Additional City Civil And Session Judge Santhosh Gajanan Bhat had on April 3, framed charges against Revanna under Sections 376(2)(k) (rape by a person in a position of dominance), 376(2)(n) (repeated rape), 354(A) (sexual harassment), 354(B) (assault or use of force with intent to disrobe), 354(C) (voyeurism), 506 (criminal intimidation), and 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) and Section 66(e) of the Information Technology Act. 

The Supreme Court of India, had, in November 2024 dismissed the bail plea of ex-MP Prajwal Revanna booked for rape, sexual assault. In August, a Special Investigation Team of Karnataka which is probing four cases of sexual assault and harassment against Revanna submitted a 2,144-page charge sheet. A bench of Justices Bela M Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma rejected the plea and observed that Revanna is a very influential person. Appearing for Revanna, senior advocate Mukul Rohatgi said that a charge sheet has been filed in the case and section 376 of the IPC was not there in the initial complaint.

The special court had, on April 3 had framed charges against Prajwal Revanna for sexually assaulting the farm labourer who worked for his family. The 1,625-page-long charge sheet, filed on September 14, 2024, said that the woman was sexually assaulted thrice, two times at the family’s farmhouse and once at their residence in Basavanagudi, Bengaluru.

As per prosecution, the victim worked as a maid at a farmhouse owned by the Revanna family. It is claimed that from 2021, during the COVID-19 lockdown, Revanna repeatedly raped her and filmed the assaults in different locations. Further, it is alleged that Revanna used the videos to intimidate and silence her, preventing her from complaining.

The SIT formed in this case is also investigating three cases registered against Prajwal and he is presently in judicial custody. The SIT had arrested Prajwal at the Bengaluru Airport on his arrival from Germany on May 30 last year. He was arrested in Crime No.107/2024, registered with the Holenarasipura Town Police Station.

Senior advocates Ashok Nayak and BN Jagadeesha were special public prosecutors in the case. 

The complainant, the 47-year-old farm labourer, Mridula*, was working at the family farmhouse in Gannikada and also accompanied the family during their trips to Bengaluru. She had accused Prajwal of raping her when he had called her inside the room on the pretext of bringing him water at the farmhouse. He was accused of raping her a second time when she had accompanied the family to their house in Basavangudi, Bengaluru.

According to the chargesheet, the assault took place in 2021 at the Gannikada farmhouse. “Mridula was cleaning a room on the first floor when Prajwal came and asked if the room was cleaned. He then asked her to fetch some water. Mridula came back with a jug (chombu) of water when Prajwal suddenly pulled her inside his room. He then locked the door. Mridula asked him to open the door, “Baagilu tegi anna, bhaya aagutte (Open the door anna, I’m scared),” the chargesheet said. Prajwal responded with “Enu agalla” (Nothing will happen) to her cries and then raped her. The chargesheet said that he recorded the assault on his phone.

A case of kidnapping has also been filed against Prajwal’s parents, HD Revanna and Bhavani, and Prajwal’s relative, Satish Babanna, as Mridula had complained that she was taken to the farm on April 29, 2024, and kept for a few days. This coincided with the time that the videos had started circulating. On May 2, Mridula’s son filed a complaint of kidnapping against Prajwal after he came to know of the videos. At the time, Mridula was forced to record a video saying she was alright and had not been kidnapped. A couple of days later, she managed to escape from the farm where she was being held.

Prajwal has been in jail since June 2024, after complaints of sexual assault and having recorded the encounters on video emerged. 

The complaints started after thousands of video clips of these alleged encounters started circulating during the general elections held last year, when Prajwal, the incumbent MP, was contesting from the Hassan Lok Sabha constituency. A Special Investigation Team was formed to look into all the allegations, and four women came forward with complaints against him. 

Other cases against Revanna

There are three more cases filed against Prajwal Revanna. Of these, the first complaint was filed by Girija* and her daughter, Sunitha*. Prajwal is accused of raping Girija and forcing Sunitha to strip on a video call.  In another case, Prajwal is accused of raping Priya*, a former member of the local body and JD(S) party worker. This assault is said to have taken place at Prajwal’s then official residence in Hassan, says The News Minute. A case of molestation has also been filed against Prajwal by another woman who said that he had molested her when she had approached him to seek help on a personal matter.

* Names of the victims have been changed to protect their identity.

Related:

India’s flawed rape laws: a betrayal of equality

Report card: BJP and crimes against women

The post Prajwal Revanna convicted of rape in first case, sentencing of August 2 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

• Pragya Singh Thakur, BJP leader and former MP, and self-styled god-woman
• Lt Col Prasad Purohit, a serving Army intelligence officer at the time of arrest
• Major (Retd) Ramesh Upadhyay
• Sameer Kulkarni
• Sudhakar Chaturvedi
• Ajay Rahirkar
• Sudhakar Dhar Dwivedi alias Dayanand Pandey

The special court, presided over by Judge A.K. Lahoti, stated that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused “deserved the benefit of doubt”. 

The Malegaon Blast: What happened?

On September 29, 2008, a powerful explosion ripped through Bhikku Chowk, a Muslim-dominated commercial area in Malegaon, Maharashtra. The bomb, fitted on an LML Freedom motorcycle bearing a fake number plate, killed six persons and injured over 100.

Initial investigations by the Maharashtra ATS, led by the late Hemant Karkare, suggested the use of RDX and ammonium nitrate. The ATS soon traced the motorcycle to Pragya Singh Thakur, who initially denied ownership.

The conspiracy, as detailed in the ATS’s 4,500-page chargesheet, involved:

• Planning meetings in Raigad Fort, Deolali, Pune, Bhopal, Indore, Faridabad, Kolkata, and Nashik
• Procurement of explosives by Lt Col Purohit from army stocks during his J&K posting
• Bomb assembly at Sudhakar Chaturvedi’s house in Deolali, whose keys were stored at the Military Intelligence office
• A radical plan to establish a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation) through Abhinav Bharat, a group allegedly floated by Purohit and others.

How the case collapsed

The Malegaon 2008 blast case was initially investigated by the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) under the leadership of the late Hemant Karkare. In January 2009, the ATS filed its primary charge sheet, naming 12 accused, including Pragya Singh Thakur and Lt Col Prasad Purohit, both of whom had been arrested months after the explosion.

In 2011, the case was transferred to the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which eventually filed a supplementary charge sheet on May 13, 2016.

The ATS investigation had alleged that Thakur, Purohit (who was identified as the founder of Abhinav Bharat, a radical right-wing group), and others were part of a larger conspiracy aimed at taking “revenge” and instilling fear among the Muslim community. According to the ATS, the accused participated in a series of conspiracy meetings held in cities including Bhopal and Indore. It further claimed that the motorcycle used in the blast was registered in Thakur’s name, and that she had made it available for use in the attack.

In its 2009 charge sheet, the ATS invoked multiple provisions, including the stringent Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA), against all the accused. 

However, a significant shift occurred after the NIA took over. Between 2011 and 2016, the agency had initially opposed any relief sought by Thakur. But in a complete reversal, the NIA’s 2016 supplementary charge sheet dropped all charges against her. While it retained several allegations against the remaining accused, invoking sections of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and the Explosive Substances Act, the agency asserted that it found no credible evidence implicating Thakur. Instead, the NIA accused the ATS of coercing witnesses into giving statements against her and recommended dropping MCOCA charges against all 12 accused.

Notably, the supplementary charge sheet was filed without informing the designated Special Public Prosecutor, Avinash Rasal, raising questions about procedural transparency.

Despite the NIA’s exoneration of Thakur, the special NIA court refused to discharge her, stating that it could not overlook the incriminating material submitted earlier by the ATS.

Despite early investigative successes, the case gradually fell apart. The court’s verdict outlines technical and evidentiary failures, but the rot runs far deeper.

(Detailed copy of the ATS charge sheet may be read here.)

1. Forensic failures and “contaminated” evidence

• No fingerprints or DNA were recovered from the blast site 
• The bike’s chassis and engine numbers were destroyed, and could not be conclusively linked to Thakur
• The court ruled that forensic samples were contaminated, making them unreliable 

2. Discredited intercepts and defective sanctions

• Phone taps of the accused were ruled inadmissible due to lack of proper legal sanction 
• The court held that two UAPA sanctions signed by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) were procedurally defective.
• MCOCA, initially invoked by the ATS for establishing an organised crime syndicate, was later dropped by the NIA in its 2016 charge sheet

Vanishing Evidence: Missing papers, missing justice

One of the darkest chapters in the case is the disappearance of key evidence:

• Confessional statements of at least 13 witnesses and two accused, recorded under CrPC 164 and MCOCA, went missing from court records by 2016, as per Mumbai Mirror
• These included accounts of meetings between Pragya Thakur and Ramji Kalsangra (an absconding accused) discussing the Malegaon blast plan.
• A special court eventually allowed the use of photocopies, over defence objections, after the originals remained untraceable despite court-to-court tracking 

Compounding this, new statements recorded by the NIA in Delhi directly contradicted the earlier ones, which now lead to exonerating the accused 

Witnesses Turn Hostile: 39 and counting

Of the 323 witnesses examined, at least 39 turned hostile, including serving Army officers and other key prosecution witnesses, as per The Hindu. Many of these had earlier confirmed:

• Attendance at planning meetings
• The ideological indoctrination of “Hindu Rashtra”
• Purohit’s and Thakur’s involvement in Abhinav Bharat

Yet under oath, they reversed their earlier testimonies.

Another 30 witnesses died before they could testify.

Critically, no prosecution for perjury was initiated, and the court did not question the pattern of defection.

Political winds and prosecutorial apathy

The prosecution’s attitude changed after 2014, a fact publicly confirmed by Rohini Salian, the initial special public prosecutor, according to Indian Express.

In 2015, Salian disclosed that she had been instructed by NIA officials to “go soft” on the accused. When she refused, she was side-lined and replaced. She recounted how:

“A senior NIA officer came and said there are instructions from higher-ups. Someone else will appear instead of you,” as reported by Indian Express. 

Salian’s replacement, Avinash Rasal, led the rest of the trial. The NIA’s 2016 supplementary chargesheet notably weakened the ATS case, dropped MCOCA, and questioned the credibility .of the confessions obtained under ATS custody — often on the basis of alleged torture/

The accused claimed their confessions were coerced. The NIA appeared to agree — without formally prosecuting the ATS for custodial abuse.

Abhinav Bharat- forgotten conspiracy

The ATS had built a robust case that Abhinav Bharat was a radical Hindutva outfit plotting systemic violence.

• Meeting transcripts, many recorded by Swami Dayanand Pandey himself, showed elaborate plans for a parallel state structure with its own flag, constitution, and army, as per a report of SabrangIndia.
• The accused discussed revenge for Muslim acts of terror, equipping themselves to create a “Hindu Rashtra” by force.
• The Bhonsala Military School in Nashik — used for training cadres — was spared scrutiny 
• Senior army officials who facilitated meetings or gave access to explosives were listed as witnesses, not accused

Despite this, the court held that the group’s structure could not be proved, and hence conspiracy could not be established.

A bigger network, never investigated

The Malegaon case was not an isolated act. It had alleged links to:

• Samjhauta Express blasts (2007)
• Ajmer Sharif Dargah blast (2007)
• Mecca Masjid blast in Hyderabad (2007)
• Nanded and Parbhani mosque blasts (2003–2006)

The ATS had initially argued for treating these as part of a larger Hindutva terror network, with shared ideology, funding, and personnel. This theory was quietly shelved when the NIA took over in 2011.

(Detailed report may be read here.)

What justice meant for the victims

Most of the Malegaon victims were poor Muslim daily wage workers. Their families waited 17 years for justice.

• No reparations have been announced for their suffering.
• No accountability has been fixed on investigative agencies for case mismanagement.
• No police officials have faced scrutiny for custodial torture or botched procedures

Meanwhile, the accused have moved on:

• Pragya Thakur was a sitting Member of Parliament.
• Lt Col Purohit was reinstated into the Army.
• Others have resumed public life, with some even receiving public felicitation by Hindu outfits, as reported by Sabrang India

Notably, through the judgement, the court said that families of all six victims of the blast will be given Rs 2 lakh each, and all injured victims will be given Rs 50,000 as compensation.

The real cost of acquittal

Judge Lahoti’s observation that “Terrorism has no religion as no religion advocates violence… Judgments cannot be based on morals and public perception” is legally sound. But this case was not just about legal thresholds.

It is about:

• Vanishing documents
• Reversed testimonies
• Political interference
• Institutional sabotage
• And a justice system that slowly but surely stopped caring

The acquittal may be final, but it is not exoneration. It is a legal closure of a political wound, not a factual resolution.

Conclusion: Not a verdict, but a warning

The Malegaon blast trial was never just about one bombing. It was about the integrity of our institutions, the non-negotiability of secularism, and the State’s duty to remain impartial in matters of terror.

The July 31, 2025 verdict might be a bookend to the case. But it is also an open question to the Indian republic: When evidence disappears, witnesses retreat, prosecutors fall silent, and ideology infiltrates investigation— can we still call it justice?

Related:

ARCHIVES: Hindutva Terror – The terror trail from Nanded to Malegaon and beyond

Criminal conspiracy – The ATS charge sheet in the Malegaon blast case

Malegaon blast case: Court rejects Pragya’s plea seeking exemption from appearing for trail

Malegaon Blast Accused Sadhvi Pragya may get Z-Security

PM Modi Defends Malegaon Blast Accused Sadhvi Pragya’s Candidature

The post Malegaon Acquittals: A judgement of some doubt, a trail of uneven justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The resignation comes a day after the union government, on July 29, 2025, notified Gupta’s appointment as a judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court for a two-year term. This appointment was made despite Sharma’s formal representations to the Supreme Court Collegium, the President of India, the Ministry of Law and Justice, and the Chief Justice of the MP High Court, opposing his elevation. Sharma had submitted that Gupta had subjected her to continued humiliation, discrimination, and casteist behaviour when he was her administrative superior.

A resignation letter that reads like an indictment

In her resignation, accessed and reported by The Print, Sharma declared she was resigning with the “ache of betrayal — not at the hands of a criminal or an accused, but at the hands of the very system I swore to serve.” She described being subjected to “unrelenting harassment, not merely of the body or the mind, but of my dignity, my voice, and my very existence as a woman judge who dared to speak up.”

Rejecting the notion that her resignation was an act of personal defeat, Sharma wrote, as reported by Hindustan Times, “I am resigning from judicial service, not because I failed the institution, but because the institution has failed me.” Her words were not just personal; they carried an institutional warning: “Let this letter haunt the files it enters. Let it whisper in the hallways where silence once reigned.”

Allegations ignored, harassment unchecked

Sharma’s allegations were not anonymous, nor unsupported. As The Print and Hindustan Times both confirm, she made detailed and documented complaints against Gupta—including incidents of public humiliation, caste-based insults, and interference in her professional assessments. She alleged that Gupta and his wife not only demeaned her, but also sought to control her social interactions, particularly objecting to her friendship with their daughter.

In her petition before the Supreme Court, filed earlier this year, Sharma accused Gupta of abusing his administrative position to downgrade her performance ratings and creating a hostile work environment during her tenure as a trainee judge. The harassment, she claimed, extended to personal insults and attempts to damage her reputation.

Yet, despite multiple representations, Sharma states there was no inquiry, no notice, no opportunity to be heard—a complete abandonment of even the most basic tenets of natural justice. “The same judiciary that sermonizes about transparency from the bench failed to even follow the basic tenets of natural justice within its own halls,” her letter reads, as per The Print.

A troubling elevation amid allegations

Notably, Gupta’s elevation had previously been blocked by the Supreme Court Collegium in 2023, headed by then CJI D.Y. Chandrachud, after it received Sharma’s and other complaints. The file was returned to the Madhya Pradesh High Court for further inquiry. However, after what appears to be a perfunctory probe, where Sharma was never even called to testify, according to The Print, Gupta was given a clean chit and his name re-sent for reconsideration in April 2025.

ThePrint also reported that Gupta faced multiple complaints from other judicial officers, including a Dalit judge who accused him of casteist harassment, and another senior judge who alleged intimidation and derogatory remarks about High Court judges. None of these complaints, Sharma notes in her resignation, were adequately investigated.

Supreme Court had earlier reinstated Sharma

In February 2025, Sharma won a significant legal victory when the Supreme Court set aside her 2023 dismissal, calling it “punitive, arbitrary and illegal.” A bench led by Justice B.V. Nagarathna noted that her appraisal had ignored critical factors, including a miscarriage and long COVID-related complications. The judgment emphasised institutional responsibility in supporting women judges, particularly during health crises or maternity.

Yet even after her reinstatement, Sharma said she continued to face subtle retaliation, including an “advisory” from the HC to mend her behaviour. Her attempts to convert her earlier complaint into a formal grievance were met with silence.

A system that rewards power, not truth

Throughout her letter, Sharma reiterates that her protest is not about revenge, but about accountability. “. Shri Rajesh Kumar Gupta who orchestrated my suffering was not questioned – was rewarded. Recommended. Elevated. Given a pedestal instead of a summons. Shri Rajesh Kumar Gupta the man I accused not lightly, not anonymously, but with documented facts and the raw courage only a wounded woman can Summon was not even asked to explain. No inquiry. No notice. No hearing. No accountability—is now titled Justice, a cruel joke upon the very word,” she wrote, as per ThePrint.

In a scathing indictment of the collegium system, she warned that rewarding impunity sends a chilling message to other whistleblowers within the judiciary. “In that silence, I saw the brutal truth of our times that integrity is optional, power is protection, and those who speak the truth are punished more severely than those who violate it,” she wrote. “The same institution that teaches equality before law handpicked power over truth.”

Senior Advocate Indira Jaising: A structural betrayal

Senior Advocate Indira Jaising, who represented Sharma in her SC challenge against dismissal, told ThePrint: that this is not the first time she was dealing with a case where a woman judge has been forced to resign. She added: “As she said, ‘the judiciary’s daughters’ have been let down by the judiciary itself. I agree. There is something very wrong with the process of appointing judges of the high court behind closed doors. Surprisingly, the judiciary and the government are on the same page”

Jaising argued that closed-door appointments without adequate scrutiny of complaints were symptomatic of institutional decay. She said, “We lost a very good judicial officer with an unblemished record of service. She won in the judicial side but lost on the administrative side.”

A call for institutional introspection

Sharma’s resignation is not merely a personal exit—it is a formal indictment of the judiciary’s failure to uphold its own principles. She closes her letter with piercing words:

“I leave now, with wounds that no reinstatement, no compensation, no apology will ever heal—but also with my truth intact. Let this letter haunt the files it enters. Let it whisper in the hallways where silence once reigned. Let it live longer than the reputations hastily protected, and the wrongs quietly buried. 

I sign off not as an officer of the court, but as a victim of its silence. 

Where were the rules then? Where was the revered transparency then? 

You refused to protect one of your own. 

You refused to uphold the principles you preach. 

You refused to be just where it mattered the most. 

And if this does not shake your conscience, then perhaps the rot runs deeper than we dare admit.

I leave this institution with no medals, no celebration, and no bitterness—only the bitter truth that the judiciary failed me. But worse—it failed itself. 

This letter of resignation is not closure. It is a statement of protest. Let it remain in your archives as a reminder that there once was a woman judge in Madhya Pradesh who gave her all to justice, and was broken by the system that preached it the loudest. 

And if even one judge, one registrar, one member of the Collegium reads this and feels unease then perhaps, my voice has done more justice than my robe ever could.”

Her act—bold, painful, and unflinchingly honest—now stands as a testament to how women in the judiciary are treated. It raises deeply troubling questions about the integrity of appointments, the erasure of women’s voices in power structures, and the danger of silencing dissent through procedural opacity.

Related:

Beed to Delhi: Lawyer beaten in Maharashtra, judge threatened in Delhi—what the path for justice means for women practioners in today’s India

When Courts Fail Survivors: How patriarchy shapes justice in sexual offence against women cases

Surviving Communal Wrath: Women who have defied the silence, demanded accountability from the state

‘We are considered servants, not humans’: Women of Jai Bhim Nagar reveal the violence of domestic work

The post Resignation in Protest: MP woman judge quits over elevation of senior she accused of harassment and discrimination appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment is a significant ruling. It is notable, not for what it dismantled, as the Act itself remains on the statute books, but for the specific legal grounds upon which it provided relief. The High Court’s strict focus on the principles of locus standi (the right to bring a complaint) and the failure to establish a prima facie criminal case has resulted in a precedent against the potential weaponization of the law by third-party vigilantes. As a crucial judicial interpretation in the early life of this anti-conversion statute, the Mustafa judgment provides a clear precedent for challenging such prosecutions even as the government reportedly has been planning to repeal the law in the State of Karnataka.

Facts of the case

The facts of the Mustafa case presented a scenario that the KPRFR Act was seemingly designed to address. On May 4, 2025, a complaint was filed by Ramesh Mallappa Navi, a devotee at the Ramatheerth Temple in Jamkhandi. He alleged that the petitioners were distributing Islamic pamphlets and, when confronted, made derogatory statements about Hinduism, declaring their mission was to “make the whole world turn towards Islam” and threatening those who stood in their way. In India today, while this information could be the crux of an angry Whatsapp forward, it is within the framework of Constitutional rights to propagate their own religion under Article 25. Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of the Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.

In this case, the First Information Report (FIR) invoked the specific language of the KPRFR Act, alleging that the petitioners offered “material incentives, such as vehicles and job opportunities in Dubai,” to entice people to convert. This allegation of “allurement” is a central pillar of the offense defined under Section 3 of the Act. With a fact pattern that so closely mirrored the legislative intent, the stage was set for a direct examination of the law’s application. However, the High Court based its decision on fundamental procedural and substantive flaws in the prosecution’s case without needing to delve into a broader constitutional inquiry.

The First Pillar: Who has the right to complain?

The court’s primary reason for quashing the FIR was the complainant’s lack of legal standing. It held unequivocally that the complaint was initiated by a “third party, who does not fall within the category of persons enumerated under Section 4 of the Act.” This made the registration of the FIR “legally invalid.”

Section 4 of the KPRFR Act specifies that a complaint can only be lodged by the person who was allegedly converted, their parents, siblings, or another relative by blood, marriage, or adoption. The complainant in this case, a bystander at the temple, fit none of these criteria.

The strict enforcement of this provision sends a clear message: the machinery of this criminal statute cannot be triggered by just any concerned citizen or ideological activist. This interpretation provides a significant judicial counterweight to the expansive language found in the Act and its counterparts in other states. The Karnataka Act, for instance, also vaguely permits complaints from anyone “in any form associated or a colleague,” and a recent amendment to the Uttar Pradesh law allows “any person” to file an FIR. Such provisions effectively deputize the public, risking a flood of vexatious litigation driven by vigilante groups.

The Mustafa judgment’s reasoning re-centres the legal process on the individual whose rights are actually at stake, the alleged victim of the unlawful conversion. It shifts the focus from the offended sensibilities of an observer to the tangible harm, if any, experienced by the person whose freedom of conscience is the subject of the dispute. This creates a “procedural firewall,” a preliminary legal argument that lawyers can now raise to challenge cases based on generalized accusations or those motivated by communal animosity.

The Second Pillar: Was there an “attempt to convert”?

Beyond the procedural defect, the High Court found a fatal flaw in the substance of the complaint itself. Even taking all the allegations in the FIR at face value, the court concluded that they “fail to satisfy the essential elements of an offence under Section 3 of the Act.”

The reasoning was precise: “There is no allegation that the petitioners converted or attempted to convert any person to another religion.” This finding establishes a high bar for prosecution. It clarifies that generalized acts of proselytization, such as distributing literature, debating theology etc do not, by themselves, constitute a criminal offense under the Act. To invoke the law, the state must demonstrate a specific, targeted act aimed at converting an identifiable individual.

This distinction implicitly draws a line between the constitutionally protected right to “propagate” religion under Article 25 and a prosecutable “attempt to convert” under the KPRFR Act. The judgment indicates that for religious speech to lose its constitutional shield and become a criminal act, it must crystallize into a concrete attempt directed at a specific person. The absence of such an allegation in the Mustafa FIR, despite its detailed account of the petitioners’ actions, rendered the complaint legally unsustainable. This serves as another important safeguard, providing defence counsels with a clear substantive argument against the use of the Act to police all forms of religious outreach.

The National Context: A pattern of legislative escalation

The Karnataka Act is not an isolated piece of legislation but part of a coordinated national trend. Since 2017, states like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Haryana have enacted or amended anti-conversion laws, each more stringent than the last. This new generation of statutes shares a common architecture and ideological underpinning, often justified by the unsubstantiated “love jihad” narrative and anxieties about demographic change.

These laws are characterized by:

• Overly Broad Definitions: Terms like “allurement” are defined so broadly as to include offers of free education or employment by religious institutions, potentially criminalizing legitimate charitable work.
• Targeting of Interfaith Marriage: The explicit inclusion of “promise of marriage” as a prohibited means of conversion directly intrudes into the personal autonomy of adults to choose their partners, a right recognized by the Supreme Court as part of the right to life under Article 21.
• Discriminatory Exemptions: Some of these laws exempt “reconversion” to a person’s “immediate previous religion,” a provision widely seen as creating a one-way street that privileges a return to Hinduism while penalizing conversions away from it.
• Intrusive Procedures: The laws mandate a complex pre- and post-conversion declaration process before a District Magistrate, including public notices and police inquiries, transforming a personal act of faith into a matter of public scrutiny and bureaucratic approval.
• Draconian Penalties: Offenses, for example in Rajasthan’s anti-conversion law are cognizable and non-bailable, and the burden of proof is reversed, requiring the accused to prove that the conversion was lawful, contrary to the foundational principle of “innocent until proven guilty.”

This intrusive and blatant disregard for the fundamental freedoms has led to a nationwide legal battle, with numerous petitions challenging these laws pending before various High Courts and the Supreme Court.

The legal challenges to these laws are setting the stage for a potential conflict between two competing lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence. On one side stands the 1977 judgment in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh. In this case, a Constitution Bench upheld early anti-conversion laws, narrowly interpreting the right to “propagate” religion under Article 25 as not including a fundamental right to convert another person. It validated these laws under the state’s power to maintain “public order.”

On the other side is the modern, expansive doctrine of individual autonomy articulated in the landmark 2017 Right to Privacy judgment, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. The nine-judge bench in Puttaswamy established privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21, encompassing dignity, personal autonomy, and the freedom to make fundamental life choices regarding family, marriage, and belief.

The new anti-conversion laws, with their intrusive state surveillance of personal faith decisions, lie directly at the intersection of this doctrinal clash. While Stainislaus focused on preventing conversion through illegitimate means like force or fraud, the new laws regulate the very act of voluntary conversion itself. The requirement to declare one’s intent to convert to the state and face a public inquiry is a direct challenge to the “zone of choice and self-determination” that Puttaswamy sought to protect.

The central constitutional question is no longer merely about the right to propagate (the Stainislaus issue), but about whether the state can impose such a burdensome and invasive procedure on a deeply personal choice without violating the right to privacy and liberty (the Puttaswamy issue).

The Path forward

The Mustafa judgment is a significant outcome of a cautious judicial approach, focused strictly on the letter of the law. It provides immediate, tangible relief and establishes crucial procedural checks without precipitating a direct constitutional confrontation. Its legacy will be to provide the accused and their counsel with specific, effective legal arguments to challenge prosecutions at the very initial stage, thereby helping to curb potential abuses of the law.

However, the larger battle remains. The core provisions of the KPRFR Act and its sister statutes, such as their broad definitions, discriminatory clauses, and invasive procedures, are yet to be tested on the anvil of the Constitution. Ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to reconcile the state’s interest in preventing coercive conversions with the individual’s fundamental rights to privacy, liberty, equality, and conscience. The Mustafa judgment is a crucial first chapter in this unfolding constitutional matter, a stabilizing judgment that clarifies important procedural grounds while the principal constitutional adjudication awaits.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

Related

https://cjp.org.in/anti-conversion-laws-being-weaponised-cjp-seeks-interim-relief-against-misuse-of-anti-conversion-laws/

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-plea-against-anti-conversion-laws-sc-seeks-to-know-status-of-cases-challenging-anti-conversion-laws-in-hcs/

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-other-rights-groups-challenge-maharashtra-govt-gr-setting-up-a-committee-to-monitor-inter-faith-marriages/

The post K’taka Anti-Conversion Law: HC judgement sets a precedent against potential weaponisation by third-party vigilantes appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the ECI’s own press note on July 27, these 65 lakh individuals are categorised as deceased electors (22 lakh or 2.83%), permanently shifted/not found voters (36 lakh or 4.59%), and voters enrolled at multiple places (7 lakh or 0.89%). Bhushan articulated the fear that these individuals would now face the arduous task of re-applying for inclusion, which could effectively disenfranchise them.

According to Live Law, during the hearing, Justice Surya Kant, emphasising the ECI’s constitutional authority, expressed confidence that it would act in accordance with the law, but nonetheless reassured the petitioners, “We are here, we will hear you”. 

Justice Joymalya Bagchi also said that the January 2025 electoral list serves as the “starting point if there was no SIR”. He reiterated the Court’s commitment to intervene if the “draft list will be published by ECI. Your apprehension is 65 lakh odd voters will not feature…if there is mass exclusion, we will immediately step in. Bring 15 people saying they are alive”, as Live Law reported

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, representing RJD MP Manoj Jha, highlighted that the ECI “know[s] who the 65-lakh people” are, and if their names are included in the draft list, “we have no problem”. Justice Kant concurred, stating that if the “draft list is conspicuously silent,” the petitioners should bring it to the Court’s attention. The matter is now scheduled for further detailed hearings on August 12 and 13, 2025, as reported

On final day of SIR, 65 Lakh electors flagged for deletion

On July 27, the ECI declared the successful completion of the SIR’s first phase, involving enumeration forms from 7.24 crore electors out of 7.89 crore. Crucially, the ECI stated that “65 lakh voters will be excluded from the upcoming draft electoral rolls to be published on August 1.” This figure includes 22 lakh deceased, 36 lakh relocated or untraceable, and 7 lakh duplicate entries.

ECI’s press note dated 26.07.2025 can be read here

SC refused to stay ECI’s decision to publish the draft electoral rolls for Bihar on August 1, 2025

A day prior, on Monday, July 28, 2025, the Supreme Court had declined to issue a stay on the ECI’s decision to publish the draft electoral rolls for Bihar on August 1, 2025, as per the notified schedule for the SIR. Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan, appearing for the ADR, had earnestly requested the bench to halt the notification, citing the potential “inconvenience about 4.5 crores of voters”. 

He argued that once the draft list is published, excluded persons would be compelled to undertake steps to file objections and seek inclusions. However, Senior Advocate Rakesh Dwivedi, representing the ECI, countered that it was “only a draft list”. 

Justice Kant echoed this, asserting that the Court could ultimately “strike down the entire process if any illegality was found”. Sankaranarayanan’s subsequent request for an explicit observation that the process would be “subject to the outcome of the petitions” was deemed unnecessary by Justice Kant, who stated that it was “understood”.

The core of the disagreement: documentation and inclusivity

A central point of contention revolves around the ECI’s selective acceptance of identity documents for the SIR. The Supreme Court, in its initial order on July 10, 2025, had urged the ECI to consider Aadhaar cards, Electoral Photo Identity Cards (EPIC), and ration cards as valid proofs of identity. However, the ECI, in its counter-affidavit filed on July 21, 2025, maintained its reservations.

On July 21, Sanjay Kumar, Deputy Election Commissioner, in the ECI’s counter-affidavit, argued that Aadhaar is “merely proof of identity, not citizenship or date of birth”. While Aadhaar numbers are collected optionally for identification, they are not included in the list of 11 documents considered standalone proof of eligibility under Article 326. 

The ECI also cited “widespread existence of fake ration cards” as a reason for not prescribing them as one of the 11 primary eligibility documents, though EROs are “obligated to consider all documents presented, including ration cards, on a case-to-case basis”. 

As for EPIC cards, the ECI stated that while their numbers are pre-filled in enumeration forms and serve as a “derivative indicator of electoral identity,” they cannot be treated as primary proof of eligibility during the “de novo preparation” of the electoral roll that the SIR entails. The ECI maintained that its order to consider Aadhaar, EPIC, and Ration Cards was for “limited purpose of identity” and that these are not considered “sufficient standalone documents for the purpose of screening of eligibility prescribed under Article 326”.

Despite the ECI’s stance, the Supreme Court verbally urged the ECI to consider at least the “statutory documents of Aadhaar and EPIC”. 

In July 29 hearing, Justice Kant emphasised the “presumption of correctness with official documents” and urged the ECI to “proceed with these 2 documents,” acknowledging that “any document on the earth can be forged” but that forgery should be dealt with on a “case-to-case basis”. Justice Kant further impressed upon the ECI that instead of “en masse exclusion,” there should be, “en masse inclusion” of voters, as Live Law reported

The petitioners’ rebuttal: allegations of “Grave Fraud”

The ADR’s rejoinder (dated July 25, 2025) strongly refutes the ECI’s arguments, presenting a narrative of procedural irregularities and a significant threat to voter rights. The petitioners contend that the SIR order “does not prescribe any procedure regarding the scrutiny of enumeration forms or the verification of documents, thereby conferring upon EROs arbitrary, unbridled and excessive discretionary powers”. 

They highlight the sheer volume of work assigned to a single ERO – “handling the enumeration forms of over 3 lakh individuals” – which, they argue, renders it “humanly impossible for any ERO to apply due diligence or conduct the process in a reasonable manner”.

The ADR also challenged the ECI’s rationale for initiating the SIR, which included concerns from political parties and the need for a rigorous exercise due to the last intensive revision being in 2003. The petitioners countered that electoral list updation is a continuous process, pointing to a press release from CEO Bihar dated January 7, 2025, which confirmed the successful completion of the SSR 2025, resulting in a net increase of 7,94,466 electors. 

They also referred to the ECI’s own Manual on Electoral Roll (March 2023), which states that the electoral roll is continually updated, and “no suo moto deletions shall take place in an election year where elections to state assembly or House of People is due in the State concerned during 6 months period ending in the date of expiry of the term of the house”, as rejoinder read

A critical point of contention for the petitioners is the compressed timeline of the current SIR. The process, initiated on June 24, 2025, aims for final publication by September 30, 2025, covering the entire exercise in just 97 days. This, they argue, is significantly shorter than the six months taken for the 2004 intensive revision in North-East India and Jammu & Kashmir, and places “a lot of eligible voters under huge risk of disenfranchisement”.

Perhaps most damning is the “reports from the ground in Bihar” cited by the petitioners, which they claim disclose a “shocking account of the reality of the SIR process, which is absolutely arbitrary, illegal and in violation of ECI’s own order and guidelines dated 24.06.2025”. These reports allege that “enumeration forms are being mass-uploaded by BLOs without the knowledge or consent of the voters” to meet “unrealistic target[s] set by the ECI”. 

Specific instances include BLOs signing forms themselves in the absence of voters, voters receiving messages about form submission despite never filling them, and forms being filled for deceased individuals. The petitioners contend that BLOs are often not providing acknowledgment receipts for collected forms, contrary to ECI guidelines. They assert that the SIR process in Bihar, as conducted, “constitutes a grave fraud on the voters of Bihar, and must be set aside”.

The ADR further challenged the ECI’s statistics on form collection, labelling them “meaningless since inclusion in draft roll holds no meaning without submission of documents”. While the ECI reported that 7.24 crore (91.69%) enumeration forms were collected out of 7.89 crore electors as of June 24, 2025, the petitioners argue that “most of these forms have been collected without documents (thereby is not duly filled)”. They highlight that the requirement of 11 specific documents, and the non-acceptance of commonly held documents like Aadhaar, EPIC, and Ration Cards, is “clearly exclusionary in nature”.

The question of citizenship and burden of proof

A fundamental legal disagreement persists regarding the ECI’s authority to determine citizenship. The ECI, in its counter-affidavit, asserted its “plenary powers under Article 324” to scrutinise eligibility, including citizenship. However, the ADR argued that this contradicts previous intensive revisions, citing the 2004 Assam revision order which explicitly stated that it is “not for the Electoral Registration Officers to determine whether a particular person is a citizen of India or not”.

The ECI’s stance that the “burden to prove citizenship falls on the person who claims the right to be registered in electoral rolls” is vehemently opposed by the petitioners. They contend that this position is “contrary to this Hon’ble Court’s judgment in Lal Babu Hussain (1995) 3 SCC 100”. In that case, the Supreme Court held that for individuals whose names are already on the electoral rolls, there is a presumption that their procedural requirements were met, and removal necessitates “a reasonable opportunity of being heard” with the basis for suspicion disclosed. 

The ADR also cited the Constitution Bench judgment in Inderjit Barua v. Election Commission of India (1985) 1 SCC 21, which established that presence on an existing electoral roll is prima facie proof of citizenship, and the “burden of showing that such person was not a citizen should be on the objector”. The petitioners firmly rejected the ECI’s attempt to distinguish Lal Babu Hussain, asserting that the judgment “clearly says that presence on the existing roll has to be accorded probative value even in cases of special intensive revision”.

The petitioners’ core argument is that the SIR process “shifts the onus of citizenship proof on all existing electors in a state, whose names were registered by the ECI through a due process”. They question why the established process under the Representation of People’s Act, 1950, for deleting non-citizens based on specific complaints and evidence, has been supplanted by the requirement of additional documents and enumeration forms. Notably, the ADR pointed out that the ECI has provided “no data on number of complaints received against inclusion of foreign nationals or illegal migrants in the electoral rolls of Bihar”.

Bihar’s electoral roll revision: a critical juncture

As Bihar prepares for its Assembly elections in November 2025, the ongoing legal proceedings in the Supreme Court carry immense weight. The petitioners emphasise that the SIR, if not adequately refined with safeguards and a more inclusive approach, could arbitrarily disenfranchise a substantial portion of the eligible electorate. The ECI, conversely, maintains that the SIR is a vital exercise for ensuring the accuracy and purity of electoral rolls, especially given the absence of such an intensive revision in Bihar since 2003.

The Supreme Court’s clear declaration that it will “step in” if mass exclusion occurs, along with its repeated emphasis on “en masse inclusion” rather than “en masse exclusion.” The upcoming detailed hearings on August 12 and 13, 2025, will be pivotal in shaping the future of electoral registration in Bihar and, by extension, the integrity of its democratic process.

Related

ECI to SC: Voter ID insufficient for Bihar roll, defends citizenship verification power

Punjab University’s former dean writes to CJI: Bihar SIR threatens democracy, alleges ECI overreach & voter disenfranchisement

Non-Electors Within Electors: ECI reports over 61 lakh potential exclusions

The post Bihar SIR: 65 Lakh electors flagged for deletion, SC said “if there is mass exclusion, we will immediately step in” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a writ petition case that continues to spotlight the shadowy and undocumented removal of Bengali-speaking Muslim women from Assam, the Gauhati High Court was, on July 25, 2025, confronted with an admission from the State: Doyjan Bibi has been pushed back into Bangladesh. But even as officials claimed the act was carried out by the Border Security Force (BSF) at the request of Assam Police, they failed to produce any certificate, documentation, or acknowledgement showing that the Bangladeshi authorities ever received her.

The matter was being heard in the petition filed by Abdul Rejjak, who has been seeking answers on the whereabouts of his wife, Doyjan Bibi, ever since she was allegedly picked up from their home in Chirang district on the night of May 25, 2025 — without an arrest memo, warrant, or production before a magistrate. The legal aid in this case is being provided by Citizens for Justice and Peace.

On Friday, the FT counsel presented a fresh set of documents from the Assam BSF, purporting to show that Doyjan Bibi, declared a foreigner earlier by a Foreigners Tribunal, had been handed over by the SP (Border), Goalpara to the BSF Sector Headquarters at Panbari on May 26. She was then “pushed back” into Bangladesh the next day, on May 27, from the area of responsibility (AOR) of the 2503 BSF Battalion.

But the documents contained a discrepancy: they identified Doyjan Bibi as the wife of Abdul Munnaf. This triggered renewed alarm. The petitioner, Abdul Rejjak, has consistently identified himself by that name — no alias, no variations.

The Court, during the hearing today, noted that the BSF documents suggested Rejjak’s alias was Abdul Munnaf. But petitioner’s counsel Mrinmoy Dutta categorically denied this:

“I do not use or acknowledge any other name. In earlier court filings, including petitions filed by Doyjan Bibi herself, she clearly stated that her husband is Abdul Rejjak. There is no alias.”

The Bench then confirmed that all identifying information, Doyjan’s name, her father’s name, and her Foreigners Tribunal case number, fully matched the petitioner’s claim. The conclusion was unavoidable: the woman declared a foreigner and pushed back was indeed the petitioner’s wife.

That led to the core issue — one that the State has failed to answer since the case began in June: Where is the proof that Doyjan Bibi was handed over to any Bangladeshi official?

Petitioners: “This is not deportation, this is disappearance”

With mounting frustration, Advocate Dutta confronted the State’s silence: “If they have handed over Doyjan Bibi, they must produce the handover certificate. This is the procedure — a person who is pushed back or deportation must be documented. Otherwise, this is not deportation, this is disappearance. It amounts to human trafficking.”

He continued: “Pushback is a term used for people apprehended while crossing borders illegally — not for detainees removed from detention. In this case, the woman was allegedly in custody and removed. That cannot be called pushback, especially without any formal records.”

The FT counsel admitted, on record, that no such certificate of handover existed. There was no documentation from Bangladeshi authorities confirming receipt. There was no record of the border handover. This, despite the fact that in other cases, the May 2, 2025 Ministry of Home Affairs notification and the Ministry’s own deportation SOP, which lays down that full records must be maintained for every such action.

Dutta underscored this contradiction: “They are not following their own rules. In their own guidelines, deportation must be documented. If they say they have removed someone across the international border, they must show to whom. Otherwise, the person is simply missing.”

Bench: “If there is an illegality, then you must make that challenge in your petition”

The Bench observed that if the petitioner wished to contest the legality of the procedure followed for the pushback, a separate prayer would have to be made: “You will have to file a fresh petition, or amend this one. We cannot decide the legality of pushback unless you specifically challenge it.”

Dutta pushed back: “But the petition is the challenge. The case is that the petitioner’s wife was picked up and has not been seen since. The State now says they pushed her back, but can produce no document to show to whom. That itself proves disappearance.”

Bench: “But that is not the present prayer. You must frame it clearly that the pushback was illegal and the procedure is being challenged.”

Petitioner’s counsel asked for time to consider whether to amend the writ petition or move a fresh one.  The Court recorded the State’s version that Doyjan Bibi was “sent back to Bangladesh” but granted the petitioner two weeks to respond. In doing so, the Court did not accept that the State’s failure to follow procedure extinguishes the claim being raised by the petitioner. Instead, it left the door open for legal escalation.

Background: A case of vanishing in plain sight

This case has unfolded through disturbing phases of State inconsistency. At the June 16 hearing, the State initially claimed, based on telephonic instruction, that Doyjan Bibi was in Kokrajhar Holding Centre. But that turned out to be false. By June 25, the State admitted she had been handed over to the BSF. The BSF later said she was “pushed back,” but until today, no certificate of deportation, no arrest memo, no handover documentation, and no FIR or judicial oversight has been placed on record. The only thing the State has submitted are internal letters stating that Doyjan Bibi was “handed over”.

Constitutional Stakes: Is the State Above Its Own Procedure?

The issue now is no longer just Doyjan Bibi — but whether the Indian State can pick up a person it has labelled a “foreigner,” and push them across an international border without any formal deportation order, without any certificate of receipt, and without leaving behind even a scrap of documentation.

The Gauhati High Court has already noted in previous cases that “foreigners” are still entitled to fundamental rights under Article 21. The State’s own 2025 guidelines require recorded and certified deportation through diplomatic channels.

The petitioner has rightly asked: “If there is no record of where she was sent, or to whom she was handed, how can this be called legal deportation?”

The Court will now hear the matter again after two weeks. But until then, the core question remains: Can a woman in State custody simply vanish without a trace — and the system call that deportation?

Details of the previous hearings may be read here.

Related:

Gauhati High Court seeks Centre’s May 2025 deportation notification as legality of re-detention of Abdul Shiekh and Majibur Rehman is scrutinised

Confusion over identity clouds ‘pushback case’ of Doyjan Bibi, Gauhati High Court directs state to verify true identity and whereabouts

A Targeted Campaign: The orchestrated crackdown on Bengali Migrants and the rising pushback from courts, Bengal government, and civil society

The post “Humans Cannot Just Disappear”: Gauhati High Court told in Doyjan Bibi case as State fails to produce pushback documents appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The stay was issued following the argument advanced by Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta, appearing on the behalf of Maharashtra, that some parts in the high court order would have an impact on other pending MCOCA matters. MCOCA 1999 is a law that has, over the years since its enactment come up for several judicial indictments on its abuse.

Eleven of the defendants who are living (one of them passed away during the Cobid-19 pandemic, in 2021 while in jail) were released on July 21, as soon as the high court pronounced the judgement. Maharashtra chief minister Devendra Fadnavis, responding to the judgment, had said that it was “shocking” and within a day, the appeal before the apex court was filed. Two are still pending release in other minor cases.

In his arguments, Mehta told the Supreme Court bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice N.K. Singh that he was not asking that the defendants be sent back to jail but that the judgment be stayed. The court first said that the judgement can’t be used as a “precedent” in other matters. But when Mehta further pressed for staying the order, Justice Sundresh said, “Order stayed to that extent”.

The court observed in the order: “We have been informed that all the respondents have been released and there is no question of bringing them back to the prison. However, taking note of the submission made by the SG (Mehta) on the question of law, we are inclined to hold that the impugned judgment shall not be treated as a precedent. To that extent, there is a stay of the impugned judgment.”

The acquittal came after 19 long years of incarceration. In 2015, the special MCOCA court had convicted 12 persons for their alleged role in the serial train blast case that had killed 189 persons and severely injured over 400 persons. Among those acquitted by the high court, five persons – Kamal Ansari, Mohammad Faisal Ataur Rahman Shaikh, Ehtesham Qutubuddin Siddiqui, Naveed Hussain Khan and Asif Khan – were awarded the death penalty by the MCOCA court.

Seven others who were sentenced to life (unto death) by the MCOCA court are Tanveer Ahmed Mohammed Ibrahim Ansari, Mohammed Majid Mohammed Shafi, Shaikh Mohammed Ali Alam Shaikh, Mohammed Sajid Margub Ansari, Muzammil Ataur Rahman Shaikh, Suhail Mehmood Shaikh and Zameer Ahmed Latiur Rehman Shaikh. Kamal Ansari died in 2021.

One person, Abdul Wahid Shaikh, who was also arrested along with the 12 men, and after nine years of incarceration, was finally acquitted by the MCOCA court in 2015. The state government had not filed an appeal against his acquittal at the time. 

Today, during the hearing, the Supreme Court asked if any of those acquitted were Pakistani nationals. “You mention in your appeal that there are Pakistani accused in this case,” the court inquired. To this, special public prosecutor Raja Thakare, who handled the trial in the lower court, said the Pakistani nationals are shown as absconding accused in the case and the 12 acquitted men were all Indians. 

 The implications of the stay of the High Court order are significant. As stated above, the SC has not stayed the release of those wrongfully convicted (except two they were released day before yesterday). What has happened and this does set another precedent is that Bombay HC’s scathing observations on the (mis)use of MCOCA, procedural lapses etc., has been stayed and the 671 page judgement passed by one constitutional court, after 75 days of rigorous hearings, has been stayed. The scathing findings by the high court in the judgement on the misuse of the MCOCA law cannot be used as a precedent in other cases. The question of law in the matter may come up at any future date, even after years, given the pendency of the cases in the apex court.

Related:

Still Waiting in Grief: How the 2006 Mumbai train blast victims were denied closure and justice

A Spectacle of Injustice Undone: After 19 years, Bombay HC’s acquittal in the 7/11 Mumbai train blasts case recognises the (mis) use of ‘torture for confession’

The post 7/11 Bomb Blasts: Supreme Court Judgement says Bombay HC Order cannot be treated as Precedent appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The 7/11 blasts as the incident came to be known, preceded by over two years the deadly 26/11 (2008) blasts in south Mumbai, a deadly terror attack that targeted civilians at numerous sites in the southern part of Mumbai, including the Chhatrapati Shivaji railway station, the popular Leopold Café, two hospitals, and a theatre. While the initial spate of attacks ended within a few hours after they were launched around 9.30 p.m. on November 26, the terror kept unfolding at three locations where hostages were taken—the Nariman House (location of a Jewish outreach centre) the Oberoi Trident and Taj Mahal Palace & Towers five star hotels. Totally, at least 174 people, including 20 security force personnel and 26 foreign nationals, were killed. More than 300 people were injured. Nine of the 10 terrorists were killed, and one was arrested. 

The coordinated 7/11 train blasts in fact preceded the 26/11 multiple terror attacks on Mumbai. 

On July 18, 2024, 19 years down, the Bombay High Court acquitted all 12 men who had been wrongfully convicted in connection with the blasts, after having spent years in prison. The Court cited fabricated confessions, coerced evidence, unreliable witnesses, and procedural lapses so grave they amounted to a collapse of justice itself. Worse, these men were brutally tortured by squads of the police, treatment that is entrenched in a criminal justice system that shows communal and caste bias. Even as the innocent incarcerated walk free, acquitted by the High Court, after nearly two decade long incarcerations which in itself came with a cost, the families of the victims remain ensnared in the pain of loss—now coupled with the gnawing knowledge that the real perpetrators were never pursued with integrity or seriousness. An absence of closure that does not allow the real healing.

A verdict that reopened old wounds

“We waited for justice for 19 years,” said Yashwant Bhalerao, father of 23-year-old Harshal Bhalerao, who died in the blast on his first day of work at Ibex Software in Andheri, as reported by Free Press Journal. “When the police arrested the accused, they fought among themselves for credit. I realised then they had no real evidence,” the report provided.

Bhalerao’s frustration was echoed by other survivors and bereaved families. Saguna Bhalerao, Harshal’s mother, was in tears as she recalled the day: “I prayed he wouldn’t be on that train. His phone wasn’t ringing. But what happened was not what I prayed for. My son will never return, but the terrorists should have been punished.”

A State more eager for rushed processes than either closure or the truth

The Bombay High Court’s 671-page judgment offered an unflinching indictment of the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS), which had investigated the case. It found that the prosecution relied on scripted confessions extracted under duress, unsupported forensic claims, and call records that were misrepresented or inconclusive.

As Justices Anil Kilor and S.C. Chandak noted, the investigation was marred by “serious infirmities,” making the convictions legally unsustainable. No eyewitnesses could place any of the accused at the blast sites. Alleged bomb-making materials were recovered without proper documentation or witnesses. As per the judgment, one witness had even testified in an unrelated blast case, calling into question the neutrality of key testimonies.

Grief meets disbelief

Anita Srivastava, whose husband Abhinav died in the blasts, now works at Malad station as a railway announcer. She was offered the job on compassionate grounds. Speaking to Hindustan Times, she said: “If those who were given the death sentence didn’t do it, why were they in jail for so long?”

Rajesh Parekh, whose father Mahendra survived with lifelong hearing damage, expressed rage at the state’s abdication of responsibility. “It has been proven again today that there is no justice in the country,” he said. “I’m moving my family abroad.”

Ameet Shrawagi, a chartered accountant who lost his father Mohan in the Bandra explosion, said the verdict was a “mockery of the justice system.” He added, as per the HT report, that “The trial court sentenced five to death and seven to life. A decade later, the High Court lets them all go free. It’s just unbelievable.”

Justice delayed, justice denied

The police and prosecution’s eagerness to close the case with a string of hasty arrests, led to a focus on vulnerable Muslim men from impoverished backgrounds, from all over India, based largely on custodial confessions. Defence lawyers and human rights groups had flagged these concerns for years.

According to LiveLaw, senior advocate Dr. S. Muralidhar, who represented two of the acquitted, said during arguments: “In such cases where there is a public outcry, the approach by police is always to first assume guilt and then go from there. Investigating agencies have failed us miserably.”

Despite these early warnings, the Special MCOCA Court in 2015 sentenced five to death and seven to life imprisonment. Only now has the High Court reversed that, but it is a cold comfort to victims who watched nearly two decades pass by with no real accountability.

A House Named After a Martyr, a Justice System That Forgot Him

Harshal Bhalerao’s parents named their new home “7/11 Harshal Smriti,” believed to be the only such memorial to a blast victim. The name stands as a personal tribute—but also a haunting reminder that their son died without the State ever seriously pursuing his killers. His father, an Income Tax officer, shared with Free Press Journal how July 11 was Harshal’s first day at his job. “I told his boss not to go easy on him just because he was my son. That was the last thing I ever said about him.”

Conclusion: A justice system adrift

The acquittal of all 12 accused has raised profound questions about India’s approach to terror investigations. When the State closes a case not with evidence but expediency, it compounds the crime: first, by failing to prevent violence; next, by misidentifying perpetrators; and finally, by denying the victims and their families the dignity of truth.

What remains is a chilling silence. No fresh investigation has been announced. Rather, the acquittal by the Bombay High Court was challenged in the Supreme Court, within one day of the judgment being delivered, surely not a reasoned or studied decision. The ATS, discredited yet unaccountable, continues as if nothing has happened. Meanwhile, the real masterminds behind one of India’s deadliest terror attacks still walk free.

Related:

A Spectacle of Injustice Undone: After 19 years, Bombay HC’s acquittal in the 7/11 Mumbai train blasts case recognises the (mis) use of ‘torture for confession’

No innocent should ever be jailed, my life is dedicated to get other innocents released: Abdul Wahid Shaikh

2008 Jaipur blasts: Rajasthan HC acquits all four who were given death penalty

Malegaon blast case: Court rejects Pragya’s plea seeking exemption from appearing for trail

After 23 years in Prison on false charges, five Men walk out free in Samleti Blast case

The post Still Waiting in Grief: How the 2006 Mumbai train blast victims were denied closure and justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At the hearing, the petitioners strongly contested the justification for re-detention, calling the State’s affidavit “vague” and insufficient, particularly in light of the fact that no bail cancellation was ever sought. The Court, signalling its concern, directed that the Union Government’s May 2, 2025 notification on deportation procedures, cited by the State as the basis for renewed custody, must be placed on record before any further hearing. The matter is now listed for July 25. CJP has been providing legal aid for these two cases.

Petitioner’s Counsel: Detention is illegal, affidavit vague

Appearing for both petitioners, Advocate Mrinmoy Dutta argued that the State’s latest affidavit, submitted pursuant to earlier directions, was “as vague as it can be”, particularly pointing to paragraph 7, which failed to provide any specific grounds or documentation justifying why the two men were re-detained.

Dutta submitted that the issue was not verification, but detention; that factual or documentary verification for deportation could easily have been undertaken without arresting and detaining individuals who were already on court-sanctioned bail. He stressed that the men had been released not merely due to COVID, but on the explicit ground of prolonged detention and that the Supreme Court order under which they were released was still binding.

“The SC order is not just a COVID-related release, it applies to those who have completed more than 2 or 3 years in detention. That order has not been recalled. This is a clear violation of that binding direction,” Dutta submitted before the division bench comprising Justices Kalyan Rai Surana and Susmita Phukan Khaund.

State Counsel: COVID-era bail was temporary, deportation now underway

Opposing the petitioners’ challenge, the FT counsel reiterated the State’s position that the detainees were previously released while they awaited deportation, but deportation was stalled due to the pandemic. With the situation having now changed, the Government of India and Assam are “initiating deportations”, and for that, verification of identity and nationality is underway.

He claimed that the individuals were “not in detention centres but in holding centres”, and that such custody was merely to complete verification before deportation could be effected.

However, the Court appeared unconvinced.

Bench seeks clarity: “Where is the notification?”

The Division pressed the State on its failure to produce any official notification along with the affidavit that would justify treating these detentions as part of a lawful deportation process.

“Where is the notification? You’ve not annexed anything to support this position,” the Court remarked during the hearing.

The Bench observed that as per UN Conventions and principles of international law, some form of verification may be necessary before deportation. However, the counsel for the petitioners emphasised that verification alone does not authorise detention, especially when the person is on standing bail under a court order.

The Court directed the Ministry of Home Affairs’ (MHA) May 2, 2025 notification on deportation to be brought on record. Advocate Dutta was also asked to prepare submissions specifically addressing the State’s claim that deportation proceedings justify the detention of bail-compliant individuals. The matter is now listed for July 25, 2025.

Previous hearings may be referred here.

Background

Both Abdul Sheikh and Majibur Rehman were declared foreigners by FTs in Assam and detained for more than two years. In 2021, they were released under the Supreme Court’s April 2020 directions, which permitted conditional release of detainees who had completed prolonged detention terms and were not facing imminent deportation.

From the time of their release, both men had been consistently appearing before their respective police stations, as required by the bail conditions. Their last attendance was recorded in May 2025, shortly before they were suddenly picked up again by police and transferred to the Kokrajhar Holding Centre — without any order cancelling their bail or citing violation of its terms.

The ongoing hearings raise a serious constitutional question — can individuals, released on binding bail orders, be re-detained without cancellation of bail, merely because the State has decided to restart deportation processes?

In earlier hearings on June 25 and June 26, the Court had already recorded the State’s admission that both Abdul Sheikh and Majibur Rehman had been fully compliant with their bail conditions. Despite this, the State continued to defend its action on the ground that deportation is now feasible, and detention is part of the “preparatory process”.

The petitioners have argued that such detentions, without any recall of prior judicial orders, are a direct breach of Article 21, and threaten to render the judicial system meaningless if State agencies can override court orders without due process.

Related:

Confusion over identity clouds ‘pushback case’ of Doyjan Bibi, Gauhati High Court directs state to verify true identity and whereabouts

Gauhati HC closes writ petition in Bakkar Ali case after his detained father, Samsul Ali, was recovered and not rearrested

India’s Stealthy Pushback: Thousands of alleged “Bangladeshi immigrants” deported without due process across states

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The Supreme Court not only quashed a retaliatory FIR filed against the victim under Section 309 IPC for “attempt to suicide” but directed the immediate arrest of the officers involved and ordered the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir to pay ₹50 lakh as constitutional compensation, recoverable from the guilty officers following departmental proceedings. The CBI has also been tasked with investigating systemic failures and institutional impunity at the JIC.

“The unprecedented gravity of this case involving brutal and inhuman custodial torture, characterised by the complete mutilation of the appellant’s genitalia, represents one of the most barbaric instances of police atrocity which the State is trying to defend and cover up with all pervasive power. The medical evidence conclusively establishes that such injuries are impossible to be self-inflicted. The respondent’s theory of suicide attempt crumbles under scrutiny when examined against the timeline and the medical evidence.” (Para 19)

Delivering the judgment, a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta described the case as one involving “unprecedented gravity”, with complete mutilation of genitalia, pepper powder and electric shocks on private parts, and injuries consistent with custodial torture techniques such as falanga, the presence of multiple vegetative particles in the rectum, and anal insertion. The Court found the state’s claim of attempted suicide “medically impossible”, rejecting it as a fabricated counter-narrative aimed at shielding perpetrators.

“More significantly, the respondent’s suicide theory is demolished when assessed in light of the medical evidence, which decisively rules out the theory of the harm being self-inflicted. The complete surgical removal of both testicles, the extensive injuries to the appellant’s palms and soles, consistent with custodial torture techniques such as falanga, the presence of multiple vegetative particles in the rectum, and bruising on the buttocks extending to the thighs all points to a pattern of sustained and systematic torture. These injuries are medically impossible to be self-inflicted, particularly in the absence of fatal haemorrhage or loss of consciousness, as would have occurred had the mutilation been self-administered. The respondent’s reliance on superficial cuts to the forearm as indicative of a suicide attempt pales in comparison to the magnitude and nature of the injuries sustained.” (Para 20)

The Case: A signal, a summons, a six-day ordeal

The appellant, Khursheed Ahmad Chohan, a police constable posted in Baramulla, received a signal on February 17, 2023 from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kupwara, instructing him to report to the SSP Kupwara for an enquiry into a narcotics matter. On February 20, he complied and reported to the Joint Interrogation Centre. What followed, according to the Supreme Court, was six days of illegal detention and “barbaric, medically irrefutable torture.”

What followed, the Court held, was “systematic, brutal, and medically irrefutable torture.” According to medical records from SKIMS, Srinagar, where Chohan was eventually shifted in critical condition:

• Genital mutilation: His testicles were amputated and brought in a plastic bag by a Sub-Inspector to the Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences (SKIMS), where he was admitted in a critical condition on February 26.
• Other injuries: A 10 X 5 centimetres scrotal laceration, bruises on the buttocks, fractures, tenderness in palms and soles, and vegetative particles in his rectum were documented.
• Surgery: The SKIMS discharge summary confirmed surgical procedures for reconstruction and repair of the urethra and scrotal wounds.

FIR Against Victim, Not Perpetrators: A legal travesty

On the same day Chohan was admitted to hospital, the police lodged FIR No. 32/2023 under Section 309 IPC, accusing him of “attempting suicide by cutting his vein with a razor blade under a blanket” at the JIC barracks.

The Supreme Court categorically rejected this FIR as a “calculated fabrication”, noting that:

• The FIR contradicted medical records, which established injuries that were far more severe and inaccessible for self-infliction.
• The forensic and CCTV evidence, used by the state to allege suicide, was dismissed as inadequate to override the weight of medical evidence showing extreme torture.
• The FIR was a “pre-emptive defence mechanism”, constituting abuse of process, falling squarely within grounds for quashing as laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal.

“In the present case, the authorities, instead of registering the complaint of the appellant regarding custodial torture, filed a counter FIR against him under Section 309 of the IPC. Perusal of the contents of FIR (supra) reflect that the allegations made therein are vague and manifestly contradictory to the established medical evidence. The FIR states that the appellant tried to cut his vein with a blade, however, the medical records, above discussed, reveal that the injuries are much graver and more extensive than what is depicted in this manifestly fabricated narrative. The stark disparity between the trivial description of ‘cutting his vein’ in the FIR and the barbaric reality of complete castration and systematic torture exposes the mala fide intent behind registering this counter FIR.” (Para 31)

Judicial Rebuke to the High Court and police machinery

The Court was equally scathing of the J&K High Court’s failure to grant relief when Chohan’s wife, Rubina Aktar, moved a writ petition seeking registration of FIR and CBI investigation, and a miscellaneous petition to quash the suicide FIR.

The High Court had:

• Directed a preliminary enquiry to be conducted by the same SSP who summoned Chohan and whose subordinates were the accused—an act the Supreme Court termed a “flagrant violation of natural justice”.
• Refused to quash the suicide FIR or refer the matter to CBI, holding that the investigation was in its infancy—a finding reversed by the apex court.

The Supreme Court held that Lalita Kumari v. State of UP (2014) mandates immediate registration of FIR where allegations disclose cognizable offences, and that no preliminary enquiry is permitted in custodial violence cases. The Court found that the High Court erred in law and failed to protect the victim’s fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21.

“The High Court committed a grave error in law by failing to exercise the writ jurisdiction and in refusing to apply the mandatory principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari (supra). Instead of ordering immediate registration of FIR, the High Court directed the very same Senior Superintendent of Police, Kupwara who had issued the Signal dated 17th February, 2023 summoning the appellant and under whose jurisdiction the alleged torture occurred, to conduct an inquiry into his own subordinates’ actions. This direction constitutes a flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice encapsulated in the Latin maxim “nemo judex in causa sua” (no one should be a judge in his own cause). The High Court’s approach, by treating this as a case requiring a preliminary inquiry rather than immediate registration of FIR, demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of the settled legal position and has resulted in the denial of justice to the appellant who is the victim of custodial torture.” (Part 14)

Institutional complicity and systemic failure at JIC Kupwara

Taking a constitutional view of state accountability, the Court directed that the CBI shall not only investigate the individual acts of torture but also examine “systemic issues” at the Joint Interrogation Centre, Kupwara.

“Considering the unprecedented gravity of this custodial torture case, the systematic cover-up orchestrated by local police machinery, the institutional bias demonstrated in the handling of the complaint, and the complete failure of local authorities to conduct a fair investigation and the unrelenting stand taken by the respondent State, we are constrained to direct transfer of investigation to the CBI.” (Para 27)

“The majesty of law demands nothing less than complete independence and impartiality in investigating crimes that shock the conscience of society and violate the most fundamental principles of human dignity enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the transfer of investigation to the CBI becomes not merely advisable but constitutionally imperative to ensure justice and uphold the rule of law.” (Para 27)

The CBI has been directed to:

• Register a Regular Case (RC) based on the March 1, 2023 complaint filed by the victim’s wife and the medical evidence on record. The RC is to be registered within 7 days of this order.
• Take over all existing documents, medical records, CCTV footage, forensic evidence, and case diary.
• The CBI is to also conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the systemic issues at the Joint Interrogation Centre, Kupwara, including examination of all CCTV systems, interrogation from all personnel present during the relevant period, forensic examination of the premises, and review of all protocols and procedures followed for detention and interrogation of suspects.
• FIR No. 32 of 2023, registered against the appellant under Section 309 of the IPC at Police Station Kupwara, to be quashed for being prima facie fabricated.
• Submit a status report to the Supreme Court by November 10, 2025.

Compensation as Constitutional Remedy: ₹50 lakh awarded

The Court awarded ₹50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) as compensation to the appellant, holding it to be a necessary constitutional remedy in light of the established violation of Article 21.

“A sequel to the above discussion and in order to provide some solace to the victim and his family for the barbaric acts of custodial torture leading to complete castration, we hereby direct the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir to pay compensation of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) to the appellant (victim). The said amount shall be recoverable from the officer(s) concerned against whom a departmental proceeding shall be initiated upon conclusion of the investigation by the CBI.” (Para 38 (V))

Citing D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal and Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, the Court reiterated that:

“Before we conclude, we deem it necessary to address the question of compensation to the appellant, who is a victim of brutal and inhuman custodial torture. It is now well-settled in Indian constitutional jurisprudence that where fundamental rights, particularly the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are violated by State machinery, appropriate monetary compensation may be an effective remedy. In D.K. Basu (supra), this Court held that pecuniary compensation is an appropriate and effective remedy for the infringement of fundamental rights caused by State officials and that the defence of sovereign immunity is inapplicable. The Court noted that such compensation must focus on the compensatory element and serve as a balm to the victim, without prejudice to other remedies in civil or criminal law.” (Para 34)

The amount is recoverable from the officers found guilty, following completion of the CBI investigation and departmental proceedings. Notable, the compensation is without prejudice to Chohan’s right to pursue additional remedies.

Closing Words: Upholding the rule of law amid torture and power

In conclusion, the Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142, describing the case as a “gross abuse of state power” requiring independent, credible, and constitutionally driven accountability.

“Only investigation by an independent agency, i.e., CBI can restore public faith in the criminal justice system, ensure that this dehumanising crime does not go unpunished, and guarantee that the truth emerges without any institutional bias or cover-up attempts.” (Para 27)

The judgment sets a new precedent not just in affirming constitutional remedies for custodial violence, but also in highlighting the institutional duty of courts to intervene decisively where the state uses its apparatus to silence and punish those it has already harmed.

The complete judgment may be read below.

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The post “A Constitutionally Imperative to Ensure Justice”: Supreme Court Orders CBI probe, arrests, and ₹50 Lakh compensation for brutal custodial torture of constable in J&K appeared first on SabrangIndia.