According to her husband, Jumman Fakir, the family soon received a call from the Mumbai Police’s Chembur Crime Branch. Sahida had been detained on suspicion of being an “illegal immigrant”. Within days, the family was told that she had been sent to Bangladesh. Her husband says he had repeatedly approached the authorities with documents establishing her identity and roots in West Bengal, but they were allegedly disregarded. Sahida eventually called her family from Satkhira, Bangladesh.

The story, first reported in detail by Scroll on August 11, is disturbing not merely because of what allegedly happened to one woman, but because of the larger question it raises: what happens when the State begins treating Bengali identity as evidence of foreignness?

The Indian Express separately reported that Sahida was detained on July 18 and that sources said she was taken to Assam before being pushed across the border along with others. The report also provided that her family was preparing to approach the Calcutta High Court and that a migrant workers’ forum had written to the Ministry of External Affairs seeking intervention.

The facts, as reported, demand something more than administrative clarification. They demand scrutiny of the entire architecture through which a person can apparently move from being a resident of India to being labelled an “infiltrator”, detained and ultimately expelled from the country without a meaningful opportunity to contest that determination.

A woman disappears, and the State’s explanation is suspicion

Sahida’s case is particularly troubling because her family says it did not merely possess one disputed identity document. They produced a birth certificate recording her birth in Swarupdaha village in West Bengal in 1988. They produced a school certificate, a voter identity card issued in 2008, documents relating to land in Gobindapur, and records concerning her family. Her parents’ names, according to Scroll, also appeared in the 2002 electoral rolls.

None of these documents, individually, should be treated as an automatic and conclusive certificate of citizenship. That distinction matters. A voter ID, Aadhaar or land document cannot, by itself, settle every question concerning citizenship. But that is precisely why the State’s obligation becomes more important, not less.  If citizenship is disputed, the answer cannot simply be deportation. The dispute must first be investigated.

Sahida’s husband told Scroll that police asked for the birth certificates of her parents even after he had produced her own birth certificate and other documents. He said the family could not provide such certificates because they were from a generation in which birth registration was not common. That raises an obvious question: how much documentation must a poor citizen produce before the State believes that she belongs to the country in which she was born and has lived?

For months, instances of forced deportations and illegal pushbacks have surfaced from Assam, West Bengal, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Delhi of individuals “suspected” of being Bangladeshi nationals. In many of these cases, the family of those deported have approached the courts alleging that the removals were carried out without any disclosed nationality verification, without travel documents, and without Bangladesh formally acknowledging or accepting the individuals concerned.

Detailed reports may be read here, here, here, here and here.

The most dangerous word in this story is “suspected”

There is a profound legal difference between suspecting that someone may be a foreign national and establishing that they are one. The first is an investigative starting point. The second is a legal conclusion. Sahida’s case, as reported, appears to collapse the two. Scroll reported that the family was not given documents relating to her arrest or detention and that the Mumbai and Navi Mumbai police did not respond to questions seeking clarification about the grounds for her detention.

When the State takes away a person’s liberty, the burden of public accountability does not disappear merely because the allegation involves “illegal immigration”. If anything, the stakes are higher because the consequence may ultimately be removal from the country itself. The Constitution does not create a zone of executive immunity around immigration enforcement.

Article 21 protects life and personal liberty. Article 14 demands non-arbitrariness and equality before the law. Article 22 contains safeguards concerning arrest and detention. These constitutional protections cannot become conditional upon whether the person is socially respectable, economically secure or perceived to “look Indian”. And the constitutional question becomes particularly serious when a person is allegedly identified not through a properly adjudicated finding but through a combination of suspicion and social profiling.

The border cannot become a substitute for a hearing

Sahida’s husband told Scroll that she was detained because she was Bengali. In Maharashtra, the crackdown has become increasingly expansive. Hindustan Times reported in March that the state government told the Legislative Council that more than 2,000 alleged illegal Bangladeshi nationals had been deported in 2025, compared with 202 in 2024, and that the state planned intensive “combing operations” in slums, construction sites and other areas. There is nothing inherently unlawful about a State identifying and removing foreign nationals who are illegally present. Immigration control is a legitimate governmental function. The danger begins when the hunt for foreigners becomes a hunt for people who appear foreign.

The physical act of pushing someone across an international border has consequences that are fundamentally different from ordinary detention. Once a person is in Bangladesh, an Indian court’s ability to protect her becomes substantially more complicated. Access to lawyers, family members and documents becomes difficult. The very act of deportation can therefore create a second legal problem out of the first. This is exactly what makes Sahida’s account so alarming. According to the Indian Express, she said she was taken to the Assam border and pushed into Bangladesh at around 1 a.m. She reportedly walked for hours through muddy fields before local residents helped her and a family in Satkhira provided her shelter.

A precedent already exists for bringing people back

The danger of mistaken deportation is no longer theoretical. In 2025, several Bengali-speaking residents working outside West Bengal were detained and sent across the Bangladesh border amid claims that they were Bangladeshi nationals. One of the most consequential cases involved Sunali Khatun, her husband and their son. The Calcutta High Court’s September 2025 judgment in Bhodu Sekh v. Union of India is particularly relevant. The court examined the deportation of Sunali Khatun, Danish and their son Sabir. The authorities had argued that the family had failed to establish Indian citizenship. But the court also considered the procedure prescribed by the Union’s May 2, 2025 memorandum for persons suspected of being Bangladeshi or Myanmar nationals who claimed Indian citizenship in another State.

The memorandum contemplated verification by the State or district from which the person claimed to originate. Where a person claimed Indian citizenship and residence in another State, the concerned authorities were required to seek verification from that State and district administration. The judgment records that such verification was to be undertaken within a specified period, during which the person could be kept in a holding centre.

The Calcutta High Court ultimately held that the procedure had not been followed and described the authorities’ action as being undertaken in “hot haste”. It set aside the detention and deportation orders concerning Sunali, Danish and Sabir and directed the authorities to take steps to bring them back to India. In May 2026, the Union told the Supreme Court that it would bring back people deported to Bangladesh and verify their citizenship claims. All those six deported in this case are now back in India.

Detailed reports may be read here and here.

Notably, a separate affidavit was filed by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) on July 31, 2026 in Rajubala Das v. Union of India pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order dated March 21, 2025. The affidavit sought to explain the legal and administrative framework governing deportation where the nationality of a declared foreigner remains unknown or unverified. In doing so, the Union makes one of its clearest judicial admissions to date: deportation cannot even be initiated unless the individual’s nationality has first been verified by the receiving State, appropriate travel documents have been obtained, and the receiving country has agreed to accept the individual.

The affidavit fundamentally distinguishes between being declared a foreigner and being legally deportable. While a declaration by a Foreigners Tribunal may settle a person’s legal status within India, it does not, the Union now accepts, authorise the State to physically remove that individual from Indian territory. Deportation remains contingent upon a separate process involving diplomatic engagement, nationality verification, issuance of travel documents and, most importantly, the consent of another sovereign State. In other words, the executive cannot unilaterally deport a person merely because Indian authorities believe them to be a foreign national.

Detailed report may be read here.

The SIR connection makes the situation even more sensitive

Sahida’s case also comes amid intense scrutiny of electoral citizenship verification in West Bengal. According to Scroll, Sahida’s parents appeared on the 2002 electoral roll, while Sahida herself was marked “under adjudication” in the recent Special Intensive Revision process, with an appeal pending before the relevant tribunal. The fact that an electoral-roll dispute exists cannot itself establish whether Sahida is or is not an Indian citizen. But it does reinforce why administrative processes must remain separate and carefully bounded. Being excluded from an electoral roll is not the same thing as being declared a foreign national.

Indeed, in August 2025, the Supreme Court sought clarity from the Centre on the standard operating procedure governing deportation drives and specifically raised concerns about allegations that Bengali-speaking minorities were being singled out. The Court observed that while persons attempting to illegally cross into India could be dealt with at the border, once a person was already inside the country, the law prescribed a procedure.

Over the past few months, multiple petitions before the Supreme Court and High Courts have alleged that persons suspected of being Bangladeshi nationals were taken across the international border without any publicly disclosed deportation process. In several cases, families have alleged that individuals were picked up without prior notice, denied access to lawyers or relatives, and removed without any disclosed deportation order or travel documents.

Detailed report may be read here, here, here and here.

Related:

‘Deportation Cannot Begin without Nationality Verification’: Union’s Rajubala affidavit clarifies legal limits on executive power

Aadhaar, Voter ID and PAN Cannot Prove Citizenship: Calcutta High Court’s Foreigners Order and the burden of belonging

They Belong Here: An elderly couple’s victory for citizenship

Another CJP Victory: Barpeta Tribunal declares Alam Khan ‘not a foreigner’

When a narrow reading of documents decide citizenship: GHC in Aminul Hoque

‘Fairness & reason ‘: SC rules that due process is a must for citizenship determination

Gauhati High Court upholds foreigner declaration, rejects mental illness plea

The post When Suspicion Becomes Deportation: The case of Sahida Fakir and the dangerous criminalisation of Bengali identity appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Recent figures reported through an RTI investigation by The Indian Express suggest that India is witnessing an unprecedented expansion of government-backed content restrictions. Between March and July 2026, government agencies issued nearly 1.95 lakh blocking directions to Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. According to the report, this amounted to roughly 1,275 directions every day, or approximately one direction every 68 seconds. Instagram alone received nearly one lakh directions, Facebook around 80,000 and YouTube approximately 15,000.

The scale becomes even more striking when compared with the previous period for which comparable figures are available. RTI data accessed by The Indian Express showed that between October 2024 and October 2025, 2,312 blocking orders were sent to 19 online platforms through the government’s Sahyog portal. That amounted to roughly six orders a day. In the following five months, directions to just three major platforms rose to almost 1.95 lakh. Such a dramatic increase cannot be treated merely as an administrative statistic. It raises a much larger question about the changing relationship between the State, technology companies and citizens in India’s digital public sphere. And the timing makes that question even more difficult to ignore.

When protest moves online, censorship follows

A significant proportion of the latest blocking directions reportedly coincided with the student protests over examination irregularities and leaks in Delhi. The Indian Express, citing a senior government official, reported that a considerable share of the directions were issued as the NEET protests gathered momentum, particularly on Instagram. This is important because Instagram was not simply being used as a space in which the protests were discussed after they happened. It became one of the principal spaces through which the movement itself was organised.

The material compiled in the research shows how the Cockroach Janta Party’s social-media presence became central to the mobilisation, with protest announcements, videos, memes, explainers and other political content circulating rapidly among young users. The account reportedly grew to millions of followers and played an important role in mobilising people for demonstrations, including the July 20 “Sansad Chalo” march. That transformation of social media into a political organising space has a profound constitutional consequence.

A protest today does not begin only when people gather on a street. It begins when people communicate. They decide where to meet, circulate information about police action, share videos from the ground, publicise their demands and tell others what is happening. The digital space has therefore become part of the infrastructure of democratic protest itself. Consequently, restricting that space can affect far more than an individual’s ability to upload a post. It can affect the ability of a movement to organise, document itself and communicate with the wider public. This is why the reported restrictions during the protests deserve particularly close scrutiny.

Article 14, for instance, reported that journalist Sadhika Tiwari’s video showing a student allegedly being beaten by police was blocked on X following a government order. The video, according to the report, showed a crying student and did not contain hate speech, misinformation or graphic imagery. Around the same period, Meta temporarily blocked the Instagram account associated with CJP, which reportedly had more than 23 million followers, although the account was subsequently restored after criticism. The significance of such incidents lies not merely in whether one particular video was lawfully restricted. It lies in the fact that videos documenting State action during a protest are themselves part of the democratic record.

If citizens cannot see what happened on the streets, they cannot independently evaluate competing claims about what happened there. If videos documenting police conduct disappear before they can circulate widely, public debate becomes dependent increasingly upon official accounts of events. That is precisely where the problem of censorship becomes a problem of democracy.

The three-hour problem

The most troubling development, however, may not be the number of takedown directions alone. It is the shrinking amount of time available to platforms to respond to them. As Article 14 reported, the period within which intermediaries are expected to comply with certain government requests has been progressively reduced, eventually reaching three hours in 2026. The investigation linked this shrinking compliance period with the sharp increase in government takedown directions. Three hours may sound like an administrative efficiency measure. It is not difficult to see why it becomes something much more consequential when the subject is constitutionally protected speech.

Imagine a government order directing a platform to remove a journalist’s report. Before complying, the platform would ideally need to determine whether the issuing authority has jurisdiction, whether the order identifies the material adequately, whether the statutory requirements have been met, whether the content actually falls within the legal grounds for restriction and whether the restriction is proportionate. The affected journalist may also need an opportunity to respond. A court may eventually have to examine the order. Yet the platform is given only a few hours to act.

Under those circumstances, the rational institutional response is unlikely to be a careful legal assessment. It is likely to be compliance first and review later. That creates an important constitutional problem. A system that imposes severe consequences for delayed compliance but relatively weak consequences for wrongful removal creates an obvious incentive for platforms to err on the side of deletion. The consequence is what free-speech activists have long warned about: over-removal.

Lawful speech does not have to be formally prohibited for censorship to occur. It is enough for platforms to become sufficiently afraid of retaining controversial material that they begin removing content whenever there is doubt.

Sahyog and the transformation of censorship into infrastructure

The government’s Sahyog portal illustrates another aspect of this changing architecture. Introduced in October 2024, Sahyog was designed to streamline communication between government authorities and online intermediaries. In itself, there is nothing inherently problematic about creating an administrative mechanism through which lawful government directions can be communicated to technology companies. But administrative efficiency cannot substitute for constitutional safeguards.

Article 14 reported that X challenged Sahyog before the Karnataka High Court, arguing that the system effectively facilitated censorship by allowing government requests to reach platforms through a centralised mechanism. The Karnataka High Court rejected the challenge in July 2025 and characterised Sahyog as a facilitation mechanism rather than an independent censorship authority. That judicial characterisation is important, but it does not end the constitutional debate.

A communication system may technically be nothing more than a channel. The real constitutional question concerns what happens after the communication reaches the platform. If a government direction arrives through an official portal, carries the appearance of State authority and has to be acted upon within three hours, the practical ability of a platform to question that direction becomes extremely limited. The portal may facilitate communication.

But when that communication is backed by an extremely short compliance window and automated enforcement, the overall system can begin functioning as something considerably more powerful: an infrastructure through which State decisions about speech are translated rapidly into restrictions on citizens’ access to information.

When the algorithm becomes the censor

This is perhaps the most disturbing development. According to The Indian Express, Meta integrated its systems with Sahyog to comply with the three-hour requirement, allowing content identified through government directions to be restricted or removed automatically rather than waiting for a separate human review before compliance. Automation is attractive because it makes compliance efficient. But constitutional rights are precisely the kind of interests that should make us suspicious of efficiency without accountability.

A human decision-maker can, at least theoretically, ask whether a government direction is valid. An automated system cannot meaningfully interrogate the constitutional legitimacy of the State’s demand. It receives an instruction and executes it. The danger is therefore not simply that the government can order content to be removed. The danger is that a government instruction can increasingly be converted into an automated technical command. The chain becomes remarkably simple: the State issues the direction, the platform’s system receives it, the content is restricted and the user discovers that the speech has disappeared.

A citizen cannot challenge a decision that they cannot see

The question of notice is therefore central. Alt News has documented instances in which users received generic notifications stating that content had been restricted pursuant to a legal request or through an automated process, without being provided meaningful information about the specific legal basis or authority involved.

This creates a basic procedural problem. If a person does not know who ordered the restriction, they cannot determine whether the authority had jurisdiction. If they do not know which law was invoked, they cannot assess whether the restriction is legally sustainable. If they do not know why their particular content was unlawful, they cannot meaningfully challenge the decision. And if they cannot access the order itself, they may not even know what exactly they are supposed to challenge. This is where transparency stops being a policy preference and becomes a constitutional necessity. The State cannot reasonably expect citizens to defend their right to speak against an order whose existence, reasoning and legal basis remain hidden from them.

The disappearance of journalism is more serious than the disappearance of content

The consequences become particularly serious when the material being restricted is journalism. Article 14 reported that in March 2026 alone, Facebook pages belonging to at least six news and digital publications were blocked. The report also identified restrictions involving Greater Kashmir, Rising Kashmir, Kashmir Life, Molitics India, National Dastak and 4PM News Network, among others. The Wire, Maktoob Media and Peek TV have similarly reported restrictions affecting their content.

The problem here is fundamentally different from the removal of ordinary user-generated material. A journalist reporting on a protest is not simply generating “content”. They are creating a record of a public event. A report about Kashmir may become part of the historical record of the region, a video documenting police action may later become evidence in litigation, or a report concerning government policy may inform electoral choices. When such material disappears without clear explanation, the damage therefore extends beyond the individual publisher.

The public loses access to information that may be essential to holding power accountable. That is why the freedom of the press cannot be protected merely by allowing newspapers to continue printing. In 2026, press freedom also requires journalists to be able to reach audiences through the digital platforms on which those audiences increasingly depend.

The State’s concern about decentralised communication is not irrelevant — but it is not enough

The controversy surrounding Bitchat, Briar and Bridgefy demonstrates that the problem extends beyond mainstream social-media platforms. During the Jantar Mantar protests, demonstrators reportedly turned to Bluetooth-based mesh communication applications that could facilitate communication between nearby devices without relying entirely on conventional mobile internet infrastructure.

The government’s concern was that such systems could make lawful interception, identification and investigation more difficult. According to reports, the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre issued directions seeking the removal of Bitchat, Briar and Bridgefy from major app stores and also sought action against Bitchat’s GitHub repository. Medianama reported that the notices provided intermediaries with three hours to comply, although officials later orally instructed companies not to enforce the directions.

ThePrint reported that the I4C notice to GitHub invoked Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules and sought removal of Bitchat’s repositories within three hours. There is a legitimate public-interest argument here. Communication technologies can be abused for criminal activity, and the State cannot be expected to remain completely powerless when technology is used to facilitate serious offences. But that cannot be the end of the analysis.

The fact that a technology can be misused does not establish that the technology itself should be suppressed. A telephone can be used to organise a crime. A messaging application can be used to coordinate violence. Social media can spread misinformation. None of these facts, by themselves, justify eliminating the technology. The State must still establish why the restriction is necessary, why less restrictive alternatives would not work and why the particular application or communication mechanism presents a sufficiently serious and demonstrable threat. Otherwise, “public order” becomes a justification capable of swallowing the right to communicate altogether.

The constitutional framework is not optional

India does not indulge this issue without constitutional guidance. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, while Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on specified grounds. The Supreme Court’s decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India remains a foundational judgment in understanding the limits of online speech regulation.

The Court’s decision is important precisely because it recognises that vague or overbroad restrictions can have a chilling effect on legitimate expression. The existence of a statutory power, therefore, cannot by itself answer the constitutional question. The State must still demonstrate that the restriction falls within the law and survives constitutional scrutiny. That is particularly important where the restriction affects political expression.

Political speech lies at the heart of democratic participation. Criticism of government policy, reporting on protests, documenting police action and exposing administrative failures cannot be placed in the same category as genuinely unlawful material merely because they are inconvenient or controversial. The State must be able to distinguish speech that is unlawful from speech that is merely uncomfortable. That distinction is the foundation of a functioning democracy.

Another concern emerging from the reporting is the increasingly routine character of mechanisms originally justified by urgency. Emergency powers exist for a reason. There are situations in which authorities may need to act quickly to prevent serious and immediate harm. But emergency mechanisms become constitutionally dangerous when the exception starts functioning as the ordinary route for restricting speech.

Article 14 reported concerns among technology-policy experts that emergency blocking mechanisms could increasingly become part of routine online governance, particularly because affected parties may not receive the underlying orders and therefore have limited opportunities to challenge them. The constitutional problem can be stated simply. An emergency procedure should make the State faster when speed is genuinely necessary. It should not make the State less accountable because it has chosen to act quickly. If anything, extraordinary powers should trigger stronger review precisely because they reduce the opportunity for the affected person to respond beforehand.

Platforms are not innocent bystanders

The responsibility, however, does not rest with the government alone. Technology companies have enormous power over what citizens can see, publish and circulate. They therefore have their own obligations of transparency. The Indian Express reporting indicates that Meta generally provides users in several jurisdictions with information when governments request restrictions on their content, but that such disclosures are not provided in India and some other markets because of legal and regulatory considerations. That should concern anyone who believes that users have a right to understand why their speech has been restricted.

A platform should not be able to tell a journalist merely that their report is unavailable because of a “legal requirement”. The journalist should know whether the government ordered the restriction, which authority issued the order and which law was invoked. Transparency does not necessarily prevent compliance. A platform can comply with a lawful government direction while still informing the affected user that the government sought the restriction. Indeed, transparency may be one of the few mechanisms capable of ensuring that government censorship does not become invisible.

The reported proposal by X to make government requests more visible to users therefore deserves attention. According to recent reports, Elon Musk announced that X would begin making government requests to restrict or remove content more transparent, including information about the requesting authority and, where available, the legal basis for the request.

The Indian government has understandably maintained that platforms operating in India remain subject to Indian law. But that is not inconsistent with transparency. The two principles can coexist. If the State has lawfully ordered a restriction, there should be no reason for the process to remain invisible. Government censorship should not become anonymous censorship.

India must decide what kind of digital democracy it wants

There is a legitimate State interest in regulating harmful online material. There is a legitimate public interest in combating misinformation, incitement, deepfakes, threats and criminal coordination. Technology companies cannot claim absolute immunity from the laws of the countries in which they operate. But none of these propositions answers the central constitutional question.

How much power should the State possess to determine what citizens are allowed to see, publish and circulate — and what safeguards must accompany that power?

Nearly 1.95 lakh blocking directions in five months, as reported by The Indian Express, should force that question into the centre of India’s democratic debate. The answer cannot simply be that the government has followed a procedure. A procedure that is too fast to meaningfully challenge, too opaque to independently scrutinise and too automated to permit genuine review can satisfy the appearance of legality while undermining the substance of constitutional protection.

Indian law therefore needs stronger safeguards around government-directed content restrictions. Orders should clearly identify the legal provision relied upon, the authority issuing them and the reasons for restricting the particular material. Affected users should ordinarily receive notice and have access to a meaningful appeal mechanism. Emergency orders should be subject to prompt independent review and should automatically lapse unless their continuation is justified. Platforms should publish greater information about government requests, including anonymised data that allows the public to assess how frequently such powers are being used and how often they are challenged or withdrawn. Most importantly, the burden cannot silently shift from the State having to justify censorship to the citizen having to prove why their speech should remain online.

The extraordinary rise in takedown directions, the targeting of protest-related content, the restrictions imposed on journalists and news organisations, the attempt to interfere with decentralised communication tools and the increasing use of automated compliance together point towards a digital environment in which the speed of censorship may be outpacing the speed of accountability.

Related:

How Can Rehabilitation Work If We Are Not Safe?’ Sanjay Tickoo on the fresh threat to Kashmiri Pandit employees

JNU Cancels Venue, Not the Conversation: Umar Khalid’s book discussion moves outdoors amid protests

After NEET protests ended, the battle moved online: Women protesters face threats, doxing and criminalisation

#STOPKILLINGUS Protest at Jantar Mantar on August 4 against GOI’s “cover-up” of Manual Scavenging deaths

The Supreme Court’s Uneasy Middle Path on Protest Policing

Ken-Betwa protest exposes the cost of state-led displacement

The post The State Wants the Delete Button: India’s new architecture of digital censorship appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the 10 am bulletin issued on the final day of the house-to-house enumeration exercise, 2, 07, 93,916 forms, or about 21.25 per cent of the state’s electorate, were in the uncollected category. The exercise ended at 5 pm on Monday, August 17, and the final figure could change after the remaining data is updated.

महाराष्ट्रातील मतदारनिहाय गणना अर्ज (EFs) यांच्या डिजिटायजेशन आणि ‘गणना अर्ज जमा न होणे’ची स्थिती – १७ ऑगस्ट २०२६
Maharashtra’s Status of Digitization and Uncollected of elector specific Enumeration Forms (EFs) – 17.8.2026

#SIR2026 #SIRMAHARASHTRA pic.twitter.com/2g1rZO3UQP

— ChiefElectoralOffice (@CEO_Maharashtra) August 17, 2026

The uncollected forms relate to voters whose details could not be verified through the enumeration process. Their absence from this category does not by itself establish that they are dead, have shifted permanently, are duplicate voters or are otherwise ineligible.

The Election Commission’s process requires voters whose forms were not collected to be dealt with separately in the draft roll. As a result, their names are unlikely to appear in the August 24 draft unless their enumeration status is updated before publication.

However, this would not amount to permanent deletion from the electoral roll. Voters whose names are missing from the draft will have from August 24 to September 23 to file claims or objections and seek inclusion or correction. The authorities will consider these applications before the final electoral roll is published on October 27.

An official reportedly told the media that the said voters should check the draft roll once it is published and submit a claim for inclusion if their names are missing. Eligible persons can also apply for inclusion during the claims and objections period. Indian Express quoted an official from the State Election Commission, saying that, “This is not permanent deletion from the electoral roll. The August 24 list is a draft, and being left out of it does not mean that an eligible voter has permanently lost the right to vote. Voters should check the draft roll on August 24. Those whose names are missing will have one month, from August 24 to September 23, to seek inclusion or correction. Eligible persons can apply for inclusion as voters during this period,” said an official.” However as stated earlier in the report, the onus now shifts from the SEC to the individually excluded voter.

The enumeration form is used to verify the details of an existing elector. During the SIR exercise, Booth Level Officers (BLOs) visited households with pre-filled forms, which were then collected for verification and digitisation.

A form could remain uncollected for several reasons. A voter may have moved to another address, may have been away when the BLO visited, or may not have been traceable at the address recorded in the electoral roll. Urban migration and frequent changes of residence have been cited by officials as some of the reasons for the higher numbers in cities.

The SIR exercise in Maharashtra began on June 30. The deadline for the house-to-house enumeration process was extended twice before the exercise concluded on Monday i.e. August 18, 2026.

राज्यात SIR अंतर्गत गृहभेटींनंतर गणना प्रपत्र दाखल करून घेण्याची प्रक्रिया पूर्ण झाली आहे. त्याबाबतचे प्रसिद्धीपत्रक @ECISVEEP pic.twitter.com/M6DrnFp7KK

— ChiefElectoralOffice (@CEO_Maharashtra) August 18, 2026

Urban districts account for a large share

The distribution of uncollected forms is uneven across Maharashtra. Four major urban districts — Thane, Mumbai City, Mumbai Suburban and Pune — together account for about 94.47 lakh uncollected forms.

That is around 45.4 per cent of all uncollected forms in the state, even though these four districts account for only about 27.5 per cent of Maharashtra’s electorate.

Thane has the largest number, with forms for 28.88 lakh of its 74.51 lakh voters remaining uncollected. This represents about 38.77 per cent of the district’s electorate.

Mumbai City recorded 9.60 lakh uncollected forms, or 37.57 per cent of its voters. Mumbai Suburban had 26.99 lakh, accounting for 34.48 per cent, while Pune had 28.99 lakh uncollected forms, or 31.92 per cent of its electorate.

The figures are also high in several other districts with significant urban and migrant populations. Nagpur had 14.06 lakh uncollected forms, representing 30.32 per cent of its electorate. In Palghar, 6.87 lakh forms, or 28.88 per cent, remained uncollected. Raigad recorded 5.91 lakh, or 23.33 per cent.

Together, Thane, Mumbai City, Mumbai Suburban, Pune, Nagpur, Palghar and Raigad account for around 1.21 crore uncollected forms, or nearly 58.3 per cent of the state-wide total. These districts, however, account for roughly 37 per cent of Maharashtra’s electorate.

Lower numbers in several rural districts

The pattern is markedly different in several rural districts. Hingoli had the lowest proportion among the districts cited, with forms for 8.82 per cent of voters remaining uncollected.

Buldhana recorded 9.10 per cent, while Ratnagiri had 9.93 per cent and Latur 10.62 per cent. The difference means that while nearly four out of every 10 voters in Thane had an uncollected form, the proportion in Hingoli was below one in 10.

The gap between urban and rural districts has raised attention to the challenges of conducting house-to-house verification in areas with high population mobility. In larger cities such as Mumbai, Thane and Pune, voters may frequently change residences without immediately updating their electoral details.

Number rose by 27 lakh in five days

The number of uncollected forms also increased sharply in the final days of the exercise. The figure stood at around 1.80 crore on August 12 and had risen to nearly 2.08 crore by Monday, an increase of about 27.3 lakh in five days.

At the time of the 10 am bulletin on Monday, around 1.08 lakh electors were still outside both the digitised and uncollected categories, with their status yet to be reflected in the data.

This essentially means that the 2.08 crore figure should be treated as the ‘bare minimum’ number of voters who could be left out of the August 24 draft based on the available bulletin. The final number may change after the remaining records are processed.

The publication of the draft roll on August 24 will therefore be the next major stage of the process. Voters will have one month after its publication to check their names and submit claims or objections where required.

The final electoral roll is scheduled to be published on October 27, after the claims and objections received during the intervening period are examined by the election authorities.

Related:

SIR 2025-26: Dismantling the very Idea of India?

21 Opposition parties to CJI: SIR process is irregular and illegal, must be suspended

SIR and the Making of a Stateless Citizen? | R. Rajagopal Speaks Out | Teesta Setalvad

Karnataka launches SIR with 5.5 crore voters, State Govt voices transparency concerns

The post Maharashtra SIR: 2.08 crore (20.8 million) voter forms “uncollected” hence may not be listed in August 24 draft electoral roll appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Indian Express, in a social media post said, “A man was beaten to death in Jharkhand’s Chatra district on Tuesday (Aug 4) morning after villagers accused him of confining a minor girl and sexually assaulting her. A top officer in the administration said the allegations of confinement and sexual assault are yet to be confirmed. The father of the man beaten to death has filed a police complaint, and an FIR has been registered under several sections, including one related to mob lynching.

The team visited the village eight days after the incident on August 12, met the family members of Imroj, the survivor victim girl, neighbours and the in-charge of Tandwa Police Station. The team comprised representatives of Jharkhand Janadhikar Mahasabha, Karwan e Mohabbat, Sajha Kadam and United Milli Forum.

The team learnt that a mob of Bargaon’s Hindu villagers led by local BJP leader and husband of Panchayat Mukhiya Vijay Choubey stormed Imroj’s house on the morning of August 4. They tied his father, Md Sultan, to a pole outside their home and beat him. They accused Imroj of kidnapping an underage girl from a neighbouring house, keeping her hostage for two days in the house and raping her. The mob finally found Imroj and brutally lynched him. The police had reached within half an hour of the mob (after Muslims called them). But, according to the version of the family to the factfinding team, the police personnel remained mute spectators and allowed the lynching in front of them.

The girl’s house is right opposite Imroj’s house, across the street, states the findings in the report. Her grandparents stayed in the outer room of Sultan’s house for three days until August 3 as their kuchcha house had collapsed. Furthermore, the rooms in Sultan’s under-construction house do not have doors. The door at the entrance of the house also remained open most of the time as he spent a lot of time on the verandah. All the houses (all Hindu except four Muslim houses) in the lane are close to each other. Hence, the fact-finding team thinks that it is improbable that a girl from across the street could be kidnapped and kept in this house. Imroj was accused of attempting to rape/abetting the attempt to rape of an underage girl in an earlier case. People complained that he used to smoke Ganja and his behaviour was not good. Hence, the allegation needs to be thoroughly and fairly investigated, states the team’s report.

While this lynching itself is a case of communal violence, there have been visible attempts by the BJP and RSS organisations to use this incident to deepen religious polarisation. BJP Scheduled Caste Morcha President and ex-MLA Kisun Das addressed a mass meeting of Hindu families in the village on 7 August. In his speech, he can be heard saying, “Naam tumhara jab alpsankhyak hai, to kayde-kanun mein rahoge to fayede mein rahoge. Aur agar utpat machaoge, to abhi to ek gaya hai, aur bhi kayio ko jana padega”. The crowd chanted, “Jai Shri Ram” in the background. BJP leader Babulal Marandi, accompanied by the Chatra MP, local MLA and several BJP leaders, addressed a mass meeting in the village on August 9 and addressed a mass meeting. Rather than trying to bridge the communal gap, he also can be heard inciting the Hindu masses. The Hindu vegetable vendors and shopkeepers have stopped selling anything to the Muslims of the village, reports the team.

There are many serious questions regarding the police’s handling of the matter. The SHO told the factfinding team that he was informed about the missing girl on August 3 by one Vijay Choubey. The question is why he did not visit the village and undertake an inquiry. Both the police and the administration allowed BJP leaders to address meetings in the village, despite BNS section 163 prohibitions in place, and did not take any action against their hate speeches. The police officers were unaware of the Supreme Court guidelines on lynching and hate speeches.

The Dalit family lives in dire poverty. Imroj worked as a labourer, and his brothers are migrant workers. It is clear that there is an attempt by the BJP to use this whole incident and also these families to build a communal narrative against Muslims. The incident also exposed Hemant Soren government’s failure in addressing communal violence. While there were many cases of communal-violence inspired lynching under the Raghubar Das government, it has continued under this dispensation too.

Demands from the local administration and state government placed by the fact-finding team include:

• The Tandwa SHO should be removed from the investigation, and a senior officer should be made the investigating officer. The state government should ensure a free and impartial investigation in both the FIRs. The people who mobilised the mob on 4^th August should be identified and arrested, along with the perpetrators of violence.
• Strict action should be taken against the BJP leaders for their hate speeches given after the incident in the village. FIRs should be registered, as per the Supreme Court judgement in the Ashwini Upadhyay case. Action should be taken in accordance with the law against everyone who incited collective hatred, ostracism, or a sense of vengeance against any community.
• The families of the both the girl and Imroj should be provided with police and legal support for the duration of the investigation.
• The administration and police should implement the Supreme Court guidelines in the Tehseen Poonawala case, such as constitution and regular meetings of peace committee.
• The state government should ensure accountability of police and administration in cases of communal violence and lynching. The government should also undertake campaigns to promote communal harmony across the state.

The factfinding team included Praveer Peter, Priyasheela Besra, Afzal anees. Mohammed Shadab Ansari, Raja Bhuiyan and Siraj Dutta.

Details of this report rely on the press note of the organisation Jharkand Janadhikar Mahasabha, dated August 17, 2026

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Teachers working as Booth Level Officers (BLOs) have been engaged in the exercise for more than a month. They were earlier expected to return to schools on August 8, but their deployment has now been extended until August 17. The draft electoral rolls are scheduled to be published on August 24.

The extended schedule means teachers appointed as BLOs, as well as those assisting them, will continue with house visits, voter verification, form-related work and other activities connected with the revision.

Unit tests and classroom teaching affected

Schools are preparing for unit tests scheduled for August while also working with new textbooks introduced for Standards III, IV and VI under the National Education Policy. Teachers and school heads said the continued absence of staff has made it difficult for schools to maintain regular teaching and complete the syllabus.

The periodic assessment test, which is mandatory for students and is intended to assess their learning and academic progress, is normally conducted in August. Educationists have said that continued teacher deployment could push the assessment towards the end of September or October.

The extension has also affected unit tests planned for the second week of August. In several government and civic schools, teachers have either been fully relieved from school duties or are spending a substantial part of their working hours on SIR-related work.

In some schools, more than 70% of the teaching staff has reportedly been deployed for SIR duties, leaving fewer teachers to handle regular classes and examinations. Several schools have also been functioning for only half a day because of the shortage of teaching staff.

Teacher Madhav Suryawanshi said the continued deployment was affecting classroom work. He said, “BLO and SIR duties are complicated and continuous processes that require teachers to stay away from classrooms for several weeks”, as reported by the Times of India.

He also pointed out that the new textbooks introduced this year for Standards III, IV and VI under the NEP required additional classroom attention. According to him, schools were already facing difficulties in completing the syllabus and preparing for the first unit tests.

Schools managing with reduced staff

The impact is not limited to teachers formally appointed as BLOs. School heads said other teaching and non-teaching employees have also been assigned to assist in the SIR exercise.

According to the Times of India, Headmaster Tanaji Mane said his school had 17 teachers, one clerk and four Class IV employees. Initially, three teachers had been appointed as BLOs, but from July, the teaching and non-teaching staff were also assigned as assistants for the SIR exercise and directed to be relieved from their regular school duties.

According to Mane, the school had to function with reduced staff before all employees were eventually relieved. He was later also assigned election duty.

He said schools were simultaneously receiving circulars relating to literacy surveys, out-of-school children, student records and departmental competitions, making it difficult to run the school with normal staffing.

Education Department accounts for large share of BLO appointments

Tanaji Kamble, president of the Progressive Teachers Association, cited figures from the Ghatkopar East Assembly constituency to highlight the extent of teacher deployment. According to Kamble, 283 employees were appointed for BLO duties in the constituency. Of these, 184, or around 65%, were from the Education Department, including 157 teachers. Kamble said the figures from one constituency reflected the wider situation in Mumbai. He also said the government had stated that around 40% of teachers had been assigned SIR duties, while the situation on the ground was different, as per a report in the Hindustan Times.

The deployment has also led to pressure on teachers who do not report for election-related work. Police stations have issued notices to some teachers who failed to report for duty.

The issue has led to concerns among teachers, headmasters and school managements. Some school administrators have also approached the court over the matter, although no hearing has taken place so far.

Teachers say prolonged duty is affecting learning

Faruk Kazi, another teacher involved in the SIR exercise, said teachers had already been under pressure because of the prolonged nature of the work. As reported by the Times of India, Kazi said, “We have been under immense pressure for the past month. The form-filling process was completed only recently, but now verification and subsequent stages will continue.”

He said the revised schedule could extend the work into October and added that the Education Department had not done enough to address the concerns arising from prolonged non-academic duties. Jalinder Sarode, working president of Shikshak Sena (Maharashtra), also said the extension was coming at a time when examinations were already being conducted, as reported

As reported, Sarode said, “Examinations are going on and the frequent absence of teachers is disturbing the teaching process.”

He suggested that the government consider using trained personnel from other departments or outsourcing election-related work instead of continuing to deploy teachers from schools.

Concern over prolonged absence from classrooms

Suhas Gurav, an educator, said the issue was not limited to the additional workload being placed on teachers. He said attention also needed to be given to the effect of prolonged BLO and SIR duties on classroom teaching. As reported, Gurav said, “The real question is whether parents and society recognise that prolonged BLO and SIR responsibilities prevent teachers from devoting sufficient time to their primary responsibility of teaching.”

The SIR extension means teachers and other school employees assigned to the exercise will continue their election-related responsibilities until August 17, while the draft electoral rolls are scheduled to be published on August 24. Schools will accordingly continue to manage regular teaching and academic activities alongside the extended election-related deployment.

Related:

The Deadly Deadline: “I Can’t Do This Anymore”—India’s electoral revision turns into a graveyard for BLOs/teachers

SIR exercise leaves trail of suicide across states as BLOs buckle under pressure and citizens panic over citizenship

Haunted by NRC fears, 57-year-old West Bengal man dies by suicide; Mamata blames BJP for turning democracy into a “theatre of fear”

Pregnant woman deported despite parents on 2002 SIR rolls, another homemaker commits suicide

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According to The Indian Express, the Jammu and Kashmir administration has informally instructed government departments to allow Kashmiri Pandit employees to remain away from work and to remain alert, with some reportedly advised to move to safer locations. Sources cited by the newspaper said the instructions were particularly directed towards departments such as School Education and Revenue. However, there is no publicly available formal government order confirming the arrangement.

The New Indian Express similarly reported that Pandit employees had been asked to work from home “for some time”, with one Prime Minister’s Package employee telling the newspaper that they had been instructed to remain away from work until August 25. Other reports have put the period at August 20 or August 15, reflecting the absence of a clearly communicated formal order.

The discrepancy has also been acknowledged by government officials. The Indian Express quoted Naseer Ahmad Wani, Director of School Education, as saying that no instructions had been issued to employees to work from home or take leave and that government employees were continuing to report for duty. His statement came after school principals reportedly told the newspaper that they had received verbal instructions to be lenient with the attendance of migrant employees and subsequently to ask them to remain at home.

The reported threat letter has been attributed to a group calling itself the United Liberation Council (ULC). Police are still verifying its authenticity. Security officials cited by Free Press Kashmir suspect that the group may be a front or “shadow” outfit of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba. According to a police officer quoted by The Indian Express, the group first surfaced in July, when it released a poster marking the death anniversary of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani.

The alleged letter specifically targeted Kashmiri Pandits who reside outside the Valley but work in Kashmir. Six employees were reportedly named, all belonging to the Revenue Department. The threat purportedly sought to connect their government duties with the seizure of properties allegedly associated with militants or terrorists. The letter is also reported to have claimed that the group possessed details of the employees’ families and locations.

The publication of the employees’ personal information has itself become a major security concern. The New Indian Express reported that Kashmiri Pandit groups have questioned how the names and phone numbers of the six employees became publicly available, asking whether the disclosure represented a security lapse, a breach of confidentiality or a deliberate leak. The Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS) called for the loopholes to be identified and for vulnerable employees to be protected before the situation deteriorates further.

Panun Kashmir convenor Dr Agnishekhar also called for a comprehensive threat assessment of all persons named in the letter and their immediate families. He urged Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha to direct the police and security agencies to review the security arrangements for Pandit employees, particularly those working in sensitive government departments.

The threat comes against the backdrop of a renewed security alert in the Valley following a series of attacks. Two migrant workers from Chhattisgarh were killed at a brick kiln in Kulgam on July 31. The Indian Express reported that the threat letter emerged approximately a week after the killings. The Wire, meanwhile, placed the developments within a broader sequence of recent attacks, noting the killing of policeman Ashiq Hussain Qureshi in a busy marketplace in Anantnag on June 22 while he was deployed for Amarnath Yatra duty, followed by the killing of the two migrant workers in Kulgam.

Against this backdrop, security arrangements have reportedly been intensified around areas inhabited by Kashmiri Pandits. According to The Wire, police and security forces have increased night patrols, checkpoints, frisking and surveillance at vulnerable locations and important entry and exit points across Kashmir ahead of Independence Day. A security review chaired by Kashmir Zone Inspector General of Police V.K. Birdi reportedly brought together senior officials from the Jammu and Kashmir Police, BSF, CRPF, SSB, ITBP, Railway Protection Force, intelligence agencies, traffic police and the Army, besides district police chiefs.

The security review reportedly focused on arrangements for Independence Day celebrations, particularly the main function at Srinagar’s Bakshi Stadium. Officers were directed to strengthen checkpoints during night hours, intensify area domination and patrolling in sensitive areas and maintain heightened surveillance and inter-agency coordination.

The security measures have coincided with the reported restrictions on Kashmiri Pandit employees. The Wire reported that some minority employees had been asked to work from home until Independence Day, while KPSS president Sanjay Tickoo told the publication that Pandit employees had been asked not to leave their residential colonies or report to their offices. Other reports, however, have cited August 20 and August 25 as the end dates communicated to employees.

The varying accounts underline an important feature of the current situation: the reported restrictions appear to have been communicated primarily through informal or departmental channels rather than through a publicly accessible government order. This has created uncertainty not only about the precise scope and duration of the restrictions but also about their legal and administrative basis.

For Kashmiri Pandit employees, staying indoors also does not necessarily resolve the underlying security problem. Sunny Raina, president of the All Prime Minister’s Package Employees, told The Indian Express that employees had been asked to remain at home after the threat posters appeared but argued that this was not a solution. Employees still need to purchase groceries, obtain medicines and maintain ordinary social lives. The concern is therefore not simply whether they can be protected inside their homes or colonies, but whether they can safely participate in ordinary public and professional life.

The issue is particularly significant because employment in Kashmir forms an integral part of the government’s rehabilitation policy for displaced Kashmiri Pandits. Over the years, approximately 6,000 people have received benefits under the Prime Minister’s Special Rehabilitation and Employment Package, under which beneficiaries are required to work in the Valley. The All Prime Minister’s Package Employees association, however, puts the number of such employees currently posted in Kashmir at around 9,000. The reported decision to keep employees away from their workplaces therefore creates an obvious tension within the rehabilitation programme itself. A policy designed to facilitate the return of displaced Kashmiri Pandits to the Valley cannot be reduced to physical relocation without also ensuring that those employees are able to live, work and move with reasonable security and dignity.

This is not the first time the government’s approach to the safety of Pandit employees has been questioned. In 2022, a series of alleged militant attacks targeted Kashmiri Pandit employees, killing five people. The attacks prompted prolonged protests by employees demanding permanent transfers outside Kashmir. According to Sunny Raina, employees protested for approximately 350 days and sought transfers to Jammu. He alleged that the administration refused the demand and that salaries were withheld for six months, eventually forcing employees to return to work. The government instead relocated some employees to areas within the Valley considered comparatively safer.

The current situation therefore revives a problem that has remained unresolved since those attacks: whether security can be meaningfully guaranteed while employees continue to be required to work in the Valley, and whether repeated periods of confinement or informal leave can substitute for a long-term security and rehabilitation strategy.

There are also questions surrounding the manner in which employees’ attendance and movement are being managed. The Indian Express reported that online GPS-based attendance has been made mandatory for teachers in Kashmir, while migrant employees have reportedly been exempted and permitted to record their attendance in an arrival book. Such exemptions may be understandable as an immediate security precaution, but they also demonstrate the extent to which the threat environment has disrupted the ordinary functioning of public employment.

The situation is unfolding alongside a broader intensification of security and administrative activity in Kashmir ahead of Independence Day. The Wire reported increased police checking and frisking, additional checkpoints and night patrols, as well as enhanced surveillance around sensitive areas and event venues.

At the same time, authorities have intensified the government’s Har Ghar Tiranga–Vande Mataram campaign across Jammu and Kashmir. District administrations and BJP workers have reportedly organised Tiranga rallies, mass recitations of Vande Mataram and the National Anthem, quizzes, marathons, sporting and cultural programmes, cleanliness drives and other public-outreach activities. The campaign also includes programmes involving students, youth, women and grassroots communities, with events marking 150 years of Vande Mataram.

According to The Wire, some government teachers and employees have also been asked through internal WhatsApp groups to share photographs of themselves with the national flag. There is reportedly no publicly available formal order mandating such photographs. A government teacher quoted by the publication said that when senior education officials share photographs with the flag in departmental groups, their conduct can effectively operate as an unofficial instruction for subordinate employees to do the same, including on their WhatsApp statuses.

Alongside these developments, security agencies have continued operations against individuals and organisations accused of radical or separatist activities. The Wire reported that the Counter-Intelligence Kashmir unit arrested two men, Mehran Qazi of Dooru in Anantnag and Babar Hamid Dar of Sopore, for allegedly circulating radical and anti-national content online. Police also reportedly conducted simultaneous searches at 26 locations in Sopore as part of an investigation concerning the activities and network of the banned Jamaat-e-Islami. The searches, carried out with CRPF assistance, reportedly covered Sopore town and several surrounding villages, with documents, literature and electronic devices seized for examination.

Jamaat-e-Islami was declared an unlawful association by the Union Home Ministry in 2019 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, with the government alleging separatist and militant links.

In another development, police obtained an order from an NIA court to attach property valued at approximately ₹69.82 lakh belonging to Parvaiz Ahmad Famda in north Kashmir’s Baramulla district. According to The Wire, the action relates to a 2008 militancy-linked case registered at Chandoosa police station under provisions of the EIMCO Act, the Ranbir Penal Code and the UAPA. The property reportedly comprises 12 kanal, one marla and 73 square feet of land. An arrest warrant has also reportedly been obtained against another accused in the case.

Taken together, these developments reveal a Valley operating under an increasingly dense security apparatus as Independence Day approaches. Keeping threatened employees indoors may provide an immediate precaution, but it cannot be the endpoint of a rehabilitation policy. Nor can informal instructions, varying leave periods and the absence of a transparent government order provide employees with certainty about their rights, duties or safety.

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Pervasive fear, surveillance of media, spiral of anti-India sentiment in Kashmir: CCG

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The order was passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Sri. Mithun Gopi G.S. in Crl.MP No. 1/2026 in Crime No. 95/2026, T.G. Mohandas v. State of Kerala.

The court noted the non-issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) before the arrest. It also took into account the recovery and seizure of electronic devices allegedly connected with the case, Mohandas’s cooperation with the investigation, and his age and health condition.

The prosecution had raised concerns that he could abscond, influence witnesses or interfere with the investigation. The court held that these concerns could be addressed by imposing conditions while granting bail.

Case concerns videos on Jantar Mantar protests

The case relates to videos uploaded on the YouTube channel “Pathrika”, in which Mohandas allegedly made statements concerning protests at Jantar Mantar.

According to the prosecution, the statements were made with the intention of disturbing public peace and tranquillity and inciting riots. It was further alleged that the content was capable of creating fear and anxiety among protesters and contained remarks insulting womanhood and violating the dignity of women.

The FIR alleges that Mohandas spoke about beating and “shooting dead” student protesters. It also alleges that he made remarks referring to women protesters as women who “enjoyed rape”. The prosecution told the court that around 16 complaints had been made against him in connection with the alleged statements.

According to The Hindu, the videos led to complaints from student and youth organisations and subsequent police action.

Alleged remarks about shooting protesters and sexual violence

According to The Hindu, Mohandas, a former head of the BJP’s State intellectual cell, had spoken in a YouTube video about how he would respond to the Jantar Mantar protest if he were in control of the situation. The report said he spoke of imposing a curfew in the area around Jantar Mantar, directing protesters to disperse and then using force against those who remained.

In the video, he described a sequence involving shooting protesters and subsequently taking bodies to hospitals. In another video, he allegedly made remarks concerning women participating in protests and referred to leftist, secular, democratic and proletarian women in the context of gang rape. The videos generated public reactions and led to demands for legal action.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh subsequently distanced itself from the remarks. K.B. Sreekumar, Saha Prantha Karyavah of the RSS in South Kerala, said the comments represented Mohandas’s personal views and that he was not an RSS office-bearer at any level. He also said the organisation did not agree with the views.

Cyber police register case

The Thiruvananthapuram City Cyber Police registered the case under several provisions.

According to Live Law, Mohandas was booked under Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act, and Sections 79, 353(1) (b) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

However, the police case included Sections 192 and 353(1) (b) of the BNS, along with Section 66 of the Information Technology Act and Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act.

On August 9, a team of cyber police officers searched Mohandas’s residence at Mattancherry before taking him into custody. The seized electronic devices were subsequently produced before the court.

Defence challenges arrest and alleges political motivation

During the bail hearing, counsel for Mohandas challenged both the allegations and the necessity of his arrest. According to Live Law, the defence argued that the case was politically motivated, referring to Mohandas’s association with the BJP and RSS and the alleged political affiliation of the complainant. The defence also submitted that there were no exceptional circumstances requiring immediate arrest.

The principal procedural objection was that the police had not issued a notice under Section 35(3) BNSS before arresting him.

The defence argued that, in the circumstances, Mohandas could have been directed to appear before the investigating officer instead of being immediately taken into custody.

Section 35(3) notice becomes central issue

Section 35 of the BNSS deals with circumstances in which police may arrest a person without a warrant. Sub-section (3) provides for issuance of a notice requiring the person to appear before the police officer where immediate arrest is not considered necessary.

The court examined whether the investigating agency had sufficient grounds to dispense with this procedural requirement. The prosecution argued that a notice was not necessary because there was a possibility that Mohandas could abscond or interfere with digital evidence. According to the prosecution, the investigating officer had recorded concerns about possible destruction, tampering or manipulation of electronic evidence. The prosecution also relied on the number of complaints received against Mohandas and the nature of the allegations while opposing the bail application.

Court rejects general apprehension of absconding

The court did not accept that the material before it established a sufficient possibility of Mohandas evading the investigation or absconding. A significant factor considered by the court was that the police had been able to locate him at his known residential address and conduct a search there.

The court observed, as reported by Live Law:

“The fact that the investigating agency was able to locate the accused at his known residential address and conduct a search there, is, in the circumstances, inconsistent with such apprehension.”

The court further held that a general apprehension that evidence might be destroyed, tampered with or manipulated could not, without circumstances demonstrating an immediate need for arrest, by itself justify dispensing with the statutory safeguard under Section 35(3) BNSS.

The court also noted that the remand report did not contain specific material supporting the apprehension that Mohandas would influence the complainant.

Electronic devices already recovered

The recovery of electronic devices was another factor considered by the court.

Since the allegations concern videos uploaded on YouTube, the electronic material formed part of the investigation. However, the court noted that the devices allegedly used in connection with the offence had already been recovered, seized and produced before it. This was relevant to the prosecution’s contention that Mohandas needed to remain in custody to prevent destruction or interference with digital evidence. The court found that there was no need for custodial interrogation at that stage.

It also considered Mohandas’s cooperation with the investigation and his age and health condition.

Court says arrest procedure was not justified

After examining the material placed before it, the court concluded that there was no justification for the investigating agency to dispense with the statutory requirement of issuing notice under Section 35(3) BNSS.

The court’s conclusion was based on the circumstances before it, including the ability of the police to locate Mohandas at his known residence, the recovery of the electronic devices and the absence of specific material showing that he was likely to abscond or interfere with the investigation.

The court said:

“Mere apprehension of destruction, tampering or manipulation of evidence, in the absence of circumstances indicating an immediate necessity for arrest, cannot by itself justify dispensing with the statutory safeguard contemplated under Section 35(3) of the BNSS.”

The court added that the same reasoning applied to the alleged apprehension that Mohandas could influence the complainant, as no specific material supporting that apprehension was disclosed in the remand report.

Court takes age, health and cooperation into account

The court also considered Mohandas’s age and health condition while deciding whether continued detention was necessary and along with these circumstances, the court took note of his cooperation with the police investigation and the recovery of the articles allegedly connected with the case.

The court ultimately held that the prosecution’s concerns regarding possible absconding, influencing witnesses or interference with the investigation could be addressed through appropriate bail conditions.

It concluded:

“The apprehensions expressed by the prosecution regarding the possibility of the accused absconding, influencing witnesses, or interfering with the investigation can be adequately addressed by imposing stringent conditions while enlarging the accused on bail.”

The court further observed:

“Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the non-issuance of notice under Section 35(3), the recovery of the articles, the cooperation extended by the accused with the police investigation, as well as the age and health condition of the accused, this Court is of the considered opinion that the further detention of the accused in judicial custody is not warranted at this stage” as Live Law reported

Student and youth organisations had sought action

Notably, youth and student organisations held protest marches to Mohandas’s residence demanding legal action. Leaders of the Students Federation of India and the All-India Students Federation also filed complaints. The delay in police action had also led to criticism of the State government, according to the report.

The RSS response came amid the controversy surrounding the remarks, with its South Kerala functionary stating that Mohandas’s comments were his personal views and did not represent the organisation.

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Hate Speech Before the Supreme Court: From judicial activism to institutional closure

The Supreme Court blinks when it comes to Hate Speech

The post Kerala court grants bail to T.G. Mohandas in Jantar Mantar remarks case, cites arrest procedure irregularity appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The first FIR was registered on August 5, just four days after the law came into force. According to The Indian Express, the 22-year-old, originally from Uttar Pradesh, was allegedly in a relationship with a minor from his village. The two subsequently moved to Karnataka and then Pune. Police allege that he asked the girl to convert from her religion. He has been booked under Sections 3 and 9(2) of the new Act, along with provisions of the POCSO Act, and is currently in judicial custody.

Section 3 prohibits conversion or attempts to convert through coercion, fraud, allurement, misrepresentation, force, threat or undue influence. Where a minor is involved, Section 9(2) permits punishment of up to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to ₹5 lakh.

The allegation, however, still has to be established. The FIR itself does not establish that an offence under Section 3 occurred, particularly since the prosecution will have to demonstrate the specific means allegedly used to induce the conversion. The distinction matters in a law where ordinary interpersonal conduct could potentially come under scrutiny if the statutory ingredients are interpreted expansively.

Second FIR widens the scope of concern

The second case concerns a British national and OCI cardholder. Pune Police allege that he participated in prayer meetings and religious gatherings and attempted to persuade people to embrace Christianity. Police have also alleged that he spoke about following Jesus and made statements concerning Hindu temples and deities that were intended to mislead people and induce conversion, The Indian Express reported.

The police have reportedly invoked both the Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Act and provisions of the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, arguing that the OCI cardholder was not authorised to preach or deliver religious discourses without permission. This case raises a more fundamental question about the boundary between religious propagation and unlawful inducement. Participation in a religious gathering or expressing one’s religious beliefs, by itself, does not establish coercion, fraud, force or undue influence. Whether the alleged conduct crosses that statutory threshold will ultimately have to be determined through evidence and judicial scrutiny.

A law with wide-reaching provisions

The Maharashtra Act does more than criminalise forced or fraudulent conversion. It introduces a prior-notice regime for persons intending to convert, permits complaints by specified relatives, regulates conversions connected with marriage or promises of marriage, and places the burden of establishing that a conversion was voluntary on the person conducting it. It also provides enhanced punishment where the alleged conversion involves minors, women, members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, or persons of unsound mind.

The breadth of terms such as “allurement”, “undue influence” and “misrepresentation” is likely to be central to the misuse of the law. A law intended to prevent coercive conversion cannot, constitutionally, become a mechanism for policing voluntary religious belief, expression or association.

The concern is particularly relevant because the legislation operates in an area closely connected with individual autonomy, freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion under Article 25 of the Constitution. This is one of the key substantive points argued by the CJP in its constitutional challenge to the Himachal Pradesh law. Report may be read here.

The speed with which the legislation moved through the state legislature had itself become a point of criticism. Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), in its dissent note, highlighted that the Bill was introduced and passed within days, with limited scope for public consultation or legislative scrutiny, despite the fact that similar anti-conversion laws enacted by other states are already under examination before the Supreme Court. CJP is the lead petitioner in the constitutional challenge to the first batch of such laws passed by five states between the years, 2020-2023. This challenge has been pending in the Supreme Court, despite pleas for interim stays on the most egregious provisions for over five years now. [1]

Details on the interim applications urging stay on the most egregious provisions, filed by CJP on April 16, 2025 may be read here.

In early 2026, while the batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of these state laws were listed before the court of the Chief Justice of India (CJI), they were once again deferred. Reports may be read here. Thereafter, first on May 13, 2026 the matters were listed to be heard after which the next date that appears on the Supreme Court calendar is August 12, 2026.

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Maharashtra’s Anti-Conversion Push: How organised street pressure, Hindutva mobilisation and a pending law threaten constitutional freedoms

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The students’ union did not cancel the discussion. Instead, it moved it outside the School of Social Sciences-II building. According to The New Indian Express, students and faculty gathered in substantial numbers despite the change of venue, while the programme was disrupted by protests from members of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP). The episode has since become about far more than a cancelled auditorium. It has raised questions about who gets to determine what can be discussed inside a university, how far administrative control over campus spaces can extend, and whether a book — even one written by a jailed political figure — can be treated as an object of academic inquiry independently of the controversies surrounding its author.

The cancellation came at the last minute

The JNU administration announced on August 9 that the booking of the SSS-I auditorium had been cancelled. Its explanation was brief. In a post on its official X account, the university said that JNU was a “democratic and decentralised institution” and that the permission had originally been granted by the Dean of the School of Social Sciences. It then said the booking stood cancelled because of the “non-disclosure of the full facts” concerning the programme scheduled for August 10. But the administration did not publicly specify what information had allegedly been withheld.

That omission lies at the heart of the controversy. Documents relating to the booking showed that the programme had gone through the formal process. The requisition described it as a “Public Talk for Adivasi Diwas (Book Discussion)” and identified the date, time and auditorium. The booking was subsequently approved by the Dean of the School of Social Sciences on August 7.

The organisers therefore questioned why an event that had gone through the university’s own booking procedure could be cancelled two days later on the ground that its “full facts” had not been disclosed.

Professor Avinash Kumar, who had submitted the requisition for the auditorium, was particularly categorical. “The stated reason for the cancellation of the booking of the SSS auditorium is false,” he said, according to Hindustan Times report. Kumar maintained that the Dean had been fully informed that the event was going to discuss Khalid’s book and that the requisition had been prepared in the format suggested by the Dean himself.

His question was simple: if the university did not know what the event was about, why was the auditorium booking approved in the first place?

Kumar also challenged the administration to disclose the actual rule under which the booking had been unilaterally withdrawn. He pointed out that the book itself emerged from Khalid’s doctoral research at JNU and asked why the university could not permit a discussion of a thesis for which it had itself awarded him a PhD.

‘They cancelled the room, not the discussion’

The JNUSU saw the cancellation as something much larger than a dispute over paperwork. In a statement, the union called the decision “arbitrary and authoritarian” and accused the administration of attempting to suppress academic discussion and dissent, according to Indian Express report.

Its argument was that book discussions are not merely social events; they are a basic part of academic life. A university, the union maintained, should be a space where students can encounter controversial arguments, question them, disagree with them and debate them — rather than one where subjects are removed from discussion because of the identity or political status of their author.

The union was particularly scathing about the administration’s explanation that “full details” had not been disclosed. According to the JNUSU, the Dean himself had instructed the organisers on how the auditorium requisition should be made. It therefore described the stated reason as a pretext for what it considered censorship. The union’s position was summed up in its response: “cancelling a room does not cancel a conversation.” And that is precisely what happened.

Gopika Babu, vice-president of the JNUSU, said the large turnout was a response to what she described as pressure from the administration and the ABVP. “Despite all threats of the admin-ABVP nexus, the students gathered in large numbers to assert campus democracy,” she said, reported The New Indian Express.

Babu described debate, dissent and discussion as central to JNU’s institutional character, arguing that the outdoor gathering demonstrated that “JNU stays alive in this spirit”. She also framed the event as an expression of solidarity with Umar Khalid and other political prisoners awaiting trial, while accusing the university administration of pursuing what she described as a “casteist” agenda.

“JNU stood in solidarity with Umar Khalid today, and through him, in solidarity with umpteen other political prisoners languishing in jail without trial,” Babu said. She further described the gathering as a response to what she called the “empty threats” of ABVP members.

JNUSU president Aditi also criticised the administration’s decision, saying, “I condemn the way the administration tried stealing our classrooms. We’ll continue to have such events on the campus.”

The statements underline how the cancellation transformed the character of the event. What began as an academic discussion around Fractured Communities became, after the auditorium was withdrawn, a visible contest over who controls the university’s physical and intellectual spaces. The administration had cancelled the venue. The students’ response was to occupy another space and continue the discussion. In that sense, the outdoor gathering became a message of its own: the withdrawal of institutional permission could change where the conversation happened, but it could not determine whether the conversation happened at all.

The discussion goes ahead — outside

On Monday afternoon, the organisers gathered outside the SSS-II building. The event began around the scheduled time and attracted students, teachers and visitors from outside JNU. The New Indian Express reported that the discussion proceeded despite the cancellation, while Rediff reported that students and teachers attended the outdoor programme from around 3 pm.

The weather itself became almost symbolic. Students gathered in the open despite the rain, listening to speakers discuss the book, its methodology and the history it attempts to recover.

The panel included historian Uma Chakravarti, Professor Prabhu Mahapatra, writer and journalist Shuddhabrata Sengupta, and scholar Banojyotsana Lahiri. The discussion focused on Fractured Communities, rather than turning exclusively into a political meeting about Khalid’s incarceration. Panellists discussed the book’s academic method and its treatment of Adivasi history, while copies of the book were also sold at the venue.

For some students, the fact that the book was written by Khalid was itself a reason to read it rather than a reason to prevent its discussion. JNU student Aniket, who bought a copy at the event, told The Hindu that he wanted to read the thesis to understand how Khalid viewed the world and, importantly, to study how an academic thesis was written. He contrasted that with what he described as a contemporary academic environment increasingly affected by plagiarism and AI-generated material. The sentiment captures an important distinction in the controversy: reading a book is not the same thing as endorsing its author. A university’s academic culture depends precisely on the ability to examine arguments without requiring prior agreement with the person who made them.

Then came the slogans

The outdoor discussion was not free from confrontation. ABVP members protested the programme and raised slogans against Khalid. The New Indian Express reported slogans including “Umar Khalid ko fansi do”, while The Times of India also reported that the event was disrupted by ABVP members who entered the gathering and raised slogans.

The protests reflected the political fault line surrounding Khalid himself. Khalid has been in custody since September 2020 in connection with the case concerning the alleged larger conspiracy behind the February 2020 Northeast Delhi riots. He faces charges under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) among other provisions and continues to contest the allegations against him. The trial against him has not started since the past 6 years.

The case against him highlights both the prolonged incarceration and the continuing litigation over bail. In July 2026, a Delhi court rejected fresh bail applications by Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, saying it was bound by an earlier Supreme Court order. The question of his imprisonment therefore inevitably hangs over any public discussion of his work. But that also makes the distinction between the author and the academic work more significant.

 

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What exactly is Fractured Communities?

The controversy risks obscuring what the event was actually supposed to discuss. Fractured Communities: Adivasi Histories and the Politics of Power is based on Khalid’s doctoral thesis, submitted to JNU’s Centre for Historical Studies in July 2018. He was subsequently awarded his PhD.

The book examines Adivasi societies in the Singhbhum region of present-day Jharkhand under British rule, including questions of indigenous agency, local governance, resistance and the politics of colonial power. Khalid himself wrote in The Indian Express in July that the thesis had been written years before its publication as a book and that he had never expected the work to acquire the political significance it now carries. He described the thesis as an engagement with history, propaganda and the use of power in shaping narratives.

The book’s publisher, Juggernaut, describes it as an archival study of Singhbhum’s tribal societies and a critique of historical accounts that flatten differences within communities. Its subject, therefore, is not the 2020 Delhi riots, Khalid’s UAPA case or contemporary electoral politics. It is a work of history. That distinction matters.

The irony of JNU cancelling a discussion on a JNU-approved thesis

Perhaps the sharpest contradiction in the episode lies here. The book at the centre of the dispute is not an anonymous political pamphlet being brought onto campus without institutional connection. It is derived from a doctoral thesis that Khalid submitted to JNU. The university examined that research. Academic processes assessed it. He was awarded a PhD.

And now, the university found itself cancelling the venue for a public discussion of the work. That does not automatically establish that the cancellation was censorship. JNU is entitled to regulate the use of its buildings and to require organisers to comply with institutional procedures. Its stated position is that the organisers failed to disclose complete information about the programme.

But the administration has not publicly identified what those allegedly undisclosed facts were. And that is where the explanation becomes difficult to assess. If the problem was procedural, the university could have identified the missing information and explained why it warranted cancellation rather than correction. Instead, the auditorium was cancelled immediately before the programme. That left the organisers, and the wider university community, to infer the reason.

Students question the double standard

The controversy has also acquired another layer because of a separate dispute involving an ISKCON programme at JNU. The JNUSU had previously objected to a programme involving an ISKCON representative at the university’s Central Library, titled “Empowering Youth for a Brighter Future”. The union had questioned the permission granted for religious programming on campus.

After the Umar Khalid book discussion was cancelled, the union revived the comparison, accusing the administration of adopting different standards for different events. That comparison remains contested, but it raises a broader question: what should the standard for campus events actually be?

If the concern is procedural compliance, the same rules should apply regardless of whether an event features a religious organisation, a political speaker, a controversial academic or a jailed activist. If the concern is the content of an event, the university should say so openly and identify the applicable rule. What becomes dangerous for an academic institution is a system in which apparently neutral procedural requirements can be invoked selectively, without clearly explaining what triggered their application.

Not everyone attending supported the event uncritically

The outdoor discussion also exposed an important criticism from within the student movement itself. Kranthi Kumar, president of the Birsa Ambedkar Phule Students’ Association, told The Hindu that while his organisation opposed the incarceration of political prisoners and the suppression of dissent, it also agreed with concerns about the composition of the panel. The criticism was that a discussion centred on Adivasi histories did not include members of Adivasi communities on the panel.

That objection complicates the binary framing of the controversy. It is entirely possible to oppose the cancellation of a discussion while simultaneously questioning who gets to speak about Adivasi history. In fact, that is precisely the kind of disagreement a university ought to be capable of accommodating.

The larger question: what is a university for?

The most consequential aspect of the JNU episode may therefore not be Umar Khalid at all. It is the question of whether universities can remain spaces where controversial scholarship is examined without the discussion itself being treated as an endorsement. There is a fundamental difference between giving someone a platform to promote a political position and allowing students to read and debate a published academic work.

There is also a difference between disagreeing with a thesis and preventing people from discussing it. A university does not become democratic because its administration describes it as one. It becomes democratic when disagreement can occur without the institution deciding in advance which questions are legitimate.

JNU’s own explanation invokes its character as a “democratic and decentralised institution”. But democracy on a university campus cannot simply mean administrative discretion. It must also include intellectual pluralism, transparency in decision-making and the ability of students and faculty to question institutional decisions. In this case, the administration cancelled the auditorium.

The students responded by taking the discussion outside. They were joined by faculty members, students from other institutions and others who wanted to hear the debate. The rain did not stop the event. Neither did the cancellation. And that may be the most telling image from the entire episode: a university discussion that the administration could remove from a room, but could not remove from the campus. Because once a university begins treating the discussion of a controversial scholar’s work as something that must be administratively contained, the question is no longer merely what Umar Khalid wrote. It becomes who gets to decide what students are allowed to read, discuss and question.

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The post JNU Cancels Venue, Not the Conversation: Umar Khalid’s book discussion moves outdoors amid protests appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The 12 States and Union Territories had a combined 13, 77, 27,807 electors before the revision. Of these, 1, 58, 59,834 names, or 11.51%, have been deleted on the basis of voters being absent, having shifted or being reported dead, according to data shared by the Election Commission.

Door-to-door verification extended in seven States and UTs

The third phase of SIR is being conducted in Delhi, Odisha, Mizoram, Sikkim, Manipur, Uttarakhand, Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Haryana, Chandigarh, Telangana, Punjab, Karnataka, Meghalaya, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Nagaland, Tripura, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu.

The enumeration or door-to-door verification process has been extended in Delhi, Punjab, Telangana, Karnataka and Maharashtra. Draft rolls for these five States/UTs, along with Tripura and Nagaland, are yet to be published.

Electoral rolls are being revised in Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu, Delhi, Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Odisha, Punjab, Sikkim, Telangana, Tripura and Uttarakhand as part of the ongoing third phase.

Highest deletion rate in Dadra and Nagar Haveli

Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu has recorded the highest proportion of deletions at 29.64%. Arunachal Pradesh follows at 19.09%, Haryana at 16.38% and Chandigarh at 12.8%.

Mizoram has the lowest proportion of deletions at 5.2%, while Sikkim has recorded a deletion rate of 8%.

Among the other States for which draft rolls have been published, 6.02% of names have been deleted in Odisha, 7.5% in Manipur, 10.39% in Uttarakhand, 7.67% in Meghalaya and 16.48% in Jharkhand.

Andhra Pradesh records 44.89 lakh deletions

Andhra Pradesh has the highest number of deletions in absolute terms. As many as 44.89 lakh names, or 10.78% of its electors, have been deleted. The draft roll in the State has consequently come down from 4.16 crore electors to 3.71 crore.

Of the deleted names in Andhra Pradesh, 22.30 lakh related to voters who had shifted or were absent from the given address. Another 15.22 lakh voters were reported dead, while 7.37 lakh were found enrolled at multiple places.

Haryana has the second-highest number of deletions, at 33.83 lakh, followed by Odisha at 20.12 lakh.

In absolute numbers, Sikkim has recorded the fewest deletions, at 37,724, or 8%, followed by Mizoram with 46,162 deletions.

Total deletions cross 8.7 crore in all three phases

The latest deletions in Phase 3 follow the removal of more than 7.2 crore voters during the first two phases of SIR conducted across 13 States and Union Territories.

With the latest figures, the total number of deletions across the three phases has crossed 8.7 crore electors. These figures remain subject to revision during the claims, objections and appeal stages.

Around two crore voters were also added during the second phase of SIR. After accounting for these additions, the net deletions from the first two phases stand at 6.7 crore.

States and UTs already covered

The SIR exercise has already been conducted in Bihar, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Puducherry, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep.

In Assam, a “special revision” was conducted because of legalities relating to the National Register of Citizens (NRC).

Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Kerala, Lakshadweep, Madhya Pradesh, Puducherry, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have therefore already been covered by the SIR exercise.

Claims and objections process

The draft rolls published in the 12 States and Union Territories will be followed by the claims and objections process. Electors can seek inclusion or deletion of names from the draft rolls, while new voters can also apply for registration. The number of electors in the final rolls may therefore change after claims, objections and the subsequent stages of the SIR process

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