In many places, the festival passed peacefully. Families gathered after morning namaz, meat was distributed among relatives and poorer households, and local communities quietly adjusted practices to avoid confrontation. But in several cities and towns, Bakri Eid also became the centre of communal disputes over goats, housing societies, slaughter spaces, public prayer, and even the visibility of Muslim religious life itself.

The result was a festival that revealed two India’s simultaneously: one still capable of accommodation and coexistence, and another where Muslim festivals are increasingly subjected to suspicion, policing, and political contestation. Authorities across the country remained on high alert in the days leading up to Eid-ul-Adha. Police deployments were increased, livestock transportation was monitored, housing societies issued restrictions, and state governments reiterated cattle slaughter regulations. The atmosphere reflected the growing politicisation of Bakri Eid itself.

The festival under regulation

One of the clearest patterns this year was the extent to which Eid celebrations became governed through administrative control and legal regulation. As Moneycontrol reported in a detailed nationwide survey of cattle slaughter laws ahead of Bakri Eid, state governments issued extensive advisories and intensified enforcement drives around livestock transport, slaughterhouses, and sacrificial practices.

The report highlighted how India’s fragmented legal landscape around cattle slaughter shaped Eid observances differently across states. Maharashtra strictly enforced provisions under the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, which bans slaughter of cows, bulls, and bullocks. Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat continued to enforce some of the country’s harshest anti-cow slaughter laws, with penalties extending to life imprisonment in certain circumstances. Assam intensified enforcement under the Assam Cattle Preservation Act, while Karnataka reiterated provisions under its stringent 2020 anti-cattle slaughter legislation.

In Delhi, minister Kapil Mishra publicly warned that sacrifice of prohibited bovine species would invite criminal prosecution. Rapid response teams were formed across districts to monitor transport and slaughter activities.

Municipal corporations and local administrations across cities also insisted that qurbani be conducted only at officially designated spaces. In Mumbai, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation reportedly designated 109 authorised slaughter locations and discouraged sacrifice in residential societies and chawls.

Increasingly, the question was no longer merely what Muslims could sacrifice during Eid, but where, how visibly, and under whose permission.

Pandharpur and the other possibility

Yet even amid this tense atmosphere, there were moments that reflected a very different social reality. Perhaps the most striking example came from Pandharpur in Maharashtra. As reported by Hindustan Times, the town’s Muslim community voluntarily decided to defer goat sacrifice because Bakri Eid coincided with Adhik Maas Ekadashi, an occasion of deep significance for devotees of Lord Vitthal.

Members of the Muslim community told reporters that they wanted to honour the sentiments of Hindu pilgrims visiting the temple town. Some residents reportedly said that Muslims in Pandharpur had long-standing emotional and spiritual connections with the town’s religious culture and had similarly deferred sacrifice in previous years when such overlaps occurred. The symbolism mattered. At a time when Muslim religious practices were being intensely scrutinised elsewhere, Pandharpur offered a reminder that coexistence in India has historically depended less on legal coercion and more on negotiated accommodation and everyday mutual recognition. The story received wide attention precisely because it contrasted so sharply with the hostility unfolding elsewhere.

Mira Road: From housing dispute to communal flashpoint

The most widely discussed communal tensions around Bakri Eid this year emerged from Mira Road near Mumbai. What began as a disagreement by a few inside a housing society over goats being kept ahead of Eid soon escalated into a much larger communal controversy involving right-wing groups, police intervention, counter-protests, and allegations of deliberate provocation.

Detailed report by SabrangIndia may be read here.

Tensions erupted at Poonam Cluster Society after some residents objected to goats being housed within the premises. Muslim residents maintained that they had obtained municipal permission and pointed out that the practice had existed for years within the society. The dispute quickly moved beyond internal society negotiations.

As provided in our report, fringe elements associated with organisations such as the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad entered the scene. What followed was an escalation marked by religious sloganeering, clashes, and eventually one of the most disturbing incidents reported during this year’s Eid period: attempts to bring pigs into the housing society as a counter-protest to the legally valid presence of goats.

The symbolism was unmistakable. And yet, what happened afterward was equally important.

Three days later, the same society celebrated Eid peacefully under police protection. In a follow-up report, Hindustan Times quoted residents insisting that “outsiders” had aggravated what was initially a manageable internal disagreement.

Residents described years of communal coexistence inside the society. Muslim families explained that the temporary goat sheds had existed for years with proper drainage and regular cleaning arrangements. Hindu and Muslim neighbours reportedly exchanged Eid greetings despite the violence of previous days.

The Mira Road episode therefore became more than a local dispute. It illustrated how quickly ordinary disagreements over shared residential space can now be communalised through organised intervention and political mobilisation. At the same time, it also revealed the persistence of local social relationships that continue to resist complete polarisation.

Kalyan and the politics of religious space

Another major point of friction emerged in Kalyan, Maharashtra. As reported by The Hindu, police-imposed restrictions on animal sacrifice inside several housing societies and heavily barricaded the area around the historic Durgadi Fort complex during Eid prayers.

The site is politically and communally sensitive because a temple and mosque exist in close proximity within the fort complex. According to the report, temporary restrictions on temple access during Eid prayers led to protests by members of both Shiv Sena factions and Hindu organisations. Groups gathered nearby to recite the Hanuman Chalisa after prayers concluded, while demonstrations were organised around allegations that Hindu devotees were being prevented from entering the temple.

The issue carried deep historical resonance. The Hindu noted that the Durgadi Fort dispute has remained politically charged since the 1980s and is closely linked to the legacy of Shiv Sena strongman Anand Dighe. Bakri Eid here became not just a religious event but a symbolic battleground over ownership of public and sacred space.

Political language and “new Hindutva”

The tensions surrounding Bakri Eid also triggered overt political commentary. Shiv Sena (UBT) MP Sanjay Raut accused certain groups of attempting to communalise the festival through what he described as “new Hindutva.” According to reports published by News The Truth, Raut argued that Maharashtra historically represented a culture of coexistence and criticised what he viewed as selective outrage around Muslim animal sacrifice while remaining silent on sacrifices associated with other traditions.

His remarks reflected a broader political argument emerging this year: that opposition to Bakri Eid practices was no longer being framed merely through animal welfare or civic regulation, but increasingly through majoritarian identity politics. At the same time, Hindu nationalist groups repeatedly framed their protests around language of “public hygiene,” “society rules,” “religious sensitivity,” and “illegal sacrifice.”

The conflict was therefore rarely articulated openly as anti-Muslim hostility. Instead, it often appeared through the bureaucratic and civic vocabulary of regulation, sanitation, legality, and public order.

Varanasi and the economics of Eid

The tensions surrounding Bakri Eid were not only communal or political. They were also economic. In Varanasi, authorities sealed the city’s decades-old Benia Bagh goat market just days before Eid, triggering panic among traders. According to reports carried by Indian Express, the market — one of eastern Uttar Pradesh’s largest seasonal livestock bazaars — had functioned for nearly four decades before authorities abruptly shut it down citing sanitation complaints and overcrowding.

Traders alleged that they were given little warning and faced devastating losses after travelling from multiple districts with goats purchased on credit.

Several traders reportedly said they had mortgaged valuables and borrowed money at high interest rates to participate in Eid livestock trade and now feared financial ruin if they could not sell their animals.

The closure highlighted another dimension of Eid increasingly overlooked in public discourse: the festival sustains a vast informal economy involving livestock farmers, transport workers, traders, butchers, leather workers, and local markets. Administrative crackdowns therefore carry not only symbolic implications, but material consequences for livelihoods as well.

Prayer, surveillance, and preventive policing

Even public prayer itself became contested in some areas. Reports circulated from Agra that Hindu nationalist leaders planned protests over temporary free entry arrangements at the Taj Mahal for Eid namaz. Police responded by placing several individuals under house arrest to prevent escalation. Elsewhere, social media videos documented protests around Eid prayers and public recitations of the Hanuman Chalisa near Muslim gatherings.

The visible police presence across cities became one of the defining features of Bakri Eid this year. In Mira Road alone, dozens of police personnel were reportedly stationed around sensitive housing societies to prevent further escalation.

The scale of preventive policing reflected both administrative caution and the extent to which Muslim festivals are increasingly treated as potential law-and-order situations.

The festival that revealed the country

Bakri Eid in India this year cannot be reduced either to a story of communal harmony or one of inevitable communal conflict. Both realities existed simultaneously.

There were stories of accommodation: Muslims in Pandharpur postponing sacrifice to respect Ekadashi; local communities negotiating solutions quietly; residents insisting that coexistence mattered more than provocation; neighbours exchanging Eid greetings despite recent tensions.

But there were also unmistakable signs of a changing political climate: housing societies policing Muslim practices; right-wing mobilisation around goats and sacrifice; counter-protests involving pigs; increasing restrictions on where Muslims may pray or perform qurbani; administrative language increasingly framing Eid through surveillance and control.

The deeper significance of Bakri Eid this year lay not merely in the incidents themselves, but in what they revealed about the condition of public life in India.

Questions that once belonged largely to the private domain of religious observance — where goats may be kept, where sacrifice may occur, whether namaz may be offered in a particular place — are now increasingly contested in public and political arenas. And yet, despite everything, the festival still passed. Families prayed. Communities negotiated fragile peace. And in many places, ordinary people continued to protect coexistence even when political actors attempted to fracture it. Bakri Eid in 2026 therefore became a portrait of contemporary India itself: anxious, polarised, heavily policed — but still, in countless everyday ways, struggling to hold together.

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The post Between Celebration and Suspicion: How Bakri Eid passed across india in 2026 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The agitation, organised under the banner of the Kanda Utpadak Shetkari Kranti Mahamorcha, drew large participation from onion growers across Nashik — one of India’s largest onion-producing regions — and was supported by leaders of the opposition Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA), including Rohit Pawar, Harshvardhan Sapkal and Ambadas Danve.

Demonstrations by different lots of farmers in a few thousands at the APMC’s procurement offices across districts culminated in a 10,000-strong blockade on the highway with several thousand being detained/arrested by the police. Apart from the protesting farmers, Opposition leaders who stood with protesting farmers in support were also detained. Harshvardhan Sakpal, President of the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee (MPCC), Rohit Pawar, Member of Vidhan Sabha (MLA) from Karjat from the NCP-Sharad Pawar (NCP-SP) and Ambadas Danve, former Leader of the Opposition in the State Assembly from Shiv Sena-Udhav Thackeray.

According to a report published by Rural Voice, nearly 1,500 farmers gathered in Chandwad town and temporarily blocked traffic on the highway while demanding remunerative prices for onions amid a steep crash in market rates. Farmers argued that the current prices being offered in markets are far below their production costs and have pushed cultivators into severe distress. The report noted that onion wholesale inflation has remained negative since March 2025, while retail inflation has stayed negative since May 2025, reflecting a prolonged decline in prices that has sharply reduced farmer earnings.

Across several other media reports, farmers repeatedly highlighted the widening gap between cultivation costs and market returns. The New Indian Express reported that onion growers were demanding procurement at ₹32 per kilogram while prevailing market prices in parts of Maharashtra had reportedly crashed to as low as ₹4–6 per kilogram. Farmers and opposition leaders argued that the current rates are insufficient even to recover the cost of seeds, fertilisers, labour, storage and transport.

The immediate trigger for the protest was the Centre’s announcement of onion procurement through NAFED and NCCF at revised rates of approximately ₹1,580 per quintal. Farmer groups rejected the procurement price as grossly inadequate. Speaking during the protest, several cultivators stated that onion production itself costs roughly ₹1,800–2,000 per quintal, making the government’s procurement rate economically unviable. The Hindu quoted one farmer saying that cultivators were “not even able to recover the cost of production after selling onions.”

Farmer organisations demanded that procurement prices be increased substantially, with various groups seeking rates between ₹2,400 and ₹3,000 per quintal. Protesters also called for compensation for farmers who had already sold onions at distress prices over recent months. Reports in National Herald, Mid-Day and The Times of India noted that growers additionally demanded expanded procurement operations across onion-producing talukas, direct intervention in markets, and stronger implementation of price deficiency payment schemes.

The protest also reflected growing anger over repeated export restrictions imposed on onions over the past several years. Farmers alleged that unstable export policies and sudden government interventions had weakened India’s onion trade and severely damaged farmer incomes. According to The Hindu, opposition leaders argued that international markets, including Bangladesh, had increasingly reduced onion imports from India due to inconsistent export policies.

The demonstrations quickly escalated into a large-scale highway blockade. Multiple media outlets, including The Times of India and The Economic Times, reported that protesters marched from the Chandwad APMC to the Mumbai–Agra highway, blocking traffic for nearly 90 minutes to two hours. Long queues of vehicles formed on both sides of the road as farmers raised slogans, dumped onions onto the highway and wore garlands made of onions as a symbol of their distress.

Some protesters also distributed Melody toffees during the agitation in a symbolic political gesture directed at the Prime Minister after recent public attention around the confectionery brand. The Economic Times reported that protesters sarcastically remarked that if onions were promoted in the same way, perhaps their prices too would rise.

Police later intervened and detained several protesters and opposition leaders, including Harshvardhan Sapkal (INC) Rohit Pawar (NCP-SP), and Ambadas Danve (SS-UBT). According to The Times of India, more than 300 police personnel, including riot control units, were deployed to manage the situation. The report stated that over 50 protesters were detained under provisions of the Bombay Police Act before being released later.

While authorities alleged that some protesters attempted to deflate the tyres of stranded vehicles, opposition leaders claimed they had instructed demonstrators not to target ambulances, public transport or ordinary civilians. Nevertheless, the confrontation underscored the intensity of frustration among onion growers, many of whom say they have been trapped in recurring cycles of debt, price crashes and policy uncertainty.

Importantly, the Nashik protests are not an isolated flashpoint. They reflect a broader agrarian crisis that has repeatedly surfaced in Maharashtra’s onion economy over the past decade. Farmers participating in the agitation argued that while the costs of cultivation have steadily increased due to fertilisers, pesticides, labour, transport and storage expenses, government interventions have largely focused on controlling consumer prices rather than ensuring farmer incomes.

Several farmer leaders warned that continuing distress sales and unstable pricing policies could intensify indebtedness and deepen the agrarian crisis across onion-producing regions of Maharashtra. As protests spread beyond Nashik into areas including Sambhaji Nagar and Solapur, the demonstrations have once again drawn national attention to the fragile economics of onion cultivation — a sector where even minor policy shifts can determine whether farmers survive a season or sink further into debt.

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The post “₹4 a Kilo for a Crop That Costs ₹20 to Grow”: Nashik’s onion farmers erupt in protest over deepening price crisis appeared first on SabrangIndia.

SabrangIndia spoke in detail with Sadique Basha, CPI(M) leader from Mira-Bhayandar who has long worked on questions of communal harmony in the region and remained closely involved on the ground throughout the developments at Poonam Estate Cluster-1.

According to Basha, much of the public narrative around the incident has obscured a crucial fact: the temporary housing of goats ahead of qurbani had been a long-standing practice within the society and had continued for nearly a decade without generating communal tensions among residents.

He stressed that the issue escalated only after “outside fringe mobilisation” entered the society premises and transformed what had previously been an internally managed matter into a communal spectacle.

#WATCH | Mira Bhayandar, Maharashtra: Residents engage in protest at Poonam Estate Cluster-1 on Mira Road ahead of Eid al-Adha. Commotion erupted after goats were brought inside the society, with residents citing High Court orders banning sacrifices in residential areas without… pic.twitter.com/fuE4xPcvda

— ANI (@ANI) May 26, 2026

A long-standing practice within the society

Poonam Estate Cluster-1, located in Mira Road East, is a mixed residential society with a Hindu-majority population and several Muslim families residing there for years.

According to Basha, residents belonging to different communities had coexisted peacefully despite political attempts over the years to polarise the wider Mira-Bhayandar region. He stated that temporary covered shelters for goats brought ahead of Eid-ul-Adha had routinely been arranged within the society premises for years without objection from residents.

Basha shared with SabrangIndia that AGM records and internal society discussions reflected that the practice had existed for nearly ten years and had continued through consensus and coexistence. SabrangIndia is in possession of the society’s AGM resolution that in deed allows such temporary shelter spaces within its premises.

“This was never treated as a communal issue earlier. People knew each other. Families had been living together peacefully for years. Even though the society is Hindu-majority, there was no atmosphere of intolerance,” Basha said.

He added that contrary to claims circulated publicly by Hindutva groups, the arrangement primarily involved temporarily keeping goats in covered enclosures until qurbani and did not involve open slaughter within the residential premises.

This account also aligns with statements quoted in several media reports. Congress Corporator Zuber Inamdar reportedly told The Indian Express that while goats had indeed been brought into the society in previous years, slaughter had never taken place openly within the premises.

How the issue escalated

According to reports published by Mid-Day, objections initially emerged over the construction of a temporary shed for goats inside the society compound. The situation escalated sharply after right-wing elements associated with organisations such as Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) entered the locality following complaints raised by a section of residents.

Multiple reports noted that Bajrang Dal extremists gathered outside the society complex late Monday night, after which arguments between groups intensified. According to police accounts carried in media reports, confrontations later escalated into physical scuffles.

Basha told SabrangIndia that this marked a turning point in the situation, “A local disagreement was converted into a communal confrontation once outsiders entered the area. Many of the people mobilising outside the gate were not even residents of the society,” he said.

Residents familiar with developments similarly indicated that the dispute intensified only after outside political and Hindutva groups began assembling near the complex and framing the issue in openly communal terms.

Police intervention prevented further escalation

Despite the growing tensions, local residents and activists repeatedly emphasised to SabrangIndia that police intervention played a decisive role in preventing violence from escalating further. According to Basha, Mira-Bhayandar police responded actively and quickly once outside groups began mobilising. Moreover, while a couple of newly arrived residents had raised ‘objections’ to the previously existing practice, a vast majority of those who live there were not in agreement with what was being said (removal of the shelter spaces).

Finally, when fringe elements allegedly attempted to bring a pig into the society premises, police immediately intervened and removed the animal from the area. Officers also dispersed crowds, increased barricading around the housing complex and prevented direct confrontation between groups gathered outside the gates.

“The police acted quickly when the pig was brought. They stopped the provocation immediately and ensured the situation did not spiral,” Basha said.

Reports carried by The Indian Express noted that heavy police deployment followed the clashes, with more than 200 personnel stationed in and around the complex. Media reports further documented that police used crowd-control measures, including mild lathi-charge and barricading, to disperse aggressive gatherings and maintain order.

The administration also facilitated negotiations between residents and eventually arranged for the goats to be shifted to an alternative municipal ground nearby. Deputy Commissioner of Police Rahul Chavan told The Indian Express that meetings were conducted with both sides and that the municipal corporation identified an alternative location where the goats were later relocated.

By Tuesday evening, reports indicated that all goats had been removed from the society premises in municipal vehicles.

#WATCH | Maharashtra: Clashes erupt in Mumbai’s Mira Road as residents of Poonam Cluster Society protest against having goats inside the premises for sacrifice during the festival of Eid Al-Adha.

Heavy police deployment to maintain peace. pic.twitter.com/aV25rJAvPe

— ANI (@ANI) May 26, 2026

#WATCH | Maharashtra: Goats are being taken out of the Poonam Cluster Society in Mumbai’s Mira Road after clashes erupted over having goats inside the premises for sacrifice during the festival of Eid Al-Adha. https://t.co/XSvPq4RxAY pic.twitter.com/b6M2krUdAZ

— ANI (@ANI) May 26, 2026

Tegang Menjelang Aidiladha, Protes Bawa Babi Cetus Kekecohan Di Mumbai

OLEH MYNEWSHUB

MUMBAI – Ketegangan dilaporkan tercetus di kawasan Mira Road, Mumbai, India menjelang sambutan Aidiladha selepas sekumpulan aktivis Hindu didakwa cuba membawa babi memasuki sebuah kawasan… pic.twitter.com/qN1E81BhXA

— MYNEWSHUB (@mynewshub) May 26, 2026

Local residents resist polarisation

A central aspect repeatedly stressed by Basha was that many local residents themselves resisted efforts to communalise the atmosphere. According to him, despite the tensions and outside mobilisation, residents across communities largely wanted peace restored rather than confrontation prolonged.

“People living in the society know each other. They did not want violence or communal hatred. The atmosphere was disturbed by people coming from outside and turning it into a political issue,” he said.

Basha also noted that many residents remained disturbed by how rapidly the issue was amplified through provocative slogans, media attention and outsider intervention.

Even after the immediate clashes were brought under control, he said groups unaffiliated with the society continued gathering outside the gates and reciting the Hanuman Chalisa in an apparent attempt to sustain communal tension.

“Even today, people from outside the society came near the gates and continued slogan shouting and recitations. Residents remain anxious because they fear the issue is still being politically exploited,” he said.

In Mumbai’s Mira Road area, tensions surfaced after goats brought for Eid al-Adha were reportedly kept inside a residential society. Following objections from some residents, members of a Hindutva organization gathered outside the society and recited the Hanuman Chalisa as a form… pic.twitter.com/e1AkRIsPZV

— FOEJ Media (@FoejMedia) May 27, 2026

FIRs, detentions and unanswered questions

According to police statements, one FIR was registered in connection with an alleged blade attack on Bajrang Dal member Harsh Singh during the late-night confrontation. Police reportedly detained one person in connection with that incident, while several others were detained following scuffles outside the society.

#WATCH | Maharashtra: Harsh Singh, Vishwa Hindu Parishad Coordinator, who claims to be injured in the clashes, says, “Yesterday, around 8:00 PM, in the Poonam Cluster Society, a group of individuals had brought over 40 to 50 goats onto the premises; this caused significant… https://t.co/XSvPq4RxAY pic.twitter.com/t6kK1ESVuT

— ANI (@ANI) May 26, 2026

However, Basha pointed out that no broader FIRs had yet been filed regarding the communal mobilisation itself — including the attempted pig provocation, public intimidation outside the society and the role played by organised fringe groups in escalating tensions.

He stated that residents and activists planned to pursue demands for legal action after Eid-ul-Adha.

“As of now, the immediate focus has been on maintaining peace and ensuring no further escalation during Eid. But there are serious concerns regarding the communal provocation that took place,” he said. “Thereafter, we will definitely also want to pursue registration of more FIRs,” he added.

Attempts to give the issue an Islamophobic and communal turn

According to Hindustan Times, tensions escalated significantly after fringe groups attempted to communalise the issue through provocative acts and rhetoric. One of the most inflammatory moments came when Hindutva extremist allegedly attempted to bring a pig near or inside the society premises in response to Muslim families keeping goats for Eid-ul-Adha.

Several reports documented that the far-right elements justified this as a so-called “Varaha Puja.” However, reports also pointed out that Varaha Jayanti falls much later in the year and that the act appeared designed primarily as a retaliatory communal provocation.

Basha described the move as a deliberate attempt to intimidate Muslim residents and transform the atmosphere inside the society.

“When fringe elements brought a pig near the society and tried to communalise the issue openly, the atmosphere became tense very quickly,” he told SabrangIndia.

The communal rhetoric surrounding the issue was further intensified through inflammatory public statements made by certain political leaders and Hindutva functionaries.

Statements reported in The Indian Express included allegations that Muslims were attempting to “occupy Hindu localities,” assertions that goats created fear among vegetarian and Jain residents, and threats that “goats would be answered with pigs.”

BJP leader Kirit Somaiya publicly framed the issue as one involving “fear” among Hindu and Jain families and demanded restrictions on qurbani in housing societies. BJP MLA Sanjay Upadhyay reportedly stated, “If the minority community does not follow the Constitution and follows Sharia, then we will answer goats with pigs.”

Mumbai, Maharashtra: BJP MLA Sanjay Upadhyay says, “Not only in Mira Road, but also in Borivali, in Sumer Nagar society, a single family lives there, yet they have brought six goats into the society premises. The entire society is opposing this. The Maharashtra government has… pic.twitter.com/fh2QPS0waU

— IANS (@ians_india) May 26, 2026

For many local residents, these statements deepened fears that an ordinary residential issue was being transformed into a wider communal mobilisation.

A wider political campaign around Qurbani

The Mira Road controversy has unfolded amid a broader political campaign by sections of BJP leaders and Hindutva organisations seeking restrictions on qurbani practices within residential areas across Mumbai and surrounding urban regions.

In recent days, BJP leaders including Kirit Somaiya and Mumbai Mayor Ritu Tawde reportedly urged civic authorities to prohibit animal sacrifice in housing societies, chawls and residential complexes.

Simultaneously, Maharashtra authorities have also announced stringent action against alleged illegal slaughterhouses ahead of Eid-ul-Adha, including possible invocation of MCOCA provisions in certain cases.

Within this larger climate, residents and local activists fear that routine religious practices are increasingly being reframed as communal flashpoints through organised political mobilisation.

For many in Mira Road, the incident has therefore come to symbolise not merely a dispute over goats or temporary sheds, but the vulnerability of mixed neighbourhoods to rapid communal polarisation once external political groups intervenes.

Opposition parties condemn communal mobilisation, call for peace

Opposition leaders and minority representatives also reacted sharply to the developments at Mira Road, condemning attempts to inflame communal tensions ahead of Eid-ul-Adha and urging the administration to ensure peace and lawful accommodation of religious practices.

Waris Pathan criticised the escalation and described the incident as an attempt to damage communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims.

Speaking on the controversy, Pathan said the developments at Mira Road were “shameful” and alleged that deliberate efforts had been made to create communal division in the area.

“The incident that happened is shameful. An incident to tear apart the Hindu-Muslim brotherhood has taken place,” he said, while demanding “strict legal action against those who tried to spread communal hatred.”

His remarks came amid growing concerns among residents and civil society groups that the issue had been amplified far beyond an internal housing society disagreement through organised political mobilisation and provocative rhetoric by fringe groups.

VIDEO | Mumbai: On Mira Road Bakri Eid Row, AIMIM leader Waris Pathan says, “The incident that happened is shameful. An incident to tear apart the Hindu-Muslim brotherhood has taken place… I have demanded that strict legal action to be taken against those who tried to spread… pic.twitter.com/2XzR5EFKci

— Press Trust of India (@PTI_News) May 26, 2026

Meanwhile, Abu Azmi appealed for restraint and urged the government to ensure that Eid-ul-Adha could be observed peacefully and in accordance with legal regulations.

Referring to qurbani as an essential religious obligation for Muslims who have the means to perform it, Azmi said authorities should proactively create designated arrangements to prevent conflict and anxiety during the festival period.

“The government should pay attention and allow this festival to be celebrated properly. There should be no tension among people,” he said.

Azmi further stated that while religious practices should remain within the framework of law and public regulations, the administration should provide separate designated spaces to facilitate sacrifice arrangements in densely populated residential localities.

#WATCH | Mumbai: On the issue of the shed built for sacrifice in Mira Road before Eid ul-Adha, Maharashtra Samajwadi Party President Abu Azmi says, “The government should pay attention and allow this festival (Eid ul-Adha) to be celebrated properly. There should be no tension… pic.twitter.com/xjocsrAJdD

— ANI (@ANI) May 26, 2026

The reactions from opposition leaders came even as local residents at Mira Road continued to emphasise that coexistence inside the society had remained peaceful for years before outside mobilisation escalated the situation into a communal confrontation.

Situation currently calm, but residents remain concerned

At present, the immediate situation in Mira Road remains under control. Police deployment continues in sensitive pockets around the housing complex, while local residents across communities have sought restoration of normalcy.

Basha told SabrangIndia that despite the fear and tension generated over the past two days, ordinary residents still wished to preserve the coexistence that had characterised the locality for years.

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The post Attempts to communalise Mira Road Eid preparations defused by residents and police appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Appearing before a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice Vipul Pancholi, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta stated that the Union had decided, “keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,” to facilitate the return of the deported individuals and examine their claims to Indian citizenship in accordance with law.

“My instructions are, the Government will bring them back, and thereafter will examine their status, and depending on the outcome, will take steps accordingly,” the Solicitor General submitted before the Court, reported LiveLaw.

Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, appearing for the affected individuals, urged the Court to formally record the Union’s assurance. The Solicitor General agreed, while clarifying that the statement was being made in the exceptional circumstances of the present case and should not be treated as a precedent for future matters involving deportation or citizenship disputes.

As per LiveLaw, recording the submission, the Supreme Court passed an order stating: “The Solicitor General of India submits that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and by not treating it as a precedent to be followed in other instances, the Government of India has decided to bring the respondents back to India and to verify the claim of Indian citizenship. Their continuation in India will depend on the outcome of such enquiry.”

The Solicitor General informed the Bench that the process of bringing the individuals back from Bangladesh could take approximately eight to ten days.

The proceedings arise out of a series of habeas corpus petitions concerning Bengali-speaking families who were deported to Bangladesh in June 2025 during identity-verification operations allegedly conducted under a Ministry of Home Affairs directive. In September 2025, the Calcutta High Court had directed the repatriation of several deported persons, including Sunali Khatun, her husband Danish Sekh and their minor son Sabir Sekh, as well as Sweety Bibi and her two sons, Kurban and Imam. The High Court had sharply criticised the “hot haste” with which the deportations were carried out, observing that the affected individuals were removed without adequate inquiry, without a meaningful opportunity of hearing, and in apparent violation of procedural safeguards contained in the Union Government’s own guidelines.

The present development marks a substantial shift in the Union’s position. Earlier, in December 2025, the Centre had agreed to facilitate the return of Sunali Khatun—who was then in an advanced stage of pregnancy—and her young son on what it described as “purely humanitarian grounds.” At the time, the Supreme Court had underscored the need to balance legal enforcement with humanitarian considerations, remarking that some situations required “law to bend to humanity.”

That earlier intervention had followed disturbing findings by the Calcutta High Court regarding the manner in which the deportations were executed. According to the pleadings before the High Court, the affected families, originally from West Bengal but residing in Delhi for livelihood, were detained during an identity-verification exercise and deported to Bangladesh within five days. The High Court had noted that documentary material, including electoral records relating to the deportees’ family members, prima facie indicated Indian lineage and warranted a fuller inquiry before any coercive action could be taken.

While the Union Government has consistently maintained that the deportations were lawful and that the citizenship claims remain disputed, Friday’s undertaking before the Supreme Court indicates that the affected individuals will now be given an opportunity to establish their nationality status within India before any further steps are contemplated.

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The post Bhodu Sekh Case: Union agrees before Supreme Court to repatriate deported Bengali-speaking individuals pending citizenship inquiry appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In Reham Ali v. UT of J&K, decided on May 13, 2026, Justice Rahul Bharti held that the allegations against the detenue, even if accepted at face value, pertained to issues of “law and order” and not “public order” — a constitutionally crucial distinction that determines whether preventive detention laws may legitimately be invoked.

The Court was hearing a habeas corpus petition filed by Reham Ali challenging his detention under Section 8(1)(a) of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. The detention order, issued by the District Magistrate, Jammu on October 28, 2025, alleged that Ali’s activities were “prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.”

According to the police dossier submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Jammu, Ali had been implicated in seven FIRs between 2022 and 2025. The authorities relied on these FIRs to portray him as a habitual offender involved in “bovine smuggling,” arguing that substantive criminal law had proved insufficient to restrain him.

However, the High Court noted that all seven FIRs stemmed from a common set of allegations — offences under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 concerning the transportation of cattle or bovine animals.

The judgment carefully dismantled the administration’s attempt to elevate these allegations into a “public order” issue warranting preventive detention. Justice Bharti observed that, at its highest, the allegations disclosed a conventional law-and-order problem capable of being addressed through the ordinary criminal justice system.

The Court stated:

“This Court has no hesitation to hold that the preventive detention of the petitioner is misconceived by reference to maintenance of Public Order as the petitioner, at the best, is a problem on the law and order side for which the provisions of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 are fully equipped if those are meant to be activated by the law and enforcement agency in realistic manner, but since the District Magistrate, Jammu has come up with a very apologetic assessment that ordinary law of the land has failed that assessment cannot form a basis for ordering preventive detention of a person to deprive him of his fundamental right of personal liberty.” (Para 13)

In a particularly sharp observation, the Court criticised the District Magistrate’s reasoning that ordinary criminal law had “failed” to curb the petitioner’s activities. The judgment held that such an assessment cannot justify suspending a person’s liberty through preventive detention.

The Court’s reasoning is significant because preventive detention jurisprudence has consistently drawn a distinction between breaches of “law and order” and disturbances affecting “public order.” While ordinary criminal offences may disrupt law and order, preventive detention is constitutionally permissible only where activities threaten the even tempo of public life or create wider societal disorder. The judgment reiterates that preventive detention cannot become a shortcut for perceived inadequacies in investigation, prosecution, or enforcement under ordinary criminal law.

The Court also took note of the procedural history of the detention. Ali had been taken into custody on November 1, 2025 and supplied with a 174-page compilation relating to his detention. By the time the petition was adjudicated, he had already undergone six months of preventive detention out of the maximum permissible period of one year.

During the hearing, counsel for the petitioner relied on an earlier decision of the same Bench in HCP No. 4/2024 (Hamid Mohd.), where a similar preventive detention order had been examined.

Ultimately, the Court allowed the habeas corpus petition, quashing both the detention order dated October 28, 2025 and the subsequent approval/confirmation order issued by the Union Territory administration. The authorities were directed to immediately release the petitioner from District Jail Poonch or any other place of detention.

The complete order may be read below:

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The post J&K High Court quashes preventive detention in cattle transport case, says PSA cannot substitute ordinary criminal law appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Bench observed that a “perceived divergence” had emerged among different benches of the Supreme Court regarding how K.A. Najeeb ought to be understood in cases involving prolonged incarceration under anti-terror legislation.

The order assumes enormous significance because it directly engages with the growing judicial disagreement over the scope of constitutional courts’ powers to grant bail in UAPA prosecutions despite the restrictive mandate of Section 43D(5), which severely curtails bail where accusations appear prima facie true.

The reference arises in the aftermath of the recent judgment in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency delivered by a Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan. That judgment had strongly questioned the correctness of the January 2026 ruling in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), authored by Justice Aravind Kumar, insofar as it denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots conspiracy case.

Detailed piece on Andrabi judgment may be read here and here.

Detailed piece on Gulfisha judgement may be read here.

The Andrabi Bench had observed that Gulfisha Fatima and Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab appeared to have adopted an unduly narrow understanding of K.A. Najeeb, which had recognised that prolonged incarceration and the improbability of an early conclusion of trial could justify grant of bail even under stringent anti-terror statutes.

The constitutional question before the court

The present Bench framed the issue as one going beyond the individual bail claims of Tasleem Ahmed and Khalid Saifi. According to the Court, the controversy concerns the “proper constitutional approach” to cases where prolonged incarceration and delay in trial are invoked as grounds for bail despite statutory restrictions under Section 43D (5).

The Bench emphasised that K.A. Najeeb remains an “authoritative pronouncement” of a three-judge bench and preserves “the constitutional force of Article 21” while simultaneously recognising the legislative policy underlying special statutes like the UAPA.

The Court carefully reiterated the essence of K.A. Najeeb: constitutional courts retain the power to grant bail where continued incarceration violates fundamental rights, even in the presence of statutory embargoes. However, the Court stressed that K.A. Najeeb did not establish an automatic or mechanical rule that passage of time alone mandates bail.

In one of the most important observations in the order, the Bench stated:

“The ratio of K.A. Najeeb, therefore, is neither a charter for indefinite incarceration under the cover of Section 43D (5), nor a mathematical command that the mere passage of time, divorced from all surrounding circumstances, must automatically result in bail.” (Para 8)

This formulation is likely to become central to future UAPA litigation because it seeks to position the Court between two competing extremes: absolute deference to statutory restrictions on the one hand, and automatic constitutional override solely on the basis of delay on the other.

Court defends Gulfisha Fatima against criticism in Andrabi

A substantial portion of the order is devoted to defending the reasoning adopted in Gulfisha Fatima, which had granted bail to five Delhi riots accused while denying relief to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam.

The Bench observed that Gulfisha Fatima had expressly recognised K.A. Najeeb as a constitutional safeguard against “unconscionable detention” and had not treated Article 21 as subordinate to Section 43D(5).

The Court reproduced lengthy extracts from Gulfisha Fatima, particularly paragraphs 32, 52 and 53, where the earlier judgment had held that prolonged incarceration is a matter of “serious constitutional concern” but cannot be treated as the “sole determinant” for bail.

The Bench emphasised that Gulfisha Fatima rejected only a “mechanical or solitary application of delay.” Instead, it required courts to undertake a contextual inquiry considering:

• the nature of allegations,
• the role attributed to the accused,
• the stage and trajectory of trial,
• causes contributing to delay,
• prima facie material,
• risks to trial integrity,
• public order concerns,
• and the possibility of witness intimidation.

Importantly, the Court underscored that in Gulfisha Fatima, bail had actually been granted to five out of seven accused persons. Bail was denied to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam only after an “accused-specific evaluation” of their roles and the material against them.

The Bench further pointed out that even while denying bail to Khalid and Imam, liberty had been reserved to renew their pleas after examination of protected witnesses or after one year. This itself, the Court said, demonstrated that Article 21 remained a “continuing constitutional check” and was not excluded from consideration.

In another notable observation, the Court remarked that the present petitioners themselves had relied upon Gulfisha Fatima to seek bail. This, according to the Bench, demonstrated that the judgment could not be understood as one completely subordinating Article 21 to Section 43D(5).

Sharp observations on judicial discipline and coordinate benches

Perhaps the most institutionally significant aspect of the order lies in its observations on judicial discipline and the functioning of coordinate benches.

Without directly criticising the Andrabi judgment, the Bench made clear that a coordinate bench cannot effectively unsettle another coordinate bench merely through strong observations while continuing to sit with equal strength.

The Court observed:

“Judgments of this Court are not to be answered by counter-observations from another Bench of equal strength. The discipline of precedent demands a higher institutional method.” (Para 15)

The Bench stressed that if a coordinate bench entertains reservations about the reasoning of an earlier bench, especially regarding application of a binding larger bench judgment, the proper course is to refer the issue to the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate larger bench.

In language that appeared to respond directly to the criticism in Andrabi, the Court stated:

“A coordinate Bench may distinguish an earlier decision, may explain its own understanding of the law, and may, in an appropriate case, express doubt. But where the doubt goes to the root of the legal principle applied, the matter cannot be left at the stage of criticism. A doubt expressed in emphatic terms is still a doubt; it is not a declaration of law. Unless resolved by a Bench of appropriate strength, it only introduces uncertainty in the administration of justice.” (Para 17)

The Bench warned that unresolved disagreements between coordinate benches create “uncertainty in the administration of justice” — particularly in matters concerning personal liberty, national security, and anti-terror prosecutions.

Court rejects both extremes in UAPA bail jurisprudence

The order repeatedly attempts to strike a constitutional middle path. On one side, the Court cautioned against an “unqualified reading” that lapse of time alone must compel bail in every UAPA prosecution. According to the Bench, such an approach could prevent courts from considering critical factors such as:

• centrality of the accused’s role,
• protected witnesses,
• risks of intimidation,
• possibility of reactivation of networks,
• public order implications,
• national security concerns,
• and whether delays are attributable to the accused themselves.

At the same time, the Court also rejected an absolute application of Section 43D(5), observing that ignoring prolonged incarceration altogether would “imperil Article 21.” The Bench distilled the controversy into what may become the central constitutional question before the larger bench:

“The question, therefore, is not whether Article 21 survives Section 43D(5). It undoubtedly does. The true question is how Article 21 is to be applied in a statutory field where Parliament has consciously imposed restrictions on bail in respect of offences alleged to affect the security of the State and the stability of civic life.” (Para 21)

Matter referred to larger bench

The Court ultimately concluded that the issue requires authoritative determination by a bench constituted by the Chief Justice of India. Importantly, the Bench clarified that the reference is not confined merely to the correctness of Gulfisha Fatima or Andrabi. Instead, it concerns the broader constitutional approach to bail in prosecutions under special statutes involving prolonged incarceration and restrictive bail provisions. The Court specifically directed that the larger bench should “clarify or expound” the law laid down in K.A. Najeeb, particularly in the backdrop of the rigours of Section 43D(5).

Interim bail to Tasleem Ahmed and Khalid Saifi

Despite making the reference, the Court simultaneously recognised that the present appellants had already undergone substantial incarceration and that the trial was unlikely to conclude immediately.

The Bench observed that the accused “cannot be made to suffer continued incarceration merely because an important question of law has arisen for authoritative settlement.” Accordingly, the Court granted interim bail for six months subject to stringent conditions.

Among the conditions imposed were:

• execution of personal bonds of Rs. 2 lakh with two local sureties;
• surrender of passports;
• prohibition on leaving Delhi without prior permission;
• mandatory appearance before the trial court;
• prohibition on contacting witnesses;
• prohibition on tampering with evidence;
• a restriction on making public statements through print, electronic or social media touching upon the merits of the case or pending trial;
• and a direction to report to the Investigating Officer every fortnight.

The Court also warned that any attempt to delay the trial after release on interim bail would be viewed seriously and could result in cancellation of bail.

Background: The Delhi riots conspiracy case

The present proceedings arise from FIR 59/2020 concerning the alleged larger conspiracy behind the February 2020 North-East Delhi riots during protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019, in which more than 50 people were killed.

Tasleem Ahmed has remained in custody since his arrest under various provisions of the IPC, UAPA and Arms Act. His bail applications had repeatedly been rejected by lower courts, although the Supreme Court had earlier indicated that he could seek parity with co-accused.

Khalid Saifi, associated with United Against Hate, has spent over five years in custody and has sought parity with co-accused who were granted bail earlier this year. The prosecution alleges that he participated in meetings and WhatsApp groups connected with mobilisation during the anti-CAA protests and delivered inflammatory speeches — allegations he disputes.

The Court had earlier, in January 2026, granted bail to five accused persons including Gulfisha Fatima while refusing bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, setting the stage for the present constitutional controversy over the meaning and reach of K.A. Najeeb.

The complete order may be read below:

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The post Supreme Court refers UAPA bail jurisprudence to larger bench; grants interim bail to Tasleem Ahmed and Khalid Saifi in Delhi riots conspiracy case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The 242-page judgment delivered by the Division Bench of Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla and Justice Alok Awasthi goes far beyond a conventional determination of competing religious claims. The Court purportedly undertook an exhaustive examination of archaeological surveys, inscriptions, architectural remains, historical literature, colonial gazetteers, legislative history, constitutional principles, Hindu endowment law, Islamic waqf doctrine, and the jurisprudential framework evolved by the Supreme Court in the Ayodhya judgment.

At the heart of the ruling lies the Court’s conclusion that the present structure standing at Bhojshala was constructed after the destruction and alteration of an earlier temple complex and that the continuity of Hindu worship at the site “has never been extinguished”.

The Bench ultimately quashed the 2003 arrangement framed by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) to the extent that it permitted Friday namaz while restricting Hindu worship inside the complex. At the same time, the Court attempted –not very convincingly–to balance competing religious claims by observing that the Muslim community may apply to the State for allotment of an alternative site in Dhar district for construction of a mosque.

The ruling is likely to have profound legal and political implications, not merely because of its conclusions regarding Bhojshala, but because of the constitutional and evidentiary methodology adopted by the Court — one that unmistakably draws from and expands the contentious principles articulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ayodhya Verdict.

Dismantling the 1991 Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act

What is crucial for the citizen and legal mind to understand and assimilate is what the Courts are themselves doing to an existing law, the 1991 Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act. Passed in the wake of the Babri Masjid demolition on December 6, 1992, this law that received resounding support of the legislature after it was tabled by the Narasimha Rao government (that incidentally also was in power when the illegal act of the demolition took place) is currently under constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court of India.

Ironically, the last time that the “challenge to this law” was heard by the apex court was in December 2024 when the matter was supposed to be heard after four weeks. While this has not happened, verdicts such as the Bhojshala verdict, again, seek to undermine this law. The Supreme Court’s December 12, 2024 order –albeit directed at trial courts—asked them to refrain from registering new suits and passing any effective orders (including survey orders), in cases challenging the religious character of places of worship pending the challenge to the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act of 1991.

This order was passed by a bench, led by Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna and comprising Justices PV Sanjay Kumar and KV Viswanathan and the Judges had then emphasised emphasised that such proceedings violate the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act of 1991. This law prohibits altering the religious character of places of worship as they stood on August 15, 1947.

The Court’s intervention in December 2024, after years of pendency and delay (notice was issued on these petitions in 2021) came amidst a rising tide of petitions and suits challenging the status of religious sites, many of which are medieval mosques and shrines. At the time, a November 2024 survey order by a trial court regarding the 16th-century Sambhal Jama Masjid in Uttar Pradesh escalated communal tensions, culminating in violent clashes that claimed four lives in November. While the court had then stated that it would begin hearing the challenges to this law, the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, this has not yet happened. Read on those developments here.

Context and broader implications of the PWA 1991

The 1991 Act was introduced to prevent the conversion of the religious character of places of worship, with an exception only for the Babri Masjid site, which was the subject of the Ayodhya dispute. The Act, which has been subject to increasing challenges, seeks to ensure that no new legal disputes are initiated over the status of religious places, especially those with historical significance, as of August 15, 1947.

Read this crucial reference on ‘When and How Ram Vilas Paswan made a strong pitch for the Places of Worship Act, 1991 here: A powerful leader from Bihar, unkindly known as the shrewd weatherman of Indian politics, Ram Vilas Paswan, then a member of the National Front, spoke powerfully from the Opposition benches, in support of the proposed law and scathingly of the BJP’s destructive politics of demolishing places of worship (Babri masjid, December 6, 1991) while not sparing the Congress either.

Read about the Babri Masjid demolition and also extensive analyses of the flaws in the Babri Masjid judgement here, here and here.

Even as we understand and analyse the flaws behind the ‘Bhojshala’ verdict –and there are several—it is crucial to also understand what the courts are themselves doing to this law. Across several states and sites, courts are reaching the same destination through different presumptions and conclusions. As a result, now the ‘Bhojshala Order’ just like several others that are being conclusively passed while the constitutional challenge to a vital law hangs in judicial limbo, effectively is doing to the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, what neither parliament nor the Supreme Court has been willing to do. The Act is not being amended. It is not being struck down. It is being made rendered ineffective and inapplicable to those it was written to protect, one site at a time, through a different doctrinal route each time.

Incidently, the Bhojshala verdict delivered on Friday (May 15) by the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh high court is the latest expression of this pattern. It is also the most ambitious. The Bench comprised Justices Vijay Kumar Shukla and Alok Awasthi. It has held the 1991 Act inapplicable to Bhojshala. The ground is that the site is a centrally protected monument under a different statute. The route that this bench has introduced was not, until now, judicially available. This verdict now sets another precedent for those litigating sime verdict adds a sixth procedural pathway to a map that already had five.

As the Hindustan Times has reported, litigation similar to Bhojshala is now alive in courts from Uttar Pradesh through Karnataka. The geographic spread is itself the analytical fact. What follows is the spread, read against the Act it is dismantling.

Section 4 of the 1991 Places of Worship Act law says that the religious character of a holy site “shall continue to be the same as it existed” as it was on August 15, 1947, the day of independence. The only exception, under Section 5, said: “…nothing contained in this act shall apply to the place or place of worship commonly known as Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid situated in Ayodhya.”

However be it Gyan Vapi Mosque (Varanasi) or the or the suits related to the 13.37-acre land of Katra Keshav Dev Temple, seeking the removal of the 17th-century Shahi Idgah mosque, there are cases pending across courts that violate this law passed by Parliament. At least 18 suits for possession of land after removal of Shahi Idgah Masjid as well as for restoration of the temple and for permanent injunction are pending before the high court. The case was first heard on October 18, 2023 and the next hearing date is not available.

Apart from the Sambhal Shahi Masjid site in western UP, the site of the Idgah maidan dispute in Hubali, the Baba Boudhangiri syncretic shrine in Chikmagalur, Karnataka and the Malali Mosque in Malali village Mangaluru are already under similar litigation by far right Hindu organisations.

A dispute rooted in competing historical claims

The Bhojshala dispute –on which the MP HC pronounced its verdict on May 15–concerns an ASI-protected medieval structure in Dhar, Madhya Pradesh, long claimed by multiple religious communities. While Hindu groups have since the early 1990s claiming that the structure has historically been regarded as Bhojshala — a temple of Goddess Saraswati and a renowned centre of Sanskrit learning established by Raja Bhoj, the celebrated Paramara ruler associated with scholarship, literature and temple patronage, the site has Mosque located there too..

The Muslim community, however, has been worshipping here at the Kamal Maula Mosque, claiming that the site functioned as a mosque for centuries and relying upon historical references from the Khilji period as well as a 1935 Ailan issued by the erstwhile Dhar State recognising it as a mosque.

A separate set of claims was raised by Jain petitioners, who argued that certain recovered idols and iconographic features suggested that the site was originally a Jain temple associated with Goddess Ambika or Jain Vidyadevi traditions.

The dispute had for years been governed by a 2003 administrative arrangement framed by the ASI under which Hindus performed puja on Tuesdays while Muslims offered namaz on Fridays.

The litigation intensified after petitions were filed seeking recognition of the site as a Hindu temple and restraining namaz within the complex. During the proceedings, the High Court ordered a scientific survey of the site by the ASI — an order that briefly reached the Supreme Court before the survey process was ultimately permitted to continue under judicial supervision. The resulting ASI report became the backbone of the High Court’s eventual conclusions.

The Court’s Central Finding: Bhojshala was a Saraswati Temple and centre of Sanskrit learning

The High Court concluded that the cumulative historical and archaeological material overwhelmingly established Bhojshala as a temple dedicated to Goddess Saraswati and a Sanskrit educational institution associated with Raja Bhoj.

The Bench recorded:

“We have noted the continuity of hindu worship at the site through regulated over time has never been extinguished. We record finding that historical literature placed established that the character of the disputed area was Bhojshala as a Centre of Sanskrit learning associated with Raja Bhoj of Parmar dynasty and the literature and architectural reference including those connected with the period of Raja Bhoj indicate the existence of temple dedicated to the goddess Saraswati at Dhar.” (Para 210)

Crucially, the Court clarified that it was not adjudicating a civil title dispute in the conventional sense. Unlike the Ayodhya litigation, which arose from suits concerning ownership and title over land, the Bhojshala matter, according to the Bench, primarily concerned determination of the “religious character” of the disputed structure through archaeological, historical and documentary evidence.

This distinction allowed the Court to focus extensively on patterns of worship, inscriptions, architectural continuity, historical references and archaeological findings rather than conventional proprietary claims.

The ASI Survey: The foundation of the judgment

The most decisive aspect of the ruling was the Court’s reliance on the scientific survey conducted by the Archaeological Survey of India.

The Muslim parties had strongly challenged the fairness and methodology of the survey, raising objections regarding excavation practices, debris contamination, recovery of artefacts and interpretation of findings. The Court, however, categorically rejected allegations of bias or procedural impropriety.

The Bench noted that the survey had been carried out by a core technical team of senior archaeologists under the supervision of an Additional Director General of the ASI. It also recorded that officers belonging to the Muslim community participated in the process and that representatives of all contesting parties were present during videography and photography throughout the survey proceedings.

The Court held:

“We find that the survey was conducted by adopting scientific method in a fair and impartial manner. The presence of representatives of the petitioners and the respondent can be very well seen in the videography. The method which has been adopted by the experts was as per their expertise. The carbon dating method is used to determine the age of material itself and not for the age of construction period.” (Para 195)

Rejecting allegations regarding plastic waste and modern debris allegedly found at the site, the Court accepted the ASI’s explanation that such material was located only in upper heterogeneous debris layers containing modern dumped material, wrappers and conservation waste, and did not compromise the archaeological integrity of deeper strata.

The Bench further accepted the ASI’s clarification that carbon dating was not necessary because the purpose of the survey was not to determine the age of isolated organic material but to identify the architectural period and historical evolution of the structure itself.

Some facts about the History & structure

For 700 years, the Kamal Maula Mosque had been a place of worship for Dhar’s Muslims. Following the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992, and the political ascendance of Hindutva majoritarianism, the efforts to twist and misrepresent archaeology and history both at Faizabad-Ayodya and elsewhere had begun. In fact, in May 2003, a year after the Gujarat pogrom, Communalism Combat, had published a detailed list –sourced from the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)—of dozens of such “site on Hindutva’s hit list.” These may be read here.

Coming back to the Kamal Maula Mosque. History tells us that, in 1903, a British-era education officer named K.K. Lele while viewing a structure that locals called “Raja Bhoja ka Madrassa” decided to call it Bhojshala. Every British officer before him had called it a mosque. John Malcolm visited Dhar in 1822 and removed an inscribed panel from the structure. Of the building, he said only that it was a “ruined mosque.” William Kincaid, writing in 1888 about his years in Malwa, documented local legends about Raja Bhoja extensively and never once mentioned a Bhojshala. Then, in 2003, after the matter was contested in the courts, that is one hundred and twenty-three years later, the ASI submitted a 2,000-page report to the Madhya Pradesh High Court where this nuance around nomenclature was erased and only “Bhojshala Temple” appeared throughout. For locals, the structure that had stood in Dhar since 1304 CE is the Kamal Maula Mosque. Yet this history stands erased by this verdict of the MP High Court.

“Evidence of a pre-existing Temple structure”

The High Court repeatedly returned to one central conclusion drawn from the voluminous but flawed ASI report: that the existing structure was built upon and through the remains of an earlier temple complex dating to the Paramara period.

The Court observed that the remains of the earlier structure still survive beneath the present complex and that numerous inscriptions, sculptures and architectural fragments embedded within the existing structure clearly belonged to an earlier Hindu religious monument.

The judgment notes that hundreds of large and small inscription fragments were found in and around the structure, demonstrating that the site once possessed a substantially different architectural and religious identity.

The Court noted from the brief findings of the survey:

“Fragments of inscriptions, sculptures and architectural members suggest that superstructure of this stone structure was later modified and converted into mosque.” (Para 173)

The ASI findings also became central to the Court’s conclusion that the pillars and pilasters used in the present structure originally belonged to temples. There was no attempt by the Court to test the independence or autonomy of the ASI itself or seek expert autonomous opinion on the structure.

The Bench referred extensively to sculptural remains depicting:

• Ganesh,
• Brahma with consorts,
• Narasimha,
• Bhairava,
• divine and semi-divine figures,
• animal and human carvings,
• and temple motifs such as kirtimukhas.

According to the Court, many of these figures had been intentionally defaced, mutilated or chiselled out before reuse in the later structure.

The Court specifically noted that anthropomorphic depictions are generally inconsistent with mosque architecture and treated the mutilation itself as evidence that temple material had been repurposed during construction of the mosque structure.

The Bench also relied on the ASI’s observation that the present structure lacked architectural symmetry and appeared to have been assembled hurriedly from reused material of varying periods and styles.

The Paramara Dynasty, Raja Bhoj and the dating of the site

A substantial part of the judgment is devoted to dating the earlier structure to the 10th–11th centuries CE during the rule of the Paramara dynasty.

The Court relied upon:

• Paramara-era pottery,
• Indo-Sassanian coins,
• Sanskrit and Prakrit inscriptions,
• temple architectural remains,
• iron objects,
• mutilated Vishnu sculptures,
• and historical references associated with Raja Bhoj.

The Bench referred to the ASI’s finding that the earliest coins recovered from the site belonged to the Indo-Sassanian period, corresponding to the time when the Paramara kings ruled Malwa from Dhar.

One of the most important inscriptions discussed in the judgment contained two Prakrit poems consisting of 109 stanzas each associated with Raja Bhoj.

The Court noted that the inscriptions reportedly opened with invocations such as:

“Om Sarasvityanamah”

“Om Namah Shivay”

The Bench regarded this as significant evidence that the site possessed a deeply rooted Sanskritic and Hindu religious identity prior to later Islamic inscriptions. Importantly, the Court also observed that the Sanskrit and Prakrit inscriptions predated all Arabic and Persian inscriptions found at the site.

Bhojshala as a great centre of Sanskrit learning

The High Court accepted the argument that Bhojshala was not merely a temple, but a renowned educational institution associated with Sanskrit learning under Raja Bhoj.

The Court relied on several historical texts and administrative publications, including:

• the Imperial Gazetteer of India (1908),
• publications of the Royal Asiatic Society,
• G. Yazdani’s Mandu: The City of Joy,
• archaeological reviews from 1972–73,
• and educational records from the Dhar State.

The Bench repeatedly referred to the famous “serpentine grammatical inscriptions” found at the site — Sanskrit grammatical formulae carved in serpent-shaped arrangements on floor slabs and architectural members.

These inscriptions became central to identifying the structure as “Bhojshala” or “Hall of Bhoja”. Historical literature cited before the Court described the structure as: “Raja Bhoja ka Madrassa” or Raja Bhoja’s School.

The Court treated these records as corroborative evidence establishing the site’s longstanding association with scholarship, Sanskrit education and Goddess Saraswati.

The Court’s Conclusion: The existing structure was built from Temple remains

The judgment repeatedly emphasises that the current structure reflects unmistakable evidence of reuse of temple material after demolition or dismantling of an earlier Hindu religious structure.

The ASI report, extensively reproduced in the judgment, stated that the structure appeared to have been assembled rapidly using material from an earlier building without regard for symmetry or consistency.

The Court pointed to:

• reused basalt pillars,
• temple-style columns,
• mutilated deity carvings,
• reused sculptural blocks,
• and fragmented inscriptional material embedded within the mosque structure.

According to the Court, the cumulative architectural evidence clearly established that temple components had been dismantled and incorporated into the later Islamic structure.

Why the Court rejected the Mosque claim

One of the most consequential portions of the judgment concerns the Court’s rejection of the claim that the disputed structure was originally and validly a mosque. The Muslim parties had relied on historical references from the Khilji period and the 1935 Ailan recognising the structure as a mosque.

The Court, however, concluded that none of the historical material produced by the Muslim side established that the structure existed as a mosque prior to the already established 1034 AD Hindu religious structure. More significantly, the Bench held that there was no evidence establishing the site as valid waqf property.

The Court undertook a detailed discussion of Islamic waqf doctrine, referring to Sir Dinshaw Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law. It observed that a valid waqf requires:

• ownership by the waqif,
• dedication of the property to Almighty God,
• and extinction of the waqif’s ownership.

The Bench held that no evidence showed that the disputed land had ever been dedicated as waqf property.

It observed:

“No material suggests that the part of the land No.604 (Old No.313) is a Waqf property and the same was dedicated or could be dedicated to Waqf. It is imperative under Muhammadan Law that property must belong to waqif and the owner must belong to waqif and the owner must dedicate the property to the Almighty. Historical material placed before us could not show that waqf has been created and therefore, there can be no presumption regarding existence of a mosque in the disputed area which is prima facie established to be constructed as Bhojshala and temple of goddess Vagdevi (Saraswati) a place of learning Sanskrit language in 1034 AD.” (Para 192)

The Court further reasoned that land already vested in a Hindu deity could not validly become waqf property.

The 1935 Ailan declared constitutionally unsustainable

The Court also rejected reliance on the 1935 Ailan issued by the ruler of Dhar State recognising the site as a mosque. The Bench held that the order could not automatically survive after the Constitution came into force.

Invoking Articles 13 and 372 of the Constitution, the Court observed that pre-Constitution executive orders remain operative only if they conform to constitutional principles. According to the Court, the Ailan was inconsistent with the overwhelming archaeological and historical evidence establishing the site’s Hindu religious and educational character.

The Court further held that because the site had already been notified as a protected monument under the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act, 1904, the Dhar ruler lacked authority to alter its essential legal status in 1935.

The Jain claims and the British museum idol

The judgment devotes considerable attention to claims raised by Jain petitioners who argued that certain idols and iconographic features established the site as a Jain temple. Particular emphasis was placed on an idol presently located in the British Museum and identified by some petitioners as Ambika, a Jain goddess. The Court, however, rejected the argument that the disputed structure was a Jain temple.

The Bench held that no historical literature, ASI findings or architectural material supported the conclusion that the site functioned as an exclusively Jain religious structure.

It observed:

“Whether the idol is of Saraswati or of Ambika would not render much assistance to his submission that the disputed area was a Jain temple as we held that no material has been placed before us either by way of historical literature, architectural features or in ASI survey suggesting that the disputed area was a Jain temple.” (Para 209)

The Court noted that Saraswati is worshipped in both Hindu and Jain traditions as a deity associated with learning and wisdom.

The Bench also referred to iconographic features such as books held by the deity, accompanying figures and seated ascetic forms.

In one of the most controversial observations in the judgment, the Court stated that Jainism and Hinduism evolved alongside each other and referred to statutory provisions under the Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Succession Act to note that Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs are treated within broader Hindu legal frameworks for certain civil purposes.

The Court therefore concluded that the presence of Jain-associated iconography did not alter the essential Hindu character of the site.

The Saraswati Idol and the possibility of repatriation

The High Court also considered requests seeking the return of the Saraswati idol presently believed to be housed in the British Museum.

The Bench noted that representations had already been submitted to the Union Government seeking repatriation of the idol and observed that the Government of India may consider taking steps to bring the idol back and reinstall it within the Bhojshala complex.

The Court referred to inscriptions associated with the idol mentioning Vararuci, an official in the Paramara kingdom, who had commissioned images of Vagdevi and Ambika.

How the High Court imported the Ayodhya framework into Bhojshala

Perhaps the most legally significant feature of the judgment is its explicit adoption of principles articulated by the Supreme Court in the Ayodhya verdict. The High Court treated the Ayodhya decision not merely as persuasive precedent, but as a foundational jurisprudential framework for resolving historical-religious disputes.

The Court identified several governing principles:

• disputes over ancient religious sites must be decided on the civil standard of “preponderance of probabilities” rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt;
• courts must focus on continuity of worship, patterns of religious use and historical belief;
• destruction or removal of idols does not extinguish the underlying religious endowment;
• ASI reports deserve substantial evidentiary weight because they are prepared by technical experts;
• and archaeological remains, inscriptions and religious motifs possess strong probative value in determining the historical religious character of a site.

The Court also emphasised that faith cannot always be tested through rigid secular logic or documentary proof and that longstanding continuity of belief deserves legal recognition where corroborated by historical circumstances.

Final directions of the court

The High Court ultimately:

• declared the religious character of the disputed site to be Bhojshala, a temple dedicated to Goddess Saraswati;
• recognised the site as a Sanskrit learning centre associated with Raja Bhoj;
• quashed the 2003 ASI arrangement permitting namaz at the site;
• directed the Union Government and the ASI to formulate arrangements for administration and management of the temple and Sanskrit learning centre;
• clarified that the ASI would continue exercising overall statutory control over the protected monument;
• and observed that the Muslim community may apply for allotment of alternative land for construction of a mosque in Dhar district.

The Bench further stated:

“Every Government has the constitutional obligation to ensure preservation and protection of not only the ancient monuments and structures including temples of archaeological and historical importance, but also of sanctum sanctorum as well as the deity of spiritual importance. There is a constitutional duty even to sanction funds for providing basic amenities to pilgrims, proper arrangements for shelter places, maintenance of law and order and the preservation of purity and pristine character of the deity. We have noted the continuity of hindu worship at the site through regulated over time has never been extinguished. We record finding that historical literature placed established that the character of the disputed area was Bhojshala as a Centre of Sanskrit learning associated with Raja Bhoj of Parmar dynasty and the literature and architectural reference including those connected with the period of Raja Bhoj indicate the existence of temple dedicated to the goddess Saraswati at Dhar.” (Para 210)

Why the judgment will matter far beyond Bhojshala

The Bhojshala judgment is likely to become one of the most consequential religious-site rulings in India after the Supreme Court’s Ayodhya verdict, not merely, because of what it decided, but because of the legal framework, it normalises and expands. The judgment represents a significant moment in the evolution of Indian constitutional jurisprudence on contested religious spaces, where courts are increasingly being called upon to adjudicate centuries-old historical, theological and civilisational disputes through the language of archaeology, faith, continuity of worship and constitutional law.

At the heart of the ruling lies a judicial methodology that goes far beyond the facts of Bhojshala itself. The High Court explicitly imported and applied core principles from the Ayodhya judgment — particularly the reliance on “preponderance of probabilities”, continuity of worship, archaeological interpretation, and the survival of religious endowments despite destruction of structures or idols. In doing so, the Court has effectively reinforced and expanded a legal template through which competing historical claims over religious sites may increasingly be litigated and judicially resolved.

The judgment is particularly significant because it elevates archaeological evidence to a position of extraordinary constitutional and evidentiary importance. The Court repeatedly treated the ASI report as a highly persuasive and technically authoritative document capable of determining not merely architectural history, but the religious character and historical evolution of the site itself. Although the Court formally acknowledged that expert reports are not conclusive, the structure of the judgment demonstrates that the ASI findings became the backbone of almost every major conclusion ultimately reached by the Bench.

This growing judicial centrality of archaeology is likely to have implications far beyond Bhojshala. The ruling strengthens the idea that excavation reports, inscriptions, iconography, architectural fragments and material remain can decisively shape constitutional adjudication concerning religious identity and historical memory. In practice, it signals a judiciary increasingly willing to reconstruct medieval histories through archaeological interpretation and then attach contemporary legal consequences to those reconstructions.

Equally significant is the Court’s treatment of continuity of worship. The Bench repeatedly emphasised that Hindu worship at the site had “never been extinguished”, even if regulated or interrupted over time. This formulation mirrors a crucial aspect of the Ayodhya framework: that religious continuity may survive political conquest, structural alteration or physical destruction. The judgment therefore deepens the doctrinal move away from viewing religious disputes purely as questions of title and possession, and toward a broader inquiry into historical faith, devotional memory and civilisational continuity.

The ruling may consequently influence future litigation concerning other disputed religious sites where arguments are framed around claims of interrupted worship, historical destruction or continuity of sacred identity despite architectural transformation.

At the same time, the judgment raises serious constitutional, factual and secularism-related concerns. The Court repeatedly entered deeply partisan and contested theological and historical terrain, particularly while discussing the relationship between Hinduism and Jainism. Its observation that Jainism is “a branch of Hinduism”, supported through references to personal law statutes such as the Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Succession Act, is likely to invite substantial criticism from constitutional scholars, historians and members of the Jain community. Critics are likely to argue that civil statutory classification for limited legislative purposes cannot automatically determine independent religious identity or theological distinctiveness.

The judgment also raises larger concerns regarding the role of courts in resolving historical controversies that are often shaped by fragmentary evidence, competing interpretations and politically charged narratives. By relying heavily on bodies like the ASI that are neither independent nor autonomous, the kind of “literature, inscriptions and archaeological reconstruction” that the ASI has indulged in without the expertise of subject experts –that too, to determine the “religious character” of a centuries-old structure—is seriously questionable. The Court has moved the judiciary further into the terrain of subjective adjudication — an area where legal institutions may struggle with methodological and (absence of expertise) limitations.

Another critical aspect of the ruling is its treatment of waqf doctrine and mosque status. The Court concluded that no valid waqf existed because there was insufficient evidence showing dedication of the property by a lawful waqif. It further suggested that a mosque constructed upon a pre-existing Hindu religious structure could not acquire legitimacy in the absence of valid waqf dedication. This reasoning and subsequent conclusion is inherently problematic. Besides, it could have repercussions on future litigation involving mosque structures standing over sites claimed to have earlier religious histories.

Importantly, the judgment also reflects the continuing constitutional afterlife of the Ayodhya verdict. Ayodhya was initially presented by many as a singular and exceptional resolution to an unusually complex dispute. However, judgments such as Bhojshala indicate that the legal principles evolved in Ayodhya are now becoming part of a broader and expanding jurisprudential framework governing religious-site litigation across India.

The Bhojshala ruling therefore marks more than a adjudication of a long-running dispute in Dhar. It signals the consolidation of a new judicial approach in which courts are increasingly prepared to engage with questions of untested sacred geography and ‘historical grievance’ through constitutional adjudication. This kind of approach is unlikely to be healthy for a modern constitutional approach that is required to lean not on majoritarian contestation of historical fact –like in Faizabad-Ayodhya but on a sober evaluation of all aspects of such engendered conflicts.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

Ayodhya, January 22: Growing influence of religion in state & society matter of disquiet say 65 former civil servants

Babri-Ayodhya verdict: Will appeal for peace apply to Hindutva hardliners in future?

Reading SC order on Ayodhya: Condemn the Sin but Concede to Sinners

Political dimensions of Ayodhya verdict

Ayodhya Verdict: Has Faith Prevailed Over Justice?

The post Bhojshala Judgment: MP High Court declares Dhar site a Saraswati Temple, ends Namaz rights at complex appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In doing so, as the media have widely reported, the court expressed “serious reservations” regarding several aspects of the apex court judgement through which it denied bail to activists Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, who have been incarcerated, in jail, since 2020.

Besides this observation that has given rise to much public commentary given the clearly split verdict of India’s highest court on the granting of bail under UAPA, the bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan most notably observed in the same judgment that conviction rates in UAPA cases across India remained abysmally low, ranging between 1.5% and 4% from 2019-2023. Even worse still, conviction rates in Jammu and Kashmir have stayed below 1%.

The court therefore noted that these statistics suggest a high probability of acquittal in such cases, reported Live Law.

“For all India figures, we have 2% to 6% conviction, meaning thereby that there is 94% to 98% possibility of acquittal in such cases in the country. In so far as the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, the annual rate of conviction is always less than 1%. It means that at the end of the trial there is 99% possibility of acquittal in such cases,” the bench observed.

The present case and bail conditions

Who is Syed Iftikhar Andrabi? A village-level worker for the Rural Development department in Kupwara district of Jammu and Kashmir, who was taken into preventive detention in August 2019, following the reading down of Article 370, but was released after the high court declared the detention legally untenable. Thereafter, he was subsequently arrested in June 2020 in connection with a National Investigation Agency (NIA) case alleging narco-terrorism activities.

Interestingly, his appeals for bail were denied by both the Special NIA Court as well as the Jammu and Kashmir high court. The prosecution alleged that on information provided by the appellant, drugs and cash were recovered from a co-accused’s premises, further claiming that his phone records linked him to operatives in Pakistan.

According to the May 18, Supreme Court judgment, no evidence was directly recovered from Andrabi’s person or premises, directing to release the appellant on bail, subject to conditions imposed by the special NIA court. The conditions stipulate that the appellant must deposit his passport and appear before the Handwara police station once every fortnight. He is also prohibited from threatening or influencing witnesses.

The UAPA has long since been criticised as an instrument of crushing dissent in India, with numerous activists and journalists slapped with cases under the draconian rule. In Kashmir, the act has seen some of its most controversial use.

Previous analyses of this counter-terror law may be read here, here and here.

Low rates of conviction

Making a reference to official data presented before the parliament by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, drawn from National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) figures covering 2019-2023, the bench stated that the all-India conviction rate in UAPA cases falls between 1.5-4%.

What this means that a person charged under the act faces a 96% to 98.5% probability of acquittal. The court added, “In so far as the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, the annual rate of conviction is always less than 1%. It means that at the end of the trial there is 99% possibility of acquittal in such cases.”

Hence, referring to the high rate of exoneration for the accused in such cases, the court emphasised that “bail is the rule and jail the exception.” Invoking an earlier ruling, Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb, the judgement reiterated that Section 43D(5) of UAPA cannot be used in isolation to deny bail and does not serve as a blanket instrument for prolonged pre-trial detention.

The Order passed by the Supreme Court of India may be read here.

Related:

Supreme Court reasserts KA Najeeb, warns against “hollowing out” constitutional protections in UAPA cases; questions Umar Khalid bail verdict

Supreme Court restores Article 21 safeguards, calls 24-month UAPA custody without charge sheet illegal; sets aside Gauhati HC’s reliance on Sec 43D(7)

Allahabad HC grants bail in UAPA case over WhatsApp video; raises questions on overuse of stringent national security laws

The post UAPA: ‘99% Possibility of Acquittal’: What the SC said on Conviction Rates appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan granted bail to Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, a Jammu and Kashmir resident accused in a narco-terror case investigated by the National Investigation Agency, after he spent almost six years in custody awaiting trial. In doing so, the Court delivered one of its strongest recent reaffirmations of the landmark three-judge bench ruling in Union of India v. KA Najeeb, holding that constitutional courts cannot permit indefinite pre-trial incarceration under the guise of national security.

The Court unequivocally declared; “Even under the UAPA, bail is the rule and jail is the exception.”

The ruling assumes added significance because the bench simultaneously expressed “serious reservations” about the January 2025 judgment in Gulfisha Fatima v. State — the decision that denied bail to activists Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots larger conspiracy case. The Court also disapproved of the 2024 ruling in Gurwinder Singh v. Union of India, observing that both decisions appeared to dilute binding principles laid down by larger benches.

As reported by Live Law, the judgment contains unusually sharp observations on judicial discipline, prolonged incarceration, and the constitutional dangers posed by restrictive interpretations of UAPA bail provisions.

Court relies on NCRB data to highlight “overwhelming possibility of acquittal”

One of the most striking aspects of the judgment is the Court’s reliance on official National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics placed before Parliament by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs.

Referring to conviction data between 2019 and 2023, the bench noted that UAPA conviction rates across India ranged only between 1.5% and 4%. In Jammu and Kashmir, conviction rates remained below 1% throughout the period, touching a maximum of merely 0.89% in 2022 and standing at zero in 2019.

The Court observed that these figures expose the deeply troubling reality that undertrials are often incarcerated for years despite the overwhelming probability of eventual acquittal.

“For all India figures, we have 2% to 6% conviction, meaning thereby that there is 94% to 98% possibility of acquittal in such cases in the country. In so far as the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, the annual rate of conviction is always less than 1%. It means that at the end of the trial there is 99% possibility of acquittal in such cases.”

These observations, as per LiveLaw, form one of the strongest judicial acknowledgments in recent years of the structural imbalance between prosecution and liberty under anti-terror laws. The Court effectively questioned the legitimacy of incarcerating individuals for years while trials proceed at an extraordinarily slow pace despite minimal conviction outcomes nationally.

Reaffirmation of KA Najeeb and constitutional limits on UAPA

At the heart of the ruling lies a forceful reaffirmation of KA Najeeb, the 2021 three-judge bench judgment that recognised prolonged incarceration and delay in trial as independent constitutional grounds for granting bail under the UAPA.

The bench clarified that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, which imposes stringent restrictions on bailm cannot be interpreted in a manner that extinguishes Article 21 protections.

Justice Bhuyan’s judgment noted that KA Najeeb was specifically intended to prevent anti-terror legislation from becoming a mechanism for punitive incarceration without trial.

“A plain reading of Najeeb will show that it was trying to prevent precisely this possibility from arising, when it cautioned that Section 43D(5) must not become the sole metric for denial of bail, causing wholesale breach of the constitutional right to speedy trial.”

The Court further held that the earlier judgment in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali cannot be read as authorising indefinite detention merely because a prima facie case exists. Rejecting attempts to use Watali as a near-absolute bar on bail, the Court observed that such an interpretation would fundamentally undermine constitutional protections.

Sharp criticism of smaller benches diluting larger bench decisions

The judgment is also notable for its unusually direct criticism of smaller benches of the Supreme Court for progressively weakening larger bench precedents without formally referring matters to a larger bench.

The Court observed; “A judgment rendered by a bench of lesser strength is bound by the law declared by the bench of greater strength. Judicial discipline mandates that such a binding precedent must either be followed or, in case of doubt, be referred to a larger bench.”

It added; “A smaller bench cannot dilute, circumvent or disregard the ratio of a larger bench.”

Without expressly overruling Gulfisha Fatima or Gurwinder Singh, the Court made clear that the approaches adopted in those rulings were difficult to reconcile with KA Najeeb.

The bench also recorded concern over what it described as a trend of smaller benches “hollowing out” the constitutional force of larger bench decisions without openly disagreeing with them. These observations are institutionally significant because both Gurwinder Singh and Gulfisha Fatima were delivered by two-judge benches despite KA Najeeb having been decided by a larger three-judge bench.

“Serious reservations” over Delhi Riots bail judgment

The Court’s remarks on Gulfisha Fatima v. State are among the strongest judicial criticisms directed at a recent Supreme Court bail ruling. The bench specifically objected to the interpretation that KA Najeeb applies only in narrow or exceptional factual situations.

Justice Bhuyan observed; “We have serious reservations about judgment in Gulfisha Fatima. The judgment in Gulfisha Fatima would have us believe that Najeeb is only a narrow and exceptional departure from Section 43D(5). It is this hollowing out of the import of the observations in Najeeb that we are concerned with.”

The Court emphasised that KA Najeeb remains binding law and cannot be diluted by trial courts, High Courts, or benches of lesser numerical strength within the Supreme Court itself. The judgment also disapproved of aspects of the Gulfisha Fatima ruling that effectively curtailed the ability of accused persons to renew bail pleas for extended periods.

The Supreme Court’s January 2026 judgment in Gulfisha Fatima v. State arose from bail pleas filed by several accused in the 2020 Delhi riots “larger conspiracy” case prosecuted under the UAPA. A bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice N V Anjaria granted bail to Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohammad Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed after nearly six years of incarceration, holding that their alleged roles were comparatively limited and ancillary. However, the Court denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, observing that prosecution material placed them on a “qualitatively different footing” as alleged “ideological drivers” and central conspirators in the riots case. The Court held that the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA continued to apply against them because the prosecution had crossed the threshold of establishing a prima facie case. The judgment remains contentious because, despite acknowledging prolonged incarceration and delay in trial, the Court held that constitutional concerns under Article 21 had not yet overridden the statutory restrictions on bail for Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. Detailed report may be read here.

Court rejects “two-prong test” for bail

The Court further criticised the “two-prong test” evolved in Gurwinder Singh, under which courts were expected to deny bail once the prosecution established a prima facie case. According to the bench, this framework effectively transforms pre-trial incarceration into punishment itself.

Justice Bhuyan warned; “If this test is accepted, the State needs only satisfy a low prima facie threshold while the trial may continue for years, with the result that pre-trial incarceration begins to acquire a post-trial punitive character.”

The Court observed that KA Najeeb had specifically warned against precisely such outcomes.

“The more serious the accusation, the speedier the trial should be”

Reiterating the centrality of Article 21 protections, the bench observed that serious accusations demand faster trials, not greater tolerance for prolonged detention.

“Ideally, the more serious the accusations are, the speedier the trial should be.”

The Court also referred to its 2024 ruling in Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State, which similarly followed KA Najeeb in granting bail due to prolonged delay in trial.

Background of the case

Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, a resident of Handwara in Kupwara district of Jammu and Kashmir, was arrested by the NIA on June 11, 2020. The agency alleged that he was part of a cross-border narcotics syndicate that procured heroin from the Tangdhar border region and channelled proceeds to organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen.

He was prosecuted under provisions of the NDPS Act, Sections 17, 38 and 40 of the UAPA, and Section 120B of the IPC. A Special NIA Court rejected his bail application in August 2024. The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court later refused bail on August 19, 2025, holding that the seriousness of the allegations outweighed the case for release despite the lengthy custody period.

Before the Supreme Court, it was pointed out that the prosecution had cited over 320 witnesses while only a handful had been examined so far — making the likelihood of early completion of trial extremely remote.

Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat appeared on behalf of Andrabi.

Bail granted subject to conditions

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court directed Andrabi’s release on bail subject to conditions imposed by the Special NIA Court. The Court directed him to surrender his passport and mark attendance at the Handwara police station once every fortnight.

A major intervention in UAPA bail jurisprudence

The judgment is likely to emerge as a major constitutional reference point in future UAPA bail litigation. By foregrounding the right to speedy trial, condemning prolonged incarceration, relying on NCRB conviction data, and cautioning against judicial dilution of larger bench precedents, the Court has attempted to restore constitutional discipline within anti-terror jurisprudence.

The ruling also sends a significant institutional message: that personal liberty cannot be indefinitely suspended through procedural delay, and that anti-terror legislation cannot become a constitutional vacuum where Article 21 protections cease to operate. At a moment when UAPA prosecutions increasingly raise concerns regarding prolonged detention, delayed trials, and the criminalisation of dissent, the judgment may mark an important judicial effort to reclaim constitutional safeguards from the expanding shadow of preventive incarceration.

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NSA slapped on journalist, DU scholar in Noida workers’ protest case amid allegations of crackdown on dissent

Caged Voices, Silenced Truths: FSC’s expansive indictment of India’s press freedom crisis

From Cow Slaughter to “Public Order”: Allahabad High Court’s expanding use of preventive detention

The post Supreme Court reasserts KA Najeeb, warns against “hollowing out” constitutional protections in UAPA cases; questions Umar Khalid bail verdict appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The team, formed by civil rights group Jan Hastakshep included Supreme Court senior advocate S.S. Nehra, former Hindu College professor Ish Mishra, retired IFS officer Ashok Sharma, senior journalist Anil Dubey, and senior advocate M.Z. Ali.

The team visited Noida on April 24 and spoke to workers across multiple industrial units, shopkeepers and other affected residents on the issue.

According to the statement released by the team, investigators have found no evidence to support allegations circulated by sections of the administration and media that foreign elements were behind the protests.

Instead, the team reported how, the anger among the workers had been building for years over low wages, rising inflation and comparisons with higher minimum wages in neighbouring Delhi and Haryana. The agitating workers told the team that factories relocating from Delhi and Gurugram to Noida continued paying lower wages after shifting operations, despite higher pay scales prevailing in those regions.

The fact-finding group said that this dissatisfaction intensified after workers learned that wages at units in Haryana –barely 170 kilometres away–had increased significantly following a hike in minimum wages there. This comparison, combined with stagnant wages in Noida for 10 years, reportedly triggered the initial sit-in protest at a garment-manufacturing unit in Sector 83 earlier this month. According to the Fact-finding team’s statement, protests spread across industrial clusters in Sectors 59, 60, 62, 83 and 84, eventually drawing tens of thousands of workers onto the streets. The team also alleged that police action escalated tensions and that more than 1,000 workers were detained, with some families not informed of their whereabouts for several days.

The team of investigators noted that the state government’s subsequent actions, including issuing notices to 43 contractors, cancelling licences of 10 contractors and announcing a 21 per cent wage increase, indicated acknowledgement of the irregularities in wage practices rather than evidence of any external conspiracy.

Significantly, a trade union leader who had worked in a multinational company, also told the team that two decades ago, wages were not an issue in NOIDA and Greater NOIDA because wages here were higher than in other states. However, conditions have changed over the past 20 years.

Disparate wages: While wages increased in Delhi and Haryana, they did not increase in Uttar Pradesh, and companies arbitrarily set their own minimum wages. This difference also significantly increased exploitation. He added that most of NOIDA industries operate with only contract labour, with companies hiring workers through contractors who provide no security or other benefits.

The team concluded that the unrest reflected long-standing labour grievances rooted in wage stagnation and rising living costs, and called for implementation of revised minimum wages, linking wages to inflation, and withdrawal of cases against workers involved in the protests.

Related:

NSA slapped on journalist, DU scholar in Noida workers’ protest case amid allegations of crackdown on dissent

The post No ‘Pakistan conspiracy’ in Noida labour unrest: Fact-finding report appeared first on SabrangIndia.