In January 2026, CJP had documented in detail this phenomenon, a report that had been used widely in the public interest litigation that resulted in the May 2026 judgement. That detailed exploration may be read here. In all the documented cases, the photos and videos of accused were shot and shared on social media to embarrass them further. In essence, the police started a social trial against the accused and violated their dignity.

Defining public shaming could be a tricky task as it manifests itself in various forms. It could be through sharing photos online, parading in public, making accused do undignified acts, or simply—by publicly flogging the accused. However, the essence of the act remains, i.e., humiliating or punishing the accused in a manner that in the eyes of society they turn into criminals before the Court pronounces them to be so.

Public shaming does not refer to a single act of physical or mental torture but instead is a broader term wherein the accused is ridiculed (by being publicly paraded, or by having their degrading photos shared online), beaten up, and socially becomes a criminal before the trial ends (in most cases, before the trial even starts). It can be construed to be an umbrella term for violent offences that police inflict upon accused publicly.

Public shaming by police has been on the rise in the last few years. In the recognition of this rise, one has to see who has been affected by such incidents the most. Unsurprisingly, it is Muslims and Dalits, who are at the short end of the stick. As per a report tiled “Status of Policing in India Report 2025” published by Common Cause India and Lokniti empirically shows that more often than not the victims of police brutality have been from these marginalised communities. The specific act of public shaming is not any different, a perusal of the petitioners in all the cases that are analysed below makes it abundantly clear that public shaming by police unfairly affects the already marginalised. Ergo, the matter of Public Shaming has to be understood as a manifestation of State Violence as an instrument to marginalise. By perpetuating a form of violence that induces shame in the victim and ridicule in the observer, the State is further marginalising the already marginalised. Therefore, Public Shaming by police is clearly part of the phenomenon, State sanctioned violence against the minorities.

The act of public shaming is fundamentally Kafkaesque. Kafka in his famous short story In the penal colony talks about a society where accused’s body is inscribed with the alleged offence using needles. This act is carried out by a commander who happens to be the police, the judge and the executioner. The various instances of public shaming as happening in India are the similar if not the same. The police usurp the role of the judge and violates the dignity of an accused by beating and shaming them publicly. It contravenes inter alia, doctrine separation of powers and fundamental rights of the individuals—the salient features of a constitutional democracy.

In fact, in hitherto settled Indian criminal law jurisprudence, even convicts who have been convicted of serious offences are accorded –or should be accorded at least—fair if not humane treatment.

In the face of increase in public shaming by the police in Rajasthan (a detailed report on such incidents can be found here) the State’s High Court in the 2025 Islam Khan judgement laid down several guidelines that have to be followed by the police to curb such instances. It further held the act of public shaming to be violative of the fundamental right to privacy.

This primer will first breakdown the recent, year-old Rajasthan High Court judgement (Islam Khan and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others) and analyse various aspects of it, including the final guidelines that were pronounced.

The second half of the primer shall deal with other judicial decisions pronounced by other constitutional courts, that is several other HCs and also the Supreme Court.

Lastly, we will attempt to demonstrate that there is an inconsistency in how courts have adjudged this issue. Considering the legal, social and psychological ramifications of public shaming, there is clearly a need for a sounder legal framework that can mitigate such occurrences. 

2025: Islam Khan and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others

On the face of increase in acts of public shaming in Rajasthan (read a report on such incidents here), the High Court delivered a comprehensive judgement that laid down certain guidelines with the aim of stifling the practice. In the instance under examination here, the police had arrested the accused, degraded and humiliated them. Their photos and videos were shot and shared on social media. The judicial pronouncement came in response to this.

The judgement does a commendable job in grounding the prohibition of public shaming in three distinct constitutional features—doctrine of separation of powers, presumption of innocence, and respect of individual dignity. On the aspect of separation of powers, the Court starts with emphasising that the rule of law cannot be maintained without a functional separation of power. The invocation of this doctrine is important and novel, for it tacitly collapses the difference between a convict as per the court and a convict as per the media trial instigated by the police. The Court defines such a media trial engineered by the police to be “…a State-engineered narrative, wherein the police machinery, through press conferences, orchestrated disclosures, circulation of photographs, and at times even staged representations of arrest, seeks to project an accused person as culpable even before the due process of law has had an opportunity to unfold” (Paragraph 14)

The Judgement further reads, “Any transgression by the police into the judicial sphere, whether by declaring an accused guilty in the public domain, conducting actions that prejudice a fair trial, or exercising powers not sanctioned by law, would not only be without jurisdiction but would also strike at the very heart of due process” (Paragraph 13.2)

The Court by holding that media trial by police disturbs the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, implicitly held that media trial’s declaration of an accused as guilty is equally socially isolating and harmful as that of a court trial’s declaration, i.e., the mental or psychological effect is similar. Regardless of what the trial later proves, the accused in the eyes of the society becomes a criminal because of police actions that portrays them as convicts–or worse, sub-humans. The Court pegged the police action to its constitutional mandate of administrating law, not pronouncing guilt. The Court’s holding that merely showing an accused to be guilty amounts to a usurpation of judicial duties is crucial: in the context of public shaming particularly so; because the Police has repeatedly portrayed “accused” to be criminals in the eyes of the public. Such unprofessional, often partisan police conduct reduces public confidence in both the Police and Courts, eventually.

Making a logical extension of the aforesaid argument –separation of powers, the Rajasthan High Court went further to hold that criminal declarations vis a vis the accused by the police impacts the cardinal principle of presumption of innocence (until proven guilty). Media trials by the police displace the concept of presumption of innocence and whip up public prejudice and anger. Punishment precedes the conviction, and completely displaces the presumption of innocence.

Last not least, the force of this judgement lies in its assertion that the act of public shaming is a violation of human dignity. The Court recognises that acts of public shaming are ipso facto in contravention of human dignity. Dignity is the cornerstone of human rights. This is how dignity is acknowledged as a manifestation of human rights. The Preamble of the Constitution contains a solemn promise to secure the dignity of the individual as its framers were aware that the Constitution is an outcome of a long arduous struggle, which must value the dignity of an individual, independent of his social status.

The Court here grounded the inappropriateness of public shaming not just in Article 21 of the Constitution, but went a step further in the right direction, and held it to be violative of dignity itself. The effect of such a finding is that no law, circumstance, judicial pronouncement (that are often marred with legal hula-hoops to justify abhorrent actions) can justify public shaming by police. Its very existence is held to be impermissible. This is a crucial finding by a constitutional court.

However, it is the guidelines that the judgement lays down that sets it apart and hence its import. These guidelines are aimed to restrict if not stop public shaming from happening.  It is the first judicial pronouncement that explicitly lays down directions that ought to be followed by the police in the context of public shaming specifically. The guidelines require every police officer to follow the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) prescribed by the authorities. It further emphasises that no arrestee shall be subject to misbehaviour, mishandling, manhandling, harassment, or any form of coercion under any circumstances.

Crucially, the Court held in these guidelines that “any act of social media condemnation orchestrated or facilitated by police authorities, which results in public humiliation of an individual, shall be construed as a form of punishment” (Paragraph 18[iii]).

By construing public shaming as a form of punishment itself, the Court effectively made sure that no police officer can engage in the same because it would contravene both presumption of innocence (as it would lead to punishing before conviction) and doctrine of separation of power (as it would lead to police usurping the judges’ roles of sentencing a punishment).

While the judgement— specifically the guidelines, prima facie, lay down what appears to be an effective deterrent to public shaming, a closer look at it reveals no concrete steps—an absence of enforceability. A logical extension to the guidelines could have been a) compensation for the accused subject to such acts; b) institutional correction and actions against offending police officers and c) any other.

Post May 2025, less than a month after the Islam Khan judgement, the Rajasthan High Court was again asked to adjudicate on an incident of public shaming by police (Puranmal vs State of Rajasthan and Ors.). The accused was arrested, and before producing him before the competent Court, the police forcibly shaved his head, dressed him in women’s clothes, and paraded him through a crowded market, while photographs and videos of the incident were circulated on social media and news channels. Unfortunately, unlike in the case of Islam Khan findings in the Puranmal judgement were diluted. The same court that had the benefit of the guidelines laid down in Islam Khan, (both were single judge benches), the Court in Parunmal held that police’s promise of not repeating such incidents hereinafter, is sufficient. No action was taken. Even in the previous Islam Khan, despite laying such guidelines, the Court had merely asked the police to remove the videos where the accused is degraded from Social Media sites and other platforms. No proceeding was started against the police. Therefore, while the guidelines are welcome, their effectiveness remain in question.

Similarly, various High Courts and Supreme Court over the years have given different judgements on the same issue of public shaming.

Other Judicial Responses to Public Shaming

The case of public shaming was also discussed by the Supreme Court in its 2012 judgement of Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam Vs. State of Chattisgarh and Ors. The Court was called to decide whether compensation should be granted to a victim of such public shaming, the Court held in affirmative and made a distinction between defamation and public shaming.

The Court held that public shaming is distinct from defamation, public shaming causes mental and physical agony. The Court added that “[because of public shaming] the hurt develops a sense of insecurity, helplessness and his self- respect gets gradually atrophied” (Paragraph 40).

Further, the Court held that, “The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making ‘monetary amends’ under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, by not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of ‘exemplary damages’ awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law” (Paragraph 43)

Later, in In-Re Banners Placed On Road Side In The City Of Lucknow (2020), the Allahabad High Court took suo moto action against the banners placed by the UP Police on the streets of Lucknow which contained several individuals’ photographs, name and address. The context is/was the the Uttar Pradesh government’s controversial “name and shame” billboards that had publicly displayed the names, photographs, and residential addresses of individuals accused of vandalism during the anti-CAA protests in December 2019. The administration demanded compensation for public property damages, threatening to seize assets if unpaid!. The Allahabad High Court had, in a judgement, strongly condemned the actions, ordered the removal of all banners that ‘named and shamed’ holding that these acts were a violation of privacy; when the matter was carried to the Supreme Court of India, the court without staying the HC’s finding referred the matter to a constitutional bench. A report may be read here. Clearly, however this judicial rap means little to the UP state administration that had in December 2024 revived this practice that was condemned by the Allahabad HC in 2020 and which, moreover targets privacy and due process. During the violence in Sambhal in western UP, incited because of the controversial attacks on the Shahi Jama Masjid there, the administration had publicly named and shamed over 400 so-called accused! A report may be read here.

In another ruling delivered in January 2021, the Allahabad High Court condemned the act of displaying a list of so-called ‘top criminals at different police stations in various districts of UP (Jeeshan and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.) The Court not only took a dignitarian approach and condemned the State authorities, but also granted compensation for the violation of public shaming. Moreover the Court directed all the Police stations to remove the list, and warned them that if such action is repeated, criminal proceedings and monetary compensation shall follow.

The matter of public shaming has been dealt by Gujarat High Court differently.

In the case of Bhautik Vijaybhai Bhatt Vs Director General Of Police & Ors. (the case involved a bunch of instances of public shaming) in 2019, the Court deferred to the powers of the executive. The Court further held that since departmental actions for the offence had been already initiated by the higher authorities against the police officers, this was a sufficient remedy. As opposed to such a deferential attitude, the same court in the 2023, Jahirmiya Rehamumiya Malek Vs State of Gujarat judgement, held the officers in contempt. In this case, police officers had arrested the accused, tied them to a public pole and beaten them up. Recordings of these offences by the police were uploaded on social media sites. The Court held that such arrest was a violation of the DK Basu judgement (1997), and as the police officers violated Supreme Court guidelines, they ought to be held in contempt

The Madhya Pradesh High Court took a unique approach altogether. In the case of Sangram Singh Rajoot v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the petitioners were forced to walk from police station to Court on foot. The Court held that this act cannot be considered ipso facto, an act of public shaming. The Court gave a wide margin of deference to the police when it instructed the same authority (police) to “internally inquire” about the incident and find if “malice” can be attributed to the police officers! The Court observed that the representations submitted by the accused indicated that a grievance was raised before the authorities, mere non-action on such representations would not automatically warrant issuance of a writ of mandamus for initiating disciplinary proceedings, unless a prima facie case of misconduct is established. The Court delegated all its duties to the executive and did not even issue a writ of mandamus honouring the higher judiciary’s role in checking misuse of power and authority by the executive/administration.

A perusal of this catena of judgements around public shaming from 2012 (SC) to 2025-26, we observe no consistent discernable pattern. While constitutional courts have, in recent times, in some states like Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and even some orders from Gujarat, held the act of public shaming to be condemnable and directed corrective measures, social sanction for such shaming persists. The phenomenon of social media and its intrusive, sometimes unregulated character adds more complex dimensions. There appears a greater imperative on the Court, to intervene not just clearly but swiftly to restore the balance —in favour of the Rule of Law.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis makes it evident that the practice of public shaming by the police is no more an aberration but has increasingly become a baton wielded by an overarching, often authoritarian and unaccountable executive. ‘Elected governments’ are choosing to use this as a  systemic feature of India’s law enforcement architecture. The legal, social, and psychological harms it engenders are profound, recurring, and largely unaddressed.

Decades ago, when such practices certainly existed but were considered an aberration not the norm[1], did the Courts rule more assertively? The Supreme Court in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) was categorical in holding that handcuffing is prima facie inhuman, unreasonable, over-harsh, and arbitrary, and to inflict irons without fair procedure is to resort to zoological strategies repugnant to Article 21. The Court’s ruling was clear that freedom from handcuffs during transit between the prison and the court must be the rule and not the exception. Public shaming, in its various forms, is a direct descendant of the very practice Prem Shankar Shukla condemned. The DK Basu guidelines (1997) compounded this protection by laying down that custodial violence including torture and physical assault infringes Article 21, and that interrogation, though essential, must be conducted on scientific and humane principles, with third-degree methods being totally impermissible.

Yet, as the analysis of the Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh cases demonstrates, these guidelines are honoured more in their breach than in their observance. What the Prem Shankar Shukla and DK Basu guidelines could not anticipate was the peculiar, performative nature of public shaming in the age of social media, where the degradation of an accused: these acts are not merely incidental to an arrest but are part and parcel of the deliberate and orchestrated objective of the police action itself.

The social and psychological ramifications of this practice are equally severe, and they do not resolve themselves once the accused is acquitted. The Supreme Court in Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam observed that because of public shaming, the individual “develops a sense of insecurity, helplessness and his self-respect gets gradually atrophied.” Public humiliation, particularly when state-orchestrated and digitally disseminated, produces lasting trauma. The accused is no longer merely a person under trial. In the eyes of his community, employer, and family, he has been declared a criminal. His social reintegration becomes near impossible, irrespective of what the trial later concludes. The damage is therefore permanent, and the law currently has no instrument to make the victim whole. Monetary compensation, while progressive, cannot undo the viral spread of a degrading video.

The empirical picture is no less alarming. The incidents are not isolated and they are increasing. In Rajasthan alone, police officers in Sikar, Udaipur, Nagaur, Jhunjhunu, and Dausa have repeatedly forced accused men into women’s clothing, half-shaved their heads, and paraded them before crowds, with these unlawful acts being visually documented through 2025. The problem is not geographically contained. In Jammu, within a single month in 2025, there were at least two widely reported incidents of public shaming, one involving a theft accused being made to sit on the bonnet of a moving police vehicle with his hands tied and shoes garlanded around his neck, and another involving three men being publicly thrashed by police personnel after arrest, reigniting debate over the increasing tendency of law enforcement to resort to performative justice. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that a group of advocates in Jammu lodged a complaint with the National Human Rights Commission alleging that law enforcement authorities are bypassing constitutional safeguards and replacing lawful investigation procedures with performative public punishment, leading to irreversible damage to the dignity and fundamental rights of the accused.

In light of all of this, the conclusion is inescapable. Indian criminal jurisprudence (analysed above related to Islam Khan 2025 and other verdicts) needs to be widely discussed, even as citizens, civil rights groups and the media discuss and deliberate on the serious ramifications of this deliberate executive-police fracture and capture of the ‘Rule of Law.’ What are the steps that need to be taken so we return the debate to conduct accountability by the Indian Police?

Is then what is needed is a centralised statutory or Supreme Court-mandated framework that defines public shaming exhaustively, prescribes mandatory consequences for violations including automatic contempt proceedings and compensation, and places a structural obligation on States to train and supervise their police forces accordingly? Without such a framework, the courts will continue to pronounce guidelines that are ignored, and the accused will continue to be paraded, shamed, and broken, long before any verdict is returned.

Relevant Judgements

[1] The 1979-1980 “Bhagalpur blindings” refer to a horrific series of human rights abuses in Bihar, India—when the Police deliberately blinded 31 undertrial and convicted prisoners by puncturing their eyes with needles and pouring acid into the sockets

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Hamzah Patel)

Related

Rajasthan’s Public Shaming: Police humiliation practices defy law and human dignity

CJP writes to NHRC over Police brutality against teaching candidates in Lucknow, UP

CCTV in Police Stations: From judicial directives to constitutional accountability

Custody, Camaraderie, and Cover-Up: Supreme Court transfers custodial death probe to CBI, slams MP police for “shielding their own”

Dalit boy’s death in police custody and arson attack on Dalit homes: A dual crisis of justice in BJP-ruled states

The post The Court spoke, the police paraded anyway appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Court answered that question in the affirmative.

In doing so, it has delivered what may prove to be one of the most consequential judgments on internet governance and platform regulation in India. While the judgment is framed as a narrow, emergency response to an exceptional situation, the legal principles it endorses have implications that extend to every major digital platform operating in India. The decision substantially expands the scope of Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, broadens the meaning of “public order” in the digital context, and adopts an unusually deferential approach to governmental claims of necessity and proportionality.

The immediate dispute may have ended with NEET. The constitutional questions raised by the judgment have only just begun.

A case that was never really about Telegram

The government’s justification for the blocking order rested on a familiar narrative. Following the cancellation of the original NEET examination amid allegations of paper leaks and widespread irregularities, authorities claimed that Telegram had become a central vehicle for the circulation of fraudulent examination material, fake leak claims, scams targeting candidates, and organised cheating networks.

The government relied upon reports from the National Testing Agency (NTA), the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), and various law-enforcement agencies to argue that Telegram’s infrastructure had become deeply embedded in these activities. The Court accepted these claims, noting allegations that channels openly advertising themselves as “PAPER LEAKED NEET” and similar variants were operating on the platform and soliciting large sums of money from students. The Court also accepted evidence suggesting that mirror channels, reserve groups, bots, and audience migration systems allowed operators to evade enforcement efforts and quickly reconstitute themselves after takedowns.

Yet the real issue before the Court was not whether examination fraud existed. Few would dispute that it did. The real issue was whether the existence of unlawful activity on a platform can justify disabling access to the platform itself.

That distinction is critical. The Indian legal system has long recognised that newspapers may publish unlawful content without justifying a ban on newspapers as a medium. Telephone networks may be used for criminal conspiracies without justifying the suspension of telecommunication services. Email services may facilitate fraud without warranting the shutdown of email itself.

The question before the Court was therefore not whether Telegram had been misused, but whether misuse by some users justified restricting access for everyone. The judgment ultimately answers that question in favour of the State.

A detailed report on the Telegram ban may be read here.

Transforming Section 69A into a platform-blocking power

The single most important aspect of the decision is the Court’s interpretation of Section 69A of the Information Technology Act. Historically, Section 69A has been understood as a mechanism through which the government can block access to specific information hosted online. The provision authorises blocking “any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource.”

Telegram argued that this language permits blocking particular content but not an entire platform. The Court rejected this argument.

Relying upon the expansive definition of “information” under Section 2(1)(v) of the IT Act—which includes software, computer programmes, codes and databases—the Court held that there was “no reason to exclude an application or platform” from the scope of Section 69A. Since Telegram itself is software comprising code, databases, and communication infrastructure, the Court concluded that the entire platform constitutes “information” capable of being blocked.

“The expression “information”, appearing in Section 69A of the IT Act, is defined under Section 2(1)(v) of the IT Act and includes, inter alia, images, sound, voice, codes, computer programmes, software and databases. The breadth of the said definition indicates that the expression “information” is required to be construed expansively. A restrictive construction, confining the expression only to individual user accounts, channels, images, posts, files or messages, would unduly narrow the scope of Section 69A and may render the provision otiose. The legislative intent, therefore, appears to be to confer a broad and technologically neutral meaning upon the expression “information”.” (Para 35)

This is a dramatic interpretive leap. Section 69A was enacted in a vastly different technological context. For years, it has been used primarily to block URLs, websites, accounts, posts, pages, and other identifiable pieces of online content. The Delhi High Court’s reasoning effectively transforms it into a statutory basis for disabling entire digital ecosystems.

The distinction is not merely semantic as blocking a webpage and blocking a platform are fundamentally different exercises of state power. One targets particular content. The other disables an entire infrastructure of communication.

The judgment therefore does not simply uphold the Telegram ban. It significantly enlarges the legal architecture of internet censorship in India. If the reasoning is followed in future cases, the government may argue that any platform itself constitutes “information” and may therefore be blocked whenever authorities conclude that statutory grounds under Section 69A are satisfied. The implications extend far beyond Telegram.

The extraordinary expansion of “Public Order”

Equally striking is the Court’s treatment of public order. Section 69A permits blocking only on limited grounds, including sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, and public order. Historically, Indian constitutional jurisprudence has treated “public order” as a serious and relatively narrow category. The Supreme Court has repeatedly distinguished public order from ordinary law-and-order concerns and emphasised that restrictions on fundamental freedoms require a proximate and not merely speculative connection with public disorder.

In the present case, however, the Court appears willing to accept a significantly broader conception of public order. The judgment repeatedly refers to the possibility that misinformation regarding examination papers could erode public confidence in the examination process, trigger unrest among candidates, undermine faith in public institutions, and potentially lead to public disorder.

This reasoning raises important concerns. The Court does not identify any actual breakdown of public order directly caused by Telegram’s continued operation between the issuance of the blocking order and the examination. Instead, it relies primarily upon anticipated consequences and the possibility of future disruption.

“In the present case, the Impugned Order discloses that temporary blocking of the public access to Telegram is directed having regard to the potential grave implications for public order in the country and for preventing the commission of cognizable offences arising from the circulation of examination-related misinformation and purported examination papers on Telegram, particularly in light of prior incidents relating to NEET UG, 2026.” (Para 24)

“Thus, this Court is of the view that given the emergency nature of the Impugned Order, the reasons supplied in arriving at the decision were sufficient. As Respondent No. 1 has strictly followed the procedural steps as required under Section 69A of the IT Act, the challenge to the Impugned Order on the ground non-communication of reasons cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the objections founded on alleged non-application of mind and inadequacy of opportunity of hearing also fail given the statutory scheme of Section 69A of the IT Act and 2009 Rules. In view of the foregoing, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Impugned Order contains reasons and there exists a direct and substantial nexus between the direction issued and the reasons assigned.” (Para 25)

The result is a conception of public order that appears considerably broader than traditional constitutional doctrine. Under this framework, the State may be able to justify restrictions not because disorder exists, but because misinformation could theoretically undermine public confidence in an institution and thereby create conditions for disorder.

That shift is significant. If accepted as a general principle, the same logic could potentially be invoked in relation to elections, recruitment examinations, public protests, political controversies, or other events where misinformation is alleged to threaten institutional legitimacy. The danger lies not in the immediate facts of the case, but in the elasticity of the principle being created.

The curious treatment of proportionality

The Court repeatedly invokes the doctrine of proportionality and cites the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Anuradha Bhasin. It correctly notes that restrictions upon fundamental rights must be necessary, proportionate, and constitute the least restrictive means available for achieving a legitimate objective.

However, the judgment’s application of that doctrine is considerably less rigorous than its recitation. The government’s central claim was that narrower measures had failed. According to authorities, Telegram’s architecture enabled the rapid reappearance of unlawful actors through mirror channels, reserve groups, bots, and alternate identities. Consequently, channel-specific takedowns were said to be ineffective.

The Court largely accepted this assertion. What is missing, however, is a meaningful examination of alternative measures.

“In the present case, the NEET UG, 2026 examination is scheduled to be conducted on 21.06.2026. The temporary blocking of Telegram under the Orders is operative only until 22.06.2026, while the disabling of the message-editing feature is confined to the period until 30.06.2026. The limited temporal scope of these measures demonstrates that they are narrowly tailored and confined to the period strictly necessary for securing the stated objective. Applying the parameters laid down in Anuradha Bhasin (supra), this Court is satisfied that the requirements of proportionality stand fulfilled, namely: (i) identification of a legitimate objective; (ii) existence of a rational nexus between the objective and the measure adopted; (iii) necessity of the measure in the facts and circumstances of the case; and (iv) adoption of the least restrictive measure available.” (Para 46)

A genuine proportionality analysis would ordinarily require the State to demonstrate why each less restrictive option was inadequate. The judgment does not meaningfully interrogate several possibilities:

• enhanced emergency compliance obligations;
• platform-specific moderation requirements;
• targeted blocking of identified channels;
• restrictions on public channels exceeding certain thresholds;
• disabling forwarding features;
• temporary limitations on bot functionality;
• emergency monitoring arrangements;
• targeted orders directed at specific classes of accounts.

Instead, the Court appears to accept the government’s conclusion that these alternatives would not work. The distinction is important because proportionality requires courts to independently verify governmental claims of necessity. It does not require courts merely to accept them. By deferring substantially to executive assessments regarding platform architecture and technical feasibility, the Court risks diluting the very standard of scrutiny that proportionality was designed to impose.

The forgotten rights of 150 million users

Perhaps the most striking omission in the judgment is the relative absence of any serious engagement with the rights of Telegram’s lawful users. The Court expressly acknowledges that approximately 150 million people in India use Telegram. Yet these users remain largely invisible throughout the constitutional analysis.

The judgment contains extensive discussion of examination integrity, public confidence, platform architecture, bots, channels, and enforcement difficulties. Comparatively little attention is devoted to the rights being restricted.

There is almost no sustained analysis of:

• the speech rights of ordinary users;
• educational communities operating on Telegram;
• journalists and researchers using the platform;
• businesses conducting communications through Telegram;
• civil-society organisations dependent upon Telegram networks;
• the broader Article 19(1)(a) implications of disabling an entire communications platform.

This imbalance matters because proportionality requires balancing. The Court carefully assesses the interests of 2.2 million NEET candidates but devotes far less attention to the constitutional rights of 150 million users whose access to a communications platform was suspended. The asymmetry is difficult to ignore.

Architecture as a basis for restriction

Another deeply consequential feature of the judgment is its repeated emphasis on Telegram’s architecture. The Court identifies Telegram’s defining characteristics as reasons why platform-wide intervention was necessary:

• large public channels;
• cloud-based storage;
• automated bots;
• anonymity through usernames;
• reserve-channel structures;
• rapid audience migration systems;
• message-editing functionality.

What is striking is that the Court explicitly acknowledges that these features are not unlawful. Yet it nonetheless treats them as factors justifying extraordinary state intervention because they allegedly make enforcement more difficult. This aspect of the judgment may have implications extending far beyond examination fraud.

“The Orders expressly record that entity-specific interventions, including the reporting and removal of channels, groups, bots, and accounts, were repeatedly found to be ineffective and inadequate. Further, the audience-migration mechanisms enable operators to rapidly reconstitute networks after enforcement action was taken by the concerned authorities. It is clearly observed in the Orders that despite corrective measures having been sought in relation to various misuses of the Telegram platform, fresh material, including reports received from Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, disclosed the continued occurrence of illicit activities by unlawful entities notwithstanding prior interventions. Therefore, it is evident that narrower measures, including the takedown of specific bots and channels, were ineffective having regard to the particular nature and architecture of the Telegram platform.” (Para 45)

Many privacy-protective technologies are deliberately designed to minimise surveillance, decentralise control, or resist centralised moderation. If technological architecture itself becomes a ground for restrictive action whenever authorities believe it impedes enforcement, a wide range of digital platforms could face heightened regulatory vulnerability. The judgment therefore moves the debate beyond content moderation and into the realm of platform design. That shift is profound.

Preventive regulation and the message-editing feature

The Court also upheld the government’s separate direction disabling Telegram’s message-editing functionality. The rationale was that users could allegedly modify messages after an examination and falsely create the impression that papers had been leaked beforehand. Telegram’s own acknowledgement that it was making edited labels more visible was treated as corroborative evidence supporting this concern.

Here too the Court adopts a highly preventive approach. Rather than responding to demonstrated misuse, the restriction is justified largely by the possibility of future misuse. The judgment therefore reflects an increasing willingness to permit governmental intervention into platform design choices based upon anticipated harms rather than completed violations. Whether such preventive regulation can be reconciled with robust free-speech protections remains an open question.

A judgment likely to impact India’s digital future

The Delhi High Court presents its decision as a narrow, temporary and exceptional response to an extraordinary crisis surrounding NEET-UG 2026. Yet some of the most significant constitutional judgments emerge from exceptional circumstances. The lasting importance of this case lies not in the temporary suspension of Telegram but in the principles the Court has endorsed:

• that Section 69A authorises blocking entire platforms and not merely content;
• that platform architecture may itself justify platform-wide restrictions;
• that examination-related misinformation can be treated as a public-order threat warranting emergency intervention;
• that post-decisional hearings can sufficiently cure concerns regarding emergency censorship;
• and that the rights of millions of lawful users may be overridden where the State demonstrates a sufficiently compelling regulatory objective.

Taken together, these propositions represent a substantial expansion of executive power over digital communications. The judgment undoubtedly reflects legitimate concerns about examination fraud, organised criminal networks, and the integrity of public institutions. But constitutional law is tested not when governments pursue illegitimate goals, but when they pursue legitimate ones through extraordinary means.

The real question raised by the Telegram judgment is therefore not whether the State should combat examination fraud. It unquestionably should. The deeper question is whether the misuse of a communications platform by some users can justify denying access to all users.

By answering that question in the affirmative, the Delhi High Court has moved Indian internet jurisprudence decisively toward a model of platform-level regulation and censorship. Whether higher courts ultimately endorse that approach may determine the future contours of digital freedom in India.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

Censorship After NEET: A substitute for accountability

When Morality Meets Surveillance: The court’s push toward state-regulated digital content

Repeal recent amendments to the RTI act, 2005: Justice A.P Shah in an Open Letter

Safe harbour or shadow censorship? The battle over India’s digital speech

State-sponsored attacks of surveillance reveal an erosion on Indians’ right to privacy, especially journalists, political opposition

The post The telegram NEET case and the expansion of platform-level censorship in India appeared first on SabrangIndia.

These were not routine disputes. They involved some of the most fundamental questions a constitutional democracy can confront.

• What happens when citizenship is assessed through imperfect documents? How should courts respond to allegations of extra-judicial killings by state agencies?
• Can access to reservation be denied despite an undisputed claim to social disadvantage?
• Does privacy survive within the intimate space of marriage?
• To what extent can environmental violations be regularised after the fact?
• How much power can unelected constitutional authorities exercise over the decisions of elected governments?
• And how far may the State intervene in the administration of minority religious institutions?

The answers offered by the Court reveal an important judicial trend. In several of the year’s most consequential judgments, the Court displayed a marked preference for procedural rigour, institutional finality and administrative deference. Questions of substantive justice frequently became secondary to questions of compliance. Structural inequalities often received less attention than formal legal requirements. Concerns about accountability were sometimes met with faith in existing institutions rather than the creation of stronger oversight mechanisms. In matters involving citizenship, reservation, police violence, environmental governance and constitutional accountability, the Court often chose restraint where intervention was sought and certainty where contextual flexibility was urged.

To be sure, judicial restraint is itself a constitutional value. Courts cannot govern, administer or legislate. Yet constitutional adjudication has always demanded more than technical legal reasoning. It requires courts to recognise the unequal realities within which law operates and to ensure that constitutional guarantees remain meaningful for those who possess the least social, political and economic power. It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court’s major decisions of 2025 must be understood—not merely as isolated rulings on discrete legal questions, but as judgments that collectively illuminate the Court’s evolving understanding of rights, accountability, state power and constitutional governance.

Reintroducing three years bar practice raises concern on deepening structural inequality in judicial recruitment

In All India Judges Association v. Union of India, the Supreme Court delivered their judgment in May 2025, restoring the requirement of prior legal practice as a condition for appearing in lower judicial service examinations, effectively overturning the position adopted in the Third AIJA judgment (1999), which had removed the practice mandate. The Court justified the move on the ground that newly recruited judicial officers often lack practical courtroom experience and familiarity with litigation processes. Relying on the views of several High Courts and earlier observations in the Second AIJA case, the Court held that three years of practice at the Bar would better equip candidates for the responsibilities of trial court adjudication from the very first day of service.

The judgment also clarified that the three-year practice requirement would be calculated from the date of provisional enrolment, and candidates would need certification from an advocate with at least ten years’ standing or from a presiding officer to verify actual legal practice. The Court viewed practical exposure to litigation, client interaction, drafting, and courtroom procedure as indispensable for improving the quality of the subordinate judiciary. In doing so, it sought to standardise eligibility conditions across States and strengthen institutional competence at the grassroots level of the judicial system.

However, the ruling has attracted significant criticism for creating structural barriers that disproportionately affect first-generation lawyers, economically weaker aspirants, women, and candidates from marginalised communities. On of the criticism is that the requirement risks reinforcing nepotism and inherited privilege within the legal profession, as candidates from established legal families are far more likely to secure stable chamber placements, financial support, and meaningful litigation exposure during the mandatory practice period. By contrast, many young graduates—particularly from Dalit, Adivasi, OBC, minority, and rural backgrounds—often struggle to survive financially in the initial years of litigation practice, which remains deeply informal, underpaid, and dependent on personal networks.

The impact on women candidates may be especially severe. Litigation spaces in many parts of India continue to be male-dominated, insecure, and institutionally exclusionary, with persistent concerns regarding harassment, lack of mentorship, unequal briefing opportunities, and unsafe working conditions. For many women aspirants, direct entry into judicial service after graduation had become a relatively stable and dignified avenue for professional advancement and financial independence. The mandatory practice requirement may now force them into precarious professional environments for several years before they can even compete for judicial posts, potentially discouraging participation and reducing diversity within the judiciary itself.

The judgment fails to justify why exactly three years of practice constitutes the appropriate threshold for judicial competence. The Court did not provide any empirical or institutional basis for fixing this duration, raising concerns of arbitrariness under Article 14. It can be further argued that instead of excluding fresh graduates altogether, the Court could have strengthened judicial academies and post-selection training mechanisms, as earlier recognised in the Third AIJA judgment. Additionally, the possibility of exploitation during the mandatory practice period and the emergence of informal “certificate” systems, where young advocates may become dependent on senior lawyers for proof of practice, thereby creating new forms of gatekeeping within judicial recruitment.

Citizenship by Technicality: When documentary perfection trumped substantive justice

The Supreme Court’s decision in Rofiqul Hoque v. Union of India, also delivered in May last year, reflects a deeply formalistic approach to citizenship adjudication in Assam, one that places overwhelming emphasis on documentary precision while paying insufficient attention to the realities of record-keeping, migration, poverty, and bureaucratic inconsistency. While the Court correctly reiterated the legal principle from Abdul Kuddus that inclusion in the NRC cannot override a prior declaration by a Foreigners Tribunal, the troubling aspect of the judgment lies in its treatment of evidence and its unwillingness to contextualise documentary discrepancies.

The Court accepted the Tribunal’s rejection of the petitioner’s evidence based on variations in age, village names, and familial details appearing across electoral rolls spanning several decades. However, such discrepancies are hardly uncommon in rural India, where voter lists, land records, school certificates and identity documents have historically been riddled with clerical errors, transliteration mistakes, inaccurate age recording, and inconsistent spellings. Previous Supreme Court jurisprudence had generally recognised these realities and assessed citizenship claims by examining the cumulative credibility of the evidence rather than demanding documentary perfection. In Rofiqul Hoque, however, minor inconsistencies were elevated into determinative defects without sufficient consideration of whether they actually undermined the core claim of lineage.

Particularly concerning is the Court’s treatment of the village discrepancy. The judgment faulted the petitioner for not explaining the movement of his family between villages and districts over time. Yet migration within Assam for work, river erosion, floods, displacement, marriage and economic necessity is a common social reality. Expecting individuals to produce documentary proof of every movement made by previous generations places an extraordinarily onerous burden on those already struggling to establish citizenship. The Court’s reasoning effectively transforms the burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act into a near-impossible evidentiary standard for many poor and rural residents whose lives were never documented with administrative precision.

The consequences of this approach extend far beyond the individual petitioner. Citizenship proceedings in Assam disproportionately affect economically vulnerable communities, linguistic minorities, Muslims, women, landless labourers and persons with limited access to education and documentation. Women, in particular, often face severe documentation gaps because their identities are frequently recorded through male relatives, marriage results in changes of residence, and formal educational records are absent. By treating documentary inconsistencies as fatal without adequately accounting for these structural realities, the judgment risks reinforcing existing inequalities in citizenship determination.

Equally troubling is the Court’s failure to interrogate the broader reliability of the documentation regime itself. Electoral rolls prepared by the State, school records maintained by public institutions, and official identity documents are all products of government processes. When inconsistencies emerge across these records, the burden is placed entirely upon the individual to explain them, while the systemic deficiencies that produced such discrepancies escape scrutiny. The judgment therefore shifts the consequences of administrative failure onto those whose citizenship is under challenge.

While the Court was legally justified in holding that NRC inclusion cannot nullify a Foreigners Tribunal declaration, the judgment ultimately reflects a narrow and technical conception of citizenship adjudication. In a context where the stakes involve detention, statelessness, family separation and loss of fundamental rights, constitutional courts are expected to adopt a more humane and contextual assessment of evidence. Instead, Rofiqul Hoque signals a move towards documentary rigidity, where minor inconsistencies can outweigh the broader evidentiary picture and where procedural exactitude risks eclipsing substantive justice.

Detailed report may be read here.

Reservation reduced to a technicality

In this judgment, delivered in May, the Supreme Court adopted an extremely formalistic approach to reservation by holding that a candidate belonging to the OBC category could be denied the benefit of reservation solely because he submitted a caste certificate in the format prescribed for Central Government employment rather than the specific format required by the Uttar Pradesh recruitment advertisement. The Court held that compliance with the prescribed format was mandatory and that candidates could not seek relaxation merely because they genuinely belonged to a reserved category.

The ruling prioritises procedural compliance over substantive justice. There was no dispute about the candidate’s social identity, caste status, or eligibility for reservation. The rejection was based entirely on the format of the certificate rather than the authenticity of the claim itself. By treating reservation as a matter of paperwork rather than a constitutional mechanism designed to remedy historical disadvantage, the Court effectively elevated bureaucratic requirements above the objective of ensuring representation for marginalised communities.

The judgment is particularly troubling because it ignores the realities faced by many applicants from socially and educationally disadvantaged backgrounds. Recruitment processes are often complex, highly technical, and difficult to navigate. Minor mistakes in documentation are common, especially among first-generation applicants, rural candidates, and those with limited access to legal or administrative assistance. Instead of requiring authorities to verify an admittedly genuine caste claim, the Court endorsed a rigid approach that permanently excludes candidates on procedural grounds.

The consequences of such reasoning fall disproportionately on members of reserved communities, including OBCs, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, women from marginalised backgrounds, and economically vulnerable applicants who rely most heavily on affirmative action measures. By reducing access to reservation to strict compliance with technical formats, the judgment risks transforming a constitutional guarantee of substantive equality into a bureaucratic exercise where form prevails over social justice.

Passing the buck on encounter accountability in the Assam fake encounters case

In June, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Assam fake encounter case represents a missed opportunity to enforce meaningful accountability for allegations of extra-judicial killings and police violence. The petition placed before the Court was not based on a handful of isolated incidents but on as many as 171 alleged encounter cases, many of which raised concerns regarding compliance with the safeguards laid down in PUCL v. State of Maharashtra. These guidelines were intended to ensure that every encounter death or serious injury is subjected to independent scrutiny precisely because the police cannot be allowed to investigate themselves in cases involving the possible use of unlawful force.

While the Court acknowledged that allegations of fake encounters, if proven, would amount to grave violations of the right to life under Article 21, it stopped short of exercising its own constitutional authority to secure an independent investigation. Instead, it transferred the matter to the Assam Human Rights Commission for inquiry. This approach is difficult to reconcile with the extraordinary nature of the allegations. The very basis of the petition was the claim that existing institutional mechanisms had failed to adequately investigate encounter cases over several years. Referring the matter back to a state-level body, without constituting an independent judicial commission, Special Investigation Team, or court-monitored inquiry, risks reproducing the same limitations that prompted the litigation in the first place.

The judgment is particularly striking because the Court appeared to undertake a preliminary assessment of the allegations and observed that, barring a few cases, it was difficult to infer widespread non-compliance with the PUCL guidelines. Such observations sit uneasily with the Court’s simultaneous decision to direct a fresh inquiry. If the allegations required independent scrutiny, there was little reason for the Court to make broad prima facie observations appearing to endorse the State’s version of events. Conversely, if the material was insufficient to warrant further intervention, the matter could have been dismissed. The judgment attempts to occupy both positions simultaneously, thereby diluting the force of its own concerns.

More fundamentally, the Court declined to confront the structural reality of encounter policing. Allegations of extra-judicial killings involve the most serious exercise of state power—the taking of life without judicial process. In such circumstances, constitutional courts have historically acted as guardians of civil liberties, particularly where victims or their families may be unable to challenge state narratives. The Court recognised that fear, intimidation and power imbalances often prevent victims from coming forward. Yet having acknowledged these realities, it refrained from creating a robust mechanism capable of overcoming them.

The consequences of this restraint are particularly significant for marginalised communities. Encounter killings and custodial violence disproportionately affect poor persons, religious minorities, Adivasis, Dalits, migrant workers and those accused of crimes who lack social or political power. These are precisely the groups least capable of securing independent investigations against the police. By declining to establish a stronger accountability framework despite the unprecedented scale of allegations before it, the Court left unresolved the central question raised by the petition: whether constitutional guarantees against arbitrary deprivation of life can be meaningfully enforced when the alleged violator is the State itself.

In the end, the judgment acknowledges the seriousness of the allegations but avoids the constitutional consequences that such seriousness demands. Faced with claims involving 171 alleged encounter cases, the Supreme Court chose institutional deference over judicial intervention. For a case that raised profound concerns about the rule of law, the decision ultimately places responsibility elsewhere rather than exercising the Court’s own extraordinary powers to uncover the truth.

Privacy sacrificed at the altar of matrimonial litigation

In a judgment with far-reaching implications for privacy within intimate relationships, the Supreme Court in July held that secretly recorded conversations between spouses are admissible in matrimonial proceedings. While the Court framed the issue as one of balancing privacy against the right to a fair trial, the decision arguably weakens one of the most significant constitutional developments of recent decades—the recognition of privacy as an intrinsic part of dignity, autonomy and personal liberty under Article 21.

The Court’s reasoning proceeds on the assumption that once a marriage has deteriorated to the point where one spouse is secretly recording the other, the relationship has already broken down and concerns regarding privacy lose much of their force. This logic is troubling. Constitutional rights do not disappear because a relationship is strained. If anything, privacy protections become more important in situations of conflict, where surveillance, coercion and monitoring are most likely to occur. The judgment appears to reduce privacy to a matter of marital harmony rather than treating it as an independent constitutional value that survives even within family relationships.

Equally concerning is the Court’s reliance on Section 122 of the Evidence Act. The provision was intended to create limited exceptions to spousal privilege in litigation between spouses. It was not designed as a broad endorsement of covert surveillance or secret recording within marriage. By treating admissibility as a natural extension of the statutory exception, the judgment blurs the distinction between permitting evidence in court and legitimising the way that evidence is obtained. The result is that evidence procured through intrusion into private conversations may now be rewarded with evidentiary value, potentially incentivising greater monitoring between spouses.

The practical consequences of the ruling are likely to be felt unevenly. Women, who continue to face disproportionate levels of surveillance and control within domestic relationships, may be particularly vulnerable. In abusive or coercive marriages, phones, messages, and conversations are often monitored as tools of domination. By validating secretly recorded conversations as admissible evidence, the judgment risks normalising forms of conduct that are frequently associated with domestic control rather than legitimate evidence-gathering. The Court does not meaningfully engage with these realities or with the gendered dimensions of privacy violations within the home.

The implications extend beyond women. LGBTQ+ persons, individuals in interfaith marriages, and members of socially marginalised communities often rely upon privacy as a shield against social stigma, family interference, and discrimination. The judgment’s expansive acceptance of covert recordings may create anxieties about whether intimate conversations, personal disclosures, or private vulnerabilities could later be weaponised in litigation. In privileging evidentiary utility over informational privacy, the Court offers little guidance on where constitutional limits to such surveillance should lie.

At a broader level, the judgment sits uneasily with the privacy jurisprudence developed after the Supreme Court’s recognition of privacy as a fundamental right. Rather than asking whether secret recordings constitute a disproportionate intrusion into personal autonomy, the Court approached the issue primarily through the lens of evidentiary necessity and fair trial rights. The result is a decision that substantially expands the admissibility of privately obtained evidence while offering only limited protection against the growing possibility of surveillance within the most intimate sphere of human life—the family itself.

Stray dog verdict undermines animal welfare protections and established legal frameworks

In August, In Re: Menace of Dog Bites and Rabies (2025), the Supreme Court adopted an unprecedented approach to stray dog management by directing authorities in Delhi, Noida, Gurugram and Ghaziabad to immediately pick up stray dogs from public spaces and detain them in shelters without releasing them back into their original locations. The Court further warned that individuals or organisations obstructing the exercise could face legal consequences and contempt proceedings. Emphasising the need to protect children from dog attacks and rabies, the Court declared that “no sentiments should be involved” in addressing the issue.

The judgment marks a significant departure from India’s existing animal welfare framework. The Animal Birth Control Rules, framed under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, are based on the principle of capture, sterilisation, vaccination and release of dogs back into the same locality. This framework was developed after years of scientific and policy deliberation and has consistently been recognised as the governing legal regime for stray dog management. By directing that no captured dog should be released under any circumstances, the Court effectively displaced the statutory scheme without engaging with the rationale underlying it. In doing so, the judgment elevates a judicially crafted solution over a legislatively enacted framework designed to balance public health concerns with animal welfare obligations.

The ruling is also troubling for its treatment of animal welfare voices and participatory decision-making. The Court refused to entertain intervention applications from animal welfare stakeholders and expressly stated that no sentiments should be involved in the matter. However, questions concerning stray animal management have long involved competing interests, including public safety, animal welfare, municipal governance and scientific expertise. By excluding welfare organisations and discouraging contrary perspectives, the judgment narrows the scope for informed and evidence-based policymaking. The result is a highly securitised approach that treats stray animals primarily as a threat rather than as living beings protected under existing legal frameworks.

The consequences of the judgment are likely to fall disproportionately on both animals and vulnerable communities. The Court’s directions require the creation of large-scale shelter infrastructure capable of housing thousands of dogs indefinitely. Yet many municipal bodies already struggle to implement existing sterilisation and vaccination programmes due to resource constraints. The absence of a clear roadmap regarding shelter capacity, funding, veterinary care and long-term maintenance raises serious concerns about overcrowding, neglect and institutionalised confinement of animals. At the same time, poorer localities—which often face the greatest deficits in public health and municipal services—may bear the burden of implementing an expensive and administratively demanding model that lacks demonstrated feasibility.

Viewed more broadly, the judgment represents a retreat from the rights-based and welfare-oriented jurisprudence that has characterised much of India’s animal protection law over the past two decades. Rather than strengthening implementation of existing legal mechanisms, the Court opted for a sweeping solution that effectively side-lines statutory protections in favour of indefinite detention. In a year that witnessed several progressive rulings expanding constitutional protections for vulnerable groups, this judgment stands out as a notable exception—one that prioritised immediate executive action over legal consistency, scientific evidence and established principles of animal welfare.

Sealed Covers, Finality and the Silencing of Scrutiny: The Vantara judgment

The Supreme Court’s decision accepting the SIT’s clean chit to Vantara raises serious concerns about transparency, accountability and the future of public interest litigation involving powerful private actors. While there is nothing inherently objectionable about the Court relying on an independent investigation, the troubling aspect of the judgment lies in the extraordinary degree of finality it accords to a process that remains largely shielded from public scrutiny. In September, the Court accepted the SIT’s conclusions, directed that the detailed report remain confidential, and simultaneously declared that no further complaints or proceedings based on the same allegations would be entertained before judicial, statutory or administrative forums. In effect, a matter involving wildlife conservation, animal welfare, imports of endangered species and alleged regulatory violations was brought to a conclusive end without the public ever gaining access to the material on which that conclusion was reached.

The judgment reflects an uncomfortable reliance on the sealed-cover method, a practice that has repeatedly attracted criticism in recent years. Although the Court made the summary public, the substantive report, annexures and supporting material remain inaccessible. This makes meaningful public evaluation of the findings impossible. Wildlife regulation, environmental governance and animal welfare are matters of significant public concern. When allegations are dismissed on the basis of evidence that remains hidden from public view, confidence in the process inevitably suffers. The issue is not whether Vantara is ultimately innocent or guilty of the allegations; rather, it is whether the adjudicatory process itself remains transparent enough to inspire trust.

Equally concerning is the Court’s decision to effectively foreclose future proceedings based on the same allegations. Such a direction goes beyond merely accepting the findings of an investigation. It creates a near-impenetrable shield against further scrutiny, even though new evidence may emerge in the future or different complainants may possess material that was not previously examined. Public interest litigation has historically played a crucial role in uncovering environmental harms, wildlife trafficking networks and regulatory failures. By declaring that no further complaints based on the same allegations should be entertained before any judicial, statutory or administrative forum, the Court risks chilling future whistleblowing and discouraging legitimate public oversight.

The judgment also adopts a notably deferential approach towards regulatory authorities. One of the central allegations raised by the petitioners was not merely that violations occurred, but that multiple regulatory bodies had failed to adequately discharge their responsibilities. Yet the Court’s reasoning appears to treat the existence of permits, approvals and official clearances as sufficient answers to many of the concerns raised. Environmental and wildlife jurisprudence in India has historically recognised that formal compliance does not always guarantee substantive compliance. Regulatory approvals themselves may warrant scrutiny, particularly in matters involving endangered species, conservation and large-scale wildlife transfers. The judgment leaves little room for such questioning.

Perhaps most strikingly, the Court not only dismissed the allegations but expressly left open the possibility of defamation actions and criminal proceedings against those responsible for what it termed misinformation. While litigants who make knowingly false allegations should not be immune from consequences, such observations in a public interest matter risk creating a chilling effect on activists, researchers, journalists and conservation groups seeking to raise concerns about powerful institutions. Public interest litigation often operates in spaces where complete information is unavailable to outsiders. If unsuccessful challenges are followed by the threat of defamation or criminal proceedings, legitimate watchdog activity may be deterred.

Ultimately, the judgment signals a shift away from the openness and continuing oversight that have traditionally characterised environmental and wildlife litigation. The Court may well have been satisfied that Vantara committed no legal violations. However, by relying on confidential findings, granting sweeping finality to the investigation, and discouraging future scrutiny, the decision raises larger concerns about transparency and public accountability. In a sector where independent oversight is often the only mechanism through which concerns reach the public domain, the judgment appears to prioritise closure over continued scrutiny.

A deferential approach to the Waqf amendments raises concerns for minority rights

The Supreme Court’s interim judgment on the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, delivered in September, represents one of the most consequential judicial responses to a religious freedom challenge in recent years. While the Court stayed certain provisions relating to executive determination of property disputes, it declined to suspend most of the legislation, effectively allowing a far-reaching restructuring of waqf governance to operate pending final adjudication. In doing so, the Court adopted an approach marked by substantial deference to legislative policy, even where the amendments alter long-settled understandings of waqf administration and management.

Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the judgment concerns the Court’s treatment of waqf by user. For centuries, numerous mosques, dargahs, graveyards and charitable institutions acquired recognition not through formal deeds but through uninterrupted public use and community acceptance. The doctrine evolved precisely because many religious endowments predated modern systems of land registration and documentary record-keeping. By accepting the legislative decision to effectively eliminate this category and by placing considerable emphasis on the failure of mutawallis to register properties despite statutory opportunities, the Court privileges formal documentation over historical reality. Such an approach risks exposing a significant number of longstanding religious properties to future disputes, particularly where documentary evidence has been lost, destroyed, or never existed in the first place. The judgment appears to assume that the absence of registration necessarily reflects neglect or misuse, rather than recognising the complex historical circumstances under which many waqf properties evolved.

The Court’s endorsement of the requirement that a person must have practised Islam for five years before creating a waqf also raises difficult constitutional questions. While the Court accepted the State’s concern regarding potential misuse of waqf protections, it did not sufficiently grapple with the implications of empowering the State to scrutinise the sincerity, continuity, or duration of an individual’s religious practice. Questions regarding who determines religious observance, what evidence would be considered sufficient, and whether such inquiries are compatible with constitutional protections of religious freedom remain largely unanswered. The temporary stay granted by the Court is procedural rather than substantive; the constitutional concerns underlying the provision remain unresolved.

Equally significant is the Court’s acceptance of provisions that narrow who may create waqfs and the circumstances under which waqf claims may be asserted. Historically, waqf law in India developed through a combination of religious principles, community practices and statutory regulation. The amendments shift this balance decisively toward bureaucratic control and formal compliance. By treating these changes primarily as matters of legislative policy, the judgment pays relatively little attention to the broader question of whether the cumulative effect of these provisions alters the essential character of waqf as a community-based religious institution.

The Court’s approach to the inclusion of non-Muslim members in Waqf Boards similarly reflects caution rather than rigorous constitutional scrutiny. While numerical limits were imposed through interim directions, the larger question—whether bodies entrusted with administering specifically Islamic religious endowments can be substantially reconstituted through state intervention—was effectively deferred. This issue strikes at the heart of debates concerning religious autonomy under Articles 25 and 26. Yet the judgment stops short of engaging with these concerns in any meaningful manner.

To its credit, the Court intervened where executive power threatened to displace adjudicatory functions. The stay on provisions permitting revenue officers to determine whether disputed properties constituted government land recognises that questions of title cannot simply be resolved through administrative fiat. However, this intervention also highlights a broader inconsistency within the judgment. While the Court was willing to act decisively when executive encroachment upon judicial functions became apparent, it displayed considerably greater restraint when confronted with concerns regarding religious autonomy, community rights, and the historical protection of waqf properties.

The larger concern arising from the judgment is not merely the fate of individual provisions but the constitutional vision it appears to endorse. The amendments collectively move waqf governance away from historical usage, community recognition and institutional autonomy, towards a framework centred on registration, documentation, state oversight and administrative control. The Court’s refusal to substantially intervene at the interim stage allows this transformation to proceed even before the constitutional validity of the amendments has been conclusively determined.

The significance of the judgment lies not only in what it stayed, but in what it permitted. By largely accepting Parliament’s framing of waqf reform as an exercise in transparency and accountability, the Court afforded limited weight to concerns that the amendments fundamentally alter the legal and institutional foundations upon which waqf administration has historically rested. The result is a judgment that, while cautious in form, may have profound consequences for the future of religious endowments, minority institutional autonomy, and the constitutional relationship between the State and religious communities.

Environmental Compliance Diluted: Supreme Court revives post-facto environmental clearances

In Review in Vanashakti v. Union of India (2025), a 2:1 majority of the Supreme Court recalled the landmark Vanashakti judgment delivered only months earlier, which had prohibited the Union Government from granting post-facto environmental clearances (ECs) to projects that commenced operations without obtaining prior environmental approval. Through the judgment delivered in November, the majority, led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, held that the earlier judgment had failed to consider certain coordinate bench decisions permitting post-facto clearances in exceptional circumstances. As a result, the Court reopened the question and restored the possibility of regularising projects that began operations in violation of environmental law.

The judgment represents a significant setback for environmental governance in India. The principle of prior environmental clearance lies at the heart of the country’s environmental regulatory framework. Environmental impact assessments are intended to evaluate risks before a project begins, not after ecological damage has already occurred. By permitting the continued use of post-facto clearances, the Court weakens the deterrent effect of environmental law and effectively rewards non-compliance. Instead of treating prior clearance as a mandatory legal safeguard, the judgment risks reducing it to a procedural hurdle that can be cured retrospectively once investments have already been made.

The majority’s reasoning placed considerable emphasis on economic costs, infrastructure investments and the practical difficulties associated with halting or dismantling projects. However, this approach shifts the consequences of illegal environmental conduct away from project proponents and onto affected communities and ecosystems. Once a project is operational, authorities and courts are often reluctant to order closure due to sunk costs and employment concerns. This creates a powerful incentive for developers to proceed without clearances and seek regularisation later. As Justice Ujjal Bhuyan observed in his dissent, it cannot be left to violators to invoke the consequences of their own unlawful conduct as a reason for avoiding legal accountability.

The impact of such a dilution is felt most acutely by marginalised communities. Large infrastructure, mining and industrial projects disproportionately affect Adivasi populations, forest-dwelling communities, fishing communities, small farmers and rural residents whose livelihoods depend on land, forests and water resources. Environmental impact assessments and clearance processes are often the only institutional mechanisms through which these communities can raise objections and participate in decision-making. Permitting post-facto clearances weakens these protections by allowing projects to become fait accompli before meaningful consultation can occur. Women within these communities frequently bear the heaviest burden, as environmental degradation directly affects access to water, fuel, food security and household livelihoods.

The judgment also signals a broader judicial shift from precautionary environmental protection towards regulatory flexibility and economic pragmatism. The original Vanashakti ruling reaffirmed a long-standing environmental principle: that development must comply with environmental safeguards before, not after, ecological harm is caused. By recalling that decision, the Court has created uncertainty regarding the enforceability of environmental law and weakened one of the most important checks on unlawful development. In a year marked by several constitutional decisions expanding rights and accountability, this judgment stands out as a significant retreat from the principles of environmental justice, precaution and sustainable development that have historically guided Indian environmental jurisprudence.

Detailed report may be read here.

Presidential reference dilutes judicial checks on governor and presidential delays

In November, in the Presidential Reference concerning Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court substantially altered the position it had adopted earlier in the Tamil Nadu Governor case. The Constitution Bench held that Governors enjoy discretion while acting on Bills under Article 200 and are not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when choosing whether to assent, withhold assent and return a Bill, or reserve it for the President’s consideration. The Court further held that neither the Governor’s decision under Article 200 nor the President’s decision under Article 201 is ordinarily justiciable. While courts may issue a limited mandamus in cases of prolonged and unexplained inaction, they cannot examine the merits of the constitutional functionaries’ decisions.

The Court also rejected the idea of judicially prescribed timelines for Governors and Presidents to act on Bills. Overruling key aspects of its earlier Tamil Nadu judgment, it held that the Constitution deliberately preserves flexibility in the legislative process and that courts cannot impose rigid deadlines where the Constitution itself is silent. The Court further clarified that the concept of “deemed assent” has no constitutional basis and that neither Article 142 nor any other constitutional provision permits courts to substitute the constitutional role assigned to the Governor or President in the legislative process.

The ruling significantly weakened democratic accountability and judicial oversight over constitutional authorities. By recognising broad governor discretion and removing enforceable timelines, the judgment arguably creates space for Governors to indefinitely delay legislation passed by elected State legislatures. This effectively revives the possibility of a “pocket veto” in practice, even if not in name. Given the increasing frequency of political confrontations between opposition-ruled States and Governors appointed by the Union Government, the judgment is seen as tilting the constitutional balance away from representative institutions and towards unelected constitutional offices.

The decision will have critical implications for Indian federalism. Earlier judicial interventions had sought to prevent Governors from obstructing legislative agendas endorsed by democratically elected governments. By treating governor’s discretion as largely insulated from judicial review and rejecting timelines altogether, the Court has weakened one of the few constitutional safeguards available to States against executive delay. It can be contended that the judgment places excessive faith in constitutional morality and convention despite repeated instances where constitutional offices have become sites of political contestation. In doing so, it may leave State legislatures with limited remedies when legislation concerning welfare, education, social justice, reservations, or other state policies remains stalled for prolonged periods without any meaningful constitutional accountability.

Detailed report may be read here.

Conclusion

Viewed together, the Supreme Court’s most consequential judgments of 2025 reveal a Court increasingly inclined towards institutional deference, procedural discipline and constitutional restraint. Again and again, the Court was confronted with opportunities to expand accountability, deepen rights protections or scrutinise the exercise of public power. Just as often, it chose a more cautious path.

In citizenship adjudication, documentary inconsistencies were allowed to outweigh the realities of poverty, migration and flawed record-keeping. In reservation jurisprudence, bureaucratic form triumphed over undisputed social identity. In the Assam encounter litigation, allegations involving the possible unlawful deprivation of life were acknowledged as grave, yet responsibility for investigation was ultimately shifted elsewhere. In the privacy judgment, constitutional concerns about surveillance within intimate relationships gave way to evidentiary considerations. In environmental law, the deterrent value of prior clearance requirements was diluted in favour of practical accommodation. In matters concerning waqf governance and gubernatorial powers, the Court displayed significant deference to legislative and constitutional authorities even where concerns regarding minority rights and democratic accountability were directly implicated. And in the Vantara litigation, finality and closure were prioritised over transparency and continuing public scrutiny.

What emerges is not a Court abandoning rights altogether, but one increasingly reluctant to place itself in direct confrontation with institutions of power. The recurring judicial instinct was not to aggressively police the boundaries of executive authority, administrative action or legislative policy, but to trust existing structures to function within constitutional limits. Whether in relation to the State, regulatory authorities, constitutional officeholders or investigative processes, the Court frequently preferred supervision at a distance over intervention at close quarters.

The difficulty with such an approach is that constitutional rights are rarely tested when institutions function perfectly. They matter most when institutions fail, when power is exercised disproportionately, when vulnerable communities cannot protect themselves, and when procedural neutrality masks deeper inequalities. It is in these moments that constitutional courts have historically played their most important role—not merely as interpreters of law, but as guardians against arbitrariness and as protectors of those who stand furthest from centres of power.

The lasting significance of these judgments therefore lies beyond their immediate facts. Collectively, they raise a larger question about the direction of constitutional adjudication in India. Is the Court entering an era defined primarily by restraint, deference and institutional trust? Or can constitutionalism continue to demand a more searching engagement with questions of inequality, accountability and rights protection? The answer will shape not only future jurisprudence but also the lived experience of citizenship, liberty, equality and democracy itself.

For that reason, the major judgments of 2025 should not be read merely as legal outcomes. They should be understood as constitutional signals—revealing how the Supreme Court increasingly sees its role in relation to power, governance and the protection of rights. Whether that vision ultimately strengthens or weakens constitutional democracy remains one of the most important questions these decisions leave behind.

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The post The Supreme Court in 2025: Deference, technicality and the retreat from rights appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The proceedings reveal a complex intersection of competing constitutional and governance concerns. On one hand lies the Court’s continuing concern regarding the rights of pedestrians, the accessibility of public spaces, and the obligation of public authorities to enforce existing laws regulating street vending. On the other hand lies the reality that the regulatory framework created by Parliament in 2014 to govern street vending has remained only partially implemented in Mumbai for more than a decade. The result is that many of the individuals who are now the subject of identification and enforcement exercises exist within a legal and administrative landscape shaped not merely by unlawful occupation of public spaces, but also by prolonged governmental failure to complete the statutory processes contemplated under the Street Vendors Act.

The Bombay High Court’s intervention must therefore be understood against a much broader historical backdrop. The present controversy is not simply about the existence of unauthorised hawkers. It is also about the consequences of a decade-long failure to fully implement a law that was specifically enacted to regulate street vending while protecting the livelihoods of some of India’s most economically vulnerable workers.

The regulatory framework and the incomplete implementation of the Street Vendors Act

The Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 represented a significant departure from earlier approaches to street vending. Prior to the enactment of the legislation, vendors across Indian cities often existed in a precarious legal position. Despite performing an essential economic function and serving millions of urban consumers, they were frequently treated as encroachers and subjected to eviction drives, confiscation of goods, harassment, and arbitrary displacement.

The Act sought to establish a more balanced framework. Rather than treating street vendors as a problem to be removed, Parliament recognised vending as a legitimate occupation and sought to regulate it through a system of surveys, registration, certification, designated vending zones, and representative Town Vending Committees. The legislation was premised on the understanding that public spaces could be managed in a manner that balanced urban planning concerns with the constitutional protection of livelihood.

The Town Vending Committee was intended to serve as the cornerstone of this framework. These committees were tasked with conducting surveys, identifying eligible vendors, issuing certificates of vending, recommending vending zones, and ensuring periodic review of the regulatory framework. Importantly, the Act contemplated that surveys would be conducted at regular intervals and that the regulatory system would remain responsive to changing urban realities.

In Mumbai, however, the implementation of the Act remained deeply uneven. Although surveys were initiated, subsequent stages of the process progressed slowly. Certification exercises remained incomplete, disputes arose regarding eligibility, and the functioning of Town Vending Committees became a recurring source of controversy. As a result, the comprehensive regulatory framework envisaged by Parliament never fully materialised. The consequences of these delays have become central to the present litigation.

The centrality of the 2014 survey and the status of 99,435 vendors

One of the most significant figures repeatedly referred to in the Bombay High Court proceedings is 99,435. This number derives from the survey conducted by the BMC following the enactment of the Street Vendors Act and has become the foundation of the Court’s recent directions, discussed below in detail, regarding identification and verification.

The significance of this figure cannot be understood without appreciating the broader statutory context. The survey was intended to form only one component of a larger regulatory process. It was expected that the information gathered during the survey would subsequently be used to determine eligibility, issue certificates, designate vending zones, and create a functioning regulatory system overseen by Town Vending Committees.

However, while approximately 99,435 applicants were surveyed, the larger statutory process remained incomplete. Many vendors who participated in the survey never received final vending certificates. Others continued to operate in a legal grey zone, possessing survey records or acknowledgements but lacking the formal documentation contemplated under the Act.

Vendor organisations have repeatedly argued that this prolonged administrative uncertainty created a category of workers whose relationship with the law remained unresolved. They were neither fully regularised nor formally excluded. Instead, they existed within a system that acknowledged their presence but failed to conclusively determine their legal status.

This unresolved situation became particularly visible during the COVID-19 pandemic. Street vendor organisations repeatedly highlighted how incomplete implementation of the Act affected access to welfare schemes, financial assistance, and emergency relief measures. Many vendors were unable to access benefits because they lacked documentation that they had been waiting years to receive. Representatives of vendor unions pointed out that while tens of thousands had participated in official survey processes, only a small proportion had ultimately received formal recognition through certificates of vending.

Detailed report may be read here and here.

The present litigation therefore unfolds against the backdrop of a regulatory process that remains unfinished more than a decade after the enactment of the legislation.

The proceedings before Bombay High Court

The proceedings before the Bombay High Court arise from a long-running public interest litigation concerning the regulation of street vending, hawking and encroachments on roads, pavements and public spaces across Mumbai. The petition is rooted in persistent complaints that despite repeated judicial directions, large-scale unauthorised hawking continues to obstruct pedestrian movement, affect traffic circulation, impede access to railway stations, hospitals and public infrastructure, and undermine urban planning efforts. Over the years, the litigation has expanded into a broader examination of the implementation of the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014, the functioning of Town Vending Committees (TVCs), the creation of vending and non-vending zones, the conduct of surveys of eligible vendors, and the responsibilities of multiple authorities including the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC), Mumbai Police, Railways and the State Government. The Court has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with what it views as administrative inaction and the failure of authorities to establish an effective regulatory framework despite the existence of a statutory scheme.

The current phase of the litigation reflects the Court’s growing dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of municipal and police authorities in regulating street vending across Mumbai. During successive hearings, the Court examined affidavits and compliance reports submitted by the BMC and other authorities detailing enforcement actions undertaken against unauthorised hawkers. However, photographs and materials placed before the Court frequently suggested that locations identified for special monitoring continued to witness significant vending activity despite repeated eviction drives.

The Court consequently began questioning whether existing enforcement efforts were producing any meaningful or lasting results. Particular concern was expressed regarding the apparent reappearance of vendors shortly after eviction operations had concluded. According to the Court, the issue was not merely the removal of vendors but the inability of public authorities to prevent the repeated reoccupation of the same spaces.

This concern became a recurring theme across several hearings. The Court repeatedly questioned why vendors who had been removed from specific locations appeared able to return almost immediately despite the presence of municipal authorities and police personnel. The judges also expressed concern regarding the apparent disconnect between the assurances provided in court and conditions observed on the ground.

The Court increasingly viewed the issue as one involving institutional accountability. Municipal authorities pointed to challenges associated with enforcement and reoccupation. Police authorities referred to limitations arising from municipal responsibilities. The Court, however, repeatedly emphasised that the continued shifting of responsibility between agencies could not justify the persistence of conditions that had been the subject of litigation for years.

The proceedings thus gradually evolved from a discussion regarding individual instances of encroachment into a broader examination of governance failures and administrative accountability.

• October 2025: The Court signals that assurances are no longer enough

The proceedings in this petition intensified significantly during the hearing held on October 22, 2025. By this stage, the BMC had already informed the Court that it had identified twenty locations across Mumbai for focused action and monitoring. Municipal authorities asserted that steps were being taken to remove unauthorised hawkers and prevent their return.

However, photographs placed before the Court painted a different picture. Images of the area immediately outside the Bombay High Court showed that hawkers continued to occupy spaces despite repeated assurances regarding enforcement.

The Court expressed clear dissatisfaction with the situation. Justice Gadkari observed that despite repeated directions and solemn assurances from authorities, unauthorised hawkers continued to maintain a significant presence across the city. The Bench indicated that it would no longer be satisfied with general statements regarding enforcement and would instead insist upon measurable compliance.

Specific stretches, including the area from Flora Fountain to Horniman Circle, were placed under direct scrutiny. Municipal officials and police authorities were directed to ensure that these locations remained free from unauthorised hawking. The Court’s approach reflected a growing belief that the problem was not the absence of legal powers but the failure to exercise them effectively.

• November 2025: The Court expands the inquiry across Mumbai

The hearing in November 2025 marked an important shift in the Court’s approach. The issue was no longer treated as confined to a handful of locations. Instead, the Court began examining the broader condition of public spaces across Mumbai.

The Bench remarked that there appeared to be virtually no commercial district, market area or railway precinct in the city that remained unaffected by hawking. The judges questioned submissions suggesting that police personnel could not verify whether vendors possessed licences or authorisations. The Court pointed out that there was nothing preventing officers from demanding documentation and taking action against unauthorised vendors.

A recurring concern during the hearing was the phenomenon of reoccupation. According to the Court, the central problem was not merely that vendors were being removed; it was that they were returning almost immediately after enforcement operations concluded.

The Court identified twenty major locations across the city—including railway station precincts, Colaba Causeway, Linking Road, Hill Road, Mohammad Ali Road, Kurla, Ghatkopar and the route between Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus and the High Court—for continuous monitoring and enforcement, as per LiveLaw.

The hearing reflected the Court’s emerging view that the problem was systemic and required sustained institutional intervention rather than sporadic eviction drives.

• December 2025: Questions regarding political and administrative will

The Court’s frustration became more pronounced during the December 2025 hearing. The immediate trigger was the continued presence of hawkers in the vicinity of the High Court despite previous directions and the existence of a nearby police chowki. The judges openly questioned whether the State intended to comply with judicial directions at all.

Justice Gadkari remarked that the State needed to clarify whether it intended to enforce the law or permit citizens to act as they pleased. The Court also rejected suggestions that the issue should be viewed solely through the lens of vendors’ rights. While acknowledging that street vendors possess constitutional protections, the Bench emphasised that pedestrians and ordinary residents also possess rights that require protection, as per LiveLaw.

A particularly significant observation concerned the temporary clearance of the area during the swearing-in ceremony of the Chief Minister. The Court noted that authorities had demonstrated their capacity to clear the area when required but had failed to maintain those conditions thereafter. This observation reinforced the Court’s growing conviction that the persistence of the problem was not merely a question of capacity but one of sustained commitment.

• March and April 2026: The Court turns to the state’s failure to implement the act

The hearings during early 2026 marked another significant development. The Court increasingly shifted its focus from immediate enforcement failures to the larger question of why the Street Vendors Act had not been fully implemented despite having been enacted more than a decade earlier.

The most pointed criticism emerged during the hearing on April 28, 2026. When the Maharashtra Government produced a Government Resolution outlining future steps for implementation of the Act, the Court reacted sharply.

Justice Gadkari repeatedly questioned what authorities had been doing since 2014. The Bench described the Government Resolution as little more than an “eyewash” and “lip service,” observing that the State appeared to be creating implementation frameworks that should have existed years earlier, as reported by LiveLaw.

The Court was equally dismissive of statistics indicating that action had been taken against approximately 9,000 illegal hawkers. Pointing out that estimates suggested the presence of several lakh vendors across Mumbai, the Bench observed that the figures presented by the State addressed only a small fraction of the larger issue.

The hearing also highlighted concerns regarding intimidation faced by citizens who reported illegal hawking. References were made to threats, violence and retaliation against complainants. Justice Khata observed that many residents had effectively lost faith in the willingness of authorities to act.

The Court repeatedly emphasised that sufficient legal powers already existed and that the problem lay in implementation rather than legislative inadequacy.

The order may be read here.

• May 2026: The shift from enforcement to identification

The hearings conducted during May 2026 marked a significant transformation in the nature of the proceedings. Until this point, the Court’s primary concern had been enforcement. Increasingly, however, the focus shifted toward identification and verification.

The Court began examining how authorities could distinguish between vendors who formed part of the surveyed population and those operating outside the recognised framework. This discussion coincided with concerns raised regarding alleged undocumented foreign nationals, particularly Bangladeshi nationals, engaged in vending activities.

The BMC informed the Court that alleged foreign nationals residing illegally in India could not be permitted to engage in hawking and that verification exercises were necessary to identify such persons.

The Court’s response was to direct the creation of a comprehensive identification system based upon the 2014 survey database. QR-code-based identity cards were ordered for all 99,435 surveyed vendors.

The Court clarified that the issuance of identity cards would not create legal rights or confer recognition beyond existing entitlements. Rather, the purpose was to facilitate identification and distinguish surveyed vendors from persons operating outside the recognised framework.

When the BMC sought additional time for implementation, the Court expressed impatience. Justice Gadkari observed that the issue had persisted for years and that authorities could not continue to seek extensions while illegal activities allegedly continued. The Bench even suggested that the State Government allocate funds necessary to expedite the process.

The Court also directed the creation of citizen-reporting mechanisms, including dedicated WhatsApp systems, online portals and email addresses through which complaints regarding illegal hawking could be submitted.

The order may be read here.

• June 2026: Questions regarding the survey database

The hearing conducted on June 10, 2026 introduced a new dimension to the proceedings by raising questions regarding the reliability of the very database upon which the ongoing identification exercise is based.

Information placed before the Court suggested that certain individuals included within the 2014 survey records may not have been genuine hawkers and may instead have been shop owners who obtained inclusion through incorrect documentation. The Court treated these allegations seriously and directed that they be examined through an inquiry supervised by senior police officials.

This development is significant because it demonstrates that the process of verification is not limited to identifying persons outside the survey database. It also extends to examining the integrity of the database itself.

The allegations suggest that questions remain regarding the accuracy of records generated during the original survey exercise. If those records are now being used as the basis for determining legitimacy, then the reliability of the underlying data inevitably assumes considerable importance.

The June hearing therefore highlighted a broader challenge confronting the ongoing exercise. The task is not merely to distinguish surveyed vendors from unsurveyed vendors. It is also to ensure that the records being relied upon are themselves accurate and capable of supporting regulatory decisions with significant consequences for livelihoods.

The order may be read here.

The shift in the Court’s perspective

• How It Began: Public spaces, pedestrian rights, and constitutional concerns

A central feature of the Court’s reasoning, prior to May, has been its concern regarding the rights of pedestrians and the accessibility of public spaces. Throughout the proceedings, the Court has repeatedly emphasised that roads, footpaths and public areas exist primarily for public use and that authorities possess an obligation to ensure that citizens are able to access them safely and freely. Particular attention has been paid to the condition of footpaths and public thoroughfares in major commercial districts and around railway stations.

The Court has expressed concern that large sections of Mumbai’s public spaces have effectively become inaccessible to pedestrians because of encroachments and unauthorised vending activities. According to the Court, this situation raises questions not merely of urban management but also of constitutional governance.

In several hearings, the Bench linked the issue to broader concerns regarding the right to move freely and the obligation of public authorities to protect public infrastructure intended for common use. The judges repeatedly observed that the State cannot abdicate its responsibility to regulate public spaces and that continued inaction ultimately affects the rights of ordinary citizens. These concerns formed the foundation of the Court’s insistence upon stricter enforcement measures and closer monitoring of compliance.

• What It Became: The shift towards identification and verification

It is crucial to highlight that the recent 2026 proceedings have been about the Court’s increasing emphasis on identification and verification as mechanisms for regulating street vending. Earlier hearings focused primarily upon questions of encroachment and enforcement. More recent proceedings, however, have increasingly concentrated on distinguishing authorised vendors from unauthorised ones. This shift has been accompanied by directions requiring authorities to verify the identities of vendors and establish mechanisms capable of determining who falls within the recognised survey population.

The Court ultimately directed the BMC to undertake an exercise involving the issuance of QR-code-based identification cards to the 99,435 vendors included in the 2014 survey database. According to the Court, such a system would enable authorities to identify surveyed vendors and distinguish them from persons operating outside the recognised framework.

The BMC subsequently informed the Court that it had commenced the process of contacting and verifying the surveyed vendors. During the June 2026 hearing, municipal authorities indicated that the exercise remained ongoing and that additional time would be required to complete contact and verification procedures involving the entire surveyed population.

The Court has also directed the establishment of mechanisms through which members of the public can report instances of alleged illegal hawking. These measures include dedicated online portals, email addresses and WhatsApp-based complaint systems intended to facilitate direct reporting by citizens.

From a legal perspective, the State undoubtedly possesses the authority to investigate and act against persons residing unlawfully within India. However, the incorporation of migration-related concerns into litigation concerning street vending introduces a number of additional constitutional and policy considerations.

Street vending has historically been associated with economically vulnerable populations, including internal migrants, religious minorities, and workers employed within the informal economy. In recent years, several parts of the country have witnessed attempts to frame questions of livelihood, documentation and market participation through broader narratives concerning migration, citizenship and national security.

Consequently, the increasing emphasis upon identity verification raises important questions regarding the safeguards that will govern implementation. Verification exercises may be lawful and necessary for regulatory purposes, but they must remain grounded in evidence and due process. The distinction between lawful verification and profiling becomes particularly significant when questions of citizenship and migration become intertwined with questions of livelihood.

The implementation of the Court’s directions will therefore require careful attention to procedural fairness and constitutional protections.

The unaddressed issues 

• The Missing Conversation: Livelihood, informality and the original purpose of the Street Vendors Act

One striking feature of the Bombay High Court proceedings is the relative absence of sustained engagement with the livelihoods question that lies at the heart of the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014. Much of the litigation has centred on encroachments, pedestrian mobility, enforcement failures, unauthorised hawking and, more recently, identity verification. Yet the legislation itself was enacted because Parliament recognised that street vending is not merely an issue of urban management but one of livelihood, survival and economic justice. The Act emerged from decades of judicial intervention and policy reform aimed at ending the treatment of vendors as illegal occupants and recognising them instead as legitimate economic actors whose right to work required legal protection alongside reasonable regulation of public spaces.

The present dispute exposes the consequences of the State’s prolonged failure to implement that legislative vision. The fact that nearly 99,435 vendors were surveyed but large numbers remained trapped in administrative limbo for years illustrates a deeper institutional failure. These are not individuals operating entirely outside the system; they participated in official surveys, were recorded by public authorities and entered statutory processes that were never fully completed. The result has been persistent insecurity, leaving vendors vulnerable to eviction drives, confiscation of goods, extortion, loss of income and arbitrary exclusion from public spaces. These vulnerabilities became especially visible during the Covid-19 pandemic, when thousands of vendors across India struggled to access welfare measures precisely because the regulatory framework intended to formalise and protect their status remained incompletely implemented. Against this backdrop, the central question before Mumbai is not simply how to remove unauthorised hawkers, but whether the city can finally establish a regulatory regime that protects livelihoods while regulating public space in the manner Parliament originally intended, rather than perpetuating the cycle of enforcement, litigation and uncertainty that has characterised the past decade.

• Citizenship, identity and the risk of communalisation

The Bombay High Court’s emphasis on identification, verification and the removal of unauthorised vendors cannot be viewed in isolation from broader national developments in which questions of trade, livelihood and public space have increasingly become entangled with questions of religion, citizenship and belonging. Over recent years, Muslim vendors across several states have faced organised economic boycott campaigns, exclusion from markets, demands for identity disclosure and allegations linking their commercial activities to public health threats, demographic anxieties or national security concerns. During and after the Covid-19 pandemic, public campaigns urged consumers not to purchase goods from Muslim traders; villages in parts of Madhya Pradesh displayed banners barring Muslim vendors; political leaders publicly called for avoiding purchases from Muslim traders; and Muslim vendors were repeatedly subjected to suspicion and exclusion based solely on identity.

Equally significant has been the rise of informal and extra-legal identity policing. In several instances, private actors and vigilante groups have demanded identity documents, compelled traders to reveal their religious identities, pressured businesses to display religious markers, and effectively assumed functions reserved for lawful authorities. The experiences of Kashmiri traders across Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere demonstrate how quickly livelihood questions can become questions of citizenship and belonging, with vendors facing assaults, forced document checks, expulsion from localities, economic boycotts and accusations of disloyalty or terrorism. It is within this broader context that concerns arise regarding large-scale verification exercises involving Mumbai’s vendors. The Constitution undoubtedly permits lawful verification and enforcement against unauthorised activities. What it does not permit is collective suspicion, religious profiling or the transfer of verification powers to private actors. As Mumbai moves towards identifying and regulating nearly one lakh surveyed vendors, the constitutional challenge is not merely administrative. It is ensuring that verification remains a neutral legal exercise rather than becoming a mechanism through which broader anxieties about identity, migration and belonging determine who is considered entitled to participate in the city’s economic life.

The risks are not merely hypothetical. In November and December of 2025, Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) filed a complaint before the Maharashtra Director General of Police and the National Commission for Minorities after a former BJYM functionary allegedly conducted Aadhaar checks of Muslim fruit vendors at Mumbai’s Malabar Hill market while reportedly asking Hindu vendors to display saffron flags on their carts. According to the complaint, Muslim vendors were selectively required to produce identity documents, described as potential “security threats” and subjected to public scrutiny despite the absence of any legal authority to conduct such verification. CJP argued that the incident reflected a growing pattern of extra-legal identity policing in which private individuals assume state functions and transform ordinary commercial spaces into sites of religious verification and exclusion. The episode serves as a reminder that, in the absence of robust safeguards, questions of documentation and legality can rapidly acquire communal dimensions, making the manner in which Mumbai conducts its verification process as important as the exercise itself. 

Detailed report may be read here.

A case about more than hawkers

What has emerged before the Bombay High Court over the course of these proceedings is not merely a dispute concerning street vendors occupying pavements and public roads. The litigation has evolved into a broader examination of how Indian cities govern public space, how welfare-oriented legislation is implemented, and how the State manages competing claims relating to livelihoods, legality, urban order and citizenship.

The Court has undoubtedly exposed serious administrative failures. Through repeated hearings, it has highlighted the inability of municipal authorities and police agencies to develop a consistent and durable regulatory response to street vending. It has questioned a pattern of cyclical enforcement in which vendors are removed, compliance reports are filed, and the same locations are subsequently reoccupied. It has also forced public authorities to confront uncomfortable questions regarding the implementation of a statute that was enacted more than a decade ago but remains only partially realised.

Yet the proceedings simultaneously reveal a deeper contradiction at the heart of the present controversy. For years, the State failed to complete the very processes through which the legality of street vending was supposed to be determined. Surveys were conducted, databases were created and statutory mechanisms were established, but the larger framework contemplated by the Street Vendors Act remained unfinished. The current effort to distinguish between authorised and unauthorised vendors is therefore taking place within a system whose foundational processes were themselves left incomplete.

This contradiction lies at the centre of the present litigation. The problem confronting Mumbai is not solely the existence of unauthorised hawking. It is also the consequence of a regulatory regime that was never fully implemented despite clear statutory mandates. Many of the enforcement challenges now highlighted by the Court are inseparable from that history.

The significance of the case consequently extends well beyond questions of encroachment. It raises fundamental questions about the capacity of public institutions to implement social legislation, the limits of enforcement-based governance, and the role of identification and documentation in determining access to livelihoods in contemporary India. It also raises important questions about how cities balance the rights of pedestrians and residents with the economic realities of millions of informal workers who depend upon public spaces for survival.

As the litigation continues, its legacy is likely to be measured not merely by the number of hawkers removed from particular roads or footpaths. Its enduring significance may lie in whether it succeeds in prompting the creation of a regulatory framework that is lawful, transparent and effective while remaining faithful to the constitutional commitment to dignity, livelihood and equal treatment. In that sense, the proceedings have become a debate not simply about hawkers, but about the future of urban citizenship itself and the place of informal workers within India’s rapidly transforming cities.

Conclusion: A test of constitutional governance in the city

The Bombay High Court’s hawkers litigation has ultimately exposed a reality that extends far beyond pavements, encroachments and municipal enforcement. At its heart lies a fundamental governance failure: more than a decade after Parliament enacted the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014, Mumbai is still attempting to determine who is entitled to vend, where they may vend, and under what conditions. The Court’s frustration is therefore not directed merely at the presence of hawkers on public roads, but at the inability of public institutions to implement a statutory framework that was specifically designed to regulate them.

The proceedings reveal two competing truths that must be reconciled. The first is that public spaces cannot be surrendered to unregulated occupation. Footpaths, roads, railway approaches and civic infrastructure exist for public use, and the State has a constitutional obligation to ensure that they remain accessible, safe and functional. The second is that street vendors are not simply encroachers. They are workers operating within one of India’s largest informal economies, many of whom entered official surveys, participated in statutory processes and spent years awaiting the recognition and protections promised by law. Any attempt to address the former while ignoring the latter risks reducing a complex governance challenge to a narrow law-and-order problem.

What makes the present litigation particularly significant is the contradiction it has brought into sharp focus. The State is now seeking to distinguish between authorised and unauthorised vendors through records generated by a regulatory process that was itself left incomplete. Many of the enforcement difficulties highlighted by the Court today are inseparable from years of administrative delay, institutional inertia and partial implementation of the very legislation intended to resolve them. The crisis confronting Mumbai is therefore not merely one of illegal hawking; it is also the consequence of a regulatory framework that remained unfinished despite clear statutory mandates.

The Court’s recent turn towards identification and verification adds another layer of complexity. Verification may be a legitimate and necessary tool of regulation. However, its constitutional legitimacy will ultimately depend on the safeguards that accompany it. In a climate where questions of documentation, migration, citizenship and belonging increasingly shape public discourse, the distinction between lawful verification and social profiling becomes critically important. The challenge before authorities is not simply to identify vendors, but to ensure that processes designed to enforce legality do not become instruments of exclusion, discrimination or collective suspicion.

The enduring significance of this litigation will therefore not be measured by the number of hawkers removed from a particular road or market. It will be measured by whether Mumbai finally succeeds in building the regulatory system envisioned by Parliament in 2014: one that protects public spaces without criminalising poverty, regulates economic activity without destroying livelihoods, and enforces legality through transparent procedures rather than administrative improvisation. The question before the city is not simply who may sell goods on its pavements. It is whether urban governance in India can remain faithful to constitutional commitments of dignity, equality and livelihood while responding to the genuine demands of order, planning and public accountability. In that sense, this case is not merely about hawkers. It is about whether constitutional governance can succeed where a decade of institutional failure has not.

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The post Who owns Mumbai’s streets? The Bombay High Court, street vendors and a decade of regulatory failure appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment, delivered on June 12, 2026 by First Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan, found Deepak alias Baba Kevat, Ajay alias Ajju Rathore, Prakash Kaushal, Pawan Batham, Amar alias Bhola Batham, Kanhaiya Batham and Ballu alias Anuj Raghuvanshi guilty of offences under Sections 148 (rioting armed with deadly weapons), 307 read with 149 (attempt to murder with common object) and 302 read with 149 (murder with common object) of the Indian Penal Code.

At the sentencing stage, the Court made a particularly noteworthy observation, recording that the prosecution had successfully established that the accused had committed mob lynching. The Court identified several aggravating circumstances, including the formation of an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons, the extreme brutality inflicted upon the victims, the fatal injuries suffered by Najir Ahmed, and the injuries caused to the surviving victims.

Background: Attack on cattle transporters

According to the prosecution case, on the intervening night of August 2 and 3, 2022, truck driver Sheikh Lala was transporting cattle along with Najir Ahmed and Sheikh Mustaq from Nandarwada towards Maharashtra. Around 12:30 a.m., when their vehicle reached near Barakhad village in Seoni Malwa, a group of villagers intercepted the truck.

The occupants were allegedly dragged out and assaulted with lathis and wooden sticks. All three men sustained injuries. Najir Ahmed suffered severe head and bodily injuries and later died during treatment. Sheikh Lala and Sheikh Mustaq survived but sustained serious injuries.

Following the incident, police registered an FIR initially against unknown persons under provisions relating to rioting, wrongful restraint, attempt to murder and murder. During the investigation, officers collected physical evidence from the scene, including bloodstained soil and weapons, recorded witness statements, secured medical records, and obtained the dying declarations of the injured survivors.

Evidence relied upon by the court

The Court’s findings rested upon a combination of eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, forensic examination and recoveries made during the investigation.

The two surviving victims, Sheikh Lala and Sheikh Mustaq, consistently stated that a crowd had stopped their vehicle and assaulted them. Their accounts were corroborated by medical evidence documenting multiple injuries sustained during the attack.

Medical records showed that Najir Ahmed was brought to hospital in a critical and unconscious condition. Doctors noted extensive injuries, including swelling on the face and head, lacerated wounds, contusions and severe trauma. The post-mortem examination revealed multiple external and internal injuries, including skull fractures and significant head trauma.

“Arguments have been presented by the learned counsel for the accused persons that in the P.M. report (Ex. P–68–C) of the deceased Nazir, the cause of death is recorded as asphyxiation due to vomit blocking the throat, which makes it clear that the death of the deceased Nazir did not occur due to the injuries sustained by him. In this context, it is observable that although Dr. Shekhar Raghuvanshi (PW–22) admitted in paragraph 14 of his cross-examination that his opinion was given to the effect that his death occurred due to asphyxiation caused by vomit blocking the throat of deceased Nazir Ahmed, he made no statement to the effect that the injuries sustained by the deceased were insufficient to cause death, nor was any such suggestion given to the said doctor by the defense. From the aforementioned P.M. report (Ex. P–68–C), it is proved that the deceased sustained external and internal injuries, and it is also clear from the evidence of Dr. Shekhar Raghuvanshi (PW–22) that the deceased was brought in an unconscious state, his condition was highly critical, and his oxygen level as well as B.P. were unrecordable; thus, this argument of the defense is not acceptable that the death of the deceased did not occur due to the injuries sustained by him.” (Para 22) (Paragraph translated from Hindi to English)

The defence attempted to argue that Najir Ahmed’s death was caused by asphyxiation due to choking on vomit rather than by injuries sustained during the assault. The Court rejected this contention. It held that although the post-mortem referred to choking as the immediate mechanism of death, the evidence clearly established that Najir Ahmed had been brought to hospital in a grievously injured and unconscious state after the assault. The Court found that the fatal sequence of events was directly attributable to the brutal attack and that the injuries inflicted by the accused could not be separated from the death that followed.

The Court further relied on forensic evidence. Blood-stained weapons, clothing and other articles seized during the investigation were subjected to forensic examination. Human blood was detected on several seized items, including articles recovered from the accused and the deceased’s clothing. The Court noted that the accused failed to offer any satisfactory explanation for the presence of human blood on the recovered materials.

“According to the F.S.L. report Ex. P–103, Benzidine/Phenolphthalein and Crystal tests were performed on the said exhibits. According to the said report, human blood was found on A, B, C, D, E, F, $G_1$, $G_2$, I, K, $N_1$, and $N_2$. According to the said report, the stains on H, J, L, and M were disintegrated. In this manner, on the basis of the aforementioned F.S.L. report Ex. P–103, the presence of human blood on the aforementioned items seized from the accused persons is confirmed.” (Para 78) (Paragraph translated from Hindi to English)

“In the present case, blood-stained items were seized directly from the houses under the possession of the accused persons, on which human blood was found. The seizure proceedings have been duly proved by the prosecution, and according to the F.S.L. report, the chain of custody of the seized exhibits also remained intact. The police station daily log entry (Rojnamcha Sanha) of the proceedings from the date of the incident has also been produced. Under these circumstances, the burden of proof to provide an explanation was upon the accused persons, which was not given. Therefore, the aforementioned legal precedents are not applicable to the present case.” (Para 84) (Paragraph translated from Hindi to English)

Common object and unlawful assembly

A central issue before the Court was whether the accused could be held collectively liable for murder under Sections 302 and 149 IPC.

After evaluating the evidence, the Court concluded that the accused had formed; an unlawful assembly armed with lathis and dandas and had acted in furtherance of a common object. The attack was neither spontaneous nor isolated. Rather, the group acted collectively, used force and violence, and jointly assaulted the victims.

The Court held that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, acting as members of an unlawful assembly, intentionally assaulted Najir Ahmed with sticks and clubs in a manner that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It further found that the assaults on Sheikh Lala and Sheikh Mustaq amounted to an attempt to murder.

“An observation of all the circumstances available on the record establishes the involvement of the accused persons and that the death of the deceased Nazir Ahmed was caused due to the assault. Both the other injured victims, Shekh Lala and Sayyad Mushtaq, were also present along with the deceased. It stands proved that injuries were caused to the injured Shekh Lala on the neck and chest, and to the injured Sayyad Mushtaq on the head, arm, and other vital parts. Therefore, looking at the weapons used by the accused persons, the nature of the injuries of the injured victims, and the facts and circumstances leading to the death of their other companion Nazir Ahmed, the intention of the accused persons to commit murder can be inferred.” (Para 93) (Paragraph translated from Hindi to English)

In one of the key findings of the judgment, the Court observed that the accused, armed with deadly weapons, had formed an unlawful assembly, committed rioting and, in prosecution of their common object, murdered Najir Ahmed while attempting to murder the two surviving victims.

Court recognises mob lynching as an aggravating circumstance

The sentencing portion of the judgment is particularly significant because the Court expressly characterised the crime as a case of mob lynching. While considering punishment, Judge Tabassum Khan identified the following aggravating factors:

• The prosecution had proved that the accused committed mob lynching.
• The accused formed an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons and engaged in rioting.
• The assault was carried out with exceptional brutality.
• Najir Ahmed suffered extensive injuries that resulted in his death.
• The attack also caused serious injuries to other victims.

The Court observed that the violence inflicted upon the victims reflected a high degree of brutality and collective criminality, warranting severe punishment.

Why the court rejected the death penalty

Despite finding the accused guilty of murder in a mob-lynching incident, the Court declined to impose capital punishment. Relying upon the established “rarest of rare” doctrine governing death penalty cases, the Court held that the circumstances did not justify the imposition of the death sentence. Instead, it sentenced all seven convicts to imprisonment for life under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.

“For murder, there is a provision up to the death penalty, but in the legal precedent Bachan Singh Versus State of Punjab A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 898, it has been held by the Honorable Supreme Court that the death penalty should be awarded only in the “rarest of rare cases”. In the legal precedent Santosh Kumar Singh Versus State through C.B.I. (2010) 9 SCC 747, it has also been opined that when the court has to choose an alternative between life imprisonment and the death penalty, the option of life imprisonment should generally be chosen, unless there are such exceptional circumstances that make the death penalty inevitable. In this regard, the legal precedent Machi Singh Versus State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 is also followed.” (Para 102) (Paragraph translated from Hindi to English)

The convicts were also sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC for the attempted murder of the surviving victims, and three years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 IPC for rioting while armed with deadly weapons. Fines were additionally imposed.

Significance of the judgment

The judgment stands out for two reasons. First, it represents a rare instance where a trial court has explicitly described the offence as mob lynching and treated that finding as a distinct aggravating circumstance while determining punishment. Second, the Court’s reasoning underscores the application of collective liability principles under Section 149 IPC to vigilante violence carried out by groups acting in concert.

At a time when incidents of violence linked to allegations of cattle transportation and cow smuggling continue to generate legal and constitutional concerns, the ruling sends a clear message that vigilante groups cannot substitute themselves for law enforcement and that collective violence resulting in death will attract the gravest criminal consequences under the law.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

Mob lynching: Three separate incidents surface, even minors and partially disabled Muslims not safe

Another cow lynching in Nashik, one dead

Maharashtra’s shame: Cow lynching episode reported in Nashik

Allahabad HC points out misuse of cow slaughter law

K’taka: Bail to cow vigilante, Puneeth Kerehalli, accused of killing Muslim man

Cow vigilantism casts its ugly shadow on Maharashtra

Allahabad HC calls out misuse of law in cow slaughter case as only cow dung recovered from scene

The post Court recognises mob lynching as aggravating factor, sentences seven to life for 2022 cow-vigilantism killing appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a judgment that may become an important reference point in India’s continuing debate over liberty and national security, a Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja ruled that the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 cannot be indefinitely subordinated to statutory restrictions on bail.

“The appellant’s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India need to be balanced and may even trump the restriction imposed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA,” the Court observed, as per LiveLaw, while setting aside a December 2024 order of the Special NIA Court that had refused bail.

The ruling, however, does not immediately secure Parvez’s freedom. He continues to remain in custody because he is also an accused in a separate NIA case registered in 2020 relating to alleged terror-funding networks in Jammu and Kashmir, where his bail plea remains pending.

The case against Khurram Parvez

Parvez, one of Kashmir’s most internationally recognised human rights defenders, was arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) on November 22, 2021, during an investigation into what the agency described as a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) over ground worker network allegedly operated by a Pakistan-based handler known as Hyder alias Ali alias Yusuf.

Significantly, Parvez was not named in the original FIR registered by the NIA on November 6, 2021. His name emerged during the course of the investigation.

The NIA’s case is that Parvez, while functioning as Programme Coordinator of the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) and Chairperson of the Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD), was allegedly involved in terrorist conspiracy “in the guise of human rights activism.”

According to the prosecution, Parvez recruited Muneer Ahmad Kataria as an overground worker for Lashkar-e-Taiba and facilitated his introduction to Pakistani handler Hyder. Kataria allegedly recruited another accused, Arshid Ahmad Tonch, creating a chain of operatives linked to the militant organisation.

The agency further alleged that Parvez was involved in gathering sensitive information regarding Indian security installations, army camps, troop movements, road conditions near the Line of Control, and details of military and paramilitary structures. Investigators claimed that information about officers involved in counter-insurgency operations was compiled into dossiers described as “High-Ranking Perpetrators.”

The NIA also relied upon emails allegedly showing contact between Parvez and Pakistani journalists who sought footage of Indian military deployment in Kashmir.

The prosecution further pointed to Parvez’s visits to Pakistan in 2007 and 2015, where he allegedly met Syed Salahuddin, chief of the Hizbul Mujahideen and a designated terrorist. Visiting cards of Hizbul functionaries recovered from JKCCS offices were also cited as incriminating material.

Additionally, the agency alleged that Parvez played an active role during the 2016 protests that followed the killing of militant commander Burhan Wani, accusing him of making speeches including slogans such as “Burhan tere janissar, beyshumaar beyshumaar“, “Go Back India“, and “India go away from Kashmir“. According to the prosecution, these activities promoted separatist sentiment and encouraged unrest.

A separate strand of the prosecution case concerns allegations that Parvez attempted to secure the release of electronic devices seized by investigators through illegal payments routed via Muneer Ahmad Kataria to former NIA Superintendent of Police Arvind Digvijay Negi, who was later arrested in a separate corruption scandal.

The approver at the centre of the case

A critical feature of the High Court’s analysis was the centrality of Muneer Ahmad Kataria, who has since turned approver. In a supplementary chargesheet filed in July 2025, Kataria claimed that he had worked as an NIA informer since 2019 and had known Parvez since 2015. He alleged that Parvez introduced him to Hyder, described him as the “Chief Operating Commander” of the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Jammu and Kashmir module, and facilitated financial and operational links.

Kataria also alleged that Parvez paid him Rs 1.5 lakh to be passed on as a bribe to NIA officer Arvind Digvijay Negi. The High Court acknowledged that these allegations were serious. However, it emphasised that they rested substantially on the testimony of a co-accused who had become an approver and who himself claimed to have been working as an NIA informer.

“While the above statement raises serious allegations against the appellant, these allegations are based on the statement of a co-accused who has since turned approver and who himself claims to be an NIA informer. His evidence is yet to be tested in trial,” the Bench observed in Para 66 of the judgment. That observation became one of the most significant aspects of the judgment.

The Defence: Human rights work, not terrorism

Parvez’s legal team, led by Senior Advocate Tanveer Ahmed Mir, argued that the prosecution had systematically criminalised legitimate human rights documentation. The defence pointed out that many of the documents cited by investigators—including the “Structure of Violence” report and the “Alleged Perpetrators” report—were publicly available publications that had been released years earlier and remained accessible on the JKCCS website.

The “Structure of Violence” report, published in 2015, documented military and paramilitary structures in Kashmir as part of human rights research. The “Alleged Perpetrators” report, published in 2012, compiled information about officers allegedly implicated in human rights violations, much of it obtained through Right to Information requests.

The Court noted an important fact: the prosecution did not dispute that these documents had been publicly available for years. It further recorded that the “Alleged Perpetrators” report had even been shared with the Indian Army, which publicly responded to it in 2012.

The defence also argued that Parvez’s visits to Pakistan in 2007 and 2015 were undertaken openly, with valid visas, and were part of public advocacy efforts that had long been documented in the public domain.

On the allegations relating to slogans and participation in protests, the defence argued that expressions of political dissent or advocacy of self-determination cannot automatically attract anti-terror provisions unless they cross the threshold into incitement of violence or active involvement in terrorist activity.

The constitutional question

At the heart of the case lay a broader constitutional question that has increasingly confronted Indian courts: can a person accused under UAPA be kept in prison indefinitely while waiting for trial?

Section 43D (5) of the UAPA creates one of India’s toughest bail standards. Courts are ordinarily prohibited from granting bail if the accusations appear prima facie true on the basis of the chargesheet and case diary.

The High Court devoted substantial attention to recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue. The Bench revisited and relied upon the landmark decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, where the Supreme Court held that constitutional courts retain the power to grant bail when prolonged incarceration threatens fundamental rights.

Quoting extensively from Najeeb, the High Court reiterated that statutory restrictions “will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.” (Para 52)

The Court also examined the Supreme Court’s more recent judgment in Gulfisha Fatimav, which cautioned that delay alone cannot automatically justify bail in every UAPA case and that courts must conduct a contextual assessment that takes into account the nature of allegations, stage of proceedings, causes of delay and risks associated with release.

Yet the Bench also referred to the Supreme Court’s subsequent observations in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, where a three-judge bench strongly reaffirmed the constitutional foundations of bail.

The Supreme Court had observed in Andrabi: “‘Bail is the rule and jail is the exception’ is not merely an empty statutory slogan. It is a constitutional principle flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and the presumption of innocence.”

Detailed analysis of Andrabi judgment may be read here.

The High Court further noted that although the broader question regarding the relationship between Article 21 and Section 43D (5) has now been referred to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court, existing precedent continues to bind constitutional courts.

Four-and-a-half years without trial

The factor that ultimately proved decisive was the extraordinary delay in the proceedings. The Court recorded that Parvez had been incarcerated since November 22, 2021. Despite spending almost four-and-a-half years in prison, the case had not even crossed the stage of arguments on framing charges.

The prosecution proposed to examine 197 witnesses if charges were eventually framed. The Court observed that there was “no likelihood” of the trial concluding in the foreseeable future. The judges therefore considered the allegations, the stage of proceedings, the constitutional guarantee of liberty, and the reality of the judicial process together.

” We have taken note of the above allegations and the defence of the appellant, only to highlight that they must be tested against the long period of incarceration of the appellant and the fact that there is no likelihood of the trial ending soon as also against the yardstick of bail being the rule, while denial thereof being an exception. The appellant‟s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India need to be balanced and may even trump the restriction imposed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.” (Para 71)

The Court added that continued incarceration under these circumstances raised serious Article 21 concerns.

Disability as an additional ground

The Bench also gave weight to Parvez’s physical disability. Parvez lost his leg in a landmine explosion in Kupwara in 2004 while participating in election-monitoring work and has used a prosthetic limb ever since. Although the NIA argued that his disability had not prevented him from engaging in extensive travel and activism, the Court concluded that his condition nevertheless entitled him to special consideration.

“We are also to keep in mind that the appellant is infirm. Though the learned SPP has emphasised that his infirmity has not deterred the appellant from still indulging in activities, which he describes as being anti-national, the fact remains that the appellant is infirm and deserves that special consideration,” the Bench held in Para 73.

Bail granted, but under strict conditions

Having balanced the seriousness of the allegations against constitutional concerns arising from prolonged incarceration, the Court granted bail. The conditions imposed are extensive.

Parvez must furnish a personal bond of Rs 2 lakh with two sureties, surrender his passport, remain within the National Capital Territory of Delhi unless granted permission to travel, appear before the trial court whenever required, and report periodically to investigators.

He is prohibited from contacting witnesses, tampering with evidence, making public statements about the merits of the case, or engaging in activities that could prejudice the trial. Among the more notable conditions is a prohibition on uploading, sharing, disseminating or circulating any “anti-national material” through social media or other platforms. The Court also clarified that any violation of the conditions could result in cancellation of bail.

A significant UAPA bail ruling

The judgment arrives at a moment when courts across India are grappling with a growing tension between national-security legislation and constitutional guarantees of liberty. Rather than deciding whether the allegations against Parvez are true or false, the Delhi High Court repeatedly emphasised that such questions must ultimately be resolved at trial.

Its focus was narrower but constitutionally significant: whether an individual can remain imprisoned for years while a trial remains nowhere near completion.

The Court’s answer was clear.

Even in prosecutions involving terrorism allegations, constitutional courts cannot ignore prolonged incarceration. While the allegations against Parvez remain serious and continue to be contested, the Bench concluded that constitutional guarantees of liberty, speedy trial, and due process cannot become casualties of an endlessly delayed prosecution. As the Court put it, Article 21 may, in appropriate cases, “even trump” the restrictions imposed by the UAPA.

The complete judgement may be read below:

Previous reports on the cases against Khurram Parvez may be read here.

Related:

50 HR groups appeal for unconditional release of Khurram Parvez, Irfan Meraj

MEA lashes out against OHCHR comment on Khurram Parvez’s arrest

Kashmir based human rights activist Khurram Parvez arrested

Khurram Parvez is still in jail despite court’s release order due to ‘minor clerical error’

The post Article 21 May Trump UAPA Bail Bar: Delhi High Court grants bail to Kashmiri rights defender Khurram Parvez after 4½ years in jail appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The government presents the exercise as a necessary response to illegal immigration, demographic change and national security concerns. Yet mounting evidence from court proceedings, media investigations, government directives and testimonies from affected families raises a more troubling picture: one in which due process protections appear increasingly fragile, citizenship verification procedures are often opaque, and Bengali-speaking Muslims bear the overwhelming burden of suspicion.

Detailed report may be read here.

At the heart of the controversy, lies a fundamental constitutional question: can the Indian state pursue such detention and immigration enforcement while bypassing the procedural safeguards that protect individuals from arbitrary detention, wrongful deportation and statelessness? Two, without this due process of either established legal norms or procedures not enquiries/investigations into who these illegal immigrants are, is such action not arbitrary and without foundation?

The missing data and the transparency deficit

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the current deportation drive is not merely the scale of the exercise but the extraordinary lack of transparency surrounding it. Across Assam, West Bengal, Gujarat and other states, governments have announced deportations, detention drives and large-scale verification exercises. Yet even today, there is no publicly available dataset identifying who has been classified as an undocumented migrant, from which districts they were picked up, what evidence was relied upon, whether nationality was independently verified, how many individuals challenged those determinations, how many continue to remain in detention centres, and how many have ultimately been deported.

This absence of information is particularly striking because the consequences of these decisions are so severe. Deportation is among the most coercive powers exercised by the state. It can separate families, extinguish livelihoods, result in prolonged detention and, in some cases, leave individuals stranded in a country they insist is not their own. Yet the public is being asked to accept the legitimacy of the process without access to even the most basic information about how it is being carried out.

The opacity is all the more difficult to justify because the Union governments own deportation policy appears to contemplate extensive record keeping and reporting requirements. The policy submitted by the Ministry of Home Affairs before the Supreme Court requires state governments to maintain records of individuals handed over for deportation, submit mandatory reports to the Union government, and provides that the Bureau of Immigration shall publish information relating to deported Bangladeshi nationals and Rohingyas on a public portal for verification purposes.

Yet little of this information is publicly accessible. Speaking to Al Jazeera, civil rights activist and CJP Secretary Teesta Setalvad argued that the present campaign appears to be driven more by political rhetoric than publicly available evidence. “Even today the authorities have not made available exactly who, which families, from which locations have been identified as illegal immigrants, on what basis and assessment and then sent back,” she said. “There is also an element of targeting specific sections, particular communities.”

Her criticism points to a fundamental problem: In the absence of publicly available data, independent scrutiny becomes nearly impossible. It is impossible to assess whether those being detained and deported are in fact undocumented migrants, whether particular communities are being disproportionately targeted, whether established procedures are being followed, or whether wrongful deportations are taking place.

The demand for transparency is therefore not a procedural technicality. It lies at the heart of democratic accountability. If governments are confident that deportations are being carried out lawfully, after proper verification and in accordance with due process, then there is a compelling public interest in releasing comprehensive data regarding those detained, those housed in holding centres, those whose nationality has been verified, and those who have ultimately been deported.

Until such information is made available, one of the most far-reaching citizenship and deportation exercises in recent Indian history will continue to operate largely beyond meaningful public scrutiny.

From political slogan to state policy

For decades, the BJP has built its political narrative in eastern India around the issue of “illegal infiltration” from Bangladesh. The party has repeatedly argued that large-scale migration has altered the demographic composition of border states, strained public resources and created security vulnerabilities.

The issue has occupied a central place in BJP campaigns in Assam, West Bengal and Tripura. Senior BJP leaders, including Union Home Minister Amit Shah, have frequently described undocumented migrants from Bangladesh as a threat to national security and demographic stability. During previous election campaigns, Shah famously referred to illegal migrants as “termites“, a phrase that drew widespread criticism from civil society groups and human rights organisations. Report in The Hindu.

Following the BJP’s victory in West Bengal, these political commitments quickly evolved into administrative action. Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari announced the implementation of a “detect, delete and deport” framework under which individuals identified as illegal migrants would be detained by state authorities and transferred directly to the Border Security Force (BSF) for deportation, as per Hindustan Times. The announcement was accompanied by instructions to establish holding centres across districts and create a streamlined mechanism for identifying and removing alleged infiltrators. What was once campaign rhetoric had become state policy.

The creation of a national deportation architecture

The developments in West Bengal are not occurring in isolation. According to documents reported by The Hindu, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs has formulated a comprehensive deportation policy requiring states to establish district-level special task forces for the identification, detention and deportation of alleged illegal migrants from Bangladesh and Myanmar. However, before the Supreme Court of India, in the ongoing Rajubala Das v. Union of India case, the deportation policy submitted before the Courts hays down more tested procedures. The same has been explained below.

The policy directs states to:

• Create dedicated holding centres or camps for undocumented migrants awaiting deportation.
• Establish a time-bound mechanism for identification and nationality verification.
• Upload biometric information and demographic data onto the Foreigners Identification Portal.
• Cancel government-issued identity documents obtained by individuals determined to be illegal migrants.
• Maintain monthly reports regarding foreigners who are untraceable, detained or awaiting deportation.
• Coordinate with central agencies to facilitate removals.

The guidelines envision a nationwide infrastructure capable of processing large numbers of suspected migrants. Holding centres are to be enclosed by ten-foot boundary walls and barbed-wire fencing. Detainees are to remain confined pending verification of nationality and completion of deportation procedures.

Although the policy states that these facilities should provide humane living conditions, medical care, educational facilities for children, communication access and recreational space, rights groups argue that the rapid expansion of detention infrastructure signals a shift towards normalising large-scale administrative detention.

A policy contradiction at the heart of the deportation drive

One of the most striking aspects of the current deportation campaign is the apparent tension between the procedures explained above and the deportation framework that the Union Ministry of Home Affairs itself placed on record before the Supreme Court.

In the Rajubala Das v. Union of India proceedings before the Supreme Court, the MHA submitted an affidavit setting out a detailed deportation policy governing the treatment of alleged undocumented Bangladeshi nationals and Rohingyas. That policy envisages a structured process involving coordination between state governments, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of External Affairs, foreign missions and designated border-guarding forces. Crucially, it recognises that nationality cannot be assumed unilaterally and that nationality verification is a necessary component of the deportation process.

The policy specifically provides that where an alleged undocumented Bangladeshi national or Rohingya is arrested, their details are to be furnished to the Ministry of External Affairs so that the matter can be taken up with the Bangladesh High Commission or the Myanmar Embassy for nationality verification. The stated purpose is to enable the foreign government concerned to process and verify the individual’s nationality before deportation is carried out.

The same policy also requires state governments to maintain records of all individuals handed over for deportation and submit mandatory monthly reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs. It further provides that the Bureau of Immigration shall publish a list of deported Bangladeshi nationals and Rohingyas on a public portal for verification purposes.

This raises a serious question: If the deportation policy submitted before the Supreme Court contemplates nationality verification through diplomatic channels, maintenance of detailed records, mandatory reporting and publication of deportation data, how do these safeguards square with reports of alleged pushbacks, summary removals and immediate send-backs at the border?

The question becomes even more pressing in light of report that Bangladeshi and Myanmar nationals intercepted at land or maritime borders may be “immediately sent back” after their biometrics are recorded. The apparent gap between the procedures described before the Supreme Court and practices now being reported on the ground deserves far greater public scrutiny.

Detailed report on the Rajubala case may be read here.

Holding centres become operational

The practical implementation of this framework is already underway. Malda became the first district in West Bengal to operationalise a holding centre under the new policy. The facility initially housed nine individuals identified as suspected Bangladeshi nationals, including women and children.

Officials, as per The Indian Express, described the centre as a temporary facility where detainees would remain while their nationality and immigration status were verified.

However, rights advocates point out that detention itself can become punitive when individuals are confined before citizenship disputes are conclusively resolved. This concern is especially significant in border regions where documentation is often incomplete, where migration has historically occurred across fluid borders, and where linguistic and cultural similarities between Indians and Bangladeshis complicate nationality determinations.

West Bengal

West Bengal is the epicentre of the current drive. According to Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari, the state has already deported 4,800 alleged undocumented Bangladeshi migrants through newly established holding centres in border districts. Another 836 people were reportedly being held awaiting deportation as of early June 2026, as per The Times of India.

The government has also established an expanding network of detention facilities. Initial reports indicated that 11 holding centres had been created across the state and were housing at least 335 detainees, while later reports from Malda alone suggested more than 150 detainees had already been transferred there from North 24 Parganas district.

Government officials have presented these numbers as evidence of successful enforcement. However, the figures raise significant questions. If nearly 5,000 people have been removed within weeks of the BJP assuming office, it remains unclear how many cases involved completed nationality verification by Bangladesh, how many individuals received access to legal representation, and how many removals were subject to judicial scrutiny.

Gujarat

The largest publicly reported operation outside eastern India occurred in Gujarat. Under “Operation Delta Hunt”, authorities investigated approximately 6,200 individuals and identified 362 people as alleged illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, as per The Hindu. Of these, 166 were identified in Ahmedabad alone, including women and children. Authorities also stated that investigations into hundreds of additional cases were continuing.

The Gujarat government has further indicated that it intends to prosecute employers and landlords accused of sheltering undocumented migrants.

Assam

Unlike West Bengal and Gujarat, the Assam story is not primarily reflected through new numerical announcements but through litigation. Throughout 2025 and 2026, several habeas corpus petitions before the Gauhati High Court and the Supreme Court challenged alleged “pushback” operations involving Bengali-speaking Muslims who claimed Indian citizenship. The significance of Assam lies not merely in the number of people detained but in the emergence of documented allegations that Indian citizens were wrongly identified as foreigners and transported towards the Bangladesh border.

Citizens for Justice and Peace provides legal aid in some cases, details may be read here, here and here.

The Assam cases effectively became the warning sign for what now may happen on a larger scale in West Bengal.

The May 2025 Assam crisis report may be read here.

National figures

At the national level, according to The Hindu, the Ministry of External Affairs has confirmed that India has asked Bangladesh to verify the nationality of more than 2,860 individuals whom Indian authorities believe to be Bangladeshi nationals residing illegally in India.

Simultaneously, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs has directed states to establish district-level mechanisms for the identification, detention and deportation of alleged undocumented migrants from Bangladesh and Myanmar, suggesting that the campaign is being institutionalised nationwide rather than remaining confined to border states.

The human cost of wrongful deportation

Few cases illustrate the dangers of inadequate verification more clearly than that of Sunali Khatun. Reported extensively by BBC News, Khatun, a Bengali-speaking Muslim woman from West Bengal, was detained in Delhi alongside her husband and young son on suspicion of being an undocumented migrant. Authorities alleged that she lacked proof of lawful residence and initiated deportation proceedings. According to her account, officials failed to properly verify her claim that she was an Indian citizen from West Bengal. She, her husband and child were subsequently transported to Bangladesh. Once there, Bangladeshi authorities treated them as illegal entrants and imprisoned them. The family spent months in detention.

Detailed report on this case may be read here.

Only after intervention by the Supreme Court was Sunali permitted to return to India on humanitarian grounds while her citizenship claims continue to be examined. Her husband remains stranded in Bangladesh.  The case exposed the potentially catastrophic consequences of administrative errors in citizenship determination. A mistaken deportation is not simply an immigration decision. It can separate families, result in imprisonment in another country and effectively strip individuals of their nationality.

Due process concerns

The central criticism of the current deportation campaign is not that states lack authority to remove foreign nationals. Every sovereign state possesses the power to regulate immigration and deport individuals who are unlawfully present. The issue instead concerns the process by which such determinations are being made.

Under established principles of administrative fairness and constitutional governance, individuals facing deportation should ordinarily have:

• Notice of the allegations against them.
• Access to documentary evidence.
• An opportunity to challenge adverse findings.
• Legal representation.
• Independent verification of nationality.
• Judicial oversight where fundamental rights are implicated.

The recent practices, however, often fall short of these standards. Reports from Assam and West Bengal suggest that detention frequently precedes verification rather than following it. In several cases, families have alleged that individuals were forced to prove citizenship after already being taken into custody. Such an approach effectively reverses the burden of proof and creates significant risks of wrongful exclusion.

Detailed report on deportation process may be read here.

Religious selectivity and the Citizenship Amendment Act

The controversy is further complicated by the interaction between deportation policy and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. The CAA provides a pathway to citizenship for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who entered India before the prescribed cut-off date. Muslims are excluded.

Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari has repeatedly emphasised that communities covered by the CAA will not face action under the deportation framework. Those outside its protection, however, remain vulnerable to detention and deportation. Two individuals entering India under similar circumstances may face radically different legal consequences depending upon their religious identity.

This concern is particularly acute because the overwhelming majority of those targeted by current deportation drives are Bengali-speaking Muslims.

Bangladesh pushes back

The crackdown has also generated significant diplomatic friction. Bangladesh has repeatedly objected to what it describes as attempts by Indian authorities to push individuals across the border without completing formal nationality verification procedures.

As per The Indian Express, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) officials have publicly stated that they blocked numerous attempts by Indian authorities to send individuals into Bangladesh without prior verification.

Bangladesh’s Foreign Affairs Adviser, Shama Obaid, has stated that Dhaka has repeatedly communicated its concerns to New Delhi and insisted that existing bilateral mechanisms must be followed. The position of Bangladesh is straightforward: no person should be accepted unless their nationality has first been verified. India officially maintains that deportations occur only through established procedures.

Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal has stated that India has submitted details of more than 2,860 suspected Bangladeshi nationals to Dhaka for verification. Yet the persistence of Bangladeshi objections suggests continuing disagreements regarding implementation.

The demography committee

The deportation drive is now being supplemented by a broader effort to study demographic change. The Union Government recently established a high-level committee chaired by retired Supreme Court judge Justice Prakash Prabhakar Naolekar to examine demographic shifts allegedly caused by illegal migration and other factors. The committee’s mandate extends beyond research.

It has been tasked with recommending systems for identifying, detaining and deporting undocumented migrants and proposing mechanisms for strengthening border management and population monitoring. Its creation fulfils a commitment made by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and reflects the growing centrality of demographic concerns within government policy.

However, the language surrounding the committee has generated concern. Government statements describe demographic change arising from migration as an “unnatural” phenomenon and a “monumental challenge”. Such framing risks treating entire communities as demographic threats rather than as individuals possessing rights and legal protections.

Detailed report may be read here.

A constitutional test

India unquestionably has the authority to regulate immigration and remove foreign nationals who have entered or remained unlawfully. But citizenship determination is among the most consequential exercises of state power.

A mistaken arrest can be corrected. A mistaken deportation can leave a person stateless, imprisoned in a foreign country or permanently separated from family members. The experiences documented in Assam, the wrongful deportation allegations, Bangladesh’s repeated protests over alleged pushbacks, the establishment of detention infrastructure across West Bengal and the government’s push towards a nationwide deportation architecture collectively point to a deeper concern. The issue is no longer merely immigration enforcement.

It is whether the Indian state can pursue that objective while respecting the constitutional guarantees of fairness, equality and due process. As detention centres multiply, deportations accelerate and citizenship verification becomes increasingly securitised, the challenge confronting India is not simply identifying who belongs. It is ensuring that, in the process of deciding who does not, the state does not abandon the rule of law itself.

Related:

India’s Silent Push-Out: Courts, states, and the deportation of Bengali-Speaking Muslims

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The post Who decides who belongs? Detention, deportation and the crisis of due process appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment, delivered by Justice Neena Bansal Krishna on May 29, 2026, represents a comprehensive rejection of the allegations that formed the basis of nearly six years of investigation into the news portal’s foreign investment transactions. The Court not only found that the allegations failed to disclose the commission of any cognisable offence but went considerably further, characterising the proceedings as mala fide, arbitrary and an abuse of investigative powers directed against independent journalism.

The Court observed:

“Not only are the present proceedings only mala fide, but also an arbitrary attack and abuse of powers on the free and impartial journalism of the Petitioners.” (Para 121)

The finding is remarkable both for its breadth and for the language employed by the Court. While courts frequently examine the legality of investigations, it is comparatively rare for a constitutional court to explicitly connect the exercise of investigative powers with concerns regarding press freedom and the functioning of independent media.

The Background: Foreign investment, criminal allegations and ED action

The case arose out of an investment received by PPK Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd., the company operating NewsClick, from US-based Worldwide Media Holdings LLC.

According to the allegations, NewsClick received approximately USD 1.5 million, amounting to around ₹9.59 crore, in April 2018 through a share subscription arrangement. The EOW alleged that the shares had been deliberately overvalued in order to circumvent restrictions governing foreign direct investment in news media entities. It was further alleged that the funds received through the investment were siphoned away through salaries, consultancy fees, rent and other operational expenditures.

Based on these allegations, an FIR was registered in August 2020 under Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Shortly thereafter, the Enforcement Directorate registered an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), treating the offences alleged in the FIR as scheduled offences capable of triggering a money laundering investigation.

The ED subsequently conducted extensive searches and seizures, raided NewsClick’s offices and the residences of journalists associated with the platform, and repeatedly summoned Purkayastha and other employees for questioning.

However, after examining the factual and legal basis of the allegations, the High Court concluded that the prosecution’s case suffered from fundamental defects at every stage.

No FDI restriction existed in 2018

The central allegation underlying the prosecution’s case was that NewsClick had received foreign investment in violation of restrictions applicable to news media organisations.

The Court found that this allegation was fundamentally misconceived. The judgment records that before receiving the investment, NewsClick had sought clarification from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting regarding the applicability of foreign investment restrictions to online news platforms. In response, the Ministry clarified on January 5, 2018 that online publication through websites and web portals did not fall within the ambit of print media.

Relying on this clarification, the Court observed that there was no cap on foreign investment in digital news platforms at the time the investment was received.

The Court held:

” From the response received from the Ministry in respect of FDI Policy, it was clearly evident that there was no cap on the online publication of news and thus, the Agreement between the Petitioner and M/s Worldwide Media Holdings LLC and, therefore, the Investment Agreement dated 20.03.2018 cannot be said to be in violation of any law or disclosing any criminal offence. The receiving of 1.5Million USD that were remitted on 11.04.2018 in exchange of 7.69% shares of the Petitioner Company.” (Para 70)

Consequently, the Investment Agreement dated March 20, 2018 and the remittance received on April 11, 2018 could not be said to violate any law or disclose any criminal offence. This finding strikes at the heart of the prosecution’s case. The allegation that NewsClick structured the investment to evade foreign investment restrictions necessarily depended on the existence of such restrictions. Once the Court concluded that no cap existed at the relevant time, the principal basis of the investigation effectively collapsed.

The Court rejects the share overvaluation theory

The investigating agencies also alleged that NewsClick had deliberately overvalued its shares in order to facilitate the foreign investment transaction. The Court found no substance in this allegation.

The judgment records that the company had obtained a valuation certificate from BGJC Associates LLP, which assessed the fair value of the shares at ₹9,188 per share in accordance with FEMA requirements. The Court noted that there was no allegation of manipulation or illegality in the valuation exercise itself.

The final investment was made at a higher value after negotiations between the investor and the company. The Court observed that the share price was mutually agreed upon after considering the prospects and growth potential of the company. Significantly, the Court refused to criminalise what was essentially a commercial decision.

Justice Krishna observed:

“It is an economic decision which does not spell out any criminal offence.” (Para 73)

The Court further accepted the company’s explanation that the valuation had been undertaken through the Discounted Cash Flow method, an internationally recognised valuation methodology accepted under Indian regulatory frameworks.

The judgment therefore draws a clear distinction between commercial valuation disputes and criminal wrongdoing, holding that the former cannot automatically be transformed into the latter in the absence of evidence of fraud or deception.

The allegation of siphoning funds was found untenable

Another major plank of the prosecution’s case was the allegation that foreign investment received by NewsClick had been siphoned away through salaries, consultancy fees, rent and other operational expenditures. The Court rejected this allegation outright.

Justice Krishna observed that these expenditures were entirely consistent with the functioning of a digital media organisation and represented ordinary business expenses incurred in the course of running the company. The Court held that even if one were to assume that excessive expenditure had been incurred, that fact alone would not disclose the commission of a criminal offence.

The judgment states:

“Even if it is accepted that there were over payments and excessive expenditure incurred by the Petitioner, then too it does not disclose any criminal offence. The allegation of siphoning is, therefore, not tenable.” (Para 76)

This finding effectively dismantled the prosecution’s attempt to portray routine operational expenditure as evidence of criminal activity.

The RBI’s findings undermined the investigation

One of the more significant aspects of the judgment concerns the Court’s treatment of material received from the Reserve Bank of India. The Court noted that an earlier status report prepared during the investigation recorded that the RBI had informed investigators that the foreign remittance had been received through the automatic route and that there had been no delay in the issuance of shares or compliance with reporting requirements under FEMA.

According to the judgment, the RBI had stated that:

” Significantly, one Status Report dated 26.07.2021, copy of which was forwarded to the Petitioner as an advance copy, though not placed on record, clearly stated that during the course of investigation a Reply from RBI had been received wherein it was mentioned that as per the Form FCGPR, the foreign inward remittance was under automatic route and there was no delay in issue of shares as well as reporting, as per the extant FEMA regulations in case of the Petitioner.” (Para 77)

The Court noted that this material was subsequently withdrawn from later status reports. Nevertheless, it held that the correspondence was sufficient to indicate that no FEMA violations had been established against the company. The observation significantly weakened the prosecution’s attempt to portray the investment as unlawful.

The allegation that the investor was non-existent failed

The State had also alleged that Worldwide Media Holdings LLC did not legally exist and that the transaction was therefore fraudulent. The Court found that the allegation was unsupported by the material on record.

The company explained that although an earlier entity bearing the same name had been dissolved under Delaware law, a new company with the same name had subsequently been incorporated. The Court noted that nothing had emerged during the investigation to establish that the entity which invested in NewsClick was non-existent. Indeed, the status reports filed by the investigating agencies were largely silent on this aspect. The allegation therefore failed to withstand judicial scrutiny.

No offence of cheating was made out

Having examined the factual allegations, the Court proceeded to analyse whether the offences alleged in the FIR were legally sustainable. With respect to Section 420 IPC, the Court observed that the offence of cheating requires the existence of a person who has been deceived and dishonestly induced to part with property.

In the present case, the investor itself had never alleged that it had been cheated. Worldwide Media Holdings LLC had not lodged any complaint against NewsClick and no material emerged during the investigation suggesting that any person had been deceived.

The Court observed:

” For the offence of cheating, it is necessary that there must be an aggrieved person who has been cheated out of his valuable property. In this case, M/s Worldwide Media Holdings LLC is the entity which had forwarded 1.5 Million USD to the Petitioner. However, there is no Complaint whatsoever, by the Company about having been cheated by the Petitioner. Pertinently, the Complaint had been made by one Shoban Singh, who was merely an informant and was not the aggrieved person. There is nothing which has emerged even during the investigations as reflected in the Status Report, that there was any person who was aggrieved or who was cheated by the Petitioner. The offence of cheating even if all the allegations made are admitted, is not established.” (Para 83)

Accordingly, the essential ingredients of cheating were absent.

No criminal breach of trust either

The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the allegation under Section 406 IPC. Justice Krishna observed that criminal breach of trust requires entrustment of property and its subsequent misappropriation. Neither requirement was satisfied in the present case.

The transaction between NewsClick and Worldwide Media Holdings LLC was an investment in exchange for shares. The Court held that such a transaction could not, “by no stretch of interpretation,” be characterised as entrustment or misappropriation. Consequently, the offence under Section 406 IPC was also found to be absent.

The Court concluded:

” Even if all the allegations are accepted, no offence under 406 or 420 IPC is disclosed in the FIR and in the subsequent investigations that have been undertaken.” (Para 85)

The Court rejects the ED’s conspiracy argument

Recognising the weakness of the allegations under Sections 406 and 420 IPC, the Enforcement Directorate sought to rely on Section 120B IPC, arguing that the investment transaction itself constituted a criminal conspiracy involving Purkayastha and the foreign investors.

The Court was unconvinced. It noted that criminal conspiracy requires an agreement to commit an illegal act or a legal act through illegal means. The material placed before the Court disclosed neither. The allegations of conspiracy were unsupported by evidence and amounted to little more than assertions.

Justice Krishna therefore held:

“ From the reply of ED, it is evident that the allegation that there is a clear-cut existence of a scheduled offence, is totally misconceived and baseless.” (Para 117)

This finding proved fatal to the ED’s case because the existence of a scheduled offence is a jurisdictional prerequisite for invoking the PMLA.

A “fishing and roving exercise” without any offence

Perhaps the most severe criticism in the judgment should be directed at the manner in which the investigation was conducted. The Court noted that years had passed since the registration of the ECIR. Numerous summons had been issued. Purkayastha and various employees had repeatedly joined the investigation. Searches had been conducted and extensive inquiries had been undertaken. Yet no material establishing the commission of a criminal offence had emerged.

The Court concluded:

“ Two years have passed since the registration of impugned ECIR in 2022. The Petitioner No. 2 and various employees of Petitioner number one have joined investigations on numerous occasions in 2021, after which they have not been summoned even once between September 2021 to June 2022. The manner in which the investigations have been conducted clearly show that the same is a fishing and roving exercise in the financial affairs of the Petitioners without the existence of any offence.” (Para 119)

The observation goes beyond a criticism of investigative shortcomings. It reflects the Court’s conclusion that the investigation itself lacked a legally sustainable foundation.

Quashing the FIR and the ECIR

Having found that the FIR disclosed no offence under Sections 406, 420 or 120B IPC, the Court held that its continuation amounted to a “gross abuse of the process of law.” The FIR was accordingly quashed.

Once the FIR fell, the ECIR could not survive. The Court reiterated the settled principle that where the predicate offence is quashed, the corresponding money laundering proceedings must also fall. The ECIR registered by the Enforcement Directorate was therefore quashed in its entirety.

Why the judgment matters

The significance of the judgment extends well beyond the immediate relief granted to NewsClick and Prabir Purkayastha. The Court did not merely find gaps in the evidence. It found that the allegations themselves failed to disclose criminal offences. It rejected the factual premises underlying the investigation, dismantled the legal basis for the offences invoked, and questioned the very foundation of the ED’s exercise of jurisdiction under the PMLA.

Most significantly, the Court linked the proceedings to broader concerns regarding press freedom, concluding that the case represented not only a legally unsustainable prosecution but also a misuse of investigative powers against independent journalism.

In doing so, the judgment stands as a significant reaffirmation of a basic constitutional principle: that criminal law cannot be invoked merely on suspicion, and that the extraordinary powers of investigation available to the State must remain anchored to an identifiable offence supported by law and evidence.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Detailed reports on cases against Prabir Purkayastha may be read here and here.

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The post No Crime, No Predicate Offence, No ED Case: Delhi High Court quashes proceedings against NewsClick appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Khurram Parvez was arrested close to five years ago, in a case registered against him by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) for alleged terror funding, conspiracy and recruiting persons for the terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Parvez was arrested in the case on November 22, 2021 from Srinagar. He was remanded to judicial custody on February 25, 2022, following series of police custody remands.

On December 19, 2024, the date he filed the appeal, Parvez had been in custody for a total period of roughly 3 years and 1 month. Today –when the judgement is finally delivered–the period of incarceration totals 4 years and 7 months. It took a year and six months for disposal of a bail appeal in the Delhi HC!

The NIA alleged that a network linked to the banned terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) recruited Over Ground Workers (OGWs), gathered intelligence on security installations and facilitated terror funding. Parvez was arrested during the investigation, although he was not named in the original FIR. According to the charge sheet, the allegations against him were that he recruited OGWs for LeT, collected information regarding the movement and structure of the Army, had links with Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, and instigated protests following the killing of Burhan Wani in 2016.

Khurram’s appeal however strongly argued that the prosecution’s case against Parvez was unsupported by evidence and that he is a “factual stranger” to the larger conspiracy alleged by the NIA. It was also Parvez’s case that there was no digital evidence showing his contact with members of any proscribed terrorist organisation and that no call detail records were collected regarding the alleged meeting between him and co-accused Muneer Ahmad Kataria.

Parvez also argued that he is a human rights activist and was the Programme Coordinator and Spokesperson of the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) and also the Chairperson of the Philippines-based Asian Federation against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD), which campaigns on the issue of enforced disappearances. In his appeal, Parvez said that he was a factual stranger to the alleged conspiracy and that the investigators had failed to establish any contact between him and LeT operatives or members of any banned organisation. He stated that an examination of digital devices seized from him revealed no communication with alleged handlers or evidence of recruitment of overground workers.

He also rejected the allegations that his past visits to Pakistan demonstrate links with proscribed organisations, stating that the trips were undertaken publicly as part of humanitarian and advocacy initiatives, including campaigns against landmines and enforced disappearances.

In his bail application, Khurram Pervez argued that there was no evidence that Parvez passed sensitive military information to any terrorist operative and that there was no allegation linking him to any alleged terror-funding money trail.  Counsel for Pervez included senior advocate Tanveer Ahmed Mir, along with Ms. Swati Khanna, Ms. Raminder Kaur, Mr. Md. Imran Ahmad, Mr. Shahzad Khan and Mr. Kartik Venu. The bail plea was filed through advocate Kartik Venu.For the NIA, advocates Mr. Rahul Tyagi, SPP, Ms. Priya Rai, Mr. Shubham Goyal, Mr. Jatin Khatri, Mr. Amit Rohila appeared.

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The post UAPA: Delhi HC grants Bail to Kashmiri activist Khurram Parvez after close to 5 years in alleged terror funding case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In its final judgement, the Court held that hate speech is “fundamentally antithetical” to Constitutional values of fraternity. It also found hate speech at odds with the ethos of Indian civilisation that are best captured by the maxim “vasudhaiva kutumbakam”. While the Court pronounced these notions splendiferously in the obiter, the operative part of the judgement remained minimal when it came to reliefs sought by the petitioners. Speech delivered by persons in positions of high political influence was also high in vitriol and the discrimination and harm test. As a result of the judgement dated April 26, BJP politicians and ministers Anurag Thakur and Kapil Mishra remain judicially uncensored for their inciteful conduct as have other protagonists who have contributed to a fragile social climate where, religious minorities most especially live in constant fear of harm, attack and acts of overt discrimination.

This piece analyses how and where the Supreme Court limited itself in this case. Before doing so, we examine hate speech itself. We contextualize how the efforts towards making a breakthrough in jurisprudence in understanding and tackling speech that causes harm (hate speech) –including the 267^th Law Commission Report—have been qualitatively diffused by this final verdict of the Supreme Court.

What is Hate Speech?

Hate speech is any speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, or any other characteristic. It can be subtle or overt, and can have a profound impact on the targets of the speech. Primarily hate speech reduces the social standing of a particular group in the society. Hate speech can lead to stigmatisation, societal discrimination, physical and other kinds of harassment, and violence, including gendered violence where women and children are vulnerable. Hate speech creates a climate of intimidation, fear and division in society.

As per Jeremy Waldron, hate speech damages two related qualities. Firstly, he argues that it affects inclusivity. In pluralist democracies, we observe a milieu of different identities living together forming a heterogeneous social fabric. In such social fabrics, inclusiveness entails an assurance to each person that they can lead a regular life in the polity without facing “hostility, violence, discrimination or exclusion by others.” Secondly, he contends that dignity is damaged by hate speech too. Dignity as defined by him is one’s “basic [and equal] social standing… as a proper object of society’s protection and concern”. Hate speech—as we defined earlier—pierces through the heart of these values. Hate speech, ontologically, is a type of speech that aggressively shows groups as “others” by belittling them. At this juncture, it is important to note that speech, at least on some level, is constitutive of social reality. The existence of certain forms of expression makes a noticeable difference to the environment in which we live our lives. In an environment that is marred with hate speech the message of ‘exclusion’ and ‘hostility’ becomes part of the very look of that environment (becomes an intrinsic feature of that society), and thus breaks down the assurance of inclusiveness and damages dignity of groups.

Issues that have dogged the Courts, given the high decibel hate speech that India has been witnessing are evident in several judgements, analysed by the 267^th Law Commission Report (Chairman was Justice B.S. Chauhan). This report is itself worth a reference read as it analyses evolving hate speech jurisprudence the world over. We recommend that you read this report that is available here. Submitted by the Law Commission to the Ministry of Law and Justice on March 23, 2017, this critical document was made available to the public only on August 16, 2022.

Infact it was the orders passed by the Supreme Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. UOI, 2014 that led to the 267^th Law Commission Report on Hate Speech in the first place.

Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. UOI

This was the first case of recent times that made some breakthrough in outlining the harm and discriminatory components that qualify hate speech. In Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), the Supreme Court was called to adjudicate, on merits, a PIL requesting it to frame guidelines prohibiting political hate speech. The court owing to the doctrine of Separation of powers, delegated this task to the Law Commission of India. However, while deferring the case the Court made certain observations that laid down the legal framework for hate speech laws vis-à-vis free speech. The Court then went on to hold that

“Hate speech is an effort to marginalise individuals based on their membership in a group. Using expression that exposes the group to hatred, hate speech seeks to delegitimise group members in the eyes of the majority, reducing their social standing and acceptance within society. Hate speech, therefore, rises beyond causing distress to individual group members. It can have a societal impact. Hate speech lays the groundwork for later, broad attacks on vulnerable that can range from discrimination, to ostracism, segregation, deportation, violence and, in the most extreme cases, to genocide. Hate speech also impacts a protected group’s ability to respond to the substantive ideas under debate, thereby placing a serious barrier to their full participation in our democracy.”

(Paragraph 7)

By putting “marginalisation and delegitmis [ation]” as the fulcrum of determining hate speech, the Court effectively, held dignity and equality to be the grundnorm that speech must respect. It further clarified that hate speech is not directed towards individuals, or rather, is not about personal offence. It is as a matter of fact, an offence against a people. The Court goes on to adopt a consequentialist approach and lays down that hate speech has “societal impact” that could lead to violence. Hence, it establishes a causal link between speech and its (violent) reactions. Lastly, the Court says that hate speech is anathema to democracy.

This judgment lays the stepping stone for the “Proactive approach” that Supreme Court adopts in dealing with hate speech for the next few years.

This report by CJP, that may be read here, calls for a re-look at the provisions on hate speech, calling for a definition that takes into account recent jurisprudence and moves away from the colonial construct in Indian penal laws

Amish Devgan v. UOI

Another judgement, both recent and relevant, is the 2020 Amish Devgan v Union of India. Here, the Supreme Court was called upon to quash FIR filed against TV journalist Amish Devgan who had allegedly made derogatory remarks against an Islamic saint. The Court denied the relief. However, while refusing to quash the FIR the Court gave further directions on how to classify hate speech;

“The ‘context’, as indicated above, has a certain key variable, namely, ‘who’ and ‘what’ is involved and ‘where’ and the ‘occasion, time and under what circumstances’ the case arises. The ‘who’ is always plural for it encompasses the speaker who utters the statement that constitutes ‘hate speech’ and also the audience to whom the statement is addressed which includes both the target and the others. Variable context review recognises that all speeches are not alike. This is not only because of group affiliations, but in the context of dominant group hate speech against a vulnerable and discriminated group, and also the impact of hate speech depends on the person who has uttered the words. The variable recognises that a speech by ‘a person of influence’ such as a top government or executive functionary, opposition leader, political or social leader of following, or a credible anchor on a T.V. show carries a far more credibility and impact than a statement made by a common person on the street.” …

(Para 51)

“Further, certain categories of speakers may be granted a degree of latitude in terms of the State response to their speech. Communities with a history of deprivation, oppression, and persecution may sometimes speak in relation to their lived experiences, resulting in the words and tone being harsher and more critical than usual. Their historical experience often comes to be accepted by the society as the rule, resulting in their words losing the gravity that they otherwise deserve. In such a situation, it is likely for persons from these communities to reject the tenet of civility, as polemical speech and symbols that capture the emotional loading can play a strong role in mobilising. Such speech should be viewed not from the position of a person of privilege or a community without such a historical experience, but rather, the courts should be more circumspect when penalising such speech.”

(Para 51)

While seemingly obvious, the Court in this case gives a crucial direction about contextualisation when deciding on hate speech. The Court recognises two realities. Freedom of expression as a facilitator in a diverse and plural society, critical to equality and free thought within a democracy. However, just like a regular marketplace, the marketplace of ideas is also rife with inequalities. These inequalities include limitations in access, opportunity and socio-cultural status: persons with executive/political influence, journalists, and public figures command a much wider reach and audience. Hence, when such public figure spew hate speech, the impact is significantly higher, ergo they should be more cautious. Second, the Court humanises the speaker and the audience. In most cases, the social standing of the speaker and the audience is different; certain communities have a historic disadvantage while others hold a dominant position in society even today. Subsequently, the Court gave a wider margin of speech to the marginalised communities owing to their lived realities and historic experiences; it further conceded that hate speech made by dominant group against vulnerable groups has a significantly more impact.

While recognising these realities, the Court did its job in tailoring a hate speech jurisprudence that is suitable with the Indian social structure blemished with caste, religious differences and patriarchy. These two previous judgements laid the foundation for a proactive approach against hate speech. They will continue to guide future legal interventions.

Coming back to the 267^th Law Commission that remains a crucial and seminal document for anyone who wishes to engage with hate speech. After a close and thorough examination of the Constituent Assembly debates, Indian constitutional courts jurisprudence and International law (a crucial reference), the Law Commission recommends that measures which limit or restrain freedom of speech and expression, may/can do so when the “three-part test” is justified [(UN HRC, “General Comment 34” One Hundred and Second Session July 11-29, 2011 (July 21, 2011)]:

i) Measure/s must be prescribed by law;

ii) Measure must satisfy legitimate aims;

iii) Measure must be necessary to achieve its stated aim and must be proportionate to the harm that it attempts to prevent or redress. The standard of proportionality in this context has also been understood to include a requirement for minimum impairment of the right being restricted, i.e., the restriction must not do any more damage to the right than is absolutely necessary to meet its aim. [Necessity and proportionality]

Finally, the 267^th Law Commission Report makes relevant and sharp recommendations. Concluding that the Supreme Court, in the case of Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 1591, observed that the issue of hate speech deserved deeper consideration by the Law Commission of India. Quoting the Court, the Law Commission stated that “…we request the Law Commission to also examine the issues raised herein thoroughly and also to consider, if it deems proper, defining the expression “hate speech” and make recommendations to the Parliament to strengthen the Election Commission to curb the menace of “hate speeches” irrespective of whenever made”.

The Law Commission quoting the Supreme Court referred to its consistent clarifications that directions are issued only when there appears to be a total vacuum in law, i.e. “complete absence of active law to provide for the effective enforcement of basic human rights”. In case there is inaction on the part of the executive for whatsoever reason, the court has always stepped in to discharge its constitutional obligation to enforce the law. The Court further observed “in case of vacuum of legal regime, to deal with a particular situation, the court may issue guidelines to provide a solution till such time as the legislature acts to perform its role by enacting proper legislation to cover the field.”

Given the above observations and directives of the Supreme Court in the Pravasi Bhalai Case, “the Commission considered the laws on hate speech in various jurisdictions, judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the High Courts and analysed the existing provisions relevant to the subject matter. “Consequently, the Commission made concrete suggestions.

“The Law Commission suggests amendments to the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by adding new provisions on ‘Prohibiting incitement to hatred’ following section 153B IPC and ‘Causing fear, alarm, or provocation of violence in certain cases’ following section 505 IPC, and accordingly amending the First Schedule of the CrPC.”

These suggestions have been put together in the form of the Commission’s Report No. 267 title “Hate Speech”, which was submitted for consideration by the Government in March 2017.

What did the Union Government do, however?

The present government, in its first term in 2017, is currently in its third. While the Law Commission found, previous sections in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) –Section 153a, 153b, 153c and 505 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) wholly inadequate in identifying and prosecuting the growing corrosive phenomenon of hate speech and recommended legislative additions through amendments. The newly implemented Criminal Laws, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023 broke no new ground and completely bypassed or ignored both the Supreme Court and Law Commission.

In fact, the new criminal laws, that were hurriedly rushed through Parliament while 146 Members of Parliament were suspended, with no amendments being discussed not entertained –and no referrals to a Joint Select Committee as is the norm. Infact the new criminal laws had been evolved in a secretive fashion by a “Committee” consisting of former Vice Chancellor, National Law University, Delhi (NLUD), Professor Srikrishna Deva Rao, present VC, NLUD, GS Bajpeyi and advocate Mahesh Jethmalani, Rajsya Sabha member, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). That such a committee also ignored Supreme Court judgements with clear-cut directions on sections in our law for prosecuting hate speech, as also the Law Commission’s 267th Report is the moot point.

Read this CJP’s Report on Comparisons between the IPC/CRPC and BNSS here. The new criminal laws dealing with the subject matter are simply not sufficient to cope with the menace of ‘Hate Speeches’. Hate/derogatory/inflammatory speech has not been defined in the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 and neither in any other penal law. An opportunity to amend our laws to the betterment of a diverse society has been lost.

It is in this context, and failure by the executive, again, that the journey of the present litigation, interim orders and then the final judgement dated April 26, 2026 needs to be understood and read.

In the Interim: Several Preventive Orders to Curb Hate Speech

The backdrop to multiple Interim Orders lies in petitions filed before the Supreme Court arising from the Haridwar Dharam Sansad of December 2021, at which Hindu religious leaders made genocidal calls against Muslims. These petitions, filed by journalist Qurban Ali, former Patna High Court Judge Anjana Prakash, activist Tushar Gandhi, and advocates Firoz Iqbal Khan and Harpreet Mansukhani Saigal, were clubbed together and heard by a bench of former Justice K.M. Joseph and Justice B.V. Nagarathna (Tushar Gandhi vs. Rakesh Asthana).

In September 2022, a bench comprising of J K.M Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy (in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs. UOI) expressed serious concern at unregulated television news channels and directed the Union of India to state on affidavit whether it intended to legislate against hate speech in line with the Law Commission’s 267th Report.

Shaheen Abdullah and Suo Moto FIRs: In October 2022, the same bench (J K.M Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy) in Shaheen Abdullah vs. UOI passed a watershed order in these clubbed matters directing the Governments of Delhi, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh to take suo-moto action against any hate speech crime without waiting for a complaint, warning that failure to act would be contempt of court. The order may be found here.

In January 2023, in the Tushar Gandhi contempt petition, a bench of CJI Chandrachud and Justice Narasimha pulled up the Delhi Police for taking five months to register an FIR against Sudarshan News editor Suresh Chavhanke, who had administered a violent oath to make India a Hindu Rashtra, in violation of the earlier Tehseen Poonawalla directions. The Order can be found here.

On February 3, 2023, the bench of former Justice Joseph and Justice Pardiwala passed preventive orders in the Shaheen Abdullah matter. Hearing a plea against a proposed Sakal Hindu Samaj rally in Maharashtra, the Court recorded the state government’s undertaking that the meeting would only be permitted if no hate speech was made, directed the police to invoke Section 151 CrPC for preventive arrests if necessary, and ordered that the event be video-recorded. In a visible on-ground effect of this order, the Uttarakhand government refused permission to a Dharam Sansad in Roorkee. This order may be found here.

On April 28, 2023, in the matter of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India, the Court extended this suo moto FIR obligation from Delhi, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh to all States and Union Territories. The order for such extension may be found here.

On August 2, 2023, a special hearing was convened in the Shaheen Abdullah matter following anti-Muslim violence in the Nuh district of Haryana triggered by a Bajrang Dal and VHP procession. A bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and SVN Bhatti directed the Delhi Police and the governments of Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Haryana to ensure no untoward incident took place at upcoming VHP rallies and to video-record events in sensitive areas. This order may be found here.

Moving towards “practical and effective” steps to curb hate speech

On August 25, 2023, the same bench (Sanjiv Khanna and SVN Bhatti) in the Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Matter urged “practical and effective” steps to implement earlier directions and sought compliance reports from States on the Tehseen Poonawalla Judgement (2018) requirement to designate a Superintendent of Police-rank nodal officer in each district. This order can be found here.

Responding to this, in November 2023 the Ministry of Home Affairs filed an affidavit confirming that 28 States and Union Territories had appointed such nodal officers. An order of November 29 then directed nodal counsel to prepare a consolidated chart of all pending petitions and their prayers. This order may be found here.

In January 2024, a freshly constituted bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta directed the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police in Yavatmal (Maharashtra) and Raipur (Chhattisgarh) to take appropriate steps to prevent hate speech at upcoming rallies of the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti and BJP MLA T. Raja Singh. This order may be found here.

Throughout all these orders, while the Court consistently refused to grant pre-emptive gag orders on rallies, it simultaneously imposed obligations on the State to take effective measures. This is the proactive approach in its fullest expression, not the silencing of the speaker, but the activation of the State as a guarantor of inclusive public space.

Detailed report on previous Supreme Court’s orders in this case may be found here and here.

The Gavel Falls: 2026 Judgement in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India

Facts:

The 2026 judgement of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India saw a sharp departure from this proactive approach. The judgement delivered clubbed all the above-mentioned petitions in its scope and adjudication.

To better understand this departure let us look at the facts of the case, and what the Court was called to adjudicate on. The petitioners, from various parts of the country, filed 13 writ petitions seeking a range of reliefs. These included directions to the Centre to implement the Law Commission’s 267th Report, directions to stop the dissemination of fake news and communally biased media content, directions to lodge criminal cases against persons committing violence against minorities, and issuance of a continuing mandamus to ensure registration of FIRs in hate speech cases. Some petitions pertained to specific incidents, such various alleged hate speeches made by public figures across different States including “desh…….” by Anurag Thakur.

In addition to the writ petitions, several contempt petitions were also filed. These alleged violation of the Court’s interim orders (as noted above) dated October 21, 2022 and April 28, 2023, both of which had directed authorities to take suo moto action against hate speech without waiting for a formal complaint.

This reveals that Indian citizens have always been on the forefront of combatting hate speech. From filing cases seeking specific reliefs that prevent hate speech to calling Court to formulate hate speech guidelines. Indian citizenry has consistently voiced its concern over legitimisation of escalating hate speech and strongly condemned it. However, in this case it was the Court that showed a marked reluctance in taking the requisite action against hate speech.

Decision:

The Court held that there exists no legislative vacuum and the pre-existing penal framework is sufficient to address hate speech. Further, it stated that no contempt proceedings could be initiated against the police for not taking suo moto actions, as it would be an overbroad interpretation of the Order that mandated such suo moto actions. Lastly, the Court dismissed filing of an FIR against the two accused citing that “no cognizable offence” can be made out.

Analysis of the Findings by the Court

On the question of legislative vacuum and need for hate speech laws

Herein, firstly, the Court had to decide whether there exists a legislative vacuum with respect to hate speech law that could prompt the Court to order guidelines or ask the government to bring in specific laws combatting hate speech. The Court declined the plea and held that Indian Criminal law has sufficient laws dealing with hate speech and therefore, no legislative vacuum exists that could prompt the Court to take any action. The Court makes no referral or mention of the developments in its own court (Pravasi Bhalai..) that led to the 267^th Report of the Law Commission and its detailed findings and recommendations. By passing this jurisprudence, the Court has done little justice to a corrosive phenomenon that is negatively impacting the equality and dignity of millions of marginalised Indians.

In Para 37, the Court held that “several provisions which penalise acts that promote enmity between different groups, outrage religious sentiments, or disturb public tranquillity [exist]”, later the Court goes on to list the provisions of the IPC that cover the previously mentioned. Now, with respect, this is where the Court’s understanding of hate speech is lacking. Hate speech is not necessarily the same as “outraging religious sentiments” or “disturbing public tranquillity”; these are separate offences that have separate requirements. The Court here has conflated these offences with hate speech, and owing to the confusion, held that there exists no legislative vacuum.

The Court mentions Section 124A, 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, and 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code to be covering hate speech.

Section 124A criminalises sedition. Sedition is a fundamentally different act as compared to hate speech, the former deals with inciting violence against the country while the latter is about lowering dignity of a people. Sedition laws clearly have nothing to do with hate speech (as also highlighted by the Law commission’s report on hate speech in paragraphs 6.19 & 6.20).

Further, Section 153 and 505 disallows promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious or racial or language or regional groups or castes and communities and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony. While prima facie it seems to prohibit hate speech, the judicial interpretation of these provisions show a different picture. Moreover, to repeat the aspect of impact and intent in causing harm and denial of equal rights and dignity –aspects dealt with at length in Pravasi Bhalai and subsequently the 267^th Law Commission Report, have been left un-mentioned in this verdict.

On the question of Contempt Proceedings against Authorities

Secondly, the Court was called to decide whether contempt proceedings should be initiated against the Police in pursuance to its own order dated April 28, 2023. As per the Order the police was expected to file a suo moto complaint against hate speech whenever an instance comes across them. Any failure or hesitation on the part of the authorities in complying with the previously mentioned directions would be viewed seriously and may attract proceedings for contempt of Court. In pursuance of this Order, several petitioners asked for the contempt proceedings to be started against the responsible authorities. However, the Court denied the plea and held,

“The element of “hesitation” or failure to act despite knowledge of a cognizable offence is a sine qua non for invoking the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. In cases where the petitioner has not even approached the authorities or placed the relevant material before them, it would be wholly inappropriate to infer disobedience or “hesitation” on the part of the authorities. In the absence of such foundational facts, the contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked.”

(Paragraphs 159 & 160)

The Court therefore held that in the absence of material placed before the authorities, it can be assumed that the authorities had no knowledge, and therefore, it could not be said that they were hesitant in starting proceedings against the accused. This reluctance or failure to hold police authorities responsible for such egregious conduct (hate speech) can only add to the prevalent climate of impunity. Previous and several Orders by the Supreme Court, it is mandated for police to “monitor” and “videotape” speeches in sensitive areas where there is a likelihood of utterance of hate speech. Now, in the final judgement, the Court’s failure to initiate action on the police authorties’ failure or reluctance to act, the Court permits inaction on such crimes committed. In doing so, it failed to take into account its own Orders that mandated monitoring of rallies and speeches by the police. The authorities now can, refuse to monitor the rallies where hate speech is made and claim immunity from contempt proceedings that arise out of their inaction by simply pleading ignorance. In essence, it appears that the Court made non-compliance with its previous order (monitoring) as a defence to contempt proceedings in instances of no suo moto action being taken!

On the question of appeal of Delhi High Court’s Order [“no cognizable offence made out”]:

The Supreme Court was also required to check the correctness of the Delhi High Court order that dismissed the Writ petition pleading the High Court to file FIR against Anurag Thakur and Parvesh Varma. Before we analyse the Supreme Court’s response to the appeal, it is pertinent to first look at the High Court’s order.

Owing to the bar on prosecution of public servants under Section 197 of the CrPC (that is without sanction granted by the executive), the magistrate refused to file an FIR against Anurag Thakur and Parvesh Verma as there was no “prior sanction” to prosecute the public servant as required in Section 197. The writ in the High Court dealt exclusively dealt with this question of jurisdiction, i.e., “the only question for consideration before this Court is limited to the extent of adjudicating whether the [Magistrate] has rightly dismissed the complaint [owing to lack of sanction]” The High Court, congruent to the Trial Court, did not delve into the merits of the complaint. Hence, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court adjudged whether the contents of the speech itself made by the accused constituted the crime of hate speech. The High Court on the question of jurisdiction sided with the Trial Court’s finding and held that no FIR could be filed wanting sanction. It is in this backdrop, that the Supreme Court’s was required to examine the speeches themselves

The Supreme Court in this appeal, did, overrule the High Court’s finding on the question of jurisdiction. The High Court had incorrectly concluded that government sanction needed to be obtained before a Magistrate could direct the police to register an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC.

The Supreme Court clarified that this requirement of prior sanction only kicks in at the later stage of a court taking cognizance of an offence; it has no application at the earlier stage of simply setting the criminal justice process in motion through FIR registration.

Later, however, in Paragraphs 136-138 of the Supreme Court judgement when the Court starts to assess the merits of the complaint, we find several evasions. The Court held that “the High Court has, on an independent assessment, held that the speeches in question do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, observing that the statements were not directed against any specific community nor did they incite violence or public disorder” (Paragraph 136). This is, with respect, factually incorrect. The High Court had not taken any independent assessment of the speech, it merely dealt with the jurisdictional (procedural) aspect of the complaint and had not paid any heed to the content of the speech. In the following paragraph,

“Upon a careful consideration of the material placed on record, including the alleged speeches, the status report dated February 26, 2020 submitted before the Trial Court, and the reasons recorded by the courts below, we are in agreement with the conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out.”

(Para 137 of the Supreme Order).

The Court again, with respect, is mistaken in these considerations. At the cost of repetition, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court had held that “no cognizable offence is made out” while adjudicating on the content of the speech. Both Courts had merely limited themselves to the question of jurisdiction. In any case, merely agreeing with the Order of the lower Courts without giving any reasoning violates the principles of natural justice. Fundamental natural justice principles require that the Court provides some (not necessarily lengthy) reasoning for agreeing with the lower Court’s decisions. However, in this instance, the Supreme Court has overturned the legal basis of the High Court’ Order yet, without providing any reason, agreed with the outcome.

While arriving at its conclusions, the Court stated,

 “Accordingly, while we disapprove the reasoning adopted by the High Court on the issue of prior sanction, we find no ground to interfere with the ultimate conclusion” (Paragraph 138).

The reason previous Courts had held that no FIR could be filed against the accused is only on grounds of the lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction was proper, and the police could file an FIR against the accused without the sanction. The natural course of action here would then have been delving into the merits of the complaints or ordering the Magistrate to delve into the merits of the complaints. The Supreme Court however does neither. It absolves itself of providing any reasons for its decision by simply holding that “[there] are no grounds to interfere”.

The Court here, in effect, gives a clean chit to the accused without any application of judicial mind to the actual content of the speech, which makes out an alleged offence. At no level of judiciary was there an application of judicial mind to the content of the impugned speech. Despite that, the accused have got “a clean chit.”

Keeping in mind that the Court did not delve into content of the impugned speech, it is important for us to independently examine the speech by the two main accused can, at all, be classified as hate speech.

I. Anurag Thakur

Location: Delhi

Date: January 27, 2020

Link: <https://www.groundxero.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Delhi_riots_Fact_Finding_2020_compressed.pdf>

 “These [Protestors at Shaheen Bagh] are Traitors to our Country, Shoot them”

Anurag Thakur, a prominent member of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in his infamous speech had called for killing of the supposed “traitors” of the Country. Before we delve into the call for outright physical violence, it is pertinent to decode the euphuisms used, as context is very important in determining hate speech as held by the Amish Devgan judgment. The backdrop of the speech was the protestors at Shaheen bagh who were peacefully protesting against the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019. It is very evident from the context of the speech that the traitors referred to in the speech are these protestors, none else.

Most of the people who were involved in these protests at Shaheen Bagh were Muslims. Anurag Thakur deliberately invokes the slur, calls Shaheen Bagh protestors as “traitors” of the Nation and several times ask the crowd to echo his call for violence, making a clearly inciteful speech. By calling for violence against these protestors in a charged environment (that are largely Muslims demographically), Thakur indirectly calls for violence against Muslims at large.

Moreover, Thakur was a Union Minister of State when he uttered these statements. Therefore, his statements had the potential to have far-reaching consequences owing to both the reach and influence that politicians yield. These are important considerations when classifying hate speech applying the Amish Devgan Judgement.

II. Parvesh Verma

Location: Delhi and ANI News (Cable network through TV)

Date: January 28, 2020 & January 27, 2020

Link: <https://www.groundxero.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Delhi_riots_Fact_Finding_2020_compressed.pdf>

“They will enter into your homes. They will abduct your women and rape and kill them.”

[Via TV on ANI News]

Parvesh Verma uses verbal imagery the protestors at Shaheen Bagh (largely Muslims) to instil fear in the audience. He remarks that these protestors will barge into the Hindu homes, kill, and rape Hindu women. This communally charged sentence aims at fear mongering. This is also intended to create division and disharmony between the two communities.

“If my government is formed in Delhi, then give me only one month’s time. Will not leave any mosque built in my constituency on government land, I will remove them all.”

[Via TV on ANI News]

This statement is ipso facto inflammatory, communal and a threat to Muslims. By calling for destroying all the mosques in Delhi, Varma is intimidating and threatening Muslims of Violence at large. Parvesh Verma is a politician with great reach and influence, this reach is amplified by the fact that his first two impugned statements came via Television, meaning his speech could have been accessed immediately by millions of people. This becomes an important consideration in determining hate speech.

“If the BJP comes to power in Delhi, we will clear Shaheen Bagh of all protestors within 1 hour. Not a single person will be visible.”

This statement does not require much explanation. It is direct threat to violence against the protestors of Shaheen Bagh. These statements carry greater weight as they were uttered by an influential person. He is currently the Deputy Chief Minister of Delhi.

It is these three aspects of the final judgement (a. failing to give any directions on combatting hate speech, b. failing to initiate contempt proceedings c. and giving clean chit to the accused), that we can discern a clear shift in the Court’s approach during the adjudication of these cases, over five years. Interim Orders were proactive, the final judgement status quo-ist. Despite several and specific complaints, the Supreme Court chose not to take any action against hate speech.

The Court missed an important opportunity here to carve out specific directions to combat hate speech, neither did it attempt to fill up the legislative vacuum.

The Law Commission of India in its 267^th Report recognised this legal vacuum and had recommended adding specific sections to strengthen the law(s) dealing with hate speech. Worse, the Court watered down its own previous order that required suo moto actions against instances of hate speech.

By shifting the onus on complainants to file FIRs the Court restored the status quo and negated its own previous directions wherein it had placed the onus squarely on the shoulders of the authorities to prevent and take action against hate speech. Lastly, by giving a clean chit to the particular accused without even an examination into the content to merit of the speeches, the Court has set an undesirable precedent.

In the final judgement, the judges have over dozens of pages warned against dangers of hate speech in a democratic societies, in fact, the judgement had a specific section titled “Epilogue: An ode to ‘Fraternity’ in the Preamble vis- à-vis the idea of ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’”.

Yet, by failing to issue specific directions, it has not acted on its own wise words. Finally, this verdict will act not as a check but a possible enabler wherein influential protagonists can get away with their inflammatory speeches. Though the judgement recognises that politicians have a special duty to be mindful of their words owing to the wide reach and influence they have, the Court stops short of ensuring any accountability. The overall impact of this judgement on the hate speech jurisprudence in India is limiting. Instead of listing sharp directives to the executive to act, even directing he legislature to examine the legislative lacuna, the Court has missed an excellent opportunity.

Though India, experiences, on an average,  five instances of hate speech occurring every day, these may well continue without check. In choosing general observations over specific actionable directive, the Supreme Court, also known as the “Court of last resort” has caused an acute disappointment.

The complete judgment of the Supreme Court may be read here:

Interim Orders in these cases from September 2022 to January 2024 may be found here:

The High Court Judgement in the matter may be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Hamzah Patel)

Related:

India Hate Lab Report 2025: How Hate Speech has been normalised in the public sphere

BNS 2023 does nothing to bring in a nuanced effective understanding of Hate Speech, making its prosecution even more difficult

Supreme Court in 2023: Several steps forward, miles to go in the fight against hate

Hate Speech and the Supreme Court: From constitutional alarm to institutional closure

Hate Speech by BJP’s Top Brass fuelled Build Up to Delhi Violence: Minorities Commission

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