In Sujit Das and Others v. Union of India, a judgment delivered on November 5, 2026, a Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar examined the scope of Article 22(2) of the Constitution, which requires every arrested and detained person to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest, excluding only the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s court.

The judgment is significant not only for clarifying when this constitutional deadline begins, but also for reinforcing the role of judicial oversight in preventing arbitrary detention and custodial abuse. It rejects the creation of an intermediate category of detention in which a person is deprived of their liberty but is not treated as arrested for the purpose of constitutional protection. The Court has also clarified that compliance with the 24-hour ceiling does not, by itself, make detention lawful: the period of detention must also be reasonable in the circumstances.

“the magistrate shall also examine at the time of production whether the detention of the person produced, though is within the time frame of 24 hours, has exceeded the period which can be construed to be reasonable in the circumstances of the case. If he is satisfied that detention in custody has been for a longer period than what is reasonable, he may decline remand” (Para 69 (vii))

The case: Detained on September 29, formally arrested the following day

The case arose from an NDPS investigation in Tripura. On September 29, 2025, officers of the Customs Division intercepted a truck travelling towards Agartala on the basis of information that it was carrying narcotic substances concealed in a consignment of ginger. The persons travelling in the vehicle were intercepted at approximately 2 pm at Shanitala Noabadi.

The search resulted in the recovery of narcotic substances. It continued at the Customs Division office in Agartala, where further contraband was recovered from trolley bags concealed beneath the ginger consignment. The total quantity seized was 60.79 kg. The search and seizure procedure was completed at approximately 5 pm on September 29.

However, the appellants were formally shown as arrested only on September 30, at 11 am and 11.15 am. They were produced before a Judicial Magistrate at 4.45 pm that day and remanded to judicial custody.

Their bail applications were rejected by the Special Judge and subsequently by the Tripura High Court. The High Court relied, among other considerations, on Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, which imposes stringent conditions for granting bail in specified NDPS cases.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants raised a separate and fundamental constitutional objection. They argued that their liberty had been curtailed when they were intercepted and brought under the control of the investigating team at 2 pm on September 29. If that was the point from which the 24-hour period began, they should have been produced before a Magistrate by 2 pm on September 30. Their production at 4.45 pm was therefore beyond the constitutionally permitted period.

The investigating agency disputed this interpretation. It maintained that the appellants had merely been intercepted on September 29 and were not detained until their formal arrests the following morning. It argued that the intervening period was required to complete the procedures prescribed under the NDPS Act, including search and seizure, weighing and testing the seized substances, preparing seizure documents and carrying out other investigative formalities.

The agency also relied on Rule 3(4) of the NDPS (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022, which prescribes procedures for the classification, weighing, packaging and numbering of seized substances in the presence of witnesses and the person from whose possession they were recovered.

The Supreme Court directed the investigating officer to explain the period between the interception, completion of the search and seizure, formal arrest and production before the Magistrate. The central question was whether the investigating agency could treat the period during which the appellants were under its control as something other than detention for the purposes of Article 22(2).

The constitutional meaning of arrest cannot depend on the investigating agency’s paperwork

The Court approached the question by examining the language and purpose of Article 22(2). It noted that the provision refers to a person who is “arrested and detained in custody”. The expressions are used conjunctively, and the Court rejected the attempt to treat them as two separate events so that the constitutional deadline could be postponed until formal arrest.

It held that the Constitution does not recognise detention dehors arrest. In other words, a person cannot be deprived of their liberty and kept under the control of investigating authorities while being placed in a legally indeterminate category of detention that falls outside the protection of Article 22(2).

“ Any attempt to draw an artificial distinction between ‘arrest’ and ‘detention’ would dilute or negate the fundamental protection guaranteed by the Constitution under clause (2) of Article 22. Such an endeavour should be avoided. We must adopt that interpretation which enhances and furthers the constitutional objective.” (Para 58)

The Court explained that the relevant consideration is whether the person has been deprived of their personal liberty and is no longer free to leave. It referred to its earlier decisions, including Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, to examine the meaning of arrest and custody. These decisions recognise that the question of custody depends on the actual restraint imposed on an individual, rather than merely the terminology used by the authorities.

Applying this understanding, the Court held that the 24-hour period begins when a person is taken under the control of an investigating authority and their liberty is effectively curtailed. The formal arrest memo cannot determine the commencement of the constitutional deadline.

The Court also rejected the proposition that statutory procedures under the NDPS Act could justify a period of detention outside Article 22(2). It acknowledged the requirements governing search and seizure but held that these procedures cannot be used to postpone constitutional safeguards. Once a person’s liberty has been curtailed, the time spent on investigative or administrative procedures cannot be excluded from the 24-hour calculation. The only period that can be excluded is the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s court, as expressly provided under Article 22(2).

“Article 22(2) does not sanction exclusion of the time taken for enquiry and investigation before the arresting authority could effect arrest of the detainee. This is beyond the mandate of Article 22(2) of the Constitution. Article 22(2) does not sanction creation of any buffer zone where the liberty of an individual is curtailed for investigating purposes but not formally shown as arrested. Creation or contemplation of such buffer zone is unconstitutional.” (Para 43)

In reaching this conclusion, the Bench disapproved the approach adopted by the Orissa High Court in Aryaman Pattnayak, the Madras High Court in Kannan and the Kerala High Court in Arun K. Thomas. These decisions had drawn a distinction between detention during investigation and formal arrest. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation adopted by the High Courts was inconsistent with the constitutional protection of personal liberty.

The judgment is therefore an important clarification for investigations conducted under special statutes. It establishes that the existence of statutory powers to search, seize or question a person does not create an exception to the constitutional requirement of timely production before a Magistrate.

“Therefore, the declaration that the period of 24 hours for the purposes of Article 22(2) commences from the completion of such search and seizure and only from the time of arrest recorded by the arresting authority is not only unsustainable in law but is entirely unconstitutional.” (Para 43)

The 24-hour limit is not an automatic licence to detain

A further important aspect of the judgment concerns Section 58 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which corresponds to Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court identified two distinct safeguards under Section 58. First, a person cannot be detained by the police without a warrant for more than 24 hours, excluding the necessary journey time, without being produced before a Magistrate. Second, even within that period, detention must not exceed what is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.

The second requirement is particularly significant. The Court clarified that the 24-hour period should not be understood as an automatic entitlement for investigating agencies to detain a person for the entire duration. A person may be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours and yet have been detained for longer than was reasonable.

In such circumstances, the Magistrate is not required to authorise further detention merely because the outer time limit has not been breached. The Magistrate must independently examine the circumstances and may decline to authorise remand if the detention was unreasonable.

“Therefore, Section 57 CrPC (58 BNSS) mandates two limitations: firstly, the constitutional limitation of 24 hours; and secondly, within that 24 hours, the detention should not exceed what is considered to be a reasonable period in the facts of that case. This additional but salutary limitation should be borne in mind not only by the detaining authorities but also by the magistrates considering remand. In a given case, even though technically there may not be any breach of the 24 hours timeline, yet if the magistrate is satisfied that detention was for a period longer than what was reasonable, he or she may decline remand.” (Para 60)

The Court also placed a specific responsibility on Magistrates to ascertain and record the actual date and time at which the person’s liberty was curtailed. They cannot mechanically rely on the time of formal arrest recorded by the investigating agency. They must examine when the person was actually brought under official control, calculate the 24-hour period from that point and assess whether the detention was reasonable.

This direction strengthens the remand process as a substantive safeguard against arbitrary detention, rather than allowing it to become a procedural exercise in which the investigating agency’s account is accepted without scrutiny.

Connecting delayed formal arrest with the risk of custodial violence

The Court’s reasoning is rooted in the wider constitutional concern surrounding custodial violence and the abuse of investigative powers. It referred to earlier decisions, including Khatri v. State of Bihar, D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal and Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljeet Singh, to underline the importance of timely judicial oversight and safeguards against custodial abuse.

The Court recognised that the period between the actual deprivation of liberty and the formal recording of arrest can be particularly vulnerable to misuse. If investigating agencies are permitted to postpone the formal recording of arrest, individuals may remain under their control without the immediate protection that Article 22(2) is intended to provide. The judgment thus treats the 24-hour requirement as more than a procedural deadline. It is a constitutional mechanism intended to ensure that executive power over an individual’s liberty is brought under judicial scrutiny at the earliest opportunity.

This is particularly relevant in the Indian context, where allegations of custodial violence, coercive interrogation and unlawful detention have repeatedly raised concerns about the exercise of police and investigative powers. The ruling strengthens the legal basis for challenging practices in which a person’s actual detention is obscured by the terminology of questioning, enquiry or investigative custody.

Article 21 cannot be lightly subordinated to restrictive provisions under special laws

The judgment also contains important observations on the relationship between fundamental rights under Article 21 and the restrictive bail conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Tripura High Court had relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora (2026), which considered the relationship between the right to speedy trial and the restrictions imposed by Section 37. In that case, the Supreme Court had set aside a grant of bail where the High Court had not recorded satisfaction regarding the statutory twin conditions.

In Sujit Das, the Bench expressed reservations about the observations in Sukhwinder Singh suggesting that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot, solely on the ground of delay, override that provision.

The Court reiterated that Article 21 protects fundamental rights that lie at the core of constitutional jurisprudence and cannot be lightly restricted, even under special statutes. It referred to decisions including Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ankur Chadha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, among others, to support the proposition that violations of Article 21 may require the rigours of Section 37 or comparable statutory restrictions to give way.

The Bench noted that it could be argued that the relevant observations in Sukhwinder Singh were per incuriam in view of the three-Judge Bench decision in K.A. Najeeb. However, it expressly refrained from making a final pronouncement because Sukhwinder Singh was also a decision of a coordinate Bench. It further clarified that Article 22(2) had not been an issue before the Bench in that case.

“We have our reservation on the aforesaid observations made by the Bench. First and foremost, the rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India are not only constitutional rights. These are fundamental rights. Right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 are at the core of our constitutional jurisprudence. These fundamental rights cannot be tinkered with so lightly, not even under the special statutes.” (Para 49)

These observations are important for future litigation concerning prolonged pre-trial detention and restrictive bail provisions. However, they should not be read as overruling Sukhwinder Singh or as finally settling the relationship between Article 21 and Section 37. The Court’s binding ruling in Sujit Das concerns the commencement of the 24-hour period under Article 22(2), the reasonableness of detention under Section 58 BNSS and the responsibility of Magistrates to scrutinise the actual period of custody.

A significant safeguard, but its enforcement will depend on judicial scrutiny

The human rights significance of the judgment lies in its recognition that constitutional protection must follow the actual experience of deprivation of liberty. A person cannot be kept under the control of the state while the state decides when to formally acknowledge that person’s arrest.

This approach is important for people detained during investigations under special legislation, where extensive powers of search, seizure and interrogation can create situations in which the distinction between questioning and custody becomes contested. By focusing on the actual restriction of liberty, the Court has provided a basis for challenging informal detention and attempts to delay judicial oversight.

The ruling also strengthens the role of Magistrates. Its insistence that they record the actual time of detention and independently assess reasonableness can help prevent routine remand orders from legitimising detention that has already violated constitutional or statutory safeguards.

At the same time, the judgment’s practical impact will depend on how these requirements are implemented. Determining the exact moment at which liberty was curtailed may involve factual disputes. Investigating agencies may contend that a person was merely asked to cooperate, was present voluntarily or was not prevented from leaving. The Court’s test will therefore require Magistrates to examine the surrounding circumstances rather than rely on labels or formal records.

Similarly, the requirement that detention be reasonable within 24 hours leaves room for fact-specific judicial assessment. The judgment establishes the principle, but its effectiveness will depend on Magistrates recording reasons and scrutinising the circumstances of detention instead of treating the 24-hour limit as a routine period available to investigating agencies.

Implications for future litigation and human rights advocacy

The ruling provides an important basis for challenging unlawful detention, delayed formal arrests and remand orders that fail to account for the actual period during which an individual was under state control. In bail proceedings, particularly those arising under the NDPS Act, defence lawyers can rely on the judgment where the available facts indicate that an accused person was intercepted, restrained or otherwise prevented from leaving before the formal arrest was recorded. The relevant records may include interception and seizure documents, CCTV footage, station or office registers, statements of witnesses, interrogation records and the arrest memo itself. These can help establish the point at which liberty was effectively curtailed and whether production before the Magistrate took place within the constitutionally permitted period.

The judgment may also be relevant in habeas corpus petitions and proceedings challenging unlawful detention, particularly where investigating authorities deny that a person has been arrested despite exercising effective control over their movements. Its reasoning can be invoked to argue that constitutional safeguards cannot be postponed through the use of alternative descriptions such as questioning, enquiry or temporary investigative detention.

For Magistrates, the judgment provides a clear direction to examine the actual circumstances of detention at the remand stage. For lawyers and human rights organisations, it offers a basis to seek greater transparency in arrest records, challenge unexplained gaps between interception and formal arrest, and demand accountability where individuals are kept in custody without timely judicial scrutiny.

It may also inform advocacy for stronger institutional safeguards against custodial violence, including effective implementation of existing arrest and detention requirements, preservation of relevant records and meaningful compliance with judicial directions concerning custodial accountability.

The Supreme Court’s directions

Applying its interpretation to the facts, the Court found that the appellants’ liberty had been curtailed when they were intercepted at approximately 2 pm on September 29, 2025. They were therefore required to be produced before a Magistrate by 2 pm on September 30, excluding only the necessary journey time. Their production at 4.45 pm on September 30 meant that they had been produced 2 hours and 45 minutes beyond the constitutional deadline. The Court held that their continued detention beyond 2 pm on September 30 was illegal and unconstitutional.

The Court also found the unexplained interval of approximately 18 hours between the completion of the search and seizure at 5 pm on September 29 and the formal recording of arrest the following morning to be unreasonable under Section 58 of the BNSS.

The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the Tripura High Court’s order dated April 29, 2026. It directed that the appellants be produced before the jurisdictional Special Court within a maximum period of seven days from the date of the judgment, after which they were to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the Special Court considered appropriate. The Court also directed that the judgment be circulated to the Directors General of Police of all States and Union Territories, the Registrars General of the High Courts and the Directors of State Judicial Academies.

The complete judgment may be read below:

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The post Supreme Court rejects ‘informal detention’, strengthens safeguards against arbitrary arrest appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The seizure of 19,250 live cartridges from Koilawar police thane near the Kulhadiya Toll Plaza has drawn strong political reactions with Tejasvi Yadav, leader of the opposition raising serious questions over the accused’s alleged involvement with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The Lokmat News reported this seizure even as the incident erupted into a political controversy with questions on motives behind the possession and transportation of thousands and thousands of such live cartridges and dangerous explosives over the Diwali weekend arose.

बिहार में 𝐑𝐒𝐒 से जुड़े चंदन तिवारी, अभिषेक तिवारी, लालटू कुमार और सरस कुमार से 𝟒𝟒,𝟎𝟎𝟎 जिंदा कारतूस पकड़े गए है। ये लोग गोला-बारूद के अंतरराज्यीय तस्करी के एक खतरनाक नेटवर्क से जुड़े है। क्या 𝐑𝐒𝐒 के ये आतंकवादी देशभर में धमाके करने की साज़िश रच रहे थे?

𝐑𝐒𝐒 से जुड़े तस्करी नेटवर्क के तीन लोगों से ही 𝟒𝟒,𝟎𝟎𝟎 ज़िंदा कारतूस पकड़े जाने के बाद भी क्या 𝐑𝐒𝐒 को आतंकवादी संगठन घोषित नहीं कर देना चाहिए?

— Tejashwi Yadav (@yadavtejashwi) November 5, 2026

So far, nothing in the publicly disclosed official accounts reveal any such clear organisational link.

In fact, it is on November 2, when a joint task force of the Bihar STF and the Bhojpur District police apprehended and stopped an SUV at the Toll Plaza, and on searching it unearthed these 19,250 live cartridges and one “desi” pistol. Three persons have been arrested in this connection, and they reportedly hail from Muzaffarpur: Laltu Kumar (38), Saras Kumar (27) and Chandan Tiwari (26) from Siwan and are part of an international arms ammunition network. Sections of the BNSS and Arms act have been added in the charges against them. The connection or alleged connection with the RSS surfaced later, according to Lokmat News, their older photographs in the RSS’ uniform started circulating. It is through this seizure and investigation that 25,000 live cartridge seizure by the Haryana STF near Jhajjar was unearthed.

Meanwhile, a team of Haryana police special task force (STF) seized a consignment of 25000 live cartridges that was being smuggled to Uttar Pradesh and Bihar and arrested five suspects from two cars near Rohad toll plaza on Bahadurgarh-Rohtak highway in Jhajjar on Tuesday. The arrested suspects were Afifuddin alias Munna Khan, 49, Asim Rais, 33, Sablu Khan, 32, Arbaz Ali, 27 and Zeenat, 33. All five are residents of different localities in Uttar Pradesh’s Budaun. Eight mobile phones and two cars were also seized from them, STF officials said.

In the third weekend incident involving seizure of explosives, Uttar Pradesh Police have arrested two men and seized nearly 199 kg of gelatin explosives, 100 fuses, seven bundles of red wire and 2.945 kg of powder from a fleeing Bolero vehicle in Chitrakoot district, according reports in Dainik Bhaskar and Amar Ujala published on November 5. News reports published over the weekend and today, Monday November 9 have reported that a leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and his close associate have been arrested in Uttar Pradesh’s Chitrakoot district after local police allegedly recovered nearly 200 kg of explosive material from their vehicle near the Madhya Pradesh border. The arrest has resulted in a storm within political circles; however, predictably, the BJP itself has so far maintained a stony silence over the incident. Hari Gopal Mishra is the BJP leader who was arrested while his associate is Pappu Tiwari. Both men are residents of Bhouri village under the Raipura police station area of Chitrakoot.

The reported political background of Hari Gopal Mishra has drawn attention following the seizure. According to Amar Ujala, he had contested a Zila Panchayat election with BJP backing.

In the highway seizure in Jajjhar, Haryana authorities have revealed to the media that Munna owns an ancestral Badaun Gun House in the Civil Lines area of Badaun and had procured the consignment from Vijay Goel, who runs Mehak Gun House in Sirsa, Haryana, which he has been running since 1999.  The Haryana STF said Vijay has also been arrested and was quizzed to ascertain his role in the interstate smuggling network, which is suspected to be running for the last three years.

Waseem Akram, superintendent of police, Haryana STF, said that 24400 cartridges of 7.65mm (.32 bore) used in regular small handguns and .315 bore used in rifles were seized from a Tata Harrier, while another batch of 600 cartridges (.315 bore) were seized from a Hyundai Aura.

“The 7.65mm cartridges are used in illegal country-made pistols manufactured in Bihar’s Munger, West Bengal and Eastern UP, while the rifle bore cartridges are used in breach-load illegal pistols manufactured in these areas for which the smuggling was taking place,” Akram said.

Akram said Munna was the kingpin of the smuggling racket running due to continuous cartridge stock pilferage from the gun houses in Haryana, UP and other places. Shamsher Dahiya, deputy superintendent of police, STF, said the entire consignment was manufactured in an ammunition factory in Pune’s Khadki, as the marking ‘KF’ was engraved on all the cartridges. “The two cars were intercepted near a roadside eatery, Triveni Dhaba, which is located right opposite the toll plaza after we had received a tip-off from Bihar police STF,” he added. Some controversy has erupted over a photograph showing the accused posing in uniforms of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

Photographs showing Bihar-based accused Chandan Tiwari and his brother Abhishek Tiwari wearing the uniform of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) were reported in a section of the digital media. Another image reportedly showing them posing with a local MLA from Muzaffarpur has also surfaced. The photographs have prompted questions about the alleged political and organisational associations of the accused. However, the images alone do not establish that the RSS, as an organisation, was involved in the arms smuggling network.

Questions over Ammunition manufactured in government factories

Another aspect of the investigation concerns reports that some of the seized cartridges were manufactured in government-owned ordnance factories. If confirmed, the reported origin of the ammunition raises questions about how it entered the alleged illegal supply chain and whether it was diverted through licensed dealers or other intermediaries.

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has reportedly joined the investigation. It is expected to examine the origin of the ammunition, the supply chain and the possible involvement of other individuals. According to media reports, the investigation has also brought renewed attention to the name of Jalan Shop, which reportedly surfaced in an earlier arms smuggling case in Bihar. Reports in that case alleged that an individual associated with the shop supplied nearly 100 pistols to different parts of Bihar using forged arms licences. The accused was reportedly wanted by the NIA and remains absconding.

Investigators have yet to establish whether the current ammunition network has any connection with that case or other previously investigated arms trafficking operations. The agencies are now attempting to trace the intended recipients of the seized cartridges and identify the ultimate buyers. They are also examining whether the ammunition was meant for organised criminal groups or other illegal networks.

Explosives seized in Chitrakoot

There are differing accounts regarding the intended use of the seized materials from the third incident.

According to reports, the accused told investigators that the explosives were being transported from Majhgawan in Madhya Pradesh for digging a well in a rocky area. Police reportedly said the materials were of the type used for breaking rocks in stone quarries.

However, another Amar Ujala report stated that the accused had told police that the materials were intended for making firecrackers. Investigators are examining the source, destination and intended use of the explosives. Police have registered a case against the two accused under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The Bolero used to transport the materials has also been seized.  Following the recovery, police took both men into custody and informed Chitrakoot Superintendent of Police Arun Kumar Singh, who subsequently reached the spot. The accused, along with the seized explosives, were taken to the police station for questioning. Both men were produced before a court and sent to judicial custody.

Investigators are examining the supply chain, the source of the explosives in Madhya Pradesh, their intended recipients and whether other individuals were involved in the transportation or distribution of the materials.

It was while the police from the Markundi police station were conducting a routine checking operation in their jurisdiction on the night of November 3 when they spotted a Bolero approaching. However, suspiciously, when the police signalled the Bolero vehicle to stop, its occupants allegedly attempted to flee. Thereafter, the police intercepted the vehicle after cordoning off the area.

When police personnel asked the two occupants to step out and allow the vehicle to be searched, Mishra reportedly identified himself as a BJP leader and attempted to use his political influence to avoid the search. However, the police proceeded with the inspection and recovered a large quantity of explosive material from the vehicle.

The seized material included 199 kg of gelatin sticks, 100 red-coloured fuses, seven bundles of red wire and 2.945 kg of explosive powder. It was on November 4, Superintendent of Police Arun Kumar Singh held a press conference and presented the two arrested men before journalists, as reported by Dainik Bhaskar and Amar Ujala.

The SP confirmed that Hari Gopal Mishra was associated with the BJP and had contested the Zila Panchayat member election on the party’s ticket. He had also served as a Zila Panchayat member. The second accused, Pappu Tiwari, was identified as his associate.

According to the SP, the two men were apprehended near the Uttar Pradesh–Madhya Pradesh border with approximately two quintals of explosive material. The police are investigating where the explosives were procured, where they were being transported and what they were intended to be used for. Investigators are also examining whether other individuals or organised groups were involved in the case.

The police are further probing the possible purchase and sale of the explosives; the network of people associated with their supply and whether the accused possessed the mandatory licences and documents for storing and transporting such material.

The SP said that the complete details would emerge only after the investigation was concluded. He also observed that the recovery of such a large quantity of explosives raised serious concerns, as the material could potentially have been used to carry out a major incident.

BJP silent, yet to respond

The arrest of a person identified by the police as a former BJP-backed Zila Panchayat member, along with the recovery of such a huge quantity of explosives, has caused considerable embarrassment for the party. The BJP has not issued any public statement on the matter so far.

The incident has also triggered political questions about the source, illegal procurement and intended use of the explosives. However, the allegations concerning any wider political or organisational involvement remain unsubstantiated and will have to be established through the police investigation.

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The post UP & Bihar: Tranches of arms & explosives recovered over the Diwali weekend appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A copy of the judgement is not yet available.

Doley was arrested on July 12, days after he took part in a protest against a hotel project at Ingle Pathar, a village adjoining the Kaziranga National Park in Assam. Predictably, the police had alleged that he “unlawfully trespassed into the site of the Tea Tribes Museum and thereafter trespassed into the nearby ATDC [Assam Tourism Development Corporation] Hyatt project at Ingle Pathar with deadly weapons” during the protest. Doley, is the convenor of the Greater Kaziranga Land and Human Rights Protection Committee (GKLHRPC) and a leading face of the agitation against a proposed luxury hotel project near Kaziranga National Park.

On July 29, a sessions court in Golaghat granted bail to Doley, stating that the investigating officer had already recorded the statements of key witnesses and that there was no possibility of the accused concealing or tampering with the evidence.

However, the very next day, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in the state detained Doley under the National Security Act, alleging that he had carried out “suspicious foreign transactions from doubtful sources” in violation of the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act. Shockingly, this means that he was not released from jail, despite the bail order.

In August, the Congress had alleged that the Assam government invoking the Act against Doley was part of a “growing pattern” of the BJP “weaponising extraordinary laws to silence dissent”. Party leader Jairam Ramesh had described the state government’s allegations against Doley as “vague and speculative”.

Citing detentions of at least two other persons under the Act in Uttar Pradesh in April, the Opposition MP claimed that this was a familiar script followed by the Narendra Modi government.

At the time of the arrest itself, three organisations have issued strongly worded statements condemning the arrest of prominent Assam land rights activist Pranab Doley, describing the police action as an attempt to suppress democratic dissent and intimidate communities resisting corporate-backed projects in and around Kaziranga. In separate statements released on July 12, the Forum for Social Harmony, the Asom Mojuri Shramik Union (AMSU) and All India Kisan Mazdoor Sabha (AIKMS), and the Bhumi Adhikar Andolan (BAA) alleged that Doley’s arrest is part of an intensifying pattern of criminalising indigenous rights defenders, farmers and people’s movements challenging land acquisition, displacement and the expansion of corporate interests in ecologically sensitive areas. While each statement approaches the issue from a distinct perspective, all three organisations unequivocally demand Doley’s immediate and unconditional release, withdrawal of what they describe as false and politically motivated criminal cases, and an end to the alleged use of police powers to stifle democratic protest.

The statements were issued hours after the Assam Police detained Doley in Guwahati on July 12 in connection with a criminal case registered at Bokakhat Police Station.

Forum for Social Harmony calls arrest an attack on democratic rights

The Forum for Social Harmony characterised Doley’s arrest as “an attack on democratic rights”, alleging that the Assam government had deployed the police machinery to suppress a legitimate people’s movement centred on land rights, livelihood protection and environmental justice. The organisation said the arrest was deeply alarming because it followed a prolonged and peaceful campaign by local farmers, indigenous communities and several people’s organisations opposing the proposed luxury hotel project at Engle (Inglay) Pathar in Kaziranga.

According to the Forum, the government’s response has not been to engage with the concerns raised by affected communities but to repeatedly invoke criminal law against movement leaders. It alleged that the filing of one criminal case after another reflects a “dangerous trend” of shrinking democratic space, where constitutionally protected rights to dissent and freedom of expression are increasingly curtailed through criminal prosecution and police action.

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A brief background on the facts and legal proceedings:

Two days ago, on November 3, 2026, a Division Bench (DB) comprising Justices Anil K. Narendran and Muralee Krishna S., in Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit v Archana P.S. & Ors (W.A. 2276/2026), set aside a single judge’s interim order. The interim order had directed the university to accept the fees of 16 suspended students of the Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit (Kalady, Ernakulam, Kerala) and let them appear for their exams. The appeal before the Division Bench (DB) was decided on grounds of pleadings and interim relief. In doing so, the DB quoted, and gave fresh life to, the 2017 observations in Dr Antony Thomas v V.M. Muhammed Rafique, to say that students engaging in such protest in an educational institution are liable to be expelled or rusticated.

The university has alleged that both obstruction and assault took place on August 13, 2026. Students on their part have disputed this, and an investigation is ongoing. NAJAR has stated that it takes no position on disputed facts and does not condone violence, if it has happened. But the issue of whether violence took place and whether peaceful protests have a place in a campus are entirely different questions, and the two must not be inter-twined. NAJAR believes that presenting non-violent campus protest as inherently ‘anti-democratic’ confuses peaceful agitation (for better facilities) or student rights with unlawful disruption and the same cannot be accepted.

Peaceful Protest in Academic Spaces is a Constitutional Right:

Article 19 (1) (a) and (b) under the Indian Constitution guarantee freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. Nothing in the Constitution excludes dharna or satyagraha as forms of peaceful protest, and nothing suspends these rights when a citizen is a student or when the place is a university campus or academic institution. The Supreme Court has recognised peaceful protest as part of these freedoms, including in in the famed Ramlila Maidan Incident (2012), Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India (2018) and Amit Sahni v Commissioner of Police (2020).

Invoking Dr. Ambedkar to restrain peaceful protest is unfair:

On November 3, 2026; the Division Bench repeated the following observations of the Court in Dr. Antony Thomas v. V.M. Muhammed Rafique and others:

“Political activities like dharna, hunger strikes and other practices like Satyagraha have no place in a constitutional democracy, much less in academic institutions. Anyone indulging in the said activities in an educational institution would make himself liable to be expelled and/or rusticated. Educational Institutions are meant for imparting education and not politics. By their political ambition the political parties cannot hold to ransom the educational institution or the right of the civilized students to receive education.”

These observations apparently stem from Dr B.R. Ambedkar’s “Grammar of Anarchy”, wherein he had stressed that, where there are constitutional remedies available, there is no justification in adopting unconstitutional methods. However, says NAJAR, to misquote Dr. Ambedkar in such a skewed fashion, particularly in the context of student politics is nothing more than a futile attempt at stretching the clock of constitutionalism over institutional suppression. The whole ideation is problematic in manifold ways.

First, the above quoted passage is conditional. It says unconstitutional methods lack justification where constitutional methods are open. The relevant question is whether constitutional channels were actually open to these students, and the Court actually has not examined it on merit. When university authorities act arbitrarily, constitutional avenues inside the campus stand effectively shut. In such situations, peaceful protest is not a breakdown of law; it is the only remaining constitutional recourse to invoke administrative accountability.

Second, Dr. Ambedkar’s call to rely on constitutional remedies alone has to be read with the shift in his personal and political ideology pre and post adoption of the Constitution. The fact that in the pre-independence era, the people had to rely on both violent and non-violent means of protest against the colonial oppressors doesn’t vitiate the political reality of today, which many a times demand lawful means of protests including Satyagraha and dharna. In fact, more often it is the constitutional institutions that compel the citizens to adopt such means. Quoting Babasaheb, who himself led the Mahad Satyagraha in 1927, to justify a blanket ban on satyagrahas is selective. Equating non-violent protest with criminality distorts the original intention and warning.

Satyagraha and the role of student movements in India today:

Satyagraha was one of the methods of mass resistance during India’s freedom movement. It is difficult to call it ‘alien’ to constitutional democracy when this method, popularised by Gandhi himself, helped create one. Student movements, likewise, have shaped campuses in Kerala and the country, from the freedom struggle to later movements for rights and institutional reform. Back then, students boycotted colonial institutions and joined the Non-Cooperation and Quit India movements. In recent years, students have challenged sexist hostel curfews and caste discrimination on campus. After the NTA cancelled the NEET-UG exam amid paper leak allegations, students across the country peacefully took to the streets, following which Mr. Dharmendra Pradhan, former Union Education Minister, had to resign.

These movements are not ‘distractions’ from or ‘disruptions’ in education. They are how students and youth demand answers and accountability from educational institutions. To say that educational institutions are meant for imparting education and not politics is either political illiteracy or a much despicable attempt to isolate students from critical thinking and democratic expression.

NAJAR Re-affirms Right to Peaceful Organising and Protest:

NAJAR has emphasised that it believes that all students across campuses and learning spaces must have lawful channels to raise grievances, and institutions should answer reasonable grievances, rather than discipline or crack down on those who raise them. De-politicizing campuses strips students of their ability to question injustice and understand, reform social structures.

Belonging to a particular political ideology or refusing to tender an apology, or relying on matters yet to be evidentially ascertained, cannot be the reasons to shun protesting students from placing their reasonable grievances for institutional reforms, in a constitutionally democratic manner. Protesting peacefully does not make the students ‘less civilized’ or ‘unruly’.

Rather restricting the right to peaceful protest is a highly dubious attempt of subverting the progressive, democratic civic spaces in a state like Kerala, which is what it is today, thanks to democratic resistance, protests and the constitutional fights spearheaded by student and citizen movements!

Hence, the collective has also called upon the Sree Sankaracharya University to complete the enquiry promptly and fairly, in accordance with natural justice and proportionality. NAJAR has also urged that the 2017 observations of the High Court not be relied upon currently by the Kerala High Court to punish peaceful protests. Campus dissent must not be criminalised or treated as a threat to education.

Related:

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Campuses in Revolt: How the UGC Equity Stay and Criminalised Dissent Have Ignited Student Protests Across India

The post Kerala High Court’s Observations on Protest in Educational Institutions Unacceptable & Restrictive: NAJAR appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A division bench of Justices Valmiki Menezes and Amit Jamsandekar allowed the petitions challenging the deletion of their names and the rejection of their Form 8 applications, which are used by existing voters to update their residential addresses.

The court directed the Booth Level Officer (BLO) of the Santacruz Assembly constituency in Goa to include the petitioners’ names within 10 days, after verifying their residence.

As reported by LiveLaw, the bench said, “We allow the petition… We have rejected the contention of the ECI that the hearing in the present plea be deferred as the issue of SIR is pending before the Supreme Court…. This is not pertaining to SIR… We therefore ordered the BLO of Santacruz Constituency (in Goa) to add the names of the petitioners within a period of 10 days from today.”

The court also refused the ECI’s request to stay the operation of its order for two weeks.

Court questions requirement to submit enumeration forms

The dispute arose after the petitioners, members of the Salgaonkar family, approached the court stating that their names had been omitted from the electoral roll despite submitting Form 8 applications seeking changes to their residential addresses.

The ECI argued that under the SIR guidelines, voters were required to submit a pre-filled enumeration form along with Form 8. Since the petitioners had not submitted the enumeration forms, they were asked to file Form 6, which is meant for fresh inclusion in the electoral roll.

The bench questioned this requirement, pointing out that the pre-filled enumeration form contained a declaration that the elector continued to reside at the address recorded in the existing electoral roll.

Questioning how voters who had shifted residence could be compelled to make such a declaration, Justice Menezes observed:

“If a voter comes to you with Form 8, saying he has changed his address you just cannot tell that person that look your name isn’t included in the draft roll now you will have to fill in Form 6 (inclusion of new voter). Your enumeration form, basically has a declaration that a person continues to live at the address as mentioned in the existing voters list. But consider, if someone has changed their residence, can you compel the person to make a false declaration by submitting that pre-filled enumeration? Why can’t that person simply give a Form 8 because anyway, his name is there in the existing list he just wants to get his address changed.. Why compel enumeration form?”

The bench had also questioned why an existing elector seeking an address correction should be required to apply as a new voter.

Court flags risk of excluding eligible voters

During the hearings, the bench questioned the ECI’s approach of rejecting Form 8 applications instead of keeping them pending for verification. It also raised concerns about the consequences of compelling relocated voters to submit declarations that no longer reflected their actual residential status.

As reported by Bar and Bench, the court flagged a “catch-22 situation” in which voters who had shifted residence faced rejection of their Form 8 applications and were instead directed to submit Form 6, potentially creating further difficulties in establishing their electoral registration.

The ECI, represented by Senior Advocate Ashutosh Kumbhakoni, argued that the draft SIR roll was prepared afresh (de novo) on the basis of newly collected enumeration forms. According to the ECI, voters whose names did not appear in the draft roll could not use Form 8 to modify an existing entry and were required to apply afresh through Form 6 during the claims and objections period.

The court, however, allowed the petitions and directed restoration of the six names. It also rejected the ECI’s request to defer the proceedings until the Supreme Court decides the broader challenges to the SIR process.

The detailed written order is awaited.

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The post Goa SIR: Bombay High Court orders ECI to restore names of six voters deleted from final electoral roll appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“A police force has made itself the enforcement arm of a private legal notice,” the IFF said in its statement condemning the police action.

The following complete text is a statement issued by the Internet Freedom Foundation detailing how it was issued a legal notice on behalf of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh along with other organisations documenting censorship in India, and the police action that followed.

The Delhi Police has asked X to remove the Internet Freedom Foundation’s account, six of its posts, the accounts of SFLC and @geoblockedindia, and posts by 16 other users, on the ground that they defame the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

The posts document and comment on a legal notice sent in the RSS’s name to IFF, SFLC and @geoblockedindia, which demanded that the three-stop criticising and documenting government blocking orders. IFF received copies of the two police notices from X on the morning of 3 November 2026.

IFF has called on the Delhi Police to withdraw both notices. If they are not withdrawn, IFF will challenge them in court.

What happened thus far

On October 29, 2026 at 9:54 PM, IFF, SFLC and the operator of @geoblockedindia received a two-page “legal notice” said to be issued on behalf of the RSS. It asked the three to stop opposing the government’s blocking directions, stop documenting restricted content, stop posting details of geo-blocked posts, and confirm in writing within seven days that they would comply. It was signed by an unnamed “Authorised Signatory”. Several RSS office-bearers have since said on X that the notice is not authentic.

IFF replied to the notice, wrote to the RSS at its official address asking whether it had authorised it, and published both the notice and its reply just the next day, on October 30. Undeterred by whether or not the notice was authentic, on October 31, 2026 at 8:06 PM, the Special Commissioner of Police (Crime), Delhi Police, filed an “Illegal Content Report” with X (reference LD-321926). It listed two posts: IFF’s post of October 30 on the notice, and SFLC post of the same day. The stated reason was that the posts are “defamatory towards the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) under Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023”. The boxes for “safety/security”, “defamation” and “other” were ticked. The fields for the nature of the court order and court order details were left empty. The desired action was “Remove/withhold content”.

There is more. On November 1, 2026, a Sunday, a second notice arrived in the RSS’s name. It said the matter had been handed to the Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad, that complaints had been filed in several states, and that requests had been made to block IFF’s X account and suspend the organisations. The Delhi Police had made its first request to X the previous evening. IFF did not know this until X told it on 3 November.

On November 2, 2026 at 8:51 AM, the Special Commissioner of Police (Crime) filed a second notice with X (reference LD-322956). It lists 40 URLs. Thirty-seven are posts. Three are the entire accounts of @internetfreedom, @SFLCin and @geoblockedindia. This time the boxes for “Hate speech”, “defamation”, “safety/security”, “enforcement of court order” and “other” were all ticked. The court order fields were again left empty. The stated reason reads: “The posts constitute defamation and illegal content under Section 356 BNS. Under Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021, read with Section 79(3)(b) IT Act, lawful notices require action within 3 hours.”

The 16 other users are @ProdctiveUseful, @PanjwaniManoj, @jidge_, @RatanSharda55, @baxiabhishek, @SchrdingersDbag, @ashleshbiradar, @seemay, @NasirHussainINC, @Being_creat_ive, @AjoyDharmavaram, @othlaw, @_ananyaaa, @AimPoojaind, @incorigibleBhai and @rraoind.

Their posts, as far as IFF can tell, comment on the notice or on the notice about it. X forwarded both notices to IFF on 3 November 2026, at 8:47 AM and 10:03 AM, saying it was doing so “in the interest of transparency” and that IFF may wish to seek legal counsel and challenge the request in court. X’s emails do not say that it has acted on the requests.

The Delhi Police has not written to IFF, and no court has been approached, as far as the reports disclose. SFLC and @geoblockedindia have separately reported notifications from X about requests from the Uttar Pradesh Police, the Telangana Police and the Delhi Police’s Cyber Crime unit, one of them against the whole of the @geoblockedindia account.

IFF’s position

IFF has unequivocally condemned this legal action. A police force has made itself the enforcement arm of a private legal notice whose authenticity the organisation it names has not confirmed, and whose demand was that three organisations stop documenting censorship.

The notices would deliver exactly what the notice asked for as they would also remove the accounts of the three groups in India that keep public records of what is blocked, and of who ordered it. The posts in question are about a legal notice sent to us. They quote it, criticise how it was drafted, and say that we will carry on with our work.

A person who receives a threat is entitled to publish it and answer it and that is not defamation of the sender. In the three weeks before the first notice, IFF assisted 86 people whose accounts were suspended or whose posts were withheld in India. SFLC’s Free Speech Tracker recorded about 268 content restrictions and 83 account restrictions in the first days 29 of October. @geoblockedindia publishes the orders behind such blocks when platforms disclose them. None of this is unlawful.

Documenting censorship and challenging it in court is what the Constitution expects of citizens. IFF will not delete the posts. If the Delhi Police does not withdraw the notices, we will challenge them in court.

Why the reports are unlawful

Defamation is not a police matter. Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is a non-cognisable and bailable offence. Under Section 222 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, no court can take cognizance of it except on a complaint by the person aggrieved.

Under Section 174 of the BNSS, the police cannot investigate a non-cognisable offence without an order of a Magistrate. The Special Commissioner of Police (Crime) is not the person aggrieved. The notices disclose no complaint by the RSS and no order of any Magistrate. Whether a statement is defamatory is for a court to decide after hearing its author, with the defences of truth, fair comment and good faith available to that author.

In Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221, the Supreme Court upheld criminal defamation on the strength of these safeguards alone. A police officer who asks a platform to remove speech as defamatory has decided the question himself, without a complainant, a court or a hearing. The posts are protected comment. Exceptions 1 to 3 to Section 356(1) protect the truth published for the public good, opinion on the public conduct of public servants, and opinion on the conduct of any person touching a public question. The posts publish a notice that was sent to us and give our opinion of it. The RSS, if it sent the notice, chose to enter a public question. If it did not, the posts defame no one.

Further, Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d) do not permit this. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, the Supreme Court read down Section 79(3)(b) so that an intermediary acquires “actual knowledge” only through a court order, or a notification from the appropriate government or its agency that unlawful acts relatable to Article 19(2) are being committed. The court said that it would be difficult for intermediaries to judge the legitimacy of the millions of requests they receive, and that the burden must not be placed on them. Rule 3(1)(d), as amended in November 2025 and February 2026, now requires the intimation to come from an officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary or Deputy Inspector General, to be reasoned, and to specify the legal basis and the nature of the unlawful act, subject to a monthly review by a Secretary-level officer. The three-hour window the notice invokes applies to a lawful order that meets these conditions. A web form that ticks “hate speech” and “enforcement of court order” while leaving the court order fields blank, and that gives one sentence of reasons for 40 URLs, is not such an order.

The notices by the Delhi Police are also disproportionate. They seek to remove three accounts in their entirety, with years of posts, over six, four and eleven posts respectively. They sweep in 16 third parties whose only connection is that they commented on a public controversy. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637, the Supreme Court held that any restriction on speech must be necessary, proportionate and the least restrictive measure available, and that orders restricting speech must be published and reasoned. Removing an organisation’s entire account for criticising a legal notice fails each of these tests.

The effect is to silence documentation of censorship and providing legal aid to Indian internet users. The accounts named are those that record blocking orders in India. The notice asked them to stop. A takedown request that accomplishes the demand of an anonymous private notice is not law enforcement. It is the use of state power for a private end, which Article 14 forbids.

Demands put forward by the IFF

1. To the Delhi Police: Withdraw reports LD-321926 and LD-322956 and confirm the withdrawal in writing to X and to IFF.
2. To the Delhi Police: Disclose the complaint on which the Special Commissioner of Police (Crime) acted, the authority under which the reports were filed, and whether any order of a Magistrate under Section 174 BNSS exists. Disclose every request made to any platform in this matter, including those made by the Cyber Crime unit against @geoblockedindia.
3. To X: Do not act on the reports. If any content is withheld in India, tell the affected user before acting, give them the full request, and name the legal basis. Publish both reports to the Lumen database, as the reporting form itself contemplates.
4. To the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and the Ministry of Home Affairs: Have the Secretary-level review required by Rule 3(1)(d) examine these intimations, and tell police forces that Rule 3(1)(d) is not a remedy for defamation, which the law reserves to the person aggrieved and to the courts.
5. To the RSS: State publicly whether it authorised either notice or any complaint to the police. If it did not, say so to the Delhi Police. If the notices are not withdrawn, IFF will challenge them in court. We will continue to document blocking orders, to publish them, and to provide legal assistance to anyone whose account or post is withheld in India. Nothing in these notices changes that.

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The post ‘We will challenge notices in Court’: IFF’s statement on legal notice over ‘defaming’ RSS appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In constitutional jurisprudence, few distinctions are as crucial, or as frequently conflated, as the line separating the substantive protection of civil liberties from the procedural integrity of the rule of law. When state authorities deploy the machinery of criminal law to target citizens engaging in public protests, registering widespread First Information Reports (FIRs), executing indiscriminate detentions, and imposing coercive measures, the vindication of fundamental freedoms under Articles 19(1)(b) and 21 of the Indian Constitution is an urgent judicial duty. Yet, how a court achieves that protection determines whether its decision operates as a durable triumph of constitutional governance or as an act of unstructured, transactional equity.

The Supreme Court’s order of September 1, 2026, quashing over a hundred FIRs filed across multiple states during the student exam-irregularity protests, presents precisely this constitutional paradox. At first blush, the order appears to be an act of judicial benevolence since it relieves thousands of young student-protesters from the crushing burden of ongoing criminal prosecutions. However, a closer examination reveals that this relief was not achieved through judicial adjudication based in constitutional principle. Instead, it was delivered as the judicial rubber-stamping of a negotiated compromise between the executive branch and a protest organisation.

By invoking its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to extinguish criminal proceedings en masse as part of a bilateral settlement, where the quashing of FIRs was effectively exchanged for the withdrawal of a planned protest march, the Supreme Court shifted its role from an independent court of record to an informal arbitral forum. In doing so, the Court’s methodology closely mirrored the traditional logic of a panchayat, an institution that prioritizes ad-hoc compromise, transactional peace-making. While protecting citizens from abusive state prosecution is unquestionably good, accomplishing it through judicial discretion en masse represents a subtle but dangerous denigration of the rule of law.

Relief as an Executive-Judicial Settlement

The legal proceedings surrounding the July 2026 student protests examination malpractices illustrate the operational mechanisms of this model. Following widespread demonstrations across Delhi, Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, and Maharashtra, law enforcement agencies-initiated dozens of FIRs naming thousands of participants. The pattern was remarkably similar, a stenograph-ed pattern of behaviour that reflected close, cross border communications between different state police! In response, litigations were brought before the Supreme Court, challenging the proportionality of state force, the use of metallic pellet guns, biometric surveillance, and arbitrary detentions.

None of the original writ petitions prayed for a blanket judicial extinction of all criminal cases across the country without trial. Rather, they sought constitutional accountability, judicial scrutiny of police brutality, guidelines on crowd control, and the enforcement of personal liberty under Article 21. On August 18, 2026, the Supreme Court took a step toward structured adjudication by constituting a High-Powered Enquiry Committee, chaired by a retired Supreme Court judge, to investigate police conduct, preserve drone and CCTV footage, and evaluate the legality of blanket prohibitory orders.

Later, the apex court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution. When the protest leadership agreed to withdraw a major national march scheduled for September 5, and in return, the state governments ‘consciously decided’ not to pursue the FIRs. On September 1, 2026, period and Court quashed 129 specified FIRs across five states, closing all unlisted FIRs nationwide arising from the same protest period, and recording the protest group’s formal withdrawal of its demonstration.

Why Procedure is Liberty’s Shield

To understand why this disposition degrades the rule of law, one must examine the architecture of criminal procedure. Criminal law is intrinsically individualised. An FIR is an assertion that a specific individual committed a specific statutory offence at a specific time and place. The statutory scheme for extinguishing criminal proceedings, whether through police final reports, executive withdrawal of prosecution under Section 360 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), or judicial quashing under Section 528 BNSS (formerly Section 482 CrPC), requires judicial evaluation of specific material.

When a High Court or the Supreme Court exercises its inherent power to quash an FIR, the well-established legal standard requires the Court to ask whether taking the allegations in the FIR at face value, does a prima facie criminal offence exist, or is the prosecution demonstrably malicious and an abuse of legal process? This inquiry is the essential mechanism through which the judiciary holds the executive accountable for illegal criminalisation.

In the September 1 order, this entire statutory and analytical framework was bypassed. The Supreme Court quashed 129 FIRs, which encompassed disparate charges ranging from mild unlawful assembly and road blockades to serious allegations of rioting, destruction of public property, and attempted murder, in a single, wholesale decree. The Court did not evaluate whether the allegations were legally unsustainable or factually fabricated. By replacing judicial scrutiny with executive acquiescence, the Court failed to make a finding that the state’s mass registration of FIRs was unlawful. Consequently, the protesters were administratively spared prosecution as an act of state grace, rather than legally vindicated as citizens exercising a fundamental constitutional right.

The Arbitrary ‘Antecedents’ Exception

The risks of abandoning statutory procedure become even more transparent when examining the exceptions carved out within the order itself. While granting blanket immunity to the majority of protesters, Paragraph 7 of the Court’s order excluded approximately 2,873 individuals. These individuals were denied relief and subjected to fresh criminal investigation solely because state police affidavits asserted that they had ‘serious criminal antecedents’ according to national police databases and were ‘prima facie present’ at protest sites.

This carve-out demonstrates the problematic layering of uncanalised discretion. One is that Indian criminal law contains no statutory principle authorising the judicial exclusion of individuals from general legal remedies based merely on ‘antecedents.’ In criminal jurisprudence, an FIR relates to a specific alleged act, not a person’s prior history. Second, the list of 2,873 excluded individuals was compiled using automated facial recognition technology matched against police databases, an unverified process that the Court accepted without independent judicial verification or procedural testing. And then, If the mass filing of FIRs against peaceful assembly was an abuse of state power warranting Article 142 intervention, on what legal principle does prior criminal history deprive a citizen of protection against an admitted abuse of state power?

Discretion inevitably breeds further discretion. Having constructed an extraordinary amnesty unmoored from code procedure, the Court was forced to construct an equally arbitrary threshold to limit that amnesty, relying on unverified executive data to divide citizens into protected and unprotected classes.

Evasion of Constitutional Duty

Perhaps the most defenceless aspect of the September 1 order is its explicit concluding direction: that the invocation of Article 142 was based on ‘peculiar facts and circumstances’ and ‘shall not be treated as a binding precedent.’ In recent years, the practice of issuing sweeping orders while simultaneously stripping them of precedential value under Article 141 has emerged as a frequent judicial technique. From a constitutional perspective, this practice is deeply problematic.

The primary obligation of an apex constitutional court is to declare generalisable legal principles that bind lower courts, discipline executive power, and guide future adjudication. The rule of law requires that like cases be decided alike. When a court decides a dispute, applies legal standards, and then declares that its ruling cannot be cited by any other citizen in any other court, it effaces the decision’s standing as law. It transforms the judgment from a rule of general application into a one-time privilege conferred upon specific litigants.

This non-precedent mechanism severely harms civil liberties jurisprudence. A student protester in a distant trial court facing an identical, fabricated FIR cannot cite the Supreme Court’s order as a legal standard. Trial courts and High Courts remain bound by rigid procedural rules, while the Supreme Court reserves to itself the exclusive power to randomly grant extraordinary, ad-hoc relief. Instead of diffusing liberty-protective legal standards throughout the judicial pyramid, the Court centralises power within its own hall, creating a regime where fundamental rights are accessible not as of legal right, but as a matter of top-tier judicial audience and transaction.

Ad-Hoc Compromise vs. The Rule of Law

It is in this structural departure from legal principle that the resemblance to a panchayat becomes unmistakable. In traditional Indian legal theory and sociology, a village panchayat operates on principles fundamentally distinct from a constitutional court of record. A panchayat does not adjudicate rights according to pre-existing, neutral, written laws, nor is it bound by strict procedural rules or formal evidence. Its primary objective is transactional dispute resolution: ‘buying peace,’ brokering compromises between powerful factions, and restoring social harmony through ad-hoc equity.

While informal compromise has a legitimate place in customary community spaces or private civil mediation, it is the antithesis of constitutional adjudication. A constitutional court exists to enforce jus (principled justice), and not merely to secure social peace at the expense of legal standards. The Supreme Court conditioning the quashing of unlawful prosecutions on a political party agreeing to call off a protest march is the Court adopting the precise logic of the panchayat. It treats fundamental freedoms, such as the right to peaceably assemble under Article 19 (1) (b), not as non-negotiable constitutional guarantees, but as bargaining chips to be traded away in exchange for executive leniency.

This approach creates severe long-term institutional risks. It signals to the executive that mass criminalization is an effective strategy; the state can file thousands of baseless FIRs against peaceful dissenters, safe in the knowledge that if public pressure escalates, the Supreme Court will facilitate a negotiated settlement without ever holding police officers accountable or declaring the state’s actions illegal. Conversely, it signals to citizens that relief from state coercion depends on organizational bargaining power rather than constitutional entitlement.

Emergency judicial relief brings immediate comfort to citizens facing state coercion. When the Supreme Court uses Article 142 to clear criminal cases against peaceful protesters, individual lives are saved from endless prosecution. Problems emerge when that relief depends on political bargaining. Trading criminal dismissals for cancelled rallies produces informal settlements. Declaring these orders without precedential value removes their legal weight. The Court assumes the role of a village panchayat, brokering temporary peace between unequal sides.

The consequences of this approach appeared during the October demonstrations against the Chief Election Commissioner. In September, the Court wiped away FIRs from student protests while leaving foundational legal questions unresolved. The bench did not evaluate whether police could issue blanket prohibitory notices under Section 163 of the BNSS or close transit networks. By treating the September quashing as an isolated compromise, the Court allowed law enforcement to retain unchecked statutory authority.

When citizens gathered again in October, authorities deployed their usual tactics. Officials shut metro stations and stopped incoming trains. Police also detained working lawyers on their way to court. Lacking prior legal standards, the bench convened emergency Sunday sittings to hear contempt petitions. Justices issued oral warnings that regulation cannot equal total prohibition while ordering police to remove restrictive notices from around court gates.

Had the Court articulated binding constitutional boundaries in September, executive agencies would have faced clear limits. Setting prospective rules constrains state authority and protects public assembly across future disputes. Settling individual cases through transactional orders creates administrative convenience today while guaranteeing repeated overreach tomorrow.

Structural Remedies

The critique of the CJP order is not to suggest that the Supreme Court should have allowed thousands of innocent students to be dragged through decades of oppressive trials. Rather, it demonstrates that a truly liberty-preserving court must protect citizens by developing and applying legal principles, rather than resorting to ad-hoc, non-precedential amnesties.

In landmark constitutional jurisprudence ranging from Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner (1962) to Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998), the Supreme Court established that Article 142 cannot be used to supplant statutory frameworks or override fundamental rights. To genuinely protect civil liberties against state overreach, the Court must deploy structural remedies grounded in Public Law. The Court should formally evaluate mass FIRs against the standards of Article 19 (1) (b) and Article 19 (3), explicitly ruling that the routine criminalization of peaceful assembly is unconstitutional and illegal. Under the doctrine established in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997), the Court should impose direct compensatory damages on state authorities for malicious prosecution and illegal detention, creating a genuine deterrent against police abuse. By declaring clear, generalizable legal standards under Article 141, the Supreme Court empowers trial courts and High Courts across India to swiftly quash abusive FIRs at the threshold, ensuring equal protection for all citizens.

The protection of civil liberties and the preservation of the rule of law are not opposing values; they are mutually dependent. A judicial order that delivers immediate relief by sacrificing procedural rigor and precedential integrity provides only a fleeting, fragile sanctuary. True constitutional justice demands that the Supreme Court remain an uncompromising court of law protecting the citizen not through the informal compromise of a panchayat, but through the enduring, equalizing power of constitutional principle.

(The author is a legal researcher with the organisation)

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Justice Madhu Jain dismissed the appeals filed by Aman Kashyap, Devinder Kumar, Pradeep Rai, Ashish alias Goli and Arun Kumar, upholding their conviction under Sections 148 and 304 Part I read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Court held that the prosecution evidence established more than the appellants’ mere presence in a crowd: it placed them at the forefront of an armed mob that pursued and assaulted the deceased.

The central question before the Court was whether the appellants could be held collectively liable for the death when the prosecution had not established which individual had inflicted the fatal head injuries. Affirming the trial court’s findings, the High Court held that the absence of proof identifying the individual assailant was not, by itself, sufficient to absolve the appellants of liability under Section 149 IPC. The Court held that the weapons carried by the mob, the exhortations attributed to the appellants and the continued assault provided the factual basis for finding that the assembly shared the unlawful common object of assaulting the deceased and causing bodily harm.

“In the present case, the evidence establishes more than the mere presence of the appellants in a crowd. PW-10 identified all five appellants at the forefront of the armed mob, exhorting others to assault the deceased. The deceased was pursued, surrounded and assaulted even after he had fallen near the police barricades. The conduct attributed to the appellants, the weapons carried by members of the mob and the continued assault upon the deceased provide the factual basis for concluding that the assembly had an unlawful common object of assaulting the deceased and causing bodily harm to him.” (Para 67)

Prosecution evidence and the appellants’ challenge

The case arose from an incident on February 25, 2020, when Monish was allegedly chased and assaulted by a mob near Gali No. 3, Brijpuri, in the vicinity of Peer Baba Mazar, Chand Bagh. He was subsequently taken to Guru Teg Bahadur Hospital, where he died from his injuries. The post-mortem report attributed his death to shock resulting from ante-mortem brain injuries caused by blunt-force impact.

The trial court, by its judgment dated November 30, 2024, convicted the five appellants under Sections 148 and 304 Part I read with Section 149 IPC. By its order dated January 13, 2025, it sentenced them to one year of simple imprisonment for rioting while armed with a deadly weapon and seven years of rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of ₹30,000, for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.

Challenging the conviction, the appellants questioned the credibility of the eyewitnesses, the delay in recording the police witnesses’ statements, the absence of a test identification parade (TIP) and alleged deficiencies in the investigation. They also disputed the identification evidence and argued that the prosecution had failed to establish their participation in the assault or the common object necessary to attract constructive liability under Section 149 IPC.

The defence particularly relied on the changing testimony of Shashi Kant, who initially attributed the assault to the accused but subsequently clarified that he had seen the five appellants in the mob without personally witnessing them strike the deceased. Manoj Kaniyal, another prosecution witness, did not identify the appellants before the trial court and denied the prosecution’s suggestions concerning their identification.

High Court assesses identification evidence and police testimony

Rejecting the challenge to the identification evidence, the High Court placed primary reliance on the testimony of Constable Piyush, the beat constable of the locality, who stated that he knew the appellants before the incident through his official duties.

Piyush identified the five men as being at the forefront of the mob, carrying weapons and shouting “maaro maaro”. According to his testimony, the deceased was chased, assaulted near the police barricades and repeatedly beaten even after falling. The police personnel subsequently intervened, dispersed the mob and arranged for the injured man to be taken to hospital.

Head Constable Deepak and Constable Vineet substantially corroborated the account of the pursuit, assault and police intervention. The Court acknowledged, however, that these witnesses had obtained the appellants’ names from Piyush, and that their identification was not independent of his insofar as the names were concerned. Their evidence nevertheless supported the occurrence and the contemporaneous pointing out of the persons allegedly involved.

The Court also rejected the contention that the police witnesses’ testimony should be discarded merely because they were public officials. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Girja Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, it reiterated that police testimony must be assessed on its own merits rather than rejected on the basis of the witness’s official status. The Court noted that duty records supported the witnesses’ presence at the police picket and that their accounts substantially corresponded on the pursuit, assault and rescue of the deceased.

“In the present case, the presence of the said witnesses at the police picket is supported by the duty records, and their accounts substantially correspond regarding the manner in which the deceased was pursued, assaulted and subsequently rescued. Their official status, therefore, cannot constitute an independent ground for rejecting their testimonies.” (Para 53)

On the absence of a TIP, the Court relied on Malkhansingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reiterating that identification in court constitutes substantive evidence, while a TIP ordinarily tests a witness’s ability to identify a suspect during investigation. The absence of a TIP does not automatically render identification inadmissible, although its evidentiary value must be assessed with due caution. The Court considered Piyush’s prior familiarity with the appellants particularly relevant to this question.

Delay in recording statements and investigative lapses

The High Court acknowledged that the statements of the three police eyewitnesses were recorded on April 1, 2020, more than a month after the incident. It also noted the investigating officer’s admission that the witnesses had not approached him on their own and had instead been called for examination during the investigation.

The Court cautioned that the delay could not be accepted mechanically merely because the incident occurred during the riots. Nevertheless, after considering the explanation that several riot-related cases were being investigated simultaneously, along with the evidence of the police witnesses, it held that the delay did not, by itself, discredit the occurrence or establish false implication.

The judgment also addressed discrepancies concerning the precise place of the assault, the PCR call and the use of electronic evidence. It clarified that the hospital CCTV footage had been relied upon to identify the injured person, not to establish visually that the appellants had participated in the assault. Similarly, call-detail records could indicate the approximate location of a mobile device but could not conclusively establish the user’s precise physical location at a particular moment.

Acknowledging the investigative deficiencies raised by the defence, the Court held that such lapses did not automatically displace otherwise reliable eyewitness evidence. The relevant inquiry, it said, was whether an omission undermined the credibility of the evidence or prejudiced the assessment of guilt.

Section 149 IPC: Liability without proof of the individual fatal blow

The principal legal issue concerned the application of Section 149 IPC, which attributes liability to members of an unlawful assembly for offences committed in prosecution of its common object, or offences that its members knew were likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.

The Court relied on Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Lalji v. State of Uttar Pradesh to reiterate that the prosecution need not invariably establish an individual overt act by every member of an unlawful assembly. However, it also invoked Kuldip Yadav v. State of Bihar to emphasise that mere presence in an assembly, or possession of a weapon, is insufficient without establishing the unlawful common object or the requisite knowledge.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the prosecution evidence went beyond establishing the appellants’ presence in a crowd. Piyush had identified them as being at the forefront of an armed mob and exhorting others to assault Monish. The deceased was pursued, surrounded and assaulted even after he fell near the police barricades.

Taken together, the conduct attributed to the appellants, the weapons carried by members of the mob and the continued assault supported the finding that the assembly shared the unlawful common object of assaulting the deceased and causing bodily harm.

The Court therefore held that the prosecution’s inability to identify the particular person who inflicted the fatal head injuries did not, by itself, absolve the appellants of liability. The decisive consideration was whether the offence was committed in prosecution of the assembly’s common object or was one its members knew was likely to be committed in pursuit of that object.

Why the conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC was upheld

The High Court separately examined the nature of the offence, emphasising that the fact of death alone could not determine whether the case fell under Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC. Part I applies where the act causing death is accompanied by the intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Part II applies where the accused has the requisite knowledge that death is likely but lacks the intention contemplated under Part I.

Relying on the evidence concerning the weapons carried by the mob, the exhortations attributed to the appellants and the manner in which Monish was assaulted, the Court held that these circumstances had to be considered together in determining the requisite mental element. It noted that the deceased was pursued by an armed mob, repeatedly assaulted after falling and sustained head injuries that proved fatal.

The Court thus upheld the finding that the offence involved the requisite intention under Section 304 Part I IPC and was committed in prosecution of the unlawful assembly’s common object, or was an offence its members knew was likely to be committed in pursuit of that object. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed all five appeals and affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction dated November 30, 2024, and order on sentence dated January 13, 2025.

The complete judgment may be read below:

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The statement forms part of the ECI’s counter-affidavit in a petition filed by Rakesh Kumar Singh, which challenges the functioning of the CEC and the legality of certain Commission decisions. The affidavit, filed by Deputy Election Commissioner Bhanu Prakash Yeturu, says the SIR orders dated June 24, 2025, October 27, 2025, and May 14, 2026, were unanimous. It was approved by all three members.

The Commission has questioned the petition’s reliance on a newspaper report, arguing that the petitioner did not independently verify the allegations. It has also said that it neither released nor authorised the release of internal notes or files to the media.

However, the concerns raised in The Indian Express investigation, published on October 27, go beyond whether the Commission formally approved its decisions. The report documented 14 notes recorded by Sandhu and Joshi over 10 months. Many concerned actions that had already been taken, systems that had been developed or proceedings that had been initiated before the two Commissioners recorded that they had not been informed.

Also, you can read our investigation here:
1. https://t.co/Ous0b5lD98
2. https://t.co/SrJbWUC9OM
3. https://t.co/PGpsT3x7ci
4. https://t.co/pFfaB1Wc5Y
5. https://t.co/ZBf8dSCt6F
(9/10)

— Ritika Chopra (@RitikaChopra__) October 27, 2026

The affidavit explains how the ECI says decisions should be taken. It does not fully explain why the two Commissioners repeatedly recorded that they learnt about important developments after they had occurred.

ECI’s explanation does not resolve concerns over consultation

The Commission has argued that notes, queries, suggestions and observations recorded by individual Commissioners during file processing are not, by themselves, decisions of the ECI.

It says files ordinarily pass from one Election Commissioner to the other before reaching the CEC. The affidavit relies on Section 18 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, which provides for decisions to be taken unanimously as far as practicable and by majority where unanimity is not possible.

But the timing of the notes remains central to the dispute. As reported by The Indian Express, the two Commissioners were often recording their concerns after a decision had been implemented or an official action had already taken place.

The question, therefore, is not simply whether the final orders carried the Commission’s approval. It is whether all three members were adequately informed and involved before the decisions were put into effect. The affidavit does not provide a detailed explanation for the instances in which Sandhu and Joshi said they had been left out of the process.

Form 6 was not amended, says ECI, but who introduced the online declaration?

The dispute over Form 6 illustrates the gap between the Commission’s legal explanation and the questions about how the changes were implemented.

Form 6 is used by citizens to apply for inclusion in electoral rolls. In May, Joshi recorded that the form could not be changed without an amendment to the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. Sandhu agreed. Despite these objections, the online version of Form 6 was changed in July to include a declaration requiring applicants to provide details linking themselves, their parents or grandparents to earlier intensive electoral rolls.

According to The Indian Express, Sandhu learnt about the change through a newspaper report. In August, he described the declaration inserted into the online form as “unauthorised/ illegal”.

The ECI has now said that the declaration was a separate document introduced for the SIR and did not amount to an amendment of the statutory form. It has also maintained that only the Central Government can amend the form prescribed under the 1960 Rules.

At the same time, the affidavit acknowledges that the way the declaration appeared on the online application platform could give the impression that Form 6 had been amended. It further says that certain steps taken by officials needed to be corrected.

On October 21, the Commission’s Electoral Rolls Division decided to separate the online application into two components: Form 6 and the SIR declaration. This brings the online process in line with the procedure followed for physical applications.

The correction addresses how the two documents are presented. But the affidavit does not identify who authorised the declaration’s insertion into Form 6 in July or explain why it was implemented after two Commissioners had recorded objections. It says the declaration was entered on the online page of Form 6 but does not name the official responsible.

ECINet: Formal authority rests with EROs, but earlier software concerns remain

The ECI has defended ECINet, the platform used for electoral roll-related work, by stressing that the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) remains the statutory authority. According to the affidavit, no name can be added to, deleted from or modified in the electoral roll without an order from the competent ERO.

The Commission has also said that an expert committee comprising members from IIT Madras and IISc Bengaluru has been constituted to examine the platform’s compliance with applicable requirements. It has referred to arrangements for scrutinising new information technology modules before they are approved.

However, the measures now described in the affidavit resemble a proposal Joshi made on May 29. He had raised concerns about the gradual centralisation of the electoral roll database and sought an outside expert’s involvement to verify that only the relevant statutory authorities could make changes to it. Sandhu endorsed the proposal in July.

On August 14, Sandhu recorded that he did not know what had happened to the two notes. The affidavit identifies September 26 and 30 as the dates of the Commission’s decisions on the committee but does not mention the earlier proposal.

Other concerns recorded by the Commissioners also remain unanswered. In April, Sandhu noted that the IT division had developed several modules and portals without bringing them before the Commission. He said he had learnt about them through the media. In August, he recorded complaints from field officers who said the system did not allow them to perform functions required by law.

The affidavit’s assurance that the ERO remains legally responsible does not establish whether the software enabled officers to carry out their statutory duties when these concerns were raised.

Goa deletions: Subsequent applications do not explain why officers could not reverse them

The affidavit refers to 97 voters who were left off Goa’s final electoral roll and says that 88 have since applied for inclusion through Form 6.

But this does not explain the earlier failure of the software to allow Electoral Registration Officers in Goa to implement decisions reversing the deletions.

The state’s election office made eight requests over seven days in February for the system to permit the deletions to be reversed. A Deputy Election Commissioner had also recorded that the “IT system cannot block necessary action.”

The affidavit does not explain why the software prevented the required action or how the requests were handled at the time. The fact that 88 voters subsequently applied again does not answer why the earlier decisions could not be implemented through the system.

West Bengal appeals: Who authorised the filings, and how were so many cases handled?

The affidavit states that appeals against orders restoring voters to the electoral roll in West Bengal were filed by officers in the office of the state’s Chief Electoral Officer (CEO). It says the matters were not brought to the Commission and argues that the officers had authority to file the appeals under the Supreme Court’s orders.

How the appeals were handled and who knew about them

On August 7, after a newspaper report about the appeals, Joshi’s office sought the factual position from the officer in charge of the state. Five days later, Sandhu put five questions to the same officer. His note recorded that Joshi had told him he did not have the details.

The affidavit identifies the officers who filed the appeals and says they had the authority to do so under the Supreme Court’s orders. But it does not reconcile this explanation with Sandhu’s note recording that the West Bengal CEO had also said she did not have information about the details of the matter.

The affidavit now cites a letter from the CEO’s office dated October 22 to establish that officers from that office filed the appeals. It does not explain the apparent gap between the earlier account and this later clarification.

There are further unanswered questions. The affidavit does not explain how lakhs of appeals came to be filed on nearly identical grounds, whether the cases were examined individually or how proceedings on this scale moved forward without the Commission being informed. The circumstances also remain unclear given the CEO’s earlier statement, recorded by Sandhu, that she lacked the details.

July administrative order: ECI says it was not implemented

Another issue concerns an order issued in July by a senior officer who had been given temporary charge of the Commission’s administration. The order redistributed work among ECI officers.

Joshi wrote to the Cabinet Secretary that the Administration Division did not provide him with the file when he sought it. The ECI says the order was never implemented after Sandhu and Joshi issued a joint direction. It adds that the two Commissioners’ letters related to this order.

However, the affidavit does not explain why the order was issued without the Commission’s involvement, why the file was not provided to a member of the Commission or what happened to the officer who issued it. The Commission’s explanation addresses the order’s eventual non-implementation but leaves the circumstances surrounding its issuance and the withholding of the file unresolved.

ECI disputes the release of internal files

The Commission has stated that it did not release or authorise the release of any internal note or file to a news agency. This contests how the documents reached the media, rather than answering the concerns recorded in them.

The affidavit also opposes the plea seeking to restrain Gyanesh Kumar from functioning as CEC. Relying on Article 324(5) of the Constitution, the ECI says the CEC can be removed only in the same manner and on the same grounds as a Supreme Court judge. It has also referred to the Supreme Court’s earlier consideration of challenges to the credibility of Electronic Voting Machines.

The Commission described its affidavit as a short response filed because of the intervening Dussehra holidays and reserved the right to submit a detailed, paragraph-wise counter.

Supreme Court to examine the Commission’s explanation

The ECI’s affidavit sets out its position on three central issues: the unanimity of SIR decisions, the legal status of the declaration accompanying Form 6, and the ERO’s authority over electoral roll changes. It also identifies corrective measures, including separating Form 6 from the SIR declaration online and establishing an expert committee to examine ECINet.

But several specific questions raised by Sandhu and Joshi remain unanswered. These concern the implementation of the online declaration, the software’s failure to permit action in Goa, the handling of appeals in West Bengal, the administrative order issued in July and the repeated instances in which the Commissioners said they were not informed of developments.

The affidavit’s claim that the final decisions were unanimous does not, by itself, settle whether the decision-making process worked as it should have. Nor do the corrective measures fully explain how the earlier problems arose.

On October 5, the Supreme Court declined to suspend Gyanesh Kumar through an ex-parte interim order while issuing notice on the petition. The bench said it would examine the decisions and take appropriate action if they were found incompatible with the law.

The Court’s examination will now determine whether the Commission’s explanations adequately address the concerns about consultation, access to information and the implementation of decisions during the SIR exercise.

The controversial ECI affidavit may be read here.

Related:

UP voter lists: Software manipulates Voter’s names, Pilibhit investigation finds 10,470 irregular entries

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Vote for Democracy seeks answers from ECI and TCS on ECI’s electoral database access and security

Barricades and detentions fail to stop Delhi protesters marching against CEC

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#WATCH | Mumbai: Students staged a protest at Chaityabhoomi, expressing disappointment over the lack of action in the IIT Bombay student Sahil Wakode’s death case. Police detained all the protesters at the site. https://t.co/wxdd5uvOaA

— ANI (@ANI) October 25, 2026

Comedian Masoom Rajwani and many others detained by Mumbai Police.

Their crime?

Carrying out a peaceful candlelight gathering for Sahil Wakode.

Sahil, a Dalit student, died by suicide at IIT Bombay.

His parents have alleged that caste-based harassment led to his death https://t.co/7UgIIQwSL8

— Parth MN (@parthpunter) October 25, 2026

Why is Mumbai police house-arresting General Secretary of AIISCA @deepali_writes from going to Chaityabhoomi for candle gathering at 6 PM. Chait yabhoomi is a sacred place for Ambedicarites, it is arrocously casterst, cowardly and unconstitutional of police to detain Deepali. Why is the state so afraid of Dalits demanding justice?

— TheAmbedkarianChronicle (@TheAmbedkarian) October 25, 2026

VIDEO | Mumbai: The Progressive Students Union (PSU) organised a candlelight march at Chaityabhoomi to demand justice in the case of the suicide of IIT Bombay student Sahil Wakode.

Protesters participating in the march were taken into custody. A heavy police force was deployed in the area as a precautionary measure.

(Full video available on PTI Videos – https://t.co/bIyFWTfmBd)

— Press Trust of India (@PTI_News) October 25, 2026

https://www.instagram.com/p/De8wW4MjUw_/ 

Parents of Wakode were also detained, and released later. 

Mumbai police has illegally detained Sahil Wakode’s parents in an unknown location.

— TheAmbedkarianChronicle (@TheAmbedkarian) October 25, 2026

The detentions at Chaityabhoomi, the memorial site of Dr B.R. Ambedkar, came amid mounting demands for accountability from the IIT Bombay administration over allegations of caste-based harassment preceding Wakode’s death. Rather than allowing students and concerned citizens to mourn and demand justice peacefully, the police deployed a heavy force, prevented the gathering from proceeding freely and detained participants on the grounds that the vigil lacked permission. 

According to The Hindu, approximately 20 to 25 people were detained at Chaityabhoomi, with protesters alleging that police personnel forcibly removed participants, including women. The Times of India also reported the detentions, confirming that Rajwani was among those taken into custody. Police maintained that the gathering was unauthorised and cited law-and-order concerns.

The Progressive Students Union (PSU) had called for the candlelight vigil at 5.30 p.m. to pay tribute to Wakode and demand an impartial investigation into his death. Participants included students and activists associated with organisations supporting the struggle for justice, including individuals from IIT Bombay and the Tata Institute of Social Sciences.

According to accounts reported by The Hindu, protesters alleged that police personnel carried out two rounds of detentions, at around 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. Tejas Anoop of Aamchi Padhai Aamchi Ladai said police approached individuals and detained those they suspected of participating in the protest, including people carrying candles or placards. He further alleged that people who questioned the detentions or sought written authorisation were also taken away.

Rajwani told The Hindu that he arrived at Chaityabhoomi around 6.10 p.m. and that the march had still not begun by 7.30 p.m. He alleged that four police personnel lifted him by his arms and legs while detaining him, causing a minor scratch. He also claimed that detainees were not told where they were being taken and were not provided water during transportation.

Another participant, Akalya, alleged that four police personnel put her inside a van while she was photographing the gathering. She said she was kept inside for approximately 30 to 45 minutes without being informed of the reason for her detention. Her phone was temporarily taken away when she tried to contact her family, she alleged.

Deepali, another participant, said she had been taken to a police station and released around 6.30 p.m. She maintained that the gathering was intended to be peaceful and condemned the manner in which participants were treated. Social media posts also raised allegations that police had prevented activists, including the general secretary of the All India Independent Scheduled Caste Association (AIISCA), from reaching Chaityabhoomi.

Despite the police action, approximately 40 to 50 people subsequently gathered to pay tribute to Wakode, according to reports. Those detained were released from police stations in Tardeo, Worli and Dadar later that evening.

People broke free from Tardeo police station https://t.co/HXDOLYDJgC

— Preksha (@09preksha) October 25, 2026

A month of protests, allegations of police brutality

Wakode, a second-year BTech student at IIT Bombay’s Powai campus, was found dead in his hostel room on September 18, hours after he was allegedly caught using a mobile phone during a mid-semester examination. His parents and fellow students subsequently raised allegations of caste-based harassment and mistreatment.

A police complaint named Professor Suryanarayana Doolla and invoked provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, alongside provisions relating to abetment of suicide. Doolla, who was removed from his position as dean of students’ welfare and sent on leave, has been at the centre of allegations concerning his treatment of Wakode. The professor and IIT Bombay Director Shireesh Kedare have denied allegations of caste-based discrimination. The Mumbai Crime Branch has taken over the investigation and recorded statements from more than 40 people.

The police action at Chaityabhoomi followed earlier detentions of Wakode’s parents and protesting students on October 18, exactly a month after his death. At the time, police also demolished the protest site outside IIT Bombay and detained several people. Students and activists have continued to allege that the police, acting alongside the institutional response to the death, have repeatedly attempted to suppress their demands for accountability.

As The Wire previously reported, a student injured during an earlier protest received a medico-legal certificate from KMJ Hospital in Vikhroli that reportedly recorded “assault by Powai police” as the cause of injury. The certificate also documented blunt trauma to the shoulder and a linear abrasion over the right elbow, alongside a reported attempt to strangle the student. Earlier social media posts had also alleged that women protesters were dragged, beaten and inappropriately touched by police personnel.

84 organisations demand IIT Bombay director’s resignation

The police crackdown came as 84 organisations from across the country issued an open letter demanding the resignation of IIT Bombay Director Professor Shireesh Kedare, describing it as a necessary measure of institutional accountability following Wakode’s death. As reported by Maktoob Media, the letter accused the institute of responding to complaints of caste discrimination with callousness and repression. The signatories questioned the administration’s decision to refer to Wakode as a “cheater” in its initial communication following his death, arguing that the statement risked discrediting the student before the circumstances surrounding his death had been adequately investigated.

The letter also criticised the public support extended by the institute’s faculty body to Doolla, who has been named in the police complaint, and raised concerns about the alleged selective release of examination-hall CCTV footage to the media. It further condemned the police action against Wakode’s parents and fellow students during earlier protests.

“The series of events which has unfolded following the unfortunate demise of your student Sahil Wakode has revealed IIT Bombay administration to be spectacularly callous at best or maliciously repressive towards complaints of caste discrimination,” the letter stated.

The signatories include student unions, Ambedkarite organisations, teachers’ associations and civil rights groups, including the Ambedkar Students’ Association, Students’ Federation of India, All India Students’ Association, National Alliance of People’s Movements and Disha Students’ Organisation.

The organisations argued that the director’s resignation was necessary to establish accountability and send a clear message that allegations of discrimination and harassment against marginalised students cannot be brushed aside through institutional statements or disciplinary narratives that shift scrutiny onto the deceased student.

Tribal students detained at Shivaji Park

The crackdown was not confined to Chaityabhoomi. At nearby Shivaji Park, Mumbai Police detained approximately 120 tribal students and activists who had assembled to demand the resignation of Maharashtra Tribal Development Minister Ashok Uike, along with the commissioner and secretary of the tribal development department.

According to PTI and The New Indian Express, the protesters were seeking accountability for deteriorating conditions in tribal residential schools, an inquiry into the alleged deaths of 584 students, improved hostel facilities and the scrapping of the contract system for centralised kitchens in tribal residential schools.

The students had reportedly been agitating since August. Their earlier demonstration on October 5 had ended with police detaining participants and sending them back to their hometowns in Nashik, Nandurbar and Jalgaon. On Sunday, protesters said they were detained at Dadar railway station and near Tilak Bhavan before they could reach the proposed venue. Police personnel were also reportedly deployed at railway stations and bus stops along routes leading to Shivaji Park. The protesters had sought permission to demonstrate at Azad Maidan and Shivaji Park but were denied permission. They said they would continue their agitation at Azad Maidan on Monday.

Taken together, the detentions at Shivaji Park and Chaityabhoomi reveal a disturbing pattern: students raising questions about caste deaths, discrimination and the treatment of vulnerable communities are met with preventive custody and restrictions on assembly rather than meaningful engagement with their grievances.

At Chaityabhoomi, the demand was for justice for a young Dalit student whose death has raised serious questions about caste discrimination and institutional responsibility. At Shivaji Park, tribal students were seeking accountability for conditions in residential schools and alleged student deaths. Both gatherings were disrupted by police action.

Related:

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Dalit Class XI student dies by suicide after alleged casteist harassment in Coimbatore School

Mumbai Police detain Ambedkarite leaders demanding justice for Sahil Wakode; IIT Bombay refuses to hear delegation

Bihar custodial death: Six suspended after Dilshad Ansari’s death in custody; family demands high-level probe

When a Student Dies, Who Questions the Institution? | Sahil Wakode’s Parents Seek Justice | Teesta

Caged in Police Vans, Beaten in Custody, Journalists Attacked: Delhi’s crackdown on anti-CEC protests draws UN condemnation

Police detain Adivasi students for second day, force them out of Mumbai

The post Mumbai police detain 140 protesters as student’s demand justice for Sahil Wakode, accountability from IIT Bombay appeared first on SabrangIndia.