Earlier, Senior Advocate Sanjay Parikh, representing PUCL, argued that a non-independent commission violates Articles 14 and 19, affecting voters’ rights. Advocate Prashant Bhushan, for ADR, and Senior Advocate Vijay Hansaria also criticised the “haste” of recent appointments. The matter is scheduled for further hearing next week.

Background

The current legal battle is rooted in the 2023 Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India [WP(C) No. 104/2015] judgment. For decades, the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners (ECs) was made solely by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Supreme Court ruled this “vacuum”—the lack of a specific law by Parliament—could not continue. They directed an interim committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India (CJI). However, the Parliament then passed the 2023 Act, which removed the CJI and gave a Cabinet Minister the third seat, ensuring the government always has a 2-1 majority.

The argument against a “Prime Minister’s Man”

According to Live Law, Senior Advocate Vijay Hansaria opened the challenge by arguing that the new law effectively allows the ruling party to select its own “referee.” He argued that even though the Leader of the Opposition is in the room, they are mathematically irrelevant. The core of his argument was that the Election Commission must be insulated from the “political whims” of the government of the day to remain impartial.

“The idea is that it should not be Prime Minister’s man. Under the impugned Act, if the Prime Minister suggests the appointment of X, there is no way out that anybody else can be appointed. The Constituent Assembly members expressed that it must be independent, impartial and it must not be under government of the day.”

Dominance versus mere presence in selection

In today’s hearing (May 7, 2026), Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat emphasised that the problem is not the presence of the executive, but its absolute dominance. He compared the current selection committee to unfair arbitration clauses in contracts, where one party gets to choose the judge. He argued that if the referee is sympathetic to one side, the entire contest is compromised before it begins.

“In arbitration involving PSUs etc. there used to be unilateral clauses. It was akin to having a ‘Home Umpire’… In such a case the arbitrator would not be impartial as he would at the be sympathetic to one party. Presence (of executive) is not a problem but dominance is” as Live Law reported

The haste of appointments and judicial scrutiny

A major point of contention was the “breakneck speed” with which the government appointed two new Commissioners on March 14, 2024. Petitioners alleged that the government rushed the process to appoint Gyanesh Kumar and Sukhbir Sandhu just one day before the Supreme Court was scheduled to hear a stay application against the Act. The Court noted that the Leader of the Opposition was given a list of 200 names only hours before the final meeting.

“On 12th March the LOP sought the shortlisted candidate. On 13th March Secretary sent a list of 200 names being considered… On 14th March they gave a list of 6 names. The selection committee met on the same day and recommended the names… who were sworn in on 15th March.”

During the hearing, Justice Datta observed that “We can only say that we wish such speed is shown in appointment of judges. Especially High Court judges.”

Constitutional thresholds and global comparisons

Counsel for the intervenors brought up the South African Constitution, where the electoral body is a “guarantor institution” protected from simple majority votes. Farasat argued that India’s ECI serves the same purpose and should require a two-thirds majority or unanimity in the selection committee. This would force the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition to agree on a person who is fair to both sides of the political aisle.

“ECI is a guarantor institution. Electoral commission is one of the state institutions supporting constitutional democracy. It is explicit in their [South African] constitution but implicit in our constitution… They have requirement of simple majority… Simple majority might mean executive so your lordships are right that two third versus executive.”

The fallout: Article 14 and the rights of voters

Senior Advocate Sanjay Parikh concluded the petitioner’s arguments by linking the independence of the ECI to the fundamental rights of every citizen. He argued that if the commission is not independent, it violates Article 14 (Equality) because it does not treat all political parties with an even hand. Furthermore, it violates Article 19, as the voter’s right to a free and fair election is curtailed when the overseeing body is under executive control.

“Naturally the rights of the voters are affected if ECI is not independent. Article 19 is also violated… an election commission that is not independent would fail to adhere to the guarantee of equality under article 14 of the constitution.”

This law is outside the threshold of the constitution: Petitioner

As the hearing drew to a close, Shadan Farasat urged the court to strike down the law. He acknowledged that while striking down the law might be “impractical” for previous actions taken by the commission, it was necessary to prevent another round of biased appointments. He asked the court to set the law aside and provide a “functional” interim mechanism that restores the balance originally intended by the Anoop Baranwal bench.

“This law is outside the threshold of the constitution. Your lordships should set it aside and then in the interim give us something functional… You have to consider that another round does not happen if you agree with us. If you don’t that is a different question.”

With the petitioners’ arguments concluded, the matter is set to continue next week for the Union of India’s response.

Related:

The Erased Record: A constitutional challenge to the election commission’s 45-day data destruction mandate

Bihar: Sinister move by ECI as ‘intensive’ revision of electoral roles set to exclude vast majority of legitimate voters

Bihar 2025 Election: EC drops parental birth document requirement for 4.96 crore electors and their children in Bihar

The post The Guardians of the Ballot: Supreme Court hearing the legality of executive primacy in ECI appointments appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“Considering the gravity of the offence, the involvement of applicant and other accused with particular motive organized attempts, and the necessity of detailed investigation regarding undue influence on the victim, imbibing or forcing particular religion under threat or otherwise. Considering the seriousness and magnitude of the alleged offence, the role attributed to the applicant, and the settled legal principles, the court is of the opinion that this is not a fit case for granting anticipatory bail. Application is devoid of merit.” (Para 26)

The application, filed under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, pertains to Crime No. 156/2026 registered at Deolali Police Station under provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

Prosecution Narrative: Organised coercion and religious influence

The prosecution case is anchored in allegations that the primary accused, Danish Sheikh, induced the victim into a physical relationship under the pretext of marriage, while co-accused Tausif Attar allegedly subjected her to harassment and threats. Within this framework, the present applicant’s role is described as facilitating and reinforcing religious influence over the victim.

According to the investigation, Khan is alleged to have:

• Provided the victim with a burqa and religious literature
• Installed religious applications and shared faith-based digital content
• Instructed the victim in offering namaz and observing religious practices
• Visited the victim’s residence for such instruction
• Participated in efforts to change the victim’s name and explore relocation abroad

The prosecution further asserts that the accused contemplated sending the victim to Malaysia and engaged intermediaries in Malegaon, with the investigation examining possible financial and organisational links. Alongside these allegations are claims of caste-based humiliation in the workplace, with the victim asserting that the accused were aware of her Scheduled Caste identity and targeted her on that basis. Additionally, the Court recorded allegations that the accused made derogatory remarks about Hindu deities, which it treated as contributing to offences under Section 299 BNS relating to injury to religious sentiments.

Defence Submissions: Weak FIR, political motive, and over-criminalisation

The defence contested the applicant’s involvement on multiple grounds:

• The FIR, as originally lodged, did not contain allegations of religious conversion; such claims emerged only in subsequent statements
• The more serious penal provisions were not attributable to the applicant
• Maharashtra does not have a specific law criminalising religious conversion, raising questions about the legal framing of the allegations
• The applicant’s role was exaggerated, with primary allegations directed at co-accused
• The interactions between the parties arose out of personal relationships and cannot be criminalised
• The case was politically motivated, triggered by interpersonal disputes

The applicant also relied on her pregnancy as a ground for protection from arrest.

A detailed report of the case and its allegations may be read here.

Court’s Reasoning: Expansive reading of “brainwashing”

The Court put notable weight on the allegations of “brainwashing” as a unifying thread across disparate allegations. While it acknowledged that the more serious provisions (Sections 69 and 75 BNS) were not directly attributable to Khan, it nonetheless held that her conduct—particularly providing religious materials and instruction—was sufficient to establish prima facie involvement in a coordinated plan. The Court, thus, held that the material on record prima facie establishes her involvement in offences under Section 299 BNS and the Atrocities Act.

“No doubt, Sections 69 and 75 of the BNS are not attracted against the present applicant, but the entire investigation shows that accused Nos.1 and 2, with the help of the applicant, tried to brainwash the victim and tried to teach that the Hindu religion has objectionable stories. They have also specifically made obscene remarks against Lord Shiva, Lord Krishna, and Brahmadeva and hurt religious sentiments. The investigation also shows that applicant gave a ‘Burqa’, the accused also provided a life story book of Prophet Muhammad Paigambar. The material on record shows that the applicant used to visit the victim’s house to give training regarding ‘Namaz’ and other daily religious observations.” (Para 19)

It observed that:

• The applicant’s role is “clearly mentioned” in the FIR and subsequent statements
• The provision of a burqa, religious texts, and guidance on rituals indicates active participation
• The alleged conduct reflects an “organised attempt” rather than isolated acts

The Court concluded that these elements, taken together, indicate an organised attempt to influence the victim’s beliefs and conduct. At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the victim retains a constitutional right to profess and adopt any religion. It, however, drew a distinction between voluntary exercise of that right and what it described as “organised” or “planned” influence, holding that the latter may attract criminal scrutiny where accompanied by coercion or undue pressure.

“Prima facie, it appeared that the applicant’s role is specifically mentioned, and involvement is also seen. The magnitude of the offense is truly multi-dimensional and multi-layered. The material on record shows that the accused tried to change the victim’s name. No doubt, the victim has a Constitutional right to profess any religion and have any name of her own choice, but that does not mean she should be brainwashed for the same and that too with organised plan. The material on record shows that after changing the name, the accused wanted to send her to Malaysia. For the purpose of changing the name, they were taking the help of the Malegaon party. Admittedly, names of some cities and countries were revealed during the investigation. Considering the applicant’s involvement along with the other accused and the magnitude of the offense, custodial interrogation is necessary to go to the root of the case.” (Para 20)

“On perusal of material on record, it is clear that the investigation is complicated and multi-dimensional. In these premises, the physical custody of the accused is warranted.” (Para 21)

Custodial Interrogation: Central to denial of relief

A critical aspect of the defence—namely, the absence of conversion-related allegations in the FIR—does not receive substantial engagement in the Court’s reasoning. Instead, the Court accepts the prosecution’s position that an FIR is not an “encyclopedia” and that supplementary statements can elaborate the narrative.

“Ld. DGP further submitted that the applicant used to visit the victim’s house to give training of her religion. The investigation shows that the victim’s name was to be changed to Haniya, and she was to be sent to Malaysia. The documents were to be prepared with the help of the Malegaon Party. In these circumstances, custodial interrogation is necessary to investigate whether any international syndicate is involved and whether the applicant is connected to the same. An FIR is not an encyclopedia. The supplementary statement and the statement under Section 183 of the BNSS speak about the same. The applicant also tried to convert the family members by making threats and using dominant position in the office. She also asked the victim to observe the fast of Ramadan (Roza). The accused, including the applicant, tried to change the victim’s name, and some city and country names were revealed during the investigation. Foreign funding and the money trail need to be investigated. Therefore, custodial interrogation is necessary.” (Para 9)

A decisive factor in the rejection of anticipatory bail was the Court’s conclusion that custodial interrogation was necessary. It noted that:

• The investigation is ongoing and involves multiple accused
• Digital evidence, communication trails, and alleged external links require further examination
• The applicant may need to be confronted with co-accused and witnesses

Relying on established precedent, the Court reiterated that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy and should not be granted where investigation is at a crucial stage and custodial interrogation is required.

“Admittedly, the applicant is seeking anticipatory bail on the ground that she has not committed any offence, as alleged and she is falsely implicated. It is settled legal principle that the power under Section 482 of BNSS being an extraordinary remedy has to be exercised sparingly. The alleged offence seems to be systematic plan of brainwashing of the victim with organized attempts. It is also settled legal principle by way of catena of judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court and Hon’ble High Court in various bail matters that the pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases.” (Para 24)

“Needless to say that grant of anticipatory bail to some extent, would cause interference in the sphere of investigation of an offence. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule and has to be granted only when there are convincing, exceptional circumstances exist to resort that extraordinary remedy.” (Para 25)

While this is doctrinally correct, the order does not meaningfully address the implications of such post-FIR “improvements,” especially when they introduce entirely new dimensions such as international relocation, organised conspiracy, and religious conversion. At the anticipatory bail stage, where the test is prima facie satisfaction rather than proof, courts are still expected to scrutinise material for consistency and credibility—an exercise that appears relatively thin here.

Criminalising religious conduct?

One of the more troubling aspects of the order is its treatment of religious acts—such as giving a burqa, sharing religious literature, or teaching prayer—as indicators of criminal intent. In the absence of a specific anti-conversion statute in Maharashtra, the Court effectively reads these acts into offences relating to religious insult and coercion.

This raises a broader doctrinal concern: can acts of religious propagation, absent clear evidence of force, fraud, or inducement, attract criminal liability? The order does not articulate a clear standard. Instead, it relies on the cumulative narrative of “brainwashing,” a term that carries strong moral connotations but lacks precise legal definition.

Custodial Interrogation: Justified or assumed?

The denial of anticipatory bail ultimately turns on the Court’s conclusion that custodial interrogation is necessary. The Court cites the complexity of the investigation, the need to explore digital evidence, and possible international links.

However, the justification appears somewhat speculative:

• References to “foreign funding” and “international syndicate” are based on investigative assertions rather than concrete material
• The necessity of custodial interrogation for recovering digital evidence—such as messages or app installations—could arguably be achieved through less intrusive means

The reliance on precedents like State v. Anil Sharma and Jai Prakash Singh is doctrinally sound, but their application here appears formulaic rather than tailored to the specific facts.

Pregnancy argument rejected without nuanced consideration

The Court summarily rejects the applicant’s plea based on pregnancy, observing that the law does not distinguish between a “normal person” and a pregnant woman in matters of criminal liability.

While technically correct, this reasoning overlooks established jurisprudence that courts may consider humanitarian factors, including pregnancy, when exercising discretionary powers in bail matters. The absence of any balancing exercise here reflects a rigid approach.

Conclusion

The Sessions Court’s order is undeniably forceful in its tone and clear in its outcome: anticipatory bail is denied in light of the seriousness and complexity of the allegations. It underscores the judiciary’s increasing sensitivity to cases involving coercion, caste-based harm, and workplace exploitation.

At the same time, the order leaves several critical legal questions insufficiently addressed:

• What is the threshold for criminal liability in cases involving religious influence?
• How should courts treat significant improvements in prosecution narratives at the bail stage?
• To what extent can speculative elements—such as international links—justify custodial interrogation?

By relying heavily on the language of “brainwashing” and “organised influence,” the order risks blurring the line between constitutionally protected religious interaction and criminal conduct.

The complete order may be read below:

Related:

From FIRs to “Corporate Jihad”: How the TCS Nashik case was transformed from an investigation into a communal narrative

Allahabad High Court flags surge in “false” conversion firs, seeks accountability from UP government

Censorship and the Drumbeats of Hate: Mapping the state of free speech ahead of the 2026 polls

Maharashtra’s Anti-Conversion Bill: Legislating suspicion in the name of “love jihad”

The post Anticipatory Bail Denied to Nida Khan in TCS Nashik Case: Sessions Court flags “systematic plan” and stresses custodial interrogation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Delivering the ruling on April 9, 2026, Justice N. Tukaramji articulated a clear constitutional standard: that the legitimacy of an investigation is not measured solely by procedural compliance, but by whether it inspires confidence as being fair, impartial, and independent. Where that confidence is reasonably shaken, judicial intervention becomes not exceptional, but necessary.

A death within the force, a case against the force

The case concerns the death of P. Prabhakar Reddy, a Sub-Inspector posted at Kukunoorpally Police Station in Siddipet district, who allegedly died by suicide on June 14, 2017, using his service weapon at the police headquarters.

While the factum of death by firearm injury was not disputed, the circumstances surrounding it, and more importantly, the investigation that followed, became deeply contested.

The writ petition, filed by the deceased’s widow and mother, alleged that the suicide was the culmination of sustained harassment and coercion by a senior officer, the then Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), Gajwel. According to them, the deceased had been compelled to carry out illegal and unofficial tasks, resulting in severe mental distress. But the allegations did not end with abetment.

The petitioners asserted that immediately after the incident, the very officer under suspicion entered the scene, secured and controlled access to the premises, and removed a suicide note purportedly written by the deceased—an act with obvious and profound evidentiary implications. They further alleged tampering with the crime scene and removal of valuables from the body, suggesting not merely bias, but active interference with the integrity of evidence.

The State’s Defence: Personal distress, procedural compliance

The State sought to neutralise these allegations by attributing the suicide to personal distress. It argued that the deceased feared implication in a separate criminal case, which could have damaged his career and reputation, thereby pushing him toward suicide.

It further maintained that the investigation had been conducted in accordance with law: post-mortem confirmed the cause of death, forensic examinations were carried out, statements were recorded, and ultimately, a final report was filed finding no incriminating material against the ACP. In essence, the State’s position rested on procedural sufficiency.

Reframing the Legal Question: From outcome to process

The High Court decisively rejected this framing. It held that the central issue was not the cause of death, but the credibility of the investigation. This distinction is critical: even if the conclusion of suicide were correct, the process by which that conclusion was reached must independently satisfy constitutional standards.

“It is not in dispute that the deceased died due to a gunshot injury inflicted by his service weapon, and that a case under Section 306 was registered. However, the core issue pertains to the fairness, impartiality, and credibility of the investigation.” (Para 7)

The Court thus shifted the analytical lens from evidentiary outcome to procedural integrity—insisting that justice is not merely a matter of results, but of the fairness embedded in the method.

“Reasonable Likelihood of Bias”: A constitutional threshold

At the core of the judgment lies a powerful articulation of the doctrine of apparent bias. Relying on precedents such as Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, the Court reaffirmed that a fair and impartial investigation is an inseparable component of Article 21. However, it went a step further. It held unequivocally that:

“Further, in cases where allegations are made against police officials themselves, investigation by the same agency may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.  Even in the absence of proven mala fides, reasonable likelihood of bias is sufficient to warrant transfer of investigation.” (Para 10)

This formulation is doctrinally significant. It lowers the threshold for intervention from demonstrable wrongdoing to credible apprehension—recognising that institutional structures themselves can generate bias, particularly where police officers are tasked with investigating their colleagues or superiors.

Institutional conflict and the problem of self-investigation

The judgment squarely confronts a persistent structural problem in criminal justice: the investigation of police wrongdoing by the police themselves.

The Court noted that:

• Serious allegations—including abetment of suicide and destruction of evidence—were directed against a senior officer
• The same police establishment was responsible for investigating those allegations
• Key claims, such as removal of a suicide note and tampering with the scene, went to the heart of evidentiary integrity

These factors, taken together, created what the Court termed a “reasonable apprehension of lack of fairness,” sufficient to erode public confidence in the investigation.

“In the instant case, the allegation regarding removal of the suicide note is of significant evidentiary value; allegations of tampering with the crime scene and removal of valuables raise serious doubts; the investigation has remained pending for a considerable period; the accused officer belongs to the same department conducting the investigation. These factors cumulatively create a reasonable apprehension of lack of fairness, thereby undermining public confidence in the investigative process.” (Para 11)

Importantly, the Court did not require proof that the investigation was actually biased. It recognised that in such cases, the structure itself produces a conflict that is incompatible with constitutional expectations.

Article 21 as a guarantee of investigative integrity

The ruling reinforces and deepens the jurisprudence that places fair investigation within the ambit of Article 21.

The Court held that the existing probe “does not inspire confidence” and falls short of the constitutional mandate of fairness and impartiality.

“In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the investigation conducted by the local police does not inspire confidence and falls short of the constitutional mandate of a fair and impartial investigation under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.” (Para 12)

This is not merely a critique of investigative lapses—it is a constitutional indictment. It affirms that the right to life and personal liberty includes the right to an investigation that is:

• Independent
• Unbiased
• Credible in both fact and perception

By grounding its reasoning in Article 21, the Court elevates investigative fairness from a procedural expectation to a fundamental right.

Evidentiary gaps, timing concerns, and loss of confidence

The Court’s reasoning is also anchored in specific factual concerns:

• The alleged removal of the suicide note—described as having significant evidentiary value
• Claims of tampering with the crime scene and removal of valuables
• The prolonged pendency of the investigation
• The filing of the final report only after the writ proceedings had commenced

Each of these factors, while not conclusively establishing wrongdoing, contributed to a cumulative erosion of trust in the investigative process. The Court’s approach is notable for its cumulative reasoning: it is not any single irregularity, but the aggregation of circumstances that renders the investigation constitutionally suspect.

Directions: Resetting the investigation

In allowing the writ petition, the Court ordered a comprehensive transfer of the investigation to the CBCID, with clear and structured directions:

• The transferee agency is empowered to conduct further or even de novo investigation
• All records, material objects, and forensic reports must be handed over immediately
• The CBCID must independently examine all allegations, including abetment, evidence tampering, and removal of the suicide note
• The investigation is to be completed within nine months
• Periodic progress reports must be submitted before the jurisdictional Magistrate

These directions reflect not just a transfer, but a judicially supervised reset of the investigative process.

Beyond the Case: A Structural Message

This judgment resonates beyond the facts of a single case. It sends a broader institutional message:

• Self-investigation in cases of alleged police wrongdoing is inherently suspect
• Perception of fairness is as critical as fairness itself
• Courts will intervene not only to correct bias, but to prevent its reasonable apprehension

In doing so, the Court strengthens the architecture of accountability within the criminal justice system. The Telangana High Court’s ruling is a forceful reminder that the criminal justice system derives its legitimacy not from authority, but from trust. Where that trust is undermined—whether by actual bias or its reasonable appearance—the Constitution demands corrective action.

By holding that reasonable apprehension of bias is enough, the Court has set a robust and rights-oriented standard—one that prioritises institutional integrity over procedural defensiveness, and constitutional fidelity over investigative convenience.

The complete judgement may be read below:

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Malegaon 2006 Blast Case: Bombay High Court rejects NIA’s ‘alternate narrative’, holds prosecution built on contradictions and inadmissible evidence

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Decoding the Judgement on Sathankulam Custodial Death:Part-3 Witnesses to be Celebrated & Honoured

The post “Reasonable Apprehension of Bias Is Enough”: Telangana High Court orders CBCID probe into SI’s death, reasserts constitutional demand for investigative neutrality appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Expressing deep concern over the implications of such orders, the Court underscored that they strike at the dignity of the accused and proceed on an impermissible assumption of guilt at the pre-trial stage. It further warned that such “caste-coloured and oppressive” conditions have the potential to generate serious social friction and risk bringing disrepute to the judiciary. Notably, the Court acknowledged that the pattern emerging from the cases gave rise to a perception of caste bias, observing that there appeared to be substance in reports suggesting that such conditions were disproportionately imposed on individuals from marginalised communities. Invoking the constitutional vision of a casteless society, the Bench referred to Articles 14, 16, and 17, reminding courts of their duty to safeguard equality and dignity, especially for the most vulnerable.

The suo motu proceedings were triggered by a detailed media reports published over the past weeks by Article 14, which brought to light a troubling pattern in bail jurisprudence emerging from Odisha. While early reports identified at least eight cases between May 2025 and January 2026 where courts, particularly in Rayagada district, had imposed cleaning duties as bail conditions, further investigation revealed that the practice was far more widespread. According to Bar & Bench, a single judge of the Orissa High Court had passed at least 50 such orders between April and September 2025, directing accused persons in a wide range of cases to undertake cleaning work at police stations, hospitals, temples, roads, and other public spaces for fixed durations.

Ground reportage by Article 14 added a critical socio-political dimension to these findings, documenting how many of those subjected to such conditions were Dalit and Adivasi individuals, several of whom had been arrested in connection with protests against a proposed bauxite mining project in Odisha’s Tijimali region. The report highlighted concerns that these bail conditions were not only legally untenable but also carried the imprint of caste-based stigma, compelling members of historically marginalised communities to perform labour long associated with social oppression. It is against this backdrop—where questions of liberty, dignity, caste, and judicial discretion intersect—that the Supreme Court has now stepped in, transforming what began as a series of individual bail orders into a moment of constitutional reckoning.

The proceedings

Taking serious exception to the practice, the Supreme Court of India termed such conditions “obnoxious” and reflective of a deeply troubling caste bias within the justice system.

“We are deeply disappointed and disheartened, and express our strongest disapproval at the manner in which the Odisha State judiciary has, in fact regressed to a colonial mindset by imposing such onerous, degrading and humiliating conditions, which are ex-facie violative of human rights. Such conditions, far from advancing the cause of justice, strike at the dignity of the accused, and proceed on the premise of guilt, which is completely impermissible in law,” the Court observed, as per LiveLaw.

Declaring the impugned bail conditions “null and void”, the Court categorically directed that no court in the country should impose such conditions in the future.

“We are of the considered view that no other State judiciary shall also ought to impose such caste-coloured and oppressive conditions, which have the potential to generate serious social friction,” the Bench noted, directing that its order be circulated to all High Courts across India.

The Court further acknowledged the disturbing implications of the pattern revealed through media reports, noting that the overwhelming number of those subjected to such conditions belonged to marginalised communities.

“There seems to be some force in the reportage that no such conditions are being imposed by the State judiciary in cases where the accused are from the privileged sections of society. Assuming such conditions were imposed inadvertently or without any premeditated bias, the nature of the conditions are so abhorrent, cruel, degrading and unknown to the law, that there is a potential to cast a serious aspersion suggesting that the Odisha judiciary is afflicted by caste-based bias,” the Court observed, reported LiveLaw.

Invoking the transformative vision of the Constitution, the Court explicitly referred to Article 17, which abolishes untouchability, and emphasised the guarantees of equality under Articles 14 and 16.

“A judiciary is entrusted with the duty to safeguard these constitutional guarantees and is expected to jealously protect those who are most vulnerable. Over the course of 75 years of the Constitutional journey, the judiciary has transformed the principle of equality into a potent instrument in the hands of citizens, ensuring that the might of the State cannot transgress fundamental rights,” the Bench underscored.

The Bench, comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi, was hearing a suo-moto case registered on the basis of multiple media reports highlighting the controversial bail conditions.

Addressing the Advocate General of Odisha, Pitambar Acharya, the Chief Justice made his disapproval unequivocally clear:

“Unfortunately, the High Courts and some trial courts in Odisha are imposing some bail conditions which are obnoxious, reflecting caste-based bias, and bringing a bad name to the judiciary. Directing the accused to clean the police station for two months—this should not be a condition a judiciary should be imposing in 2026.”

From “isolated orders” to a pattern of judicial practice

Initial reporting by LiveLaw indicated that the trigger for the Supreme Court’s intervention was a set of bail orders, including a May 28, 2025 order of the Orissa High Court directing one Kumeswar Naik to clean the premises of the Kashipur Police Station daily between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. for two months. The report also identified at least eight such orders passed between May 2025 and January 2026, largely emanating from trial courts in Rayagada district.

However, a deeper investigation by Bar & Bench fundamentally alters the scale of the issue. According to its analysis of e-courts data, Justice S.K. Panigrahi of the Orissa High Court alone passed at least fifty bail orders between April and September 2025 incorporating similar “community service” conditions.

These were not confined to a narrow category of offences. Rather, they cut across the criminal spectrum—from theft and cheating to grave offences including murder. Nor were they limited to a single type of institution. The directions required accused persons to clean police stations (the most frequent site), hospitals, temples, village roads, ponds, and even a bank branch in one instance.

The structure of these orders was strikingly consistent:

• Mandatory cleaning duties for 2–3 hours daily, typically between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.;
• Fixed durations ranging from one to three months;
• Detailed specification of location and time, often leaving little room for practical flexibility.

Crucially, as Bar & Bench notes, no other judge of the Orissa High Court appears to have adopted such a practice, raising further questions about the individual exercise of judicial discretion.

Bail or punishment?

At the heart of the controversy lies a foundational principle: bail is not punishment. Under established criminal law doctrine, bail conditions are preventive and procedural—not punitive. Their purpose is limited to ensuring that the accused:

1. Appears for trial;
2. Does not tamper with evidence;
3. Does not influence witnesses;
4. Does not commit further offences.

The imposition of compulsory labour—particularly labour that is unrelated to these objectives—sits uneasily, if not entirely incompatibly, with this framework.

The legal tension becomes sharper when viewed in light of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. While the BNS introduces “community service” as a recognized form of punishment, this is explicitly a post-conviction measure, applicable only upon a finding of guilt and only for specific, relatively minor offences.

As highlighted in Bar & Bench, and reinforced by a June 2025 decision of the Kerala High Court, community service cannot be transposed into the bail stage. To do so effectively collapses the distinction between accusation and conviction—between presumption of innocence and adjudicated guilt.

Moreover, the absence of proportionality is stark. Identical cleaning conditions were imposed on individuals accused of vastly different offences, without any discernible calibration based on the gravity of the alleged crime or the circumstances of the accused.

When Context Matters: Anti-mining protests and criminalisation of dissent

The controversy cannot be understood in isolation from its socio-political context, meticulously documented in Article 14’s ground report.

A significant number of the affected individuals were arrested in connection with protests against a proposed bauxite mining project in the Tijimali hills of Odisha. The project, linked to Vedanta Ltd., has been resisted by local communities—primarily Dalits and Adivasis—on grounds of displacement, environmental degradation, and alleged violations of statutory safeguards under laws such as the Forest Rights Act (FRA) and the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA).

According to Article 14, since 2023:

• At least 40–50 individuals have been arrested in connection with these protests;
• FIRs have invoked serious charges, including rioting, obstruction of public servants, and even attempt to murder;
• Protesters have alleged coercion, fabricated consent processes, and police intimidation.

Within this broader pattern, the imposition of onerous and humiliating bail conditions begins to resemble not merely judicial overreach, but an extension of state response to dissent.

The Caste Dimension: Labour, stigma, and constitutional morality

Perhaps the most constitutionally troubling aspect is the social profile of those subjected to these conditions.

As Article 14 documents:

• Of eight identified cases involving such bail conditions, six accused were Dalits and two were Adivasis;
• Many were associated with grassroots resistance movements;
• The imposed labour—cleaning public spaces, particularly police stations—carries deep historical associations with caste-based occupational hierarchies.

For individuals like Kumeswar Naik, a Dalit protester, the bail condition translated into a daily ritual of enforced humiliation—returning to the very police station where he had been detained, to perform cleaning work under judicial mandate.

Many have argued that such orders are not neutral. They operate within, and risk reinforcing, a social structure where certain forms of labour have historically been imposed on marginalized communities.

This raises serious constitutional questions:

• Does compelling such labour violate Article 21’s guarantee of dignity?
• Does it amount to “forced labour” under Article 23, even if framed as a bail condition?
• Does the disproportionate impact on Dalit and Adivasi accused implicate Article 14 (equality) and Article 15 (non-discrimination)?

The answers to these questions go beyond doctrinal legality—they engage the idea of constitutional morality itself.

Judicial innovation or judicial overreach?

Indian courts have, in the past, experimented with “creative” bail conditions—ranging from planting trees to distributing books. While such measures have occasionally been justified as reformative or restorative, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against conditions that are:

• Unconnected to the purpose of bail;
• Disproportionate or excessive;
• Infringing upon fundamental rights.

What distinguishes the Odisha cases is not merely creativity, but compulsion—and the nature of the work imposed. Cleaning police stations, hospitals, or temples under court order is not symbolic. It is labour—mandated, time-bound, and enforceable.

The fact that these conditions were often imposed uniformly, without individualized reasoning, further strengthens the case for constitutional scrutiny.

Conclusion: Bail, dignity, and the rule of law

The Supreme Court’s suo moto intervention, reportedly prompted also by representations from civil society, including a letter signed by over 80 lawyers and activists, signals institutional recognition that the issue transcends individual orders. At its core, the controversy forces a return to first principles.

Bail is the juridical expression of the presumption of innocence. It is not a site for experimentation with punishment, nor a vehicle for moral correction, nor an instrument—directly or indirectly—of social discipline. When liberty is made conditional upon labour—especially labour that carries historical stigma—the line between justice and coercion begins to blur.

By declaring such bail conditions “null and void” and prohibiting their future imposition, the Supreme Court has not merely corrected a set of problematic orders—it has drawn a clear constitutional boundary.

The judgment serves as a powerful reaffirmation that:

• Bail cannot be used as a site for punishment;
• Judicial discretion is not unbounded;
• Dignity is integral to liberty;
• And the criminal justice system must remain free from caste prejudice—whether explicit or structural.

Related:

Police action in Odisha’s Rayagada district condemned, Adivasi rights paramount: CCG

Fractured Fault lines: Violence, governance gaps, and rising tensions across Odisha

Odisha: 18 months, 54 incidents of communal hate crimes, 7 mob lynchings

Publicly Tortured, Forced to Eat Cow Dung: No arrests in Odisha Pastor assault case

The post “Obnoxious and Caste-Coloured”: Supreme Court strikes down Odisha bail orders mandating cleaning work, declares them void appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan categorically rejected the argument that the possibility of adoption could justify forcing a woman to carry a pregnancy to term. According to LiveLaw, the Court underscored that such reasoning fundamentally misconceives the issue by shifting focus away from the woman to the unborn child. It observed that it is “easy to say” that a child can be given up for adoption, but that cannot be a valid consideration in cases where the pregnancy itself is unwanted. Compelling a woman to continue such a pregnancy, the Court held, would subordinate her welfare to that of a child yet to be born—an approach incompatible with constitutional guarantees.

The bench made it clear, as reported by LiveLaw, that no court ought to compel a woman, particularly a minor, to carry a pregnancy to full term against her express will. Such compulsion, it warned, would inflict grave mental, emotional, and physical trauma. It further noted that an unwanted pregnancy not only adversely affects the woman but can also have a bearing on the well-being of the child to be born, given the psychological state of the mother. The Court emphasised that a woman’s considered decision to terminate a pregnancy—despite the attendant medical risks—must be respected rather than overridden by paternalistic considerations.

The case arose from a petition filed by the mother of the minor seeking permission for termination beyond the statutory limit prescribed under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. During the hearing, Tushar Mehta, appearing for the State, pointed to a medical report indicating potential risks to both the girl and the foetus if termination were undertaken at such an advanced stage. He suggested that the child could be placed for adoption through the Central Adoption Resource Authority, assuring that the process would safeguard the privacy and reputation of the minor and her family. He also offered financial assistance to facilitate the process.

The Court, however, firmly pushed back against this line of reasoning. Justice Nagarathna questioned the propriety of suggesting financial aid or adoption as substitutes for respecting the minor’s choice. The bench observed that courts cannot direct women to depend on external financial support in such deeply personal decisions. It pointedly asked what course of action would remain if the minor was unwilling to continue the pregnancy, noting that approximately ten weeks still remained before delivery—time that would only prolong her distress.

Counsel for the petitioner highlighted the severe psychological toll the pregnancy had already taken on the minor, including its impact on her education and daily life. The Court recorded that each passing day had been traumatic for both the child and her family. It also took note of alarming indicators of mental distress, including attempts by the minor to take her own life.

Expressing broader institutional concern, as per LiveLaw, the bench warned that a rigid denial of permission in such cases could drive minors toward unsafe and illegal abortion methods. Justice Nagarathna observed that forcing continuation of pregnancy against a woman’s will may push her into clandestine and medically unsafe procedures, risking permanent physical and psychological harm.

Importantly, the Court noted that the pregnancy had arisen out of a consensual relationship between two minors and that the girl had unequivocally expressed her unwillingness to continue with it. This clear articulation of choice, coupled with the documented psychological harm, weighed heavily in the Court’s determination.

In a strongly worded articulation of constitutional principles, the Court held that forcing the continuation of an unwanted pregnancy would violate the minor’s right to live with dignity. It recognised that such compulsion would have long-term consequences on her mental health, educational trajectory, social standing, and overall development. The bench emphasised that in exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32, constitutional courts must prioritise the best interests of the minor over rigid adherence to statutory timelines.

Reproductive autonomy, the Court reiterated, is an integral facet of personal liberty and privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. The right to make decisions concerning one’s body, it held, cannot be rendered illusory by imposing unreasonable restrictions—particularly in cases involving minors and unwanted pregnancies. The availability of adoption, the Court clarified, cannot be invoked to dilute or defeat this fundamental right.

Addressing the role of constitutional courts, the bench observed that cases of unwanted pregnancy often reach courts precisely because the statutory window under the MTP Act has elapsed. In such situations, the absence of a statutory remedy cannot become a ground for denying relief. To do so, the Court held, would be inconsistent with the very purpose of constitutional adjudication, which is to safeguard fundamental rights where statutory frameworks fall short.

The Court stressed that judges must assess such cases from the standpoint of the woman seeking termination—taking into account her willingness to undergo medical risks—rather than privileging abstract considerations about the unborn child. It cautioned that any insistence on continuing unwanted pregnancies would not only breach constitutional rights but also risk pushing women toward unsafe alternatives.

Ultimately, the Court distilled the issue to a single determinative question: whether the pregnant woman intends to give birth to the child. In the present case, the answer was unequivocal. Respecting that choice, the Court directed that the minor be permitted to undergo medical termination of pregnancy at All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, subject to all necessary medical safeguards. It also directed the petitioner to submit an undertaking consenting to the procedure on behalf of the minor.

The judgment stands as a forceful reiteration that reproductive choice lies at the core of dignity, autonomy, and liberty—and that neither statutory limits nor moral abstractions can override the express will of the woman concerned.

Related:

Rights-based approach to abortion: The need for legislative reforms

Supreme Court on abortion rights, one step forward – two steps back

Women, married or unmarried have the right to safe & legal abortion: SC

Shubha case: Reformative Justice meets Gendered Realities

Wars Fought in The Name of Women’s Rights

The post Reproductive Autonomy Cannot Be Subordinated to Adoption: Supreme Court allows termination of 7-month pregnancy of minor appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At the heart of the ruling lies an unsettling reality: the State, through its own agencies, presented two mutually destructive accounts of the same crime. One narrative, constructed by the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) and later endorsed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), attributed the blasts to one set of accused. The second, advanced years later by the NIA, not only displaced that version but implicated an entirely different group. Faced with these “diagonally opposite” stories, the Court concluded that the prosecution had effectively reached a point where it “leads nowhere”—a finding that goes to the very legitimacy of continuing criminal proceedings.

“The diagonally opposite stories in the charge-sheet filed by the ATS and the NIA lead nowhere. The witnesses proposed by the NIA are mostly hearsay witnesses. The materials collected by the NIA regarding purchase of bicycles etc. even if found truthful and admissible, cannot be considered as incriminating material against the appellants. A further investigation does not start with recording the statement of the accused person in a case. The further investigation is carried for the purposes of recording the evidence of a few more witnesses and for collection of additional materials to add other offences or another accused person. This is a mystery why the NIA did not collect fresh materials and started recording the retracted statement of the accused persons A1 to A3 and A5 to A8. The retracted statements of a few witnesses on which the NIA seeks to lay a case against the appellants can also not be admissible evidence. A witness who gives two versions of a story and retracts his previous statement becomes an unreliable witness and his testimony is liable to be discarded.” (Para 20)

“For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there is no sufficient material on record to proceed against the appellants.” (Para 21)

 The Appellate Framework: A duty to scrutinise, not endorse

Exercising its jurisdiction under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, the High Court undertook a substantive review of the order framing charges passed by the Special NIA Court. The judgment underscores that appellate scrutiny under this provision is not a limited or deferential exercise; rather, it requires a rigorous re-evaluation of both facts and law, particularly where the liberty of the accused is at stake.

The Court carefully located its inquiry within the framework of Section 227 of the CrPC, emphasising that the threshold for proceeding to trial is not a mere formality. The judge is required to sift the material on record and determine whether there exists sufficient ground to proceed. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that a criminal court cannot act as a passive conduit for the prosecution’s claims. It must actively interrogate the evidentiary foundation before allowing the machinery of trial to be set in motion. This insistence on judicial application of mind becomes especially critical in cases involving serious offences carrying grave penal consequences.

“Unlike other statutory provisions, section 21 makes a statutory requirement to be followed by the High Court in an appeal under section 21 that the appeal so laid by the aggrieved party must be examined on facts collected by the NIA having regard to the applicable law on the subject. In the matters of discharge from the criminal liability, the High Court shall be entitled to scrutinize and assess the materials collected by the NIA to find out whether there is sufficient material to proceed against the accused person. In doing so, the High Court shall keep in mind the principles governing a discharge application under section 227 Cr.P.C. which provides that if the Judge forms an opinion upon consideration of the record of the case including the documents and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. The expression “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” enjoins upon the Judge to apply his mind and not to act as mere Post Office before framing the charge against the accused person at the behest of the prosecution.” (Para 4)

The Evolution of the Case: From ATS narrative to NIA reconstruction

The judgment meticulously traces the evolution of the prosecution across three investigative regimes. The initial investigation conducted by the ATS, subsequently affirmed by the CBI, constructed a detailed narrative implicating members of the Students Islamic Movement of India. This version was not merely speculative; it was supported by confessional statements recorded under special statutes, forensic evidence indicating the presence of RDX, intercepted communications, and corroborative witness testimony. The prosecution case, at that stage, possessed a certain internal coherence, even if its ultimate veracity was later questioned.

The turning point came when the NIA assumed control of the investigation in 2011. Rather than supplementing the existing record with additional evidence, the NIA fundamentally reoriented the case. Relying heavily on a confessional statement attributed to Swami Aseemanand, as well as retracted statements of earlier accused and witnesses, the agency advanced a completely new theory of the crime. This new narrative alleged that the blasts were the result of a conspiracy involving a different set of individuals, including the present appellants, who were said to have undergone training and participated in the planning and execution of the attack.

“This is an admitted case that no person has come forward to make a statement before the NIA that he has seen any one of the appellants engaged in the bomb blasts. The case of the NIA solely rests on circumstantial evidence which is primarily in the nature of confessional statements by the appellants and Assemanand and the retracted statements of the witnesses and the first set of accused persons sent up for trial by the ATS and CBI. This is also a matter of record that on receiving the information about disclosure statement made by Assemanand the Central Government passed the orders dated 22nd March 2011 and 4th April 2011 directing the NIA to take over Crime No.07 of 2026. There seems to be considerable force in the argument that the NIA conducted a fresh and de-novo investigation inasmuch as it has relied on the retracted confessional statements of the accused persons who were sent-up for trial by the ATS and CBI.” (Para 15)

What troubled the Court was not merely the existence of an alternative theory, but the manner in which it was constructed. The NIA’s case was not built on fresh, independent evidence; instead, it drew heavily from the retraction of earlier statements and the reinterpretation of existing material. In doing so, it effectively displaced the earlier investigation without legally displacing its evidentiary record.

Contradictions at the Core: A prosecution that cannot stand together

The Court’s most forceful reasoning emerges in its analysis of the contradictions between the two investigative narratives. These were not minor discrepancies or peripheral inconsistencies; they went to the root of the prosecution’s case. The ATS and CBI had identified specific individuals as perpetrators, supported by forensic and testimonial evidence. The NIA, however, not only excluded those individuals but placed them at entirely different locations at the time of the crime. In one striking instance, an accused identified by the ATS as a key participant was described by the NIA as being nearly 400 kilometres away from the blast site.

Similarly, the question of procurement of bicycles used in the blasts was attributed to one set of accused by the earlier investigation, while the NIA assigned the same role to the appellants. These are not differences that can be reconciled through evidentiary evaluation at trial; they represent fundamentally incompatible versions of reality. The Court was categorical in observing that such “diagonally opposite stories” cannot coexist within a single prosecution, nor can they form the basis of a legally sustainable trial.

This finding has profound implications. It suggests that where the State itself advances mutually exclusive narratives, the burden cannot be shifted onto the accused to face trial and resolve those contradictions. The law does not permit a prosecution to proceed in the hope that clarity might emerge through the process of trial.

“The NIA has projected an entirely different story and states that the investigation of the case is still continuing and further evidence is being collected against the accused persons and requested the Special Court to permit it to continue further investigation of the case as per the provisions of section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The NIA completely ignored the charge-sheet laid by the ATS which gives a vivid narration of the entire planning by A1 to A13. The ATS collected incriminating materials from the place of incident and those materials were sent for forensic examination. This is the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) that there were traces of RDX in the soil samples collected from the place of occurrence and the godown of A2 Shabbir Ahmed Masiullah and both the samples were found to be the same. There is another FSL report which confirmed the presence of RDX and Ammonium Nitrate, charcoal, fuel oil etc. in the samples.” (Para 18)

“The Special Judge overlooked the inherent contradiction and intrinsic improbability in the prosecution story as put forth by the NIA. There is no explanation coming forth as to how the voice samples and FSL reports collected by the ATS and CBI can be ignored by the trial Court. The things as stand today give two contradictory versions of the incident and both stories as floated by the ATS and NIA cannot be reconciled by any stretch of imagination. The evidence collected by the ATS in course of the investigation is not wiped out from the record and have to be considered by the trial Court even if the appellants are required to face the trial. There seems to be no answer in law as to how the trial Judge can deal with the materials collected by the ATS which implicates another set of accused persons. The case seems to have reached a dead end.” (Para 19)

The Evidentiary Collapse: Confessions, retractions, and hearsay

A central pillar of the NIA’s case was the reliance on confessional and disclosure statements. The Court subjected this material to close scrutiny under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, reaffirming the long-settled principle that confessions made to police officers are inadmissible, and that statements made in custody are barred unless recorded in the presence of a Magistrate. The limited exception under Section 27, which permits the use of information leading to discovery, was also found inapplicable in the present case. The alleged recoveries were made years after the incident and from locations accessible to the public, thereby severing the necessary nexus between the statement and the discovery.

The Court was equally critical of the reliance on retracted statements. It emphasised that a witness who offers inconsistent versions of events, and subsequently retracts earlier statements, cannot be considered reliable. The evidentiary value of such testimony is not merely diminished; it is fundamentally compromised. In the present case, the NIA’s narrative was constructed substantially on the basis of such retractions, rendering the entire evidentiary edifice unstable.

The same reasoning extended to the use of Test Identification Parade (TIP) evidence. The Court reiterated that TIP is not substantive evidence but only a tool of investigation. When conducted after an inordinate delay—as in this case, where it occurred several years after the incident—it loses whatever limited probative value it might otherwise have had. The Court also noted the absence of any prior description of the accused by witnesses, further weakening the reliability of identification.

In sum, the Court found that the NIA’s case rested on a combination of inadmissible confessions, unreliable retractions, delayed identification, and hearsay evidence. Such a combination, it held, cannot sustain even the threshold requirement for framing charges.

The Limits of “Further Investigation”: A veiled reinvestigation

One of the most significant doctrinal contributions of the judgment lies in its treatment of “further investigation” under Section 173(8) CrPC. The Court drew a clear distinction between permissible further investigation and impermissible reinvestigation. While the former allows an agency to collect additional evidence in support of an existing case, the latter involves a wholesale replacement of the earlier narrative—a course that is not sanctioned by law.

The NIA’s approach, in the Court’s view, amounted to precisely such a reinvestigation. By constructing an entirely new theory based on retracted statements and by ignoring the evidentiary material collected by the ATS and CBI, the agency effectively attempted to rewrite the case. The Court found this approach to be legally untenable, particularly in the absence of fresh, credible material that could justify such a departure.

Judicial Failure at the Trial Stage: Framing charges without scrutiny

The High Court also delivered a pointed critique of the Special NIA Court’s order framing charges. It held that the trial court had failed to apply its judicial mind to the material on record and had relied on evidence that was either inadmissible or inherently unreliable. The Court emphasised that the stage of framing charges is not a mechanical exercise; it requires a careful evaluation of whether the material discloses a prima facie case involving grave suspicion.

In the present case, the trial court overlooked the fundamental contradictions between the two investigative narratives and failed to address the legal infirmities in the evidence relied upon by the NIA. This, the High Court held, constituted a serious error warranting appellate intervention.

Reaffirming the Standard for Discharge: Suspicion is not enough

Drawing upon established jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that while a detailed appreciation of evidence is not required at the stage of framing charges, the material must nevertheless disclose more than mere suspicion. The distinction between “suspicion” and “grave suspicion” is not semantic; it is doctrinally significant. Where the material on record gives rise only to conjecture or weak inference, the accused cannot be compelled to undergo the rigours of a criminal trial.

Applying this standard, the Court found that the evidence against the appellants did not meet even the minimal threshold required to proceed. The absence of direct evidence, coupled with the unreliability of circumstantial material, rendered the prosecution’s case untenable.

Conclusion: A case that reaches a legal dead end

The judgment ultimately concludes that there is no sufficient material to proceed against the appellants, and accordingly sets aside the order framing charges. In doing so, it characterises the case as having reached a “dead end”—a rare but telling acknowledgment of investigative failure.

This ruling is significant not only for its immediate outcome but for the principles it reinforces. It underscores that criminal prosecution must be grounded in coherent, admissible, and credible evidence. It affirms that investigative agencies cannot construct shifting narratives without legal consequence. And most importantly, it reiterates that the criminal process cannot be used as a substitute for proof.

In dismantling the NIA’s case, the Bombay High Court has sent a clear message: when the State’s own versions of a crime are irreconcilable, the law cannot sustain a prosecution built on such contradictions.

The complete judgment may be read here:

Related:

Abdul Wahid Shaikh, acquitted in 7/11 Mumbai train blast case, demands ₹9 crore as Compensation for Wrongful Incarceration

Still Waiting in Grief: How the 2006 Mumbai train blast victims were denied closure and justice

A Spectacle of Injustice Undone: After 19 years, Bombay HC’s acquittal in the 7/11 Mumbai train blasts case recognises the (mis) use of ‘torture for confession’

Attempts to give communal turn to blasts in Kerala unsuccessful, 3 cases filed by Kerala Police, CM Vijayan urges restraint & unity

2008 Jaipur blasts: Rajasthan HC acquits all four who were given death penalty

From Cow Slaughter to “Public Order”: Allahabad High Court’s expanding use of preventive detention

The post Malegaon 2006 Blast Case: Bombay High Court rejects NIA’s ‘alternate narrative’, holds prosecution built on contradictions and inadmissible evidence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Complaint and allegations

The application, filed under Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), was moved by Manisha Pande on behalf of six complainants, all media professionals associated with the digital platform Newslaundry. The complainants alleged that Mitra had, through a series of posts on his X handle, repeatedly used sexually derogatory language to describe them, including referring to them as “prostitutes” and characterising their workplace in deeply offensive and demeaning terms.

The complaint specifically relied on multiple tweets, including one dated April 28, 2025, containing explicit and abusive language directed at the organisation and its women employees. Another tweet dated February 8, 2025, targeted Pande individually with sexually explicit and degrading remarks. Screenshots of these posts were placed on record before the Court.

Court’s Findings: “Sexually coloured remarks” and prima facie offence

Judicial Magistrate First Class Bhanu Pratap Singh, after examining the material on record, found that the content of the tweets clearly fell within the category of “sexually coloured remarks.” The Court noted that the language used was not merely offensive but carried a clear intent to demean and insult the dignity of the complainants, particularly as one of the tweets explicitly named Manisha Pande.

On this basis, the Court held that the allegations, supported by documentary material, prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences under:

• Section 75(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which penalises sexually coloured remarks, and
• Section 79 of the BNS, which deals with acts, intended to insult the modesty of a woman.

The Court’s reasoning underscores a recognition that online speech, when sexually abusive and targeted, can attract serious penal consequences under criminal law.

Necessity of police investigation in cyber context

The court order emphasised on the need for a police investigation, particularly given the digital nature of the alleged offences. Observing that the acts were committed in cyberspace, the Court held that investigative intervention was necessary to:

• Verify the authenticity and ownership of the X account from which the tweets originated, and
• Trace and recover the electronic devices used to publish the content.

Court criticises inadequate police response

The Court also expressed dissatisfaction with the Action Taken Report (ATR) filed by the police. It noted that the report failed to consider the specific tweets relied upon by the complainants, thereby rendering the response incomplete and inadequate.

In light of its findings, the Court directed the Station House Officer of Malviya Nagar Police Station to:

• Register an FIR against Abhijit Iyer Mitra under Sections 75(3) and 79 of the BNS, and
• File a compliance report by May 4, 2026.

The application under Section 175(3) BNSS was accordingly disposed of.

Parallel defamation proceedings before Delhi High Court

The criminal proceedings arise alongside a pending civil defamation suit before the Delhi High Court, where the complainants have sought a public apology and damages amounting to ₹2 crore. In those proceedings, the journalists have contended that Mitra’s posts were not only defamatory but also deliberately malicious and intended to harm their professional reputation and dignity.

The High Court had earlier taken note of the objectionable content and reportedly admonished Mitra, following which the posts in question were taken down. An application seeking rejection of the defamation suit remains pending adjudication.

The order may be read here:

Related:

From Cow Slaughter to “Public Order”: Allahabad High Court’s expanding use of preventive detention

Victory for Forest Rights: Allahabad HC recognises land claims of Tharu Tribes, strikes down decision of DLC

An Adivasi woman once in bonded labour now serves her village as a Sarpanch

Delhi, Mumbai: Media organisations sharply criticise UNI eviction

The post Delhi court orders FIR against Abhijit Iyer Mitra for sexually abusive posts targeting women journalists appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Both cases involve allegations of cow slaughter. Both result in the upholding of detention orders. But more importantly, both judgments articulate—and reinforce—a particular understanding of “public order”: one that is driven less by the intrinsic nature of the offence and more by its social meaning, communal context, and anticipated consequences. What makes these rulings especially significant is not merely their outcome, but the density of their reasoning. The Court draws extensively from on-ground facts, behavioural responses, intelligence inputs, and administrative measures, while also invoking broader assumptions about communal sensitivity, to construct a layered and multi-dimensional justification for preventive detention.

At first glance, both cases appear fact-specific: allegations of cow slaughter, local unrest, and administrative response. But a closer reading reveals something far more significant. Across both rulings, the Court systematically reorients the constitutional inquiry:

• From the nature of the offence → to its social meaning
• From proven disruption → to anticipated reaction
• From individual culpability → to collective sensitivity

Read together, these decisions reflect a clear doctrinal movement in which public order is no longer anchored solely in demonstrable disruption, but is increasingly shaped by perception, anticipation, and context.

The Shamli Case (Sameer v. State of U.P.): Public order rooted in predictable reaction

The incident and immediate aftermath: The case originates in March 2025, when police discovered dismembered remains of cows and calves in a field in Shamli district around the time of Holi. The person accused of the slaughter was detained under the National Security Act (NSA), 1980. What might ordinarily have been treated as a criminal offence under the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act quickly escalated into a larger law-and-order situation.

The Court records a chain of events:

• Large crowds, including members of Hindu organisations, gathered at the site
• Sloganeering and protests followed
• A major road blockade led to prolonged traffic disruption
• Police forces from multiple stations were deployed
• Authorities had to camp in several villages to restore normalcy

These consequences—particularly the collective mobilisation and disruption of everyday life—became central to the Court’s reasoning. The incident, in the Court’s view, was not contained; it radiated outward, affecting the “even tempo of life” across a wider locality.

Law and Order vs Public Order: Before the Court, the petitioner argued that the alleged offence was, at best, a violation of law and order, given that it was triable by a magistrate under ordinary criminal law. The Court, however, firmly rejected this characterisation. It held that the distinction between law and order and public order does not depend on the statutory classification of the offence, but on the extent and nature of its impact on society.

Relying on established precedents such as Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, the Court reiterated that the relevant test is whether the act disturbs the “even tempo of life” of the community. The Court reiterates that not every crime disturbs public order; only those that disrupt the life of the community at large qualify. However, in applying this test, the bench adopts a context-heavy and consequence-driven approach.

It holds that even if an act is, in itself, a standard criminal offence, its “potentiality” and “impact”—particularly in a communally sensitive context—can elevate it into a public order issue. Thus, the focus shifts from the intrinsic nature of the act to its social reverberations.

Applying this test, it concluded that the widespread disruption, mobilisation, and administrative intervention in this case clearly elevated the incident beyond a mere law-and-order issue into the realm of public order.

Cow slaughter as an inherently volatile act: The most striking aspect of the judgment lies in its categorical treatment of cow slaughter. The Court asserts that:

• Cow slaughter “spontaneously evokes strong emotions”
• It has “immediate and widespread ramifications”
• It “almost always” leads to violence

This is not framed as a case-specific finding but as a generalised social truth. By doing so, the Court effectively pre-classifies certain acts as inherently capable of disturbing public order, irrespective of the specific factual matrix.

This reasoning has two major implications:

1. It reduces the burden on the State to demonstrate actual or imminent disorder
2. It allows anticipated communal outrage to become a legally valid ground for detention

In effect, the judgment shifts the inquiry from what the accused did to how society is expected to react—a move that sits uneasily with constitutional protections of liberty.

Reaction as justification: A central tension emerges here: should unlawful or violent public reaction determine the limits of individual freedom?

The Court’s reasoning suggests that it can. By treating predictable outrage as a given, the judgment risks normalising what is often described as the “heckler’s veto”—where the threat of public disorder becomes a basis to restrict rights.

This creates a troubling inversion:

• Instead of the State being obligated to control unlawful reactions
• The individual becomes the site of pre-emptive restraint

Such an approach may inadvertently incentivise coercive or violent mobilisation, as the mere possibility of disruption strengthens the case for preventive detention.

Preventive detention of a person already in custody: The Court also addresses whether a person already in jail can be preventively detained, relying on Kamarunnissa v. Union of India. The established test requires:

• Awareness that the person is in custody
• A real possibility of release on bail
• Likelihood of engaging in prejudicial activities upon release

In this case, the Court accepts:

• Police “beat information” alleging the accused intended to reoffend
• Intelligence inputs suggesting he was seeking bail and would repeat cow slaughter

Crucially, the Court treats these inputs as “reliable material”, without demanding rigorous evidentiary scrutiny. This reflects a broader judicial pattern in preventive detention cases—deference to executive satisfaction, even when based on informal or untested intelligence.

The blurring of preventive and punitive logics: Another significant concern is the gradual erosion of the distinction between preventive detention and criminal prosecution.

The petitioner argued that:

• The offence was triable by a magistrate
• It fell within ordinary criminal law
• NSA invocation was disproportionate

The Court rejected this, holding that the public order dimension justified bypassing the ordinary criminal process.

This reasoning risks transforming preventive detention into a parallel, anticipatory criminal system—one that operates not on proof of guilt, but on projected consequences and perceived risks.

Procedural Safeguards and Judicial Deference: On procedural grounds, the petitioner challenged delays in the disposal of his representation. The Court dismissed this argument, accepting the State’s timeline as adequately explained.

Notably, there is minimal substantive scrutiny of:

• The quality of evidence underlying the detention
• The proportionality of invoking NSA
• The necessity of detention vis-à-vis ordinary law

This underscores a recurring feature of preventive detention jurisprudence: courts often prioritise procedural compliance over substantive rights review. Based on these reasonings, the bench dismissed the habeas corpus petition filed by the petitioner-Sameer challenging his detention, which was ordered by the District Magistrate of Shamli under Section 3(3) of the NSA and subsequently confirmed by the State Government.

The judgement may be read here:

The Jalaun Case (Hasnen vs Union of India and ors): Fear, timing, and administrative evidence

The incident and evidentiary detail: The second case arises from an incident on March 31, 2025, in Kalpi town, where an FIR was registered under the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, and the Arms Act. The prosecution alleged:

• Recovery of approximately 3 quintals of beef
• Discovery of cattle, bones, skin, and weapons
• Involvement of multiple accused, including the three petitioners

This led to the detention of the three persons under the National Security Act (NSA), 1980, who were accused of illegally slaughtering cattle. The petitioners were already in custody, and in two cases, had even secured bail. Yet, the District Magistrate invoked Section 3(2) of the NSA, citing apprehensions of future harm and communal disturbance.

The petitioners challenged their detention through habeas corpus petitions, arguing:

• absence of independent material,
• reliance solely on police witnesses,
• lack of criminal antecedents,
• and the fundamentally criminal—not preventive—nature of the allegations.

The State, however, framed the incident as one with far-reaching communal consequences, asserting that the act had disrupted social harmony and posed a real risk of violence.

From “law and order” to “public order”: At the heart of the judgment lies the classical distinction between “law and order” and “public order,” a doctrinal line developed in cases like Ram Manohar Lohia and Arun Ghosh. The Court held that the Kalpi incident clearly crossed this threshold.

Drawing from the detention record, the bench emphasized:

• “Community-wide fear and terror” (भय व आतंक),
• behavioural changes such as residents no longer leaving cattle unattended,
• perceived conspiracy narratives among the public,
• inter-community tension between Hindus and Muslims,
• and a visible administrative escalation—including riot drills, deployment of additional forces, and high-level patrolling.

The Court concluded that these factors collectively disrupted the “even tempo of life,” thereby bringing the case squarely within “public order.”

Crucially, the Court gave significant weight to the timing of the act, describing it as deliberate and “precise,” capable of fracturing communal bonds during a period of heightened religious sensitivity.

Preventive detention as “reasonable anticipation”: The judgment strongly reiterates the preventive (not punitive) nature of detention under the NSA. Relying on established jurisprudence, the Court held:

• Preventive detention is based on anticipation, not proof.
• The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is paramount.
• Courts do not sit in appeal over such satisfaction unless it is vitiated by illegality.

Even the fact that the petitioners were already in custody or had secured bail did not deter the Court. It upheld the State’s power to detain on the ground of a “real possibility” of release and recurrence, reaffirming that preventive detention can operate parallel to criminal proceedings.

Procedural compliance: A major plank of the Court’s reasoning is strict procedural compliance:

• Detention orders were passed under Section 3(2),
• Grounds were communicated within statutory timelines,
• Representations were considered and rejected,
• The matter was referred to the Advisory Board,
• The Board affirmed “sufficient cause,”
• The State confirmed detention for one year under Sections 12–13.

The Court concluded that Article 22(5) safeguards were fully satisfied.

Yet, this formal compliance arguably obscures a deeper issue: whether procedural correctness can compensate for thin or contestable substantive grounds.

Elasticity of “public order”: The judgment’s most contentious aspect lies in its expansive reading of “public order.” Traditionally, courts have cautioned that not every criminal act—even if serious—amounts to a disturbance of public order. The distinction requires:

• a direct and proximate impact on the community,
• not merely a potential or speculative disturbance.

However, in this case, the Court relies heavily on:

• anticipated communal reactions,
• perceptions and fears, and
• administrative responses (like police deployment),

to elevate the incident into a public order issue.

This raises a troubling inversion:

• Does the intensity of public reaction—or the State’s response to it—become the basis for preventive detention?
• If so, the doctrine risks becoming self-fulfilling: State apprehension → heightened policing → evidence of “disturbance” → justification for detention.

The problem of timing and religious sensitivity: The Court repeatedly underscores that the act occurred during Navratri and Eid, treating this as a decisive aggravating factor.

While sensitivity to communal context is not misplaced, the reasoning edges toward a more problematic terrain:

• It attributes intentionality (“precise timing”) without clear evidentiary backing.
• It risks constitutionalising religious sentiment as a determinant of liberty.
• It implicitly prioritises majoritarian hurt as a ground for preventive detention.

This approach blurs the line between actual threat and perceived offence, raising concerns about the neutrality of constitutional protections.

Preventive detention and bail: Another striking feature is the Court’s endorsement of detention despite bail:

• Two petitioners had already been granted bail,
• yet were preventively detained to preclude future conduct.

This reflects a broader trend where preventive detention operates as a shadow system, effectively overriding judicial determinations in criminal law.

While doctrinally permissible, it raises structural concerns:

• Does preventive detention undermine the logic of bail jurisprudence?
• Does it allow the executive to circumvent evidentiary thresholds required in criminal trials?

The judgement may be read here:

Liberty at the edge of anticipation

When these two judgments are read together, a coherent doctrinal pattern becomes evident. Both decisions treat cow slaughter as an act with inherent potential to disturb public order, thereby lowering the threshold for invoking preventive detention. In each case, the Court places central emphasis on societal reaction, whether manifested through crowd mobilisation or behavioural fear.

At the same time, contextual factors such as festival timing and communal sensitivity are used to amplify the perceived seriousness of the act. Preventive detention is consistently justified through anticipatory reasoning, with courts accepting intelligence inputs and apprehensions of future conduct as sufficient. Additionally, the scale of administrative response is treated as indicative of the gravity of the situation, further reinforcing the conclusion that public order was at stake.

This emerging doctrine raises significant constitutional concerns. The reliance on intelligence inputs, behavioural indicators, and administrative response points toward a dilution of traditional evidentiary standards. By centring public reaction, the Court risks validating anticipated outrage as a basis for curtailing liberty, thereby shifting the burden away from the State’s responsibility to maintain order.

Furthermore, the increasing use of preventive detention in such cases suggests a blurring of the line between preventive and punitive measures, with the NSA functioning as a parallel mechanism to ordinary criminal law. The emphasis on context and symbolism, while relevant, also introduces a level of subjectivity that can make the concept of public order highly elastic.

A shift from exception to norm

These two rulings, taken together, signal a decisive transformation. Preventive detention—constitutionally conceived as an exceptional measure—is increasingly being normalised in communally sensitive majoritarian criminal contexts.

The shift is subtle but profound:

• From exceptional threat → to contextual sensitivity
• From proven disruption → to anticipated reaction
• From State responsibility → to individual restraint

At stake is not merely the interpretation of “public order,” but the future of personal liberty under the Constitution.

The critical question that emerges is this:

Can constitutional freedoms be made contingent on how society might react—or must the State bear the burden of ensuring order without pre-emptively sacrificing liberty?

In these judgments, the answer appears to lean decisively—perhaps dangerously—toward the former.

Related:

Publicly Tortured, Forced to Eat Cow Dung: No arrests in Odisha Pastor assault case

Judicial Pushback against Cow Vigilantism: Allahabad HC flags arbitrary FIRs, demands accountability from top officials

Supreme Court disposes of PIL on cow vigilantism, declines micro-monitoring of state compliance

Rampant cow vigilantism unleashes violence on Muslim truck drivers across the country

Rise in Cow Vigilantism: A leading driver of discrimination against India’s Muslim minority

The post From Cow Slaughter to “Public Order”: Allahabad High Court’s expanding use of preventive detention appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Further, the communication points out that in the past, the Ministry of Environment and Forests granted clearance in 2004 for the diversion of forestland in the Niyamgiri Hills to enable a corporate entity to mine bauxite for an alumina refinery located nearby, also on forestland. This decision was subsequently set right by the Supreme Court of India. It was only when the Supreme Court intervened and insisted in 2013 that the concerned Gram Sabhas needed to give their consent under the Forest Rights Act (FRA), that the matter was placed before the Gram Sabhas. At the time, all the 12 concerned Gram Sabhas categorically denied permission for the mining project, affirming their cultural and spiritual rights to the area.

Now, 13 years later, regrettably, less than 50 km away from Niyamgiri, in Sijimali in Rayagada district of Odisha, also in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, efforts have been made to again illegally acquire the forest lands by fraudulent means. In December 2025, MoEFCC accorded stage I forest diversion clearance, based on the 2023 gramsabha resolutions, which are claimed to be fraudulent, with a stipulation that the diversion was subject to FRA clearance, the letter states. The Stage 1 forest diversion clearance given was itself flawed as the prior mandatory site visit was not undertaken and due process was not followed. In December 2023, it was claimed that the concerned Gram Sabhas had passed ‘unanimous’ resolutions in favour of the mining activities to be taken up by Vedanta, the same group which had attempted to take up mining in the Niyamgiri hills.  Villagers of Sijimali have alleged that the resolutions were fraudulent, that a number of non-residents took part in the Gram Sabha meetings, that minors and deceased persons were shown to be present, that consent was obtained through fraud and manipulation. Media reports[1] also mention that the Gram Sabha meetings never took place and that the police brought in people from elsewhere and recorded photographs and videos. In February 2025, two Gram Panchayats filed a writ petition in the Odisha High Court to quash the 2023 Gram Sabha resolutions. The Court disposed of the matter in March 2025 directing the Centre to take note of the concerns.  Despite this order, and regardless of local protests, construction of a three km. long approach road was started, with the presence of armed police. This is the background of the clashes.

The CCG states that the collective is “distressed by the fact that despite knowing that the Forest Rights Act was applicable to the land on which the mining would be taken up, the State Government chose not to follow the precedent of the Niyamgiri judgement of the Supreme Court and ensure fair proceedings by seeking presence of a judicial officer at the meetings of the Gram Sabha.”

“Apart from the above, the principles of the 1997 Samatha judgement of the Supreme Court have also been violated.  In the matter of ‘transfer’ of tribal land to a ‘non-tribal person’, the court had held that without due consultation and benefit sharing, government land or forest land or tribal land cannot be transferred to private entities. It is amazing that the government, despite having the duty of protecting common property resources, seems to be bent upon handing these resources over to subserve private interests.  Such actions are also a clear violation of Article 39 of the Constitution which mandates the State to secure social and economic justice.

“The manner in which the Sijimali protests have been dealt with indicates complete violation of the spirit of the Niyamgiri judgement of the Supreme Court. It shows scant regard for the Forest Rights Act.  It creates serious doubts about the authenticity of the resolutions of Gram Sabha, indicating that free, prior and informed consent of the Gram Sabha had not been obtained. It shows the State’s inability or refusal to learn from past incidents of tribal unrest which have, in several cases, led to the loss of tribal lives.”

The CCG has also pointed out that these days when we have a Mission Karmayogi to systematise capacity building at all levels, it should have been a fairly easy step to incorporate such a landmark Supreme Court Judgements in the training curriculum of the concerned officials, so that future investment proposals are handled with due diligence, without requiring people to go all the way to approach the Supreme Court again. Similarly, it should have been a routine item of administration in these days of Information Technology, that the individual and community rights recognised under the Forest Rights Act are duly incorporated into revenue records and maps. All this brings us to the disturbing question of whether the new chapter referred to by Jaipal Singh Munda, of just and fair governance, is still a distant dream.”

On January 24, 1947, Jaipal Singh Munda, member of the Constituent Assembly, had stated, “The whole history of my (tribal) people is one of continuous exploitation and dispossession by the non-aboriginals of India… I take you all at your word that now we are going to start… a new chapter of independent India where there is equality of opportunity, where no one would be neglected.”

Invoking this now 79 years later, the letter urges India’s woman Adivasi President that “they are hopeful that you will be concerned about the injustice that is being done, and that you will get the government to comprehensively re-examine the authenticity of the December 2023 Gram Sabha resolutions.  Pending a detailed enquiry, the stage I forest diversion clearance should be suspended and the physical work of road construction to Sijimali mining area should be stopped. The cases of the tribal persons who have been booked under various criminal law sections need to be reviewed by the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes. All steps must be taken to see that the gains of the Forest Rights Act, both in terms of individual and community rights, are consolidated to secure better livelihoods for all tribals and other traditional forest dwellers.”

The signatories are:

[1]   Report in the Hindu. 3.1.2026 https://frontline.thehindu.com/environment/sijimali-bauxite-mining-gram-sabha-fraud/article70463304.ece

The post Police action in Odisha’s Rayagada district condemned, Adivasi rights paramount: CCG appeared first on SabrangIndia.

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The post Decoding the Judgement on Sathankulam Custodial Death:Part-3 Witnesses to be Celebrated & Honoured appeared first on SabrangIndia.