What makes the judgment significant—but also contentious—is not merely its procedural holding, but the manner in which the Court treated the petitioner’s evidence. While the ruling rests on established precedents such as Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India (2019), it marks a notable shift from earlier Supreme Court positions that accepted minor discrepancies in names, dates, or residence as tolerable when weighed against the totality of credible documentary evidence.

As citizenship in Assam continues to be adjudicated through overlapping forums—FTs, NRC processes, and constitutional courts—this judgment bears important implications for legal strategy, evidentiary framing, and the fate of thousands accused of being ‘illegal immigrants.’ The case becomes a useful lens through which we may compare evolving judicial approaches to documentary evidence and procedural fairness.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Rofiqul Hoque v. Union of India

Factual matrix

Rofiqul Hoque, the appellant, was declared a foreigner by the Foreigners Tribunal (FT), Jorhat, Assam, on March 4, 2017 under a reference by the Border Police. The basis: he had allegedly entered India illegally after the cut-off date of March 25, 1971. He contested this decision before the Gauhati High Court, which upheld the FT’s findings. In 2018, however, the petitioner’s name appeared in the draft NRC. He filed an SLP before the Supreme Court, arguing that such inclusion rebutted the FT’s conclusion.

Submissions by the parties

Appellant’s contentions:

• Inclusion in the draft NRC should have overriding effect and demonstrate that the petitioner is not a foreigner.
• The FT and High Court adopted a “pedantic” approach, rejecting evidence on grounds of minor discrepancies in age, name spellings, and address.
• Change in village domicile does not imply change in citizenship.

Respondents (Union of India and Assam government):

• Under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, the burden of proof is on the proceedee.
• NRC inclusion is neither determinative nor binding upon the FT or the State.
• Discrepancies in documentary evidence raised substantial doubts about the petitioner’s claimed lineage.

Legal issues framed by the SC

1. Whether the findings of the FT and the High Court suffered from legal infirmity or ignored credible evidence?
2. Whether inclusion of the appellant’s name in the draft NRC can nullify a prior declaration by an FT?

Court’s Findings: Scrutinising evidence, procedure, and statutory framework

The Court’s reasoning rests on two central legal foundations:

• The burden of proof placed on the alleged foreigner under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946.
• The non-binding nature of NRC inclusion for persons already declared foreigners, as per the Citizenship Rules, 2003, and the precedent in Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India.

On the merits of evidence and the burden under Section 9: The appellant relied on a combination of official records to establish his Indian citizenship through ancestry:

• Voter lists from 1966, 1970, 1993, 2010, and 2016 purportedly featuring his grandfather (Joynal Abdin), father (Majut Ali), and mother (Sopia Bibi).
• A duplicate school certificate issued in 2014, showing his date of birth as 20.07.1996 and naming his parents.
• An income tax PAN card issued post-2017, and inclusion in the 2018 draft NRC.

Despite this, both the Tribunal and the Gauhati High Court held the petitioner failed to discharge the burden placed on him by Section 9. The Supreme Court upheld this view, stressing that the proceedee must prove:

1. Presence of ancestors in India before March 25, 1971, and
2. His linkage to those ancestors through credible, consistent documents.

The Supreme Court found the petitioner’s case wanting on the following counts:

1. Village discrepancy:

• • The appellant claimed descent from Joynal Abdin of Daobhangi village, Dhubri district.
  • Voter records showed Joynal Abdin in Kekurchar village, Sivasagar district, with no affidavit or evidence explaining this change.
  • There was no plea or corroborative document to establish a migration history, which would have reconciled the apparent inconsistency.

“The Tribunal as well as the High Court have considered these documents and have found that those earlier voter lists relate to a person located in some other village than the one of which the appellant claimed to be a resident. In such circumstances, the appellant ought to have stated in his affidavit, or demonstrated by some documentary evidence, that his ancestors had migrated from that village to the other village where the appellant was reported to be residing, but, according to the Tribunal, there was no such claim by the appellant in his affidavit. Therefore, the Tribunal discarded the probative value of those voter list entries.” (Para 15)

2. Name and lineage doubts:

• • The Court questioned whether Joynal Abdin in 1966 and 1993 voter lists was the same person. Ages did not align; e.g., he was listed as 38 in 1966 and 70 in 1993 (should have been ~65).
  • The father’s name appeared inconsistently, and the mother’s name (Sopia Bibi) was absent in crucial documents.
  • The voter lists also showed unnatural age jumps, e.g., Majut Ali’s age was 30 in 1993 but 45 in 2010—missing consistency.

“Additionally, the High Court noticed that as per the affidavit of the appellant, Joynal Abdin Seikh was a resident of Daobhangi village whereas in the voter list of 1993, Joynal Abdin was shown as a resident of Kekurchar village, which is altogether different from the village of which the appellant claims to be a resident. Further, the High Court noticed that in the 1993 voters list, the name of the mother of the appellant, namely, Sopia Bibi, is conspicuous by its absence.” [Para 5 (vi)]

“As regards the voters list of 2010, the High Court observed that here Majut Ali’s age is shown as 45 years whereas in 1993 list it was 30 years therefore, in the 2010 voters list, it ought to have been 47 years. Besides above, there was a noticeable change in respect of the place of residence because in 1993 list, the village of domicile is shown as Kekurchar whereas in 2010 voter list it is Daobhangi.” [Para 5 (vii)]

3. School certificate deficiency:

• • The certificate was a duplicate, issued ten years after the appellant allegedly left school.
  • No explanation for delay in issuance or production.
  • Crucially, the headmaster was not called to prove its contents, failing the test under the Evidence Act.
  • Hence, the document’s probative value was discounted.

“Interestingly, the school leaving certificate on which heavy reliance was placed by the appellant was also doubted as there appeared no reason for it to have been obtained 10 years after passing from the institution. Moreover, the headmaster of the school was not called for to prove the authenticity of the certificate of which duplicate was produced.” (Para 15)

The Court emphasised that these deficiencies went beyond mere clerical errors. They showed a lack of effort by the appellant to resolve material inconsistencies through affidavit, oral evidence, or additional linkage documents.

On NRC inclusion and its legal consequence: On the question of whether the appellant’s inclusion in the 2018 draft NRC nullified the earlier FT declaration, the Court delivered an unequivocal “No.”

It relied heavily on:

• Rule 4A and Paragraph 3(2) of the Citizenship Rules, 2003, and
• The three-judge bench decision in Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604.

As noted by the SC in its order, the Citizenship Rules clearly state that:

“…the names of persons who have been declared as illegal migrants or foreigners by the competent authority shall not be included in the consolidated list.” (Para 23)

In para 25–27, the Court emphasised:

• The Registering Authority under NRC has no power to override a quasi-judicial order of a Foreigners Tribunal.
• Even if a person’s name is erroneously included, that inclusion is legally ineffective unless the FT order is reversed by a higher court.
• The “competent authority” under the Citizenship Rules refers specifically to the Foreigners Tribunal, not administrative officers.

Therefore, even though the appellant’s name appeared in the draft NRC, the Supreme Court held that:

“In view of the decision of this Court in Abdul Kuddus (supra), firstly, consequent to the declaration by the Tribunal that appellant is a foreigner, the name of the appellant could not have been included in the draft NRC and, secondly, even if it has been included, it would not annul the declaration made by the Tribunal.” (Para 27)

This closed the door on the appellant’s attempt to claim citizenship via NRC inclusion.

4. Final holding and consequences

After a detailed evaluation of both factual inconsistencies and legal standards, the Supreme Court held as follows:

• The FT’s findings, as affirmed by the Gauhati High Court, were not legally flawed, arbitrary, or perverse.
• The appellant’s inclusion in the draft NRC had no legal effect, given his prior declaration as a foreigner.
• The appellant had failed to prove his Indian citizenship, either by establishing consistent lineage or through rebutting the FT declaration.
• The interim release order granted in 2019 (based on NRC inclusion) was vacated.

“In light of the discussion above, and our conclusions on the issues referred to above, we are of the view that there is no merit in this appeal. The same is, accordingly, dismissed. The release order which was passed at an interim stage stands discharged. Consequently, the appellant shall be treated and dealt with as a foreigner.” (Para 30)

Notably, it is imperative to highlight here that the Court refrained from commenting on whether the NRC itself was legally flawed or reliable. Its approach was purely technical: an FT order, once passed, takes precedence unless overturned by a superior court—not by administrative inclusion.

The complete judgment may be read below.

Previous judicial treatment of documentary discrepancies

While the Supreme Court in Rofiqul Hoque adopted a stringent approach, other judgments have demonstrated a more nuanced understanding of documentary discrepancies, recognising the challenges faced by individuals in rural and marginalized communities.

1. Anuwar Hussain @ Md. Anowar Hussain v. Union of India & Ors. (Gauhati High Court, 2014)

In this case, the petitioner was declared a foreigner by the Foreigners Tribunal due to discrepancies in his father’s name across various documents. The Tribunal noted variations such as “Samed Ali,” “Abdul Samed,” and “Samed.” The Gauhati High Court bench led by Justice Ujjal Bhuyan had observed that such variations are common in rural areas, particularly among the Muslim community, and held that these discrepancies were not significant enough to draw an adverse inference regarding the petitioner’s citizenship.

“In so far discrepancy in the name of petitioner’s father is concerned, it is a common phenomenon in rural areas, more particularly among people of Muslim community, to have more than one name or there being variation in the name such as in the name of the petitioner’s father. The discrepancy in the name as noticed- Samed Ali, Abdul Samed and Samed, is not so great as to draw adverse inference regarding the citizenship of the petitioner. On the ground of there being such discrepancy in the name of petitioner’s father, petitioner could not have been declared as a foreigner.” (Para 11)

The Court also addressed discrepancies in the petitioner’s age, noting that minor differences in age declarations are expected in rural settings and should not be the sole basis for declaring someone a foreigner.

2. Mamata Bhowmik v. Union of India & Ors. (Gauhati High Court, 2019)

The petitioner was declared a foreigner by the Foreigners Tribunal, which rejected a certified copy of the 1966 voter list on the grounds that it lacked a physical signature and did not comply with Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. The Gauhati High Court found that the Tribunal erred in its assessment, noting that the document was digitally signed and legally valid under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

“The certified copy also contains a further note that the certificate is digitally signed and, therefore, needs no physical signature… the certificate is legally valid under the Information Technology Act, 2000.” (Para 3)

The Court emphasized the need for Tribunals to consider the authenticity and legal validity of documents, even when presented in digital form, and set aside the Tribunal’s order.

3. Sirajul Hoque v. State of Assam (Supreme Court of India, 2019)

In this case, the appellant was declared a foreigner by the Foreigners Tribunal due to discrepancies in the spelling of his grandfather’s name and differences in the villages listed in various documents. The Supreme Court bench of Justices Rohinton Nariman and Vineet Saran, however, found that the appellant had successfully established his lineage through consistent documentation of his father’s and grandfather’s identities, despite minor spelling variations. The Court held that such minor discrepancies did not undermine the credibility of the appellant’s claim to citizenship.

“Having gone through these documents, we are of the view that it is not possible to state that Kematullah is not the same despite being named Kefatullah in some of the documents. This being so, the grandfather’s identity, father’s identity etc. has been established successfully by the appellant. Further, the mere fact that the father may later have gone to another village is no reason to doubt this document.” (Para 4)

The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the Foreigners Tribunal, thereby affirming the appellant’s Indian citizenship.

4. Mohammad Iddrish Ali v. Union of India & Ors. (Gauhati High Court, 2020)

In this case, the petitioner was declared a foreigner despite submitting multiple documents, including voter lists from 1965 and 1970 bearing his father’s and uncle’s names. The Tribunal disregarded these documents, citing the absence of the petitioner’s name in the 1975 voter list. The Gauhati High Court bench of Justices Manojit Bhuyan and Parthivjyoti Saikia found that the Tribunal committed an error in appreciating the evidence and emphasized that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in Tribunal proceedings.

“Reverting to the case in hand, the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a tribunal. Nothing is required to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.”

The Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and directed a fresh opinion, highlighting the importance of a holistic assessment of evidence in such cases.

5. Jagat Bahadur Chetri v. Union of India & Ors. (Gauhati High Court, 2023)

An 85-year-old resident of Assam was declared a foreigner based on a reference by an election official, despite evidence of his birth in Assam in 1937 and decades of service as a civilian employee in the military. The Gauhati High Court criticised the “non-application of mind” by the election official and set aside the Tribunal’s ruling, ordering compensation for the petitioner.

“If Jagat Bahadur Chetri was born in the year 1937 and his place of birth is Dibrugarh and there is no material that subsequent to his birth, he migrated to the specified territory and thereafter re-entered the State of Assam subsequent to 25.03.1971, we are of the view that it was an absolute non-application of mind on the part of the ERO of 52 Dispur Legislative Assembly Constituency to have referred the petitioner to the Foreigners Tribunal for an opinion as to whether the petitioner Jagat Bahadur Chetri is a foreigner who entered the State of Assam subsequent to 25.03.1971 from the specified territory.” (Para 4)

“It appears that the enquiring officer had not done its duty in the proper earnest and there can be no reason why the petitioner Jatat Bahadur Chetri would refuse to divulge the information that he was serving in Indian Army since 1963.” (Para 5)

“However, for causing inconvenience to the petitioner without any reasonable cause and without any application of mind, a cost of Rs. 10, 000/- (rupees ten thousand) is imposed on the ERO of 52 Dispur Legislative Assembly Constituency to be paid to the petitioner.” (Para 7)

This case highlights the importance of due diligence and the consideration of an individual’s lifelong ties to the country in citizenship determinations.

6.  Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim v. State of Assam & Ors. (Supreme Court of India, 2024)

In this case, the appellant was declared a foreigner based on minor discrepancies in the spelling of names and dates in official documents. The Supreme Court bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah observed that such variations are common and often arise due to differences in language, pronunciation, and clerical errors. The Court emphasized that these minor inconsistencies should not be the sole basis for declaring someone a foreigner.

“As far as the discrepancy (ies) in dates and spellings are concerned, we are of the view that the same are minor in nature. Variation in name spelling is not a foreign phenomenon in preparation of the Electoral Roll. Further, the Electoral Roll has no acceptance in the eyes of law insofar as proof of date of birth is concerned. A casual entry by the enumerators when noting and entering the name(s) and dates of birth(s) as also the address(es) of the person(s) while making preparatory surveys for the purposes of preparing the Electoral Rolls cannot visit the appellant with dire consequences. Moreover, in our country, sometimes a title is prefixed or suffixed to a name such that the same person may be known also by one or two aliases. The Tribunal seems to have been totally oblivious to all this.” (Para 41)

“The State of Assam, as per the Census 2011, boasts of 72.19% literacy rate, with females at 66.27% and males at 77.85%. However, this was not the case during the 1960s or even 1970s. Not just in Assam but in many States, it is seen that names of people, even on important government documents can have and do have varied spellings depending on them being in English or Hindi or Bangla or Assamese or any other language, for that matter. Moreover, names of persons which are written either by the persons preparing the Voters List or by the personnel making entries into different Government records, the spelling of the name, based upon its pronunciation, may take on slight variations. It is not uncommon throughout India that different spellings may be written in the regional/vernacular language and in English. Such/same person will have a differently spelt name in English and the local language. This is more pronounced where due to specific pronunciation habits or styles there can be different spellings for the same name in different languages.” (Para 42)

“In the considered opinion of this Court, the same would further buttress the appellant’s claim, that not being in the wrong, and being an ignorant person, he, truthfully and faithfully produced the official records as they were in his possession. We do not see any attempt by the appellant to get his official records prepared meticulously without any discrepancy. The conduct of an illegal migrant would not be so casual.” (Para 43)

The Court also highlighted that the authorities must have a material basis for initiating proceedings under the Foreigners Act and that arbitrary or baseless suspicions cannot justify such actions. Consequently, the Court quashed the orders of the Foreigners Tribunal and the High Court, restoring the appellant’s citizenship. (Detailed analysis of the same judgment may be read here.)

Tightening the evidentiary threshold?

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Rofiqul Hoque v. Union of India underscores a marked shift toward evidentiary stringency in citizenship adjudication under the Foreigners Act, 1946. By upholding the findings of the Foreigners Tribunal and the Gauhati High Court, the Court reasserted two core principles: (1) that the burden of proof lies squarely on the proceedee under Section 9, and (2) that inclusion in the NRC—particularly a draft list—does not override a quasi-judicial declaration of foreign status.

What makes this decision legally significant is its departure from earlier jurisprudence that acknowledged the lived realities of individuals from rural and marginalized communities—realities that often produce inconsistencies in names, ages, and addresses in official records. Judgments such as Sirajul Hoque, Md. Rahim Ali, and Md. Anuwar Hussain adopted a more flexible, contextual reading of documentary discrepancies. In contrast, Rofiqul Hoque takes a formalistic approach, requiring strict evidentiary coherence even when documentary irregularities might stem from administrative lapses rather than wilful deceit.

This evolving judicial posture has far-reaching implications. It raises the evidentiary threshold for proving citizenship, heightens the risk of wrongful exclusion, and underscores the primacy of FT decisions over NRC data, regardless of administrative errors or procedural opacity in the latter. Going forward, both legal practitioners and claimants must place greater emphasis on reconciling all documentary inconsistencies through affidavits, oral testimony, and corroborative records.

In essence, Rofiqul Hoque reinforces the authority of Foreigners Tribunals and sets a cautionary precedent: in the current legal regime, technical lapses—even those reasonably explained—may carry irrevocable consequences for individuals seeking to prove their citizenship in Assam.

Image Courtesy: scobserver.in

Related:

From Detention to Deportation: The mass deportations and detention crisis at Assam’s Matia centre

Restoring Citizenship, Rebuilding Lives: CJP continues its journey in Assam

Declared Foreigner, buried Indian: The tragic death of Abdul Matleb in Assam’s detention camp

SC: Only 10 deported, 33 of 63 contest foreigner status from the Matia Transit Camp, Assam

The post Supreme Court and the Rofiqul Hoque Judgment: A new chapter in Assam’s citizenship jurisprudence on discrepancies in documentary evidence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The case revolved around serious allegations made by a minor female wrestler, whose complaint formed the basis of a second First Information Report (FIR) filed on April 28, 2023, at the Connaught Place police station. The FIR invoked multiple provisions, including Sections 354 (assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty), 354A (sexual harassment), 354D (stalking), and 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, along with Section 10 of the POCSO Act.

Court accepts closure report

On May 26, 2025, Additional Sessions Judge Gomti Manocha of the Patiala House Courts accepted the closure report filed by the Delhi Police on June 15, 2023. The report spanned 550 pages and concluded that there was no corroborative evidence to support the allegations of sexual harassment. The judge, after summoning the minor complainant to appear before the court, noted that she did not oppose the closure of the case and had expressed satisfaction with the police investigation. As per The Hindu, the judge formally recorded this by stating, “Cancellation accepted.”

The closure followed an in-camera hearing held earlier on August 1, 2023, during which the minor also stated that she had no objections to the closure report. The proceedings had been carried out with sensitivity, given the identity of the complainant and the nature of the allegations under the POCSO Act.

Background: Retraction amid alleged intimidation

However, the developments leading to the case’s closure were fraught with controversy, particularly around the complainant’s retraction of the allegations. The father of the minor wrestler—who was also the complainant in the FIR—publicly stated that he had changed his statement due to immense pressure and fear for the safety of his family.

In a statement reported by The Hindu, the father disclosed: “I changed my statement in court because I was scared… scared for my family, daughter, and myself… my family is living under constant threat.”

He further claimed that he was being threatened by unidentified individuals and that his entire family was living in intense fear. Despite these threats, he asserted that they had not withdrawn all parts of the complaint—specifically maintaining the portion that accused Singh of discriminating against his daughter.

This clarification came amid widespread confusion triggered by media reports falsely claiming that the minor had withdrawn her complaint entirely. Shortly thereafter, the father issued a “confession” in which he stated that he had fabricated the allegations of sexual harassment in anger and frustration over his daughter’s rejection from the U-17 Asian Championship.

Speaking to PTI, the father admitted: “I was filled with rage that my child’s one-year hard work had gone down the drain because of that referee’s decision in the final and I decided to take revenge.”

He attributed his grievance to the WFI leadership, stating that the referee involved in the contested match had been appointed by Brij Bhushan Singh.

“The federation appointed the referee. Who heads the federation? Who else should I be angry at?”

In the original FIR, however, the father had detailed multiple alleged incidents of inappropriate behaviour by Singh, including claims that the WFI chief touched the minor inappropriately, asked her to support him in return for his support, and pulled her forcefully toward him. He had further claimed that the minor was deeply disturbed by the alleged harassment, which continued to “haunt her.”

Despite the retraction of those specific allegations, the complainant’s father reiterated to The Hindu that they had not withdrawn the part of the complaint that alleged his daughter faced discrimination under Singh’s leadership. (Details may be read here.)

Political and social fallout

Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh has consistently denied all allegations, calling them a politically motivated conspiracy designed to malign his image. He claimed that the complaints were part of a broader campaign to discredit him.

Even as the POCSO case now stands closed, Singh still faces legal proceedings in a separate sexual harassment case filed by six adult women wrestlers. The controversy triggered a nationwide movement in 2023, with top Indian wrestlers—such as Sakshi Malik, Vinesh Phogat, Bajrang Punia, and Sangeeta Phogat—leading prolonged protests at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi. The athletes alleged that Singh had harassed female wrestlers between 2016 and 2019 at various locations, including the WFI office, his official residence, and even during foreign tours. (Details may be read here.)

The public outcry eventually prompted the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports to constitute an oversight committee to examine the allegations. It was only after the Supreme Court intervened in May 2023 that the Delhi Police registered two FIRs—one involving the minor and another based on the complaints of the six other women. (Details may be read here.)

The closure of the POCSO case does not affect the ongoing prosecution in the other case. In June 2023, the Delhi Police filed a 1,000-page chargesheet at the Rouse Avenue court in connection with the adult women complainants’ case. (Details may be read here.)

Legal implications

The POCSO Act mandates stringent punishment for sexual offences involving minors, with minimum sentences starting at three years of imprisonment, depending on the sections applied. The court’s acceptance of the police’s closure report formally ends the legal proceedings against Singh under the POCSO Act, though serious questions remain about the conditions under which the complaint was withdrawn. While this development marks a significant turning point in one of the most high-profile sexual harassment cases in Indian sports history, but it also leaves unresolved concerns about witness intimidation, institutional accountability, and the safety of complainants who come forward in such cases concerning men with power.

Related:

From “liable to be prosecuted” to “neither opposing nor supporting bail”: The curious case of Delhi Police

Protesting wrestlers will resume stir, say govt not ready to arrest WFI chief by June 15

 their repeated sexual trauma in 2021

Battling the Indian sports industry: the cries for justice by women

From deathly silence to violence: The journey of wrestlers struggling for justice

The post Delhi Court accepts closure report in sexual harassment of minor, Drops POCSO case against Brij Bhushan Singh appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The lawsuit was a SLAPP suit – a legal tactic used to silence critical reports and public debate. This case and several other such cases highlight the growing use of lawfare to threaten and silence media, especially independent media. Akshay Luhadia and Istela Jameel in their report, Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation in India –An Analysis in the Context of Indian Defamation Laws, published in the NLIU Law Review discuss the threats to free speech and expressions in democracies through Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP). They highlight examples of SLAPP cases in India and the negative impact on democracy, particularly targeting minorities and women. Read their report here.

Statement on Vantara’s failed legal case against Himal Southasian

The post Vantara case against Himal Southasian dismissed by Delhi High Court appeared first on SabrangIndia.

However, the Court refused to stay the investigation, reported LiveLaw. Moreover, the Court also directed the Haryana DGP to constitute a Special Investigation Team comprising senior IPS officers, who do not belong to Haryana or Delhi, to investigate and understand the true meaning of the post. One officer of the SIT should be a woman. The SIT should be constituted within 24 hours, stated the court. The SIT should be headed by an IG rank officer and the other two members must be of SP rank. The matter will now be heard on Friday.

#BREAKING| SC Refuses to stay investigation against @AshokaUniv Professor

SC : having regard to two online posts have led to FIR registration, we are satisfied that NO CASE OF STAYING THE INVESTIGATION IS MADE OUT . But to have understanding of the propensity of the word use,…

— Live Law (@LiveLawIndia) May 21, 2025

Imposing some conditions for grant of interim bail, the Court restrained Ali Khan Mahmudabad from writing any posts or articles in relation to the social media posts which are subject matter of the case or from expressing any opinion in relation to the terrorist attack on Indian soil or the counter-response given by India. The Court also directed him to join and fully cooperate with the investigation. He has been directed to surrender his passport. The bench of Justice Surya Kant and Justice NK Singh clarified that the interim bail has been granted to facilitate further investigation.

After the order was dictated, senior advocate Kapil Sibal, for the petitioner, requested the Court to restrain the registration of further FIRs on the same issue. “Nothing will happen,” Justice Kant orally said. Justice Kant orally asked the State of Haryana to ensure that. The State was granted liberty to place on record any further incriminating materials they discover during the course of the investigation.

Bench queries the petitioner’s posts during the hearing

At the outset, senior advocate Kapil Sibal, drew the bench’s attention to Mahmudabad’s comments posted on his Facebook and Instagram profiles. He read out the comments to the bench. “This is a highly patriotic statement,” Sibal said.

Referring to Mahmudabad’s comments about “right-wing commentators applauding Colonel Sofiya Qureshi” and his statement that right-wing commentators must equally express concerns for victims of mob lynching, bulldozing etc., Justice Kant said, “So after commenting about war, he turned to politics!”

“Everybody has a right to express free speech. But is it the time to talk of this much communal…? The country has faced a big challenge. Monsters came all the way and attacked our innocents. We were staying united. But at this juncture.. why to gain cheap popularity on this occasion?” Justice Kant remarked.

Sibal, agreeing that Mahmudabad’s comments could have waited till May 10, however, asked what was the criminality in his comments.

“Everybody talks about rights. As if the country for last 75 years was distributing rights!” Justice Kant said.

Petitioner’s comments ‘dog-whistling’, he should have used ‘neutral and respectful’ language : Justice Surya Kant

About the petitioner’s comments, Justice Kant said, “This is what we call in the law – dog whistling!””Some of the opinions are not offending to the nation as such. But while giving an opinion, if you….” Justice Kant said.

“When the choice of words is deliberately made to insult, humiliate or cause discomfort to other persons, the learned professor cannot have the lack of dictionary words…he could convey the very same feelings in a simple language without hurting others. Have some respect for the sentiments of others. Use simple and neutral kind of language, respecting others” Justice Kant said.

Sibal said that the comments had no “criminal intent”. He highlighted that the petitioner said that the press briefing of Operation Sindoor showed that the logic on which Pakistan was built has failed, and that the post ended with “Jai Hind.” He also added that the petitioner’s wife is nine months pregnant and expecting child delivery soon.

Justice Kant asked Additional Solicitor General SV Raju, representing the State of Haryana, if the comments had the effect of insulting women army officers. Justice Kant said that the bona fides of the comment was a subject matter of investigation. “The entire projection is that he is anti-War, saying families of army people, civilian in border areas etc., suffer. But some words have double meaning also.,” he said.

ASG Raju said that the post was not as innocent as projected by Sibal

On May 20, a local court in Sonepat, Haryana sent Mahmudabad to judicial custody. While so ordering, the court rejected the State Police’s request for his 7-day custody. On May 18, the Magistrate had remanded the Professor to police custody for two days.

Mahmudabad has been charged with offences under Section 196, 152 etc., of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), inter alia, pertaining to acts prejudicial to maintaining communal harmony, making assertions likely to cause disharmony, acts endangering national sovereignty and words or gestures intended to insult a woman’s modesty. He has also been summoned by the Haryana State Commission For Women which is headed by Renu Bhatia.

Detailed Background

Dr. Ali Khan Mahmudabad, associate professor and head of the Political Science department at Ashoka University, was arrested on Sunday, May 18, in Delhi for his social media commentary on India’s recent military action dubbed Operation Sindoor. His arrest follows two First Information Reports (FIRs) filed in Haryana and stems from allegations of inciting secession, insulting religious beliefs, and undermining national unity.

The arrest was made based on complaints filed by Renu Bhatia, chairperson of the Haryana State Commission for Women, and Yogesh Jatheri, the village sarpanch of Jatheri and general secretary of the BJP Yuva Morcha in Haryana.

He was charged under several sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, including:

• Section 152– Act endangering the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India
• Section 353– Statements conducing to public mischief
• Section 79– Word, gesture, or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman
• Section 196(1)(b)– Promoting enmity between different groups on religious grounds
• Section 197(1)(c)– Assertions prejudicial to national integration
• Section 299– Malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings

According to Sonipat DCP (Crime) Narinder Kadian, Mahmudabad was produced before a local court and remanded to two days’ police custody for investigation.

Widespread support for professor Mahmudabad

Students and faculty of Ashoka University came forward in widespread support and solidarity against his arrest that has been widely criticised the country over. Fellow teachers and professors even maintained a vigil outside the police station ensuring that all medication etc reached the arrested academic in time.

SC order can be read here.

Related:

How high is the price of criticism? Professor Mahmudabad arrested for his criticism of politics of hatred

Singing Faiz’s ‘Hum Dekhenge’ is ‘Sedition’: Nagpur Police Book Organisers of Vira Sathidar Memorial

A Republic That Listens: The Supreme Court’s poetic defence of dissent through Imran Pratapgarhi judgment

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At the heart of the case lies a disturbing sequence of events: a young tribal man taken from his own wedding ceremony by police officers, subjected to alleged third-degree torture, and found dead in custody; followed by delayed and diluted FIR registration, an ambiguous post-mortem, and retaliatory criminal cases against the sole eyewitness. The State’s response—marked by delays, lack of arrests, and superficial disciplinary action—led the Court to conclude that the investigation was neither fair nor credible.

The judgment is a strong reaffirmation of the constitutional requirement for independent, impartial, and transparent investigation, especially when State agents are themselves under suspicion. It underscores the Supreme Court’s commitment to upholding due process, witness protection, and accountability in custodial deaths, while reinforcing that the rule of law cannot be compromised by institutional camaraderie.

Factual background

The case emerges from a gruesome incident of custodial torture that took place in July 2024. Deva Pardhi, a tribal man from Guna district, Madhya Pradesh, was preparing for his wedding. On July 13, while the Haldi ceremony was underway, a team of around 30–40 police personnel stormed the premises, assaulting family members—including women and children—and arresting Deva along with his uncle Gangaram Pardhi.

They were taken not to the new police station equipped with CCTV cameras but to an older facility, allegedly to avoid surveillance. At the station, both men were subjected to severe third-degree torture. According to Gangaram’s account, Deva was:

• Beaten with ropes,
• Doused with hot water, petrol, salt, and chili powder,
• Suspended upside down from the ceiling,
• Suffocated with water.

Eventually, after three hours of this treatment, Deva collapsed and was moved to a hospital where he was declared dead on arrival.

Delayed and diluted FIR: The family of the deceased attempted to register an FIR immediately, but were obstructed by the local police. Only after a Magisterial Inquiry was completed, was FIR No. 341/2024 registered—eight days later. Even then, crucially, the charge of culpable homicide amounting to murder (Section 302 IPC) was excluded, and less serious offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) were invoked:

• Section 105: Culpable homicide not amounting to murder,
• Section 115(2): Voluntarily causing hurt,
• Section 3(5): Joint criminal liability,
• Section 120: Voluntarily causing hurt to extort confession,
• Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

Despite these charges, no arrest was made in eight months—a fact that became central to the Court’s conclusion of deliberate institutional shielding.

Eyewitness targeted: Gangaram Pardhi, the only eyewitness to Deva’s custodial torture and death, was illegally detained beyond 24 hours, remanded to custody, and then systematically implicated in at least four more criminal cases:

• FIR 247/2024 (Dharnawada),
• FIR 489/2023 (Dharnawada),
• FIR 434/2023 (Jaora),
• FIR 87/2023 (Chippabarod).

His bail plea was rejected by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which, however, acknowledged the threat perception he faced and ordered his transfer from Guna District Jail to Gwalior Central Jail.

Medical evidence muzzled by influence: Post-mortem results revealed multiple abrasions and contusions. However, instead of ascribing cause of death to physical injuries, doctors later opined that Deva died of vasovagal shock leading to heart failure. The Court cast serious doubt on the credibility of this conclusion, noting that:

• The Medical Board failed to opine on cause of death despite clear injuries,
• The delay and change in findings suggested direct police interference.

This aspect was described as a symptom of a much broader institutional malaise, wherein even forensic medical systems are suborned by police influence.

Judicial censure from the bench during the April 29 hearing

The Supreme Court’s hearing on April 29, 2025, preceding the final judgment, was marked by a series of extraordinarily candid and stern oral observations by Justice Sandeep Mehta, laying bare the judicial frustration with the State’s apparent unwillingness to take decisive action against the police officials implicated in Deva Pardhi’s custodial death.

When Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati, representing the State of Madhya Pradesh, informed the bench that the two key officers had merely been transferred to line duty, Justice Mehta expressed serious displeasure, questioning the sincerity and seriousness of the State’s response. As per the report of LiveLaw, he criticised the administrative tokenism in lieu of criminal accountability, calling it a blatant instance of institutional favouritism.

““Great response to a case of custodial death! What better example of favouritism, shielding your own officers. Would you like yourself to be appointed as amicus or appointed on behalf of CBI to take over the case? Rather than representing the State police. Ridiculous and inhumane approach. Absolutely. Man dies in your custody and it takes you 10 months to lay hands on your own officers. Why did you send them to line duty? For what reason? Their complicity has been found true, why they are not been arrested?”

Justice Mehta went on to question the competence of the investigating authorities, emphasising that the State had failed to arrest even a single person despite the lapse of ten months since the incident. According to LiveLaw, he demanded to know under what provision of law the FIR had been registered and implied that the State’s conduct reflected a gross abdication of investigative duty.

“For the 10 months time you have not been able to arrest a single person. This reflects on your competence. What is the provision of law under which the FIR has been registered?”

When the State sought to justify the absence of arrests by citing that substances had been found in Deva’s body, Justice Mehta dismissed this as a crude attempt at a cover-up, further underlining the systemic efforts to derail the case.

“Can there be a better cover-up act?” Justice Mehta was noted as saying as per LiveLaw.

The Court also took strong exception to the postmortem report, which recorded no conclusive cause of death despite multiple injuries on Deva’s body. The bench described it as inexplicable and suspect, given the visible signs of torture. Justice Mehta lamented the persistent impunity for custodial violence, asserting that repeated judicial pronouncements had done little to deter such brutality.

“A 25-year-old boy killed by custodial violence and not a single injury on the body seen by the medical jurist? You say he died of a heart attack? Bruises all over the body. Sad state of affairs in this country that vice of custodial violence continues unabated despite repeated judgments by this Court, and offenders roam free. Horrendous. And you try to eliminate the sole witness.”

Witness vulnerability and the court’s reluctance to endanger Gangaram: The hearing also saw Advocate Payoshi Roy, appearing for Gangaram Pardhi, urge the Court to consider his bail application. She pointed out that Gangaram, the sole eyewitness to Deva’s death, continued to face relentless harassment by the police and was being falsely implicated in one case after another.

In response, Justice Mehta made a poignant and chilling observation, suggesting that while judicial custody was undesirable, it may ironically offer better protection than release, given the serious risk to Gangaram’s life if he were freed. His words starkly acknowledged the reality of extrajudicial killings and witness silencing:

“Presently, being in custody is better for your own health and safety. When he comes out, he is run over by a lorry and you won’t even know. It will be an accident and you will lose the single witness. Instance [like this] are not uncommon…We have even rejected bail petitions on grounds that there is a risk of the life of accused himself. It’s always better. You will see instances that the moment the accused came out on bail, he was eliminated by the other side. Don’t take that risk. Leave it to the Court,” Justice Mehta remarked, as per LiveLaw.

These remarks underscored the extraordinary vulnerability of witnesses in cases involving State actors, and served to justify the later directions issued in the final judgment for assigning responsibility to senior State officials for Gangaram’s safety.

Judicial assessment and findings in the judgment

The findings of the Court are among the most comprehensive judicial evaluations of systemic custodial abuse and the complicity of the State machinery in recent times. The Court made the following key observations:

1. Systemic failure to register and investigate FIR promptly

The Court noted that the victim’s family attempted to lodge an FIR immediately after the custodial death occurred. However, the local police actively prevented them from doing so, an action the Court regarded as a deliberate suppression of lawful process.

Only after the Magisterial Inquiry concluded was FIR No. 341 of 2024 registered. Even then, it included Section 105 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) rather than Section 302 (murder), thereby diluting the gravity of the offence.

This delay and selective invocation of penal provisions formed a crucial part of the Court’s reasoning that the investigation was neither independent nor fair. The Court termed this an engineered evasion of accountability.

“The victims’ family tried to lodge the FIR immediately after the incident, but the local police officials prevented them from doing so. It is only after the magisterial inquiry was conducted that the FIR came to be registered wherein the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder was omitted.” (Para 29)

2. Absolute Inaction for Eight Months: No arrests despite direct incrimination

The Supreme Court expressed deep concern that even after eight months, not a single police officer had been arrested despite the fact that the Magisterial Inquiry, medical evidence, and witness statements pointed toward clear custodial torture leading to death.

“Nearly eight months have passed since the FIR was registered but till date, not a single accused has been arrested.” (Para 29)

This inaction, according to the Court, was not accidental but a result of institutional camaraderie—a refusal to act against colleagues, even in the face of overwhelming evidence. The Court emphasised that the deliberate delay had the effect of sabotaging the prosecution and undermining public confidence in the legal system.

“These circumstances give rise to a clear inference that the investigation by the local police is not being carried out in a fair and transparent manner and there is an imminent possibility of the prosecution being subjugated by the accused if the investigation is left in the hands of the State police, who are apparently shielding their own fellow policemen owing to the camaraderie.” (Para 30)

3. Suppression and tampering of medical evidence

The post-mortem report, although documenting multiple contusions, abrasions, and visible injuries, made no conclusive finding on the cause of death. Instead, the medical board reserved opinion, and later attributed the death to “vasovagal shock leading to heart attack.”

The Supreme Court found this explanation medically implausible given the physical injuries and the timeline of events, and strongly suspected that the Medical Board was pressurised by the accused police officers. The doctors’ refusal to comment on the cause of death, in the Court’s view, reflected coercive interference by the police.

“The fact that the police officials have influenced the investigation right from the beginning is amply borne out from the circumstance that even the doctors, who conducted autopsy of the dead body of Deva Pardhi, seem to have been pressurised/influenced.” (Para 28)

“We are constrained to observe that despite taking note of the large number of the injuries on the body of Deva Pardhi, the victim of custodial torture, the members of the Medical Board which conducted post-mortem on his body, failed to express any opinion regarding the cause of his death. This omission seems to be deliberate rather unintentional and appears to be a direct result of influence being exercised by the local police officials.” (Para 29)

This finding is especially significant as it suggests institutional rot beyond the police force, implicating the medical system’s integrity in custodial death investigations.

4. Clear Credibility Crisis: Invoking Nemo Judex in Causa Sua

The Court invoked the foundational principle of natural justice — nemo judex in causa sua — which means that no one can be a judge in his own cause.

Given that the very individuals being investigated belonged to the same force tasked with investigating, the Court declared that any semblance of impartiality was fatally compromised. This foundational breach of investigative independence, in the Court’s eyes, necessitated transfer to the CBI.

“We are, therefore, convinced that this is a classic case warranting invocation of the Latin maxim ‘nemo judex in causa sua’ which means that ‘no one should be a judge in his own cause’. The allegation of causing custodial death of Deva Pardhi is against the local police officials of Myana Police Station.” (Para 28)

5. Credible eyewitness testimony consistently ignored

The Court gave great evidentiary weight to the statement of Gangaram Pardhi, who not only witnessed the torture of Deva Pardhi, but also tried to intervene, and was himself assaulted and illegally detained.

Despite being a direct, material eyewitness, Gangaram’s testimony had not triggered arrests, nor had it been treated with legal seriousness. Instead, he was subjected to retaliatory incarceration and implicated in multiple subsequent cases.

“The involvement of the police officials in the custodial death of Deva Pardhi is clearly borne out from the statement of the sole eye-witness Gangaram Pardhi and stands further corroborated during the magisterial inquiry.” (Para 29)

6. Retaliatory framing and judicial recognition of witness intimidation

The Supreme Court unambiguously held that multiple FIRs filed against Gangaram Pardhi after the custodial death incident were deliberate acts meant to silence and neutralise him.

The Court recognised a pattern of conduct: entangling him in successive, allegedly concocted cases to keep him detained indefinitely, cripple his morale, and deter him from deposing against the police.

“So far as the aspect of grant of bail to Gangaram Pardhi is concerned, we may observe that the underlying facts narrated supra clearly indicate that a deliberate attempt is being made to somehow or the other, implicate Gangaram Pardhi in multiple cases, one after the other, so as to keep him behind bars indefinitely, and break his spirit and the spirit of his family members thereby ensuring that the said person being the star witness of the custodial death of Deva Pardhi is not only demoralized but is also prevented from deposing against the errant police officials.” (Para 33)

Directions anchored in constitutional and criminal law doctrine

Based on these findings, the Supreme Court issued firm and time-bound directions:

• The investigation was immediately transferred to the CBI.
• CBI was ordered to register a Regular Case (RC) and complete investigation within 90 days of arrest.
• The accused police officers were to be arrested within one month.
• Protection of Gangaram under the Witness Protection Scheme was mandated.
• Liberty was granted to apply for bail in all cases, with the High Court directed to consider this Court’s findings.
• The Principal Secretary (Home) and Director General of Police, Madhya Pradesh were personally made responsible for ensuring Gangaram’s safety.

Significance and implications

This judgment is significant because it:

• Affirms Supreme Court’s role as a constitutional guardian under Articles 21 and 32 when State failure threatens liberty and life.
• Condemns the culture of custodial impunity, reinforcing that institutional allegiance cannot supersede justice.
• Clarifies that witness protection is not a procedural courtesy but a substantive right, especially when the witness is up against State forces.
• Lays down that transfer of investigation is not an affront to State police, but a necessity when bias taints the process.

Conclusion

The custodial death of Deva Pardhi is not merely a tragic event—it is a mirror held up to the systemic erosion of accountability in India’s criminal justice system. In transferring the case to the CBI and holding the State to account for its failures, the Supreme Court has emphatically reiterated that no State apparatus, however powerful, is above the Constitution. The judgment stands as a clarion call for legal reform, ethical policing, and the preservation of human dignity in custodial spaces.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

“No One is Above the Law”: Supreme Court demotes Deputy Collector for demolishing a slum settlement by flouting HC order

FIR meant to fail: MP High Court calls out state’s attempt to shield BJP minister, in hate speech case, to monitor probe

A Republic That Listens: The Supreme Court’s poetic defence of dissent through Imran Pratapgarhi judgment

Not Fragile, Not Silent: SC chooses principle over punishment in response to BJP MP Dubey’s outburst, reasserts role as Constitutional check

The post “Shielding their own”: Supreme Court slams Madhya Pradesh police, transfers custodial death probe of a tribal man to CBI appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Through strong language and principled restraint, the bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and A.G. Masih sent a clear message to public servants across India—no one is immune from the consequences of flouting judicial authority, and arrogance of power is no defense when confronted with the authority of law.

Factual background

The roots of the case trace back to the actions of the petitioner while serving as a Tahsildar in the Guntur district of Andhra Pradesh. During his tenure, the petitioner oversaw a demolition operation targeting a slum settlement, despite the existence of a categorical direction from the Andhra Pradesh High Court prohibiting any such eviction or demolition.

According to records and the observations of the High Court, the petitioner orchestrated the demolition using a force of approximately 80 police personnel, thereby displacing numerous slum-dwellers, many of whom were from socio-economically weaker sections. The Court emphasized the inhumanity and callous disregard for judicial authority in his conduct.

Upon discovering this blatant breach, the Andhra Pradesh High Court initiated contempt proceedings, resulting in a finding of civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The petitioner was convicted and sentenced to 2 months’ simple imprisonment.

The petitioner, by then promoted to the rank of Deputy Collector, filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court, challenging the sentence imposed, though not disputing the conviction.

The May 6 Hearing: Disobedience, arrogance, and judicial rebuke

During the hearing on May 6, 2025, the Supreme Court, having earlier issued notice on the sentencing aspect, explored the possibility of adopting a non-custodial punishment, considering the petitioner’s family circumstances, particularly his two children studying in Classes XI and XII.

The Bench had asked Senior Advocate Devashish Bharuka, appearing for the petitioner, to seek instructions on whether the officer was willing to accept demotion to his original rank of Deputy Tahsildar as a substitute for imprisonment.

However, when the matter resumed on May 6, Bharuka informed the Court that the petitioner had categorically refused to accept demotion. This response shocked and angered the Bench, which had already shown considerable leniency.

As per a report of LiveLaw, Justice Gavai observed:

“We were trying to save his career for the sake of his children. But his adamant attitude shows exactly how he must have treated the High Court’s orders—with defiance and contempt.”

Justice Gavai questioned the petitioner’s lack of remorse, invoking a piercing moral argument:

“When you led 80 policemen to demolish homes of the poor, did you remember God then?”

Even though the Court offered a middle path—to demote him only to the post of Tahsildar instead of the originally proposed Deputy Tahsildar—the petitioner remained unyielding. The Court warned that such arrogance and non-cooperation would not go unpunished.

The Bench went so far as to threaten dismissal and career-ending observations in the Court’s final order. According to the LiveLaw report, Justice Gavai issued a sharp caution:

“If he remains this adamant, not only will we dismiss the petition, but we’ll pass such stringent remarks that no authority will dare reinstate him. He thinks he’s close to the government—he must be a protocol director—but that doesn’t protect him from the law.”

Ultimately, on Bharuka’s request, the matter was adjourned to May 9, with the Bench giving a final opportunity for the petitioner to reconsider his position. Before adjourning the matter to May 9, the Court again urged Bharuka to convince the petitioner, stating that the window for leniency was quickly closing. Justice Gavai concluded the session with a damning indictment of the petitioner’s character:

“He threw people out of their homes. We don’t want to become like him.”

This moment revealed the Court’s moral compass—driven by law, but not devoid of empathy.

Arguments advanced by the parties:

Petitioner sought leniency in sentencing, citing:

• The potential loss of livelihood if the officer was imprisoned.
• The educational needs of the petitioner’s two children, studying in Classes XI and XII.
• The economic impact on the family.

• Emphasised the absence of malicious intent behind the demolition.

Respondent opposed leniency, arguing:

• The act amounted to a gross abuse of power.
• It was a deliberate, calculated disobedience of a judicial order.
• The officer’s callousness towards poor slum dwellers demonstrated complete insensitivity.

The May 9 Judgment: Conviction confirmed, sentence modified

When the matter was resumed on May 9, the petitioner, through counsel, finally agreed to the Court’s proposal for demotion, prompting the Bench to adopt a measured sentencing approach. Emphasizing the sanctity of judicial authority, the Court declared that no public servant, regardless of rank, can flout court orders with impunity. The bench observed:

“When a Constitutional Court or for that matter, any court issues any direction, every person or authority regardless of rank, is duty bound to respect and comply with that order. Disobedience of the orders passed by the court attacks the very foundation of the rule of law on which the edifice of a democracy is based.” (Para 16)

“The majesty of law lies not only in punishing but also in forgiving when appropriate.” (Para 11)

Though the Court took a lenient view of the sentence to protect the interests of the officer’s family—particularly his two school-going daughters—it maintained a firm stance on the principle of accountability. Justice Gavai explained that the lenient sentence was not because the petitioner was entitled to it, but because of the collateral impact on his innocent family:

“While we are of the considered view that the appellant does not merit any leniency on account of his adamant and callous conduct, we find that his children and family should not suffer as a consequence of his actions.” (Para 12)

A custodial sentence, the Court observed, would lead to dismissal from service and deprive his family of livelihood. Hence, a balance was struck by demoting the officer and fining him. The Court rebuked the petitioner for expecting humanitarian consideration while himself having acted in a “cruel and inhumane” manner toward vulnerable slum dwellers. The bench made it clear that compassion cannot be a one-way street:

“We are of the view that the appellant ought to have considered the consequences before demolishing the structures of the home dwellers and throwing them on the road along with their belongings and that too despite of the specific warnings given to him by the High Court in its order dated 11th December 2013.” (Para 8)

“The actions of the appellant were inhumane. If the appellant expects this Court to take a humanitarian approach, such conduct was not expected from him.” (Para 9)

The Bench made it clear that this order would be reportable, underscoring its precedential value and public importance.

Observations of the Court in its judgement

1. Wilful disobedience under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

The judgment affirms the importance of strict liability in contempt cases involving public servants. The petitioner’s act of leading a demolition drive in defiance of a High Court order fits squarely within the statutory definition of civil contempt (Section 2(b))—i.e., “wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court.”

The petitioner neither denied the act nor contested the High Court’s finding—only the sentence. This posture itself demonstrated a lack of contrition, further justifying the Supreme Court’s harsh words and disciplinary outcome.

2. Constitutional Principles: Rule of law and judicial supremacy

The Court’s declaration—“No one, howsoever high, is above the law”—reiterates Article 14 (equality before law) and the rule of law doctrine, which anchors the Indian constitutional framework.

In asserting that all public authorities are bound to comply with judicial directions, the Court reaffirmed the idea that judicial decisions are binding, not advisory. Any defiance is not merely administrative overreach—it is a constitutional violation.

3. Doctrine of proportionality in sentencing

While upholding the conviction, the Court applied the doctrine of proportionality in modifying the sentence. It balanced:

• The gravity of the misconduct (violence, illegal eviction),
• The need to protect judicial authority,
• And the mitigating circumstances (impact on the petitioner’s children, loss of livelihood).

By opting for demotion instead of jail time, the Court imposed a meaningful penalty that retains institutional deterrence, yet spares innocent dependents. This is a progressive model of judicial balancing, serving both justice and mercy.

4. Accountability in public office

This case signals a strong institutional message to bureaucrats and political functionaries: administrative power is not a shield against accountability. The petitioner’s reliance on political proximity and his title as “Director of Protocol” was dismissed as irrelevant to his duty to obey court orders.

Key directions and rationale of the court

• The petitioner was demoted from Deputy Collector to Tahsildar, with a direction that future promotions may only be considered from this new post.
• He must also pay a fine of ₹1 lakh within four weeks.
• The Court underscored that serving 48 hours in jail would have resulted in automatic dismissal from service, potentially jeopardizing the livelihood of his entire family—including two school-going children. This humanitarian concern led the Court to temper the sentence, while not absolving the officer of guilt.

Conclusion: A Judicial Message for the Nation

This judgment is far more than a disciplinary order—it is a constitutional proclamation. It reasserts the inviolability of judicial orders, calls out bureaucratic impunity, and restores faith in the majesty of the law. It demonstrates how the Supreme Court can be stern without being cruel, compassionate without being weak.

Through sharp rebuke and calibrated justice, the Court has immortalized a powerful message:

“Disobedience of the orders passed by the court attacks the very foundation of the rule of law on which the edifice of a democracy is based.” (Para 16)

This case will serve as a template for future contempt proceedings, a reminder to public officials about their constitutional obligations, and an example of how courts can defend the powerless against the powerful.

The complete judgement may be read below.

Related:

FIR meant to fail: MP High Court calls out state’s attempt to shield BJP minister, in hate speech case, to monitor probe

A Republic That Listens: The Supreme Court’s poetic defence of dissent through Imran Pratapgarhi judgment

Not Fragile, Not Silent: SC chooses principle over punishment in response to BJP MP Dubey’s outburst, reasserts role as Constitutional check

Judicial Setback: Supreme Court dilutes Bombay HC’s bold stand on police accountability in custodial killing in Badlapur case

The post “No One is Above the Law”: Supreme Court demotes Deputy Collector for demolishing a slum settlement by flouting HC order appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In no uncertain terms, the division bench of Justices Atul Sreedharan and Anuradha Shukla delivered a stinging rebuke to the State, noting that the FIR had been crafted in a manner designed not to prosecute, but to protect. The Court pointed out that paragraph 12 of the FIR—expected to lay out the minister’s actions and how they constituted the offences alleged—merely reproduced the concluding paragraph of the Court’s own order from the previous day, while omitting all factual and legal reasoning. This omission, the Court warned, opened the door for the FIR to be quashed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (the successor to Section 482 CrPC), effectively nullifying the judicial process.

What emerged from the May 15 hearing was the Court’s growing scepticism about the willingness of the State police to independently and impartially investigate a sitting Cabinet Minister. The bench did not shy away from calling out the subversion of process and the appearance of executive shielding. While stopping short of naming officials responsible for what it called a “clumsy attempt,” the Court made it clear that further proceedings would examine the chain of command involved in drafting the FIR.

To safeguard the integrity of the investigation, the Court took the extraordinary step of directing that its entire order from May 14 be treated as part of the FIR. It also announced that it would now monitor the investigation to ensure that the case is not quietly buried under bureaucratic evasions or political pressure. This order is not just a procedural correction—it is a firm statement that the judiciary will not tolerate the erosion of accountability when hate speech and communal slander are weaponised by those in public office.

Details of what transpired in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, along with the Supreme Court, are below.

May 15- Madhya Pradesh High Court slams state police for ‘Gross Subterfuge’ in FIR

I. The Hearing: Sharp rebuke to state over subversion of process

On May 15, 2025, the Madhya Pradesh High Court came down heavily on the state police for the manner in which it had complied with the Court’s earlier order to lodge an FIR against sitting BJP Minister Kunwar Vijay Shah for his offensive remarks against Colonel Sofiya Qureshi. A division bench comprising Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Anuradha Shukla made it unequivocally clear that the Court would not allow the investigation to be derailed or diluted.

According to the report of LiveLaw, the High Court expressed deep dissatisfaction with the contents of the FIR, criticising it for being drafted in a manner so skeletal and vague that it invited quashing. “I’m sure you’ve read it,” the bench remarked to the Advocate General. “It has been drafted in such a way that it can be quashed. Where are the ingredients? Who drafted this?” The bench questioned how an FIR could be considered valid when it lacked any specific mention of the minister’s actions or how those actions fulfilled the ingredients of the offences invoked.

While the Advocate General submitted that the state had complied with the Court’s May 14 direction and even handed over a copy of the FIR, the bench was not convinced. The Court pointed out that paragraph 12 of the FIR — which should have detailed the accused’s actions and how they constitute the alleged offences — was nothing more than a mechanical reproduction of the Court’s earlier order. Crucially, it failed to reflect the parts of that order that laid out the specific conduct of the accused and the legal basis for charging him under Sections 152, 196(1)(b), and 197(1)(c) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

The bench called this omission a deliberate design, a “gross subterfuge” meant to weaken the case and insulate the minister from future prosecution. “This FIR has been registered in such a manner…so that if it is challenged under erstwhile section 482 of CrPC (now Section 528 of the BNSS), it may be quashed,” the Court noted sharply, as per the report of LiveLaw,

Despite submissions by Advocate General Prashant Singh assuring the Court that the state had no intention to shield the minister and would comply with all directions, the Court made clear that intent alone could not cure procedural sabotage. It remarked that it would be forced to monitor the investigation, not to interfere with the agency’s independence, but to ensure that the probe was not tainted by extraneous influences or politically motivated pressures.

II. The Order: Blistering indictment and judicial safeguards

Later that evening, the High Court’s written order laid bare the extent of its disapproval. In no uncertain terms, the bench described the FIR as an exercise in deliberate obfuscation, aimed at frustrating the judicial process.

“This Court has examined paragraph-12 of the FIR, which must necessarily lay down the ingredients of the offence by connecting it to the act of the offender. The FIR is brief. Having gone through the FIR in its entirety, there is not a single mention of the actions of the suspect, which would satisfy the ingredients of the offences which have been registered against him,” the Court noted in the FIR.

Notably, Section 152 of the BNS, notably, criminalises any speech or act that incites secessionist sentiments or undermines national unity — an offence punishable with up to life imprisonment. Sections 196(1)(b) and 197(1)(c) further address attempts to incite communal disharmony and acts against national integration. These provisions relate to acts endangering India’s sovereignty and integrity, disturbing communal harmony, and undermining national integration — all serious charges triggered by Shah’s remarks describing Colonel Qureshi as a “sister of terrorists”.

However, the FIR, the Court noted, was drafted to look superficially compliant while omitting essential content that could withstand judicial scrutiny. In a scathing indictment, the bench wrote:

“This FIR has been registered in such a manner leaving sufficient space open so that if it is challenged under erstwhile section 482 of Cr.P.C (section 528 BNSS), the same may be quashed because it is deficient in material particulars of the actions which constitutes each of the specific offences. This is gross subterfuge on the part of the of the State. The FIR has been drawn in a manner so as to assist the suspect Mr. Vijay Shah to be able to have the FIR quashed on a later date.”

The Court declined, for now, to name those responsible for what it termed a “clumsy attempt” to dilute accountability, but made clear that it would examine this further in subsequent proceedings.

“At this juncture this Court desists from embarking on a journey to find out as to who was responsible in the chain of command of the State police for this clumsy attempt. This Court shall endeavour to find out the same in future proceedings.”

To safeguard the case from being derailed, the Court issued a unique direction:

“However, in order to ensure that said subterfuge is nipped in the bud, this Court directs that the entire order of 14.05.2025 shall be read as part of paragraph 12 of the FIR for all judicial, quasi-judicial and investigating process henceforth.”

This directive ensures that the contents of the Court’s earlier order — including its detailed reasoning on how Shah’s remarks constitute criminal acts — are deemed to be part of the FIR itself, immunising it from legal infirmities arising from the police’s omissions.

Lastly, recognising the sensitivity and seriousness of the matter, the Court announced that it would continue to monitor the investigation. While clarifying that this would not impinge on the police’s autonomy, the bench made it clear that judicial oversight was now essential to ensure a fair and unbiased probe.

“In view of the nature of the case and the manner in which the FIR has been registered, which does not inspire confidence of this Court, and the Court is of the opinion that if the case is not duly monitored, the police would not investigate fairly in the interest of justice in accordance with law. Under the circumstances, this Court feels compelled to ensure that it monitors the investigation without interfering in the independence of the investigating agency but only to the extent of monitoring that it acts fairly in accordance with law without being influenced by any extraneous pressures or directions.”

The matter is scheduled to be listed immediately after the vacation, ensuring continuity in judicial supervision.

Key findings of the Court through its order:

1. Failure to articulate offence

The Court unequivocally states that the FIR, while brief, omits the essential content required to constitute a valid FIR under law. Paragraph 12 of the FIR, which should describe the suspect’s actions in terms of legal ingredients, is merely a reproduction of the final operative part of the Court’s own order from May 14 2025.

2. Strategic deficiency and subterfuge

The Court goes beyond identifying technical gaps and alleges intentional subversion of judicial direction, and does not merely suggest incompetence; it attributes intent—asserting that the FIR was drawn up in a way designed to assist the accused in securing a quashing of the FIR at a later date.

3. Postponed attribution of responsibility

While noting that the drafting of the FIR amounted to a “clumsy attempt,” the Court refrains from immediately naming those responsible within the police hierarchy. However, it clearly reserves its right to do so in the future.

4. Judicial incorporation of prior order into FIR

In a decisive move to prevent the FIR from being rendered legally ineffective, the Court directs that its order dated May 14, 2025 be treated as part of the FIR. This step is unusual and noteworthy. Courts typically do not rewrite executive documents. By judicially supplementing the FIR with its own prior reasoning, the Court ensures that the FIR now contains the essential legal and factual ingredients to support the investigation and prosecution.

5. Judicial monitoring of investigation

The Court, expressing a clear lack of confidence in the police to act fairly without oversight, announces its intention to monitor the investigation. One should note that the same is not interference with investigative autonomy but a supervisory mechanism to preserve the integrity of the process. The Court’s language carefully respects the institutional independence of the police while simultaneously asserting the necessity of judicial vigilance.

The complete order may be read below.

May 15- Supreme Court declines interim relief to BJP Minister Vijay Shah

On May 15, the Supreme Court declined to grant interim relief to BJP Minister Kunwar Vijay Shah in connection with the FIR registered against him for his inflammatory remark referring to Colonel Sofiya Qureshi as a “sister of terrorists.” The FIR had been filed following a suo motu direction by the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

The matter came up through an urgent mentioning by Senior Advocate Vibha Makhija, representing Shah, who questioned the maintainability of the High Court’s suo motu order and urged the apex court to intervene. However, Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, heading the bench along with Justice AG Masih, refused to interfere at this stage. CJI Gavai made a pointed observation:

“A person holding such an office is expected to maintain a certain standard. Every sentence uttered by a minister carries responsibility.”

Makhija informed the bench that Shah had already issued an apology and claimed his remark had been widely misinterpreted and taken out of context by the media. She requested that no coercive action be taken against him until he is heard.

However, as per the report of LiveLaw, the Court was told that an FIR had already been registered. In response, the bench declined to pass any interim orders and directed Shah to approach the Madhya Pradesh High Court for appropriate relief, noting:

“Go and apply to the High Court. We will have it tomorrow.”

The Supreme Court thus refused to stay the proceedings or provide protection at this stage, keeping the door open for judicial review by the High Court. The matter is likely to be taken up again shortly.

May 14– MP HC orders FIR for hate-laden remarks against Col. Sofiya Qureshi

I. The Hearing: Unparalleled judicial censure against BJP Minister’s “disparaging” speech

On May 14, 2025, the Madhya Pradesh High Court took suo motu cognisance of a highly offensive remark made by BJP Minister Kunwar Vijay Shah. The Court acted swiftly and firmly, ordering the immediate registration of an FIR against the Minister under Sections 152, 196(1)(b), and 197(1)(c) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). The division bench, comprising Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Anuradha Shukla, unequivocally condemned the Minister’s statement as not only “disparaging” and “dangerous” but also constituting “language of the gutters.” It held that the remarks went far beyond personal insult and, in fact, were a grave denigration of the Indian Armed Forces as an institution.

The Court emphasised the importance of the armed forces as perhaps the country’s last bastion of integrity, discipline, sacrifice, selflessness, and courage—qualities which any patriotic citizen must hold dear. It noted with particular gravity that Colonel Sofiya Qureshi and Wing Commander Vyomika Singh had been the visible face of the armed forces’ briefing to the media and the nation during Operation Sindoor, the military operation against Pakistan. Therefore, the Minister’s remarks targeted not just the officer but the very honour and dignity of the armed forces. The Court described Shah’s comments as “unpardonable” innuendo aimed squarely at Colonel Qureshi.

On the legal front, the Court carefully examined the prima facie applicability of the offences alleged against Shah under the BNS, 2023. It held that Section 152, which criminalises acts that threaten the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India, was clearly attracted. The Court reasoned that by labelling Col. Qureshi—an officer who is Muslim—as the “sister of terrorists,” Shah implicitly encouraged separatist sentiments and suspicion against Muslims, thereby endangering national unity. The remark, the Court observed, imputes a separatist identity to anyone belonging to the Muslim faith, a dangerous insinuation with the potential to undermine the country’s sovereignty.

Further, the Court found that Section 196(1)(b), which punishes acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between religious, racial, linguistic, or regional groups, was triggered. It observed that deriding Col. Qureshi on communal grounds could disturb the delicate social fabric and public tranquillity. By invoking her religious identity in a disparaging way, Shah’s remarks risked fuelling communal tensions.

The Court also held that Section 197(1)(c) was prima facie attracted. This provision criminalises any assertion or plea that causes or is likely to cause enmity or ill-will between communities. The Court noted that the Minister’s comments had the clear “propensity” to stir disharmony and hatred between members of the Muslim community and others, regardless of the selfless service of individuals like Col. Qureshi.

In light of these serious prima facie findings, the Court directed the Director General of Police, Madhya Pradesh, to register an FIR against Minister Shah forthwith—no later than that very evening. It warned that failure to comply would lead to proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act against the DGP. The Advocate General was instructed to immediately transmit the Court’s order to the police authorities and ensure compliance.

The report of the LiveLaw provided that Justice Sreedharan, while addressing the Advocate General during the hearing, expressed impatience with any delay, stating with striking urgency:

“Register, register right now… I may not be alive tomorrow… I am giving you four hours… Let this order be stayed by the Supreme Court, or be complied with by tomorrow.”

When the Advocate General suggested that the Court’s findings were based mainly on media reports and that the statements might have been misunderstood or taken out of context, the Court decisively rejected this. It said it had itself reviewed the video of the remarks and would incorporate the YouTube links into the order, explicitly calling Shah’s speech “venom” and underscoring the seriousness with which it was treating the matter.

This unequivocal and stern order demonstrated the Court’s resolve to uphold the sanctity of the armed forces and the rule of law against hate speech, especially when it emanates from individuals holding public office. By acting suo motu and invoking relevant provisions of the BNS, the Court sent a clear signal that communal slander, particularly from politicians, will not be tolerated and must be met with swift judicial action.

The Court’s approach also underscored the constitutional principle that freedom of speech carries responsibility—especially for public figures whose words can inflame division and undermine national integration. This decision reinforced the judiciary’s role as a vigilant guardian against hate speech and communal disharmony, affirming that the armed forces deserve the highest respect and protection from defamatory and incendiary remarks.

II. The Order: A constitutional rebuke against hate and slur by a Minister

In its order dated May 14, 2025, the Madhya Pradesh High Court issued a powerful and unequivocal direction to register an FIR against BJP Minister Kunwar Vijay Shah for publicly calling Colonel Sofiya Qureshi a “sister of terrorists.” Triggered by media reports and publicly available video footage, the Court acted suo-motu, viewing the Minister’s speech as not only deeply offensive but also a prima facie criminal act under the BNS 2023.

At the heart of the order is the Court’s scathing assessment that Shah’s words were more than a personal insult—they amounted to an attack on the institutional honour of the Indian Armed Forces. The bench described the Minister’s language as “scurrilous,” “disparaging,” “dangerous,” and “language of the gutters.” The Court further held that the attack was not isolated but directly aimed at a senior military officer who was publicly representing the armed forces during a sensitive national operation, Operation Sindoor.

“The armed forces, perhaps the last institution existing in this country, reflecting integrity, industry, discipline, sacrifice, selflessness, character, honour and indomitable courage with which any citizen of this country who values the same can identify themselves with, has been targeted by Mr. Vijay Shah who has used the language of the gutters against Col. Sofia Quraishi.” (Para 2)

Drawing from news reports and video material, the Court found that Shah’s reference to Col. Quraishi as the “sister of terrorists” who killed 26 Indians at Pahalgam was not vague or general—it was a clear innuendo directed at her, as she was the only person who matched the description in the speech. The Court remarked that Shah had, in effect, suggested that the Prime Minister had “sent the sister of terrorists to sort them out,” a statement that it found both incendiary and deeply damaging to public confidence in the armed forces.

“At that public function, he has referred to Col. Sofia Quraishi as the sister of the terrorists who carried out the killings of 26 innocent Indians at Pahalgam. Further, the newspaper reports and a plethora of digital material available on the internet in which the speech of the minister is clear and unequivocal, where he has referred to the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Narendra Modi, for having sent the sister of the terrorists to sort them out. His comments are disparaging and dangerous, not just to the officer in question but to the armed forces itself.” (Para 3)

In its legal analysis, the Court invoked three provisions of the BNS and held that all three were prima facie attracted.

Section 152 BNS, which deals with acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, was the first invoked. The Court found that by insinuating that a Muslim Army officer was affiliated with terrorists, the Minister had encouraged feelings of separatist activity and undermined national unity. The Court emphasised that imputing separatist sentiment to Muslims serving in the armed forces is both unconstitutional and subversive:

“Prima facie, the statement of the minister that Col. Sofia Quraishi is the sister of the terrorist who carried out the attack at Pahalgam encourages feelings of separatist activities by imputing separatist feeling to anyone who is Muslim, which thereby endangers the sovereignty or unity and integrity of India.” (Para 6)

Section 196 (1)(b) BNS, which penalises acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different communities, was the second provision cited. The Court noted that the Minister’s remark could give rise to the perception that Muslims, regardless of their loyalty or contribution to the nation, remain forever suspect. This, the Court held, was likely to disturb public tranquillity and reinforce religious fault lines.

“Prima facie, this section would be applicable as Col. Sofia Quraishi is an adherent of the Muslim faith and deriding her by referring to her as the sister of terrorists may be prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religions groups as it has the propensity to fuel an impression that irrespective of the selfless duties of a person towards India, such a person could still be derided only because that person belongs to the Muslim faith. Therefore, prima facie, this Court is satisfied that the offence under Section 196(1)(b) is also committed.” (Para 8)

Section 197(1)(c) BNS, which criminalises assertions likely to cause disharmony between religious groups, was also found to be applicable. The Court stated that the Minister’s remarks had the potential to deepen religious division and provoke hostility between communities, especially by invoking a communal stereotype in a public and inflammatory setting.

“The statement made by Minister Vijay Shah prima facie has the propensity to cause disharmony and feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will between the members of the Muslim faith and other persons who do not belong to the same religion.” (Para 10)

On the strength of these findings, the Court directed the Director General of Police to register an FIR against Vijay Shah under Sections 152, 196(1)(b), and 197(1)(c) BNS forthwith, by the evening of May 14. It made clear that non-compliance would invite contempt proceedings.

“On the basis of what has been observed herein above this Court directs the Director General of Police of Madhya Pradesh to register forthwith an FIR against Minister Vijay Shah for offences under Sections 152, 196(1)(b) and 197(1)(c) of the B.N.S. The same must be done by today evening, failing which tomorrow, when the matter is listed, the Court may contemplate proceeding against the Director General of Police of the State for contempt of this Order.” (Para 11)

Further, the Court directed the Advocate General’s office to transmit the order immediately to the DGP and asked the Registrar (IT) to collect and place on record the video links of Shah’s speech for the next day’s proceedings.

Key findings of the Court through its order:

1. Use of suo-motu powers to uphold constitutional integrity: The Court acted on its own motion, recognising that the matter was too serious to wait for a formal complaint. This reinforces the judiciary’s role in addressing hate speech by those in public office.
2. Characterisation of the armed forces as a constitutional institution under attack: The Court positioned the armed forces as a symbol of national values, and it viewed any attempt to denigrate them—especially by communalising their members—as a grave constitutional breach.
3. Identification of communal intent and legal applicability of BNS provisions: The Court methodically applied new penal code provisions and found that Shah’s statement not only offended basic decency but, prima facie, satisfied the legal requirements for offences threatening national integrity and communal harmony.
4. Urgency and judicial accountability: The Court gave the State police a same-day deadline for FIR registration and made clear that non-compliance would be treated as contempt of court. This reflects a demand for immediate accountability from state institutions.
5. Condemnation of political hate speech: The order sends a strong signal that hateful, communal rhetoric by elected representatives—especially when directed at uniformed officers—is not protected political expression, but punishable criminal conduct.

The order stands as a significant constitutional moment: a court drawing the line where political speech turns into criminal propaganda, and affirming that even the highest offices must answer to the law.

The complete order may be read here.

Background

On May 14, 2025, the Madhya Pradesh High Court took up the matter on its own motion after coming across disturbing reports in multiple newspapers and digital platforms. News items published in Patrika, Dainik Bhaskar (Jabalpur edition), and Nai Duniya on the same date, along with video footage circulating online—including a YouTube link cited by the Court—revealed that a sitting minister in the Madhya Pradesh government, Vijay Shah, had made an offensive and communal remark during a public function held in Raikunda village, Ambedkar Nagar, Mhow.

The remark in question was aimed at Colonel Sofiya Qureshi, a senior officer in the Indian Army. Referring to her indirectly but unmistakably, Minister Shah called her the “sister of the terrorists” responsible for the killings in Pahalgam, in an apparent reference to her role as one of the Army’s spokespersons during Operation Sindoor. The Court noted that the language used was not only scurrilous and derogatory but also carried dangerous communal undertones. It held that the speech did not merely target an individual officer, but amounted to a broader attack on the armed forces—an institution that, the Court observed, still embodies values such as discipline, sacrifice, and integrity.

In view of the serious nature of the comment and the threat it posed to communal harmony and institutional dignity, the Court initiated proceedings without waiting for a formal complaint.

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Read: 60 Years Of Constitutional Rights Denied To 20 Millions Indian Dalit Christians | SabrangIndia

Can a Dalit not be a Christian or Muslim? Conversely, even after conversion out of caste-ridden Hinduism, is the discrimination suffered by caste be suffered by one who opts otherwise for Christianity or Islam?

Despite several attempts by the executive through Orders and Commissions to overturn once and for all, the discriminatory Presidential Order of 1950, Courts continue to affirm its limited understanding.

The recent, Akkala Rami Reddy judgement delivered by the AP high court spotlights this enduring debate on SC status for religious converts. The Andhra Pradesh High Court’s decision in Akkala Rami Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh has reignited a critical legal and social debate: Should Scheduled Caste (SC) status, with its attendant protections and affirmative action benefits, be denied to individuals solely based on their conversion to religions like Christianity or Islam, even if they continue to face caste-based discrimination? Overwhelming social scientific evidence and testimony led to the official admission in the Ranganath Mishra Commission Report (2007) that Christian and Muslim Dalits suffer the same forms of discrimination as their Hindu counterparts.

The judgment, which quashed SC/ST Act proceedings against the petitioners based on the complainant Pastor’s conversion to Christianity, underscores the judiciary’s current adherence to the 1950 Presidential Order.[1]

What is the 1950 Presidential Order?

The Presidential Orders regarding the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. These orders were issued by the President of India under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India, which define who would be Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes with respect to any State or Union Territory. More about the detailed process can be read here.

So, for a caste to be claiming the SC status, it has to be included the Constitution Order, 1950. The order states as follows in Paragraph 3:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph 2, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.”

This means, only people from the religions of Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs can be members of scheduled castes.

The Akkala Rami Reddy ruling: Conversion and ineligibility under SC/ST Act

In Akkala Rami Reddy, the AP High Court, on April 30, 2025, declared that the complainant, who had been working as a Pastor for approximately ten years, could not invoke the provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The Court reasoned that the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, explicitly states that no person professing a religion different from Hinduism (later amended to include Sikhism and Buddhism) shall be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste. The Court held that an individual converted to Christianity ceases to be a member of a Scheduled Caste and thus cannot claim the protections of the SC/ST Act. “The 2nd respondent has ceased to be a Member of the Scheduled Caste Community, the day he had converted into Christianity,” the judgment firmly stated.

The 1950 Order: A discriminatory relic?

At the heart of this recurring issue is Paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. Initially restricting SC status to Hindus, it was later amended to include Sikhs (1956) and Buddhists (1990).

The judgement presumes that caste discrimination vanishes upon conversion to egalitarian religions like Christianity or Islam. This exclusion establishes religion as the primary determinant for SC status, overlooking the socio-economic realities of continued caste-based oppression.

Judgement not a deviation but a rule

While the social realities of India would make one see the caste discrimination faced by people belonging to religions other than Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist—the courts have consistently taken a position that adheres to the literal law i.e., the Constitutional Order, 1950.

In one of the earlier cases, the Madras High Court in G. Michael v. S. Venkateswaran (1951), noted that while Christianity and Islam do not recognize caste systems, there were exceptions, particularly in South India, where members of lower castes converted to Christianity but were still considered members of their original caste by other caste members. However, the general rule established was that conversion operates as an expulsion from the caste, meaning a convert ceases to have any caste.[2]

Building on this, in S. Rajagopal v. C. M. Armugam (1968), the Supreme Court held that a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste (Adi Dravida Hindu in this case) who converted to Christianity lost their caste membership.[3] The Court found that the Christian religion does not recognize caste classifications, treating all Christians as equals. While the appellant claimed to have later reconverted to Hinduism and was professing Hindu religion by the time of the election, the Court stated that mere reconversion is not sufficient to automatically resume membership of the previous caste. It emphasized that acceptance by the caste in general as a member after reconversion is required, based on the principle that the caste itself is the supreme judge in matters affecting its composition.[4] Since the appellant had not provided evidence of such acceptance, his claim to SC status was rejected.

The principles from S. Rajagopal were considered in Principal, Guntur Medical College, v. Y. Mohan Rao (1976). This case involved a person born to parents who had converted from Hindu SC to Christianity, who later reconverted to Hinduism. The Supreme Court clarified that the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, required a person to profess Hindu or Sikh religion at the relevant time to be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste, not necessarily to be born into it. Regarding reconversion, the Court reasoned that a person born of Christian converts could become a member of the caste their parents belonged to before conversion if the members of that caste accept him as a member and admit him within the fold.[5] The caste’s acceptance is the key requirement.

Further developing the legal position, Kailash Sonkar v. Smt. Maya Devi (1983) extensively examined the effect of conversion and reconversion on caste status. The Supreme Court stated that conversion to Christianity or Islam involves loss of caste unless the new religion is liberal enough to permit the convertee to retain their caste or family laws. However, where the new religion does not accept the caste system, the loss of caste is complete. Introducing the doctrine of eclipse, the Court opined that when a person converts, the original caste remains under eclipse and automatically revives upon reconversion to the original religion during their lifetime. While acknowledging that acceptance by the community of the old order was previously considered a norm, the Court noted the difficulty and potential for exploitation in strictly insisting on this second condition in modern society.[6] It suggested that revival might occur by applying the doctrine of eclipse, though added a rider that this might be difficult if the conversion occurred several generations ago.[7]

Despite these verdicts, this one held to the contrary.
In 1984, The Supreme Court of India in the case of S. Anbalagan Vs. Devarajan AIR 1984 SC 411, said that “the practice of caste however irrational it may appear to our reason and however are repugnant it may appear to our moral and social sense, it so deep rooted in the India people that its mark does not seem to disappear on conversion to a different religion.”

However, more recently, in C. Selvarani v The Special Secretary Cum District (2024), the appellant, born Christian, claimed SC status based on her father’s background and her profession of Hinduism. The court noted evidence of her baptism shortly after birth, concluding she was a born Christian. It held that a person born Christian cannot be associated with any caste.[8] Further, upon conversion to Christianity, one loses her caste. While the appellant claimed to profess Hinduism, the court found the claim of reconversion disputed and noted the lack of positive acts or public declaration to evince such conversion, concluding she did not profess Hinduism. Therefore, in terms of the S.C. Order, 1964(The order for the Union Territory of Puducherry), she was not entitled to the Scheduled Caste community certificate as she did not profess Hinduism, Sikhism, or Buddhism.

In summary, the courts have consistently held that professing Hinduism, Sikhism, or Buddhism is a mandatory condition for being deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste under the relevant Presidential Orders. Conversion to other religions like Christianity or Islam generally results in the loss of the original caste status. While reconversion to Hinduism may allow for the regaining of caste membership, this often depends on acceptance by the caste community, although the doctrine of eclipse discussed in Kailash Sonkar suggests a potential revival upon genuine reconversion, noting the practical difficulties of insisting on community acceptance. Being born to Christian parents and subsequently claiming SC status after converting to Hinduism also hinges upon acceptance by the original caste group. Furthermore, proof of genuinely professing the specified religion and undertaking positive acts of conversion/reconversion can be crucial.

What runs contrary to this however is several Orders by the GOI’s Social Welfare Ministry and also Commissions appointed by successive governments at the Centre. Details of these may be read here.

The Issue with this judicial approach

This judicial stance, rooted in the interpretation and application of the 1950 Presidential Order, operates under the premise that caste, as a phenomenon warranting the specific provisions of Scheduled Caste status, is intrinsically linked to Hinduism (and later, Sikhism and Buddhism) and is shed upon conversion to faiths perceived as egalitarian, such as Christianity and Islam. However, a comprehensive understanding necessitates looking beyond this legally constructed silo to the complex sociological realities of caste and discrimination as they manifest across religious communities in India.

Contrary to the assumption embedded within the 1950 Order and upheld by the courts, historical and sociological research demonstrates that caste, or caste-like social stratification and discrimination, persists among Indian Christians and Muslims. While the nature and religious sanction of caste may differ significantly from its scripturally embedded form in Hinduism, its practical social manifestations – particularly the division between Dalits (formerly known as untouchables) and non-Dalits, and practices like endogamy – are not confined by religious boundaries.

As B.R. Ambedkar incisively argued, while caste among Mohammedans and Sikhs might lack the conscious, religiously consecrated ties that bind Hindu castes, and breach of caste rules might not lead to formal excommunication in the same way, caste nonetheless exists as a social practice or “survival” within these communities. Its significance might not be as profound as in Hinduism where it is a sacred institution compelling segregation, yet its presence cannot be dismissed. The crucial distinction Ambedkar makes is the absence of religious dogma compelling isolation in non-Hindu faiths, unlike in Hinduism.^[9] However, the implication that caste is non-existent or irrelevant among converts is not what Ambedkar suggests; rather, its role and basis are different.

Expanding on this, scholar Rupa Viswanath highlights that conversion has historically not guaranteed freedom from caste identity or discrimination for Dalits. The fundamental distinction between Dalits and non-Dalits, rooted in historical hierarchies and social power dynamics, transcends religious identity in India.^[10] While acknowledging Hinduism’s unique theological rationale for caste, Viswanath argues that focusing solely on this theological difference is misplaced when analysing the persistence of caste structures. The practice of endogamy, a cornerstone of caste, is observed across religious lines. Furthermore, the social division and discrimination faced by Dalits often continue regardless of their conversion, perpetuated by both co-religionists (who may retain caste consciousness or practices) and members of other communities.

Historically, within Indian Christianity, debates among missionaries and Indian converts themselves reveal the complex relationship with caste. While some Protestant missionaries, according to Vishwanath, advocated for the immediate abandonment of caste upon conversion due to its perceived link to Hinduism, others, including many high-caste Indian Christians, viewed caste as a purely civil or social distinction separable from religion, thus justifying its continuation within the Christian fold. This perspective often framed caste as a historical division of labour or social rank, seen as natural or even moral to observe, stripped of its overt “heathenish” religious justification from Hinduism.[11] Catholic missions, in some instances, were even more accommodating of existing caste structures, as seen in the approach of figures like Robert de Nobili, according to Ashok Mocherla.[12] These historical dynamics illustrate that conversion to Christianity, in practice, did not necessarily translate into the erasure of caste identity or cessation of caste-based social stratification and discrimination.

Similarly, while Islam conceptually emphasizes equality among believers, the social history of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent includes the development of hierarchical structures akin to caste, often reflected in divisions like Ashraf (those claiming foreign ancestry), Ajlaf (indigenous converts from privileged Hindu castes), and Arzal (converts from marginalised Hindu castes, including Dalits), with social interaction and marriage patterns often following these lines.[13]

Therefore, the legal position, as reinforced by judgments like Akkala Rami Reddy, rests on an incomplete and perhaps Orientalist understanding that segregates caste primarily as a “Hindu problem” that is resolved through conversion to religions deemed inherently egalitarian. This perspective fails to acknowledge the socio-economic realities and persistent discrimination faced by Dalit converts, whose historical location within the caste hierarchy continues to shape their experiences regardless of their faith. A more comprehensive understanding would recognize caste not merely as a theological construct limited to Hinduism, but as a deeply entrenched social structure of hierarchy, discrimination, and exclusion that has adapted and manifested within various religious communities in India. Consequently, linking Scheduled Caste status eligibility solely to the profession of specific religions, while ignoring the lived reality of continued caste-based disadvantage among converts to others, appears fundamentally inconsistent with the affirmative action principles intended to address historical injustices rooted in caste. It creates a paradox where individuals continue to suffer caste discrimination but are legally denied the means to address it based on their religious identity, highlighting the critical need for a religion-neutral approach to defining and addressing the Scheduled Castes.

One of the major unresolved issues lies in the Ghazi Saaduddin v. State of Maharashtra case, stalled since 2004. It challenges the constitutional legitimacy of the 1950 Presidential Order. In April 2024, the Supreme Court postponed hearing the matter, pointing to an ongoing inquiry by a commission headed by former Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan. The commission’s findings are now due in October 2025.

The core question remains whether the Indian legal system will evolve to recognize the lived reality of caste discrimination beyond specified religious confines, thereby ensuring that the constitutional promise of equality and social justice truly extends to all its Dalit citizens.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation).

[1] [1] CRIMINAL PETITION No.7114 OF 2022

[2] Para 17, AIR 1952 MADRAS 474

[3] Page 12, AIR 1969 SUPREME COURT 101

[4] Ibid page 14.

[5] Page 6, AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 1904

[6] Page 14, AIR 1984 SUPREME COURT 600

[7] Ibid

[8] Para 12, 2024 INSC 920

^[9] Dr.Bhimrao Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste (1936), ch.19, Para 7.

^[10] Rupa Vishwanath, The Pariah Problem: Caste, Religion, and the Social in Modern India (2014), p.313, Columbia University Press.

[11] Ibid p.75

[12] Ashok Kumar Mocherla, Dalit Christians in South India (2021), pp. 107-108

[13] Sobin George & Shrinidhi Adiga, ‘Caste’ Among Muslims: Ethnographic Account from a Karnataka Village(2017), p.1

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Brief facts

The case involved a series of incidents occurring on November 5 and 6, 2014. These included an initial altercation, followed by a criminal trespass, where a woman (the prosecutrix/primary victim) and her male companion (second victim) were assaulted, and a friend (third victim) who came to help was also attacked. During the trespass, the primary victim and the third victim were forced to strip and were videographed in compromising positions. Subsequently, the primary victim and the second victim were abducted. The second victim was taken to railway tracks, assaulted, and left for dead but managed to escape. The primary victim was then taken to multiple locations where she was subjected to gang rape by three individuals (two appellants and a juvenile tried separately).

Charges and initial convictions

Multiple accused faced charges including criminal trespass (Sections 450, 452 IPC), grievous hurt (Sections 324, 326 IPC), sexual harassment (Sections 354A, 354B IPC), voyeurism (Section 354C IPC), violation of privacy under the IT Act (Section 66E), abduction (Section 366 IPC), attempt to murder (Section 307 IPC), robbery (Section 394 IPC), gang rape (Section 376D IPC), and harbouring offenders (Section 212 IPC). The trial court convicted several accused on various counts, handing down severe sentences including life imprisonment. The accused appealed to the High Court.

High Court’s decision on appeals

The High Court upheld convictions for several appellants for offences including criminal trespass, assault (altered from grievous hurt to simple hurt by dangerous weapon in some instances), sexual harassment, voyeurism, IT Act violations, abduction, attempt to murder, robbery, and significantly, gang rape against two appellants.

One appellant was acquitted of all charges due to insufficient evidence placing him at the scene of the crime inside the room.

Sentences were modified for several convicts: life imprisonment for attempt to murder was reduced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment for two appellants; life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life for gang rape was reduced to 20 years rigorous imprisonment for the same two appellants. The sentence for harbouring an offender was reduced to the period already undergone for one appellant.

The Court on consent and sexual history

The High Court addressed the issue of consent, particularly in response to defence arguments that attempted to question the primary victim’s character and suggest that her alleged past relationships or sexual history, including a prior acquaintance with one of the accused, might imply consent or make her testimony unreliable. The Court emphatically rejected these notions, reinforcing the principle of “No means No.”

The judgment stated

• “NO means NO”: A woman who says ‘NO’ means ‘NO’. There exists no further ambiguity and there could be no presumption of consent based on a woman’s so called ‘immoral activities’. (Para 85)
• Irrelevance of past relationships or character: The Court made it clear that even though there may have been a relationship between the prosecutrix and [one of the accused] in the past but if the prosecutrix was not willing to have sexual intercourse with [the accused], his colleague… and the juvenile in conflict with law, any act without her consent would be an offence within the meaning of Section 375 of the IPC. (Para 85)
• Consent is instance-specific: The court stated that a woman who consents to sexual activities with a man at a particular instance does not ipso facto give consent to sexual activity with the same man at all other instances. (Para 85)
• Character and number of sexual partners are not determinative of consent: The court stated that a woman’s character or morals are not related to the number of sexual partners she has had in wake of Section 53A of the Indian Evidence Act. This section of the Evidence Act restricts evidence of the victim’s character or previous sexual experience in prosecutions for sexual offences. (Para 85)
• Primacy of consent over perceived morality: The Court addressed attempts to question the primary victim’s morals due to her being estranged from her husband and living with another man, or suggestions of a prior intimate relationship with one of the accused. It emphasized that even if such circumstances were true, “a person cannot force a woman to have intercourse with him without her consent.” (Para 84)
• Rape as aggression, domination: The Court described rape not merely as a sexual crime but as “a crime involving aggression which leads to the domination of the prosecutrix. It is a violation of her right of privacy. Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in society, as it is an assault on the body, mind and privacy of the victim, the court added. (Para 85)

In essence, the High Court’s judgment strongly affirmed that consent must be explicit and contemporaneous for each sexual act. A victim’s past sexual history, choices in relationships, or perceived character are not relevant to determining whether consent was given for a specific instance of sexual intercourse. The Court underscored that the absence of consent makes any sexual intercourse an offence, irrespective of the victim’s background or previous associations with the accused.

The judgement reinforced the evolving jurisprudence that centres the victim’s agency, making it unequivocally clear that consent must be specific, informed, and ongoing—regardless of any prior associations or societal judgments about the victim’s morality. In doing so, the Court not only delivered justice in a deeply disturbing case but also contributed meaningfully to the broader fight against rape culture and victim-blaming narratives in India’s criminal justice system.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

Related:

When marriage is tyranny: Justice Shakdher’s judgment reads down the marital rape exception as a constitutional imperative

How Justice C Harishankar, in upholding the exception to marital rape, delivered a reasoning fir for the dark ages

A Licence to Violate: Chhattisgarh HC’s ruling on marital rape exposes a legal travesty’

The post Rape is aggression, domination, consent must be instant specific, not dictated by morality tests: Bombay High Court appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The poem did not name any religion or community but lamented injustice, questioned state power, and called for non-violence as a means of resistance. The complaint alleged it incited religious hatred and disturbed social harmony.

What was at stake was far greater than one poem or one politician—it was the scope of criminal law in regulating political speech, the meaning of “incitement”, and whether popular offence can override constitutional values.

Background: A poem, a platform, and a prosecution

On December 29, 2024, during a mass wedding programme in Jamnagar, Gujarat, organised by a local councillor, Imran Pratapgarhi recited a poem that was later posted as a video on his verified social media account on the platform ‘X’. The poem included verses such as:

“ए ख़ून के प्यासों बात सुनो
गर हक़ की लड़ाई ज़ुल्म सही
हम ज़ुल्म से इश्क़ निभा देंगे…”

Translated broadly:

“O you blood-thirsty, listen!
If the fight for rights brings injustice,
We will meet that injustice with love…”

The FIR accused the appellant of promoting enmity between communities and disturbing national harmony. Shockingly, he was charged under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57 and 3(5) of the BNS—provisions dealing with incitement, hate speech, religious disharmony, and even abetment of violence. Through the FIR, it was alleged that the spoken words of the poem incite people of one community against another, and it hurts a community’s religious and social sentiments. It was further alleged that the song had lyrics that incited people of other communities to fight for the community’s rights. It was claimed that the video posted by the appellant created enmity between two communities at the national level and hatred towards each other. It was further alleged that it had a detrimental effect on national unity.

Key observations of the Court

1. Constitutional Voice vs. State Machinery: A foundational tension

At the heart of this judgment lies an old constitutional paradox: the State is both the guarantor and violator of fundamental rights. Justice Oka, with characteristic candour, begins by confronting this tension head-on:

“This case shows that even after 75 years of the existence of our Constitution, the law enforcement machinery of the State is either ignorant about this important fundamental right or does not care for this fundamental right.” (Para 1)

In this opening salvo of the judgment, Justice Abhay S. Oka sets the tone for a judgment that is as much an indictment of institutional apathy as it is a reaffirmation of constitutional values. The observation that even after 75 years of constitutional existence, law enforcement remains either ignorant of or indifferent to the fundamental right to freedom of expression, reveals a profound structural dysfunction. This remark is not made in passing—it is a judicial rebuke aimed squarely at a State apparatus that defaults to coercion over constitutional engagement. By framing the issue as one of institutional disrepair rather than individual excess, the Court shifts the spotlight from the accused citizen to the accuser state, raising critical questions about how routinely—and with what legal illiteracy—criminal law is weaponised to suppress dissent.

What emerges from this framing is the Court’s role not as a mere adjudicator of facts, but as a constitutional conscience-keeper. Rather than balancing “free speech” against “law and order,” the judgment asserts that the State’s repeated resort to criminal prosecution for expressive acts is itself an affront to the constitutional order. This is not just about a misreading of a poem—it is about the State’s deep discomfort with metaphor, criticism, and resistance. The Court’s insistence that the rule of law includes a duty to respect rights, not merely regulate them, transforms the case into a referendum on how faithfully the State embodies the very freedoms it claims to guarantee. In doing so, the Court subtly but powerfully reclaims constitutional morality as an active, living principle—not a hollow preamble.

2. A Theory of Free Speech: From libertarian tolerance to affirmative protection

This judgment doesn’t merely shield speech—it underlines its necessity. Justice Oka, who had authored the judgment on the behalf of the Bench, frames Article 19(1) (a) as not merely a right but as a structural precondition for human dignity and democratic engagement, thereby locating it within the broader penumbra of Article 21:

“Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups of individuals is an integral part of a healthy, civilised society. Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected.” (Para 38)

This convergence of Articles 19 and 21 reflects a distinctly substantive conception of liberty, moving beyond formal non-interference toward affirmative obligation. The State (including the police and judiciary) is thus required not just to refrain from suppressing speech but to actively ensure its flourishing.

“The reasonable restrictions provided for in Article 19(2) must remain reasonable and not fanciful and oppressive. Article 19(2) cannot be allowed to overshadow the substantive rights under Article 19(1), including the right to freedom of speech and expression.” (Para 29)

3.  The law’s elasticity: From ambiguity to abuse

The charges levelled against Pratapgarhi under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, and 57 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita represent an alarming instance of legal overbreadth being used as a political weapon. The BNS, like its predecessor IPC, contains clauses so capaciously worded (e.g., “feelings of enmity”, “disharmony”, “outraging religious beliefs”) that they leave room for subjective interpretation and state-led abuse.

Justice Oka (and J Bhuyan) cut through this ambiguity:

“By no stretch of imagination does it promote enmity… The poem refers to injustice and offers non-violence as a response. It cannot be seen as a cause of communal disharmony.” (Para 10)

This is a clear attempt to re-inscribe constitutional interpretation over statutory vagueness, requiring any criminal allegation under these sections to pass a high threshold of intent, clarity, and demonstrable harm.

4. From Lalita Kumari to BNSS: Rethinking FIR registration

The Court’s discussion on Section 173(3) of the BNSS is an important departure from earlier CrPC jurisprudence under Lalita Kumari.

Where Lalita Kumari limited the police’s discretion, the BNSS introduces a structured preliminary inquiry model for offences punishable by 3–7 years—like many speech-related provisions.

The Supreme Court insists that in all speech-related cases where this discretion is available, it must be exercised:

“If an option under sub-Section (3) is not exercised by the police officer in such a case, he may end up registering an FIR against a person who has exercised his fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a) even though clause (2) of Article 19 is not attracted. If, in such cases, the option under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is not exercised, it will defeat the very object of incorporating sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS and will also defeat the obligation of the police under Article 51-A (a).” (Para 29)

This means the police must now interpret the text of the speech itself, not just the complaint—an approach that, while normatively sound, places interpretive responsibility on officers often untrained in the subtleties of metaphor, political critique, or artistic licence.

5. Institutional analysis: The High Court’s abdication and the Supreme Court’s role as rights sentinel

The Gujarat High Court, by deferring to the early stage of the investigation, abdicated its constitutional responsibility to scrutinise rights violations at the threshold.

The Supreme Court rebuked this stance:

      “We fail to understand how the High Court concluded that the message was posted in a manner that would certainly disturb social harmony. Thereafter, the High Court gave a reason that the investigation was at a nascent stage. There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS. When the High Court, in the given case, finds that no offence was made out on the face of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere even though the investigation is at the nascent stage.” (Para 37)

This reaffirms that judicial intervention in the early stages of political or speech-related prosecutions is not just permissible but necessary. The longer the case proceeds, the more the process itself becomes punishment. This view counters a dangerous trend: judicial evasion in politically sensitive matters, often under the guise of deference to procedure. Here, the Court restores its duty as a constitutional firewall, refusing to be paralysed by formalism.

6. The Reasonable Reader standard: Sedition, hate Speech, and judicial empathy

A key analytical move in the judgment is the revival of the “reasonable, strong-minded” observer standard from Bhagwati Charan Shukla:

“When an offence punishable under Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strongminded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds. The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.” (Para 33)

This interpretive lens displaces subjective offence with an objective, resilient baseline, thereby protecting robust discourse. It delegitimises state action based solely on hurt sentiments or perceived disrespect to power. This is especially important in India’s contemporary climate, where claims of communal hurt are often wielded as instruments of political repression.

7. Literature as democratic praxis: The place of poetry in the Constitutional Order

In recognising the poem’s form and context, the Court refrains from sterilising language into literalism. Justice Oka honours the metaphorical richness of poetic expression and its political function:

“…the poem does not encourage violence. On the contrary, it encourages people to desist from resorting to violence and to face injustice with love. It states that if our fight with injustice results into the death of our near and dear ones, we would be happy to bury their bodies.” (Para 10)

Poetry here is not ornamental—it is political speech in its most potent, imaginative form. The Court recognises that to penalise such speech is to criminalise dissent itself. This judgment contributes to an emerging jurisprudence where art is recognised as both speech and constitutional engagement, not as a diluted cousin of prose but as its fiercest challenger.

8. Toward a doctrine of “Constitutional offence”

Perhaps the most striking analytical thread is the Court’s suggestion that some state actions themselves verge on a constitutional offence:

      “Even while dealing with the performance of an obligation under sub-Section (1) of Section 173, where the commission of the offence is based on spoken or written words, the police officer concerned will have to keep in mind the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) read with an exception carved out under clause (2) of Article 19. The reason is that he is under an obligation to abide by the Constitution and to respect the ideals under the Constitution. The Constitution is more than 75 years old. By this time, the police officers ought to have been sensitized about their duty of abiding by the Constitution and respecting the ideals of the Constitution.” (Para 30)

Here, Justice Oka (and Justice Bhuyan) aren’t merely interpreting law—they are charging the State with constitutional delinquency. In doing so, they lay the groundwork for a potential doctrine where misuse of criminal process to silence dissent could itself be a rights violation subject to public law remedy.

This is not explicitly framed in the language of compensation or tort—but it hints at a growing judicial recognition that abuse of power is not neutral—it is a rights violation in itself.

Legal analysis of offences under BNS: A systematic dismantling

In the judgment, the Supreme Court, has also meticulously analysed the ingredients of each alleged offence and found all of them legally untenable.

1. Section 196 (Promoting enmity between groups)

      “The poem does not refer to any religion, caste or language. It does not refer to persons belonging to any religion. By no stretch of imagination, does it promote enmity between different groups. We fail to understand how the statements therein are detrimental to national unity and how the statements will affect national unity. On its plain reading, the poem does not purport to affect anyone’s religious feelings.” (Para 12)

Based on precedent (Manzar Sayeed Khan, Patricia Mukhim, Javed Ahmad Hajam), the Court reaffirmed that criminalising speech requires a showing of deliberate intent (mens rea). Without it, the mere content of speech, however provocative to some, is not criminal.

      “Mens rea will have to be read into Section 196 of the BNS… it is impossible to attribute any mens rea to the appellant.” (Para 34)

2. Section 197 (Prejudicial to national integration)

Therefore, as the Supreme Court, read both facts and the law, the poem by Imran Pratapgarhi did not attract the offence under Section 197 as it:

• Did not cast doubt on the loyalty of any group.
• Did not assert the denial of citizenship rights.
• Did not jeopardise national unity.

      “…the poem does not make or publish any imputation and is not concerned with any religious, racial, language, regional group, caste, or community. It does not suggest that any class of persons have been denied rights as citizens because they are members of a religious, racial, language, regional group, caste, or community. It does not make or publish any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal likely to cause disharmony or feeling of enmity or hatred or ill will. The poem does not publish or make any false or misleading information.” (Para 16)

3. Section 299 & Section 302 (Religious insult or wounding religious sentiment)

The Court termed these charges “ridiculous”:

      “To say the least, it is ridiculous to say that the act of the appellant is intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. The poem only tells the rulers what the reaction will be if the fight for rights is met with injustice.” (Para 17)

4. Section 57 (Abetment by public)

      “We fail to understand, even if it is assumed that the appellant has committed some offence, how he has abetted the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of persons exceeding ten.” (Para 19)

The Supreme Court’s systematic dismantling of the charges against Imran Pratapgarhi reflects a jurisprudence grounded in constitutional fidelity and statutory precision. In addressing Section 196 of the BNS—concerning promotion of enmity between groups—the Court reiterates a long-standing doctrinal principle: that the mere capacity of speech to provoke cannot substitute for a demonstrable, deliberate intent to incite enmity. Drawing from precedents like Manzar Sayeed Khan, Patricia Mukhim, and Javed Ahmad Hajam, the Court makes it clear that mens rea—a deliberate, malicious state of mind—is essential for liability. The poem in question, devoid of any reference to religion, caste, or community, could not be interpreted as promoting group enmity, and to criminalise it would be a distortion of both the statute and the Constitution. The Court’s reading imposes a constitutional filter on the BNS provision, ensuring it cannot be misused to punish subjective offence or perceived disrespect.

This logic extends seamlessly to the rejection of charges under Sections 197, 299, 302, and 57. Under Section 197, which deals with acts prejudicial to national integration, the Court’s reasoning is particularly illuminating. Justice Oka dissects the elements of the offence and finds none fulfilled: the poem neither impugns any group’s loyalty nor suggests the denial of citizenship rights, nor does it propagate disinformation. Similarly, the invocation of Section 299 and 302 for religious insult is dismissed as “ridiculous,” with the Court recognising that the poem critiques state injustice, not religious belief. Most striking is the Court’s incredulity at the Section 57 charge—abetment by the public—highlighting not only the absence of any instigated act but also the absurdity of imagining that poetic expression could be interpreted as a generalised call to criminal conduct. This cluster of analyses reveals not only the hollowness of the FIR but also the deeper pathology of criminal law’s misuse: charges laid without regard for statutory thresholds, constitutional limits, or evidentiary plausibility. Justice Oka and Justice Bhuyan’s reasoning is a potent reminder that law, especially criminal law, cannot be driven by sentiment, conjecture, or political expediency—it must be anchored in demonstrable harm, clear intent, and legal fidelity.

The Court as guardian of the Republic’s imagination

Imran Pratapgarhi judgement is not merely about poetry—it is about power, protest, and the place of dissent in India’s constitutional framework. This judgment revitalises the meaning of free speech in an age where criminal law is increasingly wielded to silence opposition. It teaches us that:

• Law is not merely a set of punishments but a moral language.
• Courts must defend expression, even if the State finds it discomforting.
• Poetry, critique, and satire are not seditious—they are the scaffolding of a free republic.

In this moment, the Supreme Court does not merely defend a poem—it defends the possibility of dissent itself. And that makes it one of the most important judgments on freedom of speech in recent Indian history.

To borrow the Court’s own words:

      “Courts, particularly the constitutional Courts, must be at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. It is the bounden duty of the Courts to ensure that the Constitution and the ideals of the Constitution are not trampled upon.” (Para 39)

Conclusion: A Constitutional anthem for the right to dissent

The Imran Pratapgarhi judgment stands as a powerful reaffirmation that the Constitution of India is not a brittle document to be bruised by sentiment, nor a tool to be twisted by the might of the State. It is, instead, a living charter that guarantees not only the right to speak, but the right to disturb, to provoke, and to dissent—particularly through art, poetry, and political expression. Justice Oka’s reasoning does not merely rescue one man from a legally untenable prosecution; it reclaims the constitutional promise that the State cannot demand silence in exchange for citizenship.

By scrupulously dismantling every charge brought under the BNS and holding law enforcement accountable to constitutional ideals, the judgment delivers a rare, lucid defence of free speech in an era when such freedoms are frequently under siege. It goes beyond the judicial role of error correction and enters the moral terrain of democratic defence. This case is not just precedent—it is a call to conscience for the police, for the lower judiciary, and for civil society. In drawing a firm constitutional line between law and power, it sends an unequivocal message: poetic dissent is not criminal, and the Constitution does not flinch before uncomfortable truths.

Ultimately, this is not merely a judgment about the legality of a poem—it is a resounding assertion of the Republic’s constitutional soul. It reminds us that the true test of democracy is not how the State treats speech that flatters, but how it responds to speech that resists. On that test, the Supreme Court has spoken with uncommon clarity and courage.

The complete judgment may be read below.

Related:

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The post A Republic That Listens: The Supreme Court’s poetic defence of dissent through Imran Pratapgarhi judgment appeared first on SabrangIndia.