The order goes beyond the FIRs specifically placed before the Court by the Delhi Police and the States of Bihar, West Bengal, Assam and Maharashtra. The Court extended the protection to similar FIRs registered anywhere else in the country, including in States and Union Territories that were not parties to the applications. The Court simultaneously barred the registration of any fresh FIR in relation to the protest incidents of July 20-25, subject to one specific exception concerning 2,873 individuals whom the Delhi Police claimed had serious criminal antecedents.

The decision came after the Union government and the four States moved applications seeking the quashing of the FIRs. As reported by LiveLaw, the applications were filed against the backdrop of an assurance allegedly given by the Central government to the Cockroach Janata Party (CJP) leadership on July 25 that cases against protesters would be withdrawn and no fresh FIRs would be registered in connection with the agitation.

The Supreme Court has now converted that assurance into judicial directions, while expressly making its exercise of Article 142 dependent upon both sides honouring the understanding placed before it.

FIRs quashed and proceedings terminated

The order records that thousands of young students participated in protests held between July 20 and July 25 in Delhi, in the applicant-States and in other parts of the country. Following those protests, criminal cases were registered at several police stations. The five applications before the Court were moved by Delhi Police, Bihar, West Bengal, Assam and Maharashtra. They sought the exercise of the Supreme Court’s powers under Article 142 to quash the FIRs arising from the protests.

The Delhi Police application concerned 13 FIRs. Bihar placed 69 FIRs before the Court, while West Bengal sought relief in respect of eight FIRs and Assam in respect of five. Maharashtra placed 34 FIRs before the Court. The Court reproduced the details of these FIRs in its order.

Importantly, the Court did not restrict relief to these identified cases. After the Solicitor General submitted that additional FIRs could have been registered in other States and Union Territories concerning the same incidents, the Court directed that those cases too would not be pursued or investigated. The operative portion of the order states that any other FIR relating to the same incidents of protests between July 20 and July 25, including FIRs in States and Union Territories that were not applicants before the Court, “shall not be pursued or investigated” and shall be treated as closed for all intents and purposes.

The Court further directed that no State or Union Territory shall register any fresh FIR relating to those protest incidents. This makes the order significantly wider than the applications originally placed before the Court. The States that approached the Court sought relief concerning specified FIRs; the Court extended the protection to similarly situated cases across the country.

Court invokes Article 142 to protect students’ future

The central justification recorded by the Bench is the future of the young protesters. The Court noted the submission that the Central government and the applicant-States had consciously decided not to pursue the FIRs “as a gesture of goodwill” and to ensure that the cases did not cause prejudice to young students who had participated in the protests. The order also records an important qualification: “mere participation in the protests is not taken as an offence under the penal laws.”

It was against this background that the Court considered the matter fit for the exercise of its powers under Article 142. The Bench stated that, considering the commitments made before it and “most importantly” the future prospects of young protesters who had bona fide participated in peaceful protests to raise their demands, it was appropriate to invoke Article 142 to “do complete justice”.

The Court consequently quashed the FIRs specifically listed before it, along with all proceedings arising from them. The language of the order is significant because the Court did not merely record the government’s decision not to pursue the cases. It itself terminated the identified FIRs and extended the operative protection to other cases arising from the same protest incidents.

The 2,873-person exception

The order, however, does not provide an unconditional blanket protection to every person who may have been present at the protests. The Delhi Police had specifically sought permission to register a fresh FIR against 2,873 individuals whom it claimed had serious criminal antecedents, based on the National Crime Records Bureau database.

According to the application, these individuals were prima facie reported to have been present at the protest site. The police sought to investigate allegations relating specifically to bodily harm and destruction of public property. The Court permitted the Central government/Delhi Police to register a fresh FIR concerning these 2,873 individuals.

The permission is nevertheless confined to the allegations identified in the application. The order records that the proposed FIR is to concern offences relating to bodily harm or destruction of public property. It also expressly preserves the right of affected persons to pursue lawful remedies.

This distinction is important. The Court has not authorised a reopening of the entire protest-related criminal process against these individuals. It has permitted a fresh FIR within the limited framework sought by Delhi Police and without prejudice to the rights of those affected. The Court also linked this exception to its earlier observations of August 3, 2026, when it had clarified that protection could not be extended to persons with criminal antecedents involving “grave and heinous offences”.

Nationwide protection, despite only five jurisdictions approaching the Court

One of the most consequential features of the order is its pan-India operation. The applications before the Court came from Delhi Police, Bihar, West Bengal, Assam and Maharashtra. Yet the Solicitor General told the Court that there could be FIRs concerning the same protest incidents in other States and Union Territories.

Rather than requiring each affected protester or State to separately approach the Court, the Bench directed that such FIRs would not be pursued or investigated. The Court also barred States and Union Territories from registering fresh FIRs concerning the incidents between July 20 and July 25.

The direction therefore closes the possibility of the same protest incidents continuing to generate criminal proceedings elsewhere. The order also records a commitment by the Delhi Police and the applicant-States that, if another FIR concerning the same incidents comes to their notice, they would not oppose the affected party seeking similar relief from the Supreme Court.

NEET-UG suicide compensation: Union given 90 days

The criminal proceedings were not the only issue addressed by the Court. The Solicitor General informed the Bench that the Central government would formulate a pan-India policy or arrangement for compensation to the families of students who died by suicide in connection with the NEET-UG 2026 examination.

The Court recorded that the students concerned were situated in different parts of the country and consequently directed the Centre, in consultation with the State governments and Union Territories, to formulate the policy within 90 days. Once formulated, compensation is to be paid to the affected families without delay. The order further states that the policy or arrangement may subsequently be adopted by State governments and Union Territories as a regular mechanism for compensatory measures.

This direction gives judicial force to the assurance placed before the Court by the Solicitor General. As reported by LiveLaw, the Centre had sought three months to work out the modalities for compensation. The Court has consequently fixed a 90-day period for the formulation of the nationwide policy.

September 5 CJP march withdrawn in Court

The proceedings also resulted in the withdrawal of the protest march that the CJP had announced for September 5. The proposed march had been announced after the organisation alleged that the government’s assurances concerning the withdrawal of criminal cases had not been implemented.

According to the report of LiveLaw, the proposed demonstration in Delhi was to be held in connection with the demands arising from the NEET examination controversy, including the withdrawal of cases against protesters and compensation for families of students who died by suicide.

During the hearing, CJP co-convener Saurav Das made a statement before the Bench that the organisation was withdrawing the September 5 call in view of the assurances given by the government and the order being passed by the Court. The Supreme Court recorded that statement.

The order then made it clear that the commitments made by all sides would have to be honoured. The Court directed both sides to abide by the statements and commitments made before it and expressly linked the exercise of Article 142 to compliance with the understanding reached between the parties. CJI Surya Kant, according to the proceedings reported by LiveLaw, observed that if both sides acted in good faith, the issues could be resolved one by one.

Article 142 and the Court’s carefully confined intervention

The Court’s use of Article 142 is central to the order. The applications specifically sought the exercise of the Supreme Court’s extraordinary constitutional power to secure the quashing of FIRs that the executive itself had decided it no longer wished to pursue. The order makes clear, however, that the Court is not laying down a general rule for the quashing of protest-related FIRs.

In paragraph 15, the Bench expressly states that its directions are being issued because of the “peculiar facts and circumstances of the case” and “shall not be taken as a binding precedent.”

The Court has therefore crafted relief that is extensive in its immediate reach but expressly limited in its precedential value. The order brings closure to the particular set of protests and the criminal proceedings arising from them, while avoiding a declaration that similar FIRs in future protest cases must necessarily be quashed. The order also makes the settlement between the parties an important component of the Article 142 exercise. The Court records that its extraordinary powers are subject to the condition that both sides abide by the terms of the mutual understanding placed before it.

A judicial closure of the criminal fallout of the July protests

The order ultimately produces a comprehensive closure of the criminal proceedings arising from the specified July protests. The FIRs specifically placed before the Court have been quashed. Other FIRs concerning the same incidents, even where they were not formally brought before the Bench, are not to be pursued or investigated. States and Union Territories have been prohibited from registering fresh FIRs concerning those incidents. The only express exception is the liberty granted to Delhi Police concerning the 2,873 individuals identified in its application. The Court has simultaneously directed the Centre to formulate a nationwide compensation mechanism within 90 days for families of students who died by suicide in connection with NEET-UG 2026.

The order is thus structured around two forms of closure: criminal proceedings arising from the protests are brought to an end, while the government’s commitment concerning compensation to affected families is placed on a defined judicial timeline.

At the same time, the Bench has carefully confined the constitutional significance of its intervention. It has not declared the quashing of protest FIRs to be a general rule. Instead, it has treated the matter as an exceptional exercise of Article 142 arising from the particular circumstances before it, the commitments made by the parties, and the Court’s concern that the criminal cases should not prejudice the future prospects of young protesters who had participated in the agitation.

The order closes with the Court placing on record its appreciation of the Union government, the applicant-States, counsel and the CJP leadership for their “constructive and cooperative approach”, noting that this had kept the interests and future of the young students at the forefront. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that this resolution rests on the peculiar circumstances of this case and the commitments made before it. It is precisely for that reason that the Bench has directed that the order not be treated as a binding precedent.

The complete order may be read below:

Detailed reports on the withdrawal of FIRs may be read here, here and here.

Detailed reports on brute force used by police on the protestors may be read here, here, here and here.

Related:

Maharashtra’s schools are struggling to survive as students protest, infrastructure crumbles and Marathi-medium institutions disappear

After NEET protests ended, the battle moved online: Women protesters face threats, doxing and criminalisation

Bihar: Not just Delhi, Patna, Siwan too saw brute police violence against demonstrating students: PUCL

Maharashtra: After backlash, govt. moves to withdraw FIRs against student protesters but questions remain

Water Cannons Instead of Answers: Bihar’s recruitment crisis and the state’s crackdown on protest

Amnesty Investigation finds unlawful and deadly force against CJP-led protesters in Delhi and Siwan

The Supreme Court’s Uneasy Middle Path on Protest Policing

Governments begin rolling back cases against protesters, but questions over violence, arrests and accountability remain

July 2026: A dissent that was brutally put down, a crackdown after the protest ended

The post NEET Protests: Supreme Court ends criminal proceedings against students across India appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Bench comprising Justices Atul Sreedharan and Achal Sachdev allowed Chaudhary’s habeas corpus petition and held that the detention was founded on what the Court described as a “concocted story” by the State. The Court directed that she be released immediately if her custody was not required in any other case. The Court also directed the Noida authorities to pay her ₹5 lakh in compensation. The detailed order is awaited.

However, Bar & Bench has reported that Chaudhary is likely to remain in custody for the time being because she has not yet secured bail in the other criminal cases registered in connection with the Noida workers’ agitation. The judgment comes after the Bench subjected the State’s version of Chaudhary’s arrest and alleged involvement in the violence to close scrutiny, particularly the chronology of her arrest and the notices issued under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS).

Court questions sequence of arrest and BNSS notices

During the hearing, the State told the Court that Chaudhary had been arrested at 10:56 a.m. on April 12, 2026 and that a notice under Section 130 of the BNSS had been issued to her. The State’s case was that Chaudhary had instigated protesters to engage in stone-pelting and arson. The Bench, however, questioned whether the procedure prescribed under the BNSS had actually been followed.

Justice Sreedharan specifically asked whether Chaudhary had first been served a notice under Section 126. The State acknowledged that no such notice had been issued and that the notice under Section 130 had instead been served. The Court then examined the chronology of the documents and the General Diary (GD) entry. Justice Sreedharan questioned how a notice could have been prepared after Chaudhary had already been arrested.

As reported by LiveLaw, the Court observed in court: “Ab ismei GD entry dekhiye, usko arrest karliya fir notice banaya.”

The Bench further pointed to the apparent inconsistency between the arrest record and the notice, observing that the record indicated that Chaudhary had already been arrested before the notice was prepared. The Court’s questioning went to the heart of the legality of the detention: whether the State had followed the statutory sequence required before taking the drastic step of arrest and subsequently placing Chaudhary under preventive detention.

‘Whatever violence has happened is after her arrest’

The Court also closely examined the State’s claim that Chaudhary had played a role in instigating the violence during the workers’ protest. The State relied on the events surrounding the workers’ mobilisation and alleged that Chaudhary had encouraged protesters to resort to violence, including stone-pelting and arson. But the Bench drew attention to the chronology of events.

According to the State’s own account, people had gathered for the protest on April 11. Justice Sreedharan pointed out that the significant violence relied upon by the prosecution occurred only later.

“Yani 11 ko koi violence nahi tha. Whatever violence has happened is after her arrest,” the Court observed, according to LiveLaw.

The observation was significant because the State’s case depended on establishing Chaudhary’s connection to the violence. If she had already been arrested before the violence that formed the basis of the allegations, the Court was evidently questioning how the State could attribute subsequent acts of violence to her.

Where is the video evidence?

The Bench had already expressed concern about the evidentiary basis of the State’s allegations during the previous hearing. On September 1, the Court had specifically asked the Uttar Pradesh government to produce video footage showing Chaudhary allegedly instigating protesters to throw stones or set vehicles on fire. The State sought additional time to obtain and produce the footage. The Court refused.

Justice Sreedharan noted that Chaudhary had already spent approximately five months in custody and said, “I won’t give time. She has been in jail for 5 months.”

The Bench had also warned that if the record ultimately showed an arbitrary exercise of power, costs could be imposed on the officials concerned. The issue resurfaced during the final hearing when the State relied upon witness statements that allegedly named Chaudhary. The Bench, however, sought something more specific: where was the material showing that she had actually instigated the violence?

The Court also questioned the State’s reliance on the chargesheet, asking where the witnesses had specifically implicated her and where the videographic evidence demonstrated the alleged acts of instigation.

From workers’ protest to NSA detention

Chaudhary’s detention stems from the Noida workers’ protests of April 2026, which began over demands for higher wages and improved working conditions and later escalated into violence, arson and clashes with the police. The protests began peacefully but turned violent on April 13. Police subsequently arrested a large number of workers and activists and registered multiple criminal cases.

Chaudhary, a Delhi University history graduate and activist, was among those arrested. The Uttar Pradesh government subsequently invoked the NSA against her and journalist and activist Satyam Verma on May 13. The police alleged that the two had played a significant role in the violence and disruption associated with the workers’ agitation.

At the time, Gautam Buddh Nagar Police Commissioner Laxmi Singh claimed that the police had “strong electronic and videographic evidence” against Chaudhary, Verma and others arrested in connection with the protests. The police’s version was that the violence was not spontaneous but part of a wider organised effort.

Detailed report may be read here and here.

Related:

Noida Protest 2026: A labour uprising the state refused to understand

No ‘Pakistan conspiracy’ in Noida labour unrest: Fact-finding report

NSA slapped on journalist, DU scholar in Noida workers’ protest case amid allegations of crackdown on dissent

The post Allahabad HC quashes NSA detention of Aakriti Chaudhary, questions ‘concocted’ State narrative in Noida workers’ protest case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Bhati, president of the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BR Ambedkar faction), has alleged that he was beaten with shoes, fists, kicks, belts and wooden sticks, while Jatav, the organisation’s Meerut district president, allegedly suffered similar treatment. Bhati was left with a heavily swollen eye and other visible injuries, as reported by The Wire.

A meeting with the SSP that allegedly turned into an assault

According to Bhati’s account, he and Jatav went to meet then-SSP Avinash Pandey on August 19. They were seeking relief in a case arising from protests held on July 8 over the murder of Lalita Gautam, a young Dalit woman from Meerut. Bhati has maintained that he was not present at the protest and wanted his name removed from the FIR connected with the demonstration. He said the two men had been trying to meet the SSP for several days and were eventually asked to come to his office.

Bhati alleged that the conversation quickly became hostile, with Pandey abusing him and questioning his credentials as a political and farmer leader. He said that when he objected to the alleged abuse, police personnel dragged him into another room. There, he alleged, the SSP assaulted him. Bhati has described being kicked, punched and beaten with shoes and a belt. He specifically alleged that Pandey kicked him around the eye several times after he fell to the floor.

The Indian Express, which spoke to Bhati, reported his allegation that he was assaulted for an extended period before he and Jatav were taken to the SOG office. Bhati also alleged that wooden planks and sticks were used against them and that the soles of their feet, backs and waist were beaten.

His visible injuries have become a central element of the controversy. Photographs showed substantial swelling around his eye, while videos released by Bhati showed him describing the alleged assault.

“मेरठ SSP के दफ्तर में किसी बात पर वाद विवाद हुआ। बात खराब हो गई, हिंसा का प्रयोग हुआ। सहारनपुर रेंज DIG से इस पूरे केस की जांच कराई जा रही है”

मेरठ में किसान नेता दिग्विजय भाटी की बर्बरता से पिटाई पर ADG भानु भास्कर ने कहा !! https://t.co/SCjEgECz3g pic.twitter.com/xeiUsdPHXc

— Sachin Gupta (@Sachingupta) August 21, 2026

Meerut police claims Samajwadi Party leader Digvijay Singh Bhati sustained the torture injuries after he fell from his scooty while returning from police office. https://t.co/7otICjnVLZ pic.twitter.com/e0TecnoXtc

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) August 21, 2026

SSP kicked me in the eye multiple times, says Samajwadi party leader tortured in custody

Samajwadi party leader Digvijay Bhati claims he was brutally assaulted by Meerut SSP Avinash Pandey over Bhati’s involvement in a protest over murder of a Dalit girl. Later, he was taken to… pic.twitter.com/75JspJ8P09

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) August 21, 2026

Spoke to Digvijay Bhati, who according to UP’s Meerut police, fell from a scooty while returning from police office. pic.twitter.com/tHyUhpEkmQ

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) August 21, 2026

From the SSP office to the SOG office

Bhati has alleged that the incident did not end inside the SSP’s office. According to his account, the two men were subsequently taken by SOG personnel to another location. There, he alleged, their hands and legs were tied and they were beaten repeatedly with sticks and belts. He has described being punched around the head and temple and suffering repeated assaults. He further alleged that the men were denied ordinary dignity during the episode, including being given water in the cap of a bottle.

Perhaps the most disturbing allegation concerns their alleged humiliation after the physical assault. Bhati has alleged that police personnel played the Hindi film song “Choli Ke Peeche Kya Hai” and forced the two men to dance despite their physical condition. India Today reported the allegation that the two were forced to dance to the song, while The Indian Express also reported Bhati’s account of being humiliated after allegedly being beaten at the SOG office.

Jatav, meanwhile, has alleged that he was threatened with an encounter. Bhati has also claimed that the police threatened them with further consequences if they spoke about what had allegedly happened.

The police initially offered a dramatically different version

Meerut police initially rejected the allegations as “false and baseless”. According to the police version reported by The Wire, Bhati and Jatav had visited the police office in connection with an earlier FIR. The police claimed that the two subsequently fell from their scooter while returning home, sustaining the injuries visible in photographs. The police further said that the two men themselves submitted a written application concerning the incident, which was entered in the general diary at Civil Lines police station.

The controversy intensified when Avinash Pandey was transferred from his position as Meerut SSP on August 20 and attached to the DGP headquarters in Lucknow. Pandey was among nine IPS officers transferred in the reshuffle. Unlike officers who were given new district postings, he was attached to the state headquarters. Times of India reported that the transfer came amid the allegations of illegal detention and custodial torture.

The following day, Additional Director General of Police, Meerut Zone, Bhanu Bhaskar announced an inquiry. Saharanpur Range DIG Abhishek Singh was tasked with investigating the allegations and submitting a report. The police leadership initially described the incident more cautiously, saying that a dispute had arisen at the SSP’s office on August 19, after which violence allegedly took place. The case was therefore no longer simply an allegation made by two activists. It had become an official police inquiry.

Eight policemen sent to the lines; inspector suspended

The administration subsequently took further action. After taking charge, new Meerut SSP BBGTS Murthy ordered eight police personnel to be sent to the police lines, including Civil Lines SHO Akhilesh Gaur, two sub-inspectors and five constables. On August 23, Gaur was suspended. Times of India reported that the suspension was ordered on grounds including alleged negligence, apathy and arbitrary conduct in the discharge of his duties.

By August 25, reports indicated that Gaur had been suspended while the other personnel remained subject to administrative action, with the inquiry continuing. The investigating team has also begun examining the physical locations and documentary evidence. Navbharat Times reported that DIG Abhishek Singh inspected the relevant locations and examined CCTV footage and duty records, while questioning personnel connected with the allegations.

This controversy did not begin on August 19

The allegations against the police must also be viewed against the backdrop of what happened in Meerut in July. The entire chain of events goes back to the killing of Lalita Gautam, a 20-year-old Dalit student whose body was recovered in May after she went missing. Her death generated anger among Dalit groups and local residents, who questioned the police investigation and demanded that additional people allegedly connected with the crime be arrested.

On July 8, protesters gathered in Meerut demanding justice. The protest subsequently escalated, with police using force to disperse the demonstrators. Times of India reported that nearly 100 members of the Dalit community had gathered and that the confrontation escalated after protesters blocked roads and demanded that senior officials personally hear their grievances. A video from the confrontation also showed then-SSP Avinash Pandey repeatedly slapping a protester inside a police vehicle.

VIDEO: Meerut SSP Enters Police Van, Slaps Protest Detainee

Meerut SSP Avinash Pandey was seen entering a police custody vehicle and slapping a detainee during action taken after the Dalit community protest.

According to police, the detainee has been identified as Ravi Gautam,… pic.twitter.com/FLHa02gYSk

— Atulkrishan (@iAtulKrishan1) July 8, 2026

The police subsequently registered cases against protesters. According to Times of India, 13 people were named and around 50 others were booked on serious charges, including attempt to murder and allegations concerning women police personnel. Seven people were arrested and sent to judicial custody.

Those proceedings subsequently changed. On July 21, Times of India reported that serious non-bailable charges against the protesters had been dropped, following developments surrounding the case and intervention by the courts.

The July crackdown had also attracted the attention of the National Human Rights Commission. The NHRC sought an action-taken report from the Uttar Pradesh DGP and Home Secretary after a complaint alleged that Meerut police had used excessive force against protesters and caused serious injuries, reported The Hindu. Times of India reported that the Commission sought a detailed report within 15 days.

The ‘history-sheeter’ argument cannot answer allegations of torture

One of the most revealing aspects of the police response has been its emphasis on Bhati and Jatav’s criminal cases. Police have said that Bhati has several cases registered against him and that Jatav also has multiple cases. Bhati has disputed the circumstances and nature of several of these cases, saying many relate to protests and allegations arising from political activity. But even assuming every case cited by the police is genuine and pending, that does not resolve the central allegation. A criminal record, or a history sheet, does not authorise custodial violence.

Related:

Bihar: Not just Delhi, Patna, Siwan too saw brute police violence against demonstrating students: PUCL

The State Wants the Delete Button: India’s new architecture of digital censorship

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Supreme Court: UP Gangsters Act ‘stillborn’ for prescribing punishment without creating an offence

‘Wherever You Go, We are watching’: Second threat letter to Kashmiri Pandits

The post Inside the SSP’s Office: Allegations of beatings, torture & police impunity against farmer leaders in Meerut, UP appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and K Vinod Chandran, in Shiv Pratap Singh alias Chinu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, held that the defect goes to the very foundation of the penal legislation: the Act defines a “gang” and a “gangster”, but does not create a separate crime corresponding to those definitions.

The Court consequently quashed the proceedings under Sections 2 and 3 of the Act against two advocates, Shiv Pratap Singh and Himanshu Srivastava, while making it clear that any independent offences allegedly committed by them under the IPC or other penal statutes can continue to be prosecuted under those laws.  The judgment turns on a basic principle of criminal law: there can be no punishment without an offence created by law.

‘Punishment prescribed without an offence being created’

The Court examined Section 2 of the UP Act, which defines “gang” and “gangster”. The definition of a gang encompasses persons acting singly or collectively through violence, threats, intimidation, coercion or otherwise for purposes including disturbing public order or gaining undue temporal, pecuniary or other advantage. It then lists 25 categories of activities.

The problem, according to the Bench, is that the activities covered by those clauses are already offences under other penal laws. Kidnapping, drug trafficking, human trafficking and the other activities falling within Section 2(b), for instance, are punishable under the IPC or other specific penal enactments. The UP Act does not transform them into a new offence merely because the person committing them is characterised as a member or leader of a “gang”. The Court therefore drew a sharp distinction between defining a status and creating an offence.

“After defining gang, which includes commission of the offences listed under sub-clauses (i) to (xxv) and defining gangster as a member or leader or organiser of a gang, the punishment is prescribed for a gangster without an offence being created by statute; which makes the penal act, stillborn.” (Para 43)

In other words, the existence of an underlying crime may justify prosecution under the law that actually criminalises that conduct. But, in the Supreme Court’s analysis, the Gangsters Act cannot simply attach a further criminal punishment to the person’s classification as a “gangster” when the Act itself has not created such an offence.

The Court emphasised that it was concerned only with the proceedings under Sections 2/3 of the Gangsters Act, and not with the substantive criminal cases registered under other laws. If an accused is alleged to have committed an offence under the IPC or another penal statute, those proceedings must continue in accordance with the law applicable to that offence.

Gang chart cannot become a substitute for legislation

A central part of the judgment concerns the gang-chart mechanism under the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021. The Court found that the statutory scheme effectively allowed the executive to determine who would acquire the status of a “gangster” for the purposes of punishment. Yet, according to the Bench, determining what conduct constitutes a crime and attaching penal consequences to it is a function reserved for the legislature.

“A ‘gangster’ is defined under the Act and the determination of who a gangster is, for the purpose of punishment, is as prescribed in the Rules, left to the ipsi dixit of the Executive. The creation of crime, or to make an act or omission subject to penal consequences as an offence, is essentially a legislative function and it cannot be thrown away and left to sprout in the thickets of subordinate legislation.” (Para 54)

The Court held that this function cannot be delegated to subordinate legislation. The Rules may prescribe procedure; they cannot create a crime which Parliament or the state legislature itself has failed to create in the parent statute. The preparation of a gang chart, therefore, could not supply the missing offence.

The Bench held that using the gang chart to punish a person for conduct already covered by other penal statutes, independently of prosecution under those laws, would exceed the power conferred by Section 23 of the Act. It would effectively permit the same criminal conduct to be punished again under another enactment merely by assigning the accused the status of a gangster.

Concern over pre-trial incarceration and ‘foregone conclusion’

The Court was particularly troubled by the consequences of the gang-chart system. It noted that inclusion in a gang chart could lead not merely to the initiation of proceedings but to arrest and prolonged pre-trial incarceration, followed by trial and punishment on the basis of the very same material contained in the chart.

The Bench compared this to the English proverb: “Give a dog a bad name and hang him.”

The Court’s concern was that the executive’s determination of a person’s status as a gangster could effectively become the foundation for the subsequent criminal process, even though the statute had not itself created the offence for which punishment was being imposed.

The judgment also noted that the statutory framework could enable investigation and filing of the chargesheet to be delayed, thereby extending pre-trial incarceration for up to a year. The Court described the Gangsters Act as having been portrayed as an alternative to preventive detention, but without the safeguards that accompany preventive-detention legislation.

The comparison was significant. The Court pointed out that preventive detention, despite being permissible in appropriate circumstances, is surrounded by strict procedural safeguards because it rests substantially on executive satisfaction. Those safeguards include statutory time limits, supply of material to the detenue, opportunities for representation and scrutiny by an Advisory Board.

The Gangsters Act, the Bench observed, did not provide equivalent safeguards while permitting detention merely on the basis of inclusion in a gang chart and subsequently permitting trial and punishment on the same foundation.

“As we noticed, the provisions of the Act could lead to a detention of the accused without trial for long, which is akin to a statute enjoining preventive detention. Though preventive detention has been held to be permissible even in the teeth of Article 21, the same is hedged with safeguards, which are held to be sacrosanct and even a minor procedural violation would entail release of the detenu. The safeguards in preventive detention are numerous, since it is the subjective satisfaction of the Administration and the Police that leads to a detention, the period in which such detention continues being the exclusive premise of the State Government, who also has the authority to release the detenu at any point of time. The period provided in which such detention order has to be forwarded to the State Government; the materials to be supplied to the detenu; the right of representation to the various authorities, at every stage, as granted to the detenu; the reference to an Advisory Board constituted by statute and the decision to be arrived there at within a time frame, mitigates and erases to an extent the rigour & malice of subjectivity, which subjectivity pervades a preventive detention order. The subject enactment, the U.P. Act not only permits detention for a period without anything more than the inclusion in a Gang Chart but also enables a trial and punishment on the basis of the very same Gang Chart, in addition to the pre-trial incarceration, but without an offence being created by the Act itself. It is akin to the English proverb: ‘Give a dog a bad name and hang him’.” (Para 54)

Article 20(1): No punishment without an offence

The Court anchored its reasoning in Article 20(1) of the Constitution, which prohibits conviction for an offence except for violation of a law in force at the time the act was committed and also prohibits the imposition of a greater penalty than that prescribed at that time. The Bench invoked the Latin maxim “nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege” — no crime and no punishment without law.

The Court relied on its earlier decisions, including Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt Ltd and CBI v. R.R. Kishore, to reiterate the broader principle that criminal liability must have a legal foundation.

Among the principles distilled by the Court were that a later statute cannot turn an act that was previously innocent into a crime, cannot retrospectively increase punishment for an offence already committed, and that procedural changes can operate on pending matters only where they do not create a new offence or new punitive exposure.

Although Article 20(1) was not being applied in a conventional retrospective-criminalisation setting, the Bench said its principle was relevant because the question before it was whether a person could be tried and punished for an “offence” that did not exist in the penal statute.

Why Maharashtra and Gujarat laws survived the comparison

The Supreme Court also considered the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 and the Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015. The comparison, however, was not an endorsement of either statute. The Court noted that those enactments expressly create offences such as organised crime and prescribe the conditions necessary for invoking their penal provisions. In Mahipal Singh v. CBI, for instance, the Court had considered the Maharashtra law’s requirement of “continuing unlawful activity”, including the filing of more than one chargesheet within the prescribed period and cognizance by a competent court.

That, the Bench found, was precisely what was missing from the UP legislation. The Court also referred to its earlier decision in Shraddha Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where it had held that even a single crime could be sufficient to invoke the UP Gangsters Act. That judgment had distinguished the Maharashtra and Gujarat statutes, which contain additional requirements relating to continuing or repeated criminal activity. But the specific question of whether the UP Act actually creates an offence had not been decided then.

The present judgment therefore addressed what the Court described as a question that remained res integra before the Supreme Court, despite the Allahabad High Court Full Bench having rejected the challenge.

Two advocates get relief

The ruling arose from two separate proceedings. Shiv Pratap Singh, a practising advocate, had become embroiled in a dispute concerning elections to the Fatehgarh Bar Association in Farrukhabad. Following disciplinary proceedings by the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh and a subsequent criminal complaint, an FIR was registered in 2023 under various IPC provisions. In February 2024, the police registered a separate FIR under the Gangsters Act against Singh and two others, accompanied by a gang chart. Singh was named as accused No. 3. The Supreme Court made clear that it was not adjudicating the underlying Bar Council or Bar Association dispute. Its concern was the validity of the proceedings under the Gangsters Act and Rules.

The second appeal was filed by Himanshu Srivastava, against proceedings involving him, his brother and his father, who was alleged to be the gang leader. An FIR registered in Ghaziabad under Sections 2/3 of the Gangsters Act referred to various previous criminal cases and described Srivastava’s father as the gang leader.

In both matters, the Supreme Court confined itself to the proceedings under the Gangsters Act. It did not extinguish liability for any independent offence under the IPC or other penal laws.

‘Violence’ in the name of preventing violence

The judgment ends with one of its most striking observations. Taking a cue from the George Orwell quotation placed at the beginning of the judgment — “Those who abjure violence can do so only because others are committing violence on their behalf” — the Bench said:

“Before we leave the matter, we take a cue from the quote of George Orwell, we extracted at the outset, to find that the enactment under scrutiny on the pretext of adjuring violence, is in fact perpetuating it on un-suspecting citizens.” (Para 59)

The observation captures the Court’s central objection. The problem was not the State’s stated objective of combating criminal gangs. The Bench expressly acknowledged that curbing the menace of criminal gangs is a laudable objective. But, it said, the end cannot justify the means when a penal law interferes with the liberty of citizens without first establishing, through legislation, the offence for which they are to be punished.

The Supreme Court accordingly allowed both appeals and quashed the Gangsters Act proceedings in the two cases. It directed that the appellants be released forthwith if they were in custody and not required in any other case; where they were already on bail, their bail bonds were ordered to stand cancelled.

The judgment, however, provides that while the UP Gangsters Act proceedings cannot survive, but criminal proceedings for the underlying offences under the IPC or other penal statutes are unaffected and may proceed independently.

A judgment that stops short of the constitutional question

The judgment’s most significant limitation, however, lies in what the Court expressly chose not to decide. The challenge to the Gangsters Act was not confined to the question whether the legislation created a distinct offence. The constitutional validity of the enactment had also been questioned before the Allahabad High Court, which had rejected those challenges in a Full Bench decision. The Supreme Court, however, made it clear that it was not examining that aspect of the matter.

The Bench expressly stated that it had neither upheld the Full Bench decision nor rejected the constitutional challenges considered by it. Those questions, it said, would remain open for consideration. That qualification is important. The Court has described the statutory scheme in deeply critical terms: it found that the Act enables punishment without creating an offence, permits proceedings to rest on a gang chart prepared through an executive process, and creates the possibility of detention and prosecution on the basis of a status conferred by the authorities. Yet it stopped short of determining whether that architecture itself violates the Constitution.

The result is therefore not a declaration that the UP Gangsters Act is unconstitutional. The Court’s holding is narrower, though consequential: in its present form, the Act cannot sustain a prosecution because it does not create an offence to which its penal provision can attach. That leaves open an important question for the future. If the statutory defect is sought to be cured by legislative amendment, the broader constitutional objections to the Gangsters Act may still have to be answered. The Supreme Court’s judgment does not resolve them.

In that sense, the decision is both a sweeping indictment and a limited ruling: the Court has dismantled the legal foundation on which prosecutions under the existing Act rest, while deliberately leaving open the constitutional validity of the regime itself.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

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Lawyer booked for sedition, 28 booked under Gangsters Act

HRD & lawyer Mohammed Shoaib among two other activists in Varanasi picked up: UP

Allahabad HC slams DM for declaring a woman “gangster” for having 2 FIRs against her

Liberty on Hold: Delays turn the promise of justice into punishment

The post Supreme Court: UP Gangsters Act ‘stillborn’ for prescribing punishment without creating an offence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At one level, the case concerned two women who said that they had voluntarily embraced Islam and were subsequently confined by their father. But the legal question before the Court was considerably broader: can the alleged illegality of a person’s religious conversion justify the continued physical confinement of that person when she is an adult, competent, and unequivocally asserts that the choice was voluntary?

The Court answered in the negative. More importantly, it refused to allow the criminal investigation into the alleged conversion to collapse the distinction between two separate questions: whether the conversion was lawful, and whether the women could lawfully be detained.

“The present case discloses an exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights. The corpus, despite being major, educated and legally competent women, were deprived of their liberty for a prolonged period commencing from the year 2021, solely because they exercised their constitutionally protected freedom of conscience and chose to profess a religion different from that professed by their family. Such prolonged and coercive confinement strikes at the very foundation of constitutional democracy, which recognises the autonomy of every adult individual as sacrosanct and beyond the reach of parental or societal control. The constitutional guarantee of personal liberty cannot be permitted to yield to familial disapproval, social orthodoxy or executive apathy.” (Para 65)

“Before parting, this Court deems it necessary to reiterate that the Constitution does not confer upon parents a licence to incarcerate their major children merely because they disapprove of their faith, beliefs or personal choices. Constitutional rights cannot be eclipsed by parental authority, social morality or majoritarian sentiment. The liberty of an adult individual is inviolable, and any attempt to suppress that liberty by force or coercion invites the constitutional scrutiny of this Court and attracts appropriate public law consequences, including the award of monetary compensation for the infringement of fundamental rights.” (Para 66)

The former, the Court held, could be examined by the competent authority or court. The latter was squarely before the High Court in habeas corpus jurisdiction. The judgment consequently becomes a strong reaffirmation of decisional autonomy, freedom of conscience, the limits of parental authority, the scope of habeas corpus against private detention, and the State’s public-law liability when its machinery permits an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty to continue.

Two adult women before the constitutional court

The petition concerned Anshu Bhatia @ Amina Anshu Bhatia, aged about 35 years, and Diya Bhatia @ Zoya Diya Bhatia, aged about 20 years. By an order dated July 30, 2026, the State was directed to produce both women before the High Court. They were subsequently produced before Justice Sandeep Jain by police officials from the Cyber Crime Police Station, Agra.

The Court then did something crucial for a habeas corpus proceeding involving allegations of coercion: it interacted with the women directly. Anshu told the Court that she had voluntarily embraced Islam in 2020, describing the decision as a conscious and independent choice motivated by mental peace, spiritual fulfilment and inner solace. She stated that the decision was not the result of inducement, influence, coercion, undue persuasion or any extraneous consideration. She further stated that her father strongly opposed the decision and subsequently confined her within the parental home. According to her, physical restraint, intimidation and sustained mental harassment were used to compel her to renounce the faith she had chosen and return to Hinduism.

Diya, who had completed her education up to the Intermediate level, similarly told the Court that she had voluntarily embraced Islam in 2021, motivated by personal faith, conscience, mental peace and spiritual solace. She too denied force, fraud, coercion, undue influence or allurement.

Both women consistently maintained before the Court that their decisions were voluntary and conscious and arose from their own individual faith and freedom of conscience. They also denied that their conversion was motivated by an extraneous, unlawful or pecuniary consideration or intended to advance the interests of any individual or organisation. The dispute therefore came before the High Court in a very specific constitutional form: Were these adult women unlawfully confined by their father against their own wishes?

The State’s case: This was not merely a family dispute

The State strongly opposed the habeas corpus petition. The father had lodged Case Crime No. 228 of 2025 at Police Station Sadar Bazar, District Agra, alleging that the women had been subjected to forcible and deceitful conversion from Hinduism to Islam. The FIR was initially registered under Section 87 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

During investigation, the investigating agency subsequently added:

• Sections 61(2), 111(3), 111(4) and 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; and
• Sections 3/5(1) and 5(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021.

The State argued that the addition of these provisions demonstrated that the allegations of voluntary conversion could not simply be accepted at face value. But the State went considerably further. Its case was that the alleged conversion was part of a larger and organised conspiracy with ramifications for the sovereignty, integrity and unity of the nation.

It claimed that the investigation had uncovered material indicating the involvement of organised persons pursuing a coordinated design to disturb the social fabric through unlawful religious conversions.

The State also referred to alleged involvement of foreign entities and external influences, arguing that the investigation was continuing and that releasing the women could prejudice the proceedings. It further contended that the women had been projected as victims in the criminal case and that allowing them to reside with persons allegedly connected to the investigation could influence witnesses, prejudice the prosecution and frustrate the administration of criminal justice. The State therefore attempted to place the case within a much larger framework of public order, national interest and security.

The High Court was not persuaded.

Findings of the Court

• What is the scope of habeas corpus?

Before determining whether the detention was illegal, Justice Sandeep Jain examined the nature of the writ itself. The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Home Secretary (Prison) v. H. Nilofer Nisha, where the Supreme Court explained that habeas corpus is available wherever a person is deprived of personal liberty unlawfully or without justification.

Importantly, the Supreme Court authority recognises that habeas corpus is not confined to State detention. It can also be invoked against private detention. The Allahabad High Court quoted the principle that the writ is available for release from detention not only by the State but also from private detention. This becomes central to the case as the father was not a State official exercising a statutory power of detention. The alleged confinement was taking place inside the parental home. But that did not take the matter outside Article 226. The constitutional inquiry was simple: Was there lawful authority for the restraint?

• A parental home is not a legal prison—but it cannot become one

The judgment’s treatment of private detention is especially significant. The women were allegedly confined in their parental home. That fact could easily have been used to characterise the dispute as a family matter. Thankfully, the Court refused to do so. Habeas corpus exists precisely because the law is concerned with the fact of unlawful restraint, not merely the formal label attached to the person exercising it. The relevant question was not whether the father believed he was acting in the interests of his daughters. The question was whether he had legal authority to restrain two adult women. The Court ultimately found that he did not.

• Majority marks the constitutional end of parental custody

The Court relied on a line of constitutional jurisprudence concerning the autonomy of adult women. One of the authorities discussed was the Supreme Court’s decision in Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas. There, the Supreme Court held that once an individual attains majority, she is entitled to make her own choices and that courts should not assume the role of a super-guardian merely because a parent disapproves of that choice.

The Allahabad High Court also considered the Kerala High Court’s decision in Rajamohan MS v. State of Kerala, which dealt specifically with parental attempts to restrain an adult woman. That decision recognised that parental authority may extend to advice, counselling and guidance, but not to confinement or detention against the wishes of an adult daughter.

The Allahabad High Court reproduced the proposition that an adult major woman cannot be treated as a “chattel” and that parental authority does not give a parent the right to keep her under restraint against her will. This jurisprudence supplies the conceptual foundation for the present ruling. Once adulthood is attained, the parent-child relationship does not disappear. But its legal character changes.

• The Court rejects the idea that parents know what is “best” for adult women

The reliance on Rajamohan MS case is particularly important because it confronts a deeply embedded paternalistic assumption: that parents should be permitted to control adult women’s decisions because they believe those decisions are wrong, imprudent or harmful. The jurisprudence cited by the High Court rejects that logic.

An adult’s decision does not lose constitutional protection simply because the decision might later prove to be unwise. The Kerala High Court authority, quoted in the judgment, makes the point that courts cannot permit the concepts of parents about what is “right and good” for their adult daughters to override the daughters’ own assessment of what is right for them. This principle is particularly relevant in the present case.

The women’s choice concerned religion—a matter inherently connected to conscience and identity. The Constitution cannot recognise individual autonomy while simultaneously allowing family members to exercise a veto over the individual’s conscience.

• Reliance on Shafin Jahan to hold that constitutional courts are not super-guardians

The judgment also invokes Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., one of the Supreme Court’s most crucial decisions on individual autonomy. The High Court notes the Supreme Court’s recognition that constitutional courts may exercise parens patriae jurisdiction for persons who are incapable of exercising free will, such as minors or persons of unsound mind. But that principle cannot be extended to competent adults simply because their choices are controversial or disapproved of by others.

The Supreme Court in Shafin Jahan emphasised that decisions concerning intimate and personal matters belong to the individuals concerned and that neither State nor society can intrude into that domain merely because they disapprove of the choice. The Allahabad High Court uses that jurisprudence to reinforce a fundamental distinction: A constitutional court protects an adult’s autonomy; it does not replace it.

The Court therefore did not ask whether it believed the women’s religious choice was sensible. It asked whether the women themselves had made the choice freely. Once the answer was yes, the constitutional duty was to protect that choice from unlawful restraint.

• The Court personally tests voluntariness

This is where the Court’s interaction with the women becomes legally decisive. Justice Sandeep Jain recorded that the responses of both women were: “spontaneous, coherent and unequivocal.”

Nothing emerged during the interaction to suggest that they were acting under coercion, fear, inducement or undue influence. On the contrary, both consistently asserted that they had voluntarily embraced Islam as a matter of personal faith and conscience. The Court therefore did not simply accept the women’s claims because they were petitioners. It independently interacted with them. This matters because the State’s central argument was that their assertion of voluntariness was false and that they had been made instruments of an organised conversion network. The Court found no material before it sufficient to draw that inference.

• Article 25: “Freedom of conscience” includes the freedom to change faith

The Court then turned to Article 25. It held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience necessarily encompasses the right of a competent adult to adopt a faith, renounce a faith, or change her faith according to her own free will, belief and conviction. The Court did not conceptualise Article 25 merely as protecting the practice of an inherited religion. It recognised conscience as a matter of individual choice.

The Court held that such a decision is an essential facet of: individual autonomy, dignity and personal liberty. It is therefore protected not only under Article 25, but also under Article 21. If freedom of conscience means anything constitutionally, it cannot mean merely the freedom to remain within the religious identity assigned by one’s family. It must include the freedom to arrive at one’s own conviction. And where an adult voluntarily changes her faith, that choice cannot ordinarily be dictated by either the family or the State except within constitutionally permissible restrictions and the authority of law.

• The Uttar Pradesh Conversion Act does not answer the detention question

The State relied heavily on the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. The Court acknowledged that the Act provides the statutory framework governing unlawful religious conversions and prescribes procedures concerning conversions. But the Court made an important jurisdictional observation: The vires of the 2021 Act had not been challenged before it. Nor was the legality or validity of the alleged conversion itself the subject matter of the habeas corpus proceedings. Any question concerning compliance or non-compliance with the Act was therefore left to the competent authority or court. The Court then reached the central distinction: “The legality of the conversion and the legality of their detention constitute two distinct and independent issues.” This distinction is the backbone of the judgment.

The Court went further. It said that even assuming, for the sake of argument,  that the conversion had not been carried out strictly according to the procedure prescribed under the 2021 Act, that assumption would not itself authorise the father to continue confining the women. This is a crucial rule-of-law proposition. An alleged violation of one law does not automatically create a power under another law to deprive a person of liberty. If the conversion was unlawful, the State could investigate it. If an offence was established, the criminal law could operate.

But the father could not become the custodian of the women merely because he believed their religious conversion was illegal. The State could not use the pendency of that investigation to permit the confinement to continue. Thus, the Court separates regulation from detention. The State may regulate conduct through law; however, it cannot manufacture a detention power that the law does not confer.

• National security cannot rest on assertion alone

The State’s invocation of sovereignty, integrity and national security was also examined closely. The Court found that, apart from broad assertions based on the FIR and the pendency of investigation, no material had been placed before it demonstrating that the voluntary exercise of religious choice by these women, by itself, constituted a threat to the sovereignty, integrity or security of the country. The Court therefore refused to accept the argument.

The court held that mere apprehensions, however serious they may appear, cannot substitute legally admissible material while adjudicating upon the fundamental rights of citizens. This is not a finding that national-security considerations can never justify restrictions on liberty. Rather, it is a rejection of conjecture as constitutional evidence. The seriousness of the allegation does not eliminate the need for material. A court deciding whether a fundamental right has been infringed cannot treat the language of “national security” as a substitute for proof.

• The Court refuses to infer an “oblique motive”

The Court also rejected the suggestion that the women were merely instruments in a larger unlawful design. After interacting with them, the Court said it could not discern material warranting an inference that they had acted with an oblique motive or had been reduced to instruments in the hands of an individual or organisation pursuing an unlawful agenda.

Such an inference, the Court held, could not legitimately be drawn from conjectures, surmises or allegations that remained to be tested before the competent criminal court. This distinction is significant as the Court did not adjudicate the criminal allegations, rather it simply refused to allow untested allegations to determine the constitutional status of the women before it. The criminal investigation was therefore left intact. But it was not allowed to become a basis for continuing their detention.

The investigation arising from Case Crime No. 228 of 2025 would continue strictly in accordance with law. But, the court held that mere pendency of a criminal investigation cannot, by itself, furnish a lawful justification for curtailing the liberty of adult citizens, particularly where they are not subject to any judicial or other lawful order of detention.

This is one of the judgment’s most important safeguards. A criminal investigation is a process for determining whether an offence has been committed. It is not, by itself, a source of custody. The existence of an FIR cannot turn a private residence into a lawful detention centre. Nor can the seriousness of the allegations eliminate the requirement that any deprivation of liberty have legal authority.

Parental authority yields to constitutional liberty: Compensation and directions

Having found the detention to be wholly illegal, the Court did not confine the remedy to a declaration that the women were free. It recognised that where a serious and prolonged violation of fundamental rights has already occurred, an order of release alone may not provide an adequate constitutional remedy. The Court therefore invoked the established jurisprudence on constitutional compensation, particularly Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa. These decisions establish that constitutional courts exercising jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 can award monetary compensation for egregious violations of fundamental rights as a public-law remedy. Such compensation is distinct from ordinary private-law damages and is intended to provide meaningful redress for the breach of a public duty to protect fundamental rights.

Applying this principle, the Court found the present case to involve an “exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights.” It took into account the fact that the women were adults and legally competent, the prolonged nature of their deprivation of liberty, the circumstances in which the confinement allegedly followed their exercise of freedom of conscience, and the mental and psychological consequences of the restraint. The Court also considered the failure of the State machinery to discharge its constitutional obligation to protect their liberty. It described the conduct as a “flagrant affront to the Rule of Law” and found that the State, rather than securing their release, had allowed the detention to continue under the ostensible cover of criminal proceedings. The award of compensation was therefore not presented as punitive damages or an ex gratia payment, but as a constitutional remedy flowing from the gravity of the fundamental-rights violation.

The Court consequently held the father and the State of Uttar Pradesh jointly and severally liable to pay ₹25 lakh, with the amount to be equally divided between the two women. The judgment also incorporated an important mechanism for individual accountability within the State machinery. After satisfying the compensation award, the State was permitted, subject to due process and an opportunity of hearing, to recover the stipulated share from the father and from any delinquent public servant whose acts or omissions contributed to the unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. This aspect of the order is significant because it moves beyond merely compensating the victims and raises the question of institutional responsibility for allowing an unlawful deprivation of liberty to persist.

The Court’s directions were also designed to restore the women’s practical autonomy, rather than merely declare their freedom in abstract terms. It directed that they were free to reside at any place and with any person of their choice and restrained the father from interfering with their personal liberty, movement, residence, profession or religious choices. The State authorities were directed to ensure that no interference was caused to their peaceful life and liberty and to provide protection if required. These directions recognise that liberty can be undermined even without formal physical detention. If a person is denied access to her documents, finances, educational records or other personal belongings, her ability to independently exercise her constitutional choices may remain substantially constrained.

Accordingly, the Court directed the father to hand over the women’s passports, educational certificates, identity documents, bank passbooks, cheque books, conversion-related documents and other personal belongings within seven days, with the State authorities directed to ensure compliance where necessary. At the same time, the Court carefully limited the scope of its intervention: it did not determine whether the alleged conversion was legally valid, whether the criminal allegations would ultimately be established, or whether any offence had been committed. The investigation was permitted to continue strictly in accordance with law. The significance of the judgment therefore lies in the balance it draws between investigative power and individual liberty: the State remains free to investigate an alleged offence, but neither an investigation nor parental disapproval can become a substitute for lawful authority to deprive an adult of her liberty.

The complete judgment may be read here.

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The post When Family Becomes Custody: Allahabad HC holds adult women’s faith, residence and liberty cannot be placed under parental control appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The order was passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Sri. Mithun Gopi G.S. in Crl.MP No. 1/2026 in Crime No. 95/2026, T.G. Mohandas v. State of Kerala.

The court noted the non-issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) before the arrest. It also took into account the recovery and seizure of electronic devices allegedly connected with the case, Mohandas’s cooperation with the investigation, and his age and health condition.

The prosecution had raised concerns that he could abscond, influence witnesses or interfere with the investigation. The court held that these concerns could be addressed by imposing conditions while granting bail.

Case concerns videos on Jantar Mantar protests

The case relates to videos uploaded on the YouTube channel “Pathrika”, in which Mohandas allegedly made statements concerning protests at Jantar Mantar.

According to the prosecution, the statements were made with the intention of disturbing public peace and tranquillity and inciting riots. It was further alleged that the content was capable of creating fear and anxiety among protesters and contained remarks insulting womanhood and violating the dignity of women.

The FIR alleges that Mohandas spoke about beating and “shooting dead” student protesters. It also alleges that he made remarks referring to women protesters as women who “enjoyed rape”. The prosecution told the court that around 16 complaints had been made against him in connection with the alleged statements.

According to The Hindu, the videos led to complaints from student and youth organisations and subsequent police action.

Alleged remarks about shooting protesters and sexual violence

According to The Hindu, Mohandas, a former head of the BJP’s State intellectual cell, had spoken in a YouTube video about how he would respond to the Jantar Mantar protest if he were in control of the situation. The report said he spoke of imposing a curfew in the area around Jantar Mantar, directing protesters to disperse and then using force against those who remained.

In the video, he described a sequence involving shooting protesters and subsequently taking bodies to hospitals. In another video, he allegedly made remarks concerning women participating in protests and referred to leftist, secular, democratic and proletarian women in the context of gang rape. The videos generated public reactions and led to demands for legal action.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh subsequently distanced itself from the remarks. K.B. Sreekumar, Saha Prantha Karyavah of the RSS in South Kerala, said the comments represented Mohandas’s personal views and that he was not an RSS office-bearer at any level. He also said the organisation did not agree with the views.

Cyber police register case

The Thiruvananthapuram City Cyber Police registered the case under several provisions.

According to Live Law, Mohandas was booked under Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act, and Sections 79, 353(1) (b) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

However, the police case included Sections 192 and 353(1) (b) of the BNS, along with Section 66 of the Information Technology Act and Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act.

On August 9, a team of cyber police officers searched Mohandas’s residence at Mattancherry before taking him into custody. The seized electronic devices were subsequently produced before the court.

Defence challenges arrest and alleges political motivation

During the bail hearing, counsel for Mohandas challenged both the allegations and the necessity of his arrest. According to Live Law, the defence argued that the case was politically motivated, referring to Mohandas’s association with the BJP and RSS and the alleged political affiliation of the complainant. The defence also submitted that there were no exceptional circumstances requiring immediate arrest.

The principal procedural objection was that the police had not issued a notice under Section 35(3) BNSS before arresting him.

The defence argued that, in the circumstances, Mohandas could have been directed to appear before the investigating officer instead of being immediately taken into custody.

Section 35(3) notice becomes central issue

Section 35 of the BNSS deals with circumstances in which police may arrest a person without a warrant. Sub-section (3) provides for issuance of a notice requiring the person to appear before the police officer where immediate arrest is not considered necessary.

The court examined whether the investigating agency had sufficient grounds to dispense with this procedural requirement. The prosecution argued that a notice was not necessary because there was a possibility that Mohandas could abscond or interfere with digital evidence. According to the prosecution, the investigating officer had recorded concerns about possible destruction, tampering or manipulation of electronic evidence. The prosecution also relied on the number of complaints received against Mohandas and the nature of the allegations while opposing the bail application.

Court rejects general apprehension of absconding

The court did not accept that the material before it established a sufficient possibility of Mohandas evading the investigation or absconding. A significant factor considered by the court was that the police had been able to locate him at his known residential address and conduct a search there.

The court observed, as reported by Live Law:

“The fact that the investigating agency was able to locate the accused at his known residential address and conduct a search there, is, in the circumstances, inconsistent with such apprehension.”

The court further held that a general apprehension that evidence might be destroyed, tampered with or manipulated could not, without circumstances demonstrating an immediate need for arrest, by itself justify dispensing with the statutory safeguard under Section 35(3) BNSS.

The court also noted that the remand report did not contain specific material supporting the apprehension that Mohandas would influence the complainant.

Electronic devices already recovered

The recovery of electronic devices was another factor considered by the court.

Since the allegations concern videos uploaded on YouTube, the electronic material formed part of the investigation. However, the court noted that the devices allegedly used in connection with the offence had already been recovered, seized and produced before it. This was relevant to the prosecution’s contention that Mohandas needed to remain in custody to prevent destruction or interference with digital evidence. The court found that there was no need for custodial interrogation at that stage.

It also considered Mohandas’s cooperation with the investigation and his age and health condition.

Court says arrest procedure was not justified

After examining the material placed before it, the court concluded that there was no justification for the investigating agency to dispense with the statutory requirement of issuing notice under Section 35(3) BNSS.

The court’s conclusion was based on the circumstances before it, including the ability of the police to locate Mohandas at his known residence, the recovery of the electronic devices and the absence of specific material showing that he was likely to abscond or interfere with the investigation.

The court said:

“Mere apprehension of destruction, tampering or manipulation of evidence, in the absence of circumstances indicating an immediate necessity for arrest, cannot by itself justify dispensing with the statutory safeguard contemplated under Section 35(3) of the BNSS.”

The court added that the same reasoning applied to the alleged apprehension that Mohandas could influence the complainant, as no specific material supporting that apprehension was disclosed in the remand report.

Court takes age, health and cooperation into account

The court also considered Mohandas’s age and health condition while deciding whether continued detention was necessary and along with these circumstances, the court took note of his cooperation with the police investigation and the recovery of the articles allegedly connected with the case.

The court ultimately held that the prosecution’s concerns regarding possible absconding, influencing witnesses or interference with the investigation could be addressed through appropriate bail conditions.

It concluded:

“The apprehensions expressed by the prosecution regarding the possibility of the accused absconding, influencing witnesses, or interfering with the investigation can be adequately addressed by imposing stringent conditions while enlarging the accused on bail.”

The court further observed:

“Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the non-issuance of notice under Section 35(3), the recovery of the articles, the cooperation extended by the accused with the police investigation, as well as the age and health condition of the accused, this Court is of the considered opinion that the further detention of the accused in judicial custody is not warranted at this stage” as Live Law reported

Student and youth organisations had sought action

Notably, youth and student organisations held protest marches to Mohandas’s residence demanding legal action. Leaders of the Students Federation of India and the All-India Students Federation also filed complaints. The delay in police action had also led to criticism of the State government, according to the report.

The RSS response came amid the controversy surrounding the remarks, with its South Kerala functionary stating that Mohandas’s comments were his personal views and did not represent the organisation.

Related:

Brinda Karat seeks review of SC verdict in Thakur-Verma hate speech case

Nazia Elahi Khan faces multiple FIRs over alleged hate speech

CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal

Hate Speech Before the Supreme Court: From judicial activism to institutional closure

The Supreme Court blinks when it comes to Hate Speech

The post Kerala court grants bail to T.G. Mohandas in Jantar Mantar remarks case, cites arrest procedure irregularity appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The first FIR was registered on August 5, just four days after the law came into force. According to The Indian Express, the 22-year-old, originally from Uttar Pradesh, was allegedly in a relationship with a minor from his village. The two subsequently moved to Karnataka and then Pune. Police allege that he asked the girl to convert from her religion. He has been booked under Sections 3 and 9(2) of the new Act, along with provisions of the POCSO Act, and is currently in judicial custody.

Section 3 prohibits conversion or attempts to convert through coercion, fraud, allurement, misrepresentation, force, threat or undue influence. Where a minor is involved, Section 9(2) permits punishment of up to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to ₹5 lakh.

The allegation, however, still has to be established. The FIR itself does not establish that an offence under Section 3 occurred, particularly since the prosecution will have to demonstrate the specific means allegedly used to induce the conversion. The distinction matters in a law where ordinary interpersonal conduct could potentially come under scrutiny if the statutory ingredients are interpreted expansively.

Second FIR widens the scope of concern

The second case concerns a British national and OCI cardholder. Pune Police allege that he participated in prayer meetings and religious gatherings and attempted to persuade people to embrace Christianity. Police have also alleged that he spoke about following Jesus and made statements concerning Hindu temples and deities that were intended to mislead people and induce conversion, The Indian Express reported.

The police have reportedly invoked both the Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Act and provisions of the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, arguing that the OCI cardholder was not authorised to preach or deliver religious discourses without permission. This case raises a more fundamental question about the boundary between religious propagation and unlawful inducement. Participation in a religious gathering or expressing one’s religious beliefs, by itself, does not establish coercion, fraud, force or undue influence. Whether the alleged conduct crosses that statutory threshold will ultimately have to be determined through evidence and judicial scrutiny.

A law with wide-reaching provisions

The Maharashtra Act does more than criminalise forced or fraudulent conversion. It introduces a prior-notice regime for persons intending to convert, permits complaints by specified relatives, regulates conversions connected with marriage or promises of marriage, and places the burden of establishing that a conversion was voluntary on the person conducting it. It also provides enhanced punishment where the alleged conversion involves minors, women, members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, or persons of unsound mind.

The breadth of terms such as “allurement”, “undue influence” and “misrepresentation” is likely to be central to the misuse of the law. A law intended to prevent coercive conversion cannot, constitutionally, become a mechanism for policing voluntary religious belief, expression or association.

The concern is particularly relevant because the legislation operates in an area closely connected with individual autonomy, freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion under Article 25 of the Constitution. This is one of the key substantive points argued by the CJP in its constitutional challenge to the Himachal Pradesh law. Report may be read here.

The speed with which the legislation moved through the state legislature had itself become a point of criticism. Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), in its dissent note, highlighted that the Bill was introduced and passed within days, with limited scope for public consultation or legislative scrutiny, despite the fact that similar anti-conversion laws enacted by other states are already under examination before the Supreme Court. CJP is the lead petitioner in the constitutional challenge to the first batch of such laws passed by five states between the years, 2020-2023. This challenge has been pending in the Supreme Court, despite pleas for interim stays on the most egregious provisions for over five years now. [1]

Details on the interim applications urging stay on the most egregious provisions, filed by CJP on April 16, 2025 may be read here.

In early 2026, while the batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of these state laws were listed before the court of the Chief Justice of India (CJI), they were once again deferred. Reports may be read here. Thereafter, first on May 13, 2026 the matters were listed to be heard after which the next date that appears on the Supreme Court calendar is August 12, 2026.

Related:

Allahabad HC flags misuse of UP Anti-Conversion Law, quashes FIR and rebukes ‘mimeographed’ complaints

35 civil society groups oppose Maharashtra’s proposed anti-conversion law, warn of threat to women’s autonomy and constitutional freedoms

‘Faith Is Not a Crime’: Mumbai’s Christians rise against Maharashtra’s proposed anti-conversion bill

Maharashtra’s Proposed Anti-Conversion Law: Manufacturing moral panic to criminalise personal choice

Supreme Court defers hearing in batch of petitions, led by CJP, challenging state Anti-Conversion laws; interim relief applications pending since April 2025v

Maharashtra’s Anti-Conversion Push: How organised street pressure, Hindutva mobilisation and a pending law threaten constitutional freedoms

The post Two FIRs, Four Days In: Pune sees first use of Maharashtra’s controversial anti-conversion law appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The affidavit filed by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) on July 31, 2026 in Rajubala Das v. Union of India marks an important intervention in that debate. Filed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order dated March 21, 2025, the affidavit seeks to explain the legal and administrative framework governing deportation where the nationality of a declared foreigner remains unknown or unverified. In doing so, the Union makes one of its clearest judicial admissions to date: deportation cannot even be initiated unless the individual’s nationality has first been verified by the receiving State, appropriate travel documents have been obtained, and the receiving country has agreed to accept the individual. This is no ordinary procedural clarification.

The affidavit fundamentally distinguishes between being declared a foreigner and being legally deportable. While a declaration by a Foreigners Tribunal may settle a person’s legal status within India, it does not, the Union now accepts, authorise the State to physically remove that individual from Indian territory. Deportation remains contingent upon a separate process involving diplomatic engagement, nationality verification, issuance of travel documents and, most importantly, the consent of another sovereign State. In other words, the executive cannot unilaterally deport a person merely because Indian authorities believe them to be a foreign national. That proposition carries consequences far beyond the Rajubala case.

For months, instances of forced deportations and illegal pushbacks have surfaced from Assam, West Bengal, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Delhi of individuals “suspected” of being Bangladeshi nationals. In many of these cases, the family of those deported have approached the courts alleging that the removals were carried out without any disclosed nationality verification, without travel documents, and without Bangladesh formally acknowledging or accepting the individuals concerned.

Detailed reports may be read here, here, here, here and here.

Against this backdrop, the Union’s affidavit assumes a significance that extends well beyond the immediate dispute before the Court. By placing on record the legal prerequisites for deportation, the Government has simultaneously articulated a benchmark against which its own recent executive actions may now be tested. If nationality verification and acceptance by the receiving State are indeed indispensable legal requirements, as the affidavit repeatedly states, the obvious constitutional question is whether recent deportations and border removals have consistently adhered to those very standards.

The case of Rajubala Das

What began in 2020 as a challenge to the continued detention of one individual has gradually transformed into the Supreme Court’s most comprehensive examination of India’s detention and deportation regime. The litigation traces its origins to Rajendra Das, who was declared a foreigner by a Foreigners Tribunal in Morigaon, Assam, in 2011 under the Foreigners Act, 1946, on the allegation that he was a Bangladeshi national. Following that declaration, he was eventually detained in 2018 and remained incarcerated for years despite there being little indication that his deportation was imminent. His wife, Rajubala Das, approached the Supreme Court through the present Writ Petition, arguing that the State’s inability to deport him could not constitutionally justify his indefinite detention. The petition did not primarily dispute the Foreigners Tribunal’s declaration. Instead, it raised a deeper constitutional challenge. If deportation was not realistically possible because nationality remained disputed, travel documents were unavailable, or Bangladesh had not accepted the individual, could the State continue to deprive a person of liberty indefinitely? That question went to the heart of Article 21. For several years, the proceedings remained relatively limited. However, from 2024 onwards, the litigation underwent a remarkable transformation.

2024: The scrutiny of Matia Detention Centre- The case assumed far greater constitutional significance in 2024 when the Supreme Court considered reports of deplorable conditions inside Assam’s Matia detention centre. A report submitted by the Assam State Legal Services Authority documented severe shortages of drinking water, poor sanitation and prolonged detention of hundreds of individuals in conditions raising serious Article 21 concerns.

The Court’s inquiry consequently expanded beyond Rajendra Das’ detention to the functioning of the entire deportation regime. It directed the Assam Government to disclose the legal basis of every detainee’s incarceration, the documents supporting their detention and, crucially, the concrete steps taken towards their deportation. The Court was no longer prepared to accept broad assertions that deportation was “under process.” It demanded documentary proof that deportation was legally and practically feasible.

January–March 2025: Contradictions exposed- The affidavits filed by Assam only deepened the Court’s concerns. The State failed to explain the continued detention of nearly 270 individuals, many of whom had spent close to a decade in detention, while offering little evidence of meaningful diplomatic efforts to secure their deportation. The absence of information regarding nationality verification, travel documents and communication with Bangladesh prompted the Court to observe on January 22, 2025 that prolonged detention without any demonstrable prospect of deportation raised serious concerns under Article 21.

When the matter was heard again on February 4, 2025, Assam attributed the delays to the inability to ascertain addresses in Bangladesh. The Supreme Court was unconvinced. It directed the State to produce complete records of every detainee, explain the absence of a deportation roadmap and required the Chief Secretary to personally oversee compliance.

The contradictions became even more apparent in March 2025. Although Assam informed the Court that thirteen individuals had been deported after nationality verification through Nationality Verification Requests (NVRs), the same affidavit disclosed that 33 of the 63 persons earlier identified for deportation were simultaneously challenging the Foreigners Tribunal orders against them before the Gauhati High Court and the Supreme Court. One such detainee, Ajabha Khatun, had already secured protection against deportation from the Gauhati High Court. Even more strikingly, the thirteen persons ultimately deported were reportedly not from the original list of sixty-three individuals the State had earlier claimed were awaiting deportation. These contradictions exposed the absence of a coherent and transparent deportation framework and significantly undermined the State’s earlier assertions.

Detailed report may be read here and here.

CJP’s legal intervention in Ajabha Khatun’s matter may be read here.

The March 21, 2025 order- Faced with these inconsistencies, the Supreme Court shifted its focus from Assam to the Union Government. Recognising that deportation ultimately depends upon diplomatic engagement through the Ministries of Home Affairs and External Affairs, the Court, by its order dated March 21, 2025, directed the Union to explain the legal procedure applicable where a declared foreigner’s nationality remains unknown or unverified. The July 31, 2026 affidavit is the Union’s response to that direction.

Detailed report may be read here.

The Union’s Affidavit: A judicial admission that deportation cannot occur without nationality verification

If the earlier phases of the Rajubala Das litigation exposed the constitutional deficiencies of India’s detention regime, the Union Government’s affidavit dated July 31, 2026 seeks to explain the legal framework governing deportation itself. Filed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order of March 21, 2025, the affidavit is, on its face, an attempt to answer a seemingly straightforward question: what happens when a person has been declared a foreigner but their nationality cannot be verified?

The answer offered by the Union is strikingly clear. According to the affidavit, such a person cannot be deported. More importantly, the Union goes a step further and states that the deportation process itself cannot even be initiated until nationality verification is complete. This is perhaps the single most important legal proposition emerging from the affidavit. It is also one that may have consequences extending far beyond the Rajubala case and Assam.

Deportation is not a unilateral exercise of sovereign power: Public discourse often treats deportation as though it were entirely within the executive’s control—that once Indian authorities conclude that someone is a foreign national, they may simply escort that individual across the international border. The Union’s own affidavit rejects that understanding. Instead, it recognises that deportation is an exercise involving two sovereign States, not one.

The affidavit explains that where a foreign national possesses valid travel documents, the concerned State Government, Union Territory Administration or the Foreigners Regional Registration Office may proceed with deportation after criminal proceedings conclude and provided no other criminal case remains pending. However, the affidavit makes it equally clear that this represents only one category of cases.

A much larger legal problem arises where the individual possesses no passport, travel document or proof of nationality. In such situations, deportation cannot simply proceed on the basis of India’s unilateral determination. Instead, the receiving State must first verify that the individual is indeed its national, and only thereafter can travel documents be issued and deportation can legally occur.

A declaration by a Foreigners Tribunal answer only one question—whether, under Indian law, the person has established lawful citizenship or lawful residence. It does not determine whether another sovereign country recognises that individual as its citizen. That determination belongs exclusively to the receiving State.

The three preconditions the Union says are indispensable: Coming to the legal prerequisites for deportation, the affidavit effectively recognises three cumulative conditions.

• First, the individual’s nationality must be verified.
• Secondly, the concerned foreign government must issue or facilitate the issuance of appropriate travel documents.
• Thirdly, the receiving country must agree to receive that person.

The Union leaves little ambiguity. It states:

“ That, a foreign national whose nationality is unknown/unverified can be deported to their home country only upon confirmation of their nationality/possession of a valid travel document/ acceptance by the home country concerned. The deportation procedure cannot be initiated without nationality verification.” (Point 10)

The Union’s formulation is significant because it elevates nationality verification from a mere procedural formality to a legal precondition for deportation. By stating that the deportation process “cannot be initiated” without nationality verification, the affidavit makes clear that verification is not simply one step in the process but the foundation upon which any lawful deportation rests. In effect, the Union acknowledges that, until nationality is confirmed and the receiving State agrees to accept the individual, there is no legally valid deportation process that can commence.

The Ministry of External Affairs emerges as the central actor: The affidavit also clarifies an aspect of deportation that has often remained opaque in public discourse. It explains that nationality verification is not undertaken directly by State Governments. Instead, once an individual is apprehended—or, in certain cases, once an FIR is registered—the concerned State Government or Foreigners Regional Registration Office is required to immediately forward the individual’s particulars, including photographs, to the Ministry of External Affairs.

The Ministry of External Affairs then engages with the Embassy or High Commission of the country believed to be the person’s home State. Only after the foreign government examines the material, verifies nationality and agrees to issue travel documents can the deportation process move forward. This explanation is legally significant because it reveals that deportation is not merely an exercise under the Foreigners Act; it is simultaneously an exercise in diplomacy.

“That, in case the foreigner does not have a valid travel document/passport, it is necessary to obtain the requisite travel document from the Embassy/High Commission ofthe country concerned through the process of nationality verification before he/she can be deported in accordance with Clause 12(4) of the Immigration & Foreigners Order, 2025.” (Point 8)

“That, in such cases, the State Government/UT Administration/FRRO/FRO concerned may take up the matter regarding issuance of travel document in favour of the foreigner with the Ministry of External Affairs (Consular Division), with detailed particulars and photograph of the said foreigner immediately on arrest of the foreign national or on filing of FIR, whichever is earlier.” (Point 9)

The affidavit acknowledges the limits of Indian sovereignty: The Union expressly states that no time limit can ever be prescribed for nationality verification because the process is entirely within the domain of the foreign government. This is a significant concession as it amounts to an acknowledgment that India cannot compel another sovereign State to decide whether a particular individual is its citizen. Nor can India dictate the speed with which that determination must be made.

“That, since verification of nationality is a sovereign function of the foreign government, no time limit can be fixed for completion of the process of nationality verification. Consequently, until such time as nationality is duly verified and deportation is effected, the movement of the illegal migrant, must remain restricted within a designated holding centre to ensure his/her physical availability for deportation.” (Point 12)

Yet this admission also exposes a constitutional dilemma. The affidavit acknowledges that nationality verification is entirely dependent on the receiving State, over which India has no control, and that no timeline can be prescribed for its completion. If so, on what constitutional basis can the State continue to detain a person for an indeterminate period while awaiting a process whose duration is uncertain and potentially indefinite? The affidavit offers no limiting principle. It merely states that such individuals should remain in holding centres until verification is completed, without addressing what Article 21 requires if that process takes years—or never concludes at all.

The affidavit attempts to justify continued detention: To address this obvious constitutional concern, the Union argues that persons awaiting nationality verification should remain in designated holding centres. According to the affidavit, restricting their movement is necessary to prevent absconding, protect national security and ensure that deportation can be carried out once nationality is verified. While these are familiar justifications for immigration detention, they do not fully answer the concerns raised by the Supreme Court in Rajubala. Article 21 may permit temporary restrictions on liberty, but it does not sanction detention for an indefinite period. The affidavit assumes that detention can continue until nationality verification is complete, without addressing the constitutional question of how long such detention can remain lawful if deportation continues to be uncertain or remote. The Court’s concern has consistently been not merely whether deportation is pending, but whether continued detention remains proportionate when there is no foreseeable prospect of removal.

“That, in pursuance of the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dated 28.02.2012 in the matter of Bhim Singh vs Union of India & Ors. the Ministry has advised State Govt/UT Administrations to ensure that all foreign nationals who have completed their sentence but whose deportation/repatriation is awaited due to nonconfirmation of nationality/issue of travel documents by the country concerned may  be réleased from jails immediately and may be kept at appropriate place outside the 4 jail premises with restricted movements pending their repatriation. State Govts/UT Administrations have also been advised to ensure that the places where such foreign nationals are being kept must have basic facilities of electricity, water and hygiene.” (Point 13)

The reliance on Bhim Singh is both important and incomplete: To support its position, the Union relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Bhim Singh v. Union of India. The affidavit notes that, following that judgment, the Ministry of Home Affairs advised States and Union Territories that persons who had completed their criminal sentence but whose deportation remained delayed due to non-confirmation of nationality or non-issuance of travel documents should ordinarily not continue inside prisons. Instead, they could be accommodated in designated places outside prison premises where their movement could remain restricted pending deportation. The Union cites this advisory as demonstrating that the present practice of housing such individuals in detention or holding centres has judicial support. That reliance is only partly persuasive.

The Bhim Singh framework sought to distinguish immigration detention from ordinary criminal incarceration. It recognised that individuals who had completed their sentences should not continue to be treated as convicted prisoners merely because deportation had become difficult. However, Bhim Singh did not answer the larger constitutional question now arising in Rajubal, which is how long can a person remain in such a holding centre before the detention itself becomes arbitrary?

The July 31 affidavit reproduces the administrative framework flowing from Bhim Singh, but it does not confront its constitutional limits. That omission becomes especially significant given the Supreme Court’s repeated observations since 2024 that Article 21 cannot permit indefinite executive detention unsupported by a realistic prospect of deportation.

The affidavit and the question of recent deportation practices

The Union’s affidavit is notable not only for the legal framework it sets out, but also for what it does not address. It repeatedly states that deportation is contingent upon three conditions: verification of nationality by the receiving State, issuance of travel documents, and acceptance by that State. Yet, it is silent on how these requirements align with the recent allegations of “push back” operations reported from Assam and other States, where individuals were allegedly taken across the border without any publicly disclosed process of nationality verification or acceptance by the receiving country.

This omission is significant because the affidavit is a sworn statement before the Supreme Court, setting out the Union’s own understanding of the law. The Government does not describe nationality verification as a matter of administrative convenience; it states in categorical terms that the deportation process “cannot be initiated” without it. The affidavit also recognises that verification is a sovereign function of the receiving country and that deportation is possible only after that country confirms the individual’s nationality and agrees to accept them. These are presented as legal prerequisites, not procedural formalities.

Against this backdrop, the affidavit inevitably invites comparison with recent events. The Supreme Court is already seized of petitions alleging that several persons from West Bengal were forcibly pushed into Bangladesh without due process. One such case came to forefront in November 2025, wherein Sunali and her husband, Danish Sheikh, along with their son, were apprehended in Delhi’s K.N. Katju Marg in June, labelled as illegal immigrants. Their deportation was ordered by the Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) and executed despite Sunali’s family presenting Aadhaar and PAN documents. The petitioners further argued that the authorities had ignored the Ministry of Home Affairs’ own guidelines dated May 2, 2025, which required verification from the individual’s home State before deportation. They contended that no meaningful opportunity of hearing had been provided and that the deportations violated both statutory procedure and the constitutional guarantee of fairness. In the case of Bhodu Sheikh v. Union of India, the Union ultimately was made to undertake the decision of bringing these six people back, on humanitarian grounds, after they had allegedly been pushed across the border.

Detailed reports may be read here and here.

Similarly, in the Rajubala proceedings themselves, the Court has repeatedly insisted that deportation must follow nationality verification through Nationality Verification Requests (NVRs), issuance of travel permits and other documented procedures. The affidavit, however, does not explain whether these safeguards were followed in the recent removals that have become the subject of litigation.

The affidavit also has significant implications for how constitutional courts scrutinise deportation cases. Once the Union itself has stated on oath that deportation cannot even be initiated without nationality verification, travel documents and acceptance by the receiving State, courts can no longer be satisfied with bare assertions that an individual has been “deported” or “repatriated”. The legality of deportation necessarily turns on whether these mandatory procedural steps were actually followed.

This issue was focussed on by the CJP legal team in Gauhati Court after the illegal deportation of Doyjan Bibi in May 2025. CJP’s legal intervention in Doyjan’s case may be read here, here and here.

This shifts the focus of judicial review. It will no longer be sufficient for the State to merely state that a person has been deported. Courts will increasingly have to insist on the underlying record: when the Nationality Verification Request (NVR) was sent, whether the receiving country confirmed the person’s nationality, whether travel documents were issued, whether the receiving State formally agreed to accept the individual, and whether the deportation was carried out pursuant to a lawful order after the individual had exhausted or waived available legal remedies.

Indeed, this is precisely the direction in which the Rajubala litigation has already moved. Dissatisfied with vague assertions of impending deportation, the Supreme Court repeatedly sought detailed data from the Assam Government on detainees, nationality verification, pending litigation and the actual steps taken towards deportation. The Union’s July 31 affidavit reinforces that approach. If compliance with these procedural safeguards is what makes a deportation lawful, then those safeguards cannot remain matters of executive assertion—they must be demonstrated through documentary evidence capable of judicial verification.

In that sense, the affidavit has implications beyond the immediate case. It raises the evidentiary threshold for the State in future deportation litigation. Courts will have to examine not only whether a person was deported, but how the deportation was carried out and whether it conformed to the legal framework that the Union itself has now placed before the Supreme Court.

The affidavit leaves little room for informal “push back” operations

Perhaps the most significant implication of the affidavit lies in what it suggests about the legality of the recent “push back” operations reported from Assam and other States. Over the past few months, multiple petitions before the Supreme Court and High Courts have alleged that persons suspected of being Bangladeshi nationals were taken across the international border without any publicly disclosed deportation process. In several cases, families have alleged that individuals were picked up without prior notice, denied access to lawyers or relatives, and removed without any disclosed deportation order or travel documents.

Detailed report may be read here, here, here and here.

The Union’s affidavit describes only one legally recognised route to deportation. According to it, removal can take place only after the receiving country verifies the individual’s nationality, issues the necessary travel documents and agrees to accept them. Significantly, the affidavit states that the deportation process itself cannot be initiated before nationality verification. It does not recognise any separate category of “push back” operations or explain the legal basis on which such removals could take place outside this framework.

That omission is important. If “push back” is treated as a form of deportation, it would necessarily have to satisfy the procedural safeguards outlined in the affidavit. If it is not deportation, the affidavit offers no explanation of the statutory or constitutional authority under which such cross-border removals are carried out. The affidavit therefore leaves unresolved a question that is already before constitutional courts: whether recent removals complied with the legal process that the Union itself now says is mandatory.

Beyond Nationality Verification: The missing due process framework

While the affidavit sets out the broad mechanics of deportation, it is noticeably thin on the procedural safeguards that accompany the process. It explains how nationality verification is to be initiated but says almost nothing about the rights of the individual who is its subject.

For instance, the affidavit does not clarify whether a person is informed when a Nationality Verification Request (NVR) is sent to a foreign government, whether they have access to the material relied upon for such verification, or whether they have any opportunity to contest incorrect or incomplete information before it is acted upon. Equally, it is silent on what follows once nationality is confirmed. Is a formal deportation order issued? Is the individual notified that the receiving State has accepted them? Can that decision be challenged before a constitutional court? None of these questions are addressed.

These are not peripheral procedural details. They go to the heart of procedural fairness under Article 21. Deportation is among the most coercive powers the State can exercise—it results in the physical removal of a person from the territory of India. Such a power necessarily requires a transparent legal process, one that affords notice, an opportunity to be heard where appropriate, and meaningful judicial oversight before the final act of removal.

The significance of these omissions becomes even more pronounced in light of recent litigation concerning alleged “push back” operations. If the Union’s own position is that deportation cannot commence without nationality verification and acceptance by the receiving State, the procedural steps connecting those two stages assume constitutional importance. Without clarity on how those decisions are communicated, documented and implemented, it becomes difficult for courts to effectively scrutinise whether the legal requirements identified by the Union have actually been followed in an individual case.

The affidavit therefore provides only part of the legal architecture. It explains the prerequisites for deportation, but not the due process safeguards that ensure those prerequisites are fairly implemented. That gap is likely to assume increasing significance as constitutional courts continue to examine the legality of detention and deportation in the Rajubala proceedings and in the growing number of cases challenging recent removals across the country.

Beyond Rajubala: Why this affidavit reinforces the constitutional limits of deportation

The significance of the Union Government’s July 31 affidavit extends well beyond the immediate dispute in Rajubala Das. Rather than introducing an entirely new legal framework, the affidavit reiterates and reinforces the procedural safeguards that the Supreme Court has been examining throughout the proceedings. In doing so, it re-emphasises a central constitutional question: what constitutes a lawful deportation?

For years, courts have largely focused on whether an individual was correctly declared a foreigner under the Foreigners Act, 1946. The Rajubala case has broadened that inquiry by examining the legality of what follows—the process of detention and eventual deportation. The Union’s affidavit continues that shift by setting out the legal conditions that, according to the Government itself, must precede any deportation.

A key takeaway from the affidavit is that deportation is not a unilateral executive act. While Indian authorities may identify a person as a foreign national and initiate the process, deportation ultimately depends on nationality verification by the receiving State, issuance of travel documents and that State’s willingness to accept the individual. Until these steps are completed, the Union says, deportation cannot be initiated.

The affidavit therefore re-emphasises that executive power under the Foreigners Act is not unfettered. Declaring a person to be a foreigner may establish that they have no legal right to remain in India, but it does not automatically authorise their physical removal from the country. Deportation remains a separate legal process governed by procedural safeguards and diplomatic engagement.

This is an important clarification because it places legal limits on the State’s deportation powers. Those limits arise not only from constitutional guarantees under Article 21 but also from the Union’s own understanding of the deportation process, as placed before the Supreme Court. In that sense, the affidavit is significant not because it creates a new legal standard, but because it reaffirms one before the country’s highest court. That reaffirmation is likely to shape future judicial scrutiny of deportation cases, particularly where allegations are made that individuals were removed without following the safeguards that the Union itself now says are mandatory.

Related:

Aadhaar, Voter ID and PAN Cannot Prove Citizenship: Calcutta High Court’s Foreigners Order and the burden of belonging

They Belong Here: An elderly couple’s victory for citizenship

Another CJP Victory: Barpeta Tribunal declares Alam Khan ‘not a foreigner’

When a narrow reading of documents decide citizenship: GHC in Aminul Hoque

‘Fairness & reason ‘: SC rules that due process is a must for citizenship determination

Gauhati High Court upholds foreigner declaration, rejects mental illness plea

The post ‘Deportation Cannot Begin without Nationality Verification’: Union’s Rajubala affidavit clarifies legal limits on executive power appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On August 3, 2026, the Rouse Avenue Court in Delhi acquitted Brij Bhushan Singh and former WFI assistant secretary Vinod Tomar in the sexual harassment case filed by six women wrestlers, holding that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM) Ashwini Panwar delivered the verdict after more than two years of trial proceedings, including in-camera hearings, reported LiveLaw. The court had earlier framed charges against Singh under provisions relating to sexual harassment, assault with intent to outrage the modesty of a woman and criminal intimidation.

While the court’s decision establishes that the prosecution could not meet the criminal standard required for conviction, the verdict has left India’s leading women wrestlers, who had risked their careers, reputations and public standing to speak out, expressing deep disappointment and announcing that their legal battle will continue.

For the wrestlers, the case the legal battle was only one part of a much more varied and substantive struggle. It has been about whether institutions meant to protect athletes would stand with them when allegations were raised against the person controlling one of India’s most important sporting federations.

Olympic medallist Vinesh Phogat, one of the complainants, reacting to Bhushan’s acquittal said that the verdict had caused immense pain but would not end their fight. In a statement posted on X, Phogat said the wrestlers had gathered extraordinary courage to come forward against a politically powerful figure.

“We had to gather a lot of courage to take to the streets and get an FIR registered against a powerful leader of the ruling party.”

She alleged that Singh had used his influence and power to intimidate women wrestlers and force some complainants to withdraw.

“Using power and muscle power, Brij Bhushan intimidated several girls and forced them to withdraw their names.”

Phogat said that despite the pressure, several women wrestlers continued to stand firm throughout the legal process.

“Several women wrestlers stood firm and fought the legal battle against Brij Bhushan in court.”

However, she alleged that the institutional response from the beginning had been tilted in favour of the accused.

“From the very beginning, the entire system, the government and the administration have been engaged in protecting Brij Bhushan.”

However, she emphasised that all the women wrestlers would challenge the verdict before a higher court.

“We have not lost hope, and the wrestlers will continue their fight.”

pic.twitter.com/iDnAdceZa3

— Vinesh Phogat (@Phogat_Vinesh) August 3, 2026

Olympic bronze medallist Bajrang Punia also described the verdict as deeply disappointing, while recalling the struggle the wrestlers faced simply to have their allegations formally registered.

As reported by Hindustan Times, Punia said that the wrestlers had been forced to take to the streets because institutional mechanisms had failed to respond to their complaints.

“We had to fight a long battle, take to the streets and get an FIR registered against a powerful leader of the ruling party.”

He alleged that Singh’s position and influence created fear among complainants but said the women wrestlers who continued with the case demonstrated extraordinary courage.

The reactions from the wrestlers underline a central tension surrounding the case: a criminal court decides guilt based on whether evidence meets the legal threshold beyond reasonable doubt, but survivors often experience the justice process as a much longer struggle involving social pressure, institutional resistance and unequal power structures.

A protest born out of institutional silence

The allegations against Brij Bhushan Singh first came into public focus in January 2023, when some of India’s most decorated wrestlers gathered at Delhi’s Jantar Mantar demanding action against the then WFI president. The protestors included Olympic medallists Vinesh Phogat, Bajrang Punia and Sakshi Malik, along with other national and international-level wrestlers. They alleged that Singh had sexually harassed and intimidated women wrestlers over several years, including during training camps, tournaments and official interactions.

The allegations were particularly significant because Singh was not merely a sports administrator. He was a six-time Member of Parliament, a senior political figure of the Narendra Modi-led government and the head of the national federation responsible for governing wrestling in India.

The wrestlers demanded:

• Singh’s removal from the WFI;
• an independent investigation;
• dissolution of the federation’s existing leadership structure;
• protection for athletes who came forward with complaints.

However, the initial institutional response became one of the biggest points of contention. The wrestlers approached sports authorities, including the Indian Olympic Association (IOA) and the Union Sports Ministry, seeking intervention. Following their complaints, the IOA constituted an oversight committee headed by prominent sportspersons, including boxer Mary Kom and wrestler Yogeshwar Dutt. However, the wrestlers later expressed dissatisfaction with the process, alleging that their concerns were not adequately addressed and that instead of accountability, they faced delays and uncertainty.

The controversy highlighted a long-standing problem in Indian sport — athletes often depend on administrators for selections, training opportunities and career progression, creating a significant power imbalance when allegations are made against those very administrators.

Detailed reports may be read here, here, here, here and here.

The Supreme Court Intervention: When the FIR was finally registered

One of the most critical aspects of the case was the delay in registration of the FIR. The wrestlers eventually approached the Supreme Court, seeking directions to register a criminal case against Singh. In April 2023, the Supreme Court took note of the allegations and observed that they were serious in nature. Following the court’s intervention, Delhi Police registered two FIRs against Singh.

The development was significant because, according to the wrestlers and their supporters, it demonstrated the difficulties survivors often face in getting their complaints formally recognised when the accused occupies a position of power. The Supreme Court proceedings also brought attention to concerns regarding the safety of one of the complainants, who was a minor at the time of the allegations. The police later filed a chargesheet against Singh and Vinod Tomar in June 2023 under:

• Section 354 IPC — assault or criminal force against a woman with intent to outrage her modesty;
• Section 354A IPC — sexual harassment;
• Section 354D IPC — stalking;
• Section 506 IPC — criminal intimidation.

The chargesheet alleged that incidents took place between 2016 and 2019 at locations including the WFI office, Singh’s official residence and during international tournaments.

From charges to trial

Following the registration of the FIRs, the case moved into the criminal justice system, where the central question became whether the prosecution could establish the allegations against Brij Bhushan Singh beyond reasonable doubt.

In June 2023, Delhi Police filed a chargesheet against Singh and Vinod Tomar, the former assistant secretary of the Wrestling Federation of India (WFI). The chargesheet invoked provisions of the Indian Penal Code relating to sexual harassment, assault with intent to outrage the modesty of a woman, stalking and criminal intimidation.

The allegations made by the women wrestlers were not limited to a single incident. The complaints referred to a pattern of alleged misconduct between 2016 and 2019, including incidents at the WFI office, Singh’s official residence and during overseas competitions.

The prosecution case was built around the statements of six women wrestlers who accused Singh of inappropriate behaviour, unwanted physical contact, harassment and intimidation. Singh denied the allegations from the beginning, claiming that the accusations were politically motivated and part of a conspiracy against him.

In July 2023, the Rouse Avenue Court granted bail to Singh and Vinod Tomar while imposing conditions restricting them from influencing witnesses or leaving the country without permission. The trial, however, became a prolonged legal battle for the complainants. For women athletes who had already challenged one of the most powerful figures in Indian sport publicly, the courtroom became another arena where they had to repeatedly defend their allegations.

Charges Framed: Court finds material to proceed against Brij Bhushan Singh

In May 2024, the trial court found sufficient material to proceed against Brij Bhushan Singh. The court framed charges against him under Sections 354 and 354A of the Indian Penal Code for allegations involving sexual harassment and outraging the modesty of women. Charges of criminal intimidation were also framed in relation to allegations made by some complainants.

The court, however, discharged Singh in relation to one of the complaints, observing that there was insufficient material to proceed on that particular allegation. For the remaining allegations, the court held that a trial was necessary. The framing of charges was significant because it meant the court found a prima facie case requiring examination through evidence.

It did not determine guilt, but it rejected the argument that the allegations were entirely without basis. The trial formally commenced thereafter, with proceedings conducted in-camera due to the sensitive nature of the allegations.

Detailed report may be read here.

The Minor Wrestler’s Complaint: Allegations, withdrawal and pressure

One of the most sensitive aspects of the Brij Bhushan Singh case was the complaint filed by a minor wrestler, which initially led to the registration of a separate FIR under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The minor wrestler had accused Singh of sexual harassment, following which the Delhi Police registered a case under the stringent child protection law after the intervention of the Supreme Court in April 2023. The allegation added another layer of seriousness.

However, the case later took a different course. During the investigation, the minor wrestler and her father changed their position, following which Delhi Police filed a cancellation report in the POCSO case, stating that the allegations could not be substantiated. In May 2025, the Patiala House Court accepted the cancellation report and closed the proceedings.

While the police treated the development as a reason to close the case, supporters of the wrestlers pointed to the larger concerns surrounding complaints made against powerful individuals — particularly by young survivors who may face immense social, institutional and personal pressure. The minor wrestler’s father had earlier alleged that the family faced pressure and intimidation after the complaint was filed, raising questions about the circumstances under which the statement was changed. The allegations of pressure were strongly denied by Singh and his supporters.

Detailed report may be read here and here.

A federation, a powerful president and questions of accountability

At the heart of the allegations raised was not only the criminal case against Singh but also the functioning of the Wrestling Federation of India.

The WFI president controlled one of India’s most important sporting institutions — an organisation responsible for selecting athletes, conducting tournaments and shaping the careers of wrestlers. The allegations therefore raised a fundamental question: What protection exists for athletes when the person accused of misconduct is also the person exercising institutional authority over their careers?

The wrestlers argued that their struggle was not merely against one individual but against a culture within sports administration where athletes often lack independent mechanisms to report abuse. Women’s rights groups repeatedly pointed to the need for stronger implementation of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act) within sports bodies. They argued that national sports federations cannot remain outside effective accountability mechanisms and that athletes must have access to independent committees free from political and administrative influence.

Detailed reports may be read here, here

The Verdict: Acquittal, but not the end of the battle

On August 3, 2026, after hearing arguments from the prosecution, defence and complainants, ACJM Ashwini Panwar of the Rouse Avenue Court acquitted Brij Bhushan Singh and Vinod Tomar. The court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

This standard is fundamental to criminal law. An acquittal means the prosecution was unable to prove guilt to the legally required degree. It does not automatically mean that the allegations were fabricated or that the complainants acted dishonestly. In our judicial system, sexual harassment cases are often difficult to prove because they frequently occur in private spaces, without independent witnesses or immediate reporting. To the same, one can add the issue of survivors delaying reporting because of fear, professional consequences, social stigma or the power imbalance between the complainant and accused.

At the same time, criminal courts are bound by evidentiary standards and cannot convict unless the prosecution proves the charges beyond reasonable doubt. One cannot turn blind to the reality that the same system that had dragged the protesting wrestlers from Jantar Mantar had the responsibility of collecting evidence against the accused.  For the wrestlers, however, the issue goes beyond the courtroom outcome. Their central allegation is that the system failed them long before the judgment was delivered.

Women’s Rights Groups: “The fight for safe sporting spaces continues”

The acquittal triggered strong reactions from women’s organisations, activists and members of civil society. More than 250 feminists, women’s rights advocates and members of women’s organisations issued a joint statement expressing solidarity with the wrestlers and condemning what they described as the continued failure to create safe sporting environments.

The signatories include senior lawyer Indira Jaising, academician Uma Chakravarti, social activist Aruna Roy, PUCL India President Kavita Srivastava, Kalyani Menon Sen, publisher Urvashi Butalia, danseuse Mallika Sarabhai, author and activist, Teesta Setalvad, activists Sujata Gothaskar and Shabnam Hashmi, women’s leaders  Jagmati Sangwan and Annie Raja and Nisha Sidhu of National Federation of Indian Women, Maimoona Mollah of the All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA), Lalita Ramdas, Syeeda Hameed, Meena Saraswati Seshu, transparency activist Anjali Bharadwaj, lawyer Lara Jesani, Govind Kelkar, academic Shilpa Phadke and journalists Rituparna Chatterjee and Laxmi Murthy.

The signatories described the wrestlers’ struggle as a fight against powerful structures within Indian sport where money, political influence and institutional control often determine whose voices are heard. They said the acquittal would not end the movement for accountability. The statement recalled that the FIRs against Singh were registered only after Supreme Court intervention and argued that the wrestlers had repeatedly attempted to seek institutional remedies before approaching the courts.

It also criticised the treatment of the wrestlers during their protests in 2023, including the police action against them when they attempted to march towards the new Parliament building on May 28, 2023.

The organisations demanded:

• implementation of POSH mechanisms across all sports institutions;
• independent complaint mechanisms for athletes;
• protection for whistleblowers and survivors;
• sporting institutions free from political interference.

Senior advocate Rebecca John, who represented four of the complainants, described the acquittal as “deeply disturbing”. She maintained that the verdict would be challenged before a higher court.

Political Reactions: Opposition questions government’s claims on women empowerment

The acquittal triggered sharp criticism from opposition parties, who questioned the government’s response to the allegations and accused it of failing to stand with women athletes.

Congress MP Priyanka Gandhi Vadra criticised what she described as a contradiction between political messaging on women’s empowerment and the treatment of the wrestlers. “On one hand they say they are with the young generation, they talk about women empowerment and women reservation, and on the other hand this,” she said, reported Times of India.

Maharashtra Congress chief Harshvardhan Sapkal said the verdict reflected a failure to protect women athletes who had brought international recognition to India. As per the report of The Telegraph, he accused the government of ignoring the allegations made by the wrestlers and alleged that political power had shielded Singh.

The Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) Liberation criticised the acquittal, stating that the case exposed the persistence of political patronage and institutional protection enjoyed by powerful individuals. The party argued that the case had been weakened from the beginning due to delayed FIR registration, the composition of inquiry mechanisms and the treatment of protesting wrestlers.

Shiv Sena (UBT) MP Arvind Sawant questioned why BJP leaders had not supported the wrestlers when they were protesting publicly at Jantar Mantar. Jharkhand Mukti Morcha MP Mahua Maji said that while judicial decisions must be respected, many women were disappointed by the verdict and feared that such outcomes could discourage survivors from reporting harassment. Congress MP Shashi Tharoor adopted a more cautious position, stating that judicial processes must be allowed to continue and that courts’ decisions should not be prejudged.

Brij Bhushan’s Defence: “Truth Has Prevailed”

Following the verdict, Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh welcomed the court’s decision and maintained that the allegations against him were false and politically motivated. Speaking after the judgment, Singh claimed that he had never considered himself guilty and that the court’s decision had vindicated his stand. He said that from the beginning he had maintained that if even one allegation against him was proved, he would accept punishment.

Singh described the acquittal as an “honourable” clearance and alleged that the protests by the wrestlers had later turned into a political campaign against him. He claimed that the case was not a genuine movement by athletes but had become an effort by opposition parties to target him politically.

The current Wrestling Federation of India (WFI) leadership also welcomed the judgment. WFI president Sanjay Singh said the allegations had caused significant damage to Indian wrestling and described them as politically motivated. He said the acquittal was a victory for the sport and a rejection of what he called false accusations.

Did the system fail women wrestlers before the court did?

The Brij Bhushan Singh case now enters its next phase with the wrestlers preparing to challenge the acquittal. But beyond the legal appeal lies a larger unresolved question: Why did some of India’s most celebrated athletes have to fight for months on the streets before their allegations even reached a courtroom? The controversy exposed deep structural problems within Indian sports governance. The wrestlers were not ordinary complainants approaching an unfamiliar system. They were Olympic medallists and international champions who had represented India on the world stage. Yet, according to them, even their public stature did not shield them from institutional resistance.

The wrestlers’ struggle was never limited to one criminal case; it exposed deeper structural problems within Indian sports governance. At the centre of their concerns was the difficulty of challenging powerful administrators who control athletes’ careers, opportunities and futures. Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh was not only the president of the Wrestling Federation of India (WFI) but also a politically influential figure. For athletes dependent on federations for selection, training facilities and international opportunities, raising allegations against the person at the top carries enormous personal and professional risks. The wrestlers alleged that this unequal power dynamic enabled intimidation and discouraged some women from pursuing complaints, highlighting the vulnerability of athletes within institutions where authority and accountability often remain concentrated in the same hands.

The controversy also brought renewed scrutiny on the lack of effective accountability mechanisms within sports bodies. Although the POSH Act requires workplaces to establish Internal Complaints Committees to address complaints of sexual harassment, women’s rights groups have long argued that sporting institutions require stronger and more independent systems. Athletes often have direct professional dependence on coaches, administrators and federation officials, making internal mechanisms controlled by the same institutions inadequate. The wrestlers’ protest therefore became a larger demand for independent grievance redressal bodies, transparent investigations and protection for athletes who speak against misconduct.

Detailed piece may be read here.

The movement also exposed the immense personal cost of speaking out against powerful individuals. The wrestlers, who had been celebrated as national sporting icons for winning medals for India, found themselves on the streets at Jantar Mantar demanding that their allegations even be heard. They faced public scrutiny, political attacks and questions about their motives, while supporters argued that instead of receiving institutional protection, they were forced to fight for recognition and accountability. Their protest became symbolic of a larger struggle faced by survivors — where seeking justice often requires confronting not only the accused but also the systems that are expected to provide protection.

For Vinesh Phogat, Bajrang Punia and the other wrestlers, the acquittal is not the end of their fight. They have announced plans to challenge the verdict before a higher court, while continuing to demand broader reforms in Indian sport — including independent sexual harassment committees, effective implementation of POSH provisions, protection for athletes who report misconduct and greater transparency in sports administration. The case has already changed the conversation around women athletes in India. The medals won by these wrestlers brought national pride, but their protest tested whether the same institutions that celebrated their victories would stand with them when they challenged authority. The court has delivered its verdict in the criminal case, but the larger question raised by the wrestlers remains: when a woman athlete challenges the most powerful person in her sporting institution, does the system protect her — or does she have to fight the system itself?

Related:

Women Wrestlers & Lawyers’ battle for justice: Feminists, women leaders in support

Clear case of re-victimisation: Former SC judge Madan B Lokur on Delhi Police’s handling of women wrestlers case

“I changed my statement because I was scared, my family is living under constant threat”: father of the minor wrestlers’ complainant

Mumbai: Silent protest organised to condemn the injustice meted out to women wrestlers

FIRs suggest wrestlers had informed PM about their repeated sexual trauma in 2021

#STOPKILLINGUS Protest at Jantar Mantar on August 4 against GOI’s “cover-up” of Manual Scavenging deaths

The post Brij Bhushan Acquittal: The system vs the wrestlers appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Justice Madhav J. Jamdar delivered the ruling while dismissing a writ petition filed by Vignesh Ramesh Kamble challenging an externment order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, and its affirmation by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division. The Court found that the statutory requirements under Section 55 had been duly satisfied in light of the petitioner’s alleged membership of a gang facing numerous criminal prosecutions and the material placed before the externing authority.

Background

The petitioner challenged the legality of the externment order dated January 21, 2026, passed under the Maharashtra Police Act, as well as the appellate order dated July 3, 2026, contending that the authorities had failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for invoking their externment powers. It was argued that only four criminal cases had been registered against him, three of which had ended in acquittal, and that the authorities had mechanically relied upon the criminal history of the gang without independently examining his own conduct. The petitioner also relied on the Bombay High Court’s earlier decision in Jabbar Razzak Shaikh v. Divisional Commissioner to contend that the externment proceedings suffered from legal infirmities.

The State, however, defended the externment by pointing out that the petitioner was alleged to be a member of a gang headed by one Sunil alias Sunny Balaram Patil, against whom and whose associates 31 criminal cases had been registered. The prosecution further highlighted that one criminal case against the petitioner, involving offences under Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code along with provisions of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999, remained pending for trial. According to the State, the action had rightly been taken under Section 55, which is specifically designed to deal with gangs and bodies of persons whose collective activities pose a threat to public order.

Court’s Analysis: Two distinct statutory regimes

The judgment turns on a detailed interpretation of Sections 55 and 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act, with the Court emphasising that although both provisions confer powers of externment, they are triggered by entirely different factual considerations.

Justice Jamdar observed that Section 55 authorises the competent authority to extern a gang or body of persons where it is satisfied that the movement or encampment of such gang is causing, or is calculated to cause, danger, alarm, or reasonable suspicion that unlawful designs are being entertained. Consequently, the “subjective satisfaction” contemplated by Section 55 is directed towards the collective conduct, movement and activities of the gang itself. The enquiry is not confined to evaluating the individual criminal history of every member; rather, it is the overall conduct and impact of the group that forms the basis of the authority’s satisfaction.

“The subjective satisfaction contemplated under Section 55 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, where the externment action is contemplated against the gangs and bodies of persons and under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, where the externment action is proposed against a person are totally different. As far as Section 55 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 is concerned, the authorities can pass order of externment if the movement or encampment of any gang or body of persons in the area in his charge is causing or is calculated to cause danger or alarm or reasonable suspicion that unlawful designs are entertained by such gang or body of persons thereof. Thus, the subjective satisfaction is required to be recorded about the activities of gang or bodies of persons.” (Para 9)

The Court contrasted this with Section 56, which deals with externment of an individual person. Under that provision, the competent authority must independently satisfy itself that the individual’s own movements or acts are causing danger, alarm or harm to persons or property, or that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is engaged, or is about to engage, in offences involving force or violence or other specified offences under the Indian Penal Code. The statutory focus under Section 56, therefore, is squarely on the conduct of the individual proposed to be externed.

“As far as the subjective satisfaction required under Section 56 where the action is contemplated against the person is if the movements or acts of any person are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property or (b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or in the abatement of any such offence.” (Para 10)

The Court categorically held that the two standards of satisfaction are “totally different” and cannot be treated as interchangeable. While Section 55 is concerned with the collective threat posed by a gang, Section 56 requires a personal assessment of the individual’s conduct and criminal activities. Conflating the two provisions, the Court observed, would effectively defeat the distinct legislative framework consciously adopted by the Maharashtra Legislature.

“Thus, the subjective satisfaction required to be recorded under Section 55 and under Section 56 is totally different.” (Para 11)

Application of the law to the present case

Applying this interpretation, the Court noted that the petitioner was admittedly alleged to be a member of a gang against which 31 criminal cases had been registered. It further observed that, even independently, the petitioner continued to face trial in a serious criminal case alleging offences under Sections 302 and 307 IPC read with the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act.

“In this case, the Petitioner is alleged to be a member of the gang. There are 31 cases registered against the gang of which the Petitioner is a member and the offences alleged inter alia lodged even against the Petitioner including under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.” (Para 12)

While the petitioner emphasised that he had secured acquittals in three out of the four criminal cases registered against him, the Court held that this argument overlooked the very nature of proceedings under Section 55. Since the provision is concerned with the activities of the gang or body of persons, the relevant enquiry was whether there was sufficient material demonstrating that the gang’s activities justified externment and whether the petitioner formed part of that body. The Court found ample material supporting the authorities’ satisfaction on both counts and held that the statutory requirement under Section 55 had been properly fulfilled.

“Although learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner contended that as far as the Petitioner is concerned, there are only 4 cases registered against him and he has been acquitted in three out of four cases, C.R. No.544 of 2023 was registered with the Chunabhatti Police Station, Mumbai, inter alia concerning offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and wherein the provisions of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 have also been invoked. The said case is pending trial. The subjective satisfaction which is required to be recorded is about the activities of gang or bodies of persons of which the Petitioner is member. There is adequate material on record including against the Petitioner which demonstrate that subjective satisfaction recorded under Section 55 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 is properly recorded in the facts and circumstances of this case.” (Para 13)

The Bench also rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Jabbar Razzak Shaikh, holding that the factual matrix of that decision was materially different and therefore incapable of governing the present case. Finding no perversity, procedural irregularity or legal infirmity in either the externment order or the appellate order, the Court declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

Why the judgment matters

The decision is significant because it clarifies an issue that frequently arises in challenges to externment orders—whether the authority must establish individual culpability to the same extent in proceedings against members of a gang. By holding that Section 55 and Section 56 embody two distinct standards of “subjective satisfaction,” the Bombay High Court has reaffirmed that gang-based externment is premised upon the collective activities and threat posed by the group, whereas individual externment requires an independent assessment of the person’s own conduct. The ruling is likely to serve as an important precedent in future challenges involving preventive action against organised gangs under the Maharashtra Police Act.

The complete order may be read here.

Detailed report on Bombay HC quashing of externment of SDPI leader Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary may be read here.

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The post Bombay High Court clarifies distinct externment tests under Maharashtra Police Act appeared first on SabrangIndia.