MCOCA is among a class of ‘special laws’ enacted to combat grave threats to the social order. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of MCOCA notes that the existing legal framework was deemed “inadequate” to “curb or control the menace” of organized crime. To address this, the act introduces a set of bail conditions under Section 21 that depart significantly from the standard provisions of the Bhariyay Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) by shifting the burden of proof to the accused. Rider: The BNS 2023, under Section 479 also contains very stringent conditions for statutory bail. The said section limits the conditions for granting statutory bail to under trials.

[Section 436A of the CRPC provides for the procedure to be adopted in case the under trial is to be given statutory bail after spending a particular period under detention. In the older CrPC, if an under trial has spent half of the maximum period of imprisonment for an offence in detention, they must be released on a personal bond (not to be applied to offences which are punishable by death) BNSS, 2023 however, retains the said provision, and makes it further stringent. [1]

The stringent bail conditions under MCOCA and other special laws creates a tension between the presumption of innocence and the State’s power to restrict liberty. In Naresh Kumar, the High Court observes that the Supreme Court has consistently held that where trials under special laws are unduly delayed, the rigour of strict bail provisions must yield to the constitutional promise of liberty. The Court ruled that even the special provisions of MCOCA “cannot be construed in a manner that forecloses judicial scrutiny under Article 21.”

The complete judgment delivered in Naresh Kumar @ Pahelwan v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025) can be read here.

The eight long years of Naresh Kumar’s pre-trial detention are far from an anomaly. The indiscriminate use of special laws has created a situation where the promise of a speedy trial is, more often than not, the exception not the rule. The trajectory of the 2020 Delhi Riots cases continues to haunt public memory, where the infamous 17,000 page FIR 59/2020 charged 18 student activists with instigating communal violence as part of a larger “terror conspiracy.” They were arrested under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), a draconian special law which has bound together the politics of protest with the law’s harshest instruments. As of mid-2025, only six have been released on bail. Not a single charge has, five years down, been framed. A detailed analysis of the incarcerations in this FIR may be read here.

This legal resource traces the jurisprudence on the contradiction between and the incarceration under stringent bail statutes and fundamental right to liberty under Article 21. The judicial trend from Satender Kumar Antil v Central Bureau of Investigation (2022) to Vernon Gonsalves v State of Maharashtra (2023) to the latest decision in Naresh Kumar demonstrates a clear and consistent position: the label of a “special law” does not justify indefinite pre-trial detention. Our analysis demonstrates that the more severe the bail restrictions, the greater the obligation on the State to ensure swift adjudication.

The Constitutional Imperative

 “Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as Fundamental Rights [are] concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India.”
— Satender Kumar Antil vs Central Bureau Of Investigation (2022)

Article 21 of the Constitution of India reads:

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”

The Apex Court has consistently affirmed the ‘Golden Triangle’ of fundamental rights which sustain and nourish each other^[2]: Article 14 (Right to Equality), Article 21 (Right to Life), and Article 19 (Freedom of Speech). Consequently, any legal procedure that deprives an individual of the most fundamental of their rights must be just, fair, and reasonable, that is, a procedure which promotes  speedy trial^[3]. This principle has been foundational to a series of decisions which establish the right to a speedy trial as implicit in the broad sweep of Article 21.

The Inherent Right to a Speedy Trial

“Arrest is not a draconian measure to be used at the whims of the police officer.”

— Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal (2007)

That the right to a speedy trial is an integral part of the fundamental right to life and liberty was first enunciated all the way back in 1979. In Hussainara Khatoon v Home Secretary, State of Bihar, the Supreme Court reasoned that for a legal procedure to be just under Article 21, it must ensure “a reasonably expeditious trial” to determine the guilt of an accused. Since then, this ratio has been affirmed and re-affirmed without a single dissenting note.

The Constitutional guarantee was further developed by the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay v R.S. Nayak (1992), which recognised that the violation of this right may even demand the “quashing of a criminal proceeding altogether.” In Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (2001), the Supreme Court observed that the right to ‘default bail’ under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (now Section 187(2) of BNSS) is “nothing but a legislative exposition of the constitutional safeguard under Article 21.” The Bench held that if the accused is ready to furnish bail, and the prosecution has failed to file the charge sheet within the stipulated period, then the former has an indefeasible right to be released on bail. A decade later, the Court in Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2011), recognising the hardship of pre-trial detention, ruled that the act for holding an accused in custody must be based on ‘necessity’ and not ‘punishment.’

Recasting Bail under Special Acts: The Supreme Court’s Mandate

The principles established in these seminal judgments were decisively applied to ‘special acts’ in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2022), which sought to provide clear guidelines for lower courts to give effect to the maxim that ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception.’

Confronting the crisis of India’s overflowing jails and the “continuous supply of cases seeking bail,” the Supreme Court detailed a comprehensive framework to realign the judicial balance between legislative strictures and individual rights. To enlarge the scope and ease the process of bail, the Court devised a four-fold classification of offences, reproduced below:

• Category A Offences: Punishable with imprisonment of 7 years or less
• Category B Offences: Punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for more than 7 years
• Category C Offences (Special Acts): Punishable under Special Acts containing stringent provisions for bail like NDPS (S.37), PMLA (S.45), UAPA (S.43D(5)), Companies Act, (S.212(6)), etc.
• Category D Offences: Economic offences not covered by Special Acts

Among these, Category C specifically addresses offenses under special acts that contain stringent bail provisions, such as Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), National Security Act, 1980 (NSA), Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS), and various Gangster Acts.

Significantly, the Court extended the constitutional mandate of a speedy trial to cases under special laws, stating that “the general principle governing delay would apply to these categories also.” The Court added that Section 436A of CrPC (now Section 479 of BNSS), which limits the detention of undertrial prisoners to half of the maximum prescribed sentence, would apply to special acts in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary.

In a pivotal declaration, the Court directly linked the severity of a statute to a heightened obligation for a speedy trial, holding that “more the rigor, the quicker the adjudication ought to be.”

The complete judgment delivered in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2022) can be read here.

The guidelines laid out in Satender Kumar are the culmination of judicial reasoning on special acts which echoes as far back as Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India (1996). In that landmark ruling, the Court acknowledged the legislature’s decision to sacrifice some personal liberty for the sake of protecting the community, but stipulated that this very sacrifice makes it “all the more necessary that investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an adequate number of Designated Courts are set up,” to ensure that “persons ultimately found innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”

This jurisprudence has continued to evolve through the decades, with P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2019) cautioning against a “mechanical application of a statute” to deny bail, and Mohd. Enamul Haque v. Enforcement Directorate (2024) holding that prolonged incarceration will “inure to the benefit of the accused for bail” when the delay is not attributable to him.

Read collectively, these cases demonstrate a clear judicial trend: the more severe the statutory bail restrictions, the greater the obligation on the State to ensure a speedy trial, and the more likely that a delay will lead to the accused’s release.

Can Bail be the Exception? The Judicial Approach to Special Laws

The Paradox of Preventive Detention

Aniket is a 24-year-old law student from Madhya Pradesh. On 14 June 2024, he raised his voice against the inappropriate behaviour of a professor towards a female student belonging to a Scheduled Caste. The professor retaliated by assaulting him and registering an FIR against him on a variety of charges, ranging from rioting to attempt to murder.

On recommendation of the Station House Officer and the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate charged Aniket with Section 3(2) of the National Security Act. This order of preventive detention was served to him while he was already lodged in Bhopal Central Jail. His representation against the order was rejected by the same District Magistrate who issued the order, and subsequent appeals were dismissed by the Advisory Board and the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Instead, the order was extended thrice, leading to his pre-trial detention for over a year. These extensions were approved despite Aniket being granted bail for the underlying charge all the way back in January 2025.

Aniket filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court, submitting that his alleged offence amounted to nothing more than simple assault and criminal intimidation, charges which have no proximity to demand the draconian measure of preventive detention. The prosecution, however, insisted that the detention was necessary due to Aniket’s “potential to disturb public order.”

The bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and K. Vinod Chandran, aghast at the total “non-application of mind” of the police and lower courts, ruled that his preventive detention under NSA was “wholly untenable.”

The reasoned order by Justice Bhuyan carefully analysed NSA Section 3(2) to conclude that a person can only be taken into preventive detention if his activities are prejudicial to the security of the State, maintenance of public order, or maintenance of essential supplies and services. The Bench observed that the preventive detention order was issued with the intent to prevent the appellant from acting in a manner “prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order.” This, however, is a much broader ambit than “public order” which requires an impact to “the community or the public at large” (Ram Manohar Lohia v State of Bihar, 1965). The inability of the police to handle a law and order situation cannot be an excuse to invoke preventive detention (Nenavath Bujji v State of Telangana, 2024).

Reprimanding the authorities, the Court observed that “the entire intent appears to continue the detention of the appellant since he was likely to get bail in the criminal case, which, in fact, he got.” However, preventive detention is not intended to deny rightful bail to an accused charged with a regular criminal offence. The Apex Court ruled that:

“Preventive detention being a hard law, it is axiomatic that an order of preventive detention should be strictly construed. It is the duty of a constitutional court like the High Court to minutely scrutinize an order of preventive detention to ensure that the order of preventive detention squarely falls within the four corners of the relevant law and that the liberty of a person is not unlawfully compromised.”

 The reasoned order in Annu @ Aniket Through His Father As Next Friend Krupal Singh Thakur v. Union of India (2025) may be read here.

The UAPA Conundrum: Reclaiming Judicial Discretion from Statutory Veto

Within the landscape of India’s special laws, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act occupies a uniquely terrifying position. Enacted in the same year as Naxalbari peasants’ uprising, the Act’s stated purpose is to prevent unlawful and terrorist activities which are prejudicial to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State. But overbroad definitions, sweeping investigative powers, and impossibly stringent bail provisions have transformed the legislation into an instrument of terror itself – whereby suspicion becomes conviction and pre-trial detention becomes punishment.

Cartoon by Arun Ferreira | Source: Colours of the Cage

The human cost of this statute is staggering. Based on the data from the National Crime Records Bureau, 8,136 persons were arrested under the UAPA from 2015 to 2020. A mere 2.8% were convicted.^[4]

With the vast majority of cases ending in acquittal or withdrawal, bail becomes the only remedy that stands between an individual and a decade in jail without trial. However, Section 43D(5) of the Act has turned the oft-quoted maxim over on its head – making jail the rule and bail the exception.

Section 43D(5) reads:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release:

Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.”

In simple terms, Section 43D (5) forbids the Court from granting bail if the prosecution makes out a preliminary case. The defence, at this stage, is at a significant disadvantage: it can neither submit exculpatory evidence of its own, nor cross-examine the prosecution’s evidence. When judicial discretion is replaced by a prosecutorial veto, how, then, is a Court to grant bail?

The Supreme Court’s judgment in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) is the starting point for the modern jurisprudence on this question. The Court overruled a bail order granted to the accused by the Delhi High Court, stating that its analysis “[bordered] on being perverse, as it has virtually conducted a mini trial…and even questioned the genuineness of the documents relied upon by the Investigating Agency.” The judgment placed extraordinary weight on the accusatory narrative of the police and practically barred trial courts from examining the merits and demerits of the evidence.

The Court held that:

• Statutory mandate of a prima facie assessment requires a lighter degree of satisfaction. The evidence collated by the investigating agency must be presumed true.
• At the bail stage, courts must not engage in a “detailed analysis of evidence” or discard any material being placed before it as inadmissible.

The Watali judgement has cast a long shadow over the evolution of bail jurisprudence under the UAPA, widely and often blindly cited by High Courts in several bail rejection orders. It not only cements the “jurisprudence of suspicion,” but equates the degree of satisfaction required to reject bail to the level of the one necessary to frame charge^[5].

Such an interpretation of ‘prima facie true’ criteria raises a fundamental contradiction: if the allegations of the investigative agency are to be taken at face-value, what is the need or purpose of the Judiciary?

Union of India vs K.A. Najeeb (2021) offers a modest pushback^[6]. The case involved an accused who had been incarcerated for more than five years, without a trial even having commenced. Relying on the ratio of Shaheen Welfare Association, the Kerala High Court held that such protracted incarceration violates the respondent’s right to speedy trial and access to justice, regardless of limitations under special enactments. The State’s appeal relied on Watali to argue that the High Court erred in granting bail without adhering to the statutory rigours of Section 43­D(5).

The Apex Court dismissed the appeal, holding that:

• Section 43­D (5) is not the sole metric, but “merely…another possible ground” for the Court to deny bail. It is to be considered alongside factors like gravity of the offence, possibility of evidence or witness tampering, chance of absconsion, etc.
• The rigours of a provision like Section 43­D (5) will “melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.”

Read a detailed comparative analysis of Watali and Najeeb here.

Though the Najeeb ruling partially reads down the ‘prima facie true’ argument, it refrains from confronting Watali head-on, finding that the latter deals with an “entirely different factual matrix.” A direct challenge appears for the first time in Vernon vs State of Maharashtra (2023).

Trade unionist Vernon Gonsalves and Advocate Arun Ferreira were two of the accused in the Bhima Koregaon case. Based upon a combination of inferences drawn from letters in the nature of hearsay, statements from ‘protected witnesses,’ and third-party communication, the Prosecution wove a narrative alleging that the two were part of a ‘conspiracy’ to overthrow the State.

In granting their bail application, Supreme Court Justices Aniruddha Bose and Sudhanshu Dhulia recalibrated the standard set in Watali. The Court held that:

• A “surface-level analysis of the probative value of evidence” is essential when assessing whether the case is prima facie true under Section 43D (5) of UAPA.
• Though an ordinary bail petition precludes a scrutiny of evidence, the “restrictive provisions” of Section 43D (5) make “some element of evidence-analysis…inevitable.”

Affirming the guideline in Satender Kumar Antil, the Court ruled that “when the statutes have stringent provisions the duty of the Court would be more onerous. Graver the offence, greater should be the care taken to see that the offence would fall within the four corners of the Act.”

The Court also acknowledged Najeeb noting that at the time of the judgment, the accused had spent five years in jail, while further clarifying Article 21 can be invoked due to prolonged incarceration, even if the period is less than half of the maximum sentence.

 By requiring courts to assess some believability in the evidence (and not merely its existence), the Vernon ruling opens the door for meaningful judicial engagement at the bail stage^[7].

The complete judgment delivered in Vernon vs State of Maharashtra (2023) can be read here.

Advocate Gautam Bhatia’s analysis of the jurisprudence on bail under UAPA, culminating in Vernon, distils three judicial principles^[8]:

1. The definitional clauses of the UAPA must be given a strict and narrow construction.
2. The allegations in the chargesheet must be individualised, factual, and particularistic.
3. Bail cannot be denied when the Prosecution’s evidence is of “low probative value.”

However, the jurisprudence on this point remains ambiguous. Since Watali, Najeeb, and Vernon were delivered by benches of equal strength, lower courts are free to selectively rely on either approach. The Delhi High Court, for instance, has had multiple opportunities to apply Vernon and Najeeb in the context of FIR 59/2020, but has betrayed a caution verging on abstention^[9].

While we wait for the Supreme Court to explicitly resolve this interpretive conflict, Professor Hany Babu and Advocate Surendra Gadling (two other accused in the Bhima Koregaon case who continue to be in pre-trial detention) present an elegant argument^[10] which may lift the ominous

shadow of Watali. A close reading of Section 2 (d) of UAPA defines “Court” as a criminal court with jurisdiction to try offenses under the Act. This means that the restrictions on bail in Section 43D (5) were intended to apply only to trial courts, and not to constitutional courts.

Such an interpretation renders Watali per incuriam, and frees Constitutional Courts from the statutory constraint altogether – restoring the power of the Constitutional promise of liberty to override a statutory bail provision, no matter how special the law.

Stringency and Snails: The PMLA Recalibration

In the lead-up to the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act was shrewdly maneuvered to disrupt the electoral playing field. The Enforcement Directorate (ED) initiated raids on a number of prominent opposition figures, including Hemant Soren (Jharkhand Mukti Morcha), D.K. Shiva Kumar (Indian National Congress), and Abhishek Banerjee (All India Trinamool Congress). In the high-profile ‘Delhi Liquor Scam’ case, the arrests of Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal (Aam Aadmi Party) and K. Kavitha (Bharat Rashtra Samithi party) came in step with the Election Commission’s announcement of the Lok Sabha poll schedule.

The arrests brought two recurring themes into popular discourse: the weaponisation of the ED’s powers of arrest, and the draconian nature of the PMLA’s bail conditions.

The first of these finds its roots in Section 19 of the PMLA, which grants ED officials the power to arrest individuals if they have “reason to believe” that a person is “guilty of an offence punishable under this Act.” The Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022) upheld this provision, reasoning that unlike police officers who are only tasked with investigating offences, ED officers have an added responsibility to “prevent” money laundering. Operating under the PMLA as a ‘special’ investigative agency, the ED is exempt from many procedural safeguards and oversight mechanisms that apply to the police under BNSS. By vesting the power to arrest entirely within the ED’s internal hierarchy without prior judicial sanction, the provision allows the agency to be the sole judge of its own “reason to believe.”

The second concerns the twin bail conditions under PMLA. Section 45(1) of the Act reads:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no person accused of an offence under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless:

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail”

In 2017, the two-judge Bench in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v Union Of India had struck down an earlier version of Section 45(1), holding that it inverted the presumption of innocence. The Parliament amended the provision in 2018, replacing the offence threshold with the phrase “under this Act” but retaining the twin conditions. A subsequent challenge to the amendment in Vijay Madanlal was rejected by the Court, which held that the revised provision is “reasonable” and has a “direct nexus” with the purpose of the PMLA.

In “deferring to the wisdom of the Parliament” and upholding the constitutionality of Section 45 (1), Section 19, and several other contested provisions of the PMLA, the judgment in Vijay Madanlal entrenches a legal architecture that cements the unfettered powers of the ED while severely restricting the grant of bail^[11].

However, the stringent statutory framework upheld in Vijay Madanlal was soon confronted with the practical realities of indefinite incarceration. Subsequent decisions reveal a recalibration, with the judicial trend deferring to the right to liberty in the face of prolonged proceedings.

The Constitutional imperative of a speedy trial was the fulcrum for granting bail to former Deputy Chief Minister of Delhi Manish Sisodia, arrested in the Delhi liquor policy scam in February 2023. The Supreme Court noted the ‘snail’s pace’ of the proceedings^[12] (17 months without trial commencement) and the scale of the case (493 witnesses, thousands of pages of records and over a lakh pages of digitised material), making near-term completion unrealistic. Reinforcing the ratios of Sanjay Chandra, which emphasised the ‘necessity’ test, and Satender Kumar Antil, which mandated Article 21 protections for Category C offences, the Court ruled that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. “The reason is that the constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is the basic right of the person charged of an offence and not convicted, that he be ensured and given a speedy trial,” wrote (now, Chief) Justice B.R. Gavai.

The complete judgment in Manish Sisodia v Directorate of Enforcement (2024) can be read here.

Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024) further expanded the scope of judicial scrutiny at the bail stage. It held that “all material and evidence that can be led in the trial and admissible, whether relied on by the prosecution or not, can be examined,” since guilt “can only be established on admissible evidence to be led before the court.” Recognising that the ED’s power of arrest under the PMLA constitutes a drastic curtailment of liberty under Article 21, the Court emphasised that the Special Court must “independently apply its mind, without being influenced by the opinion recorded in the ‘reasons to believe.’”

The bail order in Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024) can be read here.

The Human Cost of Procedural Delay

Mohd. Muslim was 23 years old when he was arrested under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, a drug trafficking case involving 180 kilograms of ganja. Though he was not found in possession of any narcotic drugs (his name having surfaced only in a co-accused’s statement), he was charged with the production, possession, and criminal conspiracy in a drug offence. By 2023, he had spent over seven years in prison with the trial barely at its halfway stage.

Section 37 of the NDPS Act restricts the grant of bail through twin conditions similar to the PMLA. It requires that the court records its satisfaction that the accused might not be guilty of the offence and that upon release, they are not likely to commit any offence. In Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court observed that the Section 37 requirement to be “satisfied” of the twin conditions can only mean a “prima facie determination,” since all evidence is not yet before the court. It reasoned that a literal or mechanical reading would leave judicial discretion “within a very narrow margin,” effectively excluding bail altogether and amounting to punitive detention. To remain within constitutional limits, the Court stressed that this prima facie assessment must be applied “reasonably” based on the materials available at the time of the bail hearing.

The judgment further clarified that undue delay in trial is an independent ground for bail in light of Section 436A CrPC (Section 479 BNSS), which is not fettered by Section 37. Holding that prolonged incarceration, particularly where the delay is not attributable to the accused, must weigh heavily in favour of release regardless of the gravity of the alleged offence, the Court granted bail.

Before parting, the Court reflected on special laws and their stringent bail conditions, warning that if trials are not concluded in time, then the “injustice wrecked on the individual is immeasurable.” Drawing from A Convict Prisoner v. State of Kerala (1993), it recognised imprisonment as a “radical transformation” whereby the prisoner completely loses his identity: known by a number, stripped of personal possessions and relationships, engulfed by psychological scars from a complete loss of freedom, status, and dignity. The impact is especially acute for those from the weakest economic strata, where detention means an immediate loss of livelihood, disintegration of family, and alienation from society. The judgment stressed that courts must remain sensitive to these irreparable harms and ensure that trials, particularly under special laws with stringent bail thresholds, are taken up and concluded with urgency.

The judgment delivered in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) can be read here.

The Long Wait for Justice

Across four decades of jurisprudence, Constitutional Courts from Naresh Kumar to Vernon Gonsalves to Manish Sisodia have articulated a consistent judicial trend: the Constitution does not carve out exceptions to liberty simply because a statute is labelled “special.” The more severe the bail restrictions, the greater the obligation on the State to ensure a swift and fair adjudication.

The key principles accepted by the judiciary to grant bail in special statutes are outlined below:

• Undue Delay as a Constitutional Trigger: Prolonged pre-trial detention is a direct violation of the right to liberty under Article 21. Even under special laws with stringent bail provisions, undue delay in trial, particularly when not attributable to the accused, in trial is per se a valid bail ground for securing bail.
• The ‘Prima Facie’ Contradiction”: A mechanical interpretation of the statutory condition that a court must be ‘prima facie’ satisfied of an accused’s innocence would make bail illusory. Courts must apply a reasonable interpretation of this condition, avoiding a pre-emptive determination of guilt and ensuring the presumption of innocence is not inverted.
• Scrutiny of Evidence: While avoiding a mini-trial, courts must exercise meaningful scrutiny of evidence at the bail stage. Special courts must demonstrate an independent application of mind, free from the influence of prosecuting and investigative agencies, to assess whether the material has some probative value. Guilt can only be established on admissible evidence.
• “Graver the offence, greater the scrutiny”: An order of preventive detention should be strictly construed. It is the duty of a constitutional court to ensure that such an order falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant statute.
• Length of Detention: The mandate to grant bail when an undertrial has served half the maximum possible sentence (BNSS Section 479) applies equally to special laws, unless expressly excluded. Under Article 21, prolonged incarceration can itself justify bail, even if the period served is less than half the maximum sentence.
• “Constitutional mandate is the higher law.” The judiciary’s ultimate deference is to the supremacy of the Constitution. The constitutional mandate of Liberty is the highest law of the land, and must unequivocally trump any and all statutory restrictions.

“In a democracy, there can never be an impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually opposite to each other” (Satender Kumar Antil).

Inside the courtrooms, judges may eloquently espouse democratic ideals as counsel spar over whether Article 21 is an administrative indulgence. But on the outside, the endless adjournments of the bail hearings for Surendra Gadling, Hany Babu, Sharjeel Imam and Gulfisha Fatima, among countless others incarcerated under ‘special laws’, betray a different reality. Alongside with the sweeping, often unchecked, powers of agencies like the NIA and ED, the ‘impression’ continues to tilt uncomfortably towards indefinite preventive detention masquerading as prosecution.

Cartoon by Arun Ferreira | Source: Colours of the Cage

The promise of a speedy trial has emerged as the judiciary’s primary safeguard against indefinite detention under draconian statutes. But a safeguard that is invoked only after years of confinement or ladders of appeals is no safeguard at all. The Constitutional imperative demands that it must be enforced with unflinching consistency, from the highest constitutional courts to the lowest trial courts, and the burden must be on the State to justify every continued moment of incarceration.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this legal resource has been worked on by Raaz)

Footnotes

[1] Naresh Kumar @ Pahelwan v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025)

[2] Now, under Section 479, the provision of granting bail to under trial prisoners will now be limited to those undertrials who are first-time offenders if they have completed one-third of the maximum sentence. Since charge sheets often mention multiple offences, this may make many under trials ineligible for mandatory bail. Furthermore, through the said provision, the prohibition of getting bail under the said section had also been expanded to those offences that are punishable with life imprisonment. Therefore, the following under trials are barred from applying for statutory bail under the said section if: offences punishable by life imprisonment, and persons who have pending proceedings in more than one offence.

[3] Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v Union of India (1994)

[4] Union of India v K.A. Najeeb (2021)

[5] ‘UAPA: Criminalising Dissent And State Terror’(People’s Union of Civil Liberties, September 2022)

[6] ‘When Najeeb meets Watali – On the statutory restrictions on grant of bail under UAPA’ (Hany Babu and Surendra Gadling, Issues in Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 2025)

[7] ‘Bail under UAPA: Does the new SC judgment offer a ray of hope?’ (Sanchita Kadam, Citizens for Justice and Peace, 2021)

[8] ‘How the Delhi riots case remains stagnant with close to a dozen student leaders incarcerated’ (SabrangIndia, 2025)

[9] ‘Recovering the Basics: The Supreme Court’s Bail Order in Vernon Gonsalves’ Case’ (Gautam Bhatia, Issues in Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 2023)

[10] Supra, 7

[11] Supra, 5

[12] ‘Challenges to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act | Judgement Summary’ (Sushovan Patnaik, Supreme Court Observer, 2024)

[13] ‘“A game of snake and ladder”: Tracing Manish Sisodia’s 17-month journey to bail’ (Sushovan Patnaik and Advay Vora, Supreme Court Observer, 2024)

The post Liberty on Hold: Delays turn the promise of justice into punishment appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The case was heard by Justice N. Anand Venkatesh, who was responding to a writ petition filed by Venkatesan, seeking permission for himself and fellow community members to worship and perform rituals during the temple festival—an event traditionally open to the local public.

Despite resistance from certain quarters, including the submission by a Special Government Pleader that the temple was not under the administration of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (HR&CE) Department, the Court maintained that religious access cannot be determined by departmental control but by the principles of constitutional equality and human dignity.

Caste and community are creations of human beings; God is always neutral: HC

In his order, Justice Venkatesh observed that any temple open to the public acquires the status of a public temple, regardless of whether it is managed by the HR&CE Department or not.

In such a scenario, the judge said, “irrespective of the caste or community of the devotees, they must be permitted to offer their prayers to God. Caste and community are the creations of human beings; God is always considered to be neutral.”

The court further emphasised that denying access to a place of worship on the basis of caste is not only unconstitutional but an affront to human dignity. It violates the foundational values of the Indian Constitution and the spirit of inclusiveness in Hinduism.

“This can never be permitted in a country governed by the rule of law,” the Court stated, firmly anchoring its view in legal precedent and social justice.

Referring to Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Temple Entry Authorisation Act, 1947, the judge reiterated that “Every Hindu, irrespective of the caste or sect to which they belong, shall be entitled to enter any Hindu temple and offer worship therein—notwithstanding any law, custom, or usage to the contrary.”

All classes of Hindus are permitted to enter into the temple and participate in the festival: HC

The Court went on to clarify that any restriction imposed on entry based on caste constitutes an actionable wrong—one that can invite both civil and criminal liability. Justice Venkatesh reminded that “the Act was brought into force as a policy decision by the State Government to remove the disabilities imposed on certain classes of Hindus with respect to entry into Hindu temples.”

The High Court directed the concerned authorities to ensure that all Hindus, irrespective of caste or community, are allowed full access to the temple and its associated rituals during the festival. The Court made it clear that any obstruction or discrimination must be met with immediate legal action.

It also instructed the local administration to ensure law and order is maintained, and that no disturbance is created under the guise of religious custom or tradition.

This ruling is not just a legal order, but a reaffirmation of the principle that faith transcends caste. In a time when discrimination still exists in subtle forms, the Court’s stand serves as a reminder of India’s constitutional promise—that equality and dignity are not privileges but rights for all.

The Order of Madras High Court Dated 17.07.2025 can be read here:

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A bench comprising Justices Rajesh Bindal and Manmohan described such pre-publication restraints as “super injunctions”, stressing that they are permissible only in extremely rare circumstances in a democratic, free country.

The petition was filed by Harshendra Kumar D., Secretary of the Dharmasthala Temple management body, who alleged that defamatory content targeting the temple’s managing family was being widely circulated online, particularly on YouTube. According to his submission, around 8,000 YouTube channels were carrying material that defamed the hereditary head of the temple, Veerendra Heggade, and other members of the managing trust.

While refusing to pass any immediate restraining orders, the Supreme Court directed the Karnataka trial court to reconsider Kumar’s plea afresh, with all supporting evidence placed on record. The bench clarified that it was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the defamation claim, as per a report of Hindustan Times.

Karnataka High Court’s Intervention: August 1, 2025

This Supreme Court development came just a week after the Karnataka High Court bench comprising Justice M. Nagaprasanna set aside a sweeping gag order issued on July 18, 2025 by a Bengaluru civil court in Kumar’s earlier defamation suit.

That order had restrained reportage on the Dharmasthala burial allegations and directed 390 media houses to remove nearly 9,000 online links, including news articles, videos, and posts, related to the case. The gag order was granted ex parte, without hearing the affected media outlets, and despite there being no FIR naming Kumar or temple officials in connection with the allegations.

The High Court criticised the indiscriminate nature of such injunctions, noting that restrictions on reportage in matters of significant public interest should be exceptional, narrowly tailored, and supported by strong prima facie grounds.

Origins of the Current Case: Whistle blower’s complaint of July 3, 2025

The present controversy began more than a month earlier, when on July 3, 2025, a former sanitation worker of the Shri Dharmasthala Manjunatheshwara Temple lodged a six-page complaint with the Superintendent of Police, Dakshina Kannada district.

The whistle-blower, a Dalit man who worked for the temple between 1995 and 2014, alleged that during his employment, he was forced to bury hundreds of murder victims on temple premises and surrounding lands. He claimed that many of the victims were minor girls who had been sexually assaulted before being killed.

The worker stated that he had been threatened with death if he ever spoke about these events. He fled Dharmasthala in 2014, remaining silent for 11 years, before deciding to come forward out of guilt, as per a report in Frontline Magazine.

Historical Context: Dharmasthala’s unsolved cases

The allegations immediately gained national and international attention, in part because they appeared to connect to a long-standing history of unsolved murders and disappearances in Dharmasthala.

• 1987 – Padmalatha case: Rape and murder of a 17-year-old girl; no arrests made.
• 2012 – Soujanya case: Rape and murder of another 17-year-old girl; case remained unresolved for over a decade and was officially closed in 2023.

Families of several victims and activists have repeatedly alleged that these crimes were linked to Veerendra Heggade, the hereditary head of the temple and a Rajya Sabha MP since 2022. Past investigative reporting pointed to poor police investigations allegedly influenced by powerful individuals.

Mounting public pressure and SIT formation

Following the whistle-blower’s testimony and growing public anger, the Karnataka government, on July 19, 2025, announced the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by Director General of Police Pranab Mohanty.

Acting swiftly, the SIT identified 13 suspected burial sites. According to Indian Express, exhumations began on July 29, 2025, in challenging conditions — heavy monsoon rains, forested terrain, and proximity to the Netravathi River.

By August 4, 2025:

• Site No. 6: Partial human skeleton recovered.
• Site No. 11-A: Skeletal fragments recovered; unclear if they form complete skeletons.
• One location: PAN card found belonging to a man reportedly deceased in 2025.

Families and witnesses come forward

The SIT’s work encouraged families of past victims to step forward:

• Soujanya’s parents expressed hope that the case will finally lead to justice.
• Mother of Ananya Bhat (medical student missing since 2003) filed a fresh complaint in hopes her daughter’s remains might be identified.
• Additional witnesses provided accounts of other secret burials in and around Dharmasthala.

According to Frontline Magazine, some families and activists have called for the case to be handed over to a national agency such as the NIA, citing the gravity of the allegations and potential local influence over the investigation.

Threats, attacks, and evidence destruction concerns

Despite the High Court’s lifting of the gag order, independent journalists and YouTubers reporting on the case have faced threats and physical violence. According to Hindustan Times, on August 6, 2025, two YouTubers were attacked while filming in Dharmasthala.

In a major revelation was also present in the report raising concerns of evidence destruction, the Belthangady police station admitted in early August to having deleted records of unidentified deaths from 2000–2015 — a period covering many of the alleged crimes.

Political and institutional responses

Political reactions have largely been muted, with many leaders avoiding direct comment on the allegations against Heggade:

• G. Parameshwara (Home Minister, Karnataka): Said a “thorough investigation” must precede any conclusions and confirmed SIT’s mandate.
• R. Ashok (BJP Leader of Opposition): Dismissed the allegations as a conspiracy; falsely claimed the whistle blower was Muslim.
• B.S. Yediyurappa (former CM, BJP): Called the charges baseless but welcomed the SIT’s formation.

Heggade has made no public statement. A temple spokesperson has said the administration supports the SIT’s investigation.

Forensic challenges

Forensic experts warn that identifying the skeletal remains will be complex due to:

• Advanced decomposition.
• Possible disturbance of burial sites.
• Requirement for DNA matching with living relatives.

Despite this, victim families remain hopeful that the investigation will deliver closure after decades of unanswered grief.

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Allegations of irregularities and opaque process

The case was brought to the Court’s attention through an application filed by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR). According to Live Law, ADR’s counsel, Prashant Bhushan, contended that the ECI had not disclosed the identities of the 65 lakh voters whose names were removed. He further alleged that the ECI failed to specify whether these voters were deceased or had migrated, a crucial detail for ensuring the integrity of the electoral roll.

Bhushan also raised concerns about the process itself, stating that political parties were not given the lists at the block level, a step he claimed was essential for transparency. He also highlighted a lack of clarity on whether the inclusions and omissions in the list were based on the recommendations of the Booth Level Officers (BLOs).

Appearing before a bench of Justices Surya Kant, Ujjal Bhuyan, and NK Singh, advocate Prashant Bhushan stated that “We have filed an IA…the draft roll they have published says 65 lakh voters’ names have been omitted…they have not given list of those names…they have said people are dead, have migrated…they should disclose who are the 65 lakhs, who are dead, who have migrated…secondly, the BLOs when forwarding the forms have said this person is/is not recommended by BLO…they have not published for rest of the people that means out of 8 crores minus 65 lakhs, whether BLOs have recommended or not recommended…this information will be very important. IA may be listed tomorrow or day after” as reported by Live Law.

Bhushan also claimed that a significant number of voters were included in the list even though they were not recommended by the BLOs. He argued that these voters had failed to submit the required 11 documents, and in many cases, BLOs themselves had filled out the forms without any supporting documentation.

“Even those who have been included, BLOs have not recommended. Vast majority, more than 75%, have not submitted these 11 documents. BLOs have themselves filled up the forms and there are no documents in any of them. Among those, they are now saying BLOs have not recommended. About 12% in 2 constituencies have not been recommended,” Bhushan said, as reported by Live Law.

ECI’s defence and the Court’s directive

In response, the counsel for the ECI refuted Bhushan’s claims, stating that the submissions were “incorrect.” He asserted that the draft list was indeed shared with representatives of political parties before its publication. When asked by the bench, comprising Justices Surya Kant, Ujjal Bhuyan, and NK Singh, why the ECI couldn’t put this information in a formal reply, the counsel was directed to do so.

“Why can’t you say all this in a reply? If you have supplied, please give a list of political parties to whom you have supplied, so that Mr Bhushan’s client can collect information from those authorized representatives. File your reply by Saturday,” Justice Kant said

Justice Kant also pointed out that since this was only a preliminary list, the reasons for the deletions would be provided later, along with the final list. He also emphasised the importance of ensuring that every affected voter’s information is duly considered. The Court has scheduled the next hearing on the petitions challenging the Bihar SIR for August 12.

Background of the Bihar SIR process and SC hearings

The SIR in Bihar is an exercise undertaken by the ECI for updation in electoral rolls. On June 24, the ECI announced the SIR for Bihar ahead of the state’s assembly elections. This process required voters, particularly those whose names weren’t on the 2003 electoral roll, to re-verify their details by submitting new enumeration forms with supporting documents. The ECI cited the need to remove duplicate entries, deceased voters, and migrated individuals from the rolls.

The legality and methodology of this exercise were swiftly challenged in the Supreme Court by ADR and other petitioners, including political parties and social activists. The petitioners argued that the SIR could disenfranchise a large number of genuine voters, especially from marginalised communities, due to the stringent documentary requirements and a tight deadline. They also questioned the ECI’s authority to conduct such a revision so close to an election.

The Supreme Court has been hearing the matter since July 10. During the initial hearings, the Court refused to halt the SIR but urged the ECI to “consider” accepting additional documents like Aadhaar, Voter ID, and Ration Cards for voter verification, which were initially excluded from the ECI’s list of 11 acceptable documents. The Court also expressed its concern about the potential for “mass exclusion” of voters and warned that it would intervene if any irregularities were found. 

The ECI, in turn, defended its actions by stating it had the constitutional authority to carry out the SIR and that the process was being conducted transparently in collaboration with political parties’ Booth Level Agents (BLAs). The current hearing on August 6 is a follow-up to these earlier proceedings, triggered by the publication of the draft electoral roll with the significant deletion of 65 lakh names.

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Somnath Suryawanshi was arrested in December 2024 for allegedly participating in protests and riots that erupted in Parbhani district on December 11, following the desecration of a replica of the Indian Constitution. A resident of Pune and a student at a law college in Parbhani, Somnath was taken into custody and, after a brief remand, shifted to judicial custody. He died on December 15, allegedly as a result of injuries sustained from police torture during his time in lock-up.

Mother’s plea ignored for months

His mother, 60-year-old Vijayabai Venkat Suryawanshi, has been waging a determined legal battle since December 18, 2024, when she filed a formal complaint demanding registration of an FIR against the officers responsible for her son’s death. In her statement, Vijayabai recalled receiving a phone call informing her that Somnath had died of a “heart attack.” But what followed only deepened her suspicion.

While she was en-route to Parbhani, officials told her the body had already been shifted to the Aurangabad Government Medical College and Hospital (GMCH). On the way, she was intercepted by the Parbhani police and taken to the SP’s office, where she alleges a senior officer told her: “We didn’t kill your son. He died of a heart attack. We can help you. If you take the body, we’ll offer police training to one of your sons.” 

She refused the offer and proceeded to Aurangabad, where a post-mortem was conducted. Social activists at the hospital informed her that the autopsy indicated multiple injuries consistent with custodial torture — contradicting the state’s version of a natural death due to illness.

Bombay HC recognises prima facie brutality

On July 4, 2025, the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court, acknowledging “prima facie material indicating custodial brutality and violation of constitutional rights”, directed the police to register an FIR within a week. However, the Mahayuti-led Maharashtra government under Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis failed to comply. Instead, the state challenged the order before the Supreme Court. The apex court, however, upheld the High Court’s directive on July 30, observing that the FIR was not optional but necessary for enabling an impartial criminal investigation.

As per the report of The Statesman, the Supreme Court Bench, comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh, clarified that registration of an FIR should not be interpreted as assigning guilt but as initiating a fair investigation under the law.

Presented facts and successfully argued in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India for Vijaybai Vyankat Suryawanshi.

The Supreme Court maintained the order of the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court to file FIR and launch investigation as per the application made by Vijaybai on… pic.twitter.com/m8CdCtfqh2

— Prakash Ambedkar (@Prksh_Ambedkar) July 30, 2025

On July 4, The Aurangabad Bench of the Hon’ble Court of Bombay had ordered to register an FIR against the police responsible for the custodial death of Somnath Suryavanshi and the brutality in Parbhani.

But the State of Maharashtra appealed against the order of High Court in the… pic.twitter.com/DhG6PHRvmU

— Prakash Ambedkar (@Prksh_Ambedkar) July 30, 2025

Detailed report may be read here and here.

Allegations of torture and postmortem findings

In her FIR, Vijayabai has alleged that Somnath was subjected to three days of continuous custodial torture at the New Mondha police station. Activists have also corroborated her account, noting that the post-mortem report documented fractured bones and internal injuries, directly contradicting earlier government statements that claimed he had pre-existing respiratory issues and died of chest pain.

This claim was echoed by Chief Minister Fadnavis in the legislative assembly shortly after the new Mahayuti government was sworn in. He maintained that Somnath had a “serious respiratory illness” and had died of “natural causes.” However, these claims were debunked when the post-mortem revealed evidence of blunt force trauma, broken shoulder bones, and signs of sustained physical assault.

Detailed report may be read here and here.

Prakash Ambedkar’s legal intervention and political fallout

The case received a significant boost when Prakash Ambedkar, chief of the Vanchit Bahujan Aghadi (VBA) and grandson of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, took up the cause and personally argued the matter before the courts. “Somnath shed his blood for the Constitution of this country. He was murdered for standing up for its values,” Ambedkar said in a press briefing after the SC order.

He added that the FIR will pave the way for a broader investigation into custodial violence in Maharashtra. “This case may become a benchmark for custodial death investigations. We are now demanding that the JJ Hospital doctors who issued secondary medical opinions without court orders also be made accused. The role of doctors must not be overlooked in shielding police impunity,” he said.

Ambedkar also questioned the legality of the “combing operation” carried out in Parbhani after the desecration incident, during which multiple Dalit homes were raided, and arrests made without due process. “All officers who were part of that illegal operation must be investigated,” he added.

मुंबई उच्च न्यायालयाच्या औरंगाबाद खंडपीठाने सोमनाथ सूर्यवंशी हत्येप्रकरणी एका आठवड्याच्या आत पोलिसांवर एफआयआर दाखल करण्याचा स्पष्ट आदेश दिला होता. मात्र, आजपर्यंत तो एफआयआर दाखल झालेला नाही. त्यामुळे आता पोलीस आणि प्रशासनवर कोर्टाच्या अवमानाच्या (Contempt of Court) अंतर्गत… pic.twitter.com/uizaD3wmSC

— Prakash Ambedkar (@Prksh_Ambedkar) July 30, 2025

What lies ahead?

With the FIR now registered under Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which replaced IPC Section 302 (murder), attention is shifting toward the constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) or a Judicial Commission. Activists and lawyers have demanded that the probe be conducted independently of the Maharashtra police to avoid conflict of interest, given that police officials are the primary accused.

The delay in FIR registration — despite the HC’s clear order and the absence of any stay by the Supreme Court — has also raised questions about contempt of court and executive resistance to judicial directives, showing that the Parbhani police’s inaction between July 4 and August 1 could expose them to proceedings for wilful non-compliance.

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The post Custodial Death of Dalit Law Student Somnath Suryawanshi: FIR registered after Supreme Court upholds Bombay HC directive appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The detailed order, passed on July 22 by Special MCOCA Judge V.H. Patwadkar, underscores Karad’s alleged role as a shadow operator who directed the assault from behind the scenes and maintained operational control over his co-accused. According to the report of Hindustan Times, the court found that the accused had filmed the violent attack on Deshmukh and made video calls during the act — a deliberate attempt to instil fear and assert the dominance of their gang.

Background: A murder tied to an extortion racket

Deshmukh, aged 45, was kidnapped, tortured, and killed on December 9, 2023, allegedly for opposing an extortion demand of ₹2 crore made to Avaada Energy Private Limited by Karad and his associates. The company was operating wind energy projects in Kaij taluka, a region where local political-criminal networks have increasingly targeted renewable energy ventures for extortion.

According to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), which took over the probe due to the case’s high-profile nature, Deshmukh had attempted to shield the company from this illegal pressure. In response, as reported by Mid-day, Karad and his co-accused allegedly conspired to eliminate him. After being abducted, Deshmukh was brutally beaten, with the assault recorded and live-streamed to Karad. His body was later dumped near Daithana Phata, and the assailants fled the scene.

Detailed background may be read here.

Charges, evidence, and organised crime angle

Karad and seven other accused have been charged under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA), the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and relevant provisions of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). The CID has filed a 1,200-page chargesheet detailing the conspiracy, digital footprints, phone data, video recordings, forensic reports, and witness statements.

As per The Hindu, Rejecting Karad’s discharge plea, the court stated: “The statements of witnesses, electronic, digital, scientific, forensic evidence, etc., prima facie show the complicity of the applicant. It appears that he has been a member of the organised crime syndicate and was involved in continuing unlawful activities. Therefore, there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the applicant. The accused is not entitled to be discharged.”

Karad’s Defence: Claims of political vendetta and procedural gaps

Karad, known to be a close aide of former NCP minister Dhananjay Munde, had filed the discharge application claiming he was being framed for political reasons. He questioned the validity of the MCOCA sanction granted in February 2025, alleging procedural irregularities. He further argued that of the 20 past cases cited by the prosecution, he had been acquitted or discharged in nearly 15, including one case in which the Bombay High Court reversed his conviction on appeal.

He also asserted that the police failed to establish any specific role linking him to the crime or to any larger syndicate.

Prosecution rebuts, cites criminal history and control over co-accused

Special Public Prosecutor Ujjwal Nikam, opposing Karad’s plea, strongly defended the use of MCOCA and accused the defence of stalling proceedings through repeated discharge pleas. According to the report of The Hindu, he argued that Karad was the mastermind who controlled the operation remotely, threatening his co-accused for not executing the plan swiftly.

“This is a modus operandi to obstruct the course of justice,” Nikam told the court. “If his name is dropped, it would embolden the crime syndicate and compromise law and order.”

The prosecution highlighted that Karad had been booked in 20 criminal cases, including serious charges such as attempt to murder, criminal intimidation, and unlawful assembly — with seven cases registered within the last 10 years alone. The cumulative pattern of criminal conduct was presented as proof of his leadership in an organised crime syndicate.

Draft charges and consolidated discharge plea

On July 22, alongside the rejection of Karad’s discharge plea, the prosecution submitted draft charges against all eight accused, proposing 12 to 13 charges per individual. However, the court clarified it would consider these only after adjudicating the pending discharge pleas of the remaining seven accused.

In a critical move to prevent further delays, the court directed that all remaining accused must now file a consolidated discharge application, rejecting the tactic of multiple, piecemeal filings.

A separate prosecution plea seeking asset seizure from the accused has been reserved for a future order.

Political Fallout: Demands for CBI probe in parliament

The case has triggered intense political ripples in Maharashtra. Supriya Sule, MP and Working President of NCP (Sharad Pawar faction), raised the issue during Zero Hour in Parliament, demanding a CBI investigation into the murders of Santosh Deshmukh and Mahadev Munde, a trader found murdered in Beed in October 2023.

“These brutal, inhuman killings have shocked the state. Beed has always stood for dignity and progress. I urge the Union Home Minister to order a CBI inquiry into both murders,” Sule said, accusing the Maharashtra Home Department of inertia.

Karad’s proximity to Dhananjay Munde, who resigned from the Maharashtra cabinet in March 2025 following allegations of his links to Karad, has further intensified calls for accountability. Munde, despite stepping down, continues to occupy the official ministerial bungalow ‘Satpuda’, delaying its transfer to his successor Chhagan Bhujbal. Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis, when questioned, said he was unaware of the penalty levied for Munde’s overstay.

Conclusion

The Beed Sarpanch murder case has become a litmus test for Maharashtra’s ability to tackle organised crime with political overtones. With the discharge plea of the key accused now rejected and the court acknowledging the presence of a structured syndicate, the focus shifts to upcoming hearings and the fate of the remaining accused. The case is poised to remain in the spotlight — not only for its legal implications but for what it reveals about the murky intersections of crime, politics, caste and power in Maharashtra.

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Gruesome murder of Sarpanch Santosh Deshmukh in Beed triggers state-wide protests, political fallout in the ruling government, and rampant calls for justice

The post Beed Sarpanch Murder: Special court finds prima facie evidence of organised crime syndicate, rejects Karad’s discharge plea appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Additional City Civil And Session Judge Santhosh Gajanan Bhat had on April 3, framed charges against Revanna under Sections 376(2)(k) (rape by a person in a position of dominance), 376(2)(n) (repeated rape), 354(A) (sexual harassment), 354(B) (assault or use of force with intent to disrobe), 354(C) (voyeurism), 506 (criminal intimidation), and 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) and Section 66(e) of the Information Technology Act. 

The Supreme Court of India, had, in November 2024 dismissed the bail plea of ex-MP Prajwal Revanna booked for rape, sexual assault. In August, a Special Investigation Team of Karnataka which is probing four cases of sexual assault and harassment against Revanna submitted a 2,144-page charge sheet. A bench of Justices Bela M Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma rejected the plea and observed that Revanna is a very influential person. Appearing for Revanna, senior advocate Mukul Rohatgi said that a charge sheet has been filed in the case and section 376 of the IPC was not there in the initial complaint.

The special court had, on April 3 had framed charges against Prajwal Revanna for sexually assaulting the farm labourer who worked for his family. The 1,625-page-long charge sheet, filed on September 14, 2024, said that the woman was sexually assaulted thrice, two times at the family’s farmhouse and once at their residence in Basavanagudi, Bengaluru.

As per prosecution, the victim worked as a maid at a farmhouse owned by the Revanna family. It is claimed that from 2021, during the COVID-19 lockdown, Revanna repeatedly raped her and filmed the assaults in different locations. Further, it is alleged that Revanna used the videos to intimidate and silence her, preventing her from complaining.

The SIT formed in this case is also investigating three cases registered against Prajwal and he is presently in judicial custody. The SIT had arrested Prajwal at the Bengaluru Airport on his arrival from Germany on May 30 last year. He was arrested in Crime No.107/2024, registered with the Holenarasipura Town Police Station.

Senior advocates Ashok Nayak and BN Jagadeesha were special public prosecutors in the case. 

The complainant, the 47-year-old farm labourer, Mridula*, was working at the family farmhouse in Gannikada and also accompanied the family during their trips to Bengaluru. She had accused Prajwal of raping her when he had called her inside the room on the pretext of bringing him water at the farmhouse. He was accused of raping her a second time when she had accompanied the family to their house in Basavangudi, Bengaluru.

According to the chargesheet, the assault took place in 2021 at the Gannikada farmhouse. “Mridula was cleaning a room on the first floor when Prajwal came and asked if the room was cleaned. He then asked her to fetch some water. Mridula came back with a jug (chombu) of water when Prajwal suddenly pulled her inside his room. He then locked the door. Mridula asked him to open the door, “Baagilu tegi anna, bhaya aagutte (Open the door anna, I’m scared),” the chargesheet said. Prajwal responded with “Enu agalla” (Nothing will happen) to her cries and then raped her. The chargesheet said that he recorded the assault on his phone.

A case of kidnapping has also been filed against Prajwal’s parents, HD Revanna and Bhavani, and Prajwal’s relative, Satish Babanna, as Mridula had complained that she was taken to the farm on April 29, 2024, and kept for a few days. This coincided with the time that the videos had started circulating. On May 2, Mridula’s son filed a complaint of kidnapping against Prajwal after he came to know of the videos. At the time, Mridula was forced to record a video saying she was alright and had not been kidnapped. A couple of days later, she managed to escape from the farm where she was being held.

Prajwal has been in jail since June 2024, after complaints of sexual assault and having recorded the encounters on video emerged. 

The complaints started after thousands of video clips of these alleged encounters started circulating during the general elections held last year, when Prajwal, the incumbent MP, was contesting from the Hassan Lok Sabha constituency. A Special Investigation Team was formed to look into all the allegations, and four women came forward with complaints against him. 

Other cases against Revanna

There are three more cases filed against Prajwal Revanna. Of these, the first complaint was filed by Girija* and her daughter, Sunitha*. Prajwal is accused of raping Girija and forcing Sunitha to strip on a video call.  In another case, Prajwal is accused of raping Priya*, a former member of the local body and JD(S) party worker. This assault is said to have taken place at Prajwal’s then official residence in Hassan, says The News Minute. A case of molestation has also been filed against Prajwal by another woman who said that he had molested her when she had approached him to seek help on a personal matter.

* Names of the victims have been changed to protect their identity.

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The post Prajwal Revanna convicted of rape in first case, sentencing of August 2 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

• Pragya Singh Thakur, BJP leader and former MP, and self-styled god-woman
• Lt Col Prasad Purohit, a serving Army intelligence officer at the time of arrest
• Major (Retd) Ramesh Upadhyay
• Sameer Kulkarni
• Sudhakar Chaturvedi
• Ajay Rahirkar
• Sudhakar Dhar Dwivedi alias Dayanand Pandey

The special court, presided over by Judge A.K. Lahoti, stated that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused “deserved the benefit of doubt”. 

The Malegaon Blast: What happened?

On September 29, 2008, a powerful explosion ripped through Bhikku Chowk, a Muslim-dominated commercial area in Malegaon, Maharashtra. The bomb, fitted on an LML Freedom motorcycle bearing a fake number plate, killed six persons and injured over 100.

Initial investigations by the Maharashtra ATS, led by the late Hemant Karkare, suggested the use of RDX and ammonium nitrate. The ATS soon traced the motorcycle to Pragya Singh Thakur, who initially denied ownership.

The conspiracy, as detailed in the ATS’s 4,500-page chargesheet, involved:

• Planning meetings in Raigad Fort, Deolali, Pune, Bhopal, Indore, Faridabad, Kolkata, and Nashik
• Procurement of explosives by Lt Col Purohit from army stocks during his J&K posting
• Bomb assembly at Sudhakar Chaturvedi’s house in Deolali, whose keys were stored at the Military Intelligence office
• A radical plan to establish a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation) through Abhinav Bharat, a group allegedly floated by Purohit and others.

How the case collapsed

The Malegaon 2008 blast case was initially investigated by the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) under the leadership of the late Hemant Karkare. In January 2009, the ATS filed its primary charge sheet, naming 12 accused, including Pragya Singh Thakur and Lt Col Prasad Purohit, both of whom had been arrested months after the explosion.

In 2011, the case was transferred to the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which eventually filed a supplementary charge sheet on May 13, 2016.

The ATS investigation had alleged that Thakur, Purohit (who was identified as the founder of Abhinav Bharat, a radical right-wing group), and others were part of a larger conspiracy aimed at taking “revenge” and instilling fear among the Muslim community. According to the ATS, the accused participated in a series of conspiracy meetings held in cities including Bhopal and Indore. It further claimed that the motorcycle used in the blast was registered in Thakur’s name, and that she had made it available for use in the attack.

In its 2009 charge sheet, the ATS invoked multiple provisions, including the stringent Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA), against all the accused. 

However, a significant shift occurred after the NIA took over. Between 2011 and 2016, the agency had initially opposed any relief sought by Thakur. But in a complete reversal, the NIA’s 2016 supplementary charge sheet dropped all charges against her. While it retained several allegations against the remaining accused, invoking sections of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and the Explosive Substances Act, the agency asserted that it found no credible evidence implicating Thakur. Instead, the NIA accused the ATS of coercing witnesses into giving statements against her and recommended dropping MCOCA charges against all 12 accused.

Notably, the supplementary charge sheet was filed without informing the designated Special Public Prosecutor, Avinash Rasal, raising questions about procedural transparency.

Despite the NIA’s exoneration of Thakur, the special NIA court refused to discharge her, stating that it could not overlook the incriminating material submitted earlier by the ATS.

Despite early investigative successes, the case gradually fell apart. The court’s verdict outlines technical and evidentiary failures, but the rot runs far deeper.

(Detailed copy of the ATS charge sheet may be read here.)

1. Forensic failures and “contaminated” evidence

• No fingerprints or DNA were recovered from the blast site 
• The bike’s chassis and engine numbers were destroyed, and could not be conclusively linked to Thakur
• The court ruled that forensic samples were contaminated, making them unreliable 

2. Discredited intercepts and defective sanctions

• Phone taps of the accused were ruled inadmissible due to lack of proper legal sanction 
• The court held that two UAPA sanctions signed by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) were procedurally defective.
• MCOCA, initially invoked by the ATS for establishing an organised crime syndicate, was later dropped by the NIA in its 2016 charge sheet

Vanishing Evidence: Missing papers, missing justice

One of the darkest chapters in the case is the disappearance of key evidence:

• Confessional statements of at least 13 witnesses and two accused, recorded under CrPC 164 and MCOCA, went missing from court records by 2016, as per Mumbai Mirror
• These included accounts of meetings between Pragya Thakur and Ramji Kalsangra (an absconding accused) discussing the Malegaon blast plan.
• A special court eventually allowed the use of photocopies, over defence objections, after the originals remained untraceable despite court-to-court tracking 

Compounding this, new statements recorded by the NIA in Delhi directly contradicted the earlier ones, which now lead to exonerating the accused 

Witnesses Turn Hostile: 39 and counting

Of the 323 witnesses examined, at least 39 turned hostile, including serving Army officers and other key prosecution witnesses, as per The Hindu. Many of these had earlier confirmed:

• Attendance at planning meetings
• The ideological indoctrination of “Hindu Rashtra”
• Purohit’s and Thakur’s involvement in Abhinav Bharat

Yet under oath, they reversed their earlier testimonies.

Another 30 witnesses died before they could testify.

Critically, no prosecution for perjury was initiated, and the court did not question the pattern of defection.

Political winds and prosecutorial apathy

The prosecution’s attitude changed after 2014, a fact publicly confirmed by Rohini Salian, the initial special public prosecutor, according to Indian Express.

In 2015, Salian disclosed that she had been instructed by NIA officials to “go soft” on the accused. When she refused, she was side-lined and replaced. She recounted how:

“A senior NIA officer came and said there are instructions from higher-ups. Someone else will appear instead of you,” as reported by Indian Express. 

Salian’s replacement, Avinash Rasal, led the rest of the trial. The NIA’s 2016 supplementary chargesheet notably weakened the ATS case, dropped MCOCA, and questioned the credibility .of the confessions obtained under ATS custody — often on the basis of alleged torture/

The accused claimed their confessions were coerced. The NIA appeared to agree — without formally prosecuting the ATS for custodial abuse.

Abhinav Bharat- forgotten conspiracy

The ATS had built a robust case that Abhinav Bharat was a radical Hindutva outfit plotting systemic violence.

• Meeting transcripts, many recorded by Swami Dayanand Pandey himself, showed elaborate plans for a parallel state structure with its own flag, constitution, and army, as per a report of SabrangIndia.
• The accused discussed revenge for Muslim acts of terror, equipping themselves to create a “Hindu Rashtra” by force.
• The Bhonsala Military School in Nashik — used for training cadres — was spared scrutiny 
• Senior army officials who facilitated meetings or gave access to explosives were listed as witnesses, not accused

Despite this, the court held that the group’s structure could not be proved, and hence conspiracy could not be established.

A bigger network, never investigated

The Malegaon case was not an isolated act. It had alleged links to:

• Samjhauta Express blasts (2007)
• Ajmer Sharif Dargah blast (2007)
• Mecca Masjid blast in Hyderabad (2007)
• Nanded and Parbhani mosque blasts (2003–2006)

The ATS had initially argued for treating these as part of a larger Hindutva terror network, with shared ideology, funding, and personnel. This theory was quietly shelved when the NIA took over in 2011.

(Detailed report may be read here.)

What justice meant for the victims

Most of the Malegaon victims were poor Muslim daily wage workers. Their families waited 17 years for justice.

• No reparations have been announced for their suffering.
• No accountability has been fixed on investigative agencies for case mismanagement.
• No police officials have faced scrutiny for custodial torture or botched procedures

Meanwhile, the accused have moved on:

• Pragya Thakur was a sitting Member of Parliament.
• Lt Col Purohit was reinstated into the Army.
• Others have resumed public life, with some even receiving public felicitation by Hindu outfits, as reported by Sabrang India

Notably, through the judgement, the court said that families of all six victims of the blast will be given Rs 2 lakh each, and all injured victims will be given Rs 50,000 as compensation.

The real cost of acquittal

Judge Lahoti’s observation that “Terrorism has no religion as no religion advocates violence… Judgments cannot be based on morals and public perception” is legally sound. But this case was not just about legal thresholds.

It is about:

• Vanishing documents
• Reversed testimonies
• Political interference
• Institutional sabotage
• And a justice system that slowly but surely stopped caring

The acquittal may be final, but it is not exoneration. It is a legal closure of a political wound, not a factual resolution.

Conclusion: Not a verdict, but a warning

The Malegaon blast trial was never just about one bombing. It was about the integrity of our institutions, the non-negotiability of secularism, and the State’s duty to remain impartial in matters of terror.

The July 31, 2025 verdict might be a bookend to the case. But it is also an open question to the Indian republic: When evidence disappears, witnesses retreat, prosecutors fall silent, and ideology infiltrates investigation— can we still call it justice?

Related:

ARCHIVES: Hindutva Terror – The terror trail from Nanded to Malegaon and beyond

Criminal conspiracy – The ATS charge sheet in the Malegaon blast case

Malegaon blast case: Court rejects Pragya’s plea seeking exemption from appearing for trail

Malegaon Blast Accused Sadhvi Pragya may get Z-Security

PM Modi Defends Malegaon Blast Accused Sadhvi Pragya’s Candidature

The post Malegaon Acquittals: A judgement of some doubt, a trail of uneven justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The resignation comes a day after the union government, on July 29, 2025, notified Gupta’s appointment as a judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court for a two-year term. This appointment was made despite Sharma’s formal representations to the Supreme Court Collegium, the President of India, the Ministry of Law and Justice, and the Chief Justice of the MP High Court, opposing his elevation. Sharma had submitted that Gupta had subjected her to continued humiliation, discrimination, and casteist behaviour when he was her administrative superior.

A resignation letter that reads like an indictment

In her resignation, accessed and reported by The Print, Sharma declared she was resigning with the “ache of betrayal — not at the hands of a criminal or an accused, but at the hands of the very system I swore to serve.” She described being subjected to “unrelenting harassment, not merely of the body or the mind, but of my dignity, my voice, and my very existence as a woman judge who dared to speak up.”

Rejecting the notion that her resignation was an act of personal defeat, Sharma wrote, as reported by Hindustan Times, “I am resigning from judicial service, not because I failed the institution, but because the institution has failed me.” Her words were not just personal; they carried an institutional warning: “Let this letter haunt the files it enters. Let it whisper in the hallways where silence once reigned.”

Allegations ignored, harassment unchecked

Sharma’s allegations were not anonymous, nor unsupported. As The Print and Hindustan Times both confirm, she made detailed and documented complaints against Gupta—including incidents of public humiliation, caste-based insults, and interference in her professional assessments. She alleged that Gupta and his wife not only demeaned her, but also sought to control her social interactions, particularly objecting to her friendship with their daughter.

In her petition before the Supreme Court, filed earlier this year, Sharma accused Gupta of abusing his administrative position to downgrade her performance ratings and creating a hostile work environment during her tenure as a trainee judge. The harassment, she claimed, extended to personal insults and attempts to damage her reputation.

Yet, despite multiple representations, Sharma states there was no inquiry, no notice, no opportunity to be heard—a complete abandonment of even the most basic tenets of natural justice. “The same judiciary that sermonizes about transparency from the bench failed to even follow the basic tenets of natural justice within its own halls,” her letter reads, as per The Print.

A troubling elevation amid allegations

Notably, Gupta’s elevation had previously been blocked by the Supreme Court Collegium in 2023, headed by then CJI D.Y. Chandrachud, after it received Sharma’s and other complaints. The file was returned to the Madhya Pradesh High Court for further inquiry. However, after what appears to be a perfunctory probe, where Sharma was never even called to testify, according to The Print, Gupta was given a clean chit and his name re-sent for reconsideration in April 2025.

ThePrint also reported that Gupta faced multiple complaints from other judicial officers, including a Dalit judge who accused him of casteist harassment, and another senior judge who alleged intimidation and derogatory remarks about High Court judges. None of these complaints, Sharma notes in her resignation, were adequately investigated.

Supreme Court had earlier reinstated Sharma

In February 2025, Sharma won a significant legal victory when the Supreme Court set aside her 2023 dismissal, calling it “punitive, arbitrary and illegal.” A bench led by Justice B.V. Nagarathna noted that her appraisal had ignored critical factors, including a miscarriage and long COVID-related complications. The judgment emphasised institutional responsibility in supporting women judges, particularly during health crises or maternity.

Yet even after her reinstatement, Sharma said she continued to face subtle retaliation, including an “advisory” from the HC to mend her behaviour. Her attempts to convert her earlier complaint into a formal grievance were met with silence.

A system that rewards power, not truth

Throughout her letter, Sharma reiterates that her protest is not about revenge, but about accountability. “. Shri Rajesh Kumar Gupta who orchestrated my suffering was not questioned – was rewarded. Recommended. Elevated. Given a pedestal instead of a summons. Shri Rajesh Kumar Gupta the man I accused not lightly, not anonymously, but with documented facts and the raw courage only a wounded woman can Summon was not even asked to explain. No inquiry. No notice. No hearing. No accountability—is now titled Justice, a cruel joke upon the very word,” she wrote, as per ThePrint.

In a scathing indictment of the collegium system, she warned that rewarding impunity sends a chilling message to other whistleblowers within the judiciary. “In that silence, I saw the brutal truth of our times that integrity is optional, power is protection, and those who speak the truth are punished more severely than those who violate it,” she wrote. “The same institution that teaches equality before law handpicked power over truth.”

Senior Advocate Indira Jaising: A structural betrayal

Senior Advocate Indira Jaising, who represented Sharma in her SC challenge against dismissal, told ThePrint: that this is not the first time she was dealing with a case where a woman judge has been forced to resign. She added: “As she said, ‘the judiciary’s daughters’ have been let down by the judiciary itself. I agree. There is something very wrong with the process of appointing judges of the high court behind closed doors. Surprisingly, the judiciary and the government are on the same page”

Jaising argued that closed-door appointments without adequate scrutiny of complaints were symptomatic of institutional decay. She said, “We lost a very good judicial officer with an unblemished record of service. She won in the judicial side but lost on the administrative side.”

A call for institutional introspection

Sharma’s resignation is not merely a personal exit—it is a formal indictment of the judiciary’s failure to uphold its own principles. She closes her letter with piercing words:

“I leave now, with wounds that no reinstatement, no compensation, no apology will ever heal—but also with my truth intact. Let this letter haunt the files it enters. Let it whisper in the hallways where silence once reigned. Let it live longer than the reputations hastily protected, and the wrongs quietly buried. 

I sign off not as an officer of the court, but as a victim of its silence. 

Where were the rules then? Where was the revered transparency then? 

You refused to protect one of your own. 

You refused to uphold the principles you preach. 

You refused to be just where it mattered the most. 

And if this does not shake your conscience, then perhaps the rot runs deeper than we dare admit.

I leave this institution with no medals, no celebration, and no bitterness—only the bitter truth that the judiciary failed me. But worse—it failed itself. 

This letter of resignation is not closure. It is a statement of protest. Let it remain in your archives as a reminder that there once was a woman judge in Madhya Pradesh who gave her all to justice, and was broken by the system that preached it the loudest. 

And if even one judge, one registrar, one member of the Collegium reads this and feels unease then perhaps, my voice has done more justice than my robe ever could.”

Her act—bold, painful, and unflinchingly honest—now stands as a testament to how women in the judiciary are treated. It raises deeply troubling questions about the integrity of appointments, the erasure of women’s voices in power structures, and the danger of silencing dissent through procedural opacity.

Related:

Beed to Delhi: Lawyer beaten in Maharashtra, judge threatened in Delhi—what the path for justice means for women practioners in today’s India

When Courts Fail Survivors: How patriarchy shapes justice in sexual offence against women cases

Surviving Communal Wrath: Women who have defied the silence, demanded accountability from the state

‘We are considered servants, not humans’: Women of Jai Bhim Nagar reveal the violence of domestic work

The post Resignation in Protest: MP woman judge quits over elevation of senior she accused of harassment and discrimination appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment is a significant ruling. It is notable, not for what it dismantled, as the Act itself remains on the statute books, but for the specific legal grounds upon which it provided relief. The High Court’s strict focus on the principles of locus standi (the right to bring a complaint) and the failure to establish a prima facie criminal case has resulted in a precedent against the potential weaponization of the law by third-party vigilantes. As a crucial judicial interpretation in the early life of this anti-conversion statute, the Mustafa judgment provides a clear precedent for challenging such prosecutions even as the government reportedly has been planning to repeal the law in the State of Karnataka.

Facts of the case

The facts of the Mustafa case presented a scenario that the KPRFR Act was seemingly designed to address. On May 4, 2025, a complaint was filed by Ramesh Mallappa Navi, a devotee at the Ramatheerth Temple in Jamkhandi. He alleged that the petitioners were distributing Islamic pamphlets and, when confronted, made derogatory statements about Hinduism, declaring their mission was to “make the whole world turn towards Islam” and threatening those who stood in their way. In India today, while this information could be the crux of an angry Whatsapp forward, it is within the framework of Constitutional rights to propagate their own religion under Article 25. Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of the Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.

In this case, the First Information Report (FIR) invoked the specific language of the KPRFR Act, alleging that the petitioners offered “material incentives, such as vehicles and job opportunities in Dubai,” to entice people to convert. This allegation of “allurement” is a central pillar of the offense defined under Section 3 of the Act. With a fact pattern that so closely mirrored the legislative intent, the stage was set for a direct examination of the law’s application. However, the High Court based its decision on fundamental procedural and substantive flaws in the prosecution’s case without needing to delve into a broader constitutional inquiry.

The First Pillar: Who has the right to complain?

The court’s primary reason for quashing the FIR was the complainant’s lack of legal standing. It held unequivocally that the complaint was initiated by a “third party, who does not fall within the category of persons enumerated under Section 4 of the Act.” This made the registration of the FIR “legally invalid.”

Section 4 of the KPRFR Act specifies that a complaint can only be lodged by the person who was allegedly converted, their parents, siblings, or another relative by blood, marriage, or adoption. The complainant in this case, a bystander at the temple, fit none of these criteria.

The strict enforcement of this provision sends a clear message: the machinery of this criminal statute cannot be triggered by just any concerned citizen or ideological activist. This interpretation provides a significant judicial counterweight to the expansive language found in the Act and its counterparts in other states. The Karnataka Act, for instance, also vaguely permits complaints from anyone “in any form associated or a colleague,” and a recent amendment to the Uttar Pradesh law allows “any person” to file an FIR. Such provisions effectively deputize the public, risking a flood of vexatious litigation driven by vigilante groups.

The Mustafa judgment’s reasoning re-centres the legal process on the individual whose rights are actually at stake, the alleged victim of the unlawful conversion. It shifts the focus from the offended sensibilities of an observer to the tangible harm, if any, experienced by the person whose freedom of conscience is the subject of the dispute. This creates a “procedural firewall,” a preliminary legal argument that lawyers can now raise to challenge cases based on generalized accusations or those motivated by communal animosity.

The Second Pillar: Was there an “attempt to convert”?

Beyond the procedural defect, the High Court found a fatal flaw in the substance of the complaint itself. Even taking all the allegations in the FIR at face value, the court concluded that they “fail to satisfy the essential elements of an offence under Section 3 of the Act.”

The reasoning was precise: “There is no allegation that the petitioners converted or attempted to convert any person to another religion.” This finding establishes a high bar for prosecution. It clarifies that generalized acts of proselytization, such as distributing literature, debating theology etc do not, by themselves, constitute a criminal offense under the Act. To invoke the law, the state must demonstrate a specific, targeted act aimed at converting an identifiable individual.

This distinction implicitly draws a line between the constitutionally protected right to “propagate” religion under Article 25 and a prosecutable “attempt to convert” under the KPRFR Act. The judgment indicates that for religious speech to lose its constitutional shield and become a criminal act, it must crystallize into a concrete attempt directed at a specific person. The absence of such an allegation in the Mustafa FIR, despite its detailed account of the petitioners’ actions, rendered the complaint legally unsustainable. This serves as another important safeguard, providing defence counsels with a clear substantive argument against the use of the Act to police all forms of religious outreach.

The National Context: A pattern of legislative escalation

The Karnataka Act is not an isolated piece of legislation but part of a coordinated national trend. Since 2017, states like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Haryana have enacted or amended anti-conversion laws, each more stringent than the last. This new generation of statutes shares a common architecture and ideological underpinning, often justified by the unsubstantiated “love jihad” narrative and anxieties about demographic change.

These laws are characterized by:

• Overly Broad Definitions: Terms like “allurement” are defined so broadly as to include offers of free education or employment by religious institutions, potentially criminalizing legitimate charitable work.
• Targeting of Interfaith Marriage: The explicit inclusion of “promise of marriage” as a prohibited means of conversion directly intrudes into the personal autonomy of adults to choose their partners, a right recognized by the Supreme Court as part of the right to life under Article 21.
• Discriminatory Exemptions: Some of these laws exempt “reconversion” to a person’s “immediate previous religion,” a provision widely seen as creating a one-way street that privileges a return to Hinduism while penalizing conversions away from it.
• Intrusive Procedures: The laws mandate a complex pre- and post-conversion declaration process before a District Magistrate, including public notices and police inquiries, transforming a personal act of faith into a matter of public scrutiny and bureaucratic approval.
• Draconian Penalties: Offenses, for example in Rajasthan’s anti-conversion law are cognizable and non-bailable, and the burden of proof is reversed, requiring the accused to prove that the conversion was lawful, contrary to the foundational principle of “innocent until proven guilty.”

This intrusive and blatant disregard for the fundamental freedoms has led to a nationwide legal battle, with numerous petitions challenging these laws pending before various High Courts and the Supreme Court.

The legal challenges to these laws are setting the stage for a potential conflict between two competing lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence. On one side stands the 1977 judgment in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh. In this case, a Constitution Bench upheld early anti-conversion laws, narrowly interpreting the right to “propagate” religion under Article 25 as not including a fundamental right to convert another person. It validated these laws under the state’s power to maintain “public order.”

On the other side is the modern, expansive doctrine of individual autonomy articulated in the landmark 2017 Right to Privacy judgment, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. The nine-judge bench in Puttaswamy established privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21, encompassing dignity, personal autonomy, and the freedom to make fundamental life choices regarding family, marriage, and belief.

The new anti-conversion laws, with their intrusive state surveillance of personal faith decisions, lie directly at the intersection of this doctrinal clash. While Stainislaus focused on preventing conversion through illegitimate means like force or fraud, the new laws regulate the very act of voluntary conversion itself. The requirement to declare one’s intent to convert to the state and face a public inquiry is a direct challenge to the “zone of choice and self-determination” that Puttaswamy sought to protect.

The central constitutional question is no longer merely about the right to propagate (the Stainislaus issue), but about whether the state can impose such a burdensome and invasive procedure on a deeply personal choice without violating the right to privacy and liberty (the Puttaswamy issue).

The Path forward

The Mustafa judgment is a significant outcome of a cautious judicial approach, focused strictly on the letter of the law. It provides immediate, tangible relief and establishes crucial procedural checks without precipitating a direct constitutional confrontation. Its legacy will be to provide the accused and their counsel with specific, effective legal arguments to challenge prosecutions at the very initial stage, thereby helping to curb potential abuses of the law.

However, the larger battle remains. The core provisions of the KPRFR Act and its sister statutes, such as their broad definitions, discriminatory clauses, and invasive procedures, are yet to be tested on the anvil of the Constitution. Ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to reconcile the state’s interest in preventing coercive conversions with the individual’s fundamental rights to privacy, liberty, equality, and conscience. The Mustafa judgment is a crucial first chapter in this unfolding constitutional matter, a stabilizing judgment that clarifies important procedural grounds while the principal constitutional adjudication awaits.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

Related

https://cjp.org.in/anti-conversion-laws-being-weaponised-cjp-seeks-interim-relief-against-misuse-of-anti-conversion-laws/

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-plea-against-anti-conversion-laws-sc-seeks-to-know-status-of-cases-challenging-anti-conversion-laws-in-hcs/

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-other-rights-groups-challenge-maharashtra-govt-gr-setting-up-a-committee-to-monitor-inter-faith-marriages/

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