In a detailed judgment running over thirty pages, Justice Sachin Datta awarded ₹18.44 lakh as compensation to the father of 19-year-old Deepak, who died while lodged in the lock-up of Police Station Karawal Nagar, Delhi in January 2018.[1] The Court held that once a person’s liberty is curtailed by the State, the constitutional obligation to safeguard that person’s life becomes absolute, and any failure to discharge that obligation amounts to an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Far more than an ordinary compensation order, the judgment is an extensive survey of constitutional jurisprudence on custodial deaths. Drawing from landmark Supreme Court authorities including Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, In Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, alongside important High Court decisions from Delhi, Bombay, Karnataka, Punjab and Haryana, Allahabad and elsewhere, the Court reiterated that the State cannot evade constitutional responsibility merely because the exact cause of death remains disputed or because officials deny direct involvement.

Most importantly, the Court emphatically rejected the argument that a custodial suicide stands outside State responsibility. It observed that suicide within police custody is itself an unnatural custodial death and reflects a failure of those entrusted with the legal duty of ensuring the prisoner’s safety. Consequently, the State cannot avoid liability by arguing that the deceased took his own life.

The judgment is likely to assume considerable importance in future litigation involving custodial deaths, police accountability and constitutional compensation. Besides strengthening the evolving doctrine of public law compensation under Article 21, it also adopts the multiplier method commonly employed in motor accident compensation cases to determine damages in custodial death claims, thereby providing a more structured framework for assessing compensation in such cases.

The background

The writ petition was filed by Shyam Sundar, who approached the Delhi High Court seeking constitutional compensation following the death of his son Deepak, who died while in police custody at Police Station Karawal Nagar. The petition invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, alleging a grave violation of the deceased’s fundamental right to life.

The events giving rise to the petition began on January 15, 2018, when Deepak was arrested at approximately 11:10 a.m. from the premises of Karkardooma Courts by Sub-Inspector Sandeep in connection with FIR No. 334 of 2017 registered at Police Station Karawal Nagar. According to the petitioner, after learning of his son’s arrest, he visited the police station to meet him. Instead of being allowed to meet his son, he himself was allegedly detained and confined inside the lock-up alongside Deepak for several hours. He was released only around 5:30 p.m. that evening.

The father’s account, recorded in the judgment, paints a disturbing picture of what allegedly transpired inside the police station. He alleged that both he and his son were subjected to physical assault, intimidation and abuse by police officials, specifically naming Sub-Inspector Sandeep and Constable Karamveer Singh. According to the petition, the officers allegedly demanded ₹20,000 to ₹30,000 in exchange for securing Deepak’s release.

The allegations did not end there. Later that same night, the father allegedly received a telephone call from Sub-Inspector Sandeep seeking further particulars regarding Deepak. During that conversation, according to the petitioner, the demand for money was reiterated. Being a person of limited financial means, the father informed the officer that he was incapable of arranging such an amount.

The following morning, believing that his son would be produced before a magistrate, the father contacted the police station. He was initially informed that Deepak had indeed been produced before the court.

Shortly thereafter, however, the situation took a devastating turn. The petitioner received a phone call from a local political leader informing him that Deepak had allegedly committed suicide while in police custody. By 11:56 a.m. on 16 January 2018, Deepak had been declared “brought dead” at Guru Tegh Bahadur Hospital.

The police thereafter sought a magisterial inquiry into the custodial death. Interestingly, as recorded in the judgment, the very officer against whom allegations had been levelled—Sub-Inspector Sandeep Kumar—was entrusted with several aspects of the post-incident investigation, including arranging the post-mortem examination, photographing the lock-up, seizing the alleged ligature material, and coordinating with the crime team for forensic examination of the scene.

A medical board conducted the post-mortem examination on January 17, 2018. The board concluded that the cause of death was “asphyxia due to ante-mortem hanging.” Following the examination, Deepak’s body was handed over to his father.

The petitioner, however, consistently maintained that the official version did not explain the surrounding circumstances leading to the death. One aspect that particularly troubled the petitioner related to the recovery of articles from inside the lock-up.

According to the judgment, the Forensic Science Laboratory report noted that two blades had been recovered from the lock-up and further recorded that the possibility of the alleged ligature material having been cut using those blades could not be ruled out. The petitioner argued that Deepak had been searched thoroughly at the time of his arrest and no such objects had been found on his person. In these circumstances, the unexplained presence of the blades inside the lock-up raised serious questions regarding the police version of events.

The petitioner also relied heavily upon a departmental enquiry order dated 26 September 2018, contending that it demonstrated negligence on the part of police personnel stationed at Police Station Karawal Nagar and reinforced the State’s constitutional liability for the custodial death.

Another issue addressed during the proceedings concerned the petitioner’s relationship with the deceased. Although Deepak was biologically the son of the petitioner’s brother, the Court recorded that following the death of his biological mother when he was approximately one year old, he had been brought up and adopted by Shyam Sundar, with whom he shared a father-son relationship throughout his life. An affidavit affirming these facts was placed on record before the Court.

These factual circumstances ultimately formed the backdrop against which the Delhi High Court examined a much larger constitutional question: whether an unnatural death inside police custody, irrespective of disputes surrounding its precise cause, automatically engages the State’s constitutional liability to compensate the victim’s family under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The constitutional question before the Court

Although the petition contained serious allegations of custodial assault, extortion and police misconduct, Justice Sachin Datta made it clear that the High Court was not called upon, in these writ proceedings, to determine whether Deepak had been murdered, subjected to custodial torture, or whether individual police officers were criminally liable.

Instead, the Court carefully narrowed the controversy. The central issue before it was whether an undisputed unnatural death occurring inside police custody, regardless of whether it was ultimately caused by custodial violence, negligence or suicide, entitled the victim’s next of kin to constitutional compensation under Article 21 of the Constitution. Questions regarding criminal culpability, the Court observed, would have to be determined in appropriate proceedings independently of the constitutional remedy sought before it.

This distinction ultimately became the foundation of the judgment. Rather than treating compensation as dependent upon proving police brutality beyond doubt, the Court examined whether the constitutional obligation of the State itself had been breached merely because an individual entrusted to its custody had died an unnatural death. The answer, according to the Court, was unequivocal.

Petitioner’s Case: Every custodial death reflects a failure of the state’s constitutional duty

Appearing for the petitioner, Senior Advocate Trideep Pais argued that the State’s liability arose not merely because of allegations of police misconduct but because Deepak had died while completely under State control.

The petitioner contended that the circumstances surrounding the death demonstrated serious lapses on the part of police officials. Reliance was placed upon the forensic evidence showing recovery of two blades from inside the lock-up. Since Deepak had been searched upon arrest and no such objects had been recovered from him, the petitioner questioned how these articles came to be inside the lock-up and argued that the official version of suicide was riddled with unanswered questions.

The departmental enquiry, according to the petitioner, independently established negligence on the part of the police personnel posted at Police Station Karawal Nagar. Consequently, irrespective of the precise mechanism through which the death occurred, the State had failed in its constitutional obligation to safeguard the life of a person entirely under its control.

The petitioner also urged the Court to adopt the multiplier principle, developed in motor accident compensation jurisprudence through Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, for calculating compensation in custodial death cases, arguing that constitutional compensation should be determined on objective principles rather than arbitrary figures.

The State’s Defence: Compensation is not automatic

The Government of NCT of Delhi resisted the petition by advancing a substantially different understanding of custodial death compensation. It argued that compensation does not automatically follow every custodial death and that claims for monetary relief must be governed primarily by Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme, 2018.

According to the State, the statutory scheme constituted a comprehensive framework for determining both entitlement and quantum of compensation, and constitutional courts should ordinarily operate within those parameters.

The respondents further argued that the present case materially differed from cases involving proven custodial violence. Medical evidence, they pointed out, attributed the cause of death to ante-mortem hanging and did not reveal injuries conclusively suggestive of custodial assault. In the absence of established police brutality or direct culpability, the State argued that liability could not simply be presumed. Compensation, it submitted, must depend upon the degree of responsibility established in each individual case rather than broad constitutional presumptions.

In support of this submission, reliance was placed upon the Delhi High Court’s earlier decision in Shakila v. State (NCT of Delhi), where compensation had been discussed in the context of the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme.

The Court’s Response: Custodial death is not an ordinary death—it is a constitutional failure

Justice Datta rejected the attempt to reduce the case to a mere dispute over compensation. The judgment begins its constitutional analysis with an emphatic observation that custodial deaths are fundamentally different from deaths occurring in ordinary circumstances.

The Court observed:

“Custodial death is not merely an individual tragedy but a matter of systemic concern, striking at the very foundation of the rule of law. When a person is deprived of liberty and placed in the custody of the State, the authorities assume a heightened duty of care.” (Para 21)

Unlike ordinary citizens, individuals lodged in police custody have surrendered every meaningful degree of personal liberty. They cannot leave, seek medical assistance independently, or protect themselves. They depend entirely upon the State for their safety.

Consequently, once liberty is taken away, the State simultaneously assumes what the Court described as a “heightened duty of care.”

Justice Datta observed that every lapse resulting in death inside custody—whether arising from violence, negligence, unexplained circumstances or suicide—necessarily demands judicial scrutiny because such incidents affect not merely the individual concerned but also public confidence in the justice system itself.

This articulation marks one of the strongest statements in recent custodial death jurisprudence regarding the constitutional nature of the State’s responsibility.

Drawing upon national and international standards

To reinforce this understanding, the Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in In Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, where the Supreme Court had itself relied upon the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Guidelines on Investigating Deaths in Custody. Those guidelines classify deaths caused by intentional injury—including homicide and suicide—as unnatural deaths.

The Supreme Court had earlier endorsed these guidelines and recommended that they receive wider circulation among governments in India. Justice Datta invoked this principle to underline that suicide occurring within custody is not a natural event capable of insulating the State from constitutional scrutiny. Rather, it is categorised internationally and constitutionally as an unnatural custodial death.

Precedents invoked in the judgment

1. Nilabati Behera: The foundation of custodial death jurisprudence

The Court then turned to one of the cornerstones of Indian constitutional law—Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993). Justice Datta described the decision as laying down the strict constitutional duty owed by the State to every individual placed in custody.

The Supreme Court had declared that prisoners, undertrials and detainees do not cease to enjoy the protection of Article 21 merely because they have been deprived of liberty. Their freedom may be lawfully restricted, but their right to life remains inviolable. Indeed, because they are unable to safeguard themselves, the responsibility resting upon police and prison authorities becomes even greater.

The Delhi High Court emphasised the Supreme Court’s observation that the State’s duty of care towards persons in custody is strict, admits no exceptions, and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application where constitutional rights are violated.

Where a person dies in custody otherwise than according to procedure established by law, constitutional courts possess not merely the power but the obligation to award monetary compensation for the violation of fundamental rights under Articles 32 and 226.

Justice Datta noted that Nilabati Behera fundamentally transformed Indian constitutional law by recognising compensation as an independent public law remedy rather than merely a civil claim for damages.

2. Parvathamma: Even a custodial suicide raises questions of negligence

The judgment next relied extensively upon the Karnataka High Court’s decision in Parvathamma v. Chief Secretary to Government of Karnataka, a case involving an alleged custodial suicide. Justice Datta reproduced the Karnataka High Court’s reasoning questioning how a detainee managed to fashion a ligature, obtain the necessary material, and commit suicide inside a police station supposedly under constant supervision.

The Karnataka High Court had observed that, regardless of whether death resulted from torture or suicide, the burden rested squarely upon the police to demonstrate absence of negligence. Once an individual enters police custody, it becomes the responsibility of the police to ensure that he remains alive and safe until produced before the court.

The Court had also warned that custodial deaths cannot be treated in a “casual and cavalier fashion,” emphasising that constitutional courts must continuously evolve effective public law remedies to preserve the rule of law and protect citizens against abuse of State power. Justice Datta treated these observations as directly reinforcing the constitutional principles laid down in Nilabati Behera.

3. Bombay High Court: Suicide inside custody cannot be equated with suicide outside custody

One of the most significant discussions in the judgment concerns the Bombay High Court’s decision in Gopichand v. State of Maharashtra, which dealt specifically with custodial suicide. Rejecting the argument that suicide automatically severs State responsibility, the Bombay High Court had reasoned that a person in police custody experiences severe psychological trauma by virtue of detention itself. The existence of such trauma, it held, cannot be ignored while assessing constitutional liability.

Justice Datta reproduced the reasoning that there exists a direct logical relationship between police custody and the subsequent custodial death, even where death occurs by suicide.

The Bombay High Court had further observed that once death occurs inside police custody, the burden shifts to the authorities to demonstrate that conditions surrounding the detainee remained entirely normal and that no acts or omissions on their part contributed to the fatal outcome. Where they fail to discharge that burden, constitutional liability follows. This reasoning would become central to Justice Datta’s own conclusions regarding the State’s responsibility in Deepak’s case.

An unnatural custodial death is sufficient to attract constitutional liability

After surveying decades of constitutional jurisprudence, Justice Sachin Datta arrived at what is undoubtedly the central holding of the judgment. Rejecting the State’s attempt to limit compensation to cases involving proven custodial violence, the Court held that the very fact of an unnatural custodial death is sufficient to trigger constitutional liability.

In words that are likely to be repeatedly cited in future custodial death litigation, the Court declared that a person does not forfeit his fundamental rights merely because he has been arrested. Rather, the opposite is true. The moment an individual enters police custody, the constitutional burden upon the State becomes even heavier because the detainee is completely dependent upon State authorities for his safety, health and survival.

Justice Datta observed:

“It is well settled that when a person is in custody, he does not lose his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and the State assumes an absolute and inalienable duty to protect his life and dignity.” (Part 28)

The Court then articulated perhaps the most significant proposition emerging from the judgment. It held that an unnatural custodial death—even where the immediate cause is stated to be suicide—is not a private act divorced from State responsibility. Instead, such a death necessarily reflects a failure of the authorities entrusted with the constitutional obligation of protecting the prisoner.

Justice Datta observed:

“An unnatural death in custody, even if by suicide, is not a private act divorced from State responsibility, but reflects an omission of duty on the part of those charged with safekeeping. The State cannot escape responsibility by invoking statutory schemes or by contending absence of direct culpability. The very fact of custodial death, being unnatural, attracts liability and obliges the Court to mould relief in the form of compensation.” (Part 28)

This finding is particularly important because custodial suicide has frequently been invoked by investigating agencies as a defence against allegations of custodial misconduct. The Delhi High Court categorically rejected such an approach. Instead, it held that the question is not merely how the detainee died, but whether the State fulfilled its constitutional obligation to prevent that death.

State cannot escape responsibility by denying direct culpability

Justice Datta further rejected another recurring defence often advanced in custodial death cases—that unless direct police assault or torture is conclusively proved, compensation cannot be awarded. The Court held that constitutional liability under Article 21 is qualitatively different from criminal liability.

A criminal prosecution seeks to determine individual guilt. A constitutional court, on the other hand, examines whether the State has discharged its constitutional obligations. Accordingly, the Court held that the State cannot evade liability merely by asserting that no police officer has yet been found criminally responsible. Nor can it rely upon statutory compensation schemes to dilute constitutional remedies.

Justice Datta therefore concluded that the constitutional entitlement of the petitioner’s family to compensation was “beyond dispute.” The only remaining question concerned the amount that ought to be awarded.

Compensation under Article 21 is independent of statutory compensation schemes

A substantial portion of the judgment is devoted to answering one of the State’s principal legal arguments—that compensation must be restricted to the framework contained in Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme, 2018.

Justice Datta firmly disagreed. The Court acknowledged that statutory victim compensation schemes undoubtedly provide one avenue of relief for victims and their families. However, constitutional compensation occupies an entirely different field. Tracing the law from Nilabati Behera, D.K. Basu, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Justice Datta explained that compensation awarded under Article 226 is not derived from statutory provisions. Instead, it flows directly from the violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21.

Consequently, statutory schemes supplement constitutional remedies—they do not replace them. The Court held:

” The statutory scheme under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is only one avenue of relief; it supplements and does not curtail or exclude the power of this Court under Article 226 to award compensation for established infringement of fundamental rights. Custodial death, being unnatural, prima facie attracts liability under Article 21.” (Para 38)

This clarification considerably strengthens the scope of writ jurisdiction in custodial death cases. It confirms that constitutional courts are not constrained by the monetary limits prescribed under victim compensation schemes whenever Article 21 has been violated.

Why the court distinguished Shakila v. State

The respondents had placed considerable reliance upon the Delhi High Court’s earlier decision in Shakila v. State (NCT of Delhi).

Justice Datta carefully examined that precedent but concluded that it did not govern the present case.

The Court observed that Shakila principally dealt with an entirely different issue—namely, who qualifies as a “dependent” under the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme and how compensation should be distributed under that statutory framework. It was not concerned with determining constitutional compensation under Article 226 based upon violation of Article 21.

Moreover, Justice Datta pointed out that Shakila had not considered the earlier Division Bench judgment in Kiran v. State, which had specifically approved the use of the multiplier principle while awarding compensation for custodial deaths.

Since a Division Bench decision binds a Single Judge, the Court held that Kiran, rather than Shakila, furnished the correct legal framework for determining compensation in the present case. This aspect of the judgment provides important doctrinal clarity regarding the relationship between constitutional compensation and statutory victim compensation schemes.

The court endorses the multiplier method for custodial death cases

Perhaps the most practically significant contribution of the judgment lies in its approach to determining compensation. Historically, constitutional compensation in custodial death cases has often varied widely from case to case, with courts awarding amounts based largely on judicial discretion. Justice Datta sought to bring greater consistency to this area.

Relying upon earlier decisions including Kiran v. State, Prakash Kaur v. State of Punjab, Sanjeevani v. State of Maharashtra, and the recent Allahabad High Court decision in Prema Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court held that the multiplier method evolved in motor accident compensation jurisprudence provides a rational and objective framework for calculating damages in custodial death cases as well.

The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jagdish v. Mohan, where the Supreme Court had observed that compensation should not be viewed as charity or largesse but as an affirmation of constitutional dignity. Justice Datta reproduced the Supreme Court’s observation that:

“Awards of compensation are not law’s doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law.” (Para 40)

This, the Court held, perfectly captures the constitutional philosophy underlying public law compensation. The objective is not generosity, but rather the enforcement of constitutional rights after their violation.

How the court arrived at the figure of ₹18.44 lakh

Having settled the legal principles, the Court turned to the actual computation of compensation. The material before the Court indicated that Deepak, aged 19 years, worked as a waiter and earned approximately ₹12,000 per month.

Justice Datta accepted the lower end of the asserted income and calculated compensation in accordance with the principles laid down in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi. The calculation proceeded as follows:

• Monthly income: ₹12,000
• Annual income: ₹1,44,000
• Addition of 40% towards future prospects: ₹57,600
• Total annual income after future prospects: ₹2,01,600
• Deduction of 50% towards personal expenses (the deceased being a bachelor): ₹1,00,800
• Application of the multiplier of 18, applicable to persons aged between 15 and 20 years: ₹18,14,400
• Addition of ₹15,000 towards loss of estate.
• Addition of ₹15,000 towards funeral expenses.

The resulting compensation came to ₹18, 44, 400, which the Court directed the respondents to pay within eight weeks. Notably, by explicitly adopting the multiplier method, the Court has provided future litigants and constitutional courts with a far more structured methodology for quantifying compensation in custodial death cases, reducing dependence upon arbitrary lump-sum awards.

A significant expansion of constitutional accountability

Beyond the immediate relief granted to the petitioner’s family, the judgment represents a significant reaffirmation of India’s constitutional commitment to protecting life within State custody. Justice Datta makes it abundantly clear that the constitutional obligation of the State begins, and not ends, with arrest.

The judgment decisively rejects the notion that custodial suicide somehow falls outside constitutional responsibility. Instead, it recognises that a person confined within a police lock-up has surrendered virtually every means of self-protection. In those circumstances, ensuring that the detainee emerges alive is not merely an administrative responsibility but a constitutional obligation flowing directly from Article 21.

By reaffirming the doctrines of strict public law liability, rejecting attempts to confine relief within statutory compensation schemes, endorsing the multiplier method for assessing damages, and declaring that an unnatural custodial death itself constitutes sufficient basis for constitutional compensation, the Delhi High Court has added another important chapter to the evolving jurisprudence on custodial violence and State accountability. In doing so, the Court reinforces a foundational constitutional principle: when the State assumes control over an individual’s liberty, it assumes an equally inescapable responsibility for protecting that individual’s life and dignity.

The complete judgement may be read below:

[1] While, in 2018, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) was in power in Delhi, with Arvind Kejriwal serving as the Chief Minister and Lieutenant Governor Anil Baija, the Delhi Police has always been directly governed by the union home ministry, an issue that has caused frictions between state and centre. Rajnath Singh was union home minister at the time.

Related:

Decoding the Sathankulam Judgement on Custodial Death – Part 1 – Context of Torture in India

Rights

“Your Helplessness feels in the garb of Protection”: SC rebukes CBI for failure to arrest officers in custodial death case of Deva Pardhi

Monitoring Torture: SC’s suo motu action on custodial deaths and CCTV camera non-compliance

Custodial Death of Dalit Law Student Somnath Suryawanshi: FIR registered after Supreme Court upholds Bombay HC directive

“Even a Murderer Wouldn’t Do This”: Ajith Kumar’s custodial death and Tamil Nadu’s shameful culture of impunity

“Shielding their own”: Supreme Court slams Madhya Pradesh police, transfers custodial death probe of a tribal man to CBI

The post State cannot escape liability for custodial suicide: Delhi HC appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The present controversy and alleged derogatory remark against Prophet Mohammad

The recent controversy centres on an Instagram podcast reel uploaded around June 19, 2026. In the video, Nazia Elahi Khan is seen in conversation with a host named Divya Singh. Viewers alleged that Khan made derogatory and offensive remarks regarding Prophet Muhammad and his family during this podcast, which subsequently went viral on social media platforms.

The alleged statements sparked widespread outrage within the Muslim community, leading to protests and demands for legal action across multiple states. Community leaders and organisations, including the Raza Academy, argued that the remarks were deeply hurtful to their religious sentiments.

Khan in her defense has also claimed in some reports that the viral videos of her remarks are AI-generated not hers!

Legal action and protests across the country

Following the circulation of the podcast, multiple FIRs and complaints were registered against Khan:

• Bhiwandi, Maharashtra: The first FIR was registered on Monday evening (June 22, 2026) at the Shanti Nagar Police Station. The complaint was filed by a local resident, Adnan Ansari. Ansari stated he saw the reel on June 19 and consulted with community members before approaching the police. The Shanti Nagar police booked Khan for “deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings” and under relevant sections of the Information Technology (IT) Act. Senior Inspector Vinayak Gaikwad confirmed the FIR.

Nazia Elahi Khan Par Bhiwandi Shanti Nagar Police Mein FIR Darj For Insulting Prophet In A Podcast, FIR Filed By MIM Team pic.twitter.com/wXvCnsnTSv

— Gallinews India (@gallinews) June 22, 2026

• Mumbai, Maharashtra: A second case, classified as a ‘zero FIR,’ was registered on Tuesday (June 23, 2026) at the JJ Marg Police Station in South Mumbai over the same video content. Police officials noted that this case is likely to be transferred to West Bengal, where Khan currently resides, for further investigation. Representatives of the Raza Academy also submitted a written complaint to the Pydhonie police station seeking action.

Two FIRs have been registered in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region against BJP Minority Morcha leader and social media influencer Nazia Elahi Khan, 41, over alleged derogatory remarks about Prophet Muhammad that reportedly hurt religious sentiments.

The first FIR was registered on… pic.twitter.com/DMVWgu5h37

— The Observer Post (@TheObserverPost) June 23, 2026

• Malegaon, Maharashtra: Reports indicate an FIR has also been filed in Malegaon against Khan, accusing her of hurting religious sentiments.
• Uttar Pradesh & Madhya Pradesh: Protests and demands for action have occurred in various locations, including Bareilly, Muzaffarnagar, Bulandshahr (Uttar Pradesh), and Khargone and Rewa (Madhya Pradesh). In Bareilly, members of the Muslim community submitted a memorandum to the Aonla Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), demanding strict action against her. AIMIM representatives in Khatauli (Muzaffarnagar) also demanded legal action.
• On June 24, members of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) submitted a memorandum to the Kota District Collector in Rajasthan demanding strict legal action against Nazia Elahi Khan over her alleged remarks. According to the party, the memorandum was submitted on the instructions of AIMIM President Asaduddin Owaisi and Rajasthan State President Jameel Ahmed Khan. The delegation, led by District Vice President Zahid Nizami Mastan and accompanied by other party office-bearers, urged the administration to initiate appropriate legal proceedings over the alleged insult to the Prophet.

Huzoor ﷺ ki shaan mein ki gayi gustakhi ke khilaf aur Nazia Elahi ke viruddh sakht kanooni karwai ki maang ko lekar aaj AIMIM ke qaumi sadar @asadowaisi sahab aur AIMIM Rajasthan ke Pradesh Adhyaksh Jameel Ahmed Khan sahab ke nirdesh par Kota Zila Collector ko gyapan saupa gaya।… pic.twitter.com/e0xenYLslo

— Jameel Khan (@jameelwecan) June 24, 2026

• Hyderabad Police also registered a case against Nazia Elahi Khan over her remark, following a complaint by religious organisation.

Hyderabad Police registered a case against an accused Nazia elahi Khan over alleged derogatory remarks against religious figures, following a complaint by religious scholars and organisations. DCP Charminar Zone assured strict legal action, stressing the need to maintain peace… pic.twitter.com/pt7R6AMP1k

— Nawab Abrar (@nawababrar131) June 25, 2026

The investigations are ongoing, with Mumbai police examining whether the probe should be transferred to West Bengal.

Arrest of Nazia Elahi Khan by Kolkata Police in August 2021 in relation to cheating case

Nazia Elahi Khan was previously arrested by the Girish Park Police in Kolkata on August 26, 2021 in connection with FIR No. 116 of 2020, registered under Sections 419, 420, 506, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to allegations of cheating, impersonation, criminal intimidation, and common intention. The investigation revealed that Khan had allegedly exploited a vulnerable individual involved in a complex matrimonial dispute, extracting Rs 6 lakh under the pretence that her high-level connections could secure a swift and favourable legal outcome. When the promised legal relief failed to materialise and the client demanded the return of his funds, Khan allegedly resorted to intimidation and threats, leading directly to her arrest. She remained in judicial custody until September 18, 2021, when she was granted bail on the ground of her 13-year-old son’s illness.

According to records cited in the case, investigators alleged that despite repeatedly claiming to be an advocate, she was unable during custody to produce documents establishing her legal qualifications or formal educational credentials. The case also relies on a complaint allegedly submitted by Khan to Girish Park Police Station on May 25, 2012, in which she described her qualifications as B.Com., LL.B., a document that investigators have treated as material evidence in the ongoing impersonation proceedings.

Copy of FIR No. 116/2020 registered at Girish Park Police Station

Hate Profile: weaponising Muslim identity, the strategy of provocation

Operating under the self-adopted alias “Nazia Sanatani,” Khan began systematically catering to hard-line right-wing audiences. She recognised a potent dynamic in digital identity politics: when an individual born into a minority group echoes the prejudices of the majority, their statements are often treated as undeniable validation of those prejudices. She became an “insider” willing to confirm the worst fears of the Hindutva base, effectively weaponising her background to provide a veneer of authority to baseless claims.

The remarks made by Nazia Elahi Khan are extremely offensive and derogatory towards Islam and the Prophet Muhammad PBUH.

Has anyone filed any complaints? pic.twitter.com/10I2W86iKO

— S (@Shirink_13) August 4, 2024

Hindus should stay vigilant and should boycott Muslims from government sectors and private sectors: Nazia

On June 8, 2026, Nazia Elahi Khan also courted controversy after calling for the social and economic boycott of Muslims during a press conference. She urged Hindus to refrain from employing Muslims in both government and private sectors for the next two to three years. She reportedly said that “Hindus should stay vigilant and should boycott Muslims from government sectors and private sectors.”

She further alleged that Muslims posed an internal security threat and asserting that “120 crore Hindus” should remain vigilant against various forms of “jihad.” She further questioned the patriotism of Indian Muslims and called for their boycott from employment and public life.

A BJP leader’s call, made during a press conference, to boycott Indian Muslims from government jobs, private employment, and public life is a blatant attack on the Constitution of India and the secular foundations of our republic.

Equally condemnable is the reckless attempt to… pic.twitter.com/67JmdbwBjy

— Dr Syed Naseer Hussain, M P (@NasirHussainINC) June 8, 2026

Her strategy involved constant, high-visibility provocations. She launched what her supporters called the “Hindu Dharam Tour,” traveling to deliver speeches that consistently vilified the Muslim community. In May 2024, in Karda, Maharashtra, she utilised the “Love Jihad” conspiracy theory, falsely claiming that 2,800 Hindu women had been murdered by Muslim men, and asking the crowd, “How can a Muslim man love you when he can so easily give triple talaq and destroy lives?”

In January 2025, in Belagavi, Karnataka, she amplified the “Ghazwa-e-Hind” conspiracy, alleging that local mosques and shrines were covert training grounds designed to entrap Hindu women for an eventual Islamic takeover.

When public speaking engagements waned, Khan demonstrated a willingness to manufacture crises to maintain her digital relevance.

In February 2025, she posted a video claiming Muslim men had intentionally rammed her vehicle in an assassination attempt in Uttar Pradesh. The Kanpur Dehat Police quickly debunked the claim, stating her own driver had fallen asleep at the wheel, and publicly urged citizens not to spread her communal misinformation.

In April 2026, amid the controversy surrounding Lenskart’s alleged dress code on religious symbols, Nazia Elahi Khan entered a Lenskart store in Mumbai along with her supporters and applied tilak to several employees. Videos of the incident showed her confronting the store staff over the alleged policy, asserting that Hindu employees should not be discouraged from displaying their religious identity.

“Sharia lagu karwana hai kya?” :- Nazia Elahi Khan

BJP Minority Morcha leader Nazia Elahi Khan entered a Lenskart outlet in Mumbai’s Andheri area and confronted the store manager, identified as Mohsin Khan, alleging that Hindu employees were being discouraged from wearing… pic.twitter.com/nXQAUmxmZj

— Clips (@Masterstroke_ab) April 23, 2026

Nazia Elahi Khan is not an office-bearer: BJP Minority Morcha

Amid the growing controversy, the BJP Minority Morcha publicly distanced itself from Nazia Elahi Khan. In a statement issued on June 24, the Morcha’s National President, Jamal Siddiqui, clarified that Nazia Elahi Khan is not an office-bearer of the organisation and that no individual by that name holds any official position within the BJP Minority Morcha. He further stated that any claim of representing the Morcha or the BJP in that capacity is “false and misleading.”

The BJP Minority Morcha has said that Nazia Ilahi Khan is not an office-bearer of the organisation. National President of the Morcha, Jamal Siddiqui, stated that no person by that name holds any official position within the body. He further said that any claim of representing the… pic.twitter.com/ymmR8CVqUm

— The Observer Post (@TheObserverPost) June 24, 2026

The CJP archive: documenting a habitual offender

Her speeches have frequently been delivered from platforms hosted by organisations advancing right wing propaganda of communal hatred and have consistently echoed themes such as “Love Jihad”, “Ghazwa-e-Hind”, economic boycott of Muslims, and allegations questioning the patriotism of Indian Muslims.

The sheer volume of FIRs filed against the Nazia Elahi Khan validates the long-standing warnings issued by civil rights monitors. Organisations like Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) have meticulously tracked Khan’s activities for years, maintaining detailed dossiers that classify her as a “habitual hate offender” whose actions are designed to subvert the law for political gain.

The most critical intervention by CJP occurred during the volatile lead-up to the Delhi Assembly elections in early 2025. On January 20, 2025, CJP filed a comprehensive complaint with the Chief Electoral Officer of Delhi regarding a speech Khan delivered at an event organised by the Hindu nationalist group “Chetna” in Rohini. CJP provided exact transcripts to the Election Commission, demonstrating that Khan explicitly violated the Model Code of Conduct and the Representation of the People Act.

CJP takes action against #HateSpeech! A complaint has been filed against BJP leader Nazia Elahi Khan for inciting communal hatred during the #Delhi poll campaign. Read: https://t.co/Y5VsQjYgtB

— Citizens for Justice and Peace (@cjpindia) January 21, 2025

According to CJP, the transcripts of the speech delivered in Delhi revealed Khan telling the Delhi audience that Muslims were inherently violent and primed for criminal activity; “Tell them (Muslims) to get education, they will not! […] But if you tell them to rape, they will do it immediately. Tell them to do love jihad, they will do it immediately. Tell them to throw bombs, bullets, and ammunition! They will throw it immediately.” She further instructed Hindu parents to teach their daughters that “no Abdul is good.” CJP argued that Khan was deliberately deployed to polarise the electorate. The fact that she faced no significant legal consequences for this speech, and was allowed to continue her “Hindu Dharam Tour” for another year and a half, highlights what activists describe as the systemic apathy of law enforcement when dealing with right-wing hate speech.

Legal position governing hate speech

The law governing hate speech is well settled and imposes a clear obligation upon the State and law enforcement authorities to prevent and prosecute such offences. Despite the settled legal position and repeated directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, incidents of inflammatory and communal speeches continue to occur with impunity. Such speeches are deliberately designed to promote enmity and hatred between religious communities, disturb communal harmony, outrage religious sentiments, provoke breaches of public peace, and disseminate false and inflammatory narratives likely to incite discrimination, hostility, or offences against a particular community.

These acts attract, inter alia, Sections 196 (promoting enmity between different groups), 197 (imputations prejudicial to national integration and constitutional allegiance), 299 and 302 (deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage and wound religious feelings), 352 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace), and 353 (circulation of false information likely to incite offences or create fear and alarm) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The dissemination of such inflammatory speech through public meetings and social media further aggravates its impact by expanding its reach and increasing the likelihood of communal disharmony and public disorder.

Supreme Court directions and statutory duties

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that law enforcement agencies are under a mandatory obligation to prevent and prosecute incidents of hate speech without waiting for private complaints. In Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India & Ors. (W.P. (C) No. 940 of 2022), the Court directed all States and Union Territories to register suo moto FIRs immediately whenever any speech attracts offences relating to promotion of communal hatred, irrespective of the religion or identity of the speaker. The Court categorically directed that police authorities must act without waiting for any complaint and must ensure equal enforcement of the law so as to preserve the secular character of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court has further emphasised the preventive responsibilities of the police. By orders dated February 3, 2023, while dealing with proposed communal gatherings in Maharashtra, the Court directed that permissions for public events must be subject to the condition that no hate speech is delivered and clarified that the police are duty-bound to exercise preventive powers, including action under Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherever circumstances so require.

Subsequently, by order dated January 17, 2024, the Court directed the District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police in Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh to take all necessary preventive measures, including installation of CCTV cameras and video recording of public events, to ensure identification and prosecution of persons delivering hate speeches or inciting communal violence. These directions reaffirm that police authorities have a continuing constitutional and statutory obligation not merely to prosecute offences after they occur but also to prevent their commission through timely intervention.

In compliance with these judicial directions, the Director General of Police, Maharashtra, issued Circular dated February 2, 2023, directing all police units to strictly implement the Supreme Court’s mandate by taking suo moto action wherever speeches disclose offences relating to communal hatred. Thereafter, by Circular dated April 3, 2023, the Maharashtra Police prescribed comprehensive preventive measures for public meetings and processions, including prior meetings with organisers, imposition of conditions while granting permissions, intelligence gathering, preventive action against anti-social elements, compulsory audio-video recording of events, immediate registration of offences wherever violations occur, and prompt arrests wherever warranted.

These directions make it abundantly clear that failure to initiate timely preventive and prosecutorial action in cases of hate speech would amount to a failure to discharge statutory and constitutional duties entrusted to the police authorities.

Judicial Precedents on Hate Speech

The constitutional position regarding hate speech has been consistently reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Firoz Iqbal Khan v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 956 of 2020), the Court observed that India’s constitutional democracy is founded upon the peaceful coexistence of diverse religious and cultural communities and held that any attempt to vilify a religious community must be viewed with grave disfavour as it strikes at the core of constitutional values. Earlier, in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, (2014) AIR SC 1591, the Supreme Court recognised that hate speech marginalises vulnerable groups, legitimises discrimination, and lays the foundation for exclusion, violence, and even genocide, thereby posing a direct threat to the right to life and dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Further strengthening this jurisprudence, in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 943 of 2021), by order dated April 28, 2023, the Supreme Court extended its earlier directions to all States and Union Territories, mandating registration of suo moto FIRs whenever speeches disclose offences relating to communal hatred, irrespective of the identity or religion of the speaker. The Court reiterated that the police cannot remain passive spectators and must promptly initiate criminal proceedings whenever cognizable offences of hate speech are committed. Collectively, these decisions establish that hate speech is not merely an exercise of free expression but constitutes an abuse of constitutional freedoms where it promotes hostility, discrimination, or violence against protected communities, thereby requiring immediate preventive and penal action by the State.

Moreover, the controversy has expanded beyond social media, with police complaints, memoranda, and demands for legal action being made in several states, including Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Telangana, and Delhi. Amid the growing backlash, the BJP Minority Morcha clarified that Nazia Elahi Khan does not hold any official position in the organisation. With multiple complaints now before the authorities, the matter has shifted from public outrage to the legal process, and the response of law enforcement and the courts will determine its course

Related

CJP files complaint against BJP leader Nazia Elahi Khan over hate speech in Delhi

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CJP files 5 hate speech complaints before CEO Maharashtra as violated MCC

The post Nazia Elahi Khan faces multiple FIRs over alleged hate speech appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment is a strong reaffirmation of the constitutional guarantees under Articles 19 and 21, recognising that the freedom to express political disagreement and the right to live with dignity cannot be curtailed through executive action unsupported by law. Rejecting the police’s justification, the Court concluded that the externment proceedings were unsupported by material, based on an erroneous application of the Maharashtra Police Act, and tainted by mala fides.

The hearing also attracted considerable public attention because of Justice Jamdar’s unusually candid oral observations questioning the increasing use of criminal law against protesters and commenting on Maharashtra’s contemporary political landscape. Although these remarks do not form part of the operative judgment, they underscore the constitutional concerns that informed the Court’s approach to the case.

Background: Externment order passed against SDPI office-bearer

The petitioner, Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary, serves as the General Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), a political party registered with the Election Commission of India under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The writ petition challenged two administrative orders: an externment order dated December 3, 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Chembur, Mumbai, and the appellate order dated March 27, 2026 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, affirming the externment.

The externment directed that Chaudhary be removed from the area for one year under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

According to the State authorities, several FIRs had been registered against him, principally in connection with protests organised against decisions of the Union Government. These included demonstrations concerning amendments to citizenship laws, the Gyanvapi mosque dispute, and other politically contentious issues. The police alleged that the protests had been conducted despite the denial of permission and that slogans critical of the Central Government had been raised during these demonstrations.

Represented by Advocate Payoshi Roy, the petitioner contended that the criminal cases relied upon by the authorities were overwhelmingly under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for alleged disobedience of prohibitory orders. These FIRs, it was argued, arose solely because the petitioner had organised morchas, dharnas and agitations in his capacity as a political office-bearer opposing governmental decisions. Such activities, the petitioner submitted, could not legitimately constitute grounds for invoking the drastic power of externment under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

The petition further alleged that the externment proceedings reflected a mala fide exercise of power and lacked the statutory “subjective satisfaction” required under the Act. To support this challenge, reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India as well as the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Mohmmad Kaleem Taufiq Ahmed Siddiqui v. State of Gujarat, both of which recognised the constitutional protection afforded to peaceful democratic protest.

The State, on the other hand, defended the externment by relying upon an affidavit filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police. The prosecution argued that the petitioner had organised demonstrations despite police refusal of permission and that the slogans raised during such protests justified preventive action under the Maharashtra Police Act.

However, the High Court found that the State’s case fundamentally misunderstood both the purpose and scope of the externment provisions.

Justice Jamdar’s Oral Remarks: ‘Citizens are being made slaves of the government’

During the hearing, as reported by LiveLaw, Justice Madhav Jamdar made a series of pointed oral observations questioning the increasing tendency to invoke criminal law against citizens who protest governmental policies.

Expressing concern over the police’s approach, the Court observed that democratic governance cannot function if citizens are prevented from voicing disagreement with the government of the day.

Questioning the rationale behind the externment proceedings, reported LiveLaw, Justice Jamdar orally remarked: “All citizens are being made slaves of the Indian Government. They cannot stage protests, they cannot agitate… What is all this? If people protest, you will slap cases. It is the right of citizens to protest.”

The Court further questioned why slogans critical of political leaders or the ruling party should invite such severe executive action.

Referring to the allegations against the petitioner, Justice Jamdar observed that slogans such as “BJP Government Murdabad” or “Amit Shah Murdabad” represented political expression, asking why such slogans should become grounds for externing a citizen.

The Court also reminded the State of the constitutional role of law enforcement agencies, orally remarking that: “Police are not servants of the Chief Minister or the Prime Minister. They are public servants.”

Justice Jamdar even warned that he was inclined to impose substantial costs on the officers responsible for passing such an order, reflecting the Court’s deep dissatisfaction with the manner in which the statutory power had been exercised.

These oral observations, though not forming part of the written judgment, echoed the constitutional principles ultimately embodied in the Court’s final order—that executive powers cannot be deployed to suppress legitimate political opposition or peaceful democratic activity.

‘Horse-Trading’ and the ‘Washing Machine’: Court’s sharp political commentary

The hearing also attracted national attention because of Justice Jamdar’s comments on the prevailing political climate in Maharashtra. During the proceedings, as per the LiveLaw report, after noting that the petitioner belonged to the SDPI, the Court referred to the ongoing movement of legislators between political parties.

Justice Jamdar observed that while the State Assembly was occupied with discussions regarding shifting political loyalties and the election of its Presiding Officer, more pressing public issues, including the death of a ten-year-old child in a road accident,appeared to receive comparatively little attention.

In a lighter vein, the Judge remarked that the petitioner himself might consider changing political sides, adding that “horse-trading” appeared to be occurring across Maharashtra. Referring to the criminal cases pending against the petitioner, Justice Jamdar further quipped that perhaps he should join the “washing machine“—an unmistakable allusion to the popular political expression suggesting that corruption or criminal allegations tend to disappear after politicians join the ruling establishment.

Although these comments were made humorously and do not constitute judicial findings, they quickly became among the most widely discussed aspects of the hearing because of their obvious political significance and broader commentary on contemporary public discourse.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning: Why the externment order could not stand

While the oral observations generated widespread attention, the written judgment is equally significant for its careful examination of the statutory limits governing externment powers under the Maharashtra Police Act and its reaffirmation of constitutional protections for political dissent. Justice Madhav Jamdar systematically dismantled the factual and legal basis relied upon by the police, ultimately concluding that the externment order rested on no legally sustainable foundation.

At the heart of the dispute was Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act, a preventive provision that empowers designated authorities to direct a person to remove themselves from a particular area under narrowly defined circumstances. Since an externment order deprives an individual of the freedom to reside and move freely within a particular territory, the provision has consistently been treated by courts as an extraordinary preventive measure that must be exercised with great caution.

The Court therefore began its analysis not with the allegations against the petitioner, but with the statutory requirements themselves.

1. Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act: A preventive, not punitive, power

Justice Jamdar reproduced the relevant portions of Section 56(1)(a) and (b) of the Maharashtra Police Act to determine whether the authorities had satisfied the statutory conditions before directing the petitioner’s externment.

Under Section 56(1)(a), externment may be ordered only where the movements or acts of a person are causing, or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.

Section 56(1)(b), on the other hand, authorises externment where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is engaged in, or is about to engage in, offences involving force or violence or offences punishable under specified chapters of the Indian Penal Code, particularly offences against the human body, coupled with an assessment that witnesses are unwilling to come forward because of fear.

The Court emphasised that these are not broad administrative powers permitting the State to remove inconvenient political opponents from a locality. Rather, they are exceptional preventive measures intended to address genuine threats to public safety.

Consequently, before an externment order can lawfully be passed, the authorities must possess objective material capable of supporting the statutory satisfaction required under Section 56.

Merely reproducing the language of the statute without factual support is insufficient.

2. The allegations against the petitioner did not meet the statutory threshold

Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court found that the police had failed to demonstrate how the petitioner’s conduct satisfied either limb of Section 56.

Justice Jamdar noted that it was an admitted position that Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary had organised protests, morchas and dharnas in his capacity as Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India against decisions taken by the Union Government. The State itself accepted that these demonstrations constituted the basis of the proceedings.

However, beyond recording that protests had been organised and slogans raised, the authorities had placed no material before the Court demonstrating that the petitioner’s activities had caused alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.

The FIRs relied upon by the State primarily alleged that demonstrations had been organised without police permission and therefore constituted offences under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for disobedience of promulgated orders.

Justice Jamdar observed that an alleged violation of Section 188 IPC, carrying only a relatively minor punishment, could not by itself justify invoking the extraordinary machinery of externment.

The Court stated in unambiguous terms that there was “no material on record” demonstrating that the petitioner’s movements or activities caused, or were calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm as required by Section 56. Instead, every FIR relied upon by the authorities essentially alleged only that he had organised political protests against decisions of the Government of India and that some of these protests had taken place without prior permission. Such allegations, the Court held, simply did not satisfy the statutory requirements for externment.

“There is no material on record to show that the movements or acts of the Petitioner are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property. In all these FIR, the allegation is that the Petitioner, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India, has arranged agitations/morchas/dharnas, opposing certain decisions taken by the Government of India. The other allegation is that such agitations/morchas/dharnas have been arranged without permission of the Police. The same is an offence under Section 188 of the IPC and maximum punishment is of simple imprisonment of one month. However, that cannot be a ground for passing the externment order under the provisions of the Maharashtra Police Act.” (Para 7)

This distinction proved decisive. The judgment makes clear that unlawful assembly or violation of regulatory conditions governing protests may attract criminal consequences under the applicable penal provisions, but such allegations cannot automatically be elevated into grounds for preventive exile under the Maharashtra Police Act.

To hold otherwise would fundamentally alter the character of Section 56, transforming a narrowly tailored preventive provision into an instrument capable of suppressing political opposition.

3. The court finds the authorities’ ‘subjective satisfaction’ was vitiated

One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the doctrine of subjective satisfaction, which lies at the heart of preventive measures such as externment. Although externment orders involve administrative discretion, that discretion is not immune from judicial scrutiny.

The authority must genuinely arrive at the statutory satisfaction based upon relevant material. Justice Jamdar carefully examined the externment proposal and the affidavit filed by the police. While these documents repeatedly asserted that the petitioner’s activities were causing alarm, danger and harm to the public, the Court found that the supporting material did not justify these conclusions.

The FIRs themselves narrated only that the petitioner had organised agitations against decisions of the Union Government and raised political slogans. There was no evidence of violence, no evidence of intimidation, no evidence of danger to public safety, or of harm to persons or property.

The Court therefore concluded that the findings recorded by the authorities were unsupported by the factual record. Consequently, the statutory “subjective satisfaction” required under Section 56 stood vitiated because it rested upon assertions rather than evidence.

“Although the Externment Proposal, the details of which are set out in the Affidavit-in-Reply, records that the movements and acts of the Petitioner are causing or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger and harm to the public and property, perusal of the FIRs on the basis of which action is taken and the gist of which is set out in the Affidvit-in-Reply shows that the only allegation is that the Petitioner has arranged agitations/morchas/dharnas against certain decisions of the Union of India and given slogans. Thus, the subjective satisfaction recorded by the authorities that movements and acts of the Petitioner are causing or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger and harm to the public and property, is without any material to support the same. Thus, the subjective satisfaction is vitiated.” (Para 9)

Justice Jamdar held that although the authorities had formally recorded that the petitioner’s movements were causing alarm and danger, a scrutiny of the underlying FIRs revealed no factual basis capable of supporting such a conclusion. The recorded satisfaction was therefore unsupported by material and legally unsustainable. The judgment thus reiterates a long-standing principle of administrative law—that preventive powers cannot be exercised merely by reciting statutory language. The existence of objective material remains subject to judicial review.

4. A finding of mala fides against the state

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the written judgment is the Court’s express acceptance of the petitioner’s allegation that the action bore the hallmarks of mala fides. After analysing the nature of the FIRs and the statutory requirements, Justice Jamdar observed that there was substance in the petitioner’s contention that the externment proceedings constituted a mala fide exercise of power.

“There is substance in the contention raised by Ms. Roy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the action taken is a mala fide action.” (Para 8)

Although the judgment does not embark upon an elaborate discussion of improper motive, this finding carries considerable legal significance. Indian courts are ordinarily reluctant to attribute mala fides to executive authorities without compelling material.

The Court’s conclusion therefore reflects its view that the statutory power had been invoked for a purpose divorced from the object for which Section 56 was enacted. Externment exists to prevent imminent threats to public order—not to remove political activists whose principal activity consists of organising protests against governmental policies.

By accepting the allegation of mala fides, the Court effectively recognised that preventive policing cannot become a substitute for managing political dissent. The finding significantly strengthens the constitutional character of the judgment, indicating that the problem before the Court was not merely one of procedural irregularity but one involving the misuse of statutory authority itself.

5. The judgment as a constitutional reaffirmation of the right to dissent

Beyond the statutory shortcomings in the externment proceedings, Justice Madhav Jamdar anchored the decision firmly within India’s constitutional framework, emphasising that democratic disagreement with the government lies at the heart of constitutional governance. The judgment makes it abundantly clear that preventive policing cannot become a mechanism for punishing political expression, particularly where citizens seek to voice opposition through peaceful and organised protest.

The Court rejected the implicit premise underlying the State’s action, that repeated protests against government policies, coupled with criminal cases arising from such demonstrations, could justify the extraordinary remedy of externment. Instead, it recognised that such an approach strikes directly at the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.

“It is settled legal position that an order of externment is an extraordinary measure and effect of such order is of depriving a citizen of his fundamental right of free movement throughout the territory of India.” (Para 10)

Referring specifically to Articles 19 and 21, Justice Jamdar observed that the Constitution protects not only the right of citizens to express their opinions but also their right to live with dignity. These guarantees, the Court held, are substantially impaired when the State seeks to remove a person from his locality merely because he has criticised governmental decisions or organised political demonstrations.

The Court unequivocally held:

“The action taken by the Respondent–State of Maharashtra of externing the Petitioner, merely for opposing certain decisions of the Government of India, affects the Petitioner’s fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression and also right to live with dignity.” (Para 12)

The observation is significant because it extends the analysis beyond the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a). By invoking Article 21, the Court recognised that an externment order has consequences that reach far beyond physical displacement. It disrupts an individual’s social existence, political participation, livelihood, community ties and personal dignity. The judgment therefore situates externment not merely as an administrative measure but as one carrying profound constitutional implications.

Political opposition cannot be converted into grounds for preventive action

One of the clearest messages emerging from the judgment is that criticism of the government, even if forceful, unpopular or politically inconvenient, does not transform a citizen into a threat to public order.

Throughout the proceedings, the State repeatedly relied upon the petitioner’s participation in protests against governmental decisions, including demonstrations concerning citizenship-related issues and other matters of public controversy. However, Justice Jamdar drew a sharp constitutional distinction between opposition to government policy and conduct that genuinely threatens public safety.

The judgment records that the petitioner’s activities consisted principally of organising agitations, morchas and dharnas against decisions taken by the Government of India. The allegations further indicated that he had raised political slogans and organised demonstrations despite refusal of police permission. Yet none of these circumstances, the Court held, established the statutory conditions necessary for externment. This distinction assumes considerable constitutional importance.

Democratic governments routinely face criticism, protests and organised political mobilisation. If such activities were sufficient to justify preventive measures like externment, the constitutional guarantee of political speech would become contingent upon executive approval. Justice Jamdar’s judgment rejects precisely such an approach. Instead, it reaffirms that disagreement with governmental decisions is not a constitutional anomaly—it is one of the defining characteristics of a functioning democracy.

Precedents invoked in the judgment

1. Reliance on Anuradha Bhasin: Democratic rights cannot be suppressed

The Court’s constitutional reasoning was reinforced by its reliance upon the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India. Although Anuradha Bhasin primarily concerned restrictions imposed under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure following the constitutional changes in Jammu and Kashmir, the principles articulated by the Supreme Court regarding democratic freedoms were considered directly relevant to the present case.

Justice Jamdar noted that the Supreme Court had clearly held that extraordinary executive powers cannot be used as instruments to suppress legitimate expressions of opinion, grievances or democratic rights.

By invoking Anuradha Bhasin, the Bombay High Court placed the present dispute within a broader constitutional jurisprudence recognising that preventive powers must always be exercised consistently with democratic freedoms.

The precedent underscores that constitutional rights cannot be displaced merely because executive authorities find political protests inconvenient or uncomfortable.

2. Support from the Gujarat High Court’s decision on political protests

The Court also relied upon the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Mohmmad Kaleem Taufiq Ahmed Siddiqui v. State of Gujarat, a case involving remarkably similar facts.

Justice Jamdar observed that the Gujarat High Court had considered a situation where an externment order had likewise been issued against a citizen for participating in protests against decisions of the Union Government. The Gujarat High Court held that such circumstances could not legally justify externment and consequently set aside the order.

Finding the reasoning directly applicable, Justice Jamdar held that the principles laid down by both the Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin and the Gujarat High Court squarely governed the present dispute.

The reliance on these precedents strengthens the judgment’s doctrinal foundation by demonstrating that courts across jurisdictions have consistently viewed preventive restrictions on political protest with constitutional scepticism.

3. Externment is an extraordinary measure, not an ordinary administrative tool

The judgment also draws support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepak s/o Laxman Dongre v. State of Maharashtra, which characterised externment as an extraordinary measure because of its direct impact on an individual’s liberty and freedom of movement.

Justice Jamdar reiterated that externment cannot be treated as a routine administrative response to alleged misconduct.

Unlike ordinary criminal prosecution, an externment order effectively banishes an individual from a particular area, restricting movement, disrupting family life, employment and political participation. Such a drastic consequence necessarily demands strict compliance with statutory safeguards and close judicial scrutiny.

The Court’s reasoning reinforces the settled principle that preventive measures must remain exceptional. Administrative convenience or political sensitivity cannot dilute the high threshold established by law.

Externment orders quashed in their entirety

Having found that the statutory conditions under Section 56 were absent, that the authorities’ subjective satisfaction lacked evidentiary support, that the proceedings were vitiated by mala fides, and that the petitioner’s constitutional rights had been infringed, the Court allowed the writ petition in full.

Justice Jamdar quashed both the original externment order dated December 3, 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Chembur, Mumbai, as well as the appellate order dated March 27, 2026 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, thereby completely restoring the petitioner’s rights.

A judgment with wider constitutional significance

Although the immediate dispute concerned the externment of a single political activist, the judgment speaks to a much broader constitutional concern: the increasing use of preventive legal mechanisms against political dissent.

Externment laws were enacted to protect society from individuals whose conduct presents a demonstrable threat to public order or safety. They were never intended to become instruments for regulating political speech or discouraging public protest. Justice Jamdar’s decision restores that distinction.

By insisting that the statutory prerequisites under Section 56 must be established through objective material, by recognising the chilling effect of punitive action against protesters, and by reaffirming that Articles 19 and 21 protect not merely abstract liberties but the practical ability of citizens to oppose governmental decisions, the judgment reinforces a foundational constitutional principle—that democracy cannot function without dissent.

Read alongside the Court’s striking oral observations questioning attempts to criminalise protest, criticising the misuse of police powers, and cautioning against treating political opposition as a threat to public order, the decision stands as a robust reminder that constitutional governance demands tolerance of disagreement. Governments may disagree with protesters, investigate genuine criminality where it exists, and regulate assemblies in accordance with law, but they cannot employ extraordinary preventive powers to exile citizens simply because they challenge those in authority.

In doing so, the Bombay High Court has delivered a judgment that is likely to resonate well beyond the facts of this individual case, strengthening the constitutional jurisprudence on political dissent, preventive policing and the limits of executive power.

The complete judgment may be read below:

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Mob justice in Bengal? Mahua Moitra’s siege and the High Court’s constitutional message

The post Bombay HC condemns use of externment to silence political dissent; says opposition to government cannot be treated as a crime appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Telangana | Special Court for MPs/MLAs at Hyderabad acquitted MLA Raja Singh in a case registered under Sections 153A(a)(b), 295A, 504, 505(2) and 506 of the IPC.

Raja Singh was arrested by the Mangalhat Police. After the learned Magistrate declined to grant police remand, he…

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

The controversy that sparked nationwide outrage

The origins of the case can be traced to August 2022, when stand-up comedian Munawar Faruqui was scheduled to perform in Hyderabad. Raja Singh, then a BJP MLA representing the Goshamahal Assembly constituency, publicly opposed the event, accusing Faruqui of repeatedly insulting Hindu deities during his comedy performances. Anticipating possible law-and-order issues, the Hyderabad Police placed Singh under preventive house arrest on August 20, 2022, while providing extensive security arrangements to ensure that Faruqui’s performance could proceed peacefully.

Detailed report may be read here.

Within days, however, the controversy escalated dramatically. Raja Singh uploaded a video on his YouTube channel responding to Faruqui’s show. During the course of the video, he made a series of derogatory remarks concerning Prophet Muhammad, including references that many Muslims considered deeply offensive and blasphemous. The video spread rapidly across multiple social media platforms, provoking immediate condemnation from religious organisations, civil society groups and political leaders.

The remarks came at an especially sensitive time. Only weeks earlier, India had witnessed a diplomatic crisis after controversial comments about Prophet Muhammad by former BJP spokesperson Nupur Sharma had triggered protests across several countries and sharp criticism from governments in the Gulf and other Muslim-majority nations. Against this backdrop, Raja Singh’s statements were viewed as another flashpoint capable of inflaming already fragile communal relations.

Hyderabad witness widespread protests

Public anger against Raja Singh’s remarks was swift and intense. Thousands of people assembled across different parts of Hyderabad, particularly in the Old City, demanding his immediate arrest. Large demonstrations were organised outside the office of Hyderabad Police Commissioner C.V. Anand, while protest marches and public gatherings took place in several neighbourhoods including Shalibanda, Mangalhat and Charminar.

The protests continued for several days, with demonstrators alleging that repeated instances of hate speech by political leaders were being met with inadequate legal action. Protesters raised slogans, burnt effigies of Raja Singh and demanded strict criminal prosecution.

The demonstrations eventually turned volatile in certain areas. Reports indicated incidents of stone-pelting, clashes between sections of protesters and the police, and the use of baton charges by law enforcement to disperse crowds. Several protesters were detained. Authorities deployed additional police personnel, Rapid Action Force contingents and paramilitary forces to restore order. Educational institutions, commercial establishments and fuel stations in parts of Hyderabad remained closed as a precaution amid fears of communal violence.

The scale of the protests reflected the seriousness with which the Muslim community viewed the remarks and underscored the potential of inflammatory political speech to disturb public order in communally sensitive environments.

Criminal proceedings initiated

Following multiple complaints, the Mangalhat Police registered a criminal case against Raja Singh under several provisions of the Indian Penal Code dealing with communal hatred and public disorder.

The charges included:

• Section 153A IPC for promoting enmity between different religious groups;
• Section 295A IPC for deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings;
• Section 504 IPC for intentional insult likely to provoke breach of peace;
• Section 505(2) IPC for statements promoting hatred, enmity or ill-will between different communities; and
• Section 506 IPC relating to criminal intimidation.

These provisions constitute the principal statutory framework under which hate speech prosecutions have traditionally been pursued in India. Their application generally requires the prosecution to establish not merely that offensive words were spoken, but that the speech satisfied specific statutory ingredients such as deliberate intention, malicious conduct or promotion of communal hatred.

Arrest, release and preventive detention

Raja Singh was initially arrested on August 23, 2022. However, a magistrate declined to grant police custody owing to procedural deficiencies in the remand application, resulting in his release shortly thereafter.

The Hyderabad Police subsequently took the unusual step of invoking the Telangana Preventive Detention Act. On August 25, 2022, Singh was re-arrested under preventive detention on the ground that his repeated speeches and activities posed a continuing threat to public order and communal harmony.

The invocation of preventive detention against a sitting legislator attracted significant public attention. Preventive detention laws are ordinarily reserved for situations where authorities believe that ordinary criminal law is insufficient to prevent imminent threats to public order. Their use against an elected representative underscored the seriousness with which the administration viewed the potential consequences of Singh’s speeches.

Raja Singh remained in detention for approximately seventy-seven days before the Telangana High Court quashed the detention order in November 2022 and directed his release on bail.

BJP distances itself

The controversy also produced immediate political consequences. Within hours of Raja Singh’s arrest, the Bharatiya Janata Party suspended him from the party and issued a show-cause notice. The suspension came amid intense domestic and international scrutiny over inflammatory remarks concerning Prophet Muhammad by BJP leaders.

Party spokespersons publicly stated that the BJP did not endorse hate speech or statements capable of hurting religious sentiments. Political commentators widely viewed the suspension as an attempt to contain the growing controversy, particularly in light of the diplomatic fallout that had followed earlier controversies involving party spokespersons.

Despite the suspension, Raja Singh remained politically influential within Telangana. Before the 2023 Assembly elections, the BJP revoked his suspension, renominated him from Goshamahal, and he successfully retained his Assembly seat. In 2025, however, he resigned from the BJP following disagreements over the appointment of the Telangana state party president.

Trial before the Special Court

The criminal proceedings continued before the Special Court designated to hear cases involving Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assemblies.

Over the course of nearly four years, the prosecution examined witnesses, produced documentary material and relied upon recordings of the disputed speech. The defence, on the other hand, challenged both the evidentiary basis of the prosecution and the interpretation of the statements attributed to Raja Singh.

Following the judgment, as reported by ANI, defence counsel Advocate K. Karuna Sagar stated that the complainant himself had acknowledged during cross-examination that certain portions of the disputed speech referred to material found in Islamic literature. According to the defence, after evaluating the witness testimony and documentary evidence, the court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the ingredients of the alleged offences. The court consequently acquitted Raja Singh of all charges after holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

#WATCH | Hyderabad, Telangana: Karunasagar, High Court advocate says, “Today the Special MP/MLA Court has acquitted MLA Raja Singh from the 2022 case which was registered by PS Mangalat for allegedly commenting on the life of Prophet Muhammad. The complainant in the case has… https://t.co/Ds7zQyzt3U pic.twitter.com/YqltQwRjkE

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

Raja Singh’s response

Following the acquittal, while speaking to ANI, Raja Singh described the judgment as a “victory of truth, justice and the rule of law.”

He maintained that he had never intended to hurt the religious sentiments of any community and alleged that the criminal case, along with his preventive detention, had been initiated under political pressure exerted by the AIMIM upon the then Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) government.

He further claimed that several other criminal cases registered against him under successive governments were politically motivated and expressed confidence that he would eventually secure acquittal in those proceedings as well.

#WATCH | Hyderabad, Telangana: BJP MLA Raja Singh says, “A case was registered against me in 2022, alleging that I had made comments about someone’s deity; under pressure from the AIMIM, the then BRS government and police invoked the PD Act (Preventive Detention Act) and kept me… https://t.co/Ds7zQyzt3U pic.twitter.com/9EMfAnjsvE

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

A history of inflammatory speeches

Although acquitted in this particular prosecution, Raja Singh continues to remain one of India’s most controversial political figures because of his long history of inflammatory communal rhetoric.

Over the past decade, numerous FIRs have been registered against him alleging hate speech, promotion of communal enmity and incitement. His speeches have frequently targeted Muslims and other minority communities and have repeatedly attracted criticism from civil society organisations and human rights groups.

On July 16, 2024, Citizens for Justice and Peace sent three separate complaints to relevant authorities of Maharashtra against three separate incidents of hate speeches delivered by BJP MLA Raja Singh in the month of May. In all the three incidents highlighted in the complaint, BJP MLA Raja Singh can be heard delivered provocative and inflammatory statements against the Muslim community at events organised by the Sakal Hindu Samaj.  Details may be read here.

A dedicated profile of Raja Singh may be viewed here.

The broader legal questions

The acquittal illustrates one of the most persistent challenges in hate speech litigation in India. Public outrage, widespread protests or even deeply offensive speech do not automatically translate into criminal conviction. Criminal courts remain bound by the foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence, requiring the prosecution to establish every element of the alleged offences beyond reasonable doubt through admissible evidence.

At the same time, the judgment should not be understood as judicial approval of the speech itself. The court’s conclusion is confined to the evidence presented during trial and the prosecution’s inability to satisfy the high evidentiary threshold required for conviction under the Indian Penal Code.

The case therefore exposes a broader structural issue within India’s legal framework. Existing provisions such as Sections 153A and 295A IPC—now substantially reflected in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita—continue to be the principal statutory tools used to prosecute hate speech.

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The post From Outrage to Acquittal: The Raja Singh hate speech case comes to a close appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a significant interim order passed by Justice S.R. Krishna Kumar at the Kalaburagi Bench, the Court stayed the endorsement issued by the Basavakalyan Tehsildar refusing permission for the event. However, while allowing the convention to proceed, the Court carefully moulded the relief by placing strict conditions upon both the organisers and the invited religious leader whose proposed participation had triggered the controversy.

Most notably, the Court directed that Kaneri Mutt seer Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji may physically attend the event but shall not deliver any speech whatsoever, either personally or through any other individual. The restriction addresses the very basis on which the State had denied permission, namely the apprehension that his speech could provoke communal disharmony and disturb law and order.

State’s refusal based on anticipated law-and-order concerns

The petition was filed by the President of the Samavesha Utsava Samiti, challenging the Tehsildar’s endorsement dated, June 11 refusing permission for the proposed convention. Along with an accompanying procession to be held at either the Akkamahadevi College premises or the Basaveshwara ITI Auditorium.

The State justified its refusal by pointing to the invited seer’s previous public statements, alleging that he had repeatedly used derogatory, insulting and provocative language against the Lingayat community and followers of Basavanna. According to the authorities, those statements had previously led to widespread protests and objections from several Lingayat organisations, including the Karnataka Lingayat Mathadhipatigala Okkoota and the Basavanpura Association.

Given this background, the administration expressed apprehension that permitting both the event and the seer’s speech could result in serious disturbances and communal unrest.

Advocate General highlights existing injunction against seer

Appearing for the State, Advocate General Shashikiran Shetty argued before the High Court that the authorities’ concerns were not speculative but were founded upon the seer’s previous conduct.

The State further pointed out that there already exists an interim injunction restraining the seer from making defamatory statements against members of the Lingayat community. In light of that background, the Advocate General submitted that allowing the seer to publicly address a large gathering carried a substantial risk of triggering confrontation between rival religious groups and disrupting public peace.

Organisers and seer offer undertakings before Court

During the proceedings, as per LiveLaw, the High Court sought assurances from both the organisers and the invited seer.

Pursuant to the Court’s earlier directions issued on June 18, separate affidavits were filed by the organising committee and Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji. The organisers undertook to conduct the programme peacefully, ensure compliance with any conditions imposed by the authorities, and cooperate in maintaining public order.

The seer, for his part, furnished an unconditional undertaking that he would neither deliver a speech himself nor communicate any speech indirectly through another person during the programme. These undertakings ultimately became central to the Court’s decision.

Court permits event but removes the source of apprehension

After considering the affidavits and rival submissions, the Court concluded that the principal apprehension expressed by the State related to the possibility of inflammatory speeches rather than the mere holding of the religious gathering itself.

Justice Krishna Kumar observed that the categorical undertaking furnished by the seer substantially addressed the concerns which had prompted the authorities to reject permission in the first place.

Accordingly, while staying the Tehsildar’s endorsement refusing permission, the Court allowed the convention to proceed subject to carefully crafted safeguards intended to preserve public order.

In doing so, the Court effectively separated the constitutional right to hold a peaceful assembly from the specific activity that the State feared might trigger violence.

Strict conditions imposed

The High Court made it clear that its permission was neither unconditional nor absolute. Among the most significant conditions imposed are:

• Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji may remain physically present at the convention but shall not make any speech or address the gathering either directly or indirectly.
• Attendance at the programme shall not exceed 2,500 persons.
• No procession shall be conducted before or after the programme.
• No participant shall deliver hate speech or make statements capable of disturbing communal harmony or public order.
• No abusive language or insults directed at any political leader, religious leader, religious denomination or ethnic community shall be permitted.
• Any breach of these conditions would expose the organisers to legal consequences and liability.

The Court also took note of the State’s submission regarding limited police deployment and observed that restricting the gathering and prohibiting a procession would assist in ensuring adequate maintenance of law and order.

Judicial balancing between fundamental rights and public order

The interim order illustrates the judiciary’s attempt to reconcile two competing constitutional considerations. On one hand lies the right to peacefully assemble and organise religious or public events, protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. On the other lies the State’s constitutional obligation to maintain public order and prevent violence, particularly where previous incidents and existing judicial orders indicate a real possibility of inflammatory speech leading to communal tensions.

Instead of either completely prohibiting the event or allowing it without restriction, the High Court adopted a narrowly tailored approach. By permitting the gathering while restraining the individual whose speech constituted the primary source of concern, the Court sought to preserve constitutional freedoms without ignoring legitimate public-order considerations. The order therefore reflects an exercise in judicial balancing rather than an endorsement of unrestricted executive discretion or an absolute assertion of free speech.

Significance of the order

The case also demonstrates that while prior restraints on speech are generally viewed with constitutional caution, courts may be willing to impose narrowly framed restrictions in exceptional circumstances where there exists credible material suggesting an imminent threat to public order.

Equally significant is the Court’s insistence that no participant, not merely the invited seer, shall engage in hate speech or make statements targeting political figures, religious leaders or communities. By extending responsibility to the organisers themselves, the Court reinforces the principle that those conducting large public gatherings bear a corresponding obligation to ensure that constitutional freedoms are exercised responsibly and without endangering communal harmony.

The matter has been directed to be listed again on July 1, 2026, when the High Court will consider the case further while the interim protection granted to the organisers continues to operate subject to the conditions imposed.

The complete order may be read below:

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The post Karnataka HC allows Hindu convention but bars invitee seer from speaking to prevent law-and-order concerns appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Almost immediately after Additional District and Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced the accused to life imprisonment, on June 12, 2026, the focus of public discourse shifted away from the evidence, the findings of the court and the legal reasoning contained in the judgment. Instead, the controversy was deliberately reframed around the religious identity of the judge. Rather than questioning the correctness of the verdict through legal argument, sections of the cow vigilante movement, Hindutva organisations and right-wing commentators portrayed the decision as the product of the judge’s Muslim identity. The result was the systematic communalisation of an ordinary criminal proceeding.

As reported by Newslaundry, the atmosphere outside the courtroom became tense immediately after the judgment was pronounced. Family members of the convicted men protested as the police began taking the convicts into custody. Relatives reportedly lay down in front of police vehicles in an attempt to prevent their transportation. According to Hazari Lal Gurjar, President of the local Bar Association, it was during these immediate protests that the issue first began to acquire a communal colour. What had begun as emotional reactions by the families of convicted persons quickly transformed into a larger narrative portraying the judgment itself as an attack on Hindus because the presiding judge happened to be Muslim.

The shift was significant. Criminal courts are expected to determine guilt on the basis of evidence placed before them. The personal religion, caste or background of a judge has no legal relevance to the adjudicatory process. Yet, rather than engaging with the court’s findings regarding unlawful assembly, common object, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and the brutality of the assault, attention rapidly shifted towards Judge Khan herself. In effect, the messenger of justice became more important than the message.

Background of the judgment

Before discussing the communal campaign against Judge Tabassum Khan, it is important to understand the significance of the judgment itself. The controversy did not arise in a legal vacuum. It followed a detailed trial concerning the brutal lynching of Nazir Ahmed, who was attacked while transporting cattle through Madhya Pradesh in August 2022. After examining eyewitness testimonies, medical evidence, forensic reports, recoveries made during investigation and other documentary material, the Sessions Court concluded that the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The court held that the accused had formed an unlawful assembly, intercepted the vehicle, violently assaulted the victims with deadly weapons and were collectively responsible for the murder of Nazir Ahmed and the attempted murder of the two surviving victims.

In a significant aspect of the judgment, Additional District and Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan expressly recognised the offence as one of mob lynching, observing that the prosecution had successfully established that the accused had acted as members of an unlawful assembly and had committed a brutal act of collective violence. While considering the question of sentence, the Court treated the mob nature of the crime as an aggravating circumstance. It emphasised the exceptional brutality of the assault, the fatal injuries inflicted upon Nazir Ahmed, the serious injuries suffered by the surviving victims, and the fact that the accused had acted in concert while armed with deadly weapons. The judgment thus acknowledged not merely the commission of murder but the distinct menace posed by vigilante violence carried out by organised groups.

The Court nevertheless declined to impose the death penalty. Relying on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, Machi Singh v. State of Punjab and Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (or as cited in the judgment, Santosh Kumar Singh), Judge Khan held that the case did not satisfy the stringent “rarest of rare” threshold governing capital punishment. Instead, the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment for murder under Sections 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, along with separate sentences for rioting and the attempted murder of the surviving victims. The judgment thus represented a careful application of settled criminal law principles, balancing the gravity of the offence with the constitutional limitations governing the imposition of the death penalty. Most crucially, it upheld the path of reformative rather than retributive justice.

Far from being an arbitrary or summary decision, the verdict was a reasoned judicial determination running through the evidence in considerable detail. Yet, rather than engaging with the Court’s legal reasoning or challenging its findings before the appellate courts, the public discourse surrounding the case rapidly shifted away from the judgment itself. The evidence, legal analysis and findings of the trial court were overshadowed by a campaign that sought to question the verdict on the basis of the religious identity of the judge, setting the stage for one of the most disturbing instances of communal targeting of a serving judicial officer in recent years.

The detailed report may be read here.

Organised protests and the manufacture of a communal narrative

What initially appeared to be local dissatisfaction soon evolved into a coordinated campaign extending beyond the district in which the trial had taken place. Reports published by Newslaundry, Siasat and other news organisations indicate that several self-described cow protection organisations and Hindutva groups organised protests condemning the verdict, not primarily on legal grounds but by questioning the religious identity and impartiality of the judge.

Among the most visible organisations participating in these protests was the Gau Raksha Parishad. Demonstrations were organised in which effigies of Judge Tabassum Khan were publicly burnt while slogans branding her “anti-Hindu” were raised. Rather than calling for appellate review of the judgment, the demonstrations sought to portray the conviction itself as an act of religious discrimination against Hindus. The symbolism of burning a judge’s effigy represented a significant escalation from criticism of a judicial decision to the personal targeting of a serving judicial officer.

According to Newslaundry, these demonstrations did not remain confined to Madhya Pradesh. On June 22, members of Gau Raksha Parishad organised a ‘protest’ in Peer Muchalla in Mohali, Punjab, where demonstrators burned an effigy of Judge Khan while shouting slogans demanding the release of the convicted men. Similar protests were subsequently reported from Uttar Pradesh, where members of the Antarrashtriya Hindu Parishad-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal staged demonstrations against the judgment inside government premises! Authorities in that state allowed these unchecked. The geographical spread of these ‘protests’ suggested that the issue had acquired national dimensions, fuelled largely through coordinated organisational and social media mobilisation rather than any fresh legal developments in the case. As significantly, they signified powerful political patronage behind the acts.

Equally revealing was the language adopted by many protesters. Instead of describing the judgment as legally incorrect or identifying alleged errors in the appreciation of evidence, the demonstrations repeatedly referred to Judge Khan’s religion. Her Muslim identity became the principal basis upon which the legitimacy of the judgment was questioned. This represented a dangerous inversion of constitutional values. Judicial decisions are meant to be evaluated through legal reasoning, not through the religious identity of the individual delivering them.

Social media as a vehicle for intimidation

The campaign rapidly migrated from public demonstrations to social media, where it assumed an even more disturbing form. An extensive online campaign filled with communal abuse, personal attacks and threats directed specifically at Judge Khan.

Numerous social media posts reportedly described her as “anti-Hindu” and questioned her ability to dispense impartial justice because she was Muslim. Others employed openly derogatory communal slurs directed at Muslim women. These posts did not merely criticise the verdict; they sought to delegitimise Judge Khan’s authority as a judicial officer by reducing her identity to her religion. Gender dimensions of targeted majoritarian abuse have been increasingly common phenomenon witnessed by Muslim women in public life at multiple levels.

Several videos circulated widely across social media platforms, amplifying these narratives before large audiences. One of the most disturbing videos reportedly featured an individual using deeply offensive communal language while referring to the judge and warning that there would be a “bloodbath” if the convicted men were not released within ten days. The individual threatened violence extending beyond Madhya Pradesh and attempted to portray the judicial verdict as justification for communal mobilisation.

Judge: ADJ Tabassum Khan

14 गौ रक्षकों को सुनाई उमर क़ैद की सजा

ADJ Tabassum Khan जैसे लोग कितना भी
पढ़ ले मक़सद इनका एक ही रहता है हिंदू काफिर है

जो पहले अपने मजबह को देखते बाद में संविधान
को वो कभी न्याय नहीं कर सकते

हिंदुओं ऐसे लोगो से देश से भगाना जरूरी है pic.twitter.com/mNHeVWSbvQ

— Amrendra Bahubali (@TheBahubali_IND) June 17, 2026

Hindutva Scum calls for killing of a judge who sent 7 criminals to jail for lynching a Muslim

Instead of arresting the scum,MHA
Cyber Cell sent me a notice to remove the video or face action

Only in India,a criminal goes scot free while the whistleblower faces intimidation pic.twitter.com/VKcLJRLUDL

— Nehr_who? (@Nher_who) June 26, 2026

Another widely circulated video showed a self-described cow protector standing beside a truck transporting cattle. Rather than discussing the legal findings of the Sessions Court, he argued that cow protection groups should no longer intercept vehicles because those who had done so in the present case had been sentenced to life imprisonment. He went further by declaring that Judge Tabassum Khan would have to reverse her decision and called upon cow protection groups from Agra and other regions to organise protests against her.

Such statements represented an outright attack on India’s constitutional structure governing criminal justice. Judicial orders are not reversed because of public demonstrations or threats of violence. They are challenged through appeals before superior courts. The repeated demands that the judge herself “reverse” the judgment fundamentally misunderstood—and arguably rejected—the institutional framework of the Indian judiciary.

Amplification by influential public figures

The controversy received additional momentum when influential right-wing personalities publicly endorsed the campaign against the judgment. Among the most prominent was Sudarshan News editor Suresh Chavhanke.

14 गौ रक्षकों को उम्रक़ैद.. जज तबस्सुम ख़ान के फैसले पर न्याय संग्राम

देखें #बिंदास_बोल मेरे साथ @DrMohanYadav51 https://t.co/4gJZkzlUfh

— Dr. Suresh Chavhanke “Sudarshan News” (@SureshChavhanke) June 19, 2026

As reported by Newslaundry, Chavhanke described the Sessions Court’s judgment as “judicial lynching” during a televised programme. Declaring his solidarity with the convicted men and their families, he stated: “We stand with all the gau-rakshaks and their families. This fight is not yours alone; it is ours too.”

The significance of such statements lies not merely in their criticism of the verdict but in the authority and reach of the platform from which they were delivered. When prominent media personalities portray judicial decisions as manifestations of religious bias without engaging with the reasoning contained in the judgment, they contribute to the erosion of public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. Such narratives risk encouraging audiences to view judges not as neutral adjudicators but as representatives of religious communities.

Police intervention and criminal investigation

As the campaign intensified, law enforcement authorities eventually intervened. According to Newslaundry, the Seoni Malwa Police registered a First Information Report after taking suo- motu cognisance of the communal and threatening material circulating online.

Station House Officer Sudhakar Bhaskar confirmed that the FIR had been registered against individuals responsible for communal posts and videos under relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. He further stated that the cyber cell had been tasked with identifying the origin of the viral videos, tracing those responsible for their circulation and continuously monitoring social media platforms for additional inflammatory content.

The registration of the FIR reflected official recognition that the controversy had moved beyond ordinary criticism of a judicial verdict. The campaign contained elements capable of promoting communal hostility, intimidating a judicial officer and potentially disturbing public order. Police intervention therefore became necessary not to suppress legitimate criticism but to investigate conduct that allegedly crossed the threshold into criminal intimidation and hate speech.

Concern within the legal community

The developments also generated widespread concern among members of the legal fraternity. Hazari Lal Gurjar, President of the Bar Association, questioned why stronger institutional measures had not been initiated despite the communal targeting of a serving judicial officer. Speaking to Newslaundry, he expressed concern that a woman judge was facing communal abuse, gendered insults and threats of violence while the higher judiciary had not initiated suo motu contempt proceedings or taken more visible action to protect judicial independence.

Former Chief Judicial Magistrate Pawan Kumar similarly emphasised that the rule of law provides an established remedy for any litigant dissatisfied with a judgment. The correctness of judicial decisions is examined by appellate courts through structured legal procedures, not by personal attacks directed at judges. Public confidence in the judiciary depends upon preserving this distinction.

Several lawyers also reportedly observed that many of those criticising the judgment had not actually read it. According to Advocate Sumit Gehlot, quoted by Newslaundry, much of the outrage appeared to stem from hearsay rather than any informed engagement with the evidence analysed by the court.

Senior Congress leader Pawan Khera also spoke out on social media in support of Judge Tabassum Khan, and said “On June 12, 2026, First Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced seven men to life imprisonment for the 2022 lynching of Najir Ahmed. All the convicts are indeed Hindu men. But they were not convicted because of their religion; they were convicted because the investigation found them guilty of rioting, attempted murder and murder. Yet our Hindu brother in the video is not outraged by their behaviour. His outrage is reserved for one fact alone: that the judge who convicted them is a Muslim woman. In any civilised society, such bigotry would invite swift legal action. In Modi’s India, however, this man spewing hate walks free while notices are sent to those questioning his conduct. Jai ho!”

On June 12, 2026, First Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced seven men to life imprisonment for the 2022 lynching of Najir Ahmed.

All the convicts are indeed Hindu men. But they were not convicted because of their religion; they were convicted because the… https://t.co/xzccM88CHv

— Pawan Khera ಪವನ್ ಖೇರಾ (@Pawankhera) June 26, 2026

An attack on judicial independence

The events following Judge Tabassum Khan’s verdict raise constitutional concerns extending far beyond the facts of one criminal case. Judicial independence forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution and requires judges to decide cases without fear, favour, affection or ill will. This principle necessarily includes protection from organised campaigns of communal intimidation.

Public criticism of judicial decisions is entirely legitimate in a constitutional democracy. Courts are not immune from scrutiny, and judgments are frequently debated, criticised and overturned by appellate courts. However, there exists a profound distinction between criticising judicial reasoning and attacking a judge because of her religion.

The campaign against Judge Khan sought to erase this distinction. Rather than analysing the evidence relied upon by the Sessions Court or identifying legal errors warranting appellate interference, sections of the protest movement suggested that the judgment itself lacked legitimacy because it had been authored by a Muslim judge. Such narratives threaten to transform the judiciary into another arena of communal polarisation, where judicial authority depends not upon constitutional office but upon religious identity.

The implications extend well beyond one individual judge. If judges are made to fear organised campaigns of vilification whenever they deliver decisions against politically influential groups, the independence of the judiciary itself is weakened. The message conveyed is that legal reasoning may become secondary to identity-based mobilisation and that adverse judgments may invite not merely appeals but sustained communal intimidation. In a legal system governed by the rule of law, judges must be assessed on the strength of their reasoning and the legality of their decisions; not on the basis of their religion, gender or personal identity. Preserving that principle is essential not only for the safety of individual judges but for maintaining public confidence in the impartial administration of justice itself.

Related:

Mob lynching: Three separate incidents surface, even minors and partially disabled Muslims not safe

Another cow lynching in Nashik, one dead

Maharashtra’s shame: Cow lynching episode reported in Nashik

Allahabad HC points out misuse of cow slaughter law

K’taka: Bail to cow vigilante, Puneeth Kerehalli, accused of killing Muslim man

Cow vigilantism casts its ugly shadow on Maharashtra

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The post Judging the Judge: The communal backlash against a lynching verdict appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As public criticism mounted, the Government maintained that the clarification represented no change in legal position. Rather, officials asserted that passports had never been proof of citizenship. Quoting the statutory scheme of the Passports Act, officials argued that the Act itself contemplates the issuance of passports and travel documents to certain categories of non-citizens and therefore possession of a passport cannot constitute conclusive proof of citizenship. Government officials further justified their position by relying upon a 2013 judgment of the Bombay High Court, asserting that the Court had already held that a passport is not proof of citizenship. As reported by The Times of India, an official stated:

“It was not decided yesterday that the passport is not proof of citizenship. It was not even decided in the last 12 years. The passport has never been a proof of citizenship. Passports Act 1967 says that passports can be given to non-citizens. Judgments of Bombay HC from 2013 have also made it clear a passport is not proof of citizenship.”

The same report explained that the Government’s position rested upon two propositions: first, that the Passports Act allows passports or travel documents to be issued in limited situations to non-citizens; and secondly, that the Bombay High Court had recognised that possession of a passport cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of citizenship. Similar explanations appeared in media coverage by The Hindu, The Indian Express and other national newspapers, many of which reproduced the Government’s reliance on the Bombay High Court decision.

Even at first glance, the official explanation is not persuasive. The Times of India report itself mentions that the passport issued was subsequently terminated, suggesting that this case needs to be looked at in its specificity and is not illustrative. Sabrangindia has accessed the hitherto unavailable, unreported 2013 judgement (see below). A closer examination of both the statutory framework and the Bombay High Court judgment reveals that the legal position is considerably more nuanced. More importantly, it raises the question whether the Government has relied upon the Bombay High Court decision for a proposition that the Court itself never decided.

The statutory scheme of the Passports Act, 1967

The Passports Act, 1967 was enacted “to provide for the issue of passports and travel documents, to regulate the departure from India of citizens of India and other persons and for matters incidental or ancillary thereto.” The title of the Act itself demonstrates that Parliament recognised that travel documentation may occasionally be issued not only to Indian citizens but also to “other persons.”

This distinction is significant. The Act governs travel documentation, whereas citizenship is regulated independently by the Citizenship Act, 1955. The two enactments undoubtedly operate in different legal spheres. A passport is issued under one statute; citizenship is acquired, determined and regulated under another.

However, it does not necessarily follow that because a statute permits the issuance of travel documents to certain categories of non-citizens, every passport issued under the Act loses all evidentiary value regarding citizenship. The Government’s argument conflates two distinct legal propositions.

The first proposition, that citizenship is determined under the Citizenship Act, is unquestionably correct.

The second proposition, that a passport therefore has no evidentiary significance regarding citizenship, does not automatically follow from the first.

The Passports Act envisages exceptional circumstances in which travel documentation may be issued to non-citizens, such as certificates of identity, emergency certificates and other recognised travel documents issued in accordance with domestic law and international obligations. These exceptional statutory situations cannot be used to erase the ordinary legal presumption that accompanies the issuance of a passport to an Indian citizen after verification by the Passport Authority. The existence of exceptions does not determine the legal character of the general rule.

Indeed, the very process prescribed under the Passports Act and the Passport Rules demonstrates that issuance of a passport ordinarily follows verification of the applicant’s identity, nationality and supporting documents. While this verification may not amount to a judicial determination of citizenship, it would be equally incorrect to suggest that the exercise is legally meaningless or that a valid passport carries no evidentiary weight whatsoever.

The Bombay High Court Judgment: What did the court actually decide?

The Government’s principal judicial authority for its present position is the Bombay High Court’s decision in Anwar Hussain Abdul Kadar Shaikh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2013). The judgment, delivered by Justice K.U. Chandiwal in July 2013, has been cited in official explanations as establishing that “a passport is not proof of citizenship.”

A careful reading of the judgment, however, reveals something quite different. The applicants had been convicted under the Foreigners Act and the Passport (Entry into India) Rules. Before the High Court, they sought to rely upon several documents—including passports, Aadhaar cards and a birth certificate—to establish that they were Indian citizens. Their principal submission was that these documents had not been produced before the trial court and therefore the matter ought to be remanded for reconsideration.

The High Court declined to interfere. Crucially, however, the Court did not reject the passport because passports are incapable of evidencing citizenship. Instead, it rejected reliance on the particular passport produced before it because the passport had already been terminated.

The Court expressly observed:

“However, the passport to which the learned Counsel gave reference is already terminated passport. Therefore, no legal basis can be achieved for its reliance.” (Para 3)

This sentence constitutes the heart of the judgment. The Court’s reasoning was document-specific. It was not analysing the evidentiary value of a valid passport. Rather, it held that a passport whose legal validity had already been terminated could no longer furnish a legal basis for establishing citizenship.

The Court thereafter turned to the remaining documentary evidence. It observed that although one applicant had produced a birth certificate, the statutory requirements governing citizenship by birth had not been satisfied because no evidence had been adduced establishing that the applicant’s parents were Indian citizens. Consequently, the applicants had failed to discharge the evidentiary burden necessary to establish citizenship under the Citizenship Act.

The judgment therefore rests upon two independent factual conclusions. First, the passport relied upon had already been terminated. Secondly, the applicants had otherwise failed to establish citizenship through admissible documentary evidence.

Neither finding amounts to a declaration that all valid passports are legally incapable of evidencing citizenship.

Why the termination of the passport matters

The fact that the passport had already been terminated is not an incidental factual detail; it is the central reason why the Court declined to rely upon it.

Section 10 of the Passports Act empowers the Passport Authority to vary, impound or revoke a passport in specified circumstances. A passport may be revoked where it has been obtained by fraud, suppression of material information or misrepresentation; where the holder has ceased to be an Indian citizen; where criminal proceedings are pending; where the holder has contravened the provisions of the Act or the conditions subject to which the passport was issued; or where revocation is considered necessary in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or the interests of the general public. Once a passport is revoked or terminated under the statutory framework, it ceases to enjoy the legal validity that attaches to a subsisting passport.

This distinction fundamentally alters the significance of the Bombay High Court’s reasoning. The Court was not confronted with a valid passport issued and continuing under the statutory scheme. It was confronted with a passport whose legal efficacy had already been extinguished. Unsurprisingly, the Court held that “no legal basis” existed for relying upon such a document.

To extend this reasoning to conclude that every valid passport issued by the Government of India is incapable of evidencing citizenship is to read the judgment far beyond its factual and legal context.

Reading the judgment beyond its ratio

It is a settled principle of judicial precedent that a decision is authority only for what it actually decides. Courts have repeatedly cautioned against extracting broad legal propositions from judgments without regard to the factual matrix in which they were rendered.

Measured against this principle, the Government’s reliance on Anwar Hussain appears to stretch the judgment beyond its actual ratio. The High Court never analysed whether a valid passport constitutes prima facie evidence of citizenship. It never considered the evidentiary status of passports issued after statutory verification. Nor did it hold that a valid passport can never be relied upon in citizenship proceedings. Those questions simply did not arise because the passport before the Court had already been terminated.

The judgment therefore establishes a much narrower proposition than the one presently attributed to it. It holds only that a terminated passport, coupled with an independent failure to establish citizenship through other admissible evidence, cannot justify interference with a conviction under the Foreigners Act.

The distinction is not merely semantic. It goes to the very heart of the ongoing debate. The Government’s recent clarification has transformed a fact-specific judicial determination into a sweeping proposition of general application. Such an interpretation risks attributing to the Bombay High Court a legal conclusion that it neither articulated nor was required to decide. If the Government seeks to argue that a valid passport should not be treated as proof of citizenship, that proposition must stand on its own statutory and constitutional foundations. It cannot fairly derive unquestioned authority from a judgment that dealt with an already terminated passport and a complete absence of supporting evidence establishing citizenship.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

Rejected as Voter, also denied a Passport? Here is how ‘New India’ deals with exclusion complaints under SIR: Former editor, Telegraph, R Rajagopal

EXCLUSIVE: Bulk FIRs targets Assamese Indians through Passport Act cases, new assault on Citizenship rights: Assam

HRDA condemns U’khand police’s plan to deny passport for “anti-national” social media posts

Backdoor NPR-NRC? Parents DOB for KYC; great grandfather’s address for passport re-issue

Judgement delivered, paradox prevails: every voter a citizen, but what is the fate of 51.8 million excluded?

Sleeping under an Open Sky on No-Man’s Land: Two Children, Ten Lives, and the Machinery of Exclusion

The post Not What the Court Decided: Re-reading the Bombay High Court’s passport judgment appeared first on SabrangIndia.

That challenge from citizens has now reached the Bombay High Court. This week, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and the Forum Against Oppression of Women filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Special Public Safety Act (MSPSA), contending that the law violates fundamental constitutional guarantees and grants excessive, unchecked powers to the executive. The challenge marks the beginning of a legal test for a legislation that has generated sustained opposition from civil liberties organisations, trade unions, academics, lawyers, students’ groups, political parties and democratic rights movements across Maharashtra.

Importantly, many of the arguments now being advanced before the High Court closely mirror concerns that were repeatedly raised during the legislative process itself. Among the organisations that consistently opposed the legislation was Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), which submitted detailed objections to the Joint Select Committee examining the then Bill, participated in the broader state-wide campaign against the legislation, and warned that the law’s vague provisions could become a tool for suppressing dissent rather than addressing genuine security threats.

A constitutional challenge to the heart of the law

According to the petition filed before the High Court, the Act suffers from a fundamental constitutional defect: it authorises severe restrictions on freedoms of speech, expression, association and assembly without incorporating the procedural safeguards that constitutional jurisprudence requires when the State seeks to limit such rights.

The petition argues that the law violates Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution and undermines broader constitutional principles of liberty, equality and democratic participation. It further contends that the Act creates a framework through which organisations can be declared unlawful on the basis of broad executive discretion, while insulating those decisions from meaningful scrutiny.

Particularly significant is the challenge to the Act’s definitions of “unlawful activity” and “unlawful organisation.” According to the petitioners, these definitions are so broad and vague that they can potentially encompass trade unions, social movements, human rights organisations, political opposition groups and individuals engaged in peaceful dissent.

The challenge therefore strikes at the central architecture of the legislation rather than merely isolated provisions. It asks whether a law ostensibly enacted to combat extremism can constitutionally employ language so expansive that ordinary democratic activity may fall within its ambit.

A warning raised long before the Act was passed

The constitutional challenge did not emerge in a vacuum. For months before the legislation was enacted, Maharashtra witnessed one of the most extensive civil society mobilisations against a proposed law in recent memory. More than 12,750 objections and suggestions were reportedly submitted to the Joint Select Committee examining the Bill, making it one of the largest public responses ever received by the Maharashtra legislature. More than ninety percent of the submissions reportedly opposed the legislation.

Citizens for Justice and Peace was among the organisations at the forefront of this campaign. In April 2025, CJP submitted a detailed objection memorandum to the Joint Select Committee, warning that the legislation posed a serious threat to constitutional freedoms and democratic dissent. CJP argued that the Bill’s framing around the idea of “Urban Naxalism” rested on an inherently vague and politically charged concept that lacked clear legal meaning. Significantly, the organisation pointed out that the Union Ministry of Home Affairs itself had previously stated that it does not use the term “urban naxal” as an official category in dealing with Left-Wing Extremism. CJP warned that a law justified through such an indeterminate concept risked becoming a mechanism for targeting journalists, activists, artists, civil society organisations and political critics rather than genuine security threats.

Today, many of those concerns have reappeared in the constitutional challenge before the High Court.

The battle over “unlawful activity”

One of the most striking parallels between the writ petition and earlier civil society objections concerns the Act’s definition of unlawful activity.

The petition before the High Court argues that the definition is overbroad and vague, allowing the State to invoke the law against a wide range of lawful democratic activities.

CJP’s earlier objections had similarly focused on Section 2(f), arguing that phrases such as conduct that creates a “danger or menace to public order” were left undefined and provided no clear legal standards. According to CJP, terms such as “menace” were capable of subjective interpretation and could permit authorities to categorise ordinary activities as unlawful according to their discretion. The concern was not merely semantic. Constitutional law has long recognised that vague criminal provisions create opportunities for arbitrary enforcement. When citizens cannot reasonably determine what conduct is prohibited, enforcement becomes dependent on the discretion of the executive rather than the rule of law.

That concern now sits at the centre of the High Court challenge.

The question of executive power

The writ petition also challenges the breadth of powers conferred upon the State government to declare organisations unlawful. Again, this reflects a recurring theme in earlier objections raised by civil liberties groups.

CJP argued that the proposed framework granted extraordinary authority to the executive while providing inadequate independent oversight. It questioned the composition of the Advisory Board established under the legislation, noting that members need only be qualified for appointment as High Court judges rather than serving judicial officers. Because appointments are ultimately controlled by the government itself, CJP warned that the mechanism lacked sufficient institutional independence. The broader concern was that a law designed to regulate political organisations and associations should not depend primarily upon executive opinion.

The constitutional challenge now similarly questions whether the legislation creates a system in which governmental discretion is insufficiently constrained by objective standards and procedural safeguards.

Existing laws already covered the field

Another criticism repeatedly advanced by opponents of the legislation was that Maharashtra already possessed an extensive arsenal of security laws.

CJP argued that provisions dealing with terrorism, organised crime, unlawful activities and threats to national security already exist through laws such as the UAPA, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act. It questioned why an additional statute with even broader powers was necessary at all. The constitutional challenge raises a related issue. If existing criminal law already addresses violent extremism and organised criminal activity, what precisely justifies a separate law empowering the State to declare organisations unlawful through broad and vaguely worded standards?

This question becomes especially important because the Act itself repeatedly invokes concerns regarding Left-Wing Extremism while failing to define key terms such as “naxalism” or “left-wing extremist” within its operative provisions.

A state-wide democratic resistance

The present litigation is also the culmination of a much broader political and civic campaign. In April 2025, protests against the Bill were organised across Maharashtra, bringing together civil liberties organisations, workers’ groups, farmers’ organisations, students’ groups, political parties and grassroots movements. Demonstrations took place across dozens of districts and reflected an unusually broad coalition united by concerns regarding civil liberties and democratic freedoms.

CJP played a visible role in that mobilisation, participating in a wider coalition that argued the legislation threatened constitutionally protected rights of speech, association, assembly and protest. The campaign consistently maintained that the law’s vague language created the risk that peaceful political opposition could be conflated with threats to public security. The filing of the writ petition therefore represents not the beginning of resistance to the law, but the latest stage of a struggle that has been unfolding for over a year. The formal objections raised by CJP have been detailed and may be perused here.

Why the High Court’s decision matters

The challenge before the Bombay High Court extends beyond the future of a single state law. At its core lies a constitutional question that has repeatedly confronted Indian courts: how far can the State go in the name of security before constitutional freedoms are impermissibly compromised?

The petition asks whether a law can authorise severe consequences, including the declaration of organisations as unlawful, through definitions that have been described as vague, subjective and susceptible to political misuse. It raises concerns about executive overreach, procedural fairness, access to justice and the protection of democratic dissent.

For organisations such as Citizens for Justice and Peace, the issue has never been whether the State can act against genuine violence or armed insurgency. Rather, the concern has been whether legislation drafted in the language of security can ultimately be deployed against lawful political activity.

The complete dissent note by CJP may be read here.

Detailed reports may be read here, here and here.

Related:

Public Resistance and Democratic Assertion: India through protests, 2025

Dissent Note: The alarming scope of Maharashtra’s Special Public Safety Bill, 2024

Censorship After NEET: A substitute for accountability

The Supreme Court in 2025: When procedure trumped principle

Assam, the third state to pass UCC: Gender justice or targeted communalism the aim?

The post From Protest to Petition: Maharashtra’s Public Safety Act in the dock appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In January 2026, CJP had documented in detail this phenomenon, a report that had been used widely in the public interest litigation that resulted in the May 2026 judgement. That detailed exploration may be read here. In all the documented cases, the photos and videos of accused were shot and shared on social media to embarrass them further. In essence, the police started a social trial against the accused and violated their dignity.

Defining public shaming could be a tricky task as it manifests itself in various forms. It could be through sharing photos online, parading in public, making accused do undignified acts, or simply—by publicly flogging the accused. However, the essence of the act remains, i.e., humiliating or punishing the accused in a manner that in the eyes of society they turn into criminals before the Court pronounces them to be so.

Public shaming does not refer to a single act of physical or mental torture but instead is a broader term wherein the accused is ridiculed (by being publicly paraded, or by having their degrading photos shared online), beaten up, and socially becomes a criminal before the trial ends (in most cases, before the trial even starts). It can be construed to be an umbrella term for violent offences that police inflict upon accused publicly.

Public shaming by police has been on the rise in the last few years. In the recognition of this rise, one has to see who has been affected by such incidents the most. Unsurprisingly, it is Muslims and Dalits, who are at the short end of the stick. As per a report tiled “Status of Policing in India Report 2025” published by Common Cause India and Lokniti empirically shows that more often than not the victims of police brutality have been from these marginalised communities. The specific act of public shaming is not any different, a perusal of the petitioners in all the cases that are analysed below makes it abundantly clear that public shaming by police unfairly affects the already marginalised. Ergo, the matter of Public Shaming has to be understood as a manifestation of State Violence as an instrument to marginalise. By perpetuating a form of violence that induces shame in the victim and ridicule in the observer, the State is further marginalising the already marginalised. Therefore, Public Shaming by police is clearly part of the phenomenon, State sanctioned violence against the minorities.

The act of public shaming is fundamentally Kafkaesque. Kafka in his famous short story In the penal colony talks about a society where accused’s body is inscribed with the alleged offence using needles. This act is carried out by a commander who happens to be the police, the judge and the executioner. The various instances of public shaming as happening in India are the similar if not the same. The police usurp the role of the judge and violates the dignity of an accused by beating and shaming them publicly. It contravenes inter alia, doctrine separation of powers and fundamental rights of the individuals—the salient features of a constitutional democracy.

In fact, in hitherto settled Indian criminal law jurisprudence, even convicts who have been convicted of serious offences are accorded –or should be accorded at least—fair if not humane treatment.

In the face of increase in public shaming by the police in Rajasthan (a detailed report on such incidents can be found here) the State’s High Court in the 2025 Islam Khan judgement laid down several guidelines that have to be followed by the police to curb such instances. It further held the act of public shaming to be violative of the fundamental right to privacy.

This primer will first breakdown the recent, year-old Rajasthan High Court judgement (Islam Khan and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others) and analyse various aspects of it, including the final guidelines that were pronounced.

The second half of the primer shall deal with other judicial decisions pronounced by other constitutional courts, that is several other HCs and also the Supreme Court.

Lastly, we will attempt to demonstrate that there is an inconsistency in how courts have adjudged this issue. Considering the legal, social and psychological ramifications of public shaming, there is clearly a need for a sounder legal framework that can mitigate such occurrences. 

2025: Islam Khan and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others

On the face of increase in acts of public shaming in Rajasthan (read a report on such incidents here), the High Court delivered a comprehensive judgement that laid down certain guidelines with the aim of stifling the practice. In the instance under examination here, the police had arrested the accused, degraded and humiliated them. Their photos and videos were shot and shared on social media. The judicial pronouncement came in response to this.

The judgement does a commendable job in grounding the prohibition of public shaming in three distinct constitutional features—doctrine of separation of powers, presumption of innocence, and respect of individual dignity. On the aspect of separation of powers, the Court starts with emphasising that the rule of law cannot be maintained without a functional separation of power. The invocation of this doctrine is important and novel, for it tacitly collapses the difference between a convict as per the court and a convict as per the media trial instigated by the police. The Court defines such a media trial engineered by the police to be “…a State-engineered narrative, wherein the police machinery, through press conferences, orchestrated disclosures, circulation of photographs, and at times even staged representations of arrest, seeks to project an accused person as culpable even before the due process of law has had an opportunity to unfold” (Paragraph 14)

The Judgement further reads, “Any transgression by the police into the judicial sphere, whether by declaring an accused guilty in the public domain, conducting actions that prejudice a fair trial, or exercising powers not sanctioned by law, would not only be without jurisdiction but would also strike at the very heart of due process” (Paragraph 13.2)

The Court by holding that media trial by police disturbs the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, implicitly held that media trial’s declaration of an accused as guilty is equally socially isolating and harmful as that of a court trial’s declaration, i.e., the mental or psychological effect is similar. Regardless of what the trial later proves, the accused in the eyes of the society becomes a criminal because of police actions that portrays them as convicts–or worse, sub-humans. The Court pegged the police action to its constitutional mandate of administrating law, not pronouncing guilt. The Court’s holding that merely showing an accused to be guilty amounts to a usurpation of judicial duties is crucial: in the context of public shaming particularly so; because the Police has repeatedly portrayed “accused” to be criminals in the eyes of the public. Such unprofessional, often partisan police conduct reduces public confidence in both the Police and Courts, eventually.

Making a logical extension of the aforesaid argument –separation of powers, the Rajasthan High Court went further to hold that criminal declarations vis a vis the accused by the police impacts the cardinal principle of presumption of innocence (until proven guilty). Media trials by the police displace the concept of presumption of innocence and whip up public prejudice and anger. Punishment precedes the conviction, and completely displaces the presumption of innocence.

Last not least, the force of this judgement lies in its assertion that the act of public shaming is a violation of human dignity. The Court recognises that acts of public shaming are ipso facto in contravention of human dignity. Dignity is the cornerstone of human rights. This is how dignity is acknowledged as a manifestation of human rights. The Preamble of the Constitution contains a solemn promise to secure the dignity of the individual as its framers were aware that the Constitution is an outcome of a long arduous struggle, which must value the dignity of an individual, independent of his social status.

The Court here grounded the inappropriateness of public shaming not just in Article 21 of the Constitution, but went a step further in the right direction, and held it to be violative of dignity itself. The effect of such a finding is that no law, circumstance, judicial pronouncement (that are often marred with legal hula-hoops to justify abhorrent actions) can justify public shaming by police. Its very existence is held to be impermissible. This is a crucial finding by a constitutional court.

However, it is the guidelines that the judgement lays down that sets it apart and hence its import. These guidelines are aimed to restrict if not stop public shaming from happening.  It is the first judicial pronouncement that explicitly lays down directions that ought to be followed by the police in the context of public shaming specifically. The guidelines require every police officer to follow the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) prescribed by the authorities. It further emphasises that no arrestee shall be subject to misbehaviour, mishandling, manhandling, harassment, or any form of coercion under any circumstances.

Crucially, the Court held in these guidelines that “any act of social media condemnation orchestrated or facilitated by police authorities, which results in public humiliation of an individual, shall be construed as a form of punishment” (Paragraph 18[iii]).

By construing public shaming as a form of punishment itself, the Court effectively made sure that no police officer can engage in the same because it would contravene both presumption of innocence (as it would lead to punishing before conviction) and doctrine of separation of power (as it would lead to police usurping the judges’ roles of sentencing a punishment).

While the judgement— specifically the guidelines, prima facie, lay down what appears to be an effective deterrent to public shaming, a closer look at it reveals no concrete steps—an absence of enforceability. A logical extension to the guidelines could have been a) compensation for the accused subject to such acts; b) institutional correction and actions against offending police officers and c) any other.

Post May 2025, less than a month after the Islam Khan judgement, the Rajasthan High Court was again asked to adjudicate on an incident of public shaming by police (Puranmal vs State of Rajasthan and Ors.). The accused was arrested, and before producing him before the competent Court, the police forcibly shaved his head, dressed him in women’s clothes, and paraded him through a crowded market, while photographs and videos of the incident were circulated on social media and news channels. Unfortunately, unlike in the case of Islam Khan findings in the Puranmal judgement were diluted. The same court that had the benefit of the guidelines laid down in Islam Khan, (both were single judge benches), the Court in Parunmal held that police’s promise of not repeating such incidents hereinafter, is sufficient. No action was taken. Even in the previous Islam Khan, despite laying such guidelines, the Court had merely asked the police to remove the videos where the accused is degraded from Social Media sites and other platforms. No proceeding was started against the police. Therefore, while the guidelines are welcome, their effectiveness remain in question.

Similarly, various High Courts and Supreme Court over the years have given different judgements on the same issue of public shaming.

Other Judicial Responses to Public Shaming

The case of public shaming was also discussed by the Supreme Court in its 2012 judgement of Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam Vs. State of Chattisgarh and Ors. The Court was called to decide whether compensation should be granted to a victim of such public shaming, the Court held in affirmative and made a distinction between defamation and public shaming.

The Court held that public shaming is distinct from defamation, public shaming causes mental and physical agony. The Court added that “[because of public shaming] the hurt develops a sense of insecurity, helplessness and his self- respect gets gradually atrophied” (Paragraph 40).

Further, the Court held that, “The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making ‘monetary amends’ under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, by not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of ‘exemplary damages’ awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law” (Paragraph 43)

Later, in In-Re Banners Placed On Road Side In The City Of Lucknow (2020), the Allahabad High Court took suo moto action against the banners placed by the UP Police on the streets of Lucknow which contained several individuals’ photographs, name and address. The context is/was the the Uttar Pradesh government’s controversial “name and shame” billboards that had publicly displayed the names, photographs, and residential addresses of individuals accused of vandalism during the anti-CAA protests in December 2019. The administration demanded compensation for public property damages, threatening to seize assets if unpaid!. The Allahabad High Court had, in a judgement, strongly condemned the actions, ordered the removal of all banners that ‘named and shamed’ holding that these acts were a violation of privacy; when the matter was carried to the Supreme Court of India, the court without staying the HC’s finding referred the matter to a constitutional bench. A report may be read here. Clearly, however this judicial rap means little to the UP state administration that had in December 2024 revived this practice that was condemned by the Allahabad HC in 2020 and which, moreover targets privacy and due process. During the violence in Sambhal in western UP, incited because of the controversial attacks on the Shahi Jama Masjid there, the administration had publicly named and shamed over 400 so-called accused! A report may be read here.

In another ruling delivered in January 2021, the Allahabad High Court condemned the act of displaying a list of so-called ‘top criminals at different police stations in various districts of UP (Jeeshan and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.) The Court not only took a dignitarian approach and condemned the State authorities, but also granted compensation for the violation of public shaming. Moreover the Court directed all the Police stations to remove the list, and warned them that if such action is repeated, criminal proceedings and monetary compensation shall follow.

The matter of public shaming has been dealt by Gujarat High Court differently.

In the case of Bhautik Vijaybhai Bhatt Vs Director General Of Police & Ors. (the case involved a bunch of instances of public shaming) in 2019, the Court deferred to the powers of the executive. The Court further held that since departmental actions for the offence had been already initiated by the higher authorities against the police officers, this was a sufficient remedy. As opposed to such a deferential attitude, the same court in the 2023, Jahirmiya Rehamumiya Malek Vs State of Gujarat judgement, held the officers in contempt. In this case, police officers had arrested the accused, tied them to a public pole and beaten them up. Recordings of these offences by the police were uploaded on social media sites. The Court held that such arrest was a violation of the DK Basu judgement (1997), and as the police officers violated Supreme Court guidelines, they ought to be held in contempt

The Madhya Pradesh High Court took a unique approach altogether. In the case of Sangram Singh Rajoot v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the petitioners were forced to walk from police station to Court on foot. The Court held that this act cannot be considered ipso facto, an act of public shaming. The Court gave a wide margin of deference to the police when it instructed the same authority (police) to “internally inquire” about the incident and find if “malice” can be attributed to the police officers! The Court observed that the representations submitted by the accused indicated that a grievance was raised before the authorities, mere non-action on such representations would not automatically warrant issuance of a writ of mandamus for initiating disciplinary proceedings, unless a prima facie case of misconduct is established. The Court delegated all its duties to the executive and did not even issue a writ of mandamus honouring the higher judiciary’s role in checking misuse of power and authority by the executive/administration.

A perusal of this catena of judgements around public shaming from 2012 (SC) to 2025-26, we observe no consistent discernable pattern. While constitutional courts have, in recent times, in some states like Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and even some orders from Gujarat, held the act of public shaming to be condemnable and directed corrective measures, social sanction for such shaming persists. The phenomenon of social media and its intrusive, sometimes unregulated character adds more complex dimensions. There appears a greater imperative on the Court, to intervene not just clearly but swiftly to restore the balance —in favour of the Rule of Law.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis makes it evident that the practice of public shaming by the police is no more an aberration but has increasingly become a baton wielded by an overarching, often authoritarian and unaccountable executive. ‘Elected governments’ are choosing to use this as a  systemic feature of India’s law enforcement architecture. The legal, social, and psychological harms it engenders are profound, recurring, and largely unaddressed.

Decades ago, when such practices certainly existed but were considered an aberration not the norm[1], did the Courts rule more assertively? The Supreme Court in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) was categorical in holding that handcuffing is prima facie inhuman, unreasonable, over-harsh, and arbitrary, and to inflict irons without fair procedure is to resort to zoological strategies repugnant to Article 21. The Court’s ruling was clear that freedom from handcuffs during transit between the prison and the court must be the rule and not the exception. Public shaming, in its various forms, is a direct descendant of the very practice Prem Shankar Shukla condemned. The DK Basu guidelines (1997) compounded this protection by laying down that custodial violence including torture and physical assault infringes Article 21, and that interrogation, though essential, must be conducted on scientific and humane principles, with third-degree methods being totally impermissible.

Yet, as the analysis of the Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh cases demonstrates, these guidelines are honoured more in their breach than in their observance. What the Prem Shankar Shukla and DK Basu guidelines could not anticipate was the peculiar, performative nature of public shaming in the age of social media, where the degradation of an accused: these acts are not merely incidental to an arrest but are part and parcel of the deliberate and orchestrated objective of the police action itself.

The social and psychological ramifications of this practice are equally severe, and they do not resolve themselves once the accused is acquitted. The Supreme Court in Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam observed that because of public shaming, the individual “develops a sense of insecurity, helplessness and his self-respect gets gradually atrophied.” Public humiliation, particularly when state-orchestrated and digitally disseminated, produces lasting trauma. The accused is no longer merely a person under trial. In the eyes of his community, employer, and family, he has been declared a criminal. His social reintegration becomes near impossible, irrespective of what the trial later concludes. The damage is therefore permanent, and the law currently has no instrument to make the victim whole. Monetary compensation, while progressive, cannot undo the viral spread of a degrading video.

The empirical picture is no less alarming. The incidents are not isolated and they are increasing. In Rajasthan alone, police officers in Sikar, Udaipur, Nagaur, Jhunjhunu, and Dausa have repeatedly forced accused men into women’s clothing, half-shaved their heads, and paraded them before crowds, with these unlawful acts being visually documented through 2025. The problem is not geographically contained. In Jammu, within a single month in 2025, there were at least two widely reported incidents of public shaming, one involving a theft accused being made to sit on the bonnet of a moving police vehicle with his hands tied and shoes garlanded around his neck, and another involving three men being publicly thrashed by police personnel after arrest, reigniting debate over the increasing tendency of law enforcement to resort to performative justice. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that a group of advocates in Jammu lodged a complaint with the National Human Rights Commission alleging that law enforcement authorities are bypassing constitutional safeguards and replacing lawful investigation procedures with performative public punishment, leading to irreversible damage to the dignity and fundamental rights of the accused.

In light of all of this, the conclusion is inescapable. Indian criminal jurisprudence (analysed above related to Islam Khan 2025 and other verdicts) needs to be widely discussed, even as citizens, civil rights groups and the media discuss and deliberate on the serious ramifications of this deliberate executive-police fracture and capture of the ‘Rule of Law.’ What are the steps that need to be taken so we return the debate to conduct accountability by the Indian Police?

Is then what is needed is a centralised statutory or Supreme Court-mandated framework that defines public shaming exhaustively, prescribes mandatory consequences for violations including automatic contempt proceedings and compensation, and places a structural obligation on States to train and supervise their police forces accordingly? Without such a framework, the courts will continue to pronounce guidelines that are ignored, and the accused will continue to be paraded, shamed, and broken, long before any verdict is returned.

Relevant Judgements

[1] The 1979-1980 “Bhagalpur blindings” refer to a horrific series of human rights abuses in Bihar, India—when the Police deliberately blinded 31 undertrial and convicted prisoners by puncturing their eyes with needles and pouring acid into the sockets

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Hamzah Patel)

Related

Rajasthan’s Public Shaming: Police humiliation practices defy law and human dignity

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Dalit boy’s death in police custody and arson attack on Dalit homes: A dual crisis of justice in BJP-ruled states

The post The Court spoke, the police paraded anyway appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Court answered that question in the affirmative.

In doing so, it has delivered what may prove to be one of the most consequential judgments on internet governance and platform regulation in India. While the judgment is framed as a narrow, emergency response to an exceptional situation, the legal principles it endorses have implications that extend to every major digital platform operating in India. The decision substantially expands the scope of Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, broadens the meaning of “public order” in the digital context, and adopts an unusually deferential approach to governmental claims of necessity and proportionality.

The immediate dispute may have ended with NEET. The constitutional questions raised by the judgment have only just begun.

A case that was never really about Telegram

The government’s justification for the blocking order rested on a familiar narrative. Following the cancellation of the original NEET examination amid allegations of paper leaks and widespread irregularities, authorities claimed that Telegram had become a central vehicle for the circulation of fraudulent examination material, fake leak claims, scams targeting candidates, and organised cheating networks.

The government relied upon reports from the National Testing Agency (NTA), the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), and various law-enforcement agencies to argue that Telegram’s infrastructure had become deeply embedded in these activities. The Court accepted these claims, noting allegations that channels openly advertising themselves as “PAPER LEAKED NEET” and similar variants were operating on the platform and soliciting large sums of money from students. The Court also accepted evidence suggesting that mirror channels, reserve groups, bots, and audience migration systems allowed operators to evade enforcement efforts and quickly reconstitute themselves after takedowns.

Yet the real issue before the Court was not whether examination fraud existed. Few would dispute that it did. The real issue was whether the existence of unlawful activity on a platform can justify disabling access to the platform itself.

That distinction is critical. The Indian legal system has long recognised that newspapers may publish unlawful content without justifying a ban on newspapers as a medium. Telephone networks may be used for criminal conspiracies without justifying the suspension of telecommunication services. Email services may facilitate fraud without warranting the shutdown of email itself.

The question before the Court was therefore not whether Telegram had been misused, but whether misuse by some users justified restricting access for everyone. The judgment ultimately answers that question in favour of the State.

A detailed report on the Telegram ban may be read here.

Transforming Section 69A into a platform-blocking power

The single most important aspect of the decision is the Court’s interpretation of Section 69A of the Information Technology Act. Historically, Section 69A has been understood as a mechanism through which the government can block access to specific information hosted online. The provision authorises blocking “any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource.”

Telegram argued that this language permits blocking particular content but not an entire platform. The Court rejected this argument.

Relying upon the expansive definition of “information” under Section 2(1)(v) of the IT Act—which includes software, computer programmes, codes and databases—the Court held that there was “no reason to exclude an application or platform” from the scope of Section 69A. Since Telegram itself is software comprising code, databases, and communication infrastructure, the Court concluded that the entire platform constitutes “information” capable of being blocked.

“The expression “information”, appearing in Section 69A of the IT Act, is defined under Section 2(1)(v) of the IT Act and includes, inter alia, images, sound, voice, codes, computer programmes, software and databases. The breadth of the said definition indicates that the expression “information” is required to be construed expansively. A restrictive construction, confining the expression only to individual user accounts, channels, images, posts, files or messages, would unduly narrow the scope of Section 69A and may render the provision otiose. The legislative intent, therefore, appears to be to confer a broad and technologically neutral meaning upon the expression “information”.” (Para 35)

This is a dramatic interpretive leap. Section 69A was enacted in a vastly different technological context. For years, it has been used primarily to block URLs, websites, accounts, posts, pages, and other identifiable pieces of online content. The Delhi High Court’s reasoning effectively transforms it into a statutory basis for disabling entire digital ecosystems.

The distinction is not merely semantic as blocking a webpage and blocking a platform are fundamentally different exercises of state power. One targets particular content. The other disables an entire infrastructure of communication.

The judgment therefore does not simply uphold the Telegram ban. It significantly enlarges the legal architecture of internet censorship in India. If the reasoning is followed in future cases, the government may argue that any platform itself constitutes “information” and may therefore be blocked whenever authorities conclude that statutory grounds under Section 69A are satisfied. The implications extend far beyond Telegram.

The extraordinary expansion of “Public Order”

Equally striking is the Court’s treatment of public order. Section 69A permits blocking only on limited grounds, including sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, and public order. Historically, Indian constitutional jurisprudence has treated “public order” as a serious and relatively narrow category. The Supreme Court has repeatedly distinguished public order from ordinary law-and-order concerns and emphasised that restrictions on fundamental freedoms require a proximate and not merely speculative connection with public disorder.

In the present case, however, the Court appears willing to accept a significantly broader conception of public order. The judgment repeatedly refers to the possibility that misinformation regarding examination papers could erode public confidence in the examination process, trigger unrest among candidates, undermine faith in public institutions, and potentially lead to public disorder.

This reasoning raises important concerns. The Court does not identify any actual breakdown of public order directly caused by Telegram’s continued operation between the issuance of the blocking order and the examination. Instead, it relies primarily upon anticipated consequences and the possibility of future disruption.

“In the present case, the Impugned Order discloses that temporary blocking of the public access to Telegram is directed having regard to the potential grave implications for public order in the country and for preventing the commission of cognizable offences arising from the circulation of examination-related misinformation and purported examination papers on Telegram, particularly in light of prior incidents relating to NEET UG, 2026.” (Para 24)

“Thus, this Court is of the view that given the emergency nature of the Impugned Order, the reasons supplied in arriving at the decision were sufficient. As Respondent No. 1 has strictly followed the procedural steps as required under Section 69A of the IT Act, the challenge to the Impugned Order on the ground non-communication of reasons cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the objections founded on alleged non-application of mind and inadequacy of opportunity of hearing also fail given the statutory scheme of Section 69A of the IT Act and 2009 Rules. In view of the foregoing, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Impugned Order contains reasons and there exists a direct and substantial nexus between the direction issued and the reasons assigned.” (Para 25)

The result is a conception of public order that appears considerably broader than traditional constitutional doctrine. Under this framework, the State may be able to justify restrictions not because disorder exists, but because misinformation could theoretically undermine public confidence in an institution and thereby create conditions for disorder.

That shift is significant. If accepted as a general principle, the same logic could potentially be invoked in relation to elections, recruitment examinations, public protests, political controversies, or other events where misinformation is alleged to threaten institutional legitimacy. The danger lies not in the immediate facts of the case, but in the elasticity of the principle being created.

The curious treatment of proportionality

The Court repeatedly invokes the doctrine of proportionality and cites the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Anuradha Bhasin. It correctly notes that restrictions upon fundamental rights must be necessary, proportionate, and constitute the least restrictive means available for achieving a legitimate objective.

However, the judgment’s application of that doctrine is considerably less rigorous than its recitation. The government’s central claim was that narrower measures had failed. According to authorities, Telegram’s architecture enabled the rapid reappearance of unlawful actors through mirror channels, reserve groups, bots, and alternate identities. Consequently, channel-specific takedowns were said to be ineffective.

The Court largely accepted this assertion. What is missing, however, is a meaningful examination of alternative measures.

“In the present case, the NEET UG, 2026 examination is scheduled to be conducted on 21.06.2026. The temporary blocking of Telegram under the Orders is operative only until 22.06.2026, while the disabling of the message-editing feature is confined to the period until 30.06.2026. The limited temporal scope of these measures demonstrates that they are narrowly tailored and confined to the period strictly necessary for securing the stated objective. Applying the parameters laid down in Anuradha Bhasin (supra), this Court is satisfied that the requirements of proportionality stand fulfilled, namely: (i) identification of a legitimate objective; (ii) existence of a rational nexus between the objective and the measure adopted; (iii) necessity of the measure in the facts and circumstances of the case; and (iv) adoption of the least restrictive measure available.” (Para 46)

A genuine proportionality analysis would ordinarily require the State to demonstrate why each less restrictive option was inadequate. The judgment does not meaningfully interrogate several possibilities:

• enhanced emergency compliance obligations;
• platform-specific moderation requirements;
• targeted blocking of identified channels;
• restrictions on public channels exceeding certain thresholds;
• disabling forwarding features;
• temporary limitations on bot functionality;
• emergency monitoring arrangements;
• targeted orders directed at specific classes of accounts.

Instead, the Court appears to accept the government’s conclusion that these alternatives would not work. The distinction is important because proportionality requires courts to independently verify governmental claims of necessity. It does not require courts merely to accept them. By deferring substantially to executive assessments regarding platform architecture and technical feasibility, the Court risks diluting the very standard of scrutiny that proportionality was designed to impose.

The forgotten rights of 150 million users

Perhaps the most striking omission in the judgment is the relative absence of any serious engagement with the rights of Telegram’s lawful users. The Court expressly acknowledges that approximately 150 million people in India use Telegram. Yet these users remain largely invisible throughout the constitutional analysis.

The judgment contains extensive discussion of examination integrity, public confidence, platform architecture, bots, channels, and enforcement difficulties. Comparatively little attention is devoted to the rights being restricted.

There is almost no sustained analysis of:

• the speech rights of ordinary users;
• educational communities operating on Telegram;
• journalists and researchers using the platform;
• businesses conducting communications through Telegram;
• civil-society organisations dependent upon Telegram networks;
• the broader Article 19(1)(a) implications of disabling an entire communications platform.

This imbalance matters because proportionality requires balancing. The Court carefully assesses the interests of 2.2 million NEET candidates but devotes far less attention to the constitutional rights of 150 million users whose access to a communications platform was suspended. The asymmetry is difficult to ignore.

Architecture as a basis for restriction

Another deeply consequential feature of the judgment is its repeated emphasis on Telegram’s architecture. The Court identifies Telegram’s defining characteristics as reasons why platform-wide intervention was necessary:

• large public channels;
• cloud-based storage;
• automated bots;
• anonymity through usernames;
• reserve-channel structures;
• rapid audience migration systems;
• message-editing functionality.

What is striking is that the Court explicitly acknowledges that these features are not unlawful. Yet it nonetheless treats them as factors justifying extraordinary state intervention because they allegedly make enforcement more difficult. This aspect of the judgment may have implications extending far beyond examination fraud.

“The Orders expressly record that entity-specific interventions, including the reporting and removal of channels, groups, bots, and accounts, were repeatedly found to be ineffective and inadequate. Further, the audience-migration mechanisms enable operators to rapidly reconstitute networks after enforcement action was taken by the concerned authorities. It is clearly observed in the Orders that despite corrective measures having been sought in relation to various misuses of the Telegram platform, fresh material, including reports received from Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, disclosed the continued occurrence of illicit activities by unlawful entities notwithstanding prior interventions. Therefore, it is evident that narrower measures, including the takedown of specific bots and channels, were ineffective having regard to the particular nature and architecture of the Telegram platform.” (Para 45)

Many privacy-protective technologies are deliberately designed to minimise surveillance, decentralise control, or resist centralised moderation. If technological architecture itself becomes a ground for restrictive action whenever authorities believe it impedes enforcement, a wide range of digital platforms could face heightened regulatory vulnerability. The judgment therefore moves the debate beyond content moderation and into the realm of platform design. That shift is profound.

Preventive regulation and the message-editing feature

The Court also upheld the government’s separate direction disabling Telegram’s message-editing functionality. The rationale was that users could allegedly modify messages after an examination and falsely create the impression that papers had been leaked beforehand. Telegram’s own acknowledgement that it was making edited labels more visible was treated as corroborative evidence supporting this concern.

Here too the Court adopts a highly preventive approach. Rather than responding to demonstrated misuse, the restriction is justified largely by the possibility of future misuse. The judgment therefore reflects an increasing willingness to permit governmental intervention into platform design choices based upon anticipated harms rather than completed violations. Whether such preventive regulation can be reconciled with robust free-speech protections remains an open question.

A judgment likely to impact India’s digital future

The Delhi High Court presents its decision as a narrow, temporary and exceptional response to an extraordinary crisis surrounding NEET-UG 2026. Yet some of the most significant constitutional judgments emerge from exceptional circumstances. The lasting importance of this case lies not in the temporary suspension of Telegram but in the principles the Court has endorsed:

• that Section 69A authorises blocking entire platforms and not merely content;
• that platform architecture may itself justify platform-wide restrictions;
• that examination-related misinformation can be treated as a public-order threat warranting emergency intervention;
• that post-decisional hearings can sufficiently cure concerns regarding emergency censorship;
• and that the rights of millions of lawful users may be overridden where the State demonstrates a sufficiently compelling regulatory objective.

Taken together, these propositions represent a substantial expansion of executive power over digital communications. The judgment undoubtedly reflects legitimate concerns about examination fraud, organised criminal networks, and the integrity of public institutions. But constitutional law is tested not when governments pursue illegitimate goals, but when they pursue legitimate ones through extraordinary means.

The real question raised by the Telegram judgment is therefore not whether the State should combat examination fraud. It unquestionably should. The deeper question is whether the misuse of a communications platform by some users can justify denying access to all users.

By answering that question in the affirmative, the Delhi High Court has moved Indian internet jurisprudence decisively toward a model of platform-level regulation and censorship. Whether higher courts ultimately endorse that approach may determine the future contours of digital freedom in India.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

Censorship After NEET: A substitute for accountability

When Morality Meets Surveillance: The court’s push toward state-regulated digital content

Repeal recent amendments to the RTI act, 2005: Justice A.P Shah in an Open Letter

Safe harbour or shadow censorship? The battle over India’s digital speech

State-sponsored attacks of surveillance reveal an erosion on Indians’ right to privacy, especially journalists, political opposition

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