “Prior” Clearance

To appreciate the magnitude of the conflict between the May 2025 and November 2025 Vanashakti judgments, it is essential to situate the dispute within the broader evolution of environmental constitutionalism in India.

In the wake of the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the catastrophic Bhopal Gas Tragedy of 1984, India developed a legal regime grounded in the “Precautionary Principle.” Interpreted by the Supreme Court as part of Article 21 (the Right to Life), this principle requires that environmental protection measures must anticipate, prevent, and address sources of environmental degradation before any damage occurs.

The principal mechanism for implementing this principle is the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification. Introduced in 1994 and updated in 2006, the EIA framework mandates that certain industrial and infrastructure projects must secure “prior” Environmental Clearance (EC) before any construction begins. The underlying rationale is that any environmental harm, such as deforestation or wetland destruction, is often irreversible. If assessments are conducted post-construction, they serve merely as a bureaucratic formality, failing to achieve the goal of sustainable development.

However, a significant gap has emerged between this normative ideal and the realities of India’s rapid industrialization, ready crony land grab. Successive governments, prioritising the “Ease of Doing Business,” began to grant “ex post facto” (retrospective) clearances to projects that had already commenced operations unlawfully. This practice created a moral hazard—companies found it cheaper to violate the law and pay penalties later than to undergo the rigorous and time-consuming process of prior assessment. The Vanashakti litigation originated when the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) attempted to formalize this practice through a 2017 Notification and a 2021 Office Memorandum (OM), thereby turning what was intended as amnesty into a standard procedure.

The May 2025 Judgment: The Normative Firewall

On May 16, 2025, a two-judge bench consisting of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan delivered a judgment that aimed to uphold the “Rule of Law” over economic expediency.

Textualist Rigidity and the “Anathema” of Retrospection

The May judgment adopted a strict and literal interpretation of the EIA Notification 2006, holding that the requirement for “prior” EC is mandatory. Relying on precedents such as Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) and Alembic Pharmaceuticals v. Rohit Prajapati (2020), the bench emphasised that ex post facto clearances are “completely alien to environmental jurisprudence” and constitute an “anathema” to the EIA framework. Permitting operations without prior assessment, the Court reasoned, effectively condones violations. If EC is eventually denied after construction, the environmental harm is already irreversible; if granted, the “precautionary principle” is rendered meaningless.

The Sanctity of Executive Undertakings

The Court also scrutinised the legal history of the 2017 Notification, which had offered a six-month “amnesty” window for violators. When challenged before the Madras High Court, the Union Government had assured the court that this was a “one-time measure.” The May bench found that the subsequent 2021 OM—which perpetuated the amnesty indefinitely—breached this judicial undertaking. The Court held that the executive cannot renege on its assurance to the court, striking down the 2021 OM as arbitrary and violative of Article 14.[2]

Rejection of Monetary Regularisation

The May judgment explicitly rejected the notion that penalties under the “Polluter Pays Principle” could substitute for prior compliance. It noted that while Section 15 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 provides for penalties, it does not authorize the regularization of illegal structures. As a result, the Court held that even if penalties are paid, illegal constructions lacking prior clearance must be halted and demolished. The bench stressed that the “Polluter Pays Principle” cannot be twisted into a license to pollute.[3]

The November 2025 Review: The Pragmatic Recalibration

In a dramatic turnaround just six months later, a three-judge Review Bench led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai (with Justice Bhuyan dissenting) set aside the May judgment.

 The “Per Incuriam” Doctrine and the Battle of Precedents

The Review Bench invoked the doctrine of per incuriam—rendered in ignorance of binding law—to overturn the May judgment. The majority held that the May Bench had failed to consider coordinate bench decisions in Electrosteel Steels Ltd. (2021)[4], Pahwa Plastics (2022)[5], and D. Swamy (2023)[6].

The May Bench had relied on Common Cause and Alembic to assert that ex-post facto EC is illegal. The Review Bench argued that while Alembic described such clearances as “anathema,” it ultimately allowed industries to continue operating after paying fines.

The Review Bench interpreted the relief granted in Alembic (allowing the industry to operate) as the binding principle of law, whereas the May Bench considered the relief as an exceptional measure under Article 142, treating the prohibition on retrospective EC as binding law.

Ultimately, by prioritising Electrosteel—which stated that the Environment Protection Act “does not prohibit” ex post facto clearance—over the strict reading of Common Cause, the Review Bench found the May judgment erroneous for ignoring the more recent “balanced approach” adopted by the Court.[7]

2. The Doctrine of “National Assets” and Sunk Costs

Economic consequences were a decisive factor in the Review Judgment. The Court accepted the Union’s argument that the May judgment would require the demolition of “national assets” valued at over ₹20,000 crore.[8]

The Court cited specific examples such as the AIIMS hospital in Odisha (962 beds) and the greenfield airport in Vijayanagar as projects facing potential demolition.[9]

The Review Bench further argued that demolishing these large-scale projects would cause more environmental damage (from dust and debris) than allowing them to remain operational. The Court rhetorically questioned whether demolishing effluent treatment plants would truly benefit environmental protection.[10] This reasoning, in effect, used environmental concerns to justify non-enforcement of environmental law.

Statutory Flexibility

Contrary to the May judgment, the Review Bench held that Section 15 of the Environment Protection Act does not mandate demolition. The Act, according to the Review Bench, allows for flexibility, and the executive can “amend or modify” notifications as needed.[11] Thus, the 2021 OM was not seen as violating the “one-time” judicial undertaking but as a valid exercise of executive power, especially as it was issued following directions from the National Green Tribunal (NGT).

Analytical Critique: The Erosion of Certainty

The rapid shift between the Vanshakti verdicts reveals a deep schism within India’s environmental constitutionalism. While the Review Judgment saved billions in investment, it set a precarious precedent that undermines the rule of law in three key areas.

The Inversion of Stare Decisis (Precedent)

The main issue with the Review Judgment is its handling of precedent. Justice Bhuyan’s dissent pointed out that Electrosteel and Pahwa—relied on by the Review Bench—were two-judge bench decisions, as was Common Cause, which formed the foundation of the May judgment and offered a comprehensive interpretation of the EIA Notification.

The Review Bench declared the May judgment per incuriam for not following Electrosteel, but the dissent argued that Electrosteel itself was per incuriam for disregarding the binding principle established in Common Cause.[12]

The Review Bench’s position—that the relief granted in Alembic (allowing industries to continue) constitutes binding laws jurisprudentially problematic. The Supreme Court often uses its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to grant case-specific relief while maintaining a contrary legal principle. By elevating discretionary relief to binding precedent, the Review Judgment effectively legalises violations, signaling to lower courts that statutory prohibitions on retrospective clearance can be ignored when economic stakes are high.

The Institutionalisation of Fait Accompli

The Review Judgment entrenches the doctrine of Fait Accompli in Indian law, suggesting that violations on a sufficiently large scale become practically irreversible.

By explicitly referencing the ₹20,000 crore investment as a justification for recall, the Court signaled that the “Right to Environment” is subordinate to the “Right to Investment.” This creates a dangerous incentive for developers to proceed with construction and heavy investments before obtaining clearance, believing that courts will hesitate to order the destruction of “national assets.”

Moreover, the reasoning that demolition itself would cause pollution effectively shields all large-scale illegal infrastructure from enforcement. The further along illegal construction is, the more “environmentally damaging” it becomes to remove, thus guaranteeing its persistence. This undermines the “Precautionary Principle,” which is based on prevention rather than after-the-fact remediation.

Simply put, if the municipality of a city refrains from demolishing the encroachment buildings on banks of lakes, the city will be prone to flood and is exposed to more vulnerabilities than before. Vanshakti II judgement fully fails to engage with this very obvious and basic logic.

Conclusion: From Gatekeeper to Toll Collector

The shift from the May judgment to the November Review marks a transformation in the Supreme Court’s role in environmental governance. The May judgment sought to act as a Gatekeeper, upholding the “Prior Clearance” requirement to prevent environmental degradation before it occurs. In contrast, the Review Judgment recasts the Court as a Toll Collector, allowing violations to continue in exchange for fines and remedial actions.

While the Review Judgment provides a practical solution to the immediate issue of “stranded assets” such as the Odisha AIIMS and the Vijayanagar Airport, it causes enduring harm to the credibility of India’s environmental regulatory regime. It endorses the executive’s strategy of “dilution by notification,” where statutory mandates are weakened to accommodate industrial needs. Most significantly, it undermines the finality of Supreme Court judgments, implying that even environmentally protective verdicts can be recalled if the economic arguments are persuasive enough.

For developers, the message is unambiguous: compliance is optional, so long as one can afford the cost of post-facto forgiveness.

Amen.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organization)

[1] Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd vs Ministry Of Environment & Forest &Ors, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 180 of 2011

[2] Para 30, Vanshakti v. Union of India 2025 INSC 718 (Vanshakti I)

[3] Para 27, Vanshakti I

[4] Electrosteel Steels Limited v. Union of India and Others  (2023) 6 SCC 615

[5] Pahwa Plastics Private Limited and Another v. Dastak NGO and Others (2023) 12 SCC 774

[6] D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board and Others (2023) 20 SCC 469

[7] Para 55.1, CREDAI vs. Vankshakti 2025 INSC 1326 (Vanshakti II)

[8] Para 108, Vanshakti II (CJI Gavai)

[9] Paras 109, 110, Vanshakti II (CJI Gavai)

[10] Para 7 (VIII), Vanshakti II (Justice K. Vinod Chandran)

[11] Para 75, Vanshakti II (CJI Gavai)

[12] Para 20, Vanshakti II (Justice Bhuyan)

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June 5: World environment day & the increasing importance of seed conservation by farmers and rural communities

Strengthening indigenous communities means protection of the environment 

The post The Judicial Ouroboros: The Vanashakti Reversal & Crisis of Environmental Finality in India appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In UP’s Sambhal, lawyers protest against the transfer of chief judicial magistrate Vibhanshu Sudheer. His transfer is purportedly linked two seperate orders of registration of FIRs against policemen including ASP Anuj Chaudhary. pic.twitter.com/XNVrUYCTGB

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) January 21, 2026

The Allahabad High Court on Tuesday, January 20, transferred 14 judicial officers, including the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) of Sambhal Vibhanshu Sudheer.Aditya Singh, the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sambhal at Chandausi, has replaced Sudheer.

Sudheer, who has now been made Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sultanpur, had on January 19 ordered Sambhal police to lodge an FIR against then Circle Officer (CO) Anuj Chaudhary and SHO in connection with the shooting of a youth during the November 2024 Sambhal violence. The Sambhal police had stated that they would move the Allahabad High Court against the CJM court’s order.

Sudheer an upright judicial officer transferred several times

A social media user posted how Vidhanshu Sudheer, the chief judicial magistrate in UP’s Sambhal who had ordered an FIR against ASP Anuj Chaudhary and other police officers was transferred for the third time in less than a year!

Vibhanshu Sudheer, the chief judicial magistrate in UP’s Sambhal who ordered registration of FIR against ASP Anuj Chaudhary and other policemen, was transferred for the third time in less than a year. pic.twitter.com/ltASN2jADU

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) January 21, 2026

Attack on judicial independence

Severely criticising this serious slur on judicial independence, social media users likened this action by the higher judiciary to the transfer of Justice Muralidhar (Delhi HC, now retired) in 2020 after his midnight hearing and castigation of hate speech by BJP leaders who had uttered inciteful words like “Goli Maro Saalo ko.”

Muralidhar transferred after Delhi riots order. Justice Sreedharan transferred after order in BJP leader Vijay Shah’s hate speech case. Vibhanshu Sudheer transferred after directing FIR against police officers in Sambhal violence. What does this tell us about judicial…

— Ashish Goel (@ashish_nujs) January 21, 2026

This user even reminder the conscientious public how –in a publicised change of heart –even the Supreme Court Collegium notified the transfer of Justice Atul Sreedharan to the Allahabad HC and not to Chhattisgarh where he would have been senior most Judge! The Collegium made it public that the action was under the Union Government’s ‘advise’. This became public in October 2025. Earlier last year, Justice Sreedharan had ordered an FIR against BJP minister Vijay Shah for his “scurrilous language” against an Indian Army Officer, Colonel Sofia Quraishi, who was one of the representatives of the Indian army who had briefed the media during Operation Sindoor last May.

Trajectory of Transfer: On August 25, 2025, the Supreme Court Collegium, comprising Chief Justice of India (CJI) B.R. Gavai and Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari, and B.V. Nagarathna, had first recommended the transfer of 14 judges, including Justice Sreedharan, from the Madhya Pradesh High Court to the Chhattisgarh High Court. However, two months later, on October 14, the Supreme Court Collegium withdrew its recommendation to transfer Justice Sreedharan to Chhattisgarh at the request of the Union Government. Instead, the SC decided to transfer him to the Allahabad High Court instead. Followed by this was a much-publicised statement published on the Supreme Court’s website, which stated that the decision to modify the recommendation was made following a “reconsideration sought by the Government.” No reasons were provided for the government-sought reconsideration of the Collegium’s recommendation publicly. This was the first time, the Collegium has publicly acknowledged that it revisited—and changed—its decision at the Government’s request

Fourteen transfers by Allahabad HC

In the transfer order released by Registrar General of Allahabad High Court, January 2026, Harendra Nath, Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Kannauj, has been made Additional District & Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Kannauj in the exclusive POCSO case Court, replacing Alaka Yadav, who will be joining as Additional District & Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Gonda.

Special Judge/Additional District & Sessions Judge, Gonda, Vikas has been made Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Gonda, for trying cases of crime against women.

Urooj Fatima, Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sitapur will be joining as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitapur, replacing Anshu Shukla.

Meanwhile, Anshu Shukla has been made Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sitapur, replacing Gaurav Prakash, who will be taking charge of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitapur. Prakash has replaced Rajendra Kumar Singh, who will be the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kannauj.

He has replaced Shraddha Bhartiya, who has been made Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kannauj, replacing Jyotsna Yadav, who will now be Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kannauj.

She has replaced Sneha, who has been made Secretary (Full Time), District Legal Services Authority in Kannauj. Outgoing Sambhal CJM Vibhanshu Sudheer has replaced Alunkrita Shakti Tripathi, who will be Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in Sultanpur, replacing Shubham Verma. Verma will be joining as Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division/Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sultanpur.

Related:

“Sambhal: Anatomy of an Engineered Crisis”- How a peaceful Muslim-majority town was turned into a site of manufactured communal conflict

Sambhal Custodial Death: A systemic failure exposed

Supreme Court blocks execution of Nagar Palika’s order regarding well near Sambhal Mosque, prioritises peace and harmony

The post CJM who ordered FIR against police for 2024 Sambhal violence case transferred by Allahabad HC, new trend? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice Vipul Pancholi was hearing an application filed by Hindu Front for Justice, which sought permission for day-long Basant Panchami rituals at the site on January 23, coinciding with Friday Juma Namaz. The proceedings and directions were reported by LiveLaw.

Background: A contested sacred space

The Bhoj Shala, an 11th-century monument protected by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), occupies a deeply contested place in India’s religious and legal landscape. Hindus regard the structure as a temple dedicated to Goddess Vagdevi (Saraswati), while Muslims consider it the Kamal Maula Masjid.

Since 2003, a court-monitored arrangement has been in place permitting Hindu puja on Tuesdays and Muslim namaz on Fridays, a fragile equilibrium that has periodically come under strain, as per The Hindu.

Arguments before the Court

Appearing for the Hindu applicants, Advocate Vishnu Shankar Jain submitted that Basant Panchami holds exceptional religious significance, with the auspicious muhurat extending from sunrise to sunset, during which uninterrupted pujas and havans are traditionally performed.

Jain urged the Court to consider whether Juma Namaz could be shifted to after 5 PM, allowing Hindu rituals to continue throughout the day without interruption.

Representing the Muslim side, Senior Advocate Salman Khurshid, appearing for the Kamal Maula Mosque Committee, firmly opposed the suggestion, pointing out that Juma Namaz is time-specific and must be performed between 1 PM and 3 PM, in accordance with Islamic religious practice. He clarified that once the namaz concluded, worshippers would vacate the premises, as has been the practice.

Justice Bagchi intervened during the exchange, remarking that the Court was conscious of the religious significance of both practices and cautioning against arguments that ignored doctrinal constraints—an observation noted by LiveLaw.

Administration’s role and court-endorsed arrangement

Seeking to de-escalate tensions and ensure public order, Additional Solicitor General K.M. Nataraj, appearing for the Union of India and the ASI, proposed a pragmatic administrative solution. He suggested that if the mosque committee provided an estimate of the number of persons expected to attend the namaz, the district administration could cordon off a separate enclosure within the compound, complete with distinct ingress and egress, and issue passes to prevent overcrowding or provocation.

Khurshid agreed to furnish the numbers on the same day, a position welcomed by the Court. The Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh also assured the Bench that law and order would be strictly maintained, a commitment the Court formally recorded, as reported by Bar & Bench.

Supreme Court’s recorded directions

In its order, the Bench recorded the consensus arrangement as follows:

“A fair suggestion was given that for the duration of Juma Namaz between 1 PM and 3 PM, an exclusive and separate area within the same compound, including separate ingress and egress, shall be made available so that namaz can be performed peacefully. Similarly, a separate space shall be made available to the Hindu community to conduct traditional ceremonies on the occasion of Basant Panchami.”

The Court further noted that the district administration may issue passes or adopt any other fair mechanism to ensure that no untoward incident occurs.

In a rare and deliberate appeal, the Bench urged both communities to exercise mutual respect and restraint, stressing that cooperation with civil authorities was essential to maintaining communal harmony.

Clarification on pujas and non-interference with merits

When Jain pressed the Bench to explicitly record that Basant Panchami pujas could continue uninterrupted from sunrise to sunset, the Court clarified that this was already permitted under an existing ASI order, and nothing in its directions curtailed that right.

Importantly, the Bench emphasised that its directions were purely interim and facilitative, and did not reflect any opinion on the merits of the larger dispute, which remains sub judice.

Larger Case: ASI survey and High Court proceedings

The application was heard in the backdrop of a Special Leave Petition filed in 2024 by the Maulana Kamaluddin Welfare Society, Dhar, challenging a Madhya Pradesh High Court order directing the ASI to conduct a scientific survey of the disputed complex.

In April 2024, the Supreme Court had allowed the survey to continue but imposed strict safeguards:

• No physical excavation that could alter the structure’s character
• No action on the survey findings without the Supreme Court’s prior approval
• Maintenance of status quo at the site

During Thursday’s hearing, LiveLaw reported, the Court was informed that the ASI has completed the survey and submitted its report in a sealed cover to the High Court.

Accepting a suggestion by Salman Khurshid, the Supreme Court directed that:

• The High Court may unseal the ASI report in open court
• Copies be supplied to both parties
• Where copying is not feasible, inspection may be allowed in the presence of counsel
• Parties be permitted to file objections
• The matter thereafter be taken up for final hearing

The Court further directed that the writ petition pending before the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court be heard by a Division Bench headed by the Chief Justice or one of the senior-most judges, and disposed of the SLP accordingly.

Continuing status quo

Until final adjudication, the Supreme Court ordered that:

• Status quo at the site shall be maintained
• Parties must continue to abide by the ASI’s April 2023 operational order
• No step shall be taken that alters the religious character of the structure

A judicial tightrope

The Court’s orders reflect a careful judicial balancing act—protecting religious freedoms under Articles 25 and 26, while preventing escalation at a site emblematic of India’s broader debates on faith, history, and constitutional secularism.

By foregrounding administrative coordination, mutual respect, and non-interference with pending adjudication, the Supreme Court has, for now, sought to ensure peace at Bhoj Shala—while leaving the ultimate question of its religious character to be resolved through due process of law.

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Supreme Court blocks execution of Nagar Palika’s order regarding well near Sambhal Mosque, prioritises peace and harmony

Sambhal’s darkest hour: 5 dead, scores injured in Mosque survey violence as UP police face allegations of excessive force

Sufidar Trust, Walajah Big Mosque: The 4 decades long tradition of Hindus serving Iftar meals to Muslims during Ramzan

Conspiracy or Coincidence? Mosques defaced in March after spate of hate speeches provoking the crime weeks before

CJP escalates complaint against Times Now Navbharat show on Gyanvapi Mosque to NBDSA

The post Supreme Court brokers interim peace at bhoj shala, allows basant panchami pujas and Friday namaz under strict safeguards appeared first on SabrangIndia.

It was a single-judge bench of Justice Ashwin D Bhobe issued notice to the respondents and posted the next hearing to February 4. Senior advocate Sudeep Pasbola, represented Dr Patil and submitted that there was urgency in the matter. His client had come to India from the UK on his own and was unaware of the FIR registered against him, he added.

Advocate General Milind Sathe, for the state government, said that Patil “seems to be connected with the other (social media) post and he seems to be not cooperating” with the agency. Sathe stated that a reply to the plea, if any, will be filed within a week, which the court accepted.

The Crime Branch of the Mumbai police detained Patil on January 10 on his arrival at the Mumbai international airport. After 15 hours of questioning, he was later prevented, 10 days later, on January 19, from leaving for the UK. On January 21, he recorded his second statement before the police.

Patil has been charged with offences under Section 353 (2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which provides a maximum three-year punishment for publishing, circulation of statement, false information, rumour leading to feeling of enmity and hatred between communities through electronic means. The social media post that has attracted such frenetic ire from the authorities reportedly related to high BJP functionaries.

The NM Joshi Marg police station in Mumbai registered an FIR based on a complaint by BJP media cell functionary Nikhil Bhamre, who claimed that he came across objectionable content posted on a Facebook page named ‘Shehar Vikas Aghadi’ on December 14 last year, with disinformation on the BJP and its leaders. Dr Patil has maintained that he simply forwarded a post of other leaders like Subramaniam Swamy with a mere content, asking why there has been no action against them.

Petition

The Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of FIR No. 0672/2025 dated 18/12/2025 registered with N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station, Mumbai, under Section 353(2) BNSS. The petition argues that the impugned FIR is based on alleged posts on Facebook, which constitute statements of fact and expressions of free speech. The FIR does not disclose the essential ingredients of any cognisable offence, lacks mens rea, alleges no violence or public disorder, and is manifestly malicious, filed by a political functionary to suppress dissent. Besides, the petition states that the continuation of the investigation amounts to abuse of the process of law and squarely falls within the parameters laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal.

In the petition Dr Patil seeks the quashing of both the LOC and the FIR No 0672/2025 registered against him at the NM Joshi Police Station on December 18, 2025.

The Petition also states that the FIR does not allege any incitement to violence, threat to public order, or disturbance of public tranquillity. The complaint or FIR does not specify the group of religious, racial, language or regional groups or Caste or communities in which hatred or ill will is promoted by the post. The FIR does not specify whether the silence of the followers is false information or rumour or alarming news. The FIR does not specify how the feeling of enmity or hatred, or ill will, can be generated or actually generated by stating that blind followers remain silent. Also, the impugned FIR does not reproduce the alleged posts verbatim, nor does it disclose the exact words, context, or content which allegedly constitute an offence under Section 353(2) BNS. The allegations are purely subjective and stem from political disagreement.

The Petition argues that the most subjective part of the FIR is which political leader who is defamed by the post is not mentioned. A vague apprehension is expressed about the senior leaders of the party by the complainant. Thereafter the Petition quotes from the invoked Section 353(2) BNS which states that, “    _

(2) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement or report containing false iriformation, rumour or alarming news, including through electronic means, with intent to create or promote, or which is likely to create or promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”

The Petition states that ‘there are three important ingredients in the impugned section:I) The statement should be false or rumour, or alarming news. 2) the statement should create a feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will, and 3) There should be specific religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities involved. None of these three components is fulfilled in the said post.

Besides, states the Petition, the FIR has been registered after an unexplained delay of several days from the alleged date of posting, despite the content being publicly accessible. Respondent Number 5 is admittedly the social media coordinator of a political party, and the complaint is motivated by political fear “with the sole intention to intimidate and harass and silence the voice of the people. The petitioner is harassed not for any offence but to teach a lesson to other people to set a precedent of deterrence.

Further, the Petition goes on to state that “the Police Inspector of N .M Joshi Marg Police Station, Mr. Vilas Rane, i.e. the Respondent No. 1, has mechanically registered the FIR without any preliminary enquiry or investigation and non-application of mind, thereby acting with malicious intent and in misuse of police powers, at the behest of Respondent No.5.

Seeking the quashing of both the LOC issued by the authorities pursuant to the FIR registered, Dr Patl has alleged that he faced “faced inconvenience, mental agony, harassment and defamation because of the illegal and unnecessary issuance of the LOC.” Besides he states that he has incurred financial loss as he missed his flight and the opportunity cost of working at his destination workplace. The continuation of LOC is a continuation of harassment by way of using the procedure as punishment. In any case, the FIR that has sought to be quashed is, the Petition states, “an instance of misuse of criminal law to achieve a political vendetta and suppress any kind of different political view or opinion.”

The state is expected to file its response within a week and the next hearing is on Tuesday, February 4.

Related:

Dr Sangram Patil detained by Mumbai Crime Branch, move sharply condemned

The post Bombay HC: Notice to Maharashtra state, police on UK doctor, Sangram Patil’s petition seeking quashing of LOC & FIR appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The petitioners did not dispute that Doyjan Bibi had once been declared a foreigner by a Foreigners Tribunal. What they questioned was the legality of the State’s subsequent conduct. When a person who had been living on bail pursuant to judicial orders suddenly disappears from custody, and the State claims that she has been “sent back” to another country, the most basic requirement of constitutional governance is that the State demonstrate, through documents and procedure, that this removal was lawful. The petition asked the Court to insist on that minimum. Besides, the petition pointed out that it was only economic marginalisation that had precluded Doyjan from appealing the verdict of the Foreigner Tribunal. She had been granted bail post Covid-19 and as per conditions appeared regularly before the police station to record her presence for years.

Every week, CJP’s dedicated team in Assam, comprising community volunteers, district volunteer motivators, and lawyers, provides vital paralegal support, counseling, and legal aid to many affected by the citizenship crisis in over 24 districts in Assam.  Through our hands-on approach, 12,00,000 people successfully submitted completed NRC forms (2017-2019). We fight Foreigner Tribunal cases monthly at the district level.  Through these concerted efforts, we have achieved an impressive success rate of 20 cases annually, with individuals successfully obtaining their Indian citizenship. This ground level data ensures informed interventions by CJP in our Constitutional Courts. Your support fuels this crucial work. Stand with us for Equal Rights for All #HelpCJPHelpAssam. Donate NOW!

From Tribunal declaration to sudden disappearance

Doyjan Bibi’s legal trajectory was typical of thousands of cases in Assam. She was declared a foreigner through an ex-parte opinion of the Foreigners Tribunal, Dhubri, in August 2017. That opinion was later interfered with by the Gauhati High Court, which granted her a final opportunity to contest the proceedings. When she failed to appear within the stipulated time, the ex-parte declaration revived. Yet, this declaration did not result in immediate deportation. Like many others, she was released on bail pursuant to directions issued by the Supreme Court and the Gauhati High Court during the COVID-19 period, when constitutional courts ordered the release of long-term detainees to decongest detention centres.

For years thereafter, she remained at liberty. There was no allegation on record that she violated bail conditions or absconded. Her sudden re-arrest on May 24, 2025 therefore marked a decisive rupture. When her husband approached the Court, the State initially stated that she had been lodged in a holding centre in Kokrajhar. Acting on that representation, the Court even permitted the petitioner to meet her and obtain her signature for the purposes of legal proceedings. However, when the petitioner went to the holding centre on June 25, 2025, he was informed that she was no longer there.

The explanation offered by the State was that she had been handed over to the Border Security Force and “sent back to Bangladesh” on May 27, 2025 from an area under the control of an ad hoc BSF battalion. No contemporaneous record of this process was placed before the Court.

What the Petition sought—and what the state did not produce

The petition did not proceed on conjecture. It identified a glaring evidentiary vacuum and asked the Court to address it. If Doyjan Bibi had indeed been deported, the petitioners argued, there ought to exist some documentary trail—proof of nationality verification, a deportation order, a record of handover, or at the very least, an acknowledgment of acceptance by Bangladeshi authorities. In the absence of such records, the only plausible inference was that she may have been illegally pushed across the border.

The State’s response did not deny the absence of documentation. Instead, it relied on affidavits asserting that she had been deported. The judgment records these assertions and accepts them as sufficient. At no stage does the Court direct the State to produce any material to substantiate its claim. The legal question—whether a court can be satisfied about the legality of deportation without seeing a single document—remains unanswered.

The Judgment’s Core Move: Executive assertion as conclusive proof

The fulcrum of the judgment is its treatment of executive power as effectively unreviewable once a person has been declared a foreigner. Drawing extensively on Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail (1955), the Court reiterates that the power of the State to expel foreigners is “absolute and unfettered.” From this premise, it proceeds to hold that the Court need not inquire into the manner in which that power is exercised.

What the judgment does not confront is that Hans Muller itself imposed limits. The Supreme Court made it clear that an expelled person must leave the country as a free person and cannot be handed over in custody to another State. Nor did Hans Muller suggest that deportation could take place without procedure, documentation, or accountability. By extracting the language of plenary power while discarding the safeguards that accompany it, the judgment converts executive authority into something approaching discretion without record.

Deportation without documents, “pushback” without consequence

One of the most troubling aspects of the judgment is its refusal to meaningfully distinguish between formal deportation and informal pushback. Deportation, in law, is a structured process involving identification, verification, communication with the receiving State, and a documented handover. Pushback, by contrast, is an informal and often violent practice in which individuals are forced across borders without acknowledgment or acceptance.

The petition explicitly raised the spectre of pushback. The judgment, however, treats the State’s use of the word “deportation” as dispositive. Once that label is accepted, the absence of documents is treated as immaterial. This approach effectively collapses the distinction between deportation and pushback, granting judicial cover to practices that would otherwise be legally indefensible.

Bail, judicial protection, and executive override

Another unresolved tension in the judgment concerns the status of judicial bail. Doyjan Bibi had been released pursuant to directions of constitutional courts. Her liberty, fragile though it was, was judicially sanctioned. Yet she was re-arrested and removed without any application for cancellation of bail or judicial oversight.

The Court acknowledges that COVID-era bail orders were temporary in nature, but this observation sidesteps the real issue. The question was not whether deportation was permissible in principle, but whether the executive could override subsisting judicial protection without returning to court. On this, the judgment is silent.

Neither does the Guwahati High Court, a constitutional court, question what it means for an individual not to be able to access all four tiers of justice, available for all. True that the Foreigner Tribunal order of 2017 had not been adequately agitated by Doyjanbi in the High Court, but can this lapse –given the Indian judiciary’s overall approach on delays and condonation thereof—be enough to seize from a woman her very right to agitate citizenship?

From legal adjudication to ideological framing

The judgment goes far beyond what was required to decide the petition. It contains extended references to demographic change, migration narratives, national security concerns, and alleged misinformation about persecution. These observations, while politically charged, do little legal work. Their presence, however, is not neutral. They shift the frame of the case from one about individual liberty and State accountability to one about perceived civilisational threat.

Once that shift occurs, procedural safeguards appear expendable. The petitioner’s wife is no longer a person whose liberty demands justification, but an abstract figure within a larger narrative of migration and security. In such a frame, asking the State for documents begins to look unnecessary, even indulgent.

The Consequence: Petition emptied of content

By dismissing the petition without demanding proof of deportation, the Gauhati High Court sets a troubling precedent. It signals that in cases involving declared foreigners, executive assertion will suffice; records are optional; judicial scrutiny is limited; and families may never know how or where a person was removed.

Habeas corpus petitions have historically existed to prevent precisely this situation—to ensure that the State cannot answer the question “where is this person?” with little more than an affidavit. When courts stop asking for proof, the writ loses its meaning.

Perhaps the most consequential aspect of the judgment is the degree of deference it accords to the executive.

The Court accepts:

• Executive affidavits as conclusive proof
• Absence of documentation as immaterial
• Non-production of records as inconsequential

This transforms habeas corpus from a searching judicial inquiry into a ritualistic exercise. Once the State says “we have deported her,” the Court treats the matter as closed.

Is there an established procedure for deportation?

Deportation in India, though grounded in statutory powers, was largely operationalised through internal administrative mechanisms and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) by state authorities. (See here, here and here) following directions from the Centre.

Typical deportation process is as follows:

1.  Identification/Completion of Sentence: A foreign national is declared a foreigner or completes a prison term for violating applicable laws.
2.  Notification: Jail authorities notify relevant police officials (e.g., Superintendent of Police) about the impending release.
3.  Custody and order:

• If the government decides on deportation, a formal order is issued.
• Upon release, the individual is taken into police custody and served with the deportation order.

4.  Physical Removal: Arrangements are made for their removal from the country, often under police escort. The serving officer reports the execution of the order back to the government.
5.  Consular notification (Vienna Convention):

• As per Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Indian authorities must inform the consular representatives of the foreign national’s country about their arrest or detention.
• Indian practice (MEA Office Memorandum No. T.4415/1/91 (CPO/CIR/9)) requires:
  • Asking the arrested foreign national if they wish their consulate to be informed.
  • Immediately notifying the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
  • Providing detailed particulars (name, nationality, passport details, offence, arrest details, location) to Joint Secretaries at MEA and MHA, and state authorities.

6.  Deportation for minor violations: In cases of brief overstays or delayed registration, prosecution might be withdrawn with court approval, and the individual directly deported under delegated powers of Section 3(2)(c) of the (now-repealed) Foreigners Act. A record is submitted to the MEA.

Detailed report may be read here.

Conclusion: A quiet but profound Constitutional retreat

This judgment will reverberate far beyond one case. It lowers the threshold of accountability in deportation proceedings and normalises undocumented removals. In border regimes, where power is most concentrated and individuals most vulnerable, such a retreat from scrutiny is especially dangerous.

If this reasoning is followed, it means:

• Deportations can occur without paperwork
• Families need never be informed
• Courts need not verify State claims
• Pushbacks acquire judicial cover
• Habeas corpus becomes ineffective precisely where it is most needed

This is not a minor doctrinal shift. It is a structural weakening of constitutional oversight. The Constitution does not cease to operate at the border, nor does it become optional when the person involved is labelled a foreigner. By refusing to insist on legality through proof, the Court has allowed executive power to move beyond effective constitutional control.

That is the enduring, and deeply unsettling, legacy of this decision.

Details of the proceedings of the said case in Gauhati High Court may be read here, here, here and here.

The order of the High Court may be read here:

Related:

CJP scores big win! Citizenship restored to Mazirun Bewa, a widowed daily wage worker from Assam

Assam’s New SOP Hands Citizenship Decisions to Bureaucrats: Executive overreach or legal necessity?

Assam government to withdraw ‘Foreigner’ cases against Non-Muslims under Citizenship Amendment Act

Assam’s Citizenship Crisis: How Foreigners Tribunals construct an architecture of exclusion and rights violations

No Warrants, No Answers: The Disappeared of Assam

The post Removed Without Process: The Doyjan Bibi case and the Gauhati High Court’s Retreat from demanding deportation records appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The survivor, who was abducted and gang-raped in May 2023 during the early days of the Meitei–Kuki ethnic clashes, passed away on January 10, 2026, while undergoing treatment in Guwahati. According to her family and Kuki organisations, the injuries and trauma she suffered never healed, leaving her physically fragile and psychologically withdrawn until her death.

Abduction and assault amid breakdown of law and order

As reported by The Indian Express, the woman—then 18 years old—was kidnapped on May 15, 2023, from Imphal while attempting to withdraw money from an ATM. She was taken away in a white Bolero by four armed men dressed in black shirts, allegedly associated with Meitei militant group Arambai Tenggol, which was active during the peak of the violence.

In her First Information Report (FIR), the survivor alleged that she was handed over to the men by members of the Meira Paibi, a Meitei women’s vigilante group—an allegation repeatedly raised by Kuki organisations.

She was taken to multiple locations, including Langol and Bishnupur, where three of the men allegedly raped her repeatedly while the fourth drove the vehicle. She later told NDTV in a July 2023 interview that she was blindfolded, denied food and water, tortured through the night, and left for dead on a hilltop.

“I was taken to a hill where they tortured and assaulted me. Whatever miserable things they could do to me, they did,” she had said.

In the early hours of the next morning, she managed to escape under the pretext of going to relieve herself. Injured and bleeding, she ran downhill, eventually hiding under a pile of vegetables in an autorickshaw that took her to safety. She was first treated in Kangpokpi and later referred to hospitals in Kohima, Guwahati, and Manipur.

Delayed fir, CBI probe, and no arrests

Due to the near-total collapse of law and order in Manipur at the time, the survivor could file a police complaint only on July 21, 2023—over two months after the assault. A zero FIR was registered at Kangpokpi police station and later transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

According to The Hindu, the case is currently being heard in a special CBI court in Guwahati. However, nearly two and a half years later, no arrests have been made, charges have not been framed, and the survivor’s family says they received no meaningful updates from either the Manipur Police or the CBI.

Prolonged trauma and declining health

The woman’s family told Newslaundry and other media outlets that she never recovered from the physical injuries or psychological shock of the assault. She suffered from breathing difficulties, uterine complications, depression, and recurring illness.

“My daughter was always smiling and full of life before this happened,” her mother said. “After the incident, she lost her smile. She would stay at home, not talk much, sometimes read the Bible, sometimes watch TV.”

The Indigenous Tribal Leaders Forum (ITLF) stated that she developed serious uterine and internal injuries and required repeated hospitalisation across three states. While the family received some compensation, its source and adequacy remain unclear.

Death sparks outrage, renewed demands

Following her death, Kuki organisations in Manipur and Delhi organised candlelight vigils and issued strong statements demanding justice. The ITLF described her death as “another painful testimony to the ruthless targeting of the Kuki-Zo people” and reiterated that the community now has “no option but to demand a separate administration for our safety, dignity, and survival” (PTI).

The Kuki Students’ Organisation (KSO), Delhi & NCR demanded that her death be officially recognised as a consequence of the 2023 violence.

“Any attempt to treat her death as unrelated would amount to a denial of justice and an erasure of responsibility,” the KSO said, calling on the Centre to expedite the creation of a separate administrative arrangement for tribal communities.

The Kuki-Zo Women’s Forum, Delhi & NCR remembered the survivor for her resilience. “For nearly three years, she carried pain that no human being should ever have to bear,” the group said.

‘A National Shame’: Brinda Karat

Senior CPI(M) leader and former Rajya Sabha MP Brinda Karat described the survivor’s death as a “national shame,” underscoring the failure of the state and justice system nearly two years after the crime, as per PTI.

“She was victimised twice—first by politics that fuelled hatred and violence, and then by a system that failed to act with urgency,” Karat said. A member of the CPI(M) politburo and former general secretary of the All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA), Karat has been documenting cases of sexual violence in Manipur and had met the survivor’s family during a visit to the state.

Karat blamed the political climate fostered by the RSS–BJP for creating an atmosphere of impunity that allowed armed groups to operate unchecked during the violence. “Her death without justice is a damning reflection on our administrative and judicial institutions,” she said, adding that the delay cost the survivor not only dignity, but ultimately her life.

A broader crisis of accountability

The survivor’s death has once again drawn attention to unresolved cases of sexual violence during the Manipur conflict, which erupted in May 2023 over land rights, political representation, and ethnic tensions between the valley-dominant Meitei community and hill-based Kuki-Zo tribes.

According to official figures, more than 260 people have been killed and over 60,000 displaced. Manipur has been under President’s Rule since February 2025, yet survivors and families continue to report inertia, silence, and denial of justice.

“She was not only a daughter of Manipur,” Brinda Karat said, “but a daughter of India.”

Her death—without arrests, without accountability, and without closure—now stands as a stark indictment of the state’s response to sexual violence in conflict zones, and a reminder of the human cost of prolonged inaction.

Related:

Broken State, Divided People: PUCL releases report of Independent People’s Tribunal on Manipur

Manipur Violence: Two years down, health rights activists demand restoration and spread of essential services all over state

Arambai Tenggol: champions of Manipur’s ‘integrity’ or a Meitei communal militia?

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2024: Peace, a distant dream for Manipur

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The post Manipur gang-rape survivor dies without justice, three years after 2023 ethnic violence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A quick search of the 142-page judgement, delivered by a bench comprising Justices Aravind Kumar and NV Anjaria, finds these key words missing. Instead, the judgement expanded the contours of terrorism. Further, it created two categories of accused – leaders and followers. Researchers Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam were designated as “architects” of the conspiracy and denied bail, whereas student activist Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed were granted bail under stringent censorial conditions. All of them have been in jail since 2020.

While freedom of speech and the right to political dissent are significant contextual elements in the judgment, the Supreme Court explicitly clarified that they are not the core legal issues determining the outcome of the bail applications.

Critics, however, argue that the top court’s judgment sets a dangerous precedent by classifying political dissent and protest speeches as acts of terrorism.

Conditional freedom that robs the right to speak

Supreme Court imposed strict conditions while granting bail to the Fatima, Rehman, Khan, Haider and Ahmed. Apart from the ₹2 lakh personal bond each with two local sureties of the like amount, the top court also gagged the five activists from speaking about any issue from any platform after their release.

Conditions also include that they are:

• Required to stay within the territorial limit of Delhi NCT for the pendency of the trial. Not allowed to leave the city without court’s permission. Any request for travel shall disclose reasons, which would then be considered by the trial court “strictly” on its “merits”
• Surrender passports if any. If there is no passport, then an affidavit to be filed to that effect. Furthermore, immigration authorities have been direction to prevent any exit from the country without the court’s permission
• Twice weekly check-ins at the Delhi Police Crime Branch police station. The police are then required to submit monthly attendance reports to court; Furnish full current address and all contact details with the investigating officer of the case. there must be a seven-day notice before any change to the same.
• Co-operate during the trial, appear at every date unless exempted by court and ensure they don’t act in any way to delay the same
• No witness tampering, or any contact with them at all – direct or indirect. Not allowed to participate in the activities of any group or organization linked to the subject matter of the present FIR/ final report
• Complete media gag
• Gag on attending any rallies – political or otherwise, physically or virtually till the conclusion of the trial
• Not allowed to distribute any posts, handbills, posters, fliers, banners
• “Maintain peace and good behavior.” Violation of this condition gives the police “liberty” to seek revocation of bail

UAPA comes a full circle

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Gulfisha Fatima vs State (2026 INSC 2) represents a ‘coming to a full circle’ moment for the Unlawful Activity (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967. The UAPA, which was originally meant to address “secessionist” activities, was later amended and rebranded as India’s anti-terror law.

Around 1962-63, the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned UAPA to act as a deterrence against secessionist ideologies and preserve national integration. In the backdrop of the 1965 India-Pakistan war, UAPA was primarily intended to tackle the strong secessionist movement in Tamil Nadu which wanted to be a sovereign state. It was followed by a series of preventive detention laws and, when India signed and ratified all major United Nation counter-terrorism conventions after 9/11, the UAPA was specifically amended in 2004 to align with the country’s international obligations.

The law, in its current avatar, is so vast and vague, that even expressing disaffection towards the state or affection for another state, as in the case of the three Kashmiri youth who were jailed under sedition charges for allegedly cheering for Pakistan’s cricket team when it won the 2021 T20 World Cup, is liable for prosecution.

When protest becomes an act of terrorism

Can protest speeches, public meetings and WhatsApp group membership constitute conspiracy under Sections 16–18 of the UAPA at the bail stage?

According to the Supreme Court: Yes, they can. Even if the protests were peaceful assemblies.

The Supreme Court’s January 5 judgement essentially redefined terrorism. Even though the judgment recognized freedom of speech as a protected right, it stopped where an allegedly pre-planned conspiracy for systemic violence began. Ironically, cases against BJP politicians like Kapil Sharma, who made incendiary speeches on the eve of the breakout of violence in Delhi in 2020, continue at a snail’s pace,

Yet, the January 5 judgement read: “The factual record placed by the prosecution repeatedly returns to a distinction that is central to the case: the differentiation between a conventional dharna and a chakka jam. This is not treated as semantics. It is treated as strategy.”

“A dharna may be expressive; a chakka jam, as alleged, is disruptive by design. The prosecution case is that the sustained choking of arterial roads, replication of blockade sites, and the movement of crowds from minority clusters into mixed population areas were not accidental expressions of dissent, but calibrated acts meant to generate confrontation, overwhelm law enforcement, and create conditions for violence,” it added.

The top court said Delhi Police did not rely on a “single speech, a single meeting, or a single blockade” to oppose bail, rather it relied on “a course of conduct, spread over weeks, involving repeated meetings, formation of coordinating bodies, issuance of directions, and alleged preparations for escalation.”

“The Court cannot, at the bail stage, segregate this course of conduct into isolated benign fragments and assess each in abstraction,” the judgment read.

The Supreme Court reiterated that “dissent and protest occupy a protected space in a constitutional democracy,” however, that protection does not extend to a design that involves “systemic disruption, engineered confrontation, and preparatory steps towards violence”.

“At this stage, the Court must resist from committing two errors. The first is to criminalise speech merely because it is politically charged. The second is to immunize a continuing course of conduct merely because it contains language of non-violence,” the judgment read.

“In the application of such law, the Court does not proceed on identity, ideology, belief, or association. It proceeds on role, material, and the statutory threshold governing the exercise of jurisdiction,” the judgment read. “…[the judgment] neither endorses the prosecution case nor prejudges the guilt of any accused,” the court said adding that it applied the law as it stands, “recognising that individual liberty must be protected, but that it must also withstand the legitimate demands of national security and collective safety.”

“This balance is not a matter of preference rather it is a matter of constitutional duty,” the court added.

Selective application of law

While the Supreme Court’s judgment could be seen as a mixed bag of relief for some accused, in the denial of bail to Imam and Khalid, the top court selectively applied its own judgement and those of the high court on free speech or even bail under section 43d of the UAPA.

In cases like Vernon Gonzalves, Shoma Sen, Arvind Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia, Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh, Sheikh Javed Iqbal, the top court granted bail due to prolonged incarceration despite the bar under section 43D of the UAPA act.

On free speech, the Supreme Court in its 2015 Shreya Singhal judgment said that dissenting discourse is not a crime. In its Balwant Singh judgment, the court emphasized that shouting stray slogans like “Khalistan Zindabad” were not a crime.

In fact, the Delhi High Court granted bail to student activists Devangana Kalita, Natasha Narwal and Asif Iqbal Tanha—co-accused in the 2020 Delhi Riots conspiracy case—and pulled up the Delhi Police for its “wanton use” of the UAPA.

In this case, the High Court clearly stated: “… in its anxiety to suppress dissent and in the morbid fear that matters may get out of hand, the State has blurred the line between the constitutionally guaranteed ‘right to protest’ and ‘terrorist activity’. If such blurring gains traction, democracy would be in peril.”

“… the intent and purport of the Parliament in enacting the UAPA, and more specifically in amending it in 2004 and 2008 to bring terrorist activity within its scope, was, and could only have had been, to deal with matters of profound impact on the ‘Defence of India’, nothing more and nothing less,” it added.

Process is the punishment

In the past decade, the State (or corporations) has often been accused of (mis)using the law to stifle dissent. In effect, making the process of law the punishment. Sedition (the old and new avatar), UAPA, defamation, Copyright Act are all being used against free speech.

The NewsClick founder editor Prabir Purkayastha was charged under the draconian UAPA for publishing “propaganda” reports on China that allegedly served to endanger the “sovereignty, unity and security of India.” He secured bail after seven months in custody after the Supreme Court held that his arrest was “invalid in the eyes of the law.”

Sedition, in its new avatar, has been used against climate activist Sonam Wangchuk, Ashoka University professor Ali Khan Mahmudabad, stand-up comic Kunal Kamra, satirists Madri Kakoti and Shamita Yadav better as Dr Medusa and Ranting Gola respectively, Bhojpuri singer Neha Singh Rathore, TV star and Big Boss winner Akhil Marar, a 20-year-old autorickshaw driver Sahil Khan and even Pushpa Sathidar, wife of the late actor Vira Sathidar, who was booked for merely reciting the acclaimed Faiz Ahmed Faiz poem ‘Hum Dekhenge’ at a meeting.in Nagpur in May 2025.

Even after sedition cases are dropped, the punishing process does not end, as the ordeal of Manipuri journalist Kishore Wangkhemcha, booked for speaking out about the struggles of leaders of Manipur or film maker Aisha Sultana, charged for criticising the Lakshadweep administrator, bears out..

Clearly, the price of dissent and critical thought is extremely high. And now, a Supreme Court order penalises peaceful protest and expression as acts of terror, effectively putting an undemocratic premium on the freedom to speak freely.

*About the Author: After an almost decade-long career as a photojournalist in Mumbai, Ritika now covers the Indian judiciary and hopes to simplify the law and decode the judiciary. Now based in Delhi, Ritika is a writer, part-time dreamer & full-time K-drama addict who escapes the city when she’s not bingeing on K-dramas.

Courtesy: Free Speech Collective

The post When Speech Becomes an Act of Terrorism appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The verdict was delivered by a Bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice N.V. Anjaria, which held that although prolonged incarceration demands constitutional scrutiny, the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA continued to operate against Khalid and Imam, as the prosecution material disclosed a prima facie case against them.

At the same time, the Court stressed that all accused are not on the same footing, and that a role-specific, accused-specific analysis was constitutionally necessary even in conspiracy cases — a principle that led to bail being granted to the remaining five appellants.

The judgment was reserved on December 10, 2025, and arises from appeals challenging the September 2, 2025 judgment of the Delhi High Court, which had denied bail to all seven accused.

‘Qualitatively Different Footing’: Why bail was denied to Khalid and Imam

Reading from the operative portion of the judgment, the Bench made it clear that it had “consciously avoided adopting a collective or unified approach”, instead undertaking an independent examination of the role attributed to each accused.

According to LiveLaw, the Court recorded its satisfaction that the prosecution material, if taken at face value as required at the bail stage, disclosed a “central and formative role” played by Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the alleged conspiracy behind the February 2020 violence in Northeast Delhi.

“The material suggests involvement at the level of planning, mobilisation and strategic direction, extending beyond episodic or localised acts,” the Court observed.

On this basis, the Bench concluded: “This Court is satisfied that the prosecution material discloses a prima facie allegation against the appellants Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. The statutory threshold under Section 43D(5) stands attracted qua these appellants. This stage of the proceedings does not justify their enlargement on bail.”

As reported by Bar & Bench, the Court cautioned that to disregard the distinction between central roles and facilitatory roles would itself result in arbitrariness, even in cases alleging a common conspiracy.

However, the Court clarified that Khalid and Imam may apply for bail afresh either:

• after the examination of protected witnesses, or
• after the completion of one year from the present order.

Both accused have now been in custody for over five years, without the trial reaching the stage of recording evidence.

Arguments raised by the defence

1. Umar Khalid: ‘No violence, no presence, no terrorist act’

During the hearings, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing for Umar Khalid, mounted a sustained challenge to both the factual foundation and the legal characterisation of the allegations.

As reported by LiveLaw, Sibal had argued that there was no evidence linking Khalid to any act of violence, and emphasised that Khalid was not even present in Delhi when the riots broke out. According to the defence, this fact alone fatally undermined the allegation that Khalid played any operational role.

A central plank of the prosecution case rested on a speech delivered by Khalid in Amravati, Maharashtra. Sibal read out portions of the speech to demonstrate that Khalid had expressly called for non-violent, Gandhian methods of protest.

“We will not answer violence with violence… We will meet violence with non-violence,” Sibal quoted from the speech.

Sibal argued that calls for “chakka jams” or road blockades are legitimate forms of civil disobedience in a democracy, and that such methods have historically been employed across political movements, including the farmers’ protests, without being labelled as terrorism.

Specifically challenging the invocation of the UAPA, Sibal submitted that Section 15 cannot be stretched to criminalise protest activity, and that even highway or rail blockades do not amount to “terrorist acts” unless accompanied by a clear intent to threaten the country’s economic security or sovereignty. To do otherwise, he warned, would dangerously collapse the distinction between dissent and terrorism.

Despite these submissions, the Supreme Court held that at the bail stage, it could not weigh defence rebuttals, and confined its enquiry to whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, crossed the statutory threshold.

2. Sharjeel Imam: ‘In custody during riots, speech is not violence’

Appearing for Sharjeel Imam, Senior Advocate Siddharth Dave similarly argued that the prosecution’s case was built on attribution and inference rather than direct evidence.

According to Bar & Bench, Dave pointed out that Imam was already in custody in other cases at the time the riots occurred, making it impossible for him to have participated in any on-ground violence or mobilisation.

Dave acknowledged that Imam’s speeches may have been controversial or unpalatable, but argued that political speech, however provocative, does not automatically amount to incitement to violence. He cautioned against equating dissenting or radical speech with terrorist intent.

He also flagged the danger of pre-trial stigmatisation, noting that Imam had been branded an “intellectual terrorist” by the State despite there being no conviction or completed trial.

The prosecution, however, relied heavily on video clips of Imam’s speeches, particularly those in which he spoke about cutting off the “Chicken Neck” or Siliguri corridor, the narrow passage connecting the Northeast to the rest of India.

As reported by LiveLaw, the Delhi Police alleged that these speeches showed an intent to:

• paralyse the functioning of the State, and
• attract international attention during the visit of then US President Donald Trump in February 2020.

The Supreme Court accepted that these allegations, taken at face value, were sufficient at the bail stage to constitute a prima facie case, while clarifying that it was not expressing any final opinion on guilt.

Bail Granted to Five Accused: Liberty with stringent conditions

In contrast, the Supreme Court granted bail to Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa Ur Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed, holding that their continued incarceration could not be justified on parity with Khalid and Imam.

For Gulfisha Fatima, Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi made a pointed submission, reported by LiveLaw, that keeping students and young activists in jail for over five years without the trial even beginning makes a “caricature of our criminal justice system”.

Singhvi highlighted that co-accused Devangana Kalita, Natasha Narwal and Asif Iqbal Tanha were granted bail in 2021 on similar allegations, yet Fatima continued to remain incarcerated.

While granting bail, the Court clarified that the relief does not dilute the allegations. According to LiveLaw, the Bench imposed twelve stringent bail conditions, warning that any misuse of liberty would permit the trial court to cancel bail after hearing the accused.

Details of the judgment pronouncement

1. UAPA and Bail: Delay is not a ‘trump card’, says Court

One of the most closely analysed portions of the judgment concerns the relationship between prolonged incarceration and bail under UAPA. Justice Aravind Kumar observed, as reported by LiveLaw, that in prosecutions under special statutes like the UAPA:

• delay in trial cannot function as a “trump card” that automatically overrides statutory restrictions on bail.

However, the Court simultaneously acknowledged that:

• delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny, especially where incarceration is prolonged.

The Bench clarified that Section 43D(5) does not completely oust judicial scrutiny, and courts must conduct a structured enquiry, limited to:

1. whether the prosecution material, if accepted at face value, discloses a prima facie offence;
2. whether the role attributed to the accused has a reasonable nexus with the alleged offence; and
3. whether the statutory threshold for denial of bail is crossed.

Crucially, the Court reiterated that defence arguments and rebuttals cannot be examined at the bail stage, reinforcing the asymmetrical nature of bail adjudication under the UAPA.

2. Article 21, speedy trial and the limits of judicial intervention

The judgment repeatedly returns to Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.

Justice Kumar noted that:

• pre-trial incarceration cannot be equated with punishment, and
• the right to a speedy trial is an integral facet of Article 21.

At the same time, the Bench held that in UAPA cases, Article 21 must operate within the statutory framework, and that the Court cannot substitute legislative judgment merely because detention is prolonged.

As reported by Bar & Bench, the Court stated that: “The UAPA as a special statute represents a legislative judgment as to the conditions on which bail may be granted at the pre-trial stage.”

This formulation, while doctrinally consistent with prior UAPA rulings, has been read by legal observers as reinforcing the exceptional nature of liberty under anti-terror laws, even where trials remain stalled for years.

3. Broad reading of ‘terrorist act’ under Section 15

The Supreme Court also rejected a narrow interpretation of Section 15 of the UAPA, holding that “terrorist acts” are not confined to physical violence or loss of life.

According to LiveLaw, the Court held that the provision also covers acts that:

• disrupt essential services, or
• threaten economic stability.

The statutory scheme, the Court noted, extends culpability even to preparatory and organisational acts, significantly broadening the scope of UAPA prosecutions.

Directions to expedite trial

Recognising the constitutional implications of prolonged incarceration, the Supreme Court directed the trial court to ensure that the examination of protected witnesses proceeds without delay, and that the trial is not unnecessarily prolonged. However, the Court did not fix any outer time limit for completion of the trial.

Context: Five years of incarceration

The case arises from the February 2020 communal violence in Northeast Delhi, which left 53 people dead, hundreds injured, and large-scale destruction of property.

Over the last five years, the Delhi Police has pursued a “larger conspiracy” theory, focusing largely on student activists and organisers of anti-CAA protests — an approach that has drawn sustained criticism from civil liberties groups.

Notably, as reported in Indian and international media, a group of US lawmakers recently wrote to Indian Ambassador Vinay Mohan Kwatra, expressing concern over Umar Khalid’s prolonged pre-trial detention, highlighting the growing global scrutiny of the case.

Today’s ruling reinforces a consistent judicial position that while individual differentiation among accused is constitutionally necessary, the UAPA’s elevated bail threshold continues to operate as a near-insurmountable barrier for those alleged to occupy “central” roles — even after half a decade of incarceration without trial.

It leaves unresolved the deeper constitutional question that continues to haunt UAPA prosecutions: at what point does prolonged pre-trial detention itself become punishment?

Related:

The Word is the World: How the Delhi riots conspiracy case ritualises silence

How the Delhi riots case remains stagnant with close to a dozen student leaders incarcerated

5 Years of Delhi Riots: Some Punished, Some Rewarded!

Delhi Police on Trial: Three court orders reveal collusion, cover-ups, and custodial torture by police officers during 2020 Delhi riots

Delhi Riots 2020: Umar Khalid withdraws plea from Supreme Court citing “change in circumstances”

Hate speeches amplified by television, incited targeted violence against Muslims: CCR Report, Feb ‘20 Delhi riots

The post After Five Years in Jail, Bail Still Barred for Two: Supreme Court denies bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in Delhi riots case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Recent judicial interventions—particularly the Supreme Court’s directions to High Courts to furnish data on pending acid attack trials and the Allahabad High Court’s decision to convert a long-pending PIL on acid sale regulation into a suo moto proceeding—underscore that the crisis is no longer doctrinal but institutional as per reports in LiveLaw. Despite pathbreaking jurisprudence laid down after a decade long legal battle in the Laxmi case, the Supreme Court was compelled, in 2025, while hearing a petition highlighting a 16-year delay in an acid attack trial, to describe the situation as a “shame on the system” and a “mockery of justice”. The SC then directed all High Courts to furnish data on pending acid attack cases.

This Legal Resource examines acid attack jurisprudence not as a static body of law but as a pattern of repeated judicial correction, necessitated by persistent failures of implementation. Drawing from case law, legislative history, policy frameworks, and scholarly critiques, it argues that acid attack jurisprudence today reveals the limits of law when administrative and procedural systems fail to internalise constitutional mandates.

Laxmi v. Union of India: Constitutionalising Survivor-Centric Justice

The jurisprudential foundation of acid attack regulation in India was laid by Laxmi v. Union of India, a public interest litigation (PIL) filed in 2006 by survivor Laxmi Aggarwal. Laxmi was 15 yrs old in 2005 when a 32-old man, Naeem Khan, approached her with a marriage proposal. After she rejected him, nearly ten months later, Naeem again proposed to her; upon her second refusal, he attacked her by throwing acid on her face, with his brother Kamran aiding him in the act.

Argued consistently by Senior Advocate Aparna Bhat, the petition reframed acid violence as a failure of State regulation rather than an isolated criminal act. The Supreme Court accepted this framing, holding that the unrestricted availability of acid, absence of medical support, and lack of compensation mechanisms violated Article 21 of the Constitution (see Laxmi v. Union of India, (2014) 4 SCC 427).

Across multiple orders, the Court issued structural directions mandating the regulation of acid sales, free medical treatment for survivors in both public and private hospitals, and minimum compensation of ₹3 lakh. These directions were significant not merely for their content but for their constitutional logic: dignity, bodily integrity, and rehabilitation were recognised as enforceable rights, not discretionary welfare measures.

This shift has been closely analysed in legal scholarship. The NLS Law Journal notes that Laxmi represents a rare moment where Indian courts explicitly connected criminal law reform with long-term socio-economic rehabilitation, recognising acid attacks as producing lifelong disabilities requiring sustained State intervention rather than one-time relief (see Ajita Tandon, Acid Attacks in India: A Judicial and Legislative Response, NLS Law Journal, Vol. 13, available here).

From Judicial Directions to Statutory Reform: Codification Without Capacity

Following Laxmi, the Law Commission of India was impleaded and submitted Report No. 226 (2008), recommending a distinct offence for acid attacks and stronger regulation of corrosive substances (report available here). These recommendations later informed the Justice Verma Committee Report (2013), which acknowledged acid violence as a gendered crime requiring specific legislative recognition.

This culminated in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, which inserted Sections 326A and 326B of the IPC, along with Section 357B of the CrPC, mandating compensation in addition to fines. On paper, these provisions created a comprehensive framework combining punishment, deterrence, and victim relief. The specific recognition of acid attacks introduced via Sections 326A and 326B of the IPC has been largely preserved in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) to maintain the gravity of the offense. These translated into Sections 124(1) and 124(2) under the BNS, 2023, which read as –

124.  (1) Whoever causes permanent or partial damage or deformity to, or burns or maims or disfigures or disables, any part or parts of the body of a person or causes grievous hurt by throwing acid on or by administering acid to that person, or by using any other means with the intention of causing or with the knowledge that he is likely to cause such injury or hurt or causes a person to be in a permanent vegetative state shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine:

(2) Whoever throws or attempts to throw acid on any person or attempts to administer acid to any person, or attempts to use any other means, with the intention of causing permanent or partial damage or deformity or burns or maiming or disfigurement or disability or grievous hurt to that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

However, scholarship consistently highlights that legislative codification did not translate into institutional readiness. As Ajita Tandon’s analysis points out, while the law “responded swiftly in text,” the administrative machinery required for compensation disbursal, rehabilitation, and prioritised trials remained fragmented and uneven across States.

Trial Delays and the Right to Speedy Justice: A Systemic Breakdown

The most severe manifestation of this institutional failure has been the extraordinary delay in criminal trials involving acid attacks. In 2025, the Supreme Court, while hearing a petition highlighting a 16-year delay in an acid attack trial, described the situation as a “shame on the system” and a “mockery of justice”, and directed all High Courts to furnish data on pending acid attack cases, reported by LiveLaw.

This intervention is constitutionally significant. Acid attack cases engage the right to speedy trial under Article 21 in its most aggravated form: survivors suffer irreversible physical harm, prolonged psychological trauma, and social stigma, all of which are compounded by procedural delay. The Court’s insistence on national data collection implicitly acknowledges that delay itself functions as a form of secondary victimisation.

The consequences of such delay are visible in outcomes. In a 2009 acid attack case, a Delhi court acquitted the accused after nearly 16 years, citing evidentiary weaknesses that had emerged over time—an outcome widely reported as emblematic of systemic delay undermining prosecution itself, as per a report in The Times of India.

While the recent SC directives may we welcome, the issues and failures are systemic. One after another of human rights issues, whether it be the transparency within police conducts in police stations (SC directive on installation of CCTVs in all Police Stations)[1] or right of the accused to fair trial (directives laid down in DK Basu)[2], the police and administration have consistently ignored the breakthroughs made by the court. This amounts to institutional amnesia or downright defiance.

Regulation of Acid Sales: Judicial Supervision in the Face of Executive Inertia

Despite unequivocal directions in Laxmi, regulation of acid sales remains inconsistent. This failure came sharply into focus when the Allahabad High Court converted a decade-old PIL on acid sale regulation into a suo motu proceeding, holding that issues of acid regulation and survivor compensation implicate continuing public interest and cannot be abandoned due to petitioner withdrawal, reported LiveLaw.

The Court also reiterated that compensation cannot be made contingent on the identification or conviction of the offender, reinforcing the constitutional principle that survivor relief flows from State obligation, not prosecutorial success. This episode exemplifies a recurring pattern in acid attack jurisprudence: courts are repeatedly forced to re-enter regulatory terrain they have already mapped, due to executive inaction.

Compensation and Rehabilitation: Between Entitlement and Administrative Apathy

Compensation has remained central to acid attack jurisprudence since Laxmi, yet its implementation has been deeply uneven. The Ministry of Home Affairs’ 2024 guidelines reiterate that acid attack survivors are entitled to a minimum compensation of ₹3 lakh and free medical treatment (guidelines available here). However, High Court interventions reveal persistent delays and bureaucratic indifference.

For instance, the Allahabad High Court has censured the Uttar Pradesh government for delays extending over a decade in disbursing compensation to acid attack survivors, describing such conduct as insensitive and violative of constitutional obligations, reported by The Times of India.

Socio-legal scholarship criticises this model for reducing rehabilitation to symbolic monetary relief, often divorced from the realities of lifelong medical care, psychological counselling, loss of livelihood, and social reintegration (see IJLMH, A Socio-Legal Analysis on Acid Attacks in India, available here).

NCRB data provides only a partial picture of acid attack violence. While annual figures record reported cases, they offer little insight into trial duration, pendency, or access to compensation. Recent analyses indicate that a substantial majority of acid attack cases remain pending for years, while conviction rates remain low.

Scholars caution that these figures significantly understate the scale of the problem due to under-reporting driven by stigma, fear, and lack of institutional support—concerns repeatedly flagged in academic literature.

The Cultural Lens: Chhapaak

The 2020 film Chhapaak, while a significant cultural milestone in sensitising the public to the horrors of acid violence, also became a focal point for a profound legal debate regarding the “moral rights” and visibility of legal professionals. Advocate Aparna Bhat, who represented Laxmi Agarwal for over a decade—from the initial trial at Patiala House Courts to the landmark Supreme Court PIL—approached the Delhi High Court when the filmmakers failed to acknowledge her contribution in the credits. This omission raised a critical ethical and legal question: can the labour of a lawyer, which provides the very documentary and procedural backbone of a “true story,” be erased in its cinematic retelling? The Delhi High Court, invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ruled in Bhat’s favour, noting that her assistance was provided on the assurance of recognition. Bar and Bench reported that the court directed that the line, “Inputs by Ms. Aparna Bhat, the lawyer who represented Laxmi Agarwal, are acknowledged,” be added to the film. This intervention was not merely about a “thank you”; it was a judicial validation of the role of legal activists in translating personal trauma into transformative constitutional reform.

Conclusion

The trajectory of acid attack jurisprudence in India reveals a striking pattern. Courts have articulated robust constitutional principles, legislatures have codified them into law, and yet survivors continue to face delay, neglect, and regulatory failure. The problem today is not doctrinal uncertainty but institutional inertia.

Without administrative accountability, procedural reform, and sustained investment in survivor rehabilitation, even the most progressive jurisprudence risks becoming symbolic. Acid attack law in India now stands at an inflection point: its future efficacy will depend not on further judicial creativity, but on whether the State finally honours the constitutional commitments already laid down by the courts.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

[1] This earlier resource explores the suo motu by SC in September 2025 action highlights how weak compliance with its own (SC) 2020 CCTV directions has left detainees vulnerable and accountability elusive.

[2] Another judicial directive that spanned decades, DK Basu,but which directives stand un-implemented.

Related:

When ‘Marginal’ Means Massive: The invisible weight of gendered violence in NCRB crime statistics 2023

Disfigured but not defeated: Hajida, an acid attack survivor, ensured the culprit does not get away. Now she needs your help

Jharkhand HC expresses dismay over Govt.’s lack of response to compliance orders for Acid Attack survivors

The post Acid Attacks: The judicial struggle to regulate acid violence in India appeared first on SabrangIndia.