In other words, the Supreme Court recognised that the labour performed within households is labour. It creates value, sustains lives, reproduces communities, and makes possible the very forms of productive activity that economists, governments, and policymakers are accustomed to celebrating.

Yet beneath the welcome symbolism of the judgment lies a more disquieting question. If homemakers are indeed nation builders, why has the nation found it so difficult to see them? Why does recognition arrive most readily at the moment of death, when a court is compelled to calculate the consequences of a woman’s death, while the labour itself continues to unfold every day in a space that remains curiously peripheral to the language of economics?

The question is worth dwelling upon because it directs attention away from the judgment itself and towards the assumptions that make such recognition appear exceptional in the first place. For decades, feminist scholars have pointed out that the distinction between productive and unproductive labour, between economy and household, between production and reproduction, is neither natural nor self-evident. It is a political distinction that has acquired the appearance of nature or natural through repetition. Once established, however, it produces a peculiar inversion. The activities most essential to sustaining life become those least likely to be recognised as economically significant.

This was the insight that animated the ‘Wages for Housework’ campaign of the 1970s. When Silvia Federici, Mariarosa Dalla Costa, and Selma James demanded wages for domestic labour, they were not merely seeking a salary for homemakers, they sought to expose the hidden structure upon which capitalist economies rest. The worker arriving at a factory, an office, a school, or a government institution does not arrive fully formed. Somebody has fed that worker, cared for that worker during illness, raised that worker as a child, absorbed emotional crises, maintained living spaces, and performed the innumerable acts of care through which human beings become capable of participating in economic life. Yet the labour that reproduces labour power strangely remains outside the categories through which production is understood.

Federici’s contribution lies in her insistence that housework is not external to capitalism but one of its conditions of possibility. Capital accumulates not merely through what happens in factories and offices but through its ability to extract enormous reservoirs of labour for which it does not pay. Domestic labour though highly valuable, is ignored because its invisibility is economically useful.

If Federici exposes why domestic labour remains unpaid, Marilyn Waring reveals why women remain uncounted. In her influential work If Women Counted, Waring demonstrated that national accounting systems were never designed to measure the activities that sustain social life. They were designed to measure only the market transactions. Hence, the frameworks through which nations calculate wealth and prosperity were constructed in ways that rendered large portions of women’s work conceptually invisible from the very outset. To put it simply, it sounds nothing short of absurd. A woman preparing meals for her family contributes nothing to GDP. The same meal purchased from a restaurant contributes to economic growth. A mother caring for her child remains economically inactive. The same care purchased through the market becomes productive labour. The activity remains unchanged. What changes is its relationship to exchange.

Waring’s argument exposes the extent to which economic measurement reflects a particular philosophy of value. GDP records transactions with extraordinary precision while remaining largely indifferent to the activities that make those transactions possible. It can quantify military expenditure, financial speculation, and commodity production, yet fails to recognise the labour involved in feeding children, tending to the elderly, caring for the sick, or maintaining households. The economy, in other words, counts what passes through markets and quietly excludes much of what sustains life.

Devaki Jain, the Indian economist explained this conundrum by demonstrating how statistical categories themselves reproduce invisibility. Through her ‘Time Use Surveys’, Jain shows that women who appeared “economically inactive” within conventional labour statistics were often engaged in a dizzying array of activities like collecting water, gathering fuel, tending livestock, processing food, caring for children, supporting agricultural work, managing households, and sustaining networks of community survival. Once ‘time’ instead of ‘wages’ become the unit of analysis, an entirely different economy comes into view. Women who had been categorised as ‘non-workers’ now emerged as individuals performing longer hours of labour than men.

The ‘Time Use Survey’ extends beyond methodology as it reveals that invisibility is produced through the categories by which societies choose to organise knowledge. Michel Foucault’s analysis that systems of knowledge do not simply describe reality but actively organise it, reveals that statistics, classifications, surveys, and economic indicators function not as neutral instruments but as technologies of visibility. They determine what becomes legible and what recedes into oblivion. GDP does not simply measure the economy, more dangerously it defines what economy is. And if the homemaker disappears, it is because the dominant economic frameworks have already determined where value resides. Even when the homemaker finally gets recognition as with the Court’s ruling, it only addresses the cultural invisibility because as Nancy Fraser argues, it is the redistribution that would addresses material inequality. The problem confronting homemakers is that they have historically been denied both. Their labour has been culturally devalued and materially uncompensated. In order to recognize homemakers as nation builders, structural redistribution is essential, lest it remains only a symbolic inclusion.

Diane Elson extends the argument in analysing how economies depend upon women’s unpaid labour not only within households but also as a mechanism through which states manage crises. When public healthcare deteriorates, when childcare remains inaccessible or when welfare provisions are reduced, the resulting burdens do not vanish, it gets transferred and more often than not, they reappear within households as additional responsibilities carried by women. Elson’s description of women as the economy’s “shock absorbers” remains one of the most powerful formulations in feminist economics because it captures the silent transfer through which public failures become private obligations which we all witnessed at a large scale during the Covid-19 Pandemic. The fiscal prudence at the level of policy during whether during emergencies, lockdown or any other calamity translates into longer days, intensified caregiving responsibilities, and greater unpaid labour at the level of everyday life for women.

Does it mean that we are asking the wrong question all this time and it’s not really about the monetary value of domestic work. Amartya Sen’s capability approach offers a useful way of thinking beyond the language of valuation alone. Sen’s central insight was that human well-being cannot be reduced to income. What matters are the substantive freedoms individuals possess to live lives they have reason to value. The predicament of homemakers is not merely that they remain unpaid. It is in reality those decades devoted to sustaining households that of the leave women physically unfit without independent assets, pension rights, social security, economic autonomy, or meaningful control over their futures. Thus, we need to move the conversation from compensation to capability.

A society genuinely committed to recognising care would therefore have to think beyond symbolic gestures and beyond wages alone. It would require pensions for caregivers, universal social security, robust childcare systems, healthcare guarantees, inheritance protections, and policies that expand women’s capabilities rather than merely assigning monetary value to their labour like 30,000 rupees.

The Supreme Court’s judgment is not merely the value of domestic labour but the limitations of the frameworks through which value itself is understood. For too long, economies have been imagined through the language of production while treating the reproduction of life as an afterthought. Feminist scholars have spent decades challenging this hierarchy. Societies survive not because markets function efficiently but because vast amounts of labour continue to be performed beyond the market’s gaze.

The homemaker has always been a nation builder. The real challenge posed by the Court’s judgment is whether we are prepared to reconstruct our understanding of the economy around that fact, or whether we will continue to celebrate the labour that sustains society while organising our measures of prosperity around everything except the work that makes life possible.

(The author teaches at Sarojini Naidu Centre for Women’s Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi)

[1] “We are also of the view that the housewife contributes to the growth of the human being and the nation. The homemaker builds nation. So we have laid down the principles, and as a nation builder, we have housewife, we have quantified the amount that the loss of domestic care monthly income minimum in any event would be 30,000 per month,” Justice Karol said at the time of pronouncement. “The homemakers, to put it directly, actually are the ‘nation builders’ and they ought to be recognised as such.” The Court stringently observed that homemakers continue to be perceived as dependent on earning members despite the household substantially depending on their labour and care. The bench noted that unpaid domestic and caregiving work performed by women remains economically undervalued despite its enormous contribution to society and the economy. “It is ironic to describe a homemaker as dependant on earning members, when, in reality the household’s functioning depends substantially on the homemaker,” the Bench said. The judgment contains an extensive discussion on the social, emotional, economic and psychological contributions made by homemakers. Referring to women as the first teachers of children and the unseen force behind families, the Court said homemakers play a central role in shaping human capital, social bonds and national development: https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/homemakers-are-nation-builders-supreme-court-quantifies-homemaker-contribution-as-rs-30k-per-month-537483

Related:

‘Married woman told to do household work will not be seen as maid servant’: Bombay HC

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The post Women: Nation builders, missing from the nation’s books appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Read the judgment primer by CJP here.

“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” wrote the historian Lord Acton. Critics argue that legal protections governing the prosecution of offences by uniformed personnel have fostered a culture of impunity by making accountability more difficult. Over the years, members of India’s armed, paramilitary and police forces have been implicated in a range of serious offences against civilians, including rape, extrajudicial killings, staged encounters, culpable homicide, enforced disappearances, illegal detention, and custodial torture.

The 1991 in the villages of Kunan and Poshpora in Kashmir, the army personnel allegedly raped over 23 women in Kashmir (Human Rights Watch assessed the number of survivors at up to 100). It is gut wrenching but it is by no means the only one. In 2004, a 32-year old activist Thangjam Manorama was allegedly raped and murdered by the Indian paramilitary unit 17th Assam Rifles in Manipur. Following this, around twelve elderly women staged a naked protest outside the Assam Rifles headquarters. Their banner read: ‘Indian Army Rape Us.’

CREDIT: BBC News

In 2009, two women from Shopian in Kashmir were allegedly abducted, repeatedly gang-raped by soldiers, and murdered. Their bodies were recovered from a river.

In 2010, a 16-year-old Zahid Farooq Sheikh was shot and killed by BSF personnel as he was walking home from playing cricket with friends in Srinagar.

In 2015 and 2016, a National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST) fact-finding report documented three instances of mass sexual violence including gang-rapes, physical assault, and looting by police and paramilitary personnel deployed on anti-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh. The victims were Adivasi women, subsistence farmers. The report concluded that there had been a breakdown of discipline among the forces concerned.

In 2021, soldiers from the 21 Para Special Forces army unit shot and killed six coal miners in Nagaland’s Mon district, for mistaking the miners for militants.

These are only a few cases that reached the media. The structure of the law and the barriers to FIR registration in conflict areas means that for every case that surfaces, an unknown number do not.

In 2018, over 350 army personnel filed a petition in the Supreme Court to protect the AFSPA from being diluted. Its defenders argue that soldiers operating in counter-insurgency environments face split-second, life-or-death decisions. They are trained not to open fire unless they are fired upon, attacked, or have reasonable grounds to believe an attack is imminent. AFSPA was enacted in 1958 to enable the deployment of the armed forces in areas where the civil administration had failed to maintain law and order.  The legal protection under AFSPA is therefore justified, they contend, because actions taken during combat cannot be judged with the benefit of hindsight.

The criticism, however, is not that soldiers acting in good faith during genuine combat operations should be prosecuted. It is that the shield of prior sanction has repeatedly been invoked to protect those accused of abusing that power.

For instance, in Manorama’s case mentioned before, the post-mortem revealed injuries consistent with torture, including bullet wounds on her vagina. Most significantly, the Central Forensic Science Laboratory detected human semen on her clothing, suggesting that she had been sexually assaulted before her death. Yet the Assam Rifles invoked Section 6 of AFSPA to argue that no legal proceedings could continue without prior sanction from the Central Government. Manorama’s family questioned how acts such as rape, torture and the killing of an unarmed woman could ever be considered actions taken ‘in aid of civil power’ or in the exercise of official duty.

The full Human Rights Watch report can be accessed here.

Put very simply, there is no operational rationale for extending immunity to those who have abused the power, and specifically in the offence of rape. Unlike the use of force during an armed encounter, rape can never be characterised as a split-second military judgment or an act committed in good faith in the discharge of official duties. It is an intentional criminal act. The law offers no convincing explanation for why allegations of rape should be subject to the same procedural immunity as decisions taken during armed engagement.

According to Margot Walstrom, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, “[Sexual violence] is a way of demonstrating power and control. It inflicts fear on the whole community. And it is unfortunately a very effective, cheap and silent weapon with a long lasting effect on every society.”

A 2019 paper titled ‘Violence against women by the army personnel’ reads, “Many in Mizoram do not even talk about those days when such trauma was so prominent as to bring gushes of trauma to them. Those instances have been simply called “troubles” and no discussion takes place, such is the trauma that has been inflicted on people.”

In India’s conflict zones, sexual violence has long been dismissed as ‘collateral damage.’ As an unfortunate but inevitable cost of maintaining order in disturbed areas. However, it arguably is a documented, recurring pattern of abuse that is shielded by law and enabled by institutional silence.

The severity and persistence of the reports surrounding rapes by uniformed personnel compelled the Justice Verma Committee constituted in the wake of the 2012 Nirbhaya gang-rape to specifically examine the position of women in conflict areas and recommend a review of the AFSPA. The committee explicitly said that women in conflict areas are entitled to all the security and dignity that is afforded to citizens in any other part of our country.

That was over fifteen years ago.

In the intervening period, India has overhauled its criminal law framework wholesale, replacing the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Evidence Act with new statutes  expressly on the ground that the old laws were colonial relics. But the provisions of AFSPA, the Border Security Forces (‘BSF’) Act, the Army Act 1950, and the Disturbed Areas Act 1992 that shield uniformed personnel from prosecution for crimes committed against civilians remain untouched.

The Legal Architecture

Several statutory provisions form the backbone of security force immunity in India.

Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 218 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita ) requires government sanction before a court can prosecute judges and public servants, including armed forces and police officials, for offenses committed while discharging official duties unless the Central Government first grants sanction for prosecution. The Ministry of Home Affairs is vested with the authority to grant sanction for prosecution of public servants.

Section 47 of the BSF Act provides that BSF personnel accused of serious civil offences including  murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder, or rape against civilians cannot ordinarily be tried by an internal Security Force Court, unless the offence was committed on active duty, outside India, or at a location specifically notified by the Central Government. Read alongside the sanction requirement, this provision can operate as a gap between two forums where civilian courts are barred without sanction and military courts barred by the section itself.

Similarly, Section 70 of the Army Act, 1950 specifies when military personnel cannot be tried by a court-martial for certain serious crimes against civilians.

According to section 6 of the AFSPA no prosecution, suit, or legal proceeding may be brought against any person acting under AFSPA without the prior sanction of the Central Government. This provision has operated in parts of the Northeast since 1958 and in Jammu and Kashmir since 1990.

How have the Courts acted?

In Sebastian Hongray v. Union of India (1984), the petitioner, a student from the Naga community contended that two men were unlawfully detained by the 21st Sikh Regiment during a combing operation in Huining village of Manipur. The Army could not produce or account for two men taken into custody and asserted that the men had left the army camp alive and that an extensive search, including a CBI enquiry, had failed to locate them in Manipur. The Court applied habeas corpus directly against the Union of India and later imposed exemplary costs. The Court said:

“As we are inclined to direct registration of an offence and an investigation, we express no opinion as to what fate has befallen to Shri C. Daniel and Shri C. Paul, the missing two persons in respect of whom the writ of habeas corpus was issued save and except saying that they have not met their tragic end in an encounter as is usually claimed and the only possible inference that can be drawn from circumstance already discussed is that both of them must have met an unnatural death. Prima facie, it would be an offence of murder. 

….

 It is not necessary to start casting a doubt on anyone or any particular person. But prima facie there is material on record to reach an affirmative conclusion that both Shri C. Daniel and Shri C. Paul are not alive and have met an unnatural death. And the Union of India cannot disown the responsibility in this behalf.”

A decade later, in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993), the Supreme Court confronted the death of a man after arrest by the police. With characteristic directness, the Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity used to shield the State from civil liability has no place in proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights and that:

“There is a great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life. His liberty is in the very nature of things circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement and therefore his interest in the limited liberty left to him is rather precious. The duty of care on the part of the State is strict and admits of no exceptions.”

“A reading of the morning newspapers almost everyday carrying reports of dehumanising torture, assault, rape and death in custody of police or other governmental agencies is indeed depressing,” was the Court’s observation in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1996) in which it issued a comprehensive set of binding guidelines governing arrest, documentation, medical examination, and notification of family members, and held that violation of these guidelines would render police officers personally liable for contempt of court. The Court reiterated that defence of sovereign immunity is not available to the State for the tortious act of the public servants and for the established violation of the rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

In Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1997), the Supreme Court constitutionally upheld the validity of AFSPA. It also curated a list of ‘Do’s and Don’ts,’ in which the use of excessive force or retaliatory force by the Manipur Police or the armed forces of the Union was not permissible.

However, the provision that ASPA’s protection was not absolute and that it did not grant a ‘licence to kill indiscriminately’ remained a judicial aspiration rather than an enforceable limit.

Significantly in 2012, a division bench of Justices BS Chauhan and Swatenter Kumar while hearing the Pathribal case at the Supreme Court orally remarked that AFSPA gave very limited protection confined to action in discharge of duty and that rape and murder committed by its personnel should be considered a normal crime. The Court said that there is no question of sanction from the government before prosecution of offenders in such cases. Reported The Indian Express.

“You go to a place in exercise of AFSPA, you commit rape, you commit murder, then where is the question of sanction? It is a normal crime which needs to be prosecuted, and that is our stand,” the bench said.  However, ultimately the Court held that where AFSPA’s protection applies, prior sanction from the Central Government is required before the criminal court can take cognizance of the offence but if the competent Army authority opts for trial by court-martial, no such sanction is needed.

In 2013, the Supreme Court affirmed that the power of the armed forces to seek trial before a General Security Force Court is not unlimited. In the case concerning the killing of a teenager by BSF personnel, a Bench of Justices Chandramauli Prasad and Ibrahim Kalifulla set aside a Jammu and Kashmir High Court order that had transferred the trial to a General Security Force Court under the BSF Act, 1968. The Court described the allegations against the accused as “very distressing” and held that merely because the personnel were on active duty in a disturbed area did not automatically entitle the BSF to claim jurisdiction. The Court also held that the commanding officer’s discretion to seek trial before a security force court was not absolute and had been exercised without considering the statutory restrictions requiring such a course to be necessary in the interest of discipline.

In Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) v. Union of India (2016), the Court examined 1,528 alleged encounter killings by police and armed forces in Manipur between 1979 and 2012. A court-appointed Justice Hegde Commission investigated six cases and concluded that none were genuine encounters and that the security forces had exceeded their powers.

While hearing the case, a bench of Justices Madan B Lokur and U U Lalit rapped the Army for silence over the allegations and questioned the state government for not proceeding with these cases against them. “Don’t you want to inquire even if somebody makes such allegations against your people (Army personnel)? Are you saying whatever was done was legitimate,” the bench asked. “The reports clearly suggest that the girl was subjected to rape. You are creating a stonewall and you do not want to break that stonewall. You have not tried anything. You have not asked the Army to handover the custody of the alleged culprits,” the Court added.

In its 2017 judgment, the Supreme Court held that even in a disturbed area under AFSPA excessive or retaliatory force is prohibited and ordered every death caused by the armed forces or police to be thoroughly enquired into.

“It does not matter whether the victim was a common person or a militant or a terrorist, nor does it matter whether the aggressor was a common person or the State. The law is the same for both and is equally applicable to both,” the order read.

The EEVFAM litigation remains alive as a continuing mandamus.

Still, it is relatively uncommon for allegations of rape against armed forces personnel to culminate in prosecution before ordinary civilian criminal courts. Instead, cases have often been dealt with through the military courts, if dealt at all. When convictions have resulted from court-martial proceedings, civilian High Courts have generally examined them in the exercise of judicial review rather than hearing the criminal case at first instance.

In Captain Vinod Kumar vs State of J&K (2012), the Jammu and Kashmir High Court heard the case of two members of the 8th Battalion JAKLI who allegedly broke into a residential house in Poonch and repeatedly raped two women, aged 18 and 24, in front of the victims’ young children. The Army’s Commanding Officer initially opted in 1999 for the accused to be tried by a civil criminal court rather than a Court-martial. However, the petitioners challenged this. The Court ruled that the trial should not be abandoned and rejected the idea that army personnel should go ‘Scott free’ due to procedural errors. It famously noted that “Crime does not die in this manner” and emphasized that the seriousness of a rape charge outweighs technical procedural wrangles.

In 2014, a division bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court upheld the sentence by the Summary General Court Martial which found four army personnel guilty of rape and sentenced them to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and dismissal from service. The Court ruled that Court Martial proceedings can only be invalidated if there is a breach of fundamental procedural rules that renders the trial illegal. The Court emphasized that there cannot be “any compromise with the standards and maintenance of discipline in the army. They are not only the sentinels of the frontiers of the country but are also sacred guards of the rights of the people. Any invasion of the rights of the people by this kind of force cannot be tolerated.”

Where the Courts have deferred.

Despite this increasingly robust jurisprudential framework limiting blanket immunity under AFSPA, accountability has remained elusive. More than three decades after the alleged mass rapes in Kunan and Poshpora, judicial and investigative orders have been repeatedly challenged, stayed, or left unresolved. In 2015, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court stayed the Magistrate’s order directing further investigation after objections by the Army. Separately, the State challenged the recommendation of the Jammu and Kashmir State Human Rights Commission awarding compensation to the survivors before the Supreme Court. In its report, the Commission observed that the Director General of Police had attempted to “push the collective crime committed by the army personnel under the carpet” and that the medical evidence pointed towards gang rape. Following the abrogation of Article 370, the State Human Rights Commission itself ceased to exist, while the compensation proceedings remain pending before the Supreme Court and the criminal proceedings continue to languish without final adjudication. Reporter The Outlook.

The litigation in Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) continues as a court-monitored process nearly a decade after the Supreme Court’s landmark rulings. Thangjam Manorama Devi’s case, despite forensic evidence suggestive of sexual assault and repeated judicial scrutiny, has similarly failed to result in criminal prosecution. In these cases justice has been deferred through prolonged litigation, jurisdictional objections, repeated appeals, and institutional inaction. The consequence is much the same that is the promise of accountability remains suspended indefinitely.

According to Rishika Arora and Iyina Grover, there is a requirement for a new protocol for protecting the women in an armed conflict. Women’s participation in the drafting of future laws and their appointment as judicial officers in army tribunals are essential steps. The concept of the court martial must be women-oriented.

The Justice Verma Committee recommendations are as follows:

1.  Sexual violence against women by members of the armed forces or uniformed personnel must be brought under the purview of ordinary criminal law;
2. Special care must also be taken to ensure the safety of women who are complainants and witnesses in cases of sexual assault by armed personnel;
3. There should be special commissioners – who are either judicially or legislatively appointed – for women’s safety and security in all areas of conflict in the country. These commissioners must be chosen from those who have experience with women’s issues, preferably in conflict areas. In addition, such commissioners must be vested with adequate powers to monitor and initiate action for redress and criminal prosecution in all cases of sexual violence against women by armed personnel;
4. Care must be taken to ensure the safety and security of women detainees in police stations, and women at army or paramilitary check points, and this should be a subject under the regular monitoring of the special commissioners mentioned earlier;
5. The general law relating to detention of women during specified hours of the day must be strictly followed;
6. Training and monitoring of armed personnel must be reoriented to include and emphasize strict observance by the armed personnel of all orders issued in this behalf;
7. There is an imminent need to review the continuance of AFSPA and AFSPA-like legal protocols in internal conflict areas as soon as possible. This is necessary for determining the propriety of resorting to this legislation in the area(s) concerned; and
8. Jurisdictional issues must be resolved immediately and simple procedural protocols put in place to avoid situations where police refuse or refrain from registering cases against paramilitary personnel.

Those recommendations remain unimplemented.

The Supreme Court has already suggested that AFSPA’s protection is limited to acts conducted in the line of duty, and that offences such as rape and murder are ordinary crimes that do not require special courts. The incorporation of these suggestions remains awaited because the nation will not fully deliver on its constitutional promise until its laws place all citizens, including those in its border areas and conflict zones, on an equal footing before justice.

“The primary task of the armed forces of the Union is to defend the country in the event of war or when it is face with external aggression. Their training and orientation defeat the hostile forces. A situation of internal disturbance involving the local population requires a different approach. Involvement of armed forces is handling such a situation brings them in confrontation with their countrymen. Prolonged or too frequent deployment of armed forces for handling such situations is likely to generate a feeling of alienation among the people against the armed forces who by their sacrifices in the defence of their country have earned a place in the hearts of the people,” said the Court in  Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights in 1997.

Nearly three decades later, that warning remains as relevant as ever.  The Mizoram conviction in the 2017 case is still, in this landscape, a welcome anomaly even though it took the Court nine years to reach a decision because it shows what the system is capable of.  The guarantee that every woman in a conflict area who files a complaint will have her case heard by a court that is independent of the institution she is accusing is perhaps the minimum that the Constitution already promises and what the Mizoram court, in its judgment of June 2026, briefly delivered.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this judgement primer has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

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The story I never got to tell – of rape and torture by the Indian army

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Will Army Court Martial Captain who allegedly took money to stage Shopian ‘encounter’?

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The post Promising Principles Poor Outcomes: What the judicial record on security force accountability actually shows appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a detailed judgment running over thirty pages, Justice Sachin Datta awarded ₹18.44 lakh as compensation to the father of 19-year-old Deepak, who died while lodged in the lock-up of Police Station Karawal Nagar, Delhi in January 2018.[1] The Court held that once a person’s liberty is curtailed by the State, the constitutional obligation to safeguard that person’s life becomes absolute, and any failure to discharge that obligation amounts to an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Far more than an ordinary compensation order, the judgment is an extensive survey of constitutional jurisprudence on custodial deaths. Drawing from landmark Supreme Court authorities including Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, In Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, alongside important High Court decisions from Delhi, Bombay, Karnataka, Punjab and Haryana, Allahabad and elsewhere, the Court reiterated that the State cannot evade constitutional responsibility merely because the exact cause of death remains disputed or because officials deny direct involvement.

Most importantly, the Court emphatically rejected the argument that a custodial suicide stands outside State responsibility. It observed that suicide within police custody is itself an unnatural custodial death and reflects a failure of those entrusted with the legal duty of ensuring the prisoner’s safety. Consequently, the State cannot avoid liability by arguing that the deceased took his own life.

The judgment is likely to assume considerable importance in future litigation involving custodial deaths, police accountability and constitutional compensation. Besides strengthening the evolving doctrine of public law compensation under Article 21, it also adopts the multiplier method commonly employed in motor accident compensation cases to determine damages in custodial death claims, thereby providing a more structured framework for assessing compensation in such cases.

The background

The writ petition was filed by Shyam Sundar, who approached the Delhi High Court seeking constitutional compensation following the death of his son Deepak, who died while in police custody at Police Station Karawal Nagar. The petition invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, alleging a grave violation of the deceased’s fundamental right to life.

The events giving rise to the petition began on January 15, 2018, when Deepak was arrested at approximately 11:10 a.m. from the premises of Karkardooma Courts by Sub-Inspector Sandeep in connection with FIR No. 334 of 2017 registered at Police Station Karawal Nagar. According to the petitioner, after learning of his son’s arrest, he visited the police station to meet him. Instead of being allowed to meet his son, he himself was allegedly detained and confined inside the lock-up alongside Deepak for several hours. He was released only around 5:30 p.m. that evening.

The father’s account, recorded in the judgment, paints a disturbing picture of what allegedly transpired inside the police station. He alleged that both he and his son were subjected to physical assault, intimidation and abuse by police officials, specifically naming Sub-Inspector Sandeep and Constable Karamveer Singh. According to the petition, the officers allegedly demanded ₹20,000 to ₹30,000 in exchange for securing Deepak’s release.

The allegations did not end there. Later that same night, the father allegedly received a telephone call from Sub-Inspector Sandeep seeking further particulars regarding Deepak. During that conversation, according to the petitioner, the demand for money was reiterated. Being a person of limited financial means, the father informed the officer that he was incapable of arranging such an amount.

The following morning, believing that his son would be produced before a magistrate, the father contacted the police station. He was initially informed that Deepak had indeed been produced before the court.

Shortly thereafter, however, the situation took a devastating turn. The petitioner received a phone call from a local political leader informing him that Deepak had allegedly committed suicide while in police custody. By 11:56 a.m. on 16 January 2018, Deepak had been declared “brought dead” at Guru Tegh Bahadur Hospital.

The police thereafter sought a magisterial inquiry into the custodial death. Interestingly, as recorded in the judgment, the very officer against whom allegations had been levelled—Sub-Inspector Sandeep Kumar—was entrusted with several aspects of the post-incident investigation, including arranging the post-mortem examination, photographing the lock-up, seizing the alleged ligature material, and coordinating with the crime team for forensic examination of the scene.

A medical board conducted the post-mortem examination on January 17, 2018. The board concluded that the cause of death was “asphyxia due to ante-mortem hanging.” Following the examination, Deepak’s body was handed over to his father.

The petitioner, however, consistently maintained that the official version did not explain the surrounding circumstances leading to the death. One aspect that particularly troubled the petitioner related to the recovery of articles from inside the lock-up.

According to the judgment, the Forensic Science Laboratory report noted that two blades had been recovered from the lock-up and further recorded that the possibility of the alleged ligature material having been cut using those blades could not be ruled out. The petitioner argued that Deepak had been searched thoroughly at the time of his arrest and no such objects had been found on his person. In these circumstances, the unexplained presence of the blades inside the lock-up raised serious questions regarding the police version of events.

The petitioner also relied heavily upon a departmental enquiry order dated 26 September 2018, contending that it demonstrated negligence on the part of police personnel stationed at Police Station Karawal Nagar and reinforced the State’s constitutional liability for the custodial death.

Another issue addressed during the proceedings concerned the petitioner’s relationship with the deceased. Although Deepak was biologically the son of the petitioner’s brother, the Court recorded that following the death of his biological mother when he was approximately one year old, he had been brought up and adopted by Shyam Sundar, with whom he shared a father-son relationship throughout his life. An affidavit affirming these facts was placed on record before the Court.

These factual circumstances ultimately formed the backdrop against which the Delhi High Court examined a much larger constitutional question: whether an unnatural death inside police custody, irrespective of disputes surrounding its precise cause, automatically engages the State’s constitutional liability to compensate the victim’s family under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The constitutional question before the Court

Although the petition contained serious allegations of custodial assault, extortion and police misconduct, Justice Sachin Datta made it clear that the High Court was not called upon, in these writ proceedings, to determine whether Deepak had been murdered, subjected to custodial torture, or whether individual police officers were criminally liable.

Instead, the Court carefully narrowed the controversy. The central issue before it was whether an undisputed unnatural death occurring inside police custody, regardless of whether it was ultimately caused by custodial violence, negligence or suicide, entitled the victim’s next of kin to constitutional compensation under Article 21 of the Constitution. Questions regarding criminal culpability, the Court observed, would have to be determined in appropriate proceedings independently of the constitutional remedy sought before it.

This distinction ultimately became the foundation of the judgment. Rather than treating compensation as dependent upon proving police brutality beyond doubt, the Court examined whether the constitutional obligation of the State itself had been breached merely because an individual entrusted to its custody had died an unnatural death. The answer, according to the Court, was unequivocal.

Petitioner’s Case: Every custodial death reflects a failure of the state’s constitutional duty

Appearing for the petitioner, Senior Advocate Trideep Pais argued that the State’s liability arose not merely because of allegations of police misconduct but because Deepak had died while completely under State control.

The petitioner contended that the circumstances surrounding the death demonstrated serious lapses on the part of police officials. Reliance was placed upon the forensic evidence showing recovery of two blades from inside the lock-up. Since Deepak had been searched upon arrest and no such objects had been recovered from him, the petitioner questioned how these articles came to be inside the lock-up and argued that the official version of suicide was riddled with unanswered questions.

The departmental enquiry, according to the petitioner, independently established negligence on the part of the police personnel posted at Police Station Karawal Nagar. Consequently, irrespective of the precise mechanism through which the death occurred, the State had failed in its constitutional obligation to safeguard the life of a person entirely under its control.

The petitioner also urged the Court to adopt the multiplier principle, developed in motor accident compensation jurisprudence through Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, for calculating compensation in custodial death cases, arguing that constitutional compensation should be determined on objective principles rather than arbitrary figures.

The State’s Defence: Compensation is not automatic

The Government of NCT of Delhi resisted the petition by advancing a substantially different understanding of custodial death compensation. It argued that compensation does not automatically follow every custodial death and that claims for monetary relief must be governed primarily by Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme, 2018.

According to the State, the statutory scheme constituted a comprehensive framework for determining both entitlement and quantum of compensation, and constitutional courts should ordinarily operate within those parameters.

The respondents further argued that the present case materially differed from cases involving proven custodial violence. Medical evidence, they pointed out, attributed the cause of death to ante-mortem hanging and did not reveal injuries conclusively suggestive of custodial assault. In the absence of established police brutality or direct culpability, the State argued that liability could not simply be presumed. Compensation, it submitted, must depend upon the degree of responsibility established in each individual case rather than broad constitutional presumptions.

In support of this submission, reliance was placed upon the Delhi High Court’s earlier decision in Shakila v. State (NCT of Delhi), where compensation had been discussed in the context of the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme.

The Court’s Response: Custodial death is not an ordinary death—it is a constitutional failure

Justice Datta rejected the attempt to reduce the case to a mere dispute over compensation. The judgment begins its constitutional analysis with an emphatic observation that custodial deaths are fundamentally different from deaths occurring in ordinary circumstances.

The Court observed:

“Custodial death is not merely an individual tragedy but a matter of systemic concern, striking at the very foundation of the rule of law. When a person is deprived of liberty and placed in the custody of the State, the authorities assume a heightened duty of care.” (Para 21)

Unlike ordinary citizens, individuals lodged in police custody have surrendered every meaningful degree of personal liberty. They cannot leave, seek medical assistance independently, or protect themselves. They depend entirely upon the State for their safety.

Consequently, once liberty is taken away, the State simultaneously assumes what the Court described as a “heightened duty of care.”

Justice Datta observed that every lapse resulting in death inside custody—whether arising from violence, negligence, unexplained circumstances or suicide—necessarily demands judicial scrutiny because such incidents affect not merely the individual concerned but also public confidence in the justice system itself.

This articulation marks one of the strongest statements in recent custodial death jurisprudence regarding the constitutional nature of the State’s responsibility.

Drawing upon national and international standards

To reinforce this understanding, the Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in In Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, where the Supreme Court had itself relied upon the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Guidelines on Investigating Deaths in Custody. Those guidelines classify deaths caused by intentional injury—including homicide and suicide—as unnatural deaths.

The Supreme Court had earlier endorsed these guidelines and recommended that they receive wider circulation among governments in India. Justice Datta invoked this principle to underline that suicide occurring within custody is not a natural event capable of insulating the State from constitutional scrutiny. Rather, it is categorised internationally and constitutionally as an unnatural custodial death.

Precedents invoked in the judgment

1. Nilabati Behera: The foundation of custodial death jurisprudence

The Court then turned to one of the cornerstones of Indian constitutional law—Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993). Justice Datta described the decision as laying down the strict constitutional duty owed by the State to every individual placed in custody.

The Supreme Court had declared that prisoners, undertrials and detainees do not cease to enjoy the protection of Article 21 merely because they have been deprived of liberty. Their freedom may be lawfully restricted, but their right to life remains inviolable. Indeed, because they are unable to safeguard themselves, the responsibility resting upon police and prison authorities becomes even greater.

The Delhi High Court emphasised the Supreme Court’s observation that the State’s duty of care towards persons in custody is strict, admits no exceptions, and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application where constitutional rights are violated.

Where a person dies in custody otherwise than according to procedure established by law, constitutional courts possess not merely the power but the obligation to award monetary compensation for the violation of fundamental rights under Articles 32 and 226.

Justice Datta noted that Nilabati Behera fundamentally transformed Indian constitutional law by recognising compensation as an independent public law remedy rather than merely a civil claim for damages.

2. Parvathamma: Even a custodial suicide raises questions of negligence

The judgment next relied extensively upon the Karnataka High Court’s decision in Parvathamma v. Chief Secretary to Government of Karnataka, a case involving an alleged custodial suicide. Justice Datta reproduced the Karnataka High Court’s reasoning questioning how a detainee managed to fashion a ligature, obtain the necessary material, and commit suicide inside a police station supposedly under constant supervision.

The Karnataka High Court had observed that, regardless of whether death resulted from torture or suicide, the burden rested squarely upon the police to demonstrate absence of negligence. Once an individual enters police custody, it becomes the responsibility of the police to ensure that he remains alive and safe until produced before the court.

The Court had also warned that custodial deaths cannot be treated in a “casual and cavalier fashion,” emphasising that constitutional courts must continuously evolve effective public law remedies to preserve the rule of law and protect citizens against abuse of State power. Justice Datta treated these observations as directly reinforcing the constitutional principles laid down in Nilabati Behera.

3. Bombay High Court: Suicide inside custody cannot be equated with suicide outside custody

One of the most significant discussions in the judgment concerns the Bombay High Court’s decision in Gopichand v. State of Maharashtra, which dealt specifically with custodial suicide. Rejecting the argument that suicide automatically severs State responsibility, the Bombay High Court had reasoned that a person in police custody experiences severe psychological trauma by virtue of detention itself. The existence of such trauma, it held, cannot be ignored while assessing constitutional liability.

Justice Datta reproduced the reasoning that there exists a direct logical relationship between police custody and the subsequent custodial death, even where death occurs by suicide.

The Bombay High Court had further observed that once death occurs inside police custody, the burden shifts to the authorities to demonstrate that conditions surrounding the detainee remained entirely normal and that no acts or omissions on their part contributed to the fatal outcome. Where they fail to discharge that burden, constitutional liability follows. This reasoning would become central to Justice Datta’s own conclusions regarding the State’s responsibility in Deepak’s case.

An unnatural custodial death is sufficient to attract constitutional liability

After surveying decades of constitutional jurisprudence, Justice Sachin Datta arrived at what is undoubtedly the central holding of the judgment. Rejecting the State’s attempt to limit compensation to cases involving proven custodial violence, the Court held that the very fact of an unnatural custodial death is sufficient to trigger constitutional liability.

In words that are likely to be repeatedly cited in future custodial death litigation, the Court declared that a person does not forfeit his fundamental rights merely because he has been arrested. Rather, the opposite is true. The moment an individual enters police custody, the constitutional burden upon the State becomes even heavier because the detainee is completely dependent upon State authorities for his safety, health and survival.

Justice Datta observed:

“It is well settled that when a person is in custody, he does not lose his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and the State assumes an absolute and inalienable duty to protect his life and dignity.” (Part 28)

The Court then articulated perhaps the most significant proposition emerging from the judgment. It held that an unnatural custodial death—even where the immediate cause is stated to be suicide—is not a private act divorced from State responsibility. Instead, such a death necessarily reflects a failure of the authorities entrusted with the constitutional obligation of protecting the prisoner.

Justice Datta observed:

“An unnatural death in custody, even if by suicide, is not a private act divorced from State responsibility, but reflects an omission of duty on the part of those charged with safekeeping. The State cannot escape responsibility by invoking statutory schemes or by contending absence of direct culpability. The very fact of custodial death, being unnatural, attracts liability and obliges the Court to mould relief in the form of compensation.” (Part 28)

This finding is particularly important because custodial suicide has frequently been invoked by investigating agencies as a defence against allegations of custodial misconduct. The Delhi High Court categorically rejected such an approach. Instead, it held that the question is not merely how the detainee died, but whether the State fulfilled its constitutional obligation to prevent that death.

State cannot escape responsibility by denying direct culpability

Justice Datta further rejected another recurring defence often advanced in custodial death cases—that unless direct police assault or torture is conclusively proved, compensation cannot be awarded. The Court held that constitutional liability under Article 21 is qualitatively different from criminal liability.

A criminal prosecution seeks to determine individual guilt. A constitutional court, on the other hand, examines whether the State has discharged its constitutional obligations. Accordingly, the Court held that the State cannot evade liability merely by asserting that no police officer has yet been found criminally responsible. Nor can it rely upon statutory compensation schemes to dilute constitutional remedies.

Justice Datta therefore concluded that the constitutional entitlement of the petitioner’s family to compensation was “beyond dispute.” The only remaining question concerned the amount that ought to be awarded.

Compensation under Article 21 is independent of statutory compensation schemes

A substantial portion of the judgment is devoted to answering one of the State’s principal legal arguments—that compensation must be restricted to the framework contained in Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme, 2018.

Justice Datta firmly disagreed. The Court acknowledged that statutory victim compensation schemes undoubtedly provide one avenue of relief for victims and their families. However, constitutional compensation occupies an entirely different field. Tracing the law from Nilabati Behera, D.K. Basu, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Justice Datta explained that compensation awarded under Article 226 is not derived from statutory provisions. Instead, it flows directly from the violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21.

Consequently, statutory schemes supplement constitutional remedies—they do not replace them. The Court held:

” The statutory scheme under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is only one avenue of relief; it supplements and does not curtail or exclude the power of this Court under Article 226 to award compensation for established infringement of fundamental rights. Custodial death, being unnatural, prima facie attracts liability under Article 21.” (Para 38)

This clarification considerably strengthens the scope of writ jurisdiction in custodial death cases. It confirms that constitutional courts are not constrained by the monetary limits prescribed under victim compensation schemes whenever Article 21 has been violated.

Why the court distinguished Shakila v. State

The respondents had placed considerable reliance upon the Delhi High Court’s earlier decision in Shakila v. State (NCT of Delhi).

Justice Datta carefully examined that precedent but concluded that it did not govern the present case.

The Court observed that Shakila principally dealt with an entirely different issue—namely, who qualifies as a “dependent” under the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme and how compensation should be distributed under that statutory framework. It was not concerned with determining constitutional compensation under Article 226 based upon violation of Article 21.

Moreover, Justice Datta pointed out that Shakila had not considered the earlier Division Bench judgment in Kiran v. State, which had specifically approved the use of the multiplier principle while awarding compensation for custodial deaths.

Since a Division Bench decision binds a Single Judge, the Court held that Kiran, rather than Shakila, furnished the correct legal framework for determining compensation in the present case. This aspect of the judgment provides important doctrinal clarity regarding the relationship between constitutional compensation and statutory victim compensation schemes.

The court endorses the multiplier method for custodial death cases

Perhaps the most practically significant contribution of the judgment lies in its approach to determining compensation. Historically, constitutional compensation in custodial death cases has often varied widely from case to case, with courts awarding amounts based largely on judicial discretion. Justice Datta sought to bring greater consistency to this area.

Relying upon earlier decisions including Kiran v. State, Prakash Kaur v. State of Punjab, Sanjeevani v. State of Maharashtra, and the recent Allahabad High Court decision in Prema Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court held that the multiplier method evolved in motor accident compensation jurisprudence provides a rational and objective framework for calculating damages in custodial death cases as well.

The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jagdish v. Mohan, where the Supreme Court had observed that compensation should not be viewed as charity or largesse but as an affirmation of constitutional dignity. Justice Datta reproduced the Supreme Court’s observation that:

“Awards of compensation are not law’s doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law.” (Para 40)

This, the Court held, perfectly captures the constitutional philosophy underlying public law compensation. The objective is not generosity, but rather the enforcement of constitutional rights after their violation.

How the court arrived at the figure of ₹18.44 lakh

Having settled the legal principles, the Court turned to the actual computation of compensation. The material before the Court indicated that Deepak, aged 19 years, worked as a waiter and earned approximately ₹12,000 per month.

Justice Datta accepted the lower end of the asserted income and calculated compensation in accordance with the principles laid down in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi. The calculation proceeded as follows:

• Monthly income: ₹12,000
• Annual income: ₹1,44,000
• Addition of 40% towards future prospects: ₹57,600
• Total annual income after future prospects: ₹2,01,600
• Deduction of 50% towards personal expenses (the deceased being a bachelor): ₹1,00,800
• Application of the multiplier of 18, applicable to persons aged between 15 and 20 years: ₹18,14,400
• Addition of ₹15,000 towards loss of estate.
• Addition of ₹15,000 towards funeral expenses.

The resulting compensation came to ₹18, 44, 400, which the Court directed the respondents to pay within eight weeks. Notably, by explicitly adopting the multiplier method, the Court has provided future litigants and constitutional courts with a far more structured methodology for quantifying compensation in custodial death cases, reducing dependence upon arbitrary lump-sum awards.

A significant expansion of constitutional accountability

Beyond the immediate relief granted to the petitioner’s family, the judgment represents a significant reaffirmation of India’s constitutional commitment to protecting life within State custody. Justice Datta makes it abundantly clear that the constitutional obligation of the State begins, and not ends, with arrest.

The judgment decisively rejects the notion that custodial suicide somehow falls outside constitutional responsibility. Instead, it recognises that a person confined within a police lock-up has surrendered virtually every means of self-protection. In those circumstances, ensuring that the detainee emerges alive is not merely an administrative responsibility but a constitutional obligation flowing directly from Article 21.

By reaffirming the doctrines of strict public law liability, rejecting attempts to confine relief within statutory compensation schemes, endorsing the multiplier method for assessing damages, and declaring that an unnatural custodial death itself constitutes sufficient basis for constitutional compensation, the Delhi High Court has added another important chapter to the evolving jurisprudence on custodial violence and State accountability. In doing so, the Court reinforces a foundational constitutional principle: when the State assumes control over an individual’s liberty, it assumes an equally inescapable responsibility for protecting that individual’s life and dignity.

The complete judgement may be read below:

[1] While, in 2018, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) was in power in Delhi, with Arvind Kejriwal serving as the Chief Minister and Lieutenant Governor Anil Baija, the Delhi Police has always been directly governed by the union home ministry, an issue that has caused frictions between state and centre. Rajnath Singh was union home minister at the time.

Related:

Decoding the Sathankulam Judgement on Custodial Death – Part 1 – Context of Torture in India

Rights

“Your Helplessness feels in the garb of Protection”: SC rebukes CBI for failure to arrest officers in custodial death case of Deva Pardhi

Monitoring Torture: SC’s suo motu action on custodial deaths and CCTV camera non-compliance

Custodial Death of Dalit Law Student Somnath Suryawanshi: FIR registered after Supreme Court upholds Bombay HC directive

“Even a Murderer Wouldn’t Do This”: Ajith Kumar’s custodial death and Tamil Nadu’s shameful culture of impunity

“Shielding their own”: Supreme Court slams Madhya Pradesh police, transfers custodial death probe of a tribal man to CBI

The post State cannot escape liability for custodial suicide: Delhi HC appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The present controversy and alleged derogatory remark against Prophet Mohammad

The recent controversy centres on an Instagram podcast reel uploaded around June 19, 2026. In the video, Nazia Elahi Khan is seen in conversation with a host named Divya Singh. Viewers alleged that Khan made derogatory and offensive remarks regarding Prophet Muhammad and his family during this podcast, which subsequently went viral on social media platforms.

The alleged statements sparked widespread outrage within the Muslim community, leading to protests and demands for legal action across multiple states. Community leaders and organisations, including the Raza Academy, argued that the remarks were deeply hurtful to their religious sentiments.

Khan in her defense has also claimed in some reports that the viral videos of her remarks are AI-generated not hers!

Legal action and protests across the country

Following the circulation of the podcast, multiple FIRs and complaints were registered against Khan:

• Bhiwandi, Maharashtra: The first FIR was registered on Monday evening (June 22, 2026) at the Shanti Nagar Police Station. The complaint was filed by a local resident, Adnan Ansari. Ansari stated he saw the reel on June 19 and consulted with community members before approaching the police. The Shanti Nagar police booked Khan for “deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings” and under relevant sections of the Information Technology (IT) Act. Senior Inspector Vinayak Gaikwad confirmed the FIR.

Nazia Elahi Khan Par Bhiwandi Shanti Nagar Police Mein FIR Darj For Insulting Prophet In A Podcast, FIR Filed By MIM Team pic.twitter.com/wXvCnsnTSv

— Gallinews India (@gallinews) June 22, 2026

• Mumbai, Maharashtra: A second case, classified as a ‘zero FIR,’ was registered on Tuesday (June 23, 2026) at the JJ Marg Police Station in South Mumbai over the same video content. Police officials noted that this case is likely to be transferred to West Bengal, where Khan currently resides, for further investigation. Representatives of the Raza Academy also submitted a written complaint to the Pydhonie police station seeking action.

Two FIRs have been registered in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region against BJP Minority Morcha leader and social media influencer Nazia Elahi Khan, 41, over alleged derogatory remarks about Prophet Muhammad that reportedly hurt religious sentiments.

The first FIR was registered on… pic.twitter.com/DMVWgu5h37

— The Observer Post (@TheObserverPost) June 23, 2026

• Malegaon, Maharashtra: Reports indicate an FIR has also been filed in Malegaon against Khan, accusing her of hurting religious sentiments.
• Uttar Pradesh & Madhya Pradesh: Protests and demands for action have occurred in various locations, including Bareilly, Muzaffarnagar, Bulandshahr (Uttar Pradesh), and Khargone and Rewa (Madhya Pradesh). In Bareilly, members of the Muslim community submitted a memorandum to the Aonla Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), demanding strict action against her. AIMIM representatives in Khatauli (Muzaffarnagar) also demanded legal action.
• On June 24, members of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) submitted a memorandum to the Kota District Collector in Rajasthan demanding strict legal action against Nazia Elahi Khan over her alleged remarks. According to the party, the memorandum was submitted on the instructions of AIMIM President Asaduddin Owaisi and Rajasthan State President Jameel Ahmed Khan. The delegation, led by District Vice President Zahid Nizami Mastan and accompanied by other party office-bearers, urged the administration to initiate appropriate legal proceedings over the alleged insult to the Prophet.

Huzoor ﷺ ki shaan mein ki gayi gustakhi ke khilaf aur Nazia Elahi ke viruddh sakht kanooni karwai ki maang ko lekar aaj AIMIM ke qaumi sadar @asadowaisi sahab aur AIMIM Rajasthan ke Pradesh Adhyaksh Jameel Ahmed Khan sahab ke nirdesh par Kota Zila Collector ko gyapan saupa gaya।… pic.twitter.com/e0xenYLslo

— Jameel Khan (@jameelwecan) June 24, 2026

• Hyderabad Police also registered a case against Nazia Elahi Khan over her remark, following a complaint by religious organisation.

Hyderabad Police registered a case against an accused Nazia elahi Khan over alleged derogatory remarks against religious figures, following a complaint by religious scholars and organisations. DCP Charminar Zone assured strict legal action, stressing the need to maintain peace… pic.twitter.com/pt7R6AMP1k

— Nawab Abrar (@nawababrar131) June 25, 2026

The investigations are ongoing, with Mumbai police examining whether the probe should be transferred to West Bengal.

Arrest of Nazia Elahi Khan by Kolkata Police in August 2021 in relation to cheating case

Nazia Elahi Khan was previously arrested by the Girish Park Police in Kolkata on August 26, 2021 in connection with FIR No. 116 of 2020, registered under Sections 419, 420, 506, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to allegations of cheating, impersonation, criminal intimidation, and common intention. The investigation revealed that Khan had allegedly exploited a vulnerable individual involved in a complex matrimonial dispute, extracting Rs 6 lakh under the pretence that her high-level connections could secure a swift and favourable legal outcome. When the promised legal relief failed to materialise and the client demanded the return of his funds, Khan allegedly resorted to intimidation and threats, leading directly to her arrest. She remained in judicial custody until September 18, 2021, when she was granted bail on the ground of her 13-year-old son’s illness.

According to records cited in the case, investigators alleged that despite repeatedly claiming to be an advocate, she was unable during custody to produce documents establishing her legal qualifications or formal educational credentials. The case also relies on a complaint allegedly submitted by Khan to Girish Park Police Station on May 25, 2012, in which she described her qualifications as B.Com., LL.B., a document that investigators have treated as material evidence in the ongoing impersonation proceedings.

Copy of FIR No. 116/2020 registered at Girish Park Police Station

Hate Profile: weaponising Muslim identity, the strategy of provocation

Operating under the self-adopted alias “Nazia Sanatani,” Khan began systematically catering to hard-line right-wing audiences. She recognised a potent dynamic in digital identity politics: when an individual born into a minority group echoes the prejudices of the majority, their statements are often treated as undeniable validation of those prejudices. She became an “insider” willing to confirm the worst fears of the Hindutva base, effectively weaponising her background to provide a veneer of authority to baseless claims.

The remarks made by Nazia Elahi Khan are extremely offensive and derogatory towards Islam and the Prophet Muhammad PBUH.

Has anyone filed any complaints? pic.twitter.com/10I2W86iKO

— S (@Shirink_13) August 4, 2024

Hindus should stay vigilant and should boycott Muslims from government sectors and private sectors: Nazia

On June 8, 2026, Nazia Elahi Khan also courted controversy after calling for the social and economic boycott of Muslims during a press conference. She urged Hindus to refrain from employing Muslims in both government and private sectors for the next two to three years. She reportedly said that “Hindus should stay vigilant and should boycott Muslims from government sectors and private sectors.”

She further alleged that Muslims posed an internal security threat and asserting that “120 crore Hindus” should remain vigilant against various forms of “jihad.” She further questioned the patriotism of Indian Muslims and called for their boycott from employment and public life.

A BJP leader’s call, made during a press conference, to boycott Indian Muslims from government jobs, private employment, and public life is a blatant attack on the Constitution of India and the secular foundations of our republic.

Equally condemnable is the reckless attempt to… pic.twitter.com/67JmdbwBjy

— Dr Syed Naseer Hussain, M P (@NasirHussainINC) June 8, 2026

Her strategy involved constant, high-visibility provocations. She launched what her supporters called the “Hindu Dharam Tour,” traveling to deliver speeches that consistently vilified the Muslim community. In May 2024, in Karda, Maharashtra, she utilised the “Love Jihad” conspiracy theory, falsely claiming that 2,800 Hindu women had been murdered by Muslim men, and asking the crowd, “How can a Muslim man love you when he can so easily give triple talaq and destroy lives?”

In January 2025, in Belagavi, Karnataka, she amplified the “Ghazwa-e-Hind” conspiracy, alleging that local mosques and shrines were covert training grounds designed to entrap Hindu women for an eventual Islamic takeover.

When public speaking engagements waned, Khan demonstrated a willingness to manufacture crises to maintain her digital relevance.

In February 2025, she posted a video claiming Muslim men had intentionally rammed her vehicle in an assassination attempt in Uttar Pradesh. The Kanpur Dehat Police quickly debunked the claim, stating her own driver had fallen asleep at the wheel, and publicly urged citizens not to spread her communal misinformation.

In April 2026, amid the controversy surrounding Lenskart’s alleged dress code on religious symbols, Nazia Elahi Khan entered a Lenskart store in Mumbai along with her supporters and applied tilak to several employees. Videos of the incident showed her confronting the store staff over the alleged policy, asserting that Hindu employees should not be discouraged from displaying their religious identity.

“Sharia lagu karwana hai kya?” :- Nazia Elahi Khan

BJP Minority Morcha leader Nazia Elahi Khan entered a Lenskart outlet in Mumbai’s Andheri area and confronted the store manager, identified as Mohsin Khan, alleging that Hindu employees were being discouraged from wearing… pic.twitter.com/nXQAUmxmZj

— Clips (@Masterstroke_ab) April 23, 2026

Nazia Elahi Khan is not an office-bearer: BJP Minority Morcha

Amid the growing controversy, the BJP Minority Morcha publicly distanced itself from Nazia Elahi Khan. In a statement issued on June 24, the Morcha’s National President, Jamal Siddiqui, clarified that Nazia Elahi Khan is not an office-bearer of the organisation and that no individual by that name holds any official position within the BJP Minority Morcha. He further stated that any claim of representing the Morcha or the BJP in that capacity is “false and misleading.”

The BJP Minority Morcha has said that Nazia Ilahi Khan is not an office-bearer of the organisation. National President of the Morcha, Jamal Siddiqui, stated that no person by that name holds any official position within the body. He further said that any claim of representing the… pic.twitter.com/ymmR8CVqUm

— The Observer Post (@TheObserverPost) June 24, 2026

The CJP archive: documenting a habitual offender

Her speeches have frequently been delivered from platforms hosted by organisations advancing right wing propaganda of communal hatred and have consistently echoed themes such as “Love Jihad”, “Ghazwa-e-Hind”, economic boycott of Muslims, and allegations questioning the patriotism of Indian Muslims.

The sheer volume of FIRs filed against the Nazia Elahi Khan validates the long-standing warnings issued by civil rights monitors. Organisations like Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) have meticulously tracked Khan’s activities for years, maintaining detailed dossiers that classify her as a “habitual hate offender” whose actions are designed to subvert the law for political gain.

The most critical intervention by CJP occurred during the volatile lead-up to the Delhi Assembly elections in early 2025. On January 20, 2025, CJP filed a comprehensive complaint with the Chief Electoral Officer of Delhi regarding a speech Khan delivered at an event organised by the Hindu nationalist group “Chetna” in Rohini. CJP provided exact transcripts to the Election Commission, demonstrating that Khan explicitly violated the Model Code of Conduct and the Representation of the People Act.

CJP takes action against #HateSpeech! A complaint has been filed against BJP leader Nazia Elahi Khan for inciting communal hatred during the #Delhi poll campaign. Read: https://t.co/Y5VsQjYgtB

— Citizens for Justice and Peace (@cjpindia) January 21, 2025

According to CJP, the transcripts of the speech delivered in Delhi revealed Khan telling the Delhi audience that Muslims were inherently violent and primed for criminal activity; “Tell them (Muslims) to get education, they will not! […] But if you tell them to rape, they will do it immediately. Tell them to do love jihad, they will do it immediately. Tell them to throw bombs, bullets, and ammunition! They will throw it immediately.” She further instructed Hindu parents to teach their daughters that “no Abdul is good.” CJP argued that Khan was deliberately deployed to polarise the electorate. The fact that she faced no significant legal consequences for this speech, and was allowed to continue her “Hindu Dharam Tour” for another year and a half, highlights what activists describe as the systemic apathy of law enforcement when dealing with right-wing hate speech.

Legal position governing hate speech

The law governing hate speech is well settled and imposes a clear obligation upon the State and law enforcement authorities to prevent and prosecute such offences. Despite the settled legal position and repeated directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, incidents of inflammatory and communal speeches continue to occur with impunity. Such speeches are deliberately designed to promote enmity and hatred between religious communities, disturb communal harmony, outrage religious sentiments, provoke breaches of public peace, and disseminate false and inflammatory narratives likely to incite discrimination, hostility, or offences against a particular community.

These acts attract, inter alia, Sections 196 (promoting enmity between different groups), 197 (imputations prejudicial to national integration and constitutional allegiance), 299 and 302 (deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage and wound religious feelings), 352 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace), and 353 (circulation of false information likely to incite offences or create fear and alarm) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The dissemination of such inflammatory speech through public meetings and social media further aggravates its impact by expanding its reach and increasing the likelihood of communal disharmony and public disorder.

Supreme Court directions and statutory duties

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that law enforcement agencies are under a mandatory obligation to prevent and prosecute incidents of hate speech without waiting for private complaints. In Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India & Ors. (W.P. (C) No. 940 of 2022), the Court directed all States and Union Territories to register suo moto FIRs immediately whenever any speech attracts offences relating to promotion of communal hatred, irrespective of the religion or identity of the speaker. The Court categorically directed that police authorities must act without waiting for any complaint and must ensure equal enforcement of the law so as to preserve the secular character of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court has further emphasised the preventive responsibilities of the police. By orders dated February 3, 2023, while dealing with proposed communal gatherings in Maharashtra, the Court directed that permissions for public events must be subject to the condition that no hate speech is delivered and clarified that the police are duty-bound to exercise preventive powers, including action under Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherever circumstances so require.

Subsequently, by order dated January 17, 2024, the Court directed the District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police in Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh to take all necessary preventive measures, including installation of CCTV cameras and video recording of public events, to ensure identification and prosecution of persons delivering hate speeches or inciting communal violence. These directions reaffirm that police authorities have a continuing constitutional and statutory obligation not merely to prosecute offences after they occur but also to prevent their commission through timely intervention.

In compliance with these judicial directions, the Director General of Police, Maharashtra, issued Circular dated February 2, 2023, directing all police units to strictly implement the Supreme Court’s mandate by taking suo moto action wherever speeches disclose offences relating to communal hatred. Thereafter, by Circular dated April 3, 2023, the Maharashtra Police prescribed comprehensive preventive measures for public meetings and processions, including prior meetings with organisers, imposition of conditions while granting permissions, intelligence gathering, preventive action against anti-social elements, compulsory audio-video recording of events, immediate registration of offences wherever violations occur, and prompt arrests wherever warranted.

These directions make it abundantly clear that failure to initiate timely preventive and prosecutorial action in cases of hate speech would amount to a failure to discharge statutory and constitutional duties entrusted to the police authorities.

Judicial Precedents on Hate Speech

The constitutional position regarding hate speech has been consistently reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Firoz Iqbal Khan v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 956 of 2020), the Court observed that India’s constitutional democracy is founded upon the peaceful coexistence of diverse religious and cultural communities and held that any attempt to vilify a religious community must be viewed with grave disfavour as it strikes at the core of constitutional values. Earlier, in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, (2014) AIR SC 1591, the Supreme Court recognised that hate speech marginalises vulnerable groups, legitimises discrimination, and lays the foundation for exclusion, violence, and even genocide, thereby posing a direct threat to the right to life and dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Further strengthening this jurisprudence, in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 943 of 2021), by order dated April 28, 2023, the Supreme Court extended its earlier directions to all States and Union Territories, mandating registration of suo moto FIRs whenever speeches disclose offences relating to communal hatred, irrespective of the identity or religion of the speaker. The Court reiterated that the police cannot remain passive spectators and must promptly initiate criminal proceedings whenever cognizable offences of hate speech are committed. Collectively, these decisions establish that hate speech is not merely an exercise of free expression but constitutes an abuse of constitutional freedoms where it promotes hostility, discrimination, or violence against protected communities, thereby requiring immediate preventive and penal action by the State.

Moreover, the controversy has expanded beyond social media, with police complaints, memoranda, and demands for legal action being made in several states, including Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Telangana, and Delhi. Amid the growing backlash, the BJP Minority Morcha clarified that Nazia Elahi Khan does not hold any official position in the organisation. With multiple complaints now before the authorities, the matter has shifted from public outrage to the legal process, and the response of law enforcement and the courts will determine its course

Related

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CJP files 5 hate speech complaints before CEO Maharashtra as violated MCC

The post Nazia Elahi Khan faces multiple FIRs over alleged hate speech appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment is a strong reaffirmation of the constitutional guarantees under Articles 19 and 21, recognising that the freedom to express political disagreement and the right to live with dignity cannot be curtailed through executive action unsupported by law. Rejecting the police’s justification, the Court concluded that the externment proceedings were unsupported by material, based on an erroneous application of the Maharashtra Police Act, and tainted by mala fides.

The hearing also attracted considerable public attention because of Justice Jamdar’s unusually candid oral observations questioning the increasing use of criminal law against protesters and commenting on Maharashtra’s contemporary political landscape. Although these remarks do not form part of the operative judgment, they underscore the constitutional concerns that informed the Court’s approach to the case.

Background: Externment order passed against SDPI office-bearer

The petitioner, Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary, serves as the General Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), a political party registered with the Election Commission of India under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The writ petition challenged two administrative orders: an externment order dated December 3, 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Chembur, Mumbai, and the appellate order dated March 27, 2026 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, affirming the externment.

The externment directed that Chaudhary be removed from the area for one year under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

According to the State authorities, several FIRs had been registered against him, principally in connection with protests organised against decisions of the Union Government. These included demonstrations concerning amendments to citizenship laws, the Gyanvapi mosque dispute, and other politically contentious issues. The police alleged that the protests had been conducted despite the denial of permission and that slogans critical of the Central Government had been raised during these demonstrations.

Represented by Advocate Payoshi Roy, the petitioner contended that the criminal cases relied upon by the authorities were overwhelmingly under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for alleged disobedience of prohibitory orders. These FIRs, it was argued, arose solely because the petitioner had organised morchas, dharnas and agitations in his capacity as a political office-bearer opposing governmental decisions. Such activities, the petitioner submitted, could not legitimately constitute grounds for invoking the drastic power of externment under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

The petition further alleged that the externment proceedings reflected a mala fide exercise of power and lacked the statutory “subjective satisfaction” required under the Act. To support this challenge, reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India as well as the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Mohmmad Kaleem Taufiq Ahmed Siddiqui v. State of Gujarat, both of which recognised the constitutional protection afforded to peaceful democratic protest.

The State, on the other hand, defended the externment by relying upon an affidavit filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police. The prosecution argued that the petitioner had organised demonstrations despite police refusal of permission and that the slogans raised during such protests justified preventive action under the Maharashtra Police Act.

However, the High Court found that the State’s case fundamentally misunderstood both the purpose and scope of the externment provisions.

Justice Jamdar’s Oral Remarks: ‘Citizens are being made slaves of the government’

During the hearing, as reported by LiveLaw, Justice Madhav Jamdar made a series of pointed oral observations questioning the increasing tendency to invoke criminal law against citizens who protest governmental policies.

Expressing concern over the police’s approach, the Court observed that democratic governance cannot function if citizens are prevented from voicing disagreement with the government of the day.

Questioning the rationale behind the externment proceedings, reported LiveLaw, Justice Jamdar orally remarked: “All citizens are being made slaves of the Indian Government. They cannot stage protests, they cannot agitate… What is all this? If people protest, you will slap cases. It is the right of citizens to protest.”

The Court further questioned why slogans critical of political leaders or the ruling party should invite such severe executive action.

Referring to the allegations against the petitioner, Justice Jamdar observed that slogans such as “BJP Government Murdabad” or “Amit Shah Murdabad” represented political expression, asking why such slogans should become grounds for externing a citizen.

The Court also reminded the State of the constitutional role of law enforcement agencies, orally remarking that: “Police are not servants of the Chief Minister or the Prime Minister. They are public servants.”

Justice Jamdar even warned that he was inclined to impose substantial costs on the officers responsible for passing such an order, reflecting the Court’s deep dissatisfaction with the manner in which the statutory power had been exercised.

These oral observations, though not forming part of the written judgment, echoed the constitutional principles ultimately embodied in the Court’s final order—that executive powers cannot be deployed to suppress legitimate political opposition or peaceful democratic activity.

‘Horse-Trading’ and the ‘Washing Machine’: Court’s sharp political commentary

The hearing also attracted national attention because of Justice Jamdar’s comments on the prevailing political climate in Maharashtra. During the proceedings, as per the LiveLaw report, after noting that the petitioner belonged to the SDPI, the Court referred to the ongoing movement of legislators between political parties.

Justice Jamdar observed that while the State Assembly was occupied with discussions regarding shifting political loyalties and the election of its Presiding Officer, more pressing public issues, including the death of a ten-year-old child in a road accident,appeared to receive comparatively little attention.

In a lighter vein, the Judge remarked that the petitioner himself might consider changing political sides, adding that “horse-trading” appeared to be occurring across Maharashtra. Referring to the criminal cases pending against the petitioner, Justice Jamdar further quipped that perhaps he should join the “washing machine“—an unmistakable allusion to the popular political expression suggesting that corruption or criminal allegations tend to disappear after politicians join the ruling establishment.

Although these comments were made humorously and do not constitute judicial findings, they quickly became among the most widely discussed aspects of the hearing because of their obvious political significance and broader commentary on contemporary public discourse.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning: Why the externment order could not stand

While the oral observations generated widespread attention, the written judgment is equally significant for its careful examination of the statutory limits governing externment powers under the Maharashtra Police Act and its reaffirmation of constitutional protections for political dissent. Justice Madhav Jamdar systematically dismantled the factual and legal basis relied upon by the police, ultimately concluding that the externment order rested on no legally sustainable foundation.

At the heart of the dispute was Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act, a preventive provision that empowers designated authorities to direct a person to remove themselves from a particular area under narrowly defined circumstances. Since an externment order deprives an individual of the freedom to reside and move freely within a particular territory, the provision has consistently been treated by courts as an extraordinary preventive measure that must be exercised with great caution.

The Court therefore began its analysis not with the allegations against the petitioner, but with the statutory requirements themselves.

1. Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act: A preventive, not punitive, power

Justice Jamdar reproduced the relevant portions of Section 56(1)(a) and (b) of the Maharashtra Police Act to determine whether the authorities had satisfied the statutory conditions before directing the petitioner’s externment.

Under Section 56(1)(a), externment may be ordered only where the movements or acts of a person are causing, or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.

Section 56(1)(b), on the other hand, authorises externment where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is engaged in, or is about to engage in, offences involving force or violence or offences punishable under specified chapters of the Indian Penal Code, particularly offences against the human body, coupled with an assessment that witnesses are unwilling to come forward because of fear.

The Court emphasised that these are not broad administrative powers permitting the State to remove inconvenient political opponents from a locality. Rather, they are exceptional preventive measures intended to address genuine threats to public safety.

Consequently, before an externment order can lawfully be passed, the authorities must possess objective material capable of supporting the statutory satisfaction required under Section 56.

Merely reproducing the language of the statute without factual support is insufficient.

2. The allegations against the petitioner did not meet the statutory threshold

Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court found that the police had failed to demonstrate how the petitioner’s conduct satisfied either limb of Section 56.

Justice Jamdar noted that it was an admitted position that Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary had organised protests, morchas and dharnas in his capacity as Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India against decisions taken by the Union Government. The State itself accepted that these demonstrations constituted the basis of the proceedings.

However, beyond recording that protests had been organised and slogans raised, the authorities had placed no material before the Court demonstrating that the petitioner’s activities had caused alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.

The FIRs relied upon by the State primarily alleged that demonstrations had been organised without police permission and therefore constituted offences under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for disobedience of promulgated orders.

Justice Jamdar observed that an alleged violation of Section 188 IPC, carrying only a relatively minor punishment, could not by itself justify invoking the extraordinary machinery of externment.

The Court stated in unambiguous terms that there was “no material on record” demonstrating that the petitioner’s movements or activities caused, or were calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm as required by Section 56. Instead, every FIR relied upon by the authorities essentially alleged only that he had organised political protests against decisions of the Government of India and that some of these protests had taken place without prior permission. Such allegations, the Court held, simply did not satisfy the statutory requirements for externment.

“There is no material on record to show that the movements or acts of the Petitioner are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property. In all these FIR, the allegation is that the Petitioner, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India, has arranged agitations/morchas/dharnas, opposing certain decisions taken by the Government of India. The other allegation is that such agitations/morchas/dharnas have been arranged without permission of the Police. The same is an offence under Section 188 of the IPC and maximum punishment is of simple imprisonment of one month. However, that cannot be a ground for passing the externment order under the provisions of the Maharashtra Police Act.” (Para 7)

This distinction proved decisive. The judgment makes clear that unlawful assembly or violation of regulatory conditions governing protests may attract criminal consequences under the applicable penal provisions, but such allegations cannot automatically be elevated into grounds for preventive exile under the Maharashtra Police Act.

To hold otherwise would fundamentally alter the character of Section 56, transforming a narrowly tailored preventive provision into an instrument capable of suppressing political opposition.

3. The court finds the authorities’ ‘subjective satisfaction’ was vitiated

One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the doctrine of subjective satisfaction, which lies at the heart of preventive measures such as externment. Although externment orders involve administrative discretion, that discretion is not immune from judicial scrutiny.

The authority must genuinely arrive at the statutory satisfaction based upon relevant material. Justice Jamdar carefully examined the externment proposal and the affidavit filed by the police. While these documents repeatedly asserted that the petitioner’s activities were causing alarm, danger and harm to the public, the Court found that the supporting material did not justify these conclusions.

The FIRs themselves narrated only that the petitioner had organised agitations against decisions of the Union Government and raised political slogans. There was no evidence of violence, no evidence of intimidation, no evidence of danger to public safety, or of harm to persons or property.

The Court therefore concluded that the findings recorded by the authorities were unsupported by the factual record. Consequently, the statutory “subjective satisfaction” required under Section 56 stood vitiated because it rested upon assertions rather than evidence.

“Although the Externment Proposal, the details of which are set out in the Affidavit-in-Reply, records that the movements and acts of the Petitioner are causing or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger and harm to the public and property, perusal of the FIRs on the basis of which action is taken and the gist of which is set out in the Affidvit-in-Reply shows that the only allegation is that the Petitioner has arranged agitations/morchas/dharnas against certain decisions of the Union of India and given slogans. Thus, the subjective satisfaction recorded by the authorities that movements and acts of the Petitioner are causing or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger and harm to the public and property, is without any material to support the same. Thus, the subjective satisfaction is vitiated.” (Para 9)

Justice Jamdar held that although the authorities had formally recorded that the petitioner’s movements were causing alarm and danger, a scrutiny of the underlying FIRs revealed no factual basis capable of supporting such a conclusion. The recorded satisfaction was therefore unsupported by material and legally unsustainable. The judgment thus reiterates a long-standing principle of administrative law—that preventive powers cannot be exercised merely by reciting statutory language. The existence of objective material remains subject to judicial review.

4. A finding of mala fides against the state

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the written judgment is the Court’s express acceptance of the petitioner’s allegation that the action bore the hallmarks of mala fides. After analysing the nature of the FIRs and the statutory requirements, Justice Jamdar observed that there was substance in the petitioner’s contention that the externment proceedings constituted a mala fide exercise of power.

“There is substance in the contention raised by Ms. Roy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the action taken is a mala fide action.” (Para 8)

Although the judgment does not embark upon an elaborate discussion of improper motive, this finding carries considerable legal significance. Indian courts are ordinarily reluctant to attribute mala fides to executive authorities without compelling material.

The Court’s conclusion therefore reflects its view that the statutory power had been invoked for a purpose divorced from the object for which Section 56 was enacted. Externment exists to prevent imminent threats to public order—not to remove political activists whose principal activity consists of organising protests against governmental policies.

By accepting the allegation of mala fides, the Court effectively recognised that preventive policing cannot become a substitute for managing political dissent. The finding significantly strengthens the constitutional character of the judgment, indicating that the problem before the Court was not merely one of procedural irregularity but one involving the misuse of statutory authority itself.

5. The judgment as a constitutional reaffirmation of the right to dissent

Beyond the statutory shortcomings in the externment proceedings, Justice Madhav Jamdar anchored the decision firmly within India’s constitutional framework, emphasising that democratic disagreement with the government lies at the heart of constitutional governance. The judgment makes it abundantly clear that preventive policing cannot become a mechanism for punishing political expression, particularly where citizens seek to voice opposition through peaceful and organised protest.

The Court rejected the implicit premise underlying the State’s action, that repeated protests against government policies, coupled with criminal cases arising from such demonstrations, could justify the extraordinary remedy of externment. Instead, it recognised that such an approach strikes directly at the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.

“It is settled legal position that an order of externment is an extraordinary measure and effect of such order is of depriving a citizen of his fundamental right of free movement throughout the territory of India.” (Para 10)

Referring specifically to Articles 19 and 21, Justice Jamdar observed that the Constitution protects not only the right of citizens to express their opinions but also their right to live with dignity. These guarantees, the Court held, are substantially impaired when the State seeks to remove a person from his locality merely because he has criticised governmental decisions or organised political demonstrations.

The Court unequivocally held:

“The action taken by the Respondent–State of Maharashtra of externing the Petitioner, merely for opposing certain decisions of the Government of India, affects the Petitioner’s fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression and also right to live with dignity.” (Para 12)

The observation is significant because it extends the analysis beyond the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a). By invoking Article 21, the Court recognised that an externment order has consequences that reach far beyond physical displacement. It disrupts an individual’s social existence, political participation, livelihood, community ties and personal dignity. The judgment therefore situates externment not merely as an administrative measure but as one carrying profound constitutional implications.

Political opposition cannot be converted into grounds for preventive action

One of the clearest messages emerging from the judgment is that criticism of the government, even if forceful, unpopular or politically inconvenient, does not transform a citizen into a threat to public order.

Throughout the proceedings, the State repeatedly relied upon the petitioner’s participation in protests against governmental decisions, including demonstrations concerning citizenship-related issues and other matters of public controversy. However, Justice Jamdar drew a sharp constitutional distinction between opposition to government policy and conduct that genuinely threatens public safety.

The judgment records that the petitioner’s activities consisted principally of organising agitations, morchas and dharnas against decisions taken by the Government of India. The allegations further indicated that he had raised political slogans and organised demonstrations despite refusal of police permission. Yet none of these circumstances, the Court held, established the statutory conditions necessary for externment. This distinction assumes considerable constitutional importance.

Democratic governments routinely face criticism, protests and organised political mobilisation. If such activities were sufficient to justify preventive measures like externment, the constitutional guarantee of political speech would become contingent upon executive approval. Justice Jamdar’s judgment rejects precisely such an approach. Instead, it reaffirms that disagreement with governmental decisions is not a constitutional anomaly—it is one of the defining characteristics of a functioning democracy.

Precedents invoked in the judgment

1. Reliance on Anuradha Bhasin: Democratic rights cannot be suppressed

The Court’s constitutional reasoning was reinforced by its reliance upon the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India. Although Anuradha Bhasin primarily concerned restrictions imposed under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure following the constitutional changes in Jammu and Kashmir, the principles articulated by the Supreme Court regarding democratic freedoms were considered directly relevant to the present case.

Justice Jamdar noted that the Supreme Court had clearly held that extraordinary executive powers cannot be used as instruments to suppress legitimate expressions of opinion, grievances or democratic rights.

By invoking Anuradha Bhasin, the Bombay High Court placed the present dispute within a broader constitutional jurisprudence recognising that preventive powers must always be exercised consistently with democratic freedoms.

The precedent underscores that constitutional rights cannot be displaced merely because executive authorities find political protests inconvenient or uncomfortable.

2. Support from the Gujarat High Court’s decision on political protests

The Court also relied upon the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Mohmmad Kaleem Taufiq Ahmed Siddiqui v. State of Gujarat, a case involving remarkably similar facts.

Justice Jamdar observed that the Gujarat High Court had considered a situation where an externment order had likewise been issued against a citizen for participating in protests against decisions of the Union Government. The Gujarat High Court held that such circumstances could not legally justify externment and consequently set aside the order.

Finding the reasoning directly applicable, Justice Jamdar held that the principles laid down by both the Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin and the Gujarat High Court squarely governed the present dispute.

The reliance on these precedents strengthens the judgment’s doctrinal foundation by demonstrating that courts across jurisdictions have consistently viewed preventive restrictions on political protest with constitutional scepticism.

3. Externment is an extraordinary measure, not an ordinary administrative tool

The judgment also draws support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepak s/o Laxman Dongre v. State of Maharashtra, which characterised externment as an extraordinary measure because of its direct impact on an individual’s liberty and freedom of movement.

Justice Jamdar reiterated that externment cannot be treated as a routine administrative response to alleged misconduct.

Unlike ordinary criminal prosecution, an externment order effectively banishes an individual from a particular area, restricting movement, disrupting family life, employment and political participation. Such a drastic consequence necessarily demands strict compliance with statutory safeguards and close judicial scrutiny.

The Court’s reasoning reinforces the settled principle that preventive measures must remain exceptional. Administrative convenience or political sensitivity cannot dilute the high threshold established by law.

Externment orders quashed in their entirety

Having found that the statutory conditions under Section 56 were absent, that the authorities’ subjective satisfaction lacked evidentiary support, that the proceedings were vitiated by mala fides, and that the petitioner’s constitutional rights had been infringed, the Court allowed the writ petition in full.

Justice Jamdar quashed both the original externment order dated December 3, 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Chembur, Mumbai, as well as the appellate order dated March 27, 2026 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, thereby completely restoring the petitioner’s rights.

A judgment with wider constitutional significance

Although the immediate dispute concerned the externment of a single political activist, the judgment speaks to a much broader constitutional concern: the increasing use of preventive legal mechanisms against political dissent.

Externment laws were enacted to protect society from individuals whose conduct presents a demonstrable threat to public order or safety. They were never intended to become instruments for regulating political speech or discouraging public protest. Justice Jamdar’s decision restores that distinction.

By insisting that the statutory prerequisites under Section 56 must be established through objective material, by recognising the chilling effect of punitive action against protesters, and by reaffirming that Articles 19 and 21 protect not merely abstract liberties but the practical ability of citizens to oppose governmental decisions, the judgment reinforces a foundational constitutional principle—that democracy cannot function without dissent.

Read alongside the Court’s striking oral observations questioning attempts to criminalise protest, criticising the misuse of police powers, and cautioning against treating political opposition as a threat to public order, the decision stands as a robust reminder that constitutional governance demands tolerance of disagreement. Governments may disagree with protesters, investigate genuine criminality where it exists, and regulate assemblies in accordance with law, but they cannot employ extraordinary preventive powers to exile citizens simply because they challenge those in authority.

In doing so, the Bombay High Court has delivered a judgment that is likely to resonate well beyond the facts of this individual case, strengthening the constitutional jurisprudence on political dissent, preventive policing and the limits of executive power.

The complete judgment may be read below:

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Silence in the Statistics: What NCRB data doesn’t say about dissent

Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill: Bogey of “urban naxals” invoked to legitimise clamping down of dissent?

Mob justice in Bengal? Mahua Moitra’s siege and the High Court’s constitutional message

The post Bombay HC condemns use of externment to silence political dissent; says opposition to government cannot be treated as a crime appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Telangana | Special Court for MPs/MLAs at Hyderabad acquitted MLA Raja Singh in a case registered under Sections 153A(a)(b), 295A, 504, 505(2) and 506 of the IPC.

Raja Singh was arrested by the Mangalhat Police. After the learned Magistrate declined to grant police remand, he…

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

The controversy that sparked nationwide outrage

The origins of the case can be traced to August 2022, when stand-up comedian Munawar Faruqui was scheduled to perform in Hyderabad. Raja Singh, then a BJP MLA representing the Goshamahal Assembly constituency, publicly opposed the event, accusing Faruqui of repeatedly insulting Hindu deities during his comedy performances. Anticipating possible law-and-order issues, the Hyderabad Police placed Singh under preventive house arrest on August 20, 2022, while providing extensive security arrangements to ensure that Faruqui’s performance could proceed peacefully.

Detailed report may be read here.

Within days, however, the controversy escalated dramatically. Raja Singh uploaded a video on his YouTube channel responding to Faruqui’s show. During the course of the video, he made a series of derogatory remarks concerning Prophet Muhammad, including references that many Muslims considered deeply offensive and blasphemous. The video spread rapidly across multiple social media platforms, provoking immediate condemnation from religious organisations, civil society groups and political leaders.

The remarks came at an especially sensitive time. Only weeks earlier, India had witnessed a diplomatic crisis after controversial comments about Prophet Muhammad by former BJP spokesperson Nupur Sharma had triggered protests across several countries and sharp criticism from governments in the Gulf and other Muslim-majority nations. Against this backdrop, Raja Singh’s statements were viewed as another flashpoint capable of inflaming already fragile communal relations.

Hyderabad witness widespread protests

Public anger against Raja Singh’s remarks was swift and intense. Thousands of people assembled across different parts of Hyderabad, particularly in the Old City, demanding his immediate arrest. Large demonstrations were organised outside the office of Hyderabad Police Commissioner C.V. Anand, while protest marches and public gatherings took place in several neighbourhoods including Shalibanda, Mangalhat and Charminar.

The protests continued for several days, with demonstrators alleging that repeated instances of hate speech by political leaders were being met with inadequate legal action. Protesters raised slogans, burnt effigies of Raja Singh and demanded strict criminal prosecution.

The demonstrations eventually turned volatile in certain areas. Reports indicated incidents of stone-pelting, clashes between sections of protesters and the police, and the use of baton charges by law enforcement to disperse crowds. Several protesters were detained. Authorities deployed additional police personnel, Rapid Action Force contingents and paramilitary forces to restore order. Educational institutions, commercial establishments and fuel stations in parts of Hyderabad remained closed as a precaution amid fears of communal violence.

The scale of the protests reflected the seriousness with which the Muslim community viewed the remarks and underscored the potential of inflammatory political speech to disturb public order in communally sensitive environments.

Criminal proceedings initiated

Following multiple complaints, the Mangalhat Police registered a criminal case against Raja Singh under several provisions of the Indian Penal Code dealing with communal hatred and public disorder.

The charges included:

• Section 153A IPC for promoting enmity between different religious groups;
• Section 295A IPC for deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings;
• Section 504 IPC for intentional insult likely to provoke breach of peace;
• Section 505(2) IPC for statements promoting hatred, enmity or ill-will between different communities; and
• Section 506 IPC relating to criminal intimidation.

These provisions constitute the principal statutory framework under which hate speech prosecutions have traditionally been pursued in India. Their application generally requires the prosecution to establish not merely that offensive words were spoken, but that the speech satisfied specific statutory ingredients such as deliberate intention, malicious conduct or promotion of communal hatred.

Arrest, release and preventive detention

Raja Singh was initially arrested on August 23, 2022. However, a magistrate declined to grant police custody owing to procedural deficiencies in the remand application, resulting in his release shortly thereafter.

The Hyderabad Police subsequently took the unusual step of invoking the Telangana Preventive Detention Act. On August 25, 2022, Singh was re-arrested under preventive detention on the ground that his repeated speeches and activities posed a continuing threat to public order and communal harmony.

The invocation of preventive detention against a sitting legislator attracted significant public attention. Preventive detention laws are ordinarily reserved for situations where authorities believe that ordinary criminal law is insufficient to prevent imminent threats to public order. Their use against an elected representative underscored the seriousness with which the administration viewed the potential consequences of Singh’s speeches.

Raja Singh remained in detention for approximately seventy-seven days before the Telangana High Court quashed the detention order in November 2022 and directed his release on bail.

BJP distances itself

The controversy also produced immediate political consequences. Within hours of Raja Singh’s arrest, the Bharatiya Janata Party suspended him from the party and issued a show-cause notice. The suspension came amid intense domestic and international scrutiny over inflammatory remarks concerning Prophet Muhammad by BJP leaders.

Party spokespersons publicly stated that the BJP did not endorse hate speech or statements capable of hurting religious sentiments. Political commentators widely viewed the suspension as an attempt to contain the growing controversy, particularly in light of the diplomatic fallout that had followed earlier controversies involving party spokespersons.

Despite the suspension, Raja Singh remained politically influential within Telangana. Before the 2023 Assembly elections, the BJP revoked his suspension, renominated him from Goshamahal, and he successfully retained his Assembly seat. In 2025, however, he resigned from the BJP following disagreements over the appointment of the Telangana state party president.

Trial before the Special Court

The criminal proceedings continued before the Special Court designated to hear cases involving Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assemblies.

Over the course of nearly four years, the prosecution examined witnesses, produced documentary material and relied upon recordings of the disputed speech. The defence, on the other hand, challenged both the evidentiary basis of the prosecution and the interpretation of the statements attributed to Raja Singh.

Following the judgment, as reported by ANI, defence counsel Advocate K. Karuna Sagar stated that the complainant himself had acknowledged during cross-examination that certain portions of the disputed speech referred to material found in Islamic literature. According to the defence, after evaluating the witness testimony and documentary evidence, the court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the ingredients of the alleged offences. The court consequently acquitted Raja Singh of all charges after holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

#WATCH | Hyderabad, Telangana: Karunasagar, High Court advocate says, “Today the Special MP/MLA Court has acquitted MLA Raja Singh from the 2022 case which was registered by PS Mangalat for allegedly commenting on the life of Prophet Muhammad. The complainant in the case has… https://t.co/Ds7zQyzt3U pic.twitter.com/YqltQwRjkE

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

Raja Singh’s response

Following the acquittal, while speaking to ANI, Raja Singh described the judgment as a “victory of truth, justice and the rule of law.”

He maintained that he had never intended to hurt the religious sentiments of any community and alleged that the criminal case, along with his preventive detention, had been initiated under political pressure exerted by the AIMIM upon the then Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) government.

He further claimed that several other criminal cases registered against him under successive governments were politically motivated and expressed confidence that he would eventually secure acquittal in those proceedings as well.

#WATCH | Hyderabad, Telangana: BJP MLA Raja Singh says, “A case was registered against me in 2022, alleging that I had made comments about someone’s deity; under pressure from the AIMIM, the then BRS government and police invoked the PD Act (Preventive Detention Act) and kept me… https://t.co/Ds7zQyzt3U pic.twitter.com/9EMfAnjsvE

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

A history of inflammatory speeches

Although acquitted in this particular prosecution, Raja Singh continues to remain one of India’s most controversial political figures because of his long history of inflammatory communal rhetoric.

Over the past decade, numerous FIRs have been registered against him alleging hate speech, promotion of communal enmity and incitement. His speeches have frequently targeted Muslims and other minority communities and have repeatedly attracted criticism from civil society organisations and human rights groups.

On July 16, 2024, Citizens for Justice and Peace sent three separate complaints to relevant authorities of Maharashtra against three separate incidents of hate speeches delivered by BJP MLA Raja Singh in the month of May. In all the three incidents highlighted in the complaint, BJP MLA Raja Singh can be heard delivered provocative and inflammatory statements against the Muslim community at events organised by the Sakal Hindu Samaj.  Details may be read here.

A dedicated profile of Raja Singh may be viewed here.

The broader legal questions

The acquittal illustrates one of the most persistent challenges in hate speech litigation in India. Public outrage, widespread protests or even deeply offensive speech do not automatically translate into criminal conviction. Criminal courts remain bound by the foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence, requiring the prosecution to establish every element of the alleged offences beyond reasonable doubt through admissible evidence.

At the same time, the judgment should not be understood as judicial approval of the speech itself. The court’s conclusion is confined to the evidence presented during trial and the prosecution’s inability to satisfy the high evidentiary threshold required for conviction under the Indian Penal Code.

The case therefore exposes a broader structural issue within India’s legal framework. Existing provisions such as Sections 153A and 295A IPC—now substantially reflected in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita—continue to be the principal statutory tools used to prosecute hate speech.

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The post From Outrage to Acquittal: The Raja Singh hate speech case comes to a close appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a significant interim order passed by Justice S.R. Krishna Kumar at the Kalaburagi Bench, the Court stayed the endorsement issued by the Basavakalyan Tehsildar refusing permission for the event. However, while allowing the convention to proceed, the Court carefully moulded the relief by placing strict conditions upon both the organisers and the invited religious leader whose proposed participation had triggered the controversy.

Most notably, the Court directed that Kaneri Mutt seer Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji may physically attend the event but shall not deliver any speech whatsoever, either personally or through any other individual. The restriction addresses the very basis on which the State had denied permission, namely the apprehension that his speech could provoke communal disharmony and disturb law and order.

State’s refusal based on anticipated law-and-order concerns

The petition was filed by the President of the Samavesha Utsava Samiti, challenging the Tehsildar’s endorsement dated, June 11 refusing permission for the proposed convention. Along with an accompanying procession to be held at either the Akkamahadevi College premises or the Basaveshwara ITI Auditorium.

The State justified its refusal by pointing to the invited seer’s previous public statements, alleging that he had repeatedly used derogatory, insulting and provocative language against the Lingayat community and followers of Basavanna. According to the authorities, those statements had previously led to widespread protests and objections from several Lingayat organisations, including the Karnataka Lingayat Mathadhipatigala Okkoota and the Basavanpura Association.

Given this background, the administration expressed apprehension that permitting both the event and the seer’s speech could result in serious disturbances and communal unrest.

Advocate General highlights existing injunction against seer

Appearing for the State, Advocate General Shashikiran Shetty argued before the High Court that the authorities’ concerns were not speculative but were founded upon the seer’s previous conduct.

The State further pointed out that there already exists an interim injunction restraining the seer from making defamatory statements against members of the Lingayat community. In light of that background, the Advocate General submitted that allowing the seer to publicly address a large gathering carried a substantial risk of triggering confrontation between rival religious groups and disrupting public peace.

Organisers and seer offer undertakings before Court

During the proceedings, as per LiveLaw, the High Court sought assurances from both the organisers and the invited seer.

Pursuant to the Court’s earlier directions issued on June 18, separate affidavits were filed by the organising committee and Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji. The organisers undertook to conduct the programme peacefully, ensure compliance with any conditions imposed by the authorities, and cooperate in maintaining public order.

The seer, for his part, furnished an unconditional undertaking that he would neither deliver a speech himself nor communicate any speech indirectly through another person during the programme. These undertakings ultimately became central to the Court’s decision.

Court permits event but removes the source of apprehension

After considering the affidavits and rival submissions, the Court concluded that the principal apprehension expressed by the State related to the possibility of inflammatory speeches rather than the mere holding of the religious gathering itself.

Justice Krishna Kumar observed that the categorical undertaking furnished by the seer substantially addressed the concerns which had prompted the authorities to reject permission in the first place.

Accordingly, while staying the Tehsildar’s endorsement refusing permission, the Court allowed the convention to proceed subject to carefully crafted safeguards intended to preserve public order.

In doing so, the Court effectively separated the constitutional right to hold a peaceful assembly from the specific activity that the State feared might trigger violence.

Strict conditions imposed

The High Court made it clear that its permission was neither unconditional nor absolute. Among the most significant conditions imposed are:

• Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji may remain physically present at the convention but shall not make any speech or address the gathering either directly or indirectly.
• Attendance at the programme shall not exceed 2,500 persons.
• No procession shall be conducted before or after the programme.
• No participant shall deliver hate speech or make statements capable of disturbing communal harmony or public order.
• No abusive language or insults directed at any political leader, religious leader, religious denomination or ethnic community shall be permitted.
• Any breach of these conditions would expose the organisers to legal consequences and liability.

The Court also took note of the State’s submission regarding limited police deployment and observed that restricting the gathering and prohibiting a procession would assist in ensuring adequate maintenance of law and order.

Judicial balancing between fundamental rights and public order

The interim order illustrates the judiciary’s attempt to reconcile two competing constitutional considerations. On one hand lies the right to peacefully assemble and organise religious or public events, protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. On the other lies the State’s constitutional obligation to maintain public order and prevent violence, particularly where previous incidents and existing judicial orders indicate a real possibility of inflammatory speech leading to communal tensions.

Instead of either completely prohibiting the event or allowing it without restriction, the High Court adopted a narrowly tailored approach. By permitting the gathering while restraining the individual whose speech constituted the primary source of concern, the Court sought to preserve constitutional freedoms without ignoring legitimate public-order considerations. The order therefore reflects an exercise in judicial balancing rather than an endorsement of unrestricted executive discretion or an absolute assertion of free speech.

Significance of the order

The case also demonstrates that while prior restraints on speech are generally viewed with constitutional caution, courts may be willing to impose narrowly framed restrictions in exceptional circumstances where there exists credible material suggesting an imminent threat to public order.

Equally significant is the Court’s insistence that no participant, not merely the invited seer, shall engage in hate speech or make statements targeting political figures, religious leaders or communities. By extending responsibility to the organisers themselves, the Court reinforces the principle that those conducting large public gatherings bear a corresponding obligation to ensure that constitutional freedoms are exercised responsibly and without endangering communal harmony.

The matter has been directed to be listed again on July 1, 2026, when the High Court will consider the case further while the interim protection granted to the organisers continues to operate subject to the conditions imposed.

The complete order may be read below:

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The post Karnataka HC allows Hindu convention but bars invitee seer from speaking to prevent law-and-order concerns appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Almost immediately after Additional District and Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced the accused to life imprisonment, on June 12, 2026, the focus of public discourse shifted away from the evidence, the findings of the court and the legal reasoning contained in the judgment. Instead, the controversy was deliberately reframed around the religious identity of the judge. Rather than questioning the correctness of the verdict through legal argument, sections of the cow vigilante movement, Hindutva organisations and right-wing commentators portrayed the decision as the product of the judge’s Muslim identity. The result was the systematic communalisation of an ordinary criminal proceeding.

As reported by Newslaundry, the atmosphere outside the courtroom became tense immediately after the judgment was pronounced. Family members of the convicted men protested as the police began taking the convicts into custody. Relatives reportedly lay down in front of police vehicles in an attempt to prevent their transportation. According to Hazari Lal Gurjar, President of the local Bar Association, it was during these immediate protests that the issue first began to acquire a communal colour. What had begun as emotional reactions by the families of convicted persons quickly transformed into a larger narrative portraying the judgment itself as an attack on Hindus because the presiding judge happened to be Muslim.

The shift was significant. Criminal courts are expected to determine guilt on the basis of evidence placed before them. The personal religion, caste or background of a judge has no legal relevance to the adjudicatory process. Yet, rather than engaging with the court’s findings regarding unlawful assembly, common object, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and the brutality of the assault, attention rapidly shifted towards Judge Khan herself. In effect, the messenger of justice became more important than the message.

Background of the judgment

Before discussing the communal campaign against Judge Tabassum Khan, it is important to understand the significance of the judgment itself. The controversy did not arise in a legal vacuum. It followed a detailed trial concerning the brutal lynching of Nazir Ahmed, who was attacked while transporting cattle through Madhya Pradesh in August 2022. After examining eyewitness testimonies, medical evidence, forensic reports, recoveries made during investigation and other documentary material, the Sessions Court concluded that the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The court held that the accused had formed an unlawful assembly, intercepted the vehicle, violently assaulted the victims with deadly weapons and were collectively responsible for the murder of Nazir Ahmed and the attempted murder of the two surviving victims.

In a significant aspect of the judgment, Additional District and Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan expressly recognised the offence as one of mob lynching, observing that the prosecution had successfully established that the accused had acted as members of an unlawful assembly and had committed a brutal act of collective violence. While considering the question of sentence, the Court treated the mob nature of the crime as an aggravating circumstance. It emphasised the exceptional brutality of the assault, the fatal injuries inflicted upon Nazir Ahmed, the serious injuries suffered by the surviving victims, and the fact that the accused had acted in concert while armed with deadly weapons. The judgment thus acknowledged not merely the commission of murder but the distinct menace posed by vigilante violence carried out by organised groups.

The Court nevertheless declined to impose the death penalty. Relying on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, Machi Singh v. State of Punjab and Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (or as cited in the judgment, Santosh Kumar Singh), Judge Khan held that the case did not satisfy the stringent “rarest of rare” threshold governing capital punishment. Instead, the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment for murder under Sections 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, along with separate sentences for rioting and the attempted murder of the surviving victims. The judgment thus represented a careful application of settled criminal law principles, balancing the gravity of the offence with the constitutional limitations governing the imposition of the death penalty. Most crucially, it upheld the path of reformative rather than retributive justice.

Far from being an arbitrary or summary decision, the verdict was a reasoned judicial determination running through the evidence in considerable detail. Yet, rather than engaging with the Court’s legal reasoning or challenging its findings before the appellate courts, the public discourse surrounding the case rapidly shifted away from the judgment itself. The evidence, legal analysis and findings of the trial court were overshadowed by a campaign that sought to question the verdict on the basis of the religious identity of the judge, setting the stage for one of the most disturbing instances of communal targeting of a serving judicial officer in recent years.

The detailed report may be read here.

Organised protests and the manufacture of a communal narrative

What initially appeared to be local dissatisfaction soon evolved into a coordinated campaign extending beyond the district in which the trial had taken place. Reports published by Newslaundry, Siasat and other news organisations indicate that several self-described cow protection organisations and Hindutva groups organised protests condemning the verdict, not primarily on legal grounds but by questioning the religious identity and impartiality of the judge.

Among the most visible organisations participating in these protests was the Gau Raksha Parishad. Demonstrations were organised in which effigies of Judge Tabassum Khan were publicly burnt while slogans branding her “anti-Hindu” were raised. Rather than calling for appellate review of the judgment, the demonstrations sought to portray the conviction itself as an act of religious discrimination against Hindus. The symbolism of burning a judge’s effigy represented a significant escalation from criticism of a judicial decision to the personal targeting of a serving judicial officer.

According to Newslaundry, these demonstrations did not remain confined to Madhya Pradesh. On June 22, members of Gau Raksha Parishad organised a ‘protest’ in Peer Muchalla in Mohali, Punjab, where demonstrators burned an effigy of Judge Khan while shouting slogans demanding the release of the convicted men. Similar protests were subsequently reported from Uttar Pradesh, where members of the Antarrashtriya Hindu Parishad-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal staged demonstrations against the judgment inside government premises! Authorities in that state allowed these unchecked. The geographical spread of these ‘protests’ suggested that the issue had acquired national dimensions, fuelled largely through coordinated organisational and social media mobilisation rather than any fresh legal developments in the case. As significantly, they signified powerful political patronage behind the acts.

Equally revealing was the language adopted by many protesters. Instead of describing the judgment as legally incorrect or identifying alleged errors in the appreciation of evidence, the demonstrations repeatedly referred to Judge Khan’s religion. Her Muslim identity became the principal basis upon which the legitimacy of the judgment was questioned. This represented a dangerous inversion of constitutional values. Judicial decisions are meant to be evaluated through legal reasoning, not through the religious identity of the individual delivering them.

Social media as a vehicle for intimidation

The campaign rapidly migrated from public demonstrations to social media, where it assumed an even more disturbing form. An extensive online campaign filled with communal abuse, personal attacks and threats directed specifically at Judge Khan.

Numerous social media posts reportedly described her as “anti-Hindu” and questioned her ability to dispense impartial justice because she was Muslim. Others employed openly derogatory communal slurs directed at Muslim women. These posts did not merely criticise the verdict; they sought to delegitimise Judge Khan’s authority as a judicial officer by reducing her identity to her religion. Gender dimensions of targeted majoritarian abuse have been increasingly common phenomenon witnessed by Muslim women in public life at multiple levels.

Several videos circulated widely across social media platforms, amplifying these narratives before large audiences. One of the most disturbing videos reportedly featured an individual using deeply offensive communal language while referring to the judge and warning that there would be a “bloodbath” if the convicted men were not released within ten days. The individual threatened violence extending beyond Madhya Pradesh and attempted to portray the judicial verdict as justification for communal mobilisation.

Judge: ADJ Tabassum Khan

14 गौ रक्षकों को सुनाई उमर क़ैद की सजा

ADJ Tabassum Khan जैसे लोग कितना भी
पढ़ ले मक़सद इनका एक ही रहता है हिंदू काफिर है

जो पहले अपने मजबह को देखते बाद में संविधान
को वो कभी न्याय नहीं कर सकते

हिंदुओं ऐसे लोगो से देश से भगाना जरूरी है pic.twitter.com/mNHeVWSbvQ

— Amrendra Bahubali (@TheBahubali_IND) June 17, 2026

Hindutva Scum calls for killing of a judge who sent 7 criminals to jail for lynching a Muslim

Instead of arresting the scum,MHA
Cyber Cell sent me a notice to remove the video or face action

Only in India,a criminal goes scot free while the whistleblower faces intimidation pic.twitter.com/VKcLJRLUDL

— Nehr_who? (@Nher_who) June 26, 2026

Another widely circulated video showed a self-described cow protector standing beside a truck transporting cattle. Rather than discussing the legal findings of the Sessions Court, he argued that cow protection groups should no longer intercept vehicles because those who had done so in the present case had been sentenced to life imprisonment. He went further by declaring that Judge Tabassum Khan would have to reverse her decision and called upon cow protection groups from Agra and other regions to organise protests against her.

Such statements represented an outright attack on India’s constitutional structure governing criminal justice. Judicial orders are not reversed because of public demonstrations or threats of violence. They are challenged through appeals before superior courts. The repeated demands that the judge herself “reverse” the judgment fundamentally misunderstood—and arguably rejected—the institutional framework of the Indian judiciary.

Amplification by influential public figures

The controversy received additional momentum when influential right-wing personalities publicly endorsed the campaign against the judgment. Among the most prominent was Sudarshan News editor Suresh Chavhanke.

14 गौ रक्षकों को उम्रक़ैद.. जज तबस्सुम ख़ान के फैसले पर न्याय संग्राम

देखें #बिंदास_बोल मेरे साथ @DrMohanYadav51 https://t.co/4gJZkzlUfh

— Dr. Suresh Chavhanke “Sudarshan News” (@SureshChavhanke) June 19, 2026

As reported by Newslaundry, Chavhanke described the Sessions Court’s judgment as “judicial lynching” during a televised programme. Declaring his solidarity with the convicted men and their families, he stated: “We stand with all the gau-rakshaks and their families. This fight is not yours alone; it is ours too.”

The significance of such statements lies not merely in their criticism of the verdict but in the authority and reach of the platform from which they were delivered. When prominent media personalities portray judicial decisions as manifestations of religious bias without engaging with the reasoning contained in the judgment, they contribute to the erosion of public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. Such narratives risk encouraging audiences to view judges not as neutral adjudicators but as representatives of religious communities.

Police intervention and criminal investigation

As the campaign intensified, law enforcement authorities eventually intervened. According to Newslaundry, the Seoni Malwa Police registered a First Information Report after taking suo- motu cognisance of the communal and threatening material circulating online.

Station House Officer Sudhakar Bhaskar confirmed that the FIR had been registered against individuals responsible for communal posts and videos under relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. He further stated that the cyber cell had been tasked with identifying the origin of the viral videos, tracing those responsible for their circulation and continuously monitoring social media platforms for additional inflammatory content.

The registration of the FIR reflected official recognition that the controversy had moved beyond ordinary criticism of a judicial verdict. The campaign contained elements capable of promoting communal hostility, intimidating a judicial officer and potentially disturbing public order. Police intervention therefore became necessary not to suppress legitimate criticism but to investigate conduct that allegedly crossed the threshold into criminal intimidation and hate speech.

Concern within the legal community

The developments also generated widespread concern among members of the legal fraternity. Hazari Lal Gurjar, President of the Bar Association, questioned why stronger institutional measures had not been initiated despite the communal targeting of a serving judicial officer. Speaking to Newslaundry, he expressed concern that a woman judge was facing communal abuse, gendered insults and threats of violence while the higher judiciary had not initiated suo motu contempt proceedings or taken more visible action to protect judicial independence.

Former Chief Judicial Magistrate Pawan Kumar similarly emphasised that the rule of law provides an established remedy for any litigant dissatisfied with a judgment. The correctness of judicial decisions is examined by appellate courts through structured legal procedures, not by personal attacks directed at judges. Public confidence in the judiciary depends upon preserving this distinction.

Several lawyers also reportedly observed that many of those criticising the judgment had not actually read it. According to Advocate Sumit Gehlot, quoted by Newslaundry, much of the outrage appeared to stem from hearsay rather than any informed engagement with the evidence analysed by the court.

Senior Congress leader Pawan Khera also spoke out on social media in support of Judge Tabassum Khan, and said “On June 12, 2026, First Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced seven men to life imprisonment for the 2022 lynching of Najir Ahmed. All the convicts are indeed Hindu men. But they were not convicted because of their religion; they were convicted because the investigation found them guilty of rioting, attempted murder and murder. Yet our Hindu brother in the video is not outraged by their behaviour. His outrage is reserved for one fact alone: that the judge who convicted them is a Muslim woman. In any civilised society, such bigotry would invite swift legal action. In Modi’s India, however, this man spewing hate walks free while notices are sent to those questioning his conduct. Jai ho!”

On June 12, 2026, First Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced seven men to life imprisonment for the 2022 lynching of Najir Ahmed.

All the convicts are indeed Hindu men. But they were not convicted because of their religion; they were convicted because the… https://t.co/xzccM88CHv

— Pawan Khera ಪವನ್ ಖೇರಾ (@Pawankhera) June 26, 2026

An attack on judicial independence

The events following Judge Tabassum Khan’s verdict raise constitutional concerns extending far beyond the facts of one criminal case. Judicial independence forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution and requires judges to decide cases without fear, favour, affection or ill will. This principle necessarily includes protection from organised campaigns of communal intimidation.

Public criticism of judicial decisions is entirely legitimate in a constitutional democracy. Courts are not immune from scrutiny, and judgments are frequently debated, criticised and overturned by appellate courts. However, there exists a profound distinction between criticising judicial reasoning and attacking a judge because of her religion.

The campaign against Judge Khan sought to erase this distinction. Rather than analysing the evidence relied upon by the Sessions Court or identifying legal errors warranting appellate interference, sections of the protest movement suggested that the judgment itself lacked legitimacy because it had been authored by a Muslim judge. Such narratives threaten to transform the judiciary into another arena of communal polarisation, where judicial authority depends not upon constitutional office but upon religious identity.

The implications extend well beyond one individual judge. If judges are made to fear organised campaigns of vilification whenever they deliver decisions against politically influential groups, the independence of the judiciary itself is weakened. The message conveyed is that legal reasoning may become secondary to identity-based mobilisation and that adverse judgments may invite not merely appeals but sustained communal intimidation. In a legal system governed by the rule of law, judges must be assessed on the strength of their reasoning and the legality of their decisions; not on the basis of their religion, gender or personal identity. Preserving that principle is essential not only for the safety of individual judges but for maintaining public confidence in the impartial administration of justice itself.

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Mob lynching: Three separate incidents surface, even minors and partially disabled Muslims not safe

Another cow lynching in Nashik, one dead

Maharashtra’s shame: Cow lynching episode reported in Nashik

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The post Judging the Judge: The communal backlash against a lynching verdict appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As public criticism mounted, the Government maintained that the clarification represented no change in legal position. Rather, officials asserted that passports had never been proof of citizenship. Quoting the statutory scheme of the Passports Act, officials argued that the Act itself contemplates the issuance of passports and travel documents to certain categories of non-citizens and therefore possession of a passport cannot constitute conclusive proof of citizenship. Government officials further justified their position by relying upon a 2013 judgment of the Bombay High Court, asserting that the Court had already held that a passport is not proof of citizenship. As reported by The Times of India, an official stated:

“It was not decided yesterday that the passport is not proof of citizenship. It was not even decided in the last 12 years. The passport has never been a proof of citizenship. Passports Act 1967 says that passports can be given to non-citizens. Judgments of Bombay HC from 2013 have also made it clear a passport is not proof of citizenship.”

The same report explained that the Government’s position rested upon two propositions: first, that the Passports Act allows passports or travel documents to be issued in limited situations to non-citizens; and secondly, that the Bombay High Court had recognised that possession of a passport cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of citizenship. Similar explanations appeared in media coverage by The Hindu, The Indian Express and other national newspapers, many of which reproduced the Government’s reliance on the Bombay High Court decision.

Even at first glance, the official explanation is not persuasive. The Times of India report itself mentions that the passport issued was subsequently terminated, suggesting that this case needs to be looked at in its specificity and is not illustrative. Sabrangindia has accessed the hitherto unavailable, unreported 2013 judgement (see below). A closer examination of both the statutory framework and the Bombay High Court judgment reveals that the legal position is considerably more nuanced. More importantly, it raises the question whether the Government has relied upon the Bombay High Court decision for a proposition that the Court itself never decided.

The statutory scheme of the Passports Act, 1967

The Passports Act, 1967 was enacted “to provide for the issue of passports and travel documents, to regulate the departure from India of citizens of India and other persons and for matters incidental or ancillary thereto.” The title of the Act itself demonstrates that Parliament recognised that travel documentation may occasionally be issued not only to Indian citizens but also to “other persons.”

This distinction is significant. The Act governs travel documentation, whereas citizenship is regulated independently by the Citizenship Act, 1955. The two enactments undoubtedly operate in different legal spheres. A passport is issued under one statute; citizenship is acquired, determined and regulated under another.

However, it does not necessarily follow that because a statute permits the issuance of travel documents to certain categories of non-citizens, every passport issued under the Act loses all evidentiary value regarding citizenship. The Government’s argument conflates two distinct legal propositions.

The first proposition, that citizenship is determined under the Citizenship Act, is unquestionably correct.

The second proposition, that a passport therefore has no evidentiary significance regarding citizenship, does not automatically follow from the first.

The Passports Act envisages exceptional circumstances in which travel documentation may be issued to non-citizens, such as certificates of identity, emergency certificates and other recognised travel documents issued in accordance with domestic law and international obligations. These exceptional statutory situations cannot be used to erase the ordinary legal presumption that accompanies the issuance of a passport to an Indian citizen after verification by the Passport Authority. The existence of exceptions does not determine the legal character of the general rule.

Indeed, the very process prescribed under the Passports Act and the Passport Rules demonstrates that issuance of a passport ordinarily follows verification of the applicant’s identity, nationality and supporting documents. While this verification may not amount to a judicial determination of citizenship, it would be equally incorrect to suggest that the exercise is legally meaningless or that a valid passport carries no evidentiary weight whatsoever.

The Bombay High Court Judgment: What did the court actually decide?

The Government’s principal judicial authority for its present position is the Bombay High Court’s decision in Anwar Hussain Abdul Kadar Shaikh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2013). The judgment, delivered by Justice K.U. Chandiwal in July 2013, has been cited in official explanations as establishing that “a passport is not proof of citizenship.”

A careful reading of the judgment, however, reveals something quite different. The applicants had been convicted under the Foreigners Act and the Passport (Entry into India) Rules. Before the High Court, they sought to rely upon several documents—including passports, Aadhaar cards and a birth certificate—to establish that they were Indian citizens. Their principal submission was that these documents had not been produced before the trial court and therefore the matter ought to be remanded for reconsideration.

The High Court declined to interfere. Crucially, however, the Court did not reject the passport because passports are incapable of evidencing citizenship. Instead, it rejected reliance on the particular passport produced before it because the passport had already been terminated.

The Court expressly observed:

“However, the passport to which the learned Counsel gave reference is already terminated passport. Therefore, no legal basis can be achieved for its reliance.” (Para 3)

This sentence constitutes the heart of the judgment. The Court’s reasoning was document-specific. It was not analysing the evidentiary value of a valid passport. Rather, it held that a passport whose legal validity had already been terminated could no longer furnish a legal basis for establishing citizenship.

The Court thereafter turned to the remaining documentary evidence. It observed that although one applicant had produced a birth certificate, the statutory requirements governing citizenship by birth had not been satisfied because no evidence had been adduced establishing that the applicant’s parents were Indian citizens. Consequently, the applicants had failed to discharge the evidentiary burden necessary to establish citizenship under the Citizenship Act.

The judgment therefore rests upon two independent factual conclusions. First, the passport relied upon had already been terminated. Secondly, the applicants had otherwise failed to establish citizenship through admissible documentary evidence.

Neither finding amounts to a declaration that all valid passports are legally incapable of evidencing citizenship.

Why the termination of the passport matters

The fact that the passport had already been terminated is not an incidental factual detail; it is the central reason why the Court declined to rely upon it.

Section 10 of the Passports Act empowers the Passport Authority to vary, impound or revoke a passport in specified circumstances. A passport may be revoked where it has been obtained by fraud, suppression of material information or misrepresentation; where the holder has ceased to be an Indian citizen; where criminal proceedings are pending; where the holder has contravened the provisions of the Act or the conditions subject to which the passport was issued; or where revocation is considered necessary in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or the interests of the general public. Once a passport is revoked or terminated under the statutory framework, it ceases to enjoy the legal validity that attaches to a subsisting passport.

This distinction fundamentally alters the significance of the Bombay High Court’s reasoning. The Court was not confronted with a valid passport issued and continuing under the statutory scheme. It was confronted with a passport whose legal efficacy had already been extinguished. Unsurprisingly, the Court held that “no legal basis” existed for relying upon such a document.

To extend this reasoning to conclude that every valid passport issued by the Government of India is incapable of evidencing citizenship is to read the judgment far beyond its factual and legal context.

Reading the judgment beyond its ratio

It is a settled principle of judicial precedent that a decision is authority only for what it actually decides. Courts have repeatedly cautioned against extracting broad legal propositions from judgments without regard to the factual matrix in which they were rendered.

Measured against this principle, the Government’s reliance on Anwar Hussain appears to stretch the judgment beyond its actual ratio. The High Court never analysed whether a valid passport constitutes prima facie evidence of citizenship. It never considered the evidentiary status of passports issued after statutory verification. Nor did it hold that a valid passport can never be relied upon in citizenship proceedings. Those questions simply did not arise because the passport before the Court had already been terminated.

The judgment therefore establishes a much narrower proposition than the one presently attributed to it. It holds only that a terminated passport, coupled with an independent failure to establish citizenship through other admissible evidence, cannot justify interference with a conviction under the Foreigners Act.

The distinction is not merely semantic. It goes to the very heart of the ongoing debate. The Government’s recent clarification has transformed a fact-specific judicial determination into a sweeping proposition of general application. Such an interpretation risks attributing to the Bombay High Court a legal conclusion that it neither articulated nor was required to decide. If the Government seeks to argue that a valid passport should not be treated as proof of citizenship, that proposition must stand on its own statutory and constitutional foundations. It cannot fairly derive unquestioned authority from a judgment that dealt with an already terminated passport and a complete absence of supporting evidence establishing citizenship.

The complete judgment may be read below:

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The post Not What the Court Decided: Re-reading the Bombay High Court’s passport judgment appeared first on SabrangIndia.

That challenge from citizens has now reached the Bombay High Court. This week, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and the Forum Against Oppression of Women filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Special Public Safety Act (MSPSA), contending that the law violates fundamental constitutional guarantees and grants excessive, unchecked powers to the executive. The challenge marks the beginning of a legal test for a legislation that has generated sustained opposition from civil liberties organisations, trade unions, academics, lawyers, students’ groups, political parties and democratic rights movements across Maharashtra.

Importantly, many of the arguments now being advanced before the High Court closely mirror concerns that were repeatedly raised during the legislative process itself. Among the organisations that consistently opposed the legislation was Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), which submitted detailed objections to the Joint Select Committee examining the then Bill, participated in the broader state-wide campaign against the legislation, and warned that the law’s vague provisions could become a tool for suppressing dissent rather than addressing genuine security threats.

A constitutional challenge to the heart of the law

According to the petition filed before the High Court, the Act suffers from a fundamental constitutional defect: it authorises severe restrictions on freedoms of speech, expression, association and assembly without incorporating the procedural safeguards that constitutional jurisprudence requires when the State seeks to limit such rights.

The petition argues that the law violates Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution and undermines broader constitutional principles of liberty, equality and democratic participation. It further contends that the Act creates a framework through which organisations can be declared unlawful on the basis of broad executive discretion, while insulating those decisions from meaningful scrutiny.

Particularly significant is the challenge to the Act’s definitions of “unlawful activity” and “unlawful organisation.” According to the petitioners, these definitions are so broad and vague that they can potentially encompass trade unions, social movements, human rights organisations, political opposition groups and individuals engaged in peaceful dissent.

The challenge therefore strikes at the central architecture of the legislation rather than merely isolated provisions. It asks whether a law ostensibly enacted to combat extremism can constitutionally employ language so expansive that ordinary democratic activity may fall within its ambit.

A warning raised long before the Act was passed

The constitutional challenge did not emerge in a vacuum. For months before the legislation was enacted, Maharashtra witnessed one of the most extensive civil society mobilisations against a proposed law in recent memory. More than 12,750 objections and suggestions were reportedly submitted to the Joint Select Committee examining the Bill, making it one of the largest public responses ever received by the Maharashtra legislature. More than ninety percent of the submissions reportedly opposed the legislation.

Citizens for Justice and Peace was among the organisations at the forefront of this campaign. In April 2025, CJP submitted a detailed objection memorandum to the Joint Select Committee, warning that the legislation posed a serious threat to constitutional freedoms and democratic dissent. CJP argued that the Bill’s framing around the idea of “Urban Naxalism” rested on an inherently vague and politically charged concept that lacked clear legal meaning. Significantly, the organisation pointed out that the Union Ministry of Home Affairs itself had previously stated that it does not use the term “urban naxal” as an official category in dealing with Left-Wing Extremism. CJP warned that a law justified through such an indeterminate concept risked becoming a mechanism for targeting journalists, activists, artists, civil society organisations and political critics rather than genuine security threats.

Today, many of those concerns have reappeared in the constitutional challenge before the High Court.

The battle over “unlawful activity”

One of the most striking parallels between the writ petition and earlier civil society objections concerns the Act’s definition of unlawful activity.

The petition before the High Court argues that the definition is overbroad and vague, allowing the State to invoke the law against a wide range of lawful democratic activities.

CJP’s earlier objections had similarly focused on Section 2(f), arguing that phrases such as conduct that creates a “danger or menace to public order” were left undefined and provided no clear legal standards. According to CJP, terms such as “menace” were capable of subjective interpretation and could permit authorities to categorise ordinary activities as unlawful according to their discretion. The concern was not merely semantic. Constitutional law has long recognised that vague criminal provisions create opportunities for arbitrary enforcement. When citizens cannot reasonably determine what conduct is prohibited, enforcement becomes dependent on the discretion of the executive rather than the rule of law.

That concern now sits at the centre of the High Court challenge.

The question of executive power

The writ petition also challenges the breadth of powers conferred upon the State government to declare organisations unlawful. Again, this reflects a recurring theme in earlier objections raised by civil liberties groups.

CJP argued that the proposed framework granted extraordinary authority to the executive while providing inadequate independent oversight. It questioned the composition of the Advisory Board established under the legislation, noting that members need only be qualified for appointment as High Court judges rather than serving judicial officers. Because appointments are ultimately controlled by the government itself, CJP warned that the mechanism lacked sufficient institutional independence. The broader concern was that a law designed to regulate political organisations and associations should not depend primarily upon executive opinion.

The constitutional challenge now similarly questions whether the legislation creates a system in which governmental discretion is insufficiently constrained by objective standards and procedural safeguards.

Existing laws already covered the field

Another criticism repeatedly advanced by opponents of the legislation was that Maharashtra already possessed an extensive arsenal of security laws.

CJP argued that provisions dealing with terrorism, organised crime, unlawful activities and threats to national security already exist through laws such as the UAPA, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act. It questioned why an additional statute with even broader powers was necessary at all. The constitutional challenge raises a related issue. If existing criminal law already addresses violent extremism and organised criminal activity, what precisely justifies a separate law empowering the State to declare organisations unlawful through broad and vaguely worded standards?

This question becomes especially important because the Act itself repeatedly invokes concerns regarding Left-Wing Extremism while failing to define key terms such as “naxalism” or “left-wing extremist” within its operative provisions.

A state-wide democratic resistance

The present litigation is also the culmination of a much broader political and civic campaign. In April 2025, protests against the Bill were organised across Maharashtra, bringing together civil liberties organisations, workers’ groups, farmers’ organisations, students’ groups, political parties and grassroots movements. Demonstrations took place across dozens of districts and reflected an unusually broad coalition united by concerns regarding civil liberties and democratic freedoms.

CJP played a visible role in that mobilisation, participating in a wider coalition that argued the legislation threatened constitutionally protected rights of speech, association, assembly and protest. The campaign consistently maintained that the law’s vague language created the risk that peaceful political opposition could be conflated with threats to public security. The filing of the writ petition therefore represents not the beginning of resistance to the law, but the latest stage of a struggle that has been unfolding for over a year. The formal objections raised by CJP have been detailed and may be perused here.

Why the High Court’s decision matters

The challenge before the Bombay High Court extends beyond the future of a single state law. At its core lies a constitutional question that has repeatedly confronted Indian courts: how far can the State go in the name of security before constitutional freedoms are impermissibly compromised?

The petition asks whether a law can authorise severe consequences, including the declaration of organisations as unlawful, through definitions that have been described as vague, subjective and susceptible to political misuse. It raises concerns about executive overreach, procedural fairness, access to justice and the protection of democratic dissent.

For organisations such as Citizens for Justice and Peace, the issue has never been whether the State can act against genuine violence or armed insurgency. Rather, the concern has been whether legislation drafted in the language of security can ultimately be deployed against lawful political activity.

The complete dissent note by CJP may be read here.

Detailed reports may be read here, here and here.

Related:

Public Resistance and Democratic Assertion: India through protests, 2025

Dissent Note: The alarming scope of Maharashtra’s Special Public Safety Bill, 2024

Censorship After NEET: A substitute for accountability

The Supreme Court in 2025: When procedure trumped principle

Assam, the third state to pass UCC: Gender justice or targeted communalism the aim?

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