And where is the CCTV footage that could help establish what happened inside the station? Two journalists allege they were assaulted at Delhi’s Saket Police Station.

They allege the assault intensified after police learnt they were Muslim. Teesta Setalvad speaks with Shaheen Khan and Nafeesa Khan about journalism, their experience as Muslim women, their rights as citizens, and the unanswered questions around CCTV footage and police accountability.

The post They Asked Questions. Then Came the Assault: Shaheen & Nafeesa Khan | Teesta Setalvad appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Press Club of India, along with the Indian Women’s Press Corps, Delhi Union of Journalists, Press Association and Kerala Union of Working Journalists, issued a joint statement on September 3 condemning the alleged assault and seeking action against police personnel posted at Saket Police Station, including the Station House Officer (SHO).

The Press Club of India, Indian Women’s Press Corps, Delhi Union of Journalists,
Press Association, and Kerala Union of Working Journalist strongly condemn and
call for punitive action against Delhi Police officials posted at the Saket Police Station,
including the Station House… pic.twitter.com/aC7P19Hbkw

— Press Club of India (@PCITweets) September 3, 2026

Subsequently, the NWMI and the Editors Guild of India also issued separate statements expressing solidarity with the two journalists and calling for an investigation into the allegations. The NWMI demanded that the police personnel allegedly involved be suspended pending inquiry, while the Editors Guild sought an immediate independent and unbiased probe and strict action if the allegations were substantiated.

The Network of Women in Media, India unequivocally condemns the brutal assault on Shaheen Khan and Nafisa Khan, both journalists with 4pm News, and demands strict action against the police personnel involved. pic.twitter.com/Tju6M6egom

— NWMIndia (@NWM_India) September 5, 2026

What the journalists alleged

Shaheen Khan and Nafisa Khan, associated with digital news platform 4PM News Network, were covering the inauguration of a new wing at Max Smart Super Speciality Hospital in Saket on September 3. The event was attended by Union Home Minister Amit Shah and Delhi Chief Minister Rekha Gupta.

According to the journalists and statements subsequently issued by press organisations, the two were stopped by police personnel near the venue when they sought to ask questions as part of their journalistic coverage.

The journalists alleged that they were manhandled and taken to Saket Police Station. They further alleged that they were subsequently taken to a room inside the police station and assaulted by police personnel, including women officers.

According to the NWMI statement, the journalists had sought to ask questions during the event, including queries concerning an alleged cycle scam. NWMI stated that the journalists were allegedly handled roughly near the venue and later beaten at Saket Police Station. It further referred to the journalists’ allegation that the assault intensified after police personnel became aware that both women were Muslim and that religion-specific abuses were allegedly used.

We demand that the police personnel involved in the assault be suspended pending inquiry.

Such attacks on journalists are unconstitutional and against freedom of the press, which is an essential part of freedom of expression.https://t.co/LMuXFhq2nQ

— NWMIndia (@NWM_India) September 5, 2026

On September 5, the Editors Guild of India similarly stated that the journalists had alleged that they were manhandled and taken away in a police vehicle after attempting to pose a question to Delhi Chief Minister Rekha Gupta. According to the Guild’s statement, the two alleged that they were beaten by women police officials at Saket Police Station and subjected to abuse targeting their religion.

Statement on Assault on Women Journalists by Delhi Police pic.twitter.com/cecTcQKjKU

— Editors Guild of India (@IndEditorsGuild) September 5, 2026

Videos circulated by the journalists and their organisation showed injury marks and bruises on their bodies. The allegations led to statements of condemnation and demands for action from several journalists’ organisations.

Delhi Police denies allegations

Delhi Police has, however, rejected the allegations of assault and religious targeting.

According to the police version, the two journalists were briefly detained after allegedly obstructing or violating a designated VVIP route near the event venue. Police officials have described the allegations of assault and religious targeting as “factually incorrect”, “misleading” and baseless.

Reports quoting South Delhi police officials stated that the journalists were asked to move from the designated VVIP security route and were taken to the police station following an altercation. The police have maintained that no physical assault took place.

The Editors Guild of India, while referring to the police version, stated that Delhi Police had maintained that the journalists were removed because of an allegedly improperly parked scooter and obstruction of access. The Guild nevertheless sought an independent and unbiased examination of the allegations.

Thus, the circumstances surrounding the incident remain disputed, with the journalists alleging assault and religious targeting during their detention and Delhi Police denying the allegations.

Press Club and journalists’ organisations seek action

In its joint statement, the Press Club of India, along with the Indian Women’s Press Corps, Delhi Union of Journalists, Press Association and Kerala Union of Working Journalists, called for punitive action against police personnel allegedly involved in the incident.

The organisations urged Delhi Police Commissioner Anurag Kumar to ensure a free and fair investigation into the allegations and called upon the Press Council of India to take suo motu cognisance of the matter and conduct an independent inquiry.

The statement was issued by Press Club of India President Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty and Secretary General Afzal Imam and was supported by the four journalists’ organisations.

NWMI demands suspension pending inquiry

In its statement issued on September 5, the Network of Women in Media, India unequivocally condemned the alleged assault on Shaheen Khan and Nafisa Khan and expressed solidarity with the two journalists.

NWMI urged the Delhi Police Commissioner to investigate the conduct of the police officers allegedly involved and demanded that the personnel accused of assault be suspended pending inquiry. The organisation stated that attacks on journalists were inconsistent with freedom of the press and freedom of expression.

Editors Guild seeks independent and unbiased probe

The Editors Guild of India also strongly condemned the detention and alleged assault of Shaheen Khan and Nafisa Khan by Delhi Police personnel attached to Saket Police Station.

The Guild referred to the journalists’ allegations that they were manhandled near the event venue, taken to the police station and assaulted by women police officials. It also noted the allegations concerning religion-specific abuse.

Referring to the injury marks shown by the journalists in videos, the Editors Guild called for an immediate independent and unbiased investigation into the allegations.

The Guild demanded strict action against police personnel if the allegations against them were substantiated. The statement was issued by Editors Guild of India President Sanjay Kapoor and General Secretary Raghavan Srinivasan.

Demand for CCTV footage and legal action

Following the incident, the journalists and representatives of 4PM News Network sought the preservation and release of CCTV footage from Saket Police Station.

The journalists have maintained that CCTV footage could establish what transpired inside the police station. Reports stated that Shaheen Khan and Nafisa Khan, along with their editor Sanjay Sharma, were considering approaching the Delhi High Court seeking preservation and production of the relevant CCTV footage.

According to reports, Sharma said that the police personnel found responsible should face action and that the CCTV footage should be made available for examination.

Background

The incident took place during the inauguration of a new wing at Max Smart Super Speciality Hospital in Saket. Shaheen Khan and Nafisa Khan have said they were present in the area for journalistic coverage of the event and had sought to question the Delhi Chief Minister.

Their allegations of detention and assault emerged through videos and social media posts on September 3, following which the Press Club of India and several other journalists’ organisations issued statements demanding accountability.

The Network of Women in Media, India issued its statement on September 5, followed by the Editors Guild of India’s demand for an independent and unbiased inquiry. The statements by the organisations have collectively called for an examination of the allegations, accountability for police personnel if wrongdoing is established and protection of journalists carrying out their professional duties.

Delhi Police has maintained that the journalists were detained because of an alleged obstruction of the designated VVIP route and has denied allegations of physical assault and religious targeting. 

The differing accounts have made an independent inquiry, including examination of available CCTV footage and other evidence, central to the demands raised by the journalists and press bodies.

Related

Two women journalists allege police assault after questioning Delhi CM, say attack intensified after police heard they were Muslim

Maharashtra’s schools are struggling to survive as students protest, infrastructure crumbles and Marathi-medium institutions disappear

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The post Press bodies condemn alleged assault on women journalists at Saket Police Station, seek inquiry and action appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In an important first, the court has directed the Assam government to pay Begum interim compensation of ₹2 lakh. More significantly, however, the judgment raises disturbing questions about the manner in which the Foreigners Tribunal, police and State authorities operated in her case—and whether the machinery of citizenship determination was used to prevent judicial scrutiny rather than facilitate it.

As per the Scroll report, the Gauhati High Court bench of Justice Kalyan Rai Surana and Justice Susmita Phukan Khaund found that the conduct of the Nagaon Foreigners Tribunal displayed an apparent “malice in law”. The court went further, holding that the State machinery had acted “in tandem” to prevent Begum from exercising her right to approach the High Court against the tribunal’s order.

The case therefore goes beyond an individual error by a tribunal. It exposes what can happen when the determination of citizenship, detention and expulsion operate in close succession, leaving the person concerned with little or no practical opportunity to seek judicial protection.

A case that should never have reached deportation

Begum’s ordeal began decades before her eventual expulsion. As reported by Scroll, she was marked as a ‘D’ or doubtful voter in 1997, following a revision of electoral rolls in Assam. According to Scroll, around three lakh voters were disenfranchised during that process, with many subsequently referred by the border police to Foreigners Tribunals. Begum’s citizenship case then moved through the familiar and often exhausting cycle of tribunal proceedings and judicial challenges.

In 2017, the Nagaon Foreigners Tribunal ruled against her. She challenged that decision before the Gauhati High Court, which ordered a retrial. She returned to the tribunal, where she was again declared a foreigner. Begum challenged the decision once more in 2019. This time, the High Court found that the tribunal had failed to properly consider the evidence she had produced and directed it to reconsider the matter.

That direction should have meant another opportunity for the tribunal to examine the evidence and reach a fresh decision in accordance with law. Instead, the proceedings took a deeply troubling turn.

Arrested when she appeared to defend her case

On May 30, Begum appeared before the Nagaon Foreigners Tribunal pursuant to the High Court’s directions. According to the account reported by Scroll, rather than receiving a substantive reconsideration of her case, she was declared a foreigner and arrested within minutes of appearing before the tribunal. Her lawyers alleged that she was not even supplied a copy of the order—an omission that had obvious consequences because without knowing the contents of the order, challenging it became practically impossible. The High Court subsequently scrutinised the sequence of events surrounding her arrest.

Begum’s family said she appeared before the tribunal at around 12.30 pm and was arrested roughly half an hour later. As Scroll reported, the tribunal judge disputed this account. The Nagaon Superintendent of Police also told the court that the border police had arrested her near the tribunal premises at around 2 pm. But the High Court was not persuaded by the competing explanations.

The court reasoned that if Begum had actually been informed, even orally, that she had been declared a foreigner, there would have been little reason for her to remain around the tribunal premises during the period in which the police were able to take her into custody. That observation goes to the heart of the case.

The question was not simply whether Begum had been declared a foreigner. It was whether the process had been deliberately structured in such a way that she could be removed before she could challenge that declaration.

The right to appeal cannot be defeated by detention

The High Court’s most serious finding concerns precisely this issue. According to the court, the tribunal judge had “deliberately and wilfully delayed” issuing the order in a manner that enabled Begum to be arrested, moved to the Matia detention centre and subsequently expelled from India. The court concluded that the State machinery had thereby prevented her from exhausting her legal remedies and from approaching the High Court through a writ petition.

This is crucial. A tribunal’s declaration that a person is a foreigner does not, by itself, erase the constitutional right to challenge the decision. A legal system cannot meaningfully provide a remedy if the person concerned be removed from the country before she can access that remedy. The problem becomes particularly stark in citizenship cases, where the consequences of an adverse order can include detention, separation from family and eventual expulsion. The right to judicial review cannot become merely theoretical.

The tribunal’s conduct under scrutiny

The court did not confine its criticism to the consequences of the tribunal’s order. It questioned the circumstances in which the order itself came into existence. The High Court directed Assam’s Home and Political Department to investigate the date and time on which the tribunal member had prepared the opinion, Scroll reported. If necessary, the authorities were even directed to seize the tribunal member’s computer to establish when the order had been prepared.

The High Court also criticised the tribunal judge, Bipul Kumar Nath, saying that he appeared to have developed a personal grudge because the matter had earlier been remanded to him for fresh consideration. The issue, therefore, was not simply procedural irregularity. The court was examining whether the process had been manipulated to produce a particular outcome—and to ensure that outcome could not be challenged in time.

Expulsion before legal remedies were exhausted

The court also pointed to the safeguards governing expulsion. As reported by Scroll, the High Court found that Begum was denied an opportunity to challenge the May 30 order, which it described as a direct violation of the applicable standard operating procedure under the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950. The procedure requires legal remedies available to a person to be exhausted before expulsion. That safeguard is not a technicality.

Expulsion is an irreversible act with potentially devastating consequences. Once a person is pushed across an international border, access to Indian courts, lawyers, documents and family becomes infinitely more difficult. In Begum’s case, that is precisely what appears to have happened. Her family discovered that she had been expelled only after approaching the Gauhati High Court with a habeas corpus petition. The court subsequently involved the Ministry of External Affairs and indicated that efforts should be made to locate Begum in Bangladesh and bring her back to India.

Article 21 does not stop at citizenship

One of the most important aspects of the judgment is the High Court’s invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The court reiterated that the protection of life and personal liberty extends not only to Indian citizens but also to non-citizens. In other words, even a person whom the State treats as a foreign national does not become a person without constitutional protection. This principle is particularly significant in Assam, where citizenship status has become deeply intertwined with detention, deportation and political debates about migration.

The constitutional question cannot simply be reduced to whether a person has successfully established citizenship. Even where the State claims that an individual is a foreign national, the State must still act according to law. It cannot imprison a person without due process, suppress an available remedy, conceal an order from the person affected, or remove her from the country before she has had a genuine opportunity to challenge the decision.

₹2 lakh is compensation—but the judgment is about much more

The ₹2 lakh compensation ordered by the High Court should not obscure the larger significance of the case as the Gauhati High Court has also attempted to ensure that what happened to Begum is not repeated. It directed the Superintendent of Police in every district of Assam to ensure that a person declared a foreign national is informed of the tribunal’s judgment before being taken into custody. It further directed that an adult member of the person’s family should be informed before the detainee is moved outside the jurisdiction of the district police.

These directions are significant because they recognise a basic principle of procedural fairness: a person must know what has been decided against them before the State takes away their liberty.

Family notification is equally important. In citizenship and detention cases, the disappearance of a family member can leave relatives with no information about where the person has been taken or whether they remain in the country.

The High Court has effectively drawn a line: a declaration of foreigner status does not authorise the State to bypass due process. The State cannot convert a tribunal order into an immediate mechanism of disappearance. It cannot use detention to defeat the right of appeal. And it cannot treat the absence of citizenship status as the absence of constitutional rights.

Related:

From Statelessness to Citizenship: CJP helps Adori Bibi reclaim her Indian identity

Nationality Before Deportation: The Rajubala Das case

Aadhaar, Voter ID and PAN Cannot Prove Citizenship: Calcutta High Court’s Foreigners Order and the burden of belonging

Another CJP Victory: Barpeta Tribunal declares Alam Khan ‘not a foreigner’

The post Declared ‘Foreigner’, denied a hearing, pushed across the border: Gauhati HC pulls up Assam appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The journalists, Shaheen Khan and Nafisa Khan, said they had gone to cover the inauguration of Max Smart Super Speciality Hospital when police personnel stopped them. Shaheen alleged that she attempted to ask Gupta a question but was prevented from doing so and was taken to Saket police station along with her colleague.

Two women freelance journalists have alleged that Delhi police slapped and beat them up because they wanted to ask questions at an event featuring Union home minister Amit Shah and Delhi chief minister Rekha Gupta and that the assault was exacerbated because they are both Muslim pic.twitter.com/zWJ8RTC1eh

— The Telegraph (@ttindia) September 4, 2026

What followed, according to the journalists, was not merely detention but physical assault. In a video released by 4PM News Network, Shaheen alleged that she and Nafisa were beaten and subjected to mental harassment at the police station. She displayed injury marks on Nafisa’s body and alleged that the assault became more severe after police personnel asked their names and learnt that they were Muslims.

“Delhi Police Assaulted Us, But the Assault Intensified After They Asked Our Religion and Learned Our Muslim Names,” Says 4PM Journalist Nafisa Khan. pic.twitter.com/AETfmoWVXA

— FOEJ Media (@FoejMedia) September 3, 2026

Newslaundry also reported the journalists’ allegation that Shaheen was caught by police while attempting to question the Chief Minister and taken to the police station. The most serious allegation made by Shaheen is that the assault intensified after police personnel heard the surname “Khan”. That claim cannot simply be treated as an extension of the dispute over the parked scooter.

Shaheen Khan alleges that Nafisa’s health deteriorated following the alleged police brutality. She claims she heard police personnel say, “If she’s dying, let her die,” while Nafisa was in distress, and alleges that police personnel did not come forward to provide her medical… pic.twitter.com/WLo2g6CQqu

— FOEJ Media (@FoejMedia) September 3, 2026

Journalists’ organisations demand action

At the time of the publication, no case had reportedly been registered in connection with the allegations. Police said senior officers were in touch with the two journalists. The absence of an FIR is significant given the nature of the allegations being made: two Muslim women say they were physically assaulted after being taken to a police station, and one of them has alleged that religious identity influenced the severity of the assault.

#delhipolice पर महिला पत्रकारों को बुरी तरह पीटने का आरोप है. आरोप महिला पुलिसकर्मी पर है.

पुलिस प्रशासन चुप क्यों है? प्रशासन को बताना चाहिए कि कल दोपहर 11 बजे साकेत थाने में क्या हुआ? अगर कुछ नहीं हुआ तो कह दें पुलिस ने कमरा बंद कर महिला पत्रकारों को नहीं पीटा. लेकिन सब चुप… pic.twitter.com/BA3L4RZXrj

— Rajat Pandey (@RajatpandeyJF) September 4, 2026

The allegations have drawn a strong response from the press community. The Press Club of India, Indian Women’s Press Corps, Delhi Union of Journalists, Press Association and Kerala Union of Working Journalists issued a joint statement condemning what they described as the “brutal assault” of the two journalists. They demanded punitive action against the police officials allegedly responsible and called upon Delhi Police Commissioner Anurag Kumar to ensure a free and fair investigation.

The Press Club of India, Indian Women’s Press Corps, Delhi Union of Journalists, Press Association and Kerala Union of Working Journalists have condemned the alleged assault of freelance journalists Shaheen Khan and Nafisa Khan by Delhi Police personnel posted at Saket Police… pic.twitter.com/CnPFjM9V3A

— United News of India (@uniindianews) September 3, 2026

Political leaders have also criticised the alleged assault. AAP Delhi chief Saurabh Bharadwaj condemned the incident, while Congress leader Pawan Khera described the alleged assault as “utterly reprehensible” and questioned whether Delhi was becoming a “police state”. Both highlighted the allegation that the treatment of the journalists intensified after their Muslim identity became known.

What are these horrifying visuals coming out of a Delhi police station?

Women journalists being beaten and thrashed for asking questions about the Delhi CM.

And when the police allegedly discovered that one of these journalists was Muslim, the assault intensified.

Is this a… https://t.co/jHH7E6metC

— Pawan Khera ಪವನ್ ಖೇರಾ (@Pawankhera) September 3, 2026

The way two women reporters of @4pmnews_network were beaten by police is very shameful.

I feel all other news reporters & journalists should takeup the matter.

BJP Govt always tests things in Delhi’s Laboratory and then it’s scaled up in every state.

— Saurabh Bharadwaj (@Saurabh_MLAgk) September 4, 2026

AAP leader Somnath Bharti separately urged Lieutenant Governor Taranjit Singh Sandhu to intervene and ensure action against officials found responsible.

This is not done, Shaheen, in addition of being a journalist, is a resident of my assembly constituency and I am aghast at this development. I request Honble @LtGovDelhi to intervene and fix accountability of the involved officers. A FIR must be lodged and responsible officers be… https://t.co/UBIze5FdrK

— Somnath Bharti सोमनाथ भारती (@attorneybharti) September 3, 2026

The FIR had to be fought for at the police station

The response to the alleged assault did not end with the journalists leaving the Saket Police Station. Instead, the early hours of September 4 saw activists and political workers remain outside the same police station demanding that Delhi Police formally register Shaheen and Nafisa’s complaint against the officers they accused of assaulting them.

All India Students’ Association (AISA) president Neha Bora was among those who joined a sit-in at the Saket Police Station at around 1 am. According to Siasat, activists alleged that the police were initially refusing even to receive the women’s complaint. Bora publicly demanded that an FIR be registered against the police personnel involved.

With Shaheen and Nafisa who faced brutal assault at the hands of Delhi Police today.. we will ensure the FIR is filed against the communal and violent police personnel involved.

This is nothing but a communal targeting of two Muslim Women Journalists simply for reporting the… pic.twitter.com/xCpBqGCwzY

— Neha (@neha_aisa) September 3, 2026

The pressure intensified when Congress workers from the party’s Minority Department reached the police station in large numbers and raised slogans against the Delhi Police. The complaint was eventually registered around 3 am, according to 4PM News Network, after Shaheen insisted that an FIR be filed against the accused officers and that they be immediately suspended.

Saket Police Station: FIR Delay Sparks Protest by Journalists & Lawyers#SaketPoliceStation #DelhiPolice #FIRDelay #JournalistsProtest #LawyersProtest #ViralVideo pic.twitter.com/ADpKnKYnpt

— Savera Times Haryana (@Savera_Haryana) September 4, 2026

Delhi: Female Journalist Confronts Police Over FIR Registration at Saket Station#delhi #saketpolicestation #delhipolice #femalejournalist #firregistration #viralvideo pic.twitter.com/XbEgHFVJUD

— The Savera Times (@thesavera_timep) September 4, 2026

VVIP security cannot become a shield against accountability

Delhi Police has denied the allegations in their entirety. DCP (South) Anant Mittal described the journalists’ claims as “factually incorrect and misleading”. According to the police, the two women had parked their scooter near the hospital in a way that obstructed the designated VVIP movement route during the visit of the Home Minister and Chief Minister.

The police said the journalists were repeatedly instructed to remove the vehicle and clear the route but allegedly refused to comply. They were subsequently taken to the local police station “for further enquiry”. The police specifically denied that the women were assaulted for asking questions to the Chief Minister, calling that allegation “false, misleading and baseless”. That explanation, however, does not by itself dispose of the allegations of physical assault.

Related:

Maharashtra’s schools are struggling to survive as students protest, infrastructure crumbles and Marathi-medium institutions disappear

3,404 SIR Forms Found at Kharghar Xerox Shop: CJP, VFD and BCS demands answers from Maharashtra SEC

Allahabad HC quashes NSA detention of Aakriti Chaudhary, questions ‘concocted’ State narrative in Noida workers’ protest case

Six-year-old detained during Patna teacher aspirants’ protest, parents allege police assault

Water Cannons Instead of Answers: Bihar’s recruitment crisis and the state’s crackdown on protest

The post Two women journalists allege police assault after questioning Delhi CM, say attack intensified after police heard they were Muslim appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The order goes beyond the FIRs specifically placed before the Court by the Delhi Police and the States of Bihar, West Bengal, Assam and Maharashtra. The Court extended the protection to similar FIRs registered anywhere else in the country, including in States and Union Territories that were not parties to the applications. The Court simultaneously barred the registration of any fresh FIR in relation to the protest incidents of July 20-25, subject to one specific exception concerning 2,873 individuals whom the Delhi Police claimed had serious criminal antecedents.

The decision came after the Union government and the four States moved applications seeking the quashing of the FIRs. As reported by LiveLaw, the applications were filed against the backdrop of an assurance allegedly given by the Central government to the Cockroach Janata Party (CJP) leadership on July 25 that cases against protesters would be withdrawn and no fresh FIRs would be registered in connection with the agitation.

The Supreme Court has now converted that assurance into judicial directions, while expressly making its exercise of Article 142 dependent upon both sides honouring the understanding placed before it.

FIRs quashed and proceedings terminated

The order records that thousands of young students participated in protests held between July 20 and July 25 in Delhi, in the applicant-States and in other parts of the country. Following those protests, criminal cases were registered at several police stations. The five applications before the Court were moved by Delhi Police, Bihar, West Bengal, Assam and Maharashtra. They sought the exercise of the Supreme Court’s powers under Article 142 to quash the FIRs arising from the protests.

The Delhi Police application concerned 13 FIRs. Bihar placed 69 FIRs before the Court, while West Bengal sought relief in respect of eight FIRs and Assam in respect of five. Maharashtra placed 34 FIRs before the Court. The Court reproduced the details of these FIRs in its order.

Importantly, the Court did not restrict relief to these identified cases. After the Solicitor General submitted that additional FIRs could have been registered in other States and Union Territories concerning the same incidents, the Court directed that those cases too would not be pursued or investigated. The operative portion of the order states that any other FIR relating to the same incidents of protests between July 20 and July 25, including FIRs in States and Union Territories that were not applicants before the Court, “shall not be pursued or investigated” and shall be treated as closed for all intents and purposes.

The Court further directed that no State or Union Territory shall register any fresh FIR relating to those protest incidents. This makes the order significantly wider than the applications originally placed before the Court. The States that approached the Court sought relief concerning specified FIRs; the Court extended the protection to similarly situated cases across the country.

Court invokes Article 142 to protect students’ future

The central justification recorded by the Bench is the future of the young protesters. The Court noted the submission that the Central government and the applicant-States had consciously decided not to pursue the FIRs “as a gesture of goodwill” and to ensure that the cases did not cause prejudice to young students who had participated in the protests. The order also records an important qualification: “mere participation in the protests is not taken as an offence under the penal laws.”

It was against this background that the Court considered the matter fit for the exercise of its powers under Article 142. The Bench stated that, considering the commitments made before it and “most importantly” the future prospects of young protesters who had bona fide participated in peaceful protests to raise their demands, it was appropriate to invoke Article 142 to “do complete justice”.

The Court consequently quashed the FIRs specifically listed before it, along with all proceedings arising from them. The language of the order is significant because the Court did not merely record the government’s decision not to pursue the cases. It itself terminated the identified FIRs and extended the operative protection to other cases arising from the same protest incidents.

The 2,873-person exception

The order, however, does not provide an unconditional blanket protection to every person who may have been present at the protests. The Delhi Police had specifically sought permission to register a fresh FIR against 2,873 individuals whom it claimed had serious criminal antecedents, based on the National Crime Records Bureau database.

According to the application, these individuals were prima facie reported to have been present at the protest site. The police sought to investigate allegations relating specifically to bodily harm and destruction of public property. The Court permitted the Central government/Delhi Police to register a fresh FIR concerning these 2,873 individuals.

The permission is nevertheless confined to the allegations identified in the application. The order records that the proposed FIR is to concern offences relating to bodily harm or destruction of public property. It also expressly preserves the right of affected persons to pursue lawful remedies.

This distinction is important. The Court has not authorised a reopening of the entire protest-related criminal process against these individuals. It has permitted a fresh FIR within the limited framework sought by Delhi Police and without prejudice to the rights of those affected. The Court also linked this exception to its earlier observations of August 3, 2026, when it had clarified that protection could not be extended to persons with criminal antecedents involving “grave and heinous offences”.

Nationwide protection, despite only five jurisdictions approaching the Court

One of the most consequential features of the order is its pan-India operation. The applications before the Court came from Delhi Police, Bihar, West Bengal, Assam and Maharashtra. Yet the Solicitor General told the Court that there could be FIRs concerning the same protest incidents in other States and Union Territories.

Rather than requiring each affected protester or State to separately approach the Court, the Bench directed that such FIRs would not be pursued or investigated. The Court also barred States and Union Territories from registering fresh FIRs concerning the incidents between July 20 and July 25.

The direction therefore closes the possibility of the same protest incidents continuing to generate criminal proceedings elsewhere. The order also records a commitment by the Delhi Police and the applicant-States that, if another FIR concerning the same incidents comes to their notice, they would not oppose the affected party seeking similar relief from the Supreme Court.

NEET-UG suicide compensation: Union given 90 days

The criminal proceedings were not the only issue addressed by the Court. The Solicitor General informed the Bench that the Central government would formulate a pan-India policy or arrangement for compensation to the families of students who died by suicide in connection with the NEET-UG 2026 examination.

The Court recorded that the students concerned were situated in different parts of the country and consequently directed the Centre, in consultation with the State governments and Union Territories, to formulate the policy within 90 days. Once formulated, compensation is to be paid to the affected families without delay. The order further states that the policy or arrangement may subsequently be adopted by State governments and Union Territories as a regular mechanism for compensatory measures.

This direction gives judicial force to the assurance placed before the Court by the Solicitor General. As reported by LiveLaw, the Centre had sought three months to work out the modalities for compensation. The Court has consequently fixed a 90-day period for the formulation of the nationwide policy.

September 5 CJP march withdrawn in Court

The proceedings also resulted in the withdrawal of the protest march that the CJP had announced for September 5. The proposed march had been announced after the organisation alleged that the government’s assurances concerning the withdrawal of criminal cases had not been implemented.

According to the report of LiveLaw, the proposed demonstration in Delhi was to be held in connection with the demands arising from the NEET examination controversy, including the withdrawal of cases against protesters and compensation for families of students who died by suicide.

During the hearing, CJP co-convener Saurav Das made a statement before the Bench that the organisation was withdrawing the September 5 call in view of the assurances given by the government and the order being passed by the Court. The Supreme Court recorded that statement.

The order then made it clear that the commitments made by all sides would have to be honoured. The Court directed both sides to abide by the statements and commitments made before it and expressly linked the exercise of Article 142 to compliance with the understanding reached between the parties. CJI Surya Kant, according to the proceedings reported by LiveLaw, observed that if both sides acted in good faith, the issues could be resolved one by one.

Article 142 and the Court’s carefully confined intervention

The Court’s use of Article 142 is central to the order. The applications specifically sought the exercise of the Supreme Court’s extraordinary constitutional power to secure the quashing of FIRs that the executive itself had decided it no longer wished to pursue. The order makes clear, however, that the Court is not laying down a general rule for the quashing of protest-related FIRs.

In paragraph 15, the Bench expressly states that its directions are being issued because of the “peculiar facts and circumstances of the case” and “shall not be taken as a binding precedent.”

The Court has therefore crafted relief that is extensive in its immediate reach but expressly limited in its precedential value. The order brings closure to the particular set of protests and the criminal proceedings arising from them, while avoiding a declaration that similar FIRs in future protest cases must necessarily be quashed. The order also makes the settlement between the parties an important component of the Article 142 exercise. The Court records that its extraordinary powers are subject to the condition that both sides abide by the terms of the mutual understanding placed before it.

A judicial closure of the criminal fallout of the July protests

The order ultimately produces a comprehensive closure of the criminal proceedings arising from the specified July protests. The FIRs specifically placed before the Court have been quashed. Other FIRs concerning the same incidents, even where they were not formally brought before the Bench, are not to be pursued or investigated. States and Union Territories have been prohibited from registering fresh FIRs concerning those incidents. The only express exception is the liberty granted to Delhi Police concerning the 2,873 individuals identified in its application. The Court has simultaneously directed the Centre to formulate a nationwide compensation mechanism within 90 days for families of students who died by suicide in connection with NEET-UG 2026.

The order is thus structured around two forms of closure: criminal proceedings arising from the protests are brought to an end, while the government’s commitment concerning compensation to affected families is placed on a defined judicial timeline.

At the same time, the Bench has carefully confined the constitutional significance of its intervention. It has not declared the quashing of protest FIRs to be a general rule. Instead, it has treated the matter as an exceptional exercise of Article 142 arising from the particular circumstances before it, the commitments made by the parties, and the Court’s concern that the criminal cases should not prejudice the future prospects of young protesters who had participated in the agitation.

The order closes with the Court placing on record its appreciation of the Union government, the applicant-States, counsel and the CJP leadership for their “constructive and cooperative approach”, noting that this had kept the interests and future of the young students at the forefront. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that this resolution rests on the peculiar circumstances of this case and the commitments made before it. It is precisely for that reason that the Bench has directed that the order not be treated as a binding precedent.

The complete order may be read below:

Detailed reports on the withdrawal of FIRs may be read here, here and here.

Detailed reports on brute force used by police on the protestors may be read here, here, here and here.

Related:

Maharashtra’s schools are struggling to survive as students protest, infrastructure crumbles and Marathi-medium institutions disappear

After NEET protests ended, the battle moved online: Women protesters face threats, doxing and criminalisation

Bihar: Not just Delhi, Patna, Siwan too saw brute police violence against demonstrating students: PUCL

Maharashtra: After backlash, govt. moves to withdraw FIRs against student protesters but questions remain

Water Cannons Instead of Answers: Bihar’s recruitment crisis and the state’s crackdown on protest

Amnesty Investigation finds unlawful and deadly force against CJP-led protesters in Delhi and Siwan

The Supreme Court’s Uneasy Middle Path on Protest Policing

Governments begin rolling back cases against protesters, but questions over violence, arrests and accountability remain

July 2026: A dissent that was brutally put down, a crackdown after the protest ended

The post NEET Protests: Supreme Court ends criminal proceedings against students across India appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Bench comprising Justices Atul Sreedharan and Achal Sachdev allowed Chaudhary’s habeas corpus petition and held that the detention was founded on what the Court described as a “concocted story” by the State. The Court directed that she be released immediately if her custody was not required in any other case. The Court also directed the Noida authorities to pay her ₹5 lakh in compensation. The detailed order is awaited.

However, Bar & Bench has reported that Chaudhary is likely to remain in custody for the time being because she has not yet secured bail in the other criminal cases registered in connection with the Noida workers’ agitation. The judgment comes after the Bench subjected the State’s version of Chaudhary’s arrest and alleged involvement in the violence to close scrutiny, particularly the chronology of her arrest and the notices issued under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS).

Court questions sequence of arrest and BNSS notices

During the hearing, the State told the Court that Chaudhary had been arrested at 10:56 a.m. on April 12, 2026 and that a notice under Section 130 of the BNSS had been issued to her. The State’s case was that Chaudhary had instigated protesters to engage in stone-pelting and arson. The Bench, however, questioned whether the procedure prescribed under the BNSS had actually been followed.

Justice Sreedharan specifically asked whether Chaudhary had first been served a notice under Section 126. The State acknowledged that no such notice had been issued and that the notice under Section 130 had instead been served. The Court then examined the chronology of the documents and the General Diary (GD) entry. Justice Sreedharan questioned how a notice could have been prepared after Chaudhary had already been arrested.

As reported by LiveLaw, the Court observed in court: “Ab ismei GD entry dekhiye, usko arrest karliya fir notice banaya.”

The Bench further pointed to the apparent inconsistency between the arrest record and the notice, observing that the record indicated that Chaudhary had already been arrested before the notice was prepared. The Court’s questioning went to the heart of the legality of the detention: whether the State had followed the statutory sequence required before taking the drastic step of arrest and subsequently placing Chaudhary under preventive detention.

‘Whatever violence has happened is after her arrest’

The Court also closely examined the State’s claim that Chaudhary had played a role in instigating the violence during the workers’ protest. The State relied on the events surrounding the workers’ mobilisation and alleged that Chaudhary had encouraged protesters to resort to violence, including stone-pelting and arson. But the Bench drew attention to the chronology of events.

According to the State’s own account, people had gathered for the protest on April 11. Justice Sreedharan pointed out that the significant violence relied upon by the prosecution occurred only later.

“Yani 11 ko koi violence nahi tha. Whatever violence has happened is after her arrest,” the Court observed, according to LiveLaw.

The observation was significant because the State’s case depended on establishing Chaudhary’s connection to the violence. If she had already been arrested before the violence that formed the basis of the allegations, the Court was evidently questioning how the State could attribute subsequent acts of violence to her.

Where is the video evidence?

The Bench had already expressed concern about the evidentiary basis of the State’s allegations during the previous hearing. On September 1, the Court had specifically asked the Uttar Pradesh government to produce video footage showing Chaudhary allegedly instigating protesters to throw stones or set vehicles on fire. The State sought additional time to obtain and produce the footage. The Court refused.

Justice Sreedharan noted that Chaudhary had already spent approximately five months in custody and said, “I won’t give time. She has been in jail for 5 months.”

The Bench had also warned that if the record ultimately showed an arbitrary exercise of power, costs could be imposed on the officials concerned. The issue resurfaced during the final hearing when the State relied upon witness statements that allegedly named Chaudhary. The Bench, however, sought something more specific: where was the material showing that she had actually instigated the violence?

The Court also questioned the State’s reliance on the chargesheet, asking where the witnesses had specifically implicated her and where the videographic evidence demonstrated the alleged acts of instigation.

From workers’ protest to NSA detention

Chaudhary’s detention stems from the Noida workers’ protests of April 2026, which began over demands for higher wages and improved working conditions and later escalated into violence, arson and clashes with the police. The protests began peacefully but turned violent on April 13. Police subsequently arrested a large number of workers and activists and registered multiple criminal cases.

Chaudhary, a Delhi University history graduate and activist, was among those arrested. The Uttar Pradesh government subsequently invoked the NSA against her and journalist and activist Satyam Verma on May 13. The police alleged that the two had played a significant role in the violence and disruption associated with the workers’ agitation.

At the time, Gautam Buddh Nagar Police Commissioner Laxmi Singh claimed that the police had “strong electronic and videographic evidence” against Chaudhary, Verma and others arrested in connection with the protests. The police’s version was that the violence was not spontaneous but part of a wider organised effort.

Detailed report may be read here and here.

Related:

Noida Protest 2026: A labour uprising the state refused to understand

No ‘Pakistan conspiracy’ in Noida labour unrest: Fact-finding report

NSA slapped on journalist, DU scholar in Noida workers’ protest case amid allegations of crackdown on dissent

The post Allahabad HC quashes NSA detention of Aakriti Chaudhary, questions ‘concocted’ State narrative in Noida workers’ protest case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Bhati, president of the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BR Ambedkar faction), has alleged that he was beaten with shoes, fists, kicks, belts and wooden sticks, while Jatav, the organisation’s Meerut district president, allegedly suffered similar treatment. Bhati was left with a heavily swollen eye and other visible injuries, as reported by The Wire.

A meeting with the SSP that allegedly turned into an assault

According to Bhati’s account, he and Jatav went to meet then-SSP Avinash Pandey on August 19. They were seeking relief in a case arising from protests held on July 8 over the murder of Lalita Gautam, a young Dalit woman from Meerut. Bhati has maintained that he was not present at the protest and wanted his name removed from the FIR connected with the demonstration. He said the two men had been trying to meet the SSP for several days and were eventually asked to come to his office.

Bhati alleged that the conversation quickly became hostile, with Pandey abusing him and questioning his credentials as a political and farmer leader. He said that when he objected to the alleged abuse, police personnel dragged him into another room. There, he alleged, the SSP assaulted him. Bhati has described being kicked, punched and beaten with shoes and a belt. He specifically alleged that Pandey kicked him around the eye several times after he fell to the floor.

The Indian Express, which spoke to Bhati, reported his allegation that he was assaulted for an extended period before he and Jatav were taken to the SOG office. Bhati also alleged that wooden planks and sticks were used against them and that the soles of their feet, backs and waist were beaten.

His visible injuries have become a central element of the controversy. Photographs showed substantial swelling around his eye, while videos released by Bhati showed him describing the alleged assault.

“मेरठ SSP के दफ्तर में किसी बात पर वाद विवाद हुआ। बात खराब हो गई, हिंसा का प्रयोग हुआ। सहारनपुर रेंज DIG से इस पूरे केस की जांच कराई जा रही है”

मेरठ में किसान नेता दिग्विजय भाटी की बर्बरता से पिटाई पर ADG भानु भास्कर ने कहा !! https://t.co/SCjEgECz3g pic.twitter.com/xeiUsdPHXc

— Sachin Gupta (@Sachingupta) August 21, 2026

Meerut police claims Samajwadi Party leader Digvijay Singh Bhati sustained the torture injuries after he fell from his scooty while returning from police office. https://t.co/7otICjnVLZ pic.twitter.com/e0TecnoXtc

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) August 21, 2026

SSP kicked me in the eye multiple times, says Samajwadi party leader tortured in custody

Samajwadi party leader Digvijay Bhati claims he was brutally assaulted by Meerut SSP Avinash Pandey over Bhati’s involvement in a protest over murder of a Dalit girl. Later, he was taken to… pic.twitter.com/75JspJ8P09

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) August 21, 2026

Spoke to Digvijay Bhati, who according to UP’s Meerut police, fell from a scooty while returning from police office. pic.twitter.com/tHyUhpEkmQ

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) August 21, 2026

From the SSP office to the SOG office

Bhati has alleged that the incident did not end inside the SSP’s office. According to his account, the two men were subsequently taken by SOG personnel to another location. There, he alleged, their hands and legs were tied and they were beaten repeatedly with sticks and belts. He has described being punched around the head and temple and suffering repeated assaults. He further alleged that the men were denied ordinary dignity during the episode, including being given water in the cap of a bottle.

Perhaps the most disturbing allegation concerns their alleged humiliation after the physical assault. Bhati has alleged that police personnel played the Hindi film song “Choli Ke Peeche Kya Hai” and forced the two men to dance despite their physical condition. India Today reported the allegation that the two were forced to dance to the song, while The Indian Express also reported Bhati’s account of being humiliated after allegedly being beaten at the SOG office.

Jatav, meanwhile, has alleged that he was threatened with an encounter. Bhati has also claimed that the police threatened them with further consequences if they spoke about what had allegedly happened.

The police initially offered a dramatically different version

Meerut police initially rejected the allegations as “false and baseless”. According to the police version reported by The Wire, Bhati and Jatav had visited the police office in connection with an earlier FIR. The police claimed that the two subsequently fell from their scooter while returning home, sustaining the injuries visible in photographs. The police further said that the two men themselves submitted a written application concerning the incident, which was entered in the general diary at Civil Lines police station.

The controversy intensified when Avinash Pandey was transferred from his position as Meerut SSP on August 20 and attached to the DGP headquarters in Lucknow. Pandey was among nine IPS officers transferred in the reshuffle. Unlike officers who were given new district postings, he was attached to the state headquarters. Times of India reported that the transfer came amid the allegations of illegal detention and custodial torture.

The following day, Additional Director General of Police, Meerut Zone, Bhanu Bhaskar announced an inquiry. Saharanpur Range DIG Abhishek Singh was tasked with investigating the allegations and submitting a report. The police leadership initially described the incident more cautiously, saying that a dispute had arisen at the SSP’s office on August 19, after which violence allegedly took place. The case was therefore no longer simply an allegation made by two activists. It had become an official police inquiry.

Eight policemen sent to the lines; inspector suspended

The administration subsequently took further action. After taking charge, new Meerut SSP BBGTS Murthy ordered eight police personnel to be sent to the police lines, including Civil Lines SHO Akhilesh Gaur, two sub-inspectors and five constables. On August 23, Gaur was suspended. Times of India reported that the suspension was ordered on grounds including alleged negligence, apathy and arbitrary conduct in the discharge of his duties.

By August 25, reports indicated that Gaur had been suspended while the other personnel remained subject to administrative action, with the inquiry continuing. The investigating team has also begun examining the physical locations and documentary evidence. Navbharat Times reported that DIG Abhishek Singh inspected the relevant locations and examined CCTV footage and duty records, while questioning personnel connected with the allegations.

This controversy did not begin on August 19

The allegations against the police must also be viewed against the backdrop of what happened in Meerut in July. The entire chain of events goes back to the killing of Lalita Gautam, a 20-year-old Dalit student whose body was recovered in May after she went missing. Her death generated anger among Dalit groups and local residents, who questioned the police investigation and demanded that additional people allegedly connected with the crime be arrested.

On July 8, protesters gathered in Meerut demanding justice. The protest subsequently escalated, with police using force to disperse the demonstrators. Times of India reported that nearly 100 members of the Dalit community had gathered and that the confrontation escalated after protesters blocked roads and demanded that senior officials personally hear their grievances. A video from the confrontation also showed then-SSP Avinash Pandey repeatedly slapping a protester inside a police vehicle.

VIDEO: Meerut SSP Enters Police Van, Slaps Protest Detainee

Meerut SSP Avinash Pandey was seen entering a police custody vehicle and slapping a detainee during action taken after the Dalit community protest.

According to police, the detainee has been identified as Ravi Gautam,… pic.twitter.com/FLHa02gYSk

— Atulkrishan (@iAtulKrishan1) July 8, 2026

The police subsequently registered cases against protesters. According to Times of India, 13 people were named and around 50 others were booked on serious charges, including attempt to murder and allegations concerning women police personnel. Seven people were arrested and sent to judicial custody.

Those proceedings subsequently changed. On July 21, Times of India reported that serious non-bailable charges against the protesters had been dropped, following developments surrounding the case and intervention by the courts.

The July crackdown had also attracted the attention of the National Human Rights Commission. The NHRC sought an action-taken report from the Uttar Pradesh DGP and Home Secretary after a complaint alleged that Meerut police had used excessive force against protesters and caused serious injuries, reported The Hindu. Times of India reported that the Commission sought a detailed report within 15 days.

The ‘history-sheeter’ argument cannot answer allegations of torture

One of the most revealing aspects of the police response has been its emphasis on Bhati and Jatav’s criminal cases. Police have said that Bhati has several cases registered against him and that Jatav also has multiple cases. Bhati has disputed the circumstances and nature of several of these cases, saying many relate to protests and allegations arising from political activity. But even assuming every case cited by the police is genuine and pending, that does not resolve the central allegation. A criminal record, or a history sheet, does not authorise custodial violence.

Related:

Bihar: Not just Delhi, Patna, Siwan too saw brute police violence against demonstrating students: PUCL

The State Wants the Delete Button: India’s new architecture of digital censorship

When Suspicion Becomes Deportation: The case of Sahida Fakir and the dangerous criminalisation of Bengali identity

Supreme Court: UP Gangsters Act ‘stillborn’ for prescribing punishment without creating an offence

‘Wherever You Go, We are watching’: Second threat letter to Kashmiri Pandits

The post Inside the SSP’s Office: Allegations of beatings, torture & police impunity against farmer leaders in Meerut, UP appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and K Vinod Chandran, in Shiv Pratap Singh alias Chinu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, held that the defect goes to the very foundation of the penal legislation: the Act defines a “gang” and a “gangster”, but does not create a separate crime corresponding to those definitions.

The Court consequently quashed the proceedings under Sections 2 and 3 of the Act against two advocates, Shiv Pratap Singh and Himanshu Srivastava, while making it clear that any independent offences allegedly committed by them under the IPC or other penal statutes can continue to be prosecuted under those laws.  The judgment turns on a basic principle of criminal law: there can be no punishment without an offence created by law.

‘Punishment prescribed without an offence being created’

The Court examined Section 2 of the UP Act, which defines “gang” and “gangster”. The definition of a gang encompasses persons acting singly or collectively through violence, threats, intimidation, coercion or otherwise for purposes including disturbing public order or gaining undue temporal, pecuniary or other advantage. It then lists 25 categories of activities.

The problem, according to the Bench, is that the activities covered by those clauses are already offences under other penal laws. Kidnapping, drug trafficking, human trafficking and the other activities falling within Section 2(b), for instance, are punishable under the IPC or other specific penal enactments. The UP Act does not transform them into a new offence merely because the person committing them is characterised as a member or leader of a “gang”. The Court therefore drew a sharp distinction between defining a status and creating an offence.

“After defining gang, which includes commission of the offences listed under sub-clauses (i) to (xxv) and defining gangster as a member or leader or organiser of a gang, the punishment is prescribed for a gangster without an offence being created by statute; which makes the penal act, stillborn.” (Para 43)

In other words, the existence of an underlying crime may justify prosecution under the law that actually criminalises that conduct. But, in the Supreme Court’s analysis, the Gangsters Act cannot simply attach a further criminal punishment to the person’s classification as a “gangster” when the Act itself has not created such an offence.

The Court emphasised that it was concerned only with the proceedings under Sections 2/3 of the Gangsters Act, and not with the substantive criminal cases registered under other laws. If an accused is alleged to have committed an offence under the IPC or another penal statute, those proceedings must continue in accordance with the law applicable to that offence.

Gang chart cannot become a substitute for legislation

A central part of the judgment concerns the gang-chart mechanism under the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021. The Court found that the statutory scheme effectively allowed the executive to determine who would acquire the status of a “gangster” for the purposes of punishment. Yet, according to the Bench, determining what conduct constitutes a crime and attaching penal consequences to it is a function reserved for the legislature.

“A ‘gangster’ is defined under the Act and the determination of who a gangster is, for the purpose of punishment, is as prescribed in the Rules, left to the ipsi dixit of the Executive. The creation of crime, or to make an act or omission subject to penal consequences as an offence, is essentially a legislative function and it cannot be thrown away and left to sprout in the thickets of subordinate legislation.” (Para 54)

The Court held that this function cannot be delegated to subordinate legislation. The Rules may prescribe procedure; they cannot create a crime which Parliament or the state legislature itself has failed to create in the parent statute. The preparation of a gang chart, therefore, could not supply the missing offence.

The Bench held that using the gang chart to punish a person for conduct already covered by other penal statutes, independently of prosecution under those laws, would exceed the power conferred by Section 23 of the Act. It would effectively permit the same criminal conduct to be punished again under another enactment merely by assigning the accused the status of a gangster.

Concern over pre-trial incarceration and ‘foregone conclusion’

The Court was particularly troubled by the consequences of the gang-chart system. It noted that inclusion in a gang chart could lead not merely to the initiation of proceedings but to arrest and prolonged pre-trial incarceration, followed by trial and punishment on the basis of the very same material contained in the chart.

The Bench compared this to the English proverb: “Give a dog a bad name and hang him.”

The Court’s concern was that the executive’s determination of a person’s status as a gangster could effectively become the foundation for the subsequent criminal process, even though the statute had not itself created the offence for which punishment was being imposed.

The judgment also noted that the statutory framework could enable investigation and filing of the chargesheet to be delayed, thereby extending pre-trial incarceration for up to a year. The Court described the Gangsters Act as having been portrayed as an alternative to preventive detention, but without the safeguards that accompany preventive-detention legislation.

The comparison was significant. The Court pointed out that preventive detention, despite being permissible in appropriate circumstances, is surrounded by strict procedural safeguards because it rests substantially on executive satisfaction. Those safeguards include statutory time limits, supply of material to the detenue, opportunities for representation and scrutiny by an Advisory Board.

The Gangsters Act, the Bench observed, did not provide equivalent safeguards while permitting detention merely on the basis of inclusion in a gang chart and subsequently permitting trial and punishment on the same foundation.

“As we noticed, the provisions of the Act could lead to a detention of the accused without trial for long, which is akin to a statute enjoining preventive detention. Though preventive detention has been held to be permissible even in the teeth of Article 21, the same is hedged with safeguards, which are held to be sacrosanct and even a minor procedural violation would entail release of the detenu. The safeguards in preventive detention are numerous, since it is the subjective satisfaction of the Administration and the Police that leads to a detention, the period in which such detention continues being the exclusive premise of the State Government, who also has the authority to release the detenu at any point of time. The period provided in which such detention order has to be forwarded to the State Government; the materials to be supplied to the detenu; the right of representation to the various authorities, at every stage, as granted to the detenu; the reference to an Advisory Board constituted by statute and the decision to be arrived there at within a time frame, mitigates and erases to an extent the rigour & malice of subjectivity, which subjectivity pervades a preventive detention order. The subject enactment, the U.P. Act not only permits detention for a period without anything more than the inclusion in a Gang Chart but also enables a trial and punishment on the basis of the very same Gang Chart, in addition to the pre-trial incarceration, but without an offence being created by the Act itself. It is akin to the English proverb: ‘Give a dog a bad name and hang him’.” (Para 54)

Article 20(1): No punishment without an offence

The Court anchored its reasoning in Article 20(1) of the Constitution, which prohibits conviction for an offence except for violation of a law in force at the time the act was committed and also prohibits the imposition of a greater penalty than that prescribed at that time. The Bench invoked the Latin maxim “nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege” — no crime and no punishment without law.

The Court relied on its earlier decisions, including Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt Ltd and CBI v. R.R. Kishore, to reiterate the broader principle that criminal liability must have a legal foundation.

Among the principles distilled by the Court were that a later statute cannot turn an act that was previously innocent into a crime, cannot retrospectively increase punishment for an offence already committed, and that procedural changes can operate on pending matters only where they do not create a new offence or new punitive exposure.

Although Article 20(1) was not being applied in a conventional retrospective-criminalisation setting, the Bench said its principle was relevant because the question before it was whether a person could be tried and punished for an “offence” that did not exist in the penal statute.

Why Maharashtra and Gujarat laws survived the comparison

The Supreme Court also considered the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 and the Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015. The comparison, however, was not an endorsement of either statute. The Court noted that those enactments expressly create offences such as organised crime and prescribe the conditions necessary for invoking their penal provisions. In Mahipal Singh v. CBI, for instance, the Court had considered the Maharashtra law’s requirement of “continuing unlawful activity”, including the filing of more than one chargesheet within the prescribed period and cognizance by a competent court.

That, the Bench found, was precisely what was missing from the UP legislation. The Court also referred to its earlier decision in Shraddha Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where it had held that even a single crime could be sufficient to invoke the UP Gangsters Act. That judgment had distinguished the Maharashtra and Gujarat statutes, which contain additional requirements relating to continuing or repeated criminal activity. But the specific question of whether the UP Act actually creates an offence had not been decided then.

The present judgment therefore addressed what the Court described as a question that remained res integra before the Supreme Court, despite the Allahabad High Court Full Bench having rejected the challenge.

Two advocates get relief

The ruling arose from two separate proceedings. Shiv Pratap Singh, a practising advocate, had become embroiled in a dispute concerning elections to the Fatehgarh Bar Association in Farrukhabad. Following disciplinary proceedings by the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh and a subsequent criminal complaint, an FIR was registered in 2023 under various IPC provisions. In February 2024, the police registered a separate FIR under the Gangsters Act against Singh and two others, accompanied by a gang chart. Singh was named as accused No. 3. The Supreme Court made clear that it was not adjudicating the underlying Bar Council or Bar Association dispute. Its concern was the validity of the proceedings under the Gangsters Act and Rules.

The second appeal was filed by Himanshu Srivastava, against proceedings involving him, his brother and his father, who was alleged to be the gang leader. An FIR registered in Ghaziabad under Sections 2/3 of the Gangsters Act referred to various previous criminal cases and described Srivastava’s father as the gang leader.

In both matters, the Supreme Court confined itself to the proceedings under the Gangsters Act. It did not extinguish liability for any independent offence under the IPC or other penal laws.

‘Violence’ in the name of preventing violence

The judgment ends with one of its most striking observations. Taking a cue from the George Orwell quotation placed at the beginning of the judgment — “Those who abjure violence can do so only because others are committing violence on their behalf” — the Bench said:

“Before we leave the matter, we take a cue from the quote of George Orwell, we extracted at the outset, to find that the enactment under scrutiny on the pretext of adjuring violence, is in fact perpetuating it on un-suspecting citizens.” (Para 59)

The observation captures the Court’s central objection. The problem was not the State’s stated objective of combating criminal gangs. The Bench expressly acknowledged that curbing the menace of criminal gangs is a laudable objective. But, it said, the end cannot justify the means when a penal law interferes with the liberty of citizens without first establishing, through legislation, the offence for which they are to be punished.

The Supreme Court accordingly allowed both appeals and quashed the Gangsters Act proceedings in the two cases. It directed that the appellants be released forthwith if they were in custody and not required in any other case; where they were already on bail, their bail bonds were ordered to stand cancelled.

The judgment, however, provides that while the UP Gangsters Act proceedings cannot survive, but criminal proceedings for the underlying offences under the IPC or other penal statutes are unaffected and may proceed independently.

A judgment that stops short of the constitutional question

The judgment’s most significant limitation, however, lies in what the Court expressly chose not to decide. The challenge to the Gangsters Act was not confined to the question whether the legislation created a distinct offence. The constitutional validity of the enactment had also been questioned before the Allahabad High Court, which had rejected those challenges in a Full Bench decision. The Supreme Court, however, made it clear that it was not examining that aspect of the matter.

The Bench expressly stated that it had neither upheld the Full Bench decision nor rejected the constitutional challenges considered by it. Those questions, it said, would remain open for consideration. That qualification is important. The Court has described the statutory scheme in deeply critical terms: it found that the Act enables punishment without creating an offence, permits proceedings to rest on a gang chart prepared through an executive process, and creates the possibility of detention and prosecution on the basis of a status conferred by the authorities. Yet it stopped short of determining whether that architecture itself violates the Constitution.

The result is therefore not a declaration that the UP Gangsters Act is unconstitutional. The Court’s holding is narrower, though consequential: in its present form, the Act cannot sustain a prosecution because it does not create an offence to which its penal provision can attach. That leaves open an important question for the future. If the statutory defect is sought to be cured by legislative amendment, the broader constitutional objections to the Gangsters Act may still have to be answered. The Supreme Court’s judgment does not resolve them.

In that sense, the decision is both a sweeping indictment and a limited ruling: the Court has dismantled the legal foundation on which prosecutions under the existing Act rest, while deliberately leaving open the constitutional validity of the regime itself.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

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Lawyer booked for sedition, 28 booked under Gangsters Act

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Liberty on Hold: Delays turn the promise of justice into punishment

The post Supreme Court: UP Gangsters Act ‘stillborn’ for prescribing punishment without creating an offence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At one level, the case concerned two women who said that they had voluntarily embraced Islam and were subsequently confined by their father. But the legal question before the Court was considerably broader: can the alleged illegality of a person’s religious conversion justify the continued physical confinement of that person when she is an adult, competent, and unequivocally asserts that the choice was voluntary?

The Court answered in the negative. More importantly, it refused to allow the criminal investigation into the alleged conversion to collapse the distinction between two separate questions: whether the conversion was lawful, and whether the women could lawfully be detained.

“The present case discloses an exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights. The corpus, despite being major, educated and legally competent women, were deprived of their liberty for a prolonged period commencing from the year 2021, solely because they exercised their constitutionally protected freedom of conscience and chose to profess a religion different from that professed by their family. Such prolonged and coercive confinement strikes at the very foundation of constitutional democracy, which recognises the autonomy of every adult individual as sacrosanct and beyond the reach of parental or societal control. The constitutional guarantee of personal liberty cannot be permitted to yield to familial disapproval, social orthodoxy or executive apathy.” (Para 65)

“Before parting, this Court deems it necessary to reiterate that the Constitution does not confer upon parents a licence to incarcerate their major children merely because they disapprove of their faith, beliefs or personal choices. Constitutional rights cannot be eclipsed by parental authority, social morality or majoritarian sentiment. The liberty of an adult individual is inviolable, and any attempt to suppress that liberty by force or coercion invites the constitutional scrutiny of this Court and attracts appropriate public law consequences, including the award of monetary compensation for the infringement of fundamental rights.” (Para 66)

The former, the Court held, could be examined by the competent authority or court. The latter was squarely before the High Court in habeas corpus jurisdiction. The judgment consequently becomes a strong reaffirmation of decisional autonomy, freedom of conscience, the limits of parental authority, the scope of habeas corpus against private detention, and the State’s public-law liability when its machinery permits an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty to continue.

Two adult women before the constitutional court

The petition concerned Anshu Bhatia @ Amina Anshu Bhatia, aged about 35 years, and Diya Bhatia @ Zoya Diya Bhatia, aged about 20 years. By an order dated July 30, 2026, the State was directed to produce both women before the High Court. They were subsequently produced before Justice Sandeep Jain by police officials from the Cyber Crime Police Station, Agra.

The Court then did something crucial for a habeas corpus proceeding involving allegations of coercion: it interacted with the women directly. Anshu told the Court that she had voluntarily embraced Islam in 2020, describing the decision as a conscious and independent choice motivated by mental peace, spiritual fulfilment and inner solace. She stated that the decision was not the result of inducement, influence, coercion, undue persuasion or any extraneous consideration. She further stated that her father strongly opposed the decision and subsequently confined her within the parental home. According to her, physical restraint, intimidation and sustained mental harassment were used to compel her to renounce the faith she had chosen and return to Hinduism.

Diya, who had completed her education up to the Intermediate level, similarly told the Court that she had voluntarily embraced Islam in 2021, motivated by personal faith, conscience, mental peace and spiritual solace. She too denied force, fraud, coercion, undue influence or allurement.

Both women consistently maintained before the Court that their decisions were voluntary and conscious and arose from their own individual faith and freedom of conscience. They also denied that their conversion was motivated by an extraneous, unlawful or pecuniary consideration or intended to advance the interests of any individual or organisation. The dispute therefore came before the High Court in a very specific constitutional form: Were these adult women unlawfully confined by their father against their own wishes?

The State’s case: This was not merely a family dispute

The State strongly opposed the habeas corpus petition. The father had lodged Case Crime No. 228 of 2025 at Police Station Sadar Bazar, District Agra, alleging that the women had been subjected to forcible and deceitful conversion from Hinduism to Islam. The FIR was initially registered under Section 87 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

During investigation, the investigating agency subsequently added:

• Sections 61(2), 111(3), 111(4) and 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; and
• Sections 3/5(1) and 5(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021.

The State argued that the addition of these provisions demonstrated that the allegations of voluntary conversion could not simply be accepted at face value. But the State went considerably further. Its case was that the alleged conversion was part of a larger and organised conspiracy with ramifications for the sovereignty, integrity and unity of the nation.

It claimed that the investigation had uncovered material indicating the involvement of organised persons pursuing a coordinated design to disturb the social fabric through unlawful religious conversions.

The State also referred to alleged involvement of foreign entities and external influences, arguing that the investigation was continuing and that releasing the women could prejudice the proceedings. It further contended that the women had been projected as victims in the criminal case and that allowing them to reside with persons allegedly connected to the investigation could influence witnesses, prejudice the prosecution and frustrate the administration of criminal justice. The State therefore attempted to place the case within a much larger framework of public order, national interest and security.

The High Court was not persuaded.

Findings of the Court

• What is the scope of habeas corpus?

Before determining whether the detention was illegal, Justice Sandeep Jain examined the nature of the writ itself. The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Home Secretary (Prison) v. H. Nilofer Nisha, where the Supreme Court explained that habeas corpus is available wherever a person is deprived of personal liberty unlawfully or without justification.

Importantly, the Supreme Court authority recognises that habeas corpus is not confined to State detention. It can also be invoked against private detention. The Allahabad High Court quoted the principle that the writ is available for release from detention not only by the State but also from private detention. This becomes central to the case as the father was not a State official exercising a statutory power of detention. The alleged confinement was taking place inside the parental home. But that did not take the matter outside Article 226. The constitutional inquiry was simple: Was there lawful authority for the restraint?

• A parental home is not a legal prison—but it cannot become one

The judgment’s treatment of private detention is especially significant. The women were allegedly confined in their parental home. That fact could easily have been used to characterise the dispute as a family matter. Thankfully, the Court refused to do so. Habeas corpus exists precisely because the law is concerned with the fact of unlawful restraint, not merely the formal label attached to the person exercising it. The relevant question was not whether the father believed he was acting in the interests of his daughters. The question was whether he had legal authority to restrain two adult women. The Court ultimately found that he did not.

• Majority marks the constitutional end of parental custody

The Court relied on a line of constitutional jurisprudence concerning the autonomy of adult women. One of the authorities discussed was the Supreme Court’s decision in Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas. There, the Supreme Court held that once an individual attains majority, she is entitled to make her own choices and that courts should not assume the role of a super-guardian merely because a parent disapproves of that choice.

The Allahabad High Court also considered the Kerala High Court’s decision in Rajamohan MS v. State of Kerala, which dealt specifically with parental attempts to restrain an adult woman. That decision recognised that parental authority may extend to advice, counselling and guidance, but not to confinement or detention against the wishes of an adult daughter.

The Allahabad High Court reproduced the proposition that an adult major woman cannot be treated as a “chattel” and that parental authority does not give a parent the right to keep her under restraint against her will. This jurisprudence supplies the conceptual foundation for the present ruling. Once adulthood is attained, the parent-child relationship does not disappear. But its legal character changes.

• The Court rejects the idea that parents know what is “best” for adult women

The reliance on Rajamohan MS case is particularly important because it confronts a deeply embedded paternalistic assumption: that parents should be permitted to control adult women’s decisions because they believe those decisions are wrong, imprudent or harmful. The jurisprudence cited by the High Court rejects that logic.

An adult’s decision does not lose constitutional protection simply because the decision might later prove to be unwise. The Kerala High Court authority, quoted in the judgment, makes the point that courts cannot permit the concepts of parents about what is “right and good” for their adult daughters to override the daughters’ own assessment of what is right for them. This principle is particularly relevant in the present case.

The women’s choice concerned religion—a matter inherently connected to conscience and identity. The Constitution cannot recognise individual autonomy while simultaneously allowing family members to exercise a veto over the individual’s conscience.

• Reliance on Shafin Jahan to hold that constitutional courts are not super-guardians

The judgment also invokes Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., one of the Supreme Court’s most crucial decisions on individual autonomy. The High Court notes the Supreme Court’s recognition that constitutional courts may exercise parens patriae jurisdiction for persons who are incapable of exercising free will, such as minors or persons of unsound mind. But that principle cannot be extended to competent adults simply because their choices are controversial or disapproved of by others.

The Supreme Court in Shafin Jahan emphasised that decisions concerning intimate and personal matters belong to the individuals concerned and that neither State nor society can intrude into that domain merely because they disapprove of the choice. The Allahabad High Court uses that jurisprudence to reinforce a fundamental distinction: A constitutional court protects an adult’s autonomy; it does not replace it.

The Court therefore did not ask whether it believed the women’s religious choice was sensible. It asked whether the women themselves had made the choice freely. Once the answer was yes, the constitutional duty was to protect that choice from unlawful restraint.

• The Court personally tests voluntariness

This is where the Court’s interaction with the women becomes legally decisive. Justice Sandeep Jain recorded that the responses of both women were: “spontaneous, coherent and unequivocal.”

Nothing emerged during the interaction to suggest that they were acting under coercion, fear, inducement or undue influence. On the contrary, both consistently asserted that they had voluntarily embraced Islam as a matter of personal faith and conscience. The Court therefore did not simply accept the women’s claims because they were petitioners. It independently interacted with them. This matters because the State’s central argument was that their assertion of voluntariness was false and that they had been made instruments of an organised conversion network. The Court found no material before it sufficient to draw that inference.

• Article 25: “Freedom of conscience” includes the freedom to change faith

The Court then turned to Article 25. It held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience necessarily encompasses the right of a competent adult to adopt a faith, renounce a faith, or change her faith according to her own free will, belief and conviction. The Court did not conceptualise Article 25 merely as protecting the practice of an inherited religion. It recognised conscience as a matter of individual choice.

The Court held that such a decision is an essential facet of: individual autonomy, dignity and personal liberty. It is therefore protected not only under Article 25, but also under Article 21. If freedom of conscience means anything constitutionally, it cannot mean merely the freedom to remain within the religious identity assigned by one’s family. It must include the freedom to arrive at one’s own conviction. And where an adult voluntarily changes her faith, that choice cannot ordinarily be dictated by either the family or the State except within constitutionally permissible restrictions and the authority of law.

• The Uttar Pradesh Conversion Act does not answer the detention question

The State relied heavily on the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. The Court acknowledged that the Act provides the statutory framework governing unlawful religious conversions and prescribes procedures concerning conversions. But the Court made an important jurisdictional observation: The vires of the 2021 Act had not been challenged before it. Nor was the legality or validity of the alleged conversion itself the subject matter of the habeas corpus proceedings. Any question concerning compliance or non-compliance with the Act was therefore left to the competent authority or court. The Court then reached the central distinction: “The legality of the conversion and the legality of their detention constitute two distinct and independent issues.” This distinction is the backbone of the judgment.

The Court went further. It said that even assuming, for the sake of argument,  that the conversion had not been carried out strictly according to the procedure prescribed under the 2021 Act, that assumption would not itself authorise the father to continue confining the women. This is a crucial rule-of-law proposition. An alleged violation of one law does not automatically create a power under another law to deprive a person of liberty. If the conversion was unlawful, the State could investigate it. If an offence was established, the criminal law could operate.

But the father could not become the custodian of the women merely because he believed their religious conversion was illegal. The State could not use the pendency of that investigation to permit the confinement to continue. Thus, the Court separates regulation from detention. The State may regulate conduct through law; however, it cannot manufacture a detention power that the law does not confer.

• National security cannot rest on assertion alone

The State’s invocation of sovereignty, integrity and national security was also examined closely. The Court found that, apart from broad assertions based on the FIR and the pendency of investigation, no material had been placed before it demonstrating that the voluntary exercise of religious choice by these women, by itself, constituted a threat to the sovereignty, integrity or security of the country. The Court therefore refused to accept the argument.

The court held that mere apprehensions, however serious they may appear, cannot substitute legally admissible material while adjudicating upon the fundamental rights of citizens. This is not a finding that national-security considerations can never justify restrictions on liberty. Rather, it is a rejection of conjecture as constitutional evidence. The seriousness of the allegation does not eliminate the need for material. A court deciding whether a fundamental right has been infringed cannot treat the language of “national security” as a substitute for proof.

• The Court refuses to infer an “oblique motive”

The Court also rejected the suggestion that the women were merely instruments in a larger unlawful design. After interacting with them, the Court said it could not discern material warranting an inference that they had acted with an oblique motive or had been reduced to instruments in the hands of an individual or organisation pursuing an unlawful agenda.

Such an inference, the Court held, could not legitimately be drawn from conjectures, surmises or allegations that remained to be tested before the competent criminal court. This distinction is significant as the Court did not adjudicate the criminal allegations, rather it simply refused to allow untested allegations to determine the constitutional status of the women before it. The criminal investigation was therefore left intact. But it was not allowed to become a basis for continuing their detention.

The investigation arising from Case Crime No. 228 of 2025 would continue strictly in accordance with law. But, the court held that mere pendency of a criminal investigation cannot, by itself, furnish a lawful justification for curtailing the liberty of adult citizens, particularly where they are not subject to any judicial or other lawful order of detention.

This is one of the judgment’s most important safeguards. A criminal investigation is a process for determining whether an offence has been committed. It is not, by itself, a source of custody. The existence of an FIR cannot turn a private residence into a lawful detention centre. Nor can the seriousness of the allegations eliminate the requirement that any deprivation of liberty have legal authority.

Parental authority yields to constitutional liberty: Compensation and directions

Having found the detention to be wholly illegal, the Court did not confine the remedy to a declaration that the women were free. It recognised that where a serious and prolonged violation of fundamental rights has already occurred, an order of release alone may not provide an adequate constitutional remedy. The Court therefore invoked the established jurisprudence on constitutional compensation, particularly Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa. These decisions establish that constitutional courts exercising jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 can award monetary compensation for egregious violations of fundamental rights as a public-law remedy. Such compensation is distinct from ordinary private-law damages and is intended to provide meaningful redress for the breach of a public duty to protect fundamental rights.

Applying this principle, the Court found the present case to involve an “exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights.” It took into account the fact that the women were adults and legally competent, the prolonged nature of their deprivation of liberty, the circumstances in which the confinement allegedly followed their exercise of freedom of conscience, and the mental and psychological consequences of the restraint. The Court also considered the failure of the State machinery to discharge its constitutional obligation to protect their liberty. It described the conduct as a “flagrant affront to the Rule of Law” and found that the State, rather than securing their release, had allowed the detention to continue under the ostensible cover of criminal proceedings. The award of compensation was therefore not presented as punitive damages or an ex gratia payment, but as a constitutional remedy flowing from the gravity of the fundamental-rights violation.

The Court consequently held the father and the State of Uttar Pradesh jointly and severally liable to pay ₹25 lakh, with the amount to be equally divided between the two women. The judgment also incorporated an important mechanism for individual accountability within the State machinery. After satisfying the compensation award, the State was permitted, subject to due process and an opportunity of hearing, to recover the stipulated share from the father and from any delinquent public servant whose acts or omissions contributed to the unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. This aspect of the order is significant because it moves beyond merely compensating the victims and raises the question of institutional responsibility for allowing an unlawful deprivation of liberty to persist.

The Court’s directions were also designed to restore the women’s practical autonomy, rather than merely declare their freedom in abstract terms. It directed that they were free to reside at any place and with any person of their choice and restrained the father from interfering with their personal liberty, movement, residence, profession or religious choices. The State authorities were directed to ensure that no interference was caused to their peaceful life and liberty and to provide protection if required. These directions recognise that liberty can be undermined even without formal physical detention. If a person is denied access to her documents, finances, educational records or other personal belongings, her ability to independently exercise her constitutional choices may remain substantially constrained.

Accordingly, the Court directed the father to hand over the women’s passports, educational certificates, identity documents, bank passbooks, cheque books, conversion-related documents and other personal belongings within seven days, with the State authorities directed to ensure compliance where necessary. At the same time, the Court carefully limited the scope of its intervention: it did not determine whether the alleged conversion was legally valid, whether the criminal allegations would ultimately be established, or whether any offence had been committed. The investigation was permitted to continue strictly in accordance with law. The significance of the judgment therefore lies in the balance it draws between investigative power and individual liberty: the State remains free to investigate an alleged offence, but neither an investigation nor parental disapproval can become a substitute for lawful authority to deprive an adult of her liberty.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

Two FIRs, Four Days In: Pune sees first use of Maharashtra’s controversial anti-conversion law

After NEET protests ended, the battle moved online: Women protesters face threats, doxing and criminalisation

One Death Every Few Days, Zero Accountability: Sanitation workers protest at Jantar Mantar

From Civil Registration to Identity Control: Parliament tightens India’s birth certificate regime without debate

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Brij Bhushan Acquittal: The system vs the wrestlers

The post When Family Becomes Custody: Allahabad HC holds adult women’s faith, residence and liberty cannot be placed under parental control appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The order was passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Sri. Mithun Gopi G.S. in Crl.MP No. 1/2026 in Crime No. 95/2026, T.G. Mohandas v. State of Kerala.

The court noted the non-issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) before the arrest. It also took into account the recovery and seizure of electronic devices allegedly connected with the case, Mohandas’s cooperation with the investigation, and his age and health condition.

The prosecution had raised concerns that he could abscond, influence witnesses or interfere with the investigation. The court held that these concerns could be addressed by imposing conditions while granting bail.

Case concerns videos on Jantar Mantar protests

The case relates to videos uploaded on the YouTube channel “Pathrika”, in which Mohandas allegedly made statements concerning protests at Jantar Mantar.

According to the prosecution, the statements were made with the intention of disturbing public peace and tranquillity and inciting riots. It was further alleged that the content was capable of creating fear and anxiety among protesters and contained remarks insulting womanhood and violating the dignity of women.

The FIR alleges that Mohandas spoke about beating and “shooting dead” student protesters. It also alleges that he made remarks referring to women protesters as women who “enjoyed rape”. The prosecution told the court that around 16 complaints had been made against him in connection with the alleged statements.

According to The Hindu, the videos led to complaints from student and youth organisations and subsequent police action.

Alleged remarks about shooting protesters and sexual violence

According to The Hindu, Mohandas, a former head of the BJP’s State intellectual cell, had spoken in a YouTube video about how he would respond to the Jantar Mantar protest if he were in control of the situation. The report said he spoke of imposing a curfew in the area around Jantar Mantar, directing protesters to disperse and then using force against those who remained.

In the video, he described a sequence involving shooting protesters and subsequently taking bodies to hospitals. In another video, he allegedly made remarks concerning women participating in protests and referred to leftist, secular, democratic and proletarian women in the context of gang rape. The videos generated public reactions and led to demands for legal action.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh subsequently distanced itself from the remarks. K.B. Sreekumar, Saha Prantha Karyavah of the RSS in South Kerala, said the comments represented Mohandas’s personal views and that he was not an RSS office-bearer at any level. He also said the organisation did not agree with the views.

Cyber police register case

The Thiruvananthapuram City Cyber Police registered the case under several provisions.

According to Live Law, Mohandas was booked under Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act, and Sections 79, 353(1) (b) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

However, the police case included Sections 192 and 353(1) (b) of the BNS, along with Section 66 of the Information Technology Act and Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act.

On August 9, a team of cyber police officers searched Mohandas’s residence at Mattancherry before taking him into custody. The seized electronic devices were subsequently produced before the court.

Defence challenges arrest and alleges political motivation

During the bail hearing, counsel for Mohandas challenged both the allegations and the necessity of his arrest. According to Live Law, the defence argued that the case was politically motivated, referring to Mohandas’s association with the BJP and RSS and the alleged political affiliation of the complainant. The defence also submitted that there were no exceptional circumstances requiring immediate arrest.

The principal procedural objection was that the police had not issued a notice under Section 35(3) BNSS before arresting him.

The defence argued that, in the circumstances, Mohandas could have been directed to appear before the investigating officer instead of being immediately taken into custody.

Section 35(3) notice becomes central issue

Section 35 of the BNSS deals with circumstances in which police may arrest a person without a warrant. Sub-section (3) provides for issuance of a notice requiring the person to appear before the police officer where immediate arrest is not considered necessary.

The court examined whether the investigating agency had sufficient grounds to dispense with this procedural requirement. The prosecution argued that a notice was not necessary because there was a possibility that Mohandas could abscond or interfere with digital evidence. According to the prosecution, the investigating officer had recorded concerns about possible destruction, tampering or manipulation of electronic evidence. The prosecution also relied on the number of complaints received against Mohandas and the nature of the allegations while opposing the bail application.

Court rejects general apprehension of absconding

The court did not accept that the material before it established a sufficient possibility of Mohandas evading the investigation or absconding. A significant factor considered by the court was that the police had been able to locate him at his known residential address and conduct a search there.

The court observed, as reported by Live Law:

“The fact that the investigating agency was able to locate the accused at his known residential address and conduct a search there, is, in the circumstances, inconsistent with such apprehension.”

The court further held that a general apprehension that evidence might be destroyed, tampered with or manipulated could not, without circumstances demonstrating an immediate need for arrest, by itself justify dispensing with the statutory safeguard under Section 35(3) BNSS.

The court also noted that the remand report did not contain specific material supporting the apprehension that Mohandas would influence the complainant.

Electronic devices already recovered

The recovery of electronic devices was another factor considered by the court.

Since the allegations concern videos uploaded on YouTube, the electronic material formed part of the investigation. However, the court noted that the devices allegedly used in connection with the offence had already been recovered, seized and produced before it. This was relevant to the prosecution’s contention that Mohandas needed to remain in custody to prevent destruction or interference with digital evidence. The court found that there was no need for custodial interrogation at that stage.

It also considered Mohandas’s cooperation with the investigation and his age and health condition.

Court says arrest procedure was not justified

After examining the material placed before it, the court concluded that there was no justification for the investigating agency to dispense with the statutory requirement of issuing notice under Section 35(3) BNSS.

The court’s conclusion was based on the circumstances before it, including the ability of the police to locate Mohandas at his known residence, the recovery of the electronic devices and the absence of specific material showing that he was likely to abscond or interfere with the investigation.

The court said:

“Mere apprehension of destruction, tampering or manipulation of evidence, in the absence of circumstances indicating an immediate necessity for arrest, cannot by itself justify dispensing with the statutory safeguard contemplated under Section 35(3) of the BNSS.”

The court added that the same reasoning applied to the alleged apprehension that Mohandas could influence the complainant, as no specific material supporting that apprehension was disclosed in the remand report.

Court takes age, health and cooperation into account

The court also considered Mohandas’s age and health condition while deciding whether continued detention was necessary and along with these circumstances, the court took note of his cooperation with the police investigation and the recovery of the articles allegedly connected with the case.

The court ultimately held that the prosecution’s concerns regarding possible absconding, influencing witnesses or interference with the investigation could be addressed through appropriate bail conditions.

It concluded:

“The apprehensions expressed by the prosecution regarding the possibility of the accused absconding, influencing witnesses, or interfering with the investigation can be adequately addressed by imposing stringent conditions while enlarging the accused on bail.”

The court further observed:

“Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the non-issuance of notice under Section 35(3), the recovery of the articles, the cooperation extended by the accused with the police investigation, as well as the age and health condition of the accused, this Court is of the considered opinion that the further detention of the accused in judicial custody is not warranted at this stage” as Live Law reported

Student and youth organisations had sought action

Notably, youth and student organisations held protest marches to Mohandas’s residence demanding legal action. Leaders of the Students Federation of India and the All-India Students Federation also filed complaints. The delay in police action had also led to criticism of the State government, according to the report.

The RSS response came amid the controversy surrounding the remarks, with its South Kerala functionary stating that Mohandas’s comments were his personal views and did not represent the organisation.

Related:

Brinda Karat seeks review of SC verdict in Thakur-Verma hate speech case

Nazia Elahi Khan faces multiple FIRs over alleged hate speech

CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal

Hate Speech Before the Supreme Court: From judicial activism to institutional closure

The Supreme Court blinks when it comes to Hate Speech

The post Kerala court grants bail to T.G. Mohandas in Jantar Mantar remarks case, cites arrest procedure irregularity appeared first on SabrangIndia.