Law & Justice | SabrangIndia https://sabrangindia.in/category/law-justice/ News Related to Human Rights Tue, 17 Nov 2026 07:07:09 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.2.2 https://sabrangindia.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Favicon_0.png Law & Justice | SabrangIndia https://sabrangindia.in/category/law-justice/ 32 32 Bilkis Bano Case: SC grants bail to two convicts, suspends life sentences pending appeal https://sabrangindia.in/bilkis-bano-case-sc-grants-bail-to-two-convicts-suspends-life-sentences-pending-appeal/ Tue, 17 Nov 2026 07:07:09 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=50129 The October 28 order makes no mention of their extensive parole and furlough periods, the Gujarat remission orders overturned in 2024, or the earlier dismissal of their challenges to the 2017 convictions

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The Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the life sentences of two men convicted in the 2002 Bilkis Bano gang rape and murder case, granting them bail after citing more than 17 years of incarceration, raises some questions about the manner in which prolonged imprisonment, individual circumstances and the gravity of an offence are weighed when judicial relief is considered. Particularly in question appears to be the absence of any discussion in the latest order of the substantial periods that the two convicts had already spent outside prison, first on parole and furlough and subsequently following the Gujarat government’s controversial decision to grant remission to all 11 convicts in 2022.

The latest order also leaves unaddressed an important part of the case’s procedural history: the Supreme Court had previously dismissed the Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) filed by the convicts challenging the Bombay High Court judgment that upheld their convictions in 2017. The Court’s own January 2024 judgment quashing the remission granted to the 11 accused records that the convicts’ challenges to the High Court verdict were dismissed in July and November 2017. Neither Bilkis Bano not her advocates were heard in these proceedings.

On October 28, a Bench of Justices MM Sundresh and Prasanna B Varale suspended the life sentences of Bipinchand Kanaiyalal Joshi and Pradip Ramanlal Modhiya, granting them bail pending adjudication of their appeals against the Bombay High Court’s May 2017 judgment upholding their convictions. The Bench relied on three principal considerations: the appellants’ incarceration for more than 17 years, the fact that one of them was severely handicapped, and the existence of questions of fact and law that would require adjudication in their appeals.

The order records the defence’s contention that one of the appellants had not been named in the original First Information Report (FIR) and had been implicated nearly three years after the incident. The prosecution, represented by Additional Solicitor General Raja Thakre, vehemently opposed the applications, arguing that both the trial court and the High Court had considered the relevant evidence, particularly given the seriousness of the offences. The Court nevertheless ordered the suspension of their sentences, leaving the terms and conditions of bail to the concerned trial court.

The decision is significant not merely because two of the 11 convicts are set to walk out of prison again. It raises questions about the treatment of their custodial history, the grounds on which their fresh appeals have been entertained despite the earlier dismissal of SLPs, and whether the remaining nine convicts could seek similar relief.

Earlier SLPs dismissed in 2017: What does the fresh challenge mean?

One of the most consequential aspects of the latest proceedings is the procedural history of the convictions themselves. The Bombay High Court, on May 4, 2017, upheld the convictions and life sentences imposed on the 11 men by the special CBI court. The convicts challenged the High Court judgment before the Supreme Court. In its subsequent judgement related to the untimely remissions dated January 8, 2024 judgment in Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, the Supreme Court recorded that the SLPs filed by the convicts against the High Court judgment had been dismissed through orders dated July 10, 2017 and November 20, 2017. The Court expressly noted that these dismissals upheld the findings rendered by the High Court as well as the sentences awarded.

Yet, the October 28, 2026 order arises from fresh SLPs filed by Joshi and Modhiya against the very same Bombay High Court judgment of May 4, 2017. The order records that leave has now been granted, converting the petitions into appeals, and suspends the sentences of the two appellants pending their adjudication.

This procedural history demands some scrutiny. The latest order does not refer to the earlier dismissal of the convicts’ SLPs, explain the circumstances in which the fresh challenges have come before the Court, or indicate whether the present petitions raise grounds materially different from those considered in the earlier proceedings.

It would be inaccurate to suggest that an earlier dismissal of an SLP automatically bars every subsequent challenge to the same judgment. The legal effect of an SLP dismissal depends, among other things, on the nature of the earlier order and whether leave had been granted. A dismissal at the threshold does not invariably result in the merger of the High Court judgment with the Supreme Court’s order. However, the existence of earlier proceedings and the dismissal of challenges to the same convictions raise questions of finality, successive litigation and the basis on which a fresh challenge is being entertained. These are not peripheral procedural details. The convictions had been upheld by the High Court and the convicts’ earlier challenges had been dismissed by the Supreme Court. The latest order, while granting leave and suspending the sentences, does not address this history. Most significant through all this is the fact that in the hearing of this application for bail by these two accused, neither were Bilkis Bano’s lawyers summoned or heard nor was she served notice for a chance to be heard.

More than 17 years of incarceration, but what does the complete prison record reveal?

The Supreme Court’s reliance on more than 17 years of incarceration deserves to be examined against the convicts’ actual custodial history, particularly the periods during which they were permitted to leave prison. According to details of the Gujarat government’s affidavit submitted before the Supreme Court in October 2022, as reported by The Telegraph, Joshi had spent 909 days on parole and another 170 days on furlough, amounting to 1,079 days outside prison. Modhiya had availed himself of 1,011 days of parole and 223 days of furlough, taking his total to 1,234 days outside prison, according to the figures published by the newspaper.

These figures amount to nearly three years for Joshi and more than three years for Modhiya. They are not incidental details. They form part of the official custodial history of the very convicts whose prolonged incarceration has now been invoked as a ground for suspending their life sentences. The timeline becomes even more consequential when the 2022 remission episode is taken into account.

On August 15, 2022, the Gujarat government released all 11 convicts prematurely, citing their eligibility under its remission policy and their conduct in prison. They remained outside prison until January 21, 2024, when they surrendered following the Supreme Court’s decision to quash the remission orders.

This was not an ordinary release. The Supreme Court, in its January 8, 2024 judgment in Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, held that Gujarat was not the appropriate government to grant remission, as the trial had taken place in Maharashtra and the convicts had been sentenced by a court there. It held the remission orders illegal and vitiated, and directed all 11 convicts to surrender within two weeks. Thus, the two men had not only availed themselves of substantial periods of parole and furlough before their premature release, but had also spent approximately 17 months outside prison following the Gujarat government’s remission decision.

The latest Supreme Court order does not refer to these periods. Nor does it explain how the assertion of more than 17 years of incarceration was assessed against the complete history of temporary releases and the period during which the convicts remained free following the now-quashed remission.

Delayed implication nearly three years later: a defence submission, not a judicial finding

Another ground recorded by the Supreme Court is the defence’s contention that one of the appellants was not named in the original FIR and was implicated nearly three years after the occurrence. This is a significant issue that may require examination during the appeals. However, the distinction between a submission made by the defence and a finding established by the Court must be maintained.

The Indian Express reports today, November 17, that one of the accused in this bail application, Bipin Kanaiyalal Joshi was a neighbour of the survivor Bilkis Bano before the 2002 Gujarat carnage in the Randhikpur village of the Dahod district of Gujarat. The second accused Pradip Ramanlal Modhiya had a hotel in the same area. Not only were the two men, whose life terms were suspended by the Supreme Court on Monday among the 11 convicted by a Special CBI Court in Mumbai on January 20028, but the Bombay High Court had upheld the convictions in May 2017.

Most significantly, in its judgment, the trial court had recorded an eyewitness account of Modhiya being part of the mob that went on a rampage in Randhikpur on February 28, 2002, the day after the Godhra train burning. Prosecution witness Imtiyaz Yusuf Ghanchi had told the court that he had seen Modhiya pelting stones. He had also identified Modhiya’s brother Naresh, now dead, as being part of the mob and said he (Naresh) was holding a knife. Imtiyaz had said he fled with his mother and sister, and took shelter in a neighbour’s house for two days.Another prosecution witness, Salim Adam Ghanchi, had named Joshi among those he saw in the mob. According to the court order, Joshi’s father was a medical practitioner, and Bilkis Bano’s father was among his patients.

The October 28 order merely records the submission. It does not explain the circumstances of the subsequent implication or conclude that the delay undermines the prosecution’s case. Both men were convicted by the special CBI court in January 2008, and their convictions were upheld by the Bombay High Court in May 2017. The delayed implication argument must therefore be considered alongside the evidence on which the two courts based their findings of guilt.

The defence had also argued during earlier proceedings that the survivor had not named the two appellants in her initial police statement concerning the rape allegations or in her statement recorded during her medical examination. It further contended that no specific overt act had been attributed to them and that the evidence against them was limited to their alleged presence in the mob. These are grounds raised by the defence and remain matters for adjudication in the appeals.

The other individual consideration was Joshi’s severe physical disability. While disability and its implications for an individual’s health, dignity and conditions of incarceration are legitimate considerations in deciding bail, the order does not elaborate on the nature of his disability or the medical circumstances that informed the decision.

The question is not whether disability or prolonged incarceration should be disregarded. It is whether these considerations have been weighed against the complete evidentiary and custodial record, particularly in a case involving convictions for gang rape and multiple murders during the 2002 Gujarat communal violence.

A survivor should not have to repeatedly fight to preserve the outcome of a conviction

The Bilkis Bano case has become emblematic of the struggle for accountability following communal and gender-based violence. It has also demonstrated the enormous burden placed on survivors when executive decisions threaten to undo the outcomes of criminal proceedings.

Reacting to the development, Senior Advocate Shobha Gupta, who represented Bilkis Bano, spoke to Sabrangindia and described the Supreme Court’s decision as shocking. She said that just when Bilkis had hoped to find some measure of peace, the release of the two convicts had once again left her confronting the uncertainty surrounding the case. Gupta questioned the way the two men had secured their release, describing it as “not a straightforward procedure”.

The appeals are still to be decided. But the questions raised by this order cannot wait until then: what constitutes prolonged incarceration when the custodial record includes years of temporary release and a period of premature freedom? How consistently will the Court apply the grounds on which it has now granted relief? And what does this mean for a survivor who has already had to fight once to ensure that a judicially imposed sentence was not undone?

The 2022 remission controversy cannot be separated from the latest relief

The latest order comes against the backdrop of a prolonged legal battle in which the survivor herself had to approach the Supreme Court to challenge the premature release of the 11 convicts. Bilkis Bano was five months pregnant when she was gang raped during the 2002 Gujarat communal violence. Fourteen members of her family were murdered, including her three-year-old daughter.

The investigation was subsequently transferred to the CBI, and the Supreme Court transferred the trial from Gujarat to Maharashtra in 2004, citing concerns about the fairness of the proceedings. In January 2008, a special CBI court convicted 11 men and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The Bombay High Court upheld the convictions in May 2017.

Despite these judicial findings, the Gujarat government granted remission to all 11 men in August 2022, releasing them from prison. The decision prompted widespread outrage and was challenged before the Supreme Court, including by Bilkis Bano. In its January 8, 2024 judgment, the Supreme Court did considerably more than identify a technical jurisdictional error. It examined the circumstances surrounding the remission exercise, the suppression of material facts and the manner in which the Gujarat government had proceeded despite not being the appropriate government.

The Bench of Justices BV Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan held that the Gujarat government had usurped the powers of Maharashtra and that the remission orders were illegal. It also observed that the May 2022 order directing Gujarat to consider remission had been obtained through suppression of material facts and misrepresentation. The Court directed all 11 convicts to return to prison, emphasising that the consequences of an illegal remission had to follow.

Detailed reports may be read here, here and here.

The October 2026 order now provides two of those convicts another avenue to secure their release, this time through suspension of their sentences by the Supreme Court itself. Perhaps the most immediate legal implication of the October 28 order concerns the remaining nine convicts. The order could provide the remaining convicts with grounds to seek similar relief, particularly if they can demonstrate comparable periods of incarceration or raise issues in their own appeals. The principle of parity may also become relevant.

The complete order may be read here:

Related:

Bilkis Bano Case: Applications for extension to surrender to jail authorities by eleven convicted dismissed by SC

Bilkis Bano vindicated!

Justice once more for Bilkis Bano, but what now lies ahead?

Bilkis Bano speaks: First person account, Godhra Relief Camp, March 2002

Today, I Can Breathe Again: Bilkis Bano on landmark Supreme Court judgement

‘Be ready with files’, SC warns as it issues notice to GoI, Gujarat govts on Bilkis Bano’s plea against remission of convicts

“I will stand & fight again, against what is wrong & for what is right, for women everywhere’: Bilkis Bano

Bilkis Bano case: Convicts set free with MHA’s approval, despite opposition from CBI and Special Court

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Form 6: ECI’s “assurance of no prosecution” to deleted voters is a violation election law & rule https://sabrangindia.in/form-6-ecis-assurance-of-no-prosecution-to-deleted-voters-is-a-violation-election-law-rule/ Mon, 16 Nov 2026 12:34:18 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=50116 In its latest amended affidavit before the Supreme Court (SC) (November 14), the EC has “assured” the court that voters whose names are missing from the draft rolls will not face prosecution for making a false declaration and submitting names for re-inclusion under Form 6; this patch-work solution however is no solution to the violations […]

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In its latest amended affidavit before the Supreme Court (SC) (November 14), the EC has “assured” the court that voters whose names are missing from the draft rolls will not face prosecution for making a false declaration and submitting names for re-inclusion under Form 6; this patch-work solution however is no solution to the violations this process forces the voter to commit; why does the ECI remain committed to its faulty SIR procedures rather than the clear-cut classifications available for re-inclusion of wrongly deleted voters (public audit), Form 6 (new voters), Form 7 (deletions), Form 8 (changes on name, address, other details)?

ECI’s SIR procedures are violations of both the 2021 amendment to the RPA available through a notification dated June 17, 2022


The Election Commission of India (ECI) has now told the Supreme Court that voters whose names appeared in earlier electoral rolls but are missing from the draft rolls prepared during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) can submit Form 6 for inclusion in the final electoral roll without facing prosecution merely on account of their previous enrolment! However, the ECI remains obdurately committed to a procedure that statutorily involves a “false declaration” by a previous elector. Moreover, the ECI is clearly resistant to nationwide demands to scrap the faulty and exclusionary process of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) in its entirety and a reversion to the 2024, pre-SIR electoral rolls.

The assurance, contained in a supplementary affidavit filed on November 14, 2026, comes after apprehensions that such voters could face action under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, for submitting a declaration in Form 6 despite having been enrolled earlier.

However, the Commission’s clarification raises a larger question about the procedure being followed for voters who have already been enrolled once. Why should an elector whose name was present in an earlier electoral roll have to seek fresh enrolment through Form 6, a form prescribed for the inclusion of a new elector?

What the ECI has told the Supreme Court

In its supplementary affidavit in Rakesh Kumar Singh alias Rakesh Singh v. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1246 of 2026, the ECI stated that some previously enrolled electors whose names did not appear in the draft electoral rolls were hesitant to submit Form 6. The affidavit may be read below this story.

Since September 2026 specifically, but even before the use of Form 6 by the ECI for re-inclusion of voters deleted due to either ineptness or deliberate intent by the ECI has raised nationwide condemnation. Articles on the issue may be read here, here and here.

The criticisms, outrage and apprehensions arose because of the inherent statutory flaw in the SIR that had no reasoning nor basis. Form 6 is prescribed for New Voters alone. Under the SIR, through an annexure to Form 6, a declaration form prescribed required the applicant (older voter who was seeking re-instatement in the rolls) to state that their name is being included in the electoral roll for the first time. This amounts clearly to a false declaration and expose them to prosecution under Section 31 of the 1950 Act, that too for no fault of theirs.  Belatedly responding to this, the Commission issued a clarification through its letter dated November 3, 2026, addressed to the Chief Electoral Officers of all States and Union Territories.

The letter states that an elector whose name does not appear in the draft roll can submit Form 6 to seek inclusion in the final electoral roll, irrespective of whether the person had been enrolled previously. The ECI has maintained that submitting the form in these circumstances is not, by itself, a false declaration merely because the applicant was previously enrolled.

The protection against prosecution is, however, subject to two conditions. The applicant must not already be enrolled in another Parliamentary or Assembly constituency, and the declaration must otherwise be in accordance with law.

The Commission has directed Chief Electoral Officers to publicise this clarification widely, including in local languages. It has also relied on the Delhi High Court’s October 14, 2026 judgment in Nilotpal Datta & Anr. v. Election Commission of India & Ors., in which the Court permitted the petitioners to submit Form 6 for consideration in accordance with law.

Vote for Democracy (VFD) Experts decry this move

Dr Pyarelal Garg, expert associated with the Vote for Democracy (VFD) has sharply decried the move. He has pointed to the statutory framework governing the prescribed forms. The Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021, published in the Gazette of India on December 30, 2021, amended the Representation of the People Act, 1950, among other provisions. The subsequent notification issued by the Ministry of Law and Justice on June 17, 2022, introduced amendments to the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. These amendments came into force on August 1, 2022.

The June 17 notification, S.O. 2802(E), substituted Rule 13 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. The amended provision makes a distinction between the forms used for different electoral registration purposes, clearly.

The copy of June 17, 2022 notification can be accessed from here

Rule 13(1) provides that every claim for inclusion of a name in the electoral roll as a new elector shall be made in Form 6.

Rule 13(2) provides for Form 7 in cases involving objections to proposed inclusion or applications for deletion of an existing entry.

Rule 13(3) prescribes Form 8 for objections to particulars in an existing entry, shifting of residence and correction or updation of entries.

The distinction is significant. Form 6 is specifically prescribed for a new elector, while the rules provide distinct and separate forms for objections, deletion, shifting and correction of existing entries.

It is this distinction that Dr Garg says the Commission cannot overlook while asking previously enrolled voters, whose names have disappeared during the SIR, to seek fresh enrolment through Form 6.

ECI’s position is a violation of the statutory framework. Speaking to SabrangIndia, Dr Pyaralal Garg strongly criticised the Election Commission’s arguments before the Supreme Court.

In sum, he said, “ECI arguments before SC on Form 6 are further violations of the statutory framework that the Commission is governed under: It is strange (and inexplicable) that the ECI has dared forward these arguments in that are an outright mockery of both the Supreme Court and Parliament! This ‘invitation to committing a crime lays an innocent elector open to threat and inducement.”

Ministry of Law and Justice vide notification dated 17.06.2022 in compliance of amendments to RP Act 1950 notification dated 30.12.2021.” The copy of December 30, 2021 notification can be accessed from there

Separate relief for voters marked ASDD

The supplementary affidavit also details another set of measures announced by the Commission following a suggestion made by the Supreme Court on October 28, 2026, in proceedings concerning the Delhi SIR in Anjali Bhardwaj v. Election Commission of India.

The Court had suggested that the Commission examine ways to reach voters marked Absent, Shifted, Dead or Duplicate (ASDD), whose names were left out of the draft electoral rolls. Following this, the ECI issued directions on November 6, 2026, to the Chief Electoral Officers of Delhi, Maharashtra, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Telangana and Nagaland.

Under these directions, booth-wise lists of such electors are to be displayed afresh at polling stations, Panchayat Bhawans and urban local body offices, as well as on the websites of the respective Chief Electoral Officers. The lists must also indicate the probable reasons for non-inclusion.

The Commission has directed electoral officials to make fresh efforts to contact these voters through Booth Level Officers, including by visiting their homes and contacting family members, neighbours and Resident Welfare Associations wherever necessary. Partially filled Enumeration Forms are also to be generated again through the ERO dashboard on ECINET.

Electors who have not shifted residence can submit their signed Enumeration Forms along with a statement explaining why they could not submit the form earlier. These can be submitted to the Electoral Registration Officer, Assistant Electoral Registration Officer or Booth Level Officer, either personally or through family members. An online submission facility with e-signature is also to be made available.

For electors who have shifted residence within the same State, the Commission has provided a separate procedure. They are not required to submit Form 8 for this purpose. Instead, they can submit the Enumeration Form along with a statement giving their new address and Assembly Constituency, supported by address proof, to the ERO or AERO of the new constituency. Homeless persons who do not possess the listed address documents can rely on the BLO’s field verification report.

Importantly, the November 6 directions provide that these Enumeration Forms will be processed by the EROs under Rule 21(1) of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, after verification of eligibility, ordinary residence and other relevant particulars. If accepted, the elector will be assigned the same EPIC number that was held before the SIR.

The ECI has also clarified that an elector who has already submitted Form 6 for fresh enrolment during the SIR need not submit the Enumeration Form again. Their application will be processed under the “November 3 clarification”.

The unresolved question

The supplementary affidavit sets out two different measures: a general clarification allowing previously enrolled voters missing from the draft roll to submit Form 6 without facing prosecution merely because of their earlier enrolment, and a separate procedure for ASDD electors in seven States and Union Territories through the resubmission of Enumeration Forms under Rule 21(1).

While these measures provide additional opportunities for electors to seek inclusion in the final rolls, they do not settle the statutory question raised by VFD that whether Form 6, prescribed for a new elector, is the appropriate route for someone whose name was already included in an earlier electoral roll.

The ECI has maintained that its objective is to ensure that eligible electors are included in the final rolls while preventing duplicate enrolments. In the concluding portion of its affidavit, the Commission acknowledged the challenges arising from the large volume of data involved in the exercise and stated that it remained committed to addressing inconsistencies while ensuring that eligible voters are not left out.

The issue, therefore, is not limited to an assurance against prosecution. It also concerns the procedure through which an elector already recognised in the electoral rolls is required to establish their eligibility again during the SIR.

The affidavit may be read here:

Related:

ECI affidavit says SIR decisions were unanimous, but questions over two commissioners’ objections remain

UP voter lists: Software manipulates Voter’s names, Pilibhit investigation finds 10,470 irregular entries

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Vote Chori: Fake Applications to Delete 28 Voters; Uttarakhand court directs police to register FIR https://sabrangindia.in/vote-chori-fake-applications-to-delete-28-voters-uttarakhand-court-directs-police-to-register-fir/ Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:32:05 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=50076 A concrete case of allegations of criminality and violation of election law and rules, especially related to the Form 7 method of ‘mass deletions’ has come to light from Uttarakhand, with a BLA-2 (Ikram Ali himself petitioning the court for registration of an FIR after his identity and email were misused for 28 deletions: Ali had also approached the Haldwani judicial magistrate for directions to register an FIR which the court has directed on October 6.

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NEW DELHI – A judicial magistrate court in Haldwani, Uttarakhand, has directed police to register a First Information Report (FIR) and investigate allegations that Form-7 applications were fraudulently submitted in the name of a Booth Level Agent (BLA-2) to seek the deletion of 28 voters from the electoral rolls. The matter came to light after the complainant and petitioner–Ikram Ali — himself the BLA-2 in question whose identity had been purportedly fraudulently misused –had filed complaints for redressal. Alleging that he informed concerned election officials in writing, and when faced with silence sent his complaint to the Banbhoolpura police station by speed post on August 24, which was received by the police on August 27, according to the court order. The order was passed on October 6, The grave issue has been reported in Hindustan, Dainik Jagran and Hindustan Gazette.

After allegedly receiving no effective action at the police station, Ali submitted yet another complaint to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Nainital, on August 29. The complaint was received on August 31, the order recorded. However, the court noted that despite the complaints, no FIR had been registered and no effective investigative action had been taken, prompting Ali to approach the magistrate. In its order, the court examined the police report sought in the matter as is required under Section 175 (3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023.[1]

Advocate Manish Kumar Pandey, represents complainant, Ikram Ali, a resident of Indiranagar in Banbhulpura. While rejecting the stay application, the court scheduled the next hearing on the revision petition for December 7, 2026, noting that the non-registration of an FIR to date is also a serious matter.

Judicial Magistrate First Class Shubhangi Gupta, in an order dated October 6, accepted a petition filed by Ikram Ali, a resident of Ward No. 31 in Haldwani, under Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. The court directed the officer in charge of Banbhoolpura police station to register an FIR on the basis of the complaint received on August 24 and investigate the matter in accordance with law.

The Magistrate’s order relates to serious illegalities in the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. Ali, the petitioner and original complainant before the police, has reportedly told the court that he was working as a BLA-2 during the revision process when he learnt on August 20 that Form-7 applications had been submitted online in his name on August 12, seeking the deletion of 28 voters from Part No. 134 of the electoral roll. According to the petition, Ali denied submitting any such applications, either for himself or on behalf of any other voter. He also denied authorising anyone to file them in his name.

In the petition, Ali alleged that unidentified persons had misused his identity to prepare and submit the applications, purportedly presenting themselves as him before the election office. Ali has also contended that he informed the concerned election officials in writing after learning about the applications. He subsequently sent a written complaint to Banbhoolpura police station by speed post on August 24, which was received by the police on August 27, according to the court order.

It was only after he reportedly received no effective action at the police station, that Ali submitted another complaint to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Nainital, on August 29. The complaint was received on August 31, the order stated. The court observed that despite the complaints, no FIR had been registered and no effective investigative action had been taken, prompting Ali to approach the magistrate.

In the first instance, as observed by the court in its order, the court examined the police report sought in the matter. The report stated that the complaint concerned alleged forgery and identity theft in connection with SIR Form-7 applications. It also suggested that the complainant could raise his objection before the relevant Assistant Returning Officer under the existing procedure.

According to available media reports, Ikram Ali, the BLA-2 in question has stated that he reached Delhi on October 30, where he met senior Congress leaders Rahul Gandhi, Priyanka Gandhi, and P. Chidambaram. In addition, he met with more than 20 MPs and senior leaders of the INDIA alliance, including a representative of SP chief Akhilesh Yadav, TMC MP Mahua Moitra, and former Jammu & Kashmir Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti. Ikram informed all the leaders about the misuse of portal IDs and the deletion of voters’ names from the list using fake identities in Haldwani’s Indiranagar area. According to Ikram, all the leaders assured him that they are keeping a close watch on the matter and will take the issue forward.

The controversy surrounding the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls is no longer limited to concerns about voters being asked to prove their eligibility or submit forms to remain on the rolls. The conscious and deliberate misuse of Form 7 for third party deletions, that too by dominant political actors, has been a recurring aspect of the controversial SIR process.

Widely reported investigations by The Hindu, both in Delhi and Karnataka have raised another serious question: who can or should initiate the process for deletion of voters, on what basis, and how effectively are such deletion processes being checked?

Detailed directions by the Court

In the Order dated October 6, the magistrate held that the availability of an alternative remedy before the election authorities was not sufficient grounds to reject the plea seeking a police investigation.

“The remedy available before the Assistant Returning Officer and the relief sought by the applicant operate in different fields and are not alternatives to each other,” the court observed.

The court noted that the election authority’s role was limited to matters such as correction and maintenance of electoral rolls, whereas the complaint concerned an alleged offence committed by unidentified persons.

The order of the court further observes that the relevant election authority did not have the power to investigate the criminal offence or obtain electronic records such as user IDs and login details, registered mobile numbers and email addresses, OTP and authentication information, IP addresses, and device-related records that could help identify those responsible.

The court said the mere availability of an alternative remedy was not sufficient grounds to dismiss the petition.

The magistrate referred to the Supreme Court’s judgments in *Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh* (2014) 2 SCC 1 and *Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P.* (2015) 6 SCC 287 while examining the requirements for directing police action.

Referring to *Lalita Kumari*, the court noted that where information prima facie discloses a cognisable offence, registration of an FIR is a legal duty of the police, followed by an investigation in accordance with law.

The court also observed that the police report had not rejected the complainant’s allegations or stated that no cognisable offence was made out. Nor did it refer to any investigation conducted at the police-station level.

The magistrate said that, at first glance, the alleged submission of applications in the complainant’s name by concealing his actual identity and impersonating him in official proceedings appeared to fall within the scope of a suspected criminal offence.

The court clarified, however, that it was not expressing a final opinion on the offences involved, which would have to be determined during the investigation.

Allowing the petition, the court directed the officer in charge of Banbhoolpura police station to register an FIR on the basis of Ali’s complaint dated August 24, 2026, and investigate the case in accordance with law.

It also ordered that a copy of the order be sent immediately to the concerned police station.

The order does not establish who submitted the disputed Form-7 applications or whether the 28 voters were ultimately removed from the electoral rolls. Those issues remain subject to investigation.


[1] Unlike its predecessor, Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure this section—175 (3) has controversially added “several procedural” steps ostensibly to prevent misuse of magisterial powers. These include submission of the said complaint to the Superintendant of Police (SP), accompanied by an affidavit as also recording of the police version.


Related:

SIR: Form 7 controversies raise fresh questions about the continued power to delete voters

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Supreme Court rejects ‘informal detention’, strengthens safeguards against arbitrary arrest https://sabrangindia.in/supreme-court-rejects-informal-detention-strengthens-safeguards-against-arbitrary-arrest/ Wed, 11 Nov 2026 04:46:16 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=50045 Holding that the 24-hour deadline under Article 22(2) begins with the actual curtailment of liberty, the Court says investigating agencies cannot keep individuals in custody while delaying the formal recording of arrest

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The Supreme Court has held that the 24-hour period within which an arrested person must be produced before a Magistrate begins from the moment their liberty is effectively curtailed by investigating authorities, and not from the time at which their formal arrest is recorded. The Court has made clear that investigating agencies cannot keep a person under their control during search, seizure or questioning and subsequently claim that the constitutional clock began only when an arrest memo was prepared.

In Sujit Das and Others v. Union of India, a judgment delivered on November 5, 2026, a Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar examined the scope of Article 22(2) of the Constitution, which requires every arrested and detained person to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest, excluding only the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s court.

The judgment is significant not only for clarifying when this constitutional deadline begins, but also for reinforcing the role of judicial oversight in preventing arbitrary detention and custodial abuse. It rejects the creation of an intermediate category of detention in which a person is deprived of their liberty but is not treated as arrested for the purpose of constitutional protection. The Court has also clarified that compliance with the 24-hour ceiling does not, by itself, make detention lawful: the period of detention must also be reasonable in the circumstances.

“the magistrate shall also examine at the time of production whether the detention of the person produced, though is within the time frame of 24 hours, has exceeded the period which can be construed to be reasonable in the circumstances of the case. If he is satisfied that detention in custody has been for a longer period than what is reasonable, he may decline remand” (Para 69 (vii))

The case: Detained on September 29, formally arrested the following day

The case arose from an NDPS investigation in Tripura. On September 29, 2025, officers of the Customs Division intercepted a truck travelling towards Agartala on the basis of information that it was carrying narcotic substances concealed in a consignment of ginger. The persons travelling in the vehicle were intercepted at approximately 2 pm at Shanitala Noabadi.

The search resulted in the recovery of narcotic substances. It continued at the Customs Division office in Agartala, where further contraband was recovered from trolley bags concealed beneath the ginger consignment. The total quantity seized was 60.79 kg. The search and seizure procedure was completed at approximately 5 pm on September 29.

However, the appellants were formally shown as arrested only on September 30, at 11 am and 11.15 am. They were produced before a Judicial Magistrate at 4.45 pm that day and remanded to judicial custody.

Their bail applications were rejected by the Special Judge and subsequently by the Tripura High Court. The High Court relied, among other considerations, on Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, which imposes stringent conditions for granting bail in specified NDPS cases.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants raised a separate and fundamental constitutional objection. They argued that their liberty had been curtailed when they were intercepted and brought under the control of the investigating team at 2 pm on September 29. If that was the point from which the 24-hour period began, they should have been produced before a Magistrate by 2 pm on September 30. Their production at 4.45 pm was therefore beyond the constitutionally permitted period.

The investigating agency disputed this interpretation. It maintained that the appellants had merely been intercepted on September 29 and were not detained until their formal arrests the following morning. It argued that the intervening period was required to complete the procedures prescribed under the NDPS Act, including search and seizure, weighing and testing the seized substances, preparing seizure documents and carrying out other investigative formalities.

The agency also relied on Rule 3(4) of the NDPS (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022, which prescribes procedures for the classification, weighing, packaging and numbering of seized substances in the presence of witnesses and the person from whose possession they were recovered.

The Supreme Court directed the investigating officer to explain the period between the interception, completion of the search and seizure, formal arrest and production before the Magistrate. The central question was whether the investigating agency could treat the period during which the appellants were under its control as something other than detention for the purposes of Article 22(2).

The constitutional meaning of arrest cannot depend on the investigating agency’s paperwork

The Court approached the question by examining the language and purpose of Article 22(2). It noted that the provision refers to a person who is “arrested and detained in custody”. The expressions are used conjunctively, and the Court rejected the attempt to treat them as two separate events so that the constitutional deadline could be postponed until formal arrest.

It held that the Constitution does not recognise detention dehors arrest. In other words, a person cannot be deprived of their liberty and kept under the control of investigating authorities while being placed in a legally indeterminate category of detention that falls outside the protection of Article 22(2).

“ Any attempt to draw an artificial distinction between ‘arrest’ and ‘detention’ would dilute or negate the fundamental protection guaranteed by the Constitution under clause (2) of Article 22. Such an endeavour should be avoided. We must adopt that interpretation which enhances and furthers the constitutional objective.” (Para 58)

The Court explained that the relevant consideration is whether the person has been deprived of their personal liberty and is no longer free to leave. It referred to its earlier decisions, including Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, to examine the meaning of arrest and custody. These decisions recognise that the question of custody depends on the actual restraint imposed on an individual, rather than merely the terminology used by the authorities.

Applying this understanding, the Court held that the 24-hour period begins when a person is taken under the control of an investigating authority and their liberty is effectively curtailed. The formal arrest memo cannot determine the commencement of the constitutional deadline.

The Court also rejected the proposition that statutory procedures under the NDPS Act could justify a period of detention outside Article 22(2). It acknowledged the requirements governing search and seizure but held that these procedures cannot be used to postpone constitutional safeguards. Once a person’s liberty has been curtailed, the time spent on investigative or administrative procedures cannot be excluded from the 24-hour calculation. The only period that can be excluded is the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s court, as expressly provided under Article 22(2).

“Article 22(2) does not sanction exclusion of the time taken for enquiry and investigation before the arresting authority could effect arrest of the detainee. This is beyond the mandate of Article 22(2) of the Constitution. Article 22(2) does not sanction creation of any buffer zone where the liberty of an individual is curtailed for investigating purposes but not formally shown as arrested. Creation or contemplation of such buffer zone is unconstitutional.” (Para 43)

In reaching this conclusion, the Bench disapproved the approach adopted by the Orissa High Court in Aryaman Pattnayak, the Madras High Court in Kannan and the Kerala High Court in Arun K. Thomas. These decisions had drawn a distinction between detention during investigation and formal arrest. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation adopted by the High Courts was inconsistent with the constitutional protection of personal liberty.

The judgment is therefore an important clarification for investigations conducted under special statutes. It establishes that the existence of statutory powers to search, seize or question a person does not create an exception to the constitutional requirement of timely production before a Magistrate.

“Therefore, the declaration that the period of 24 hours for the purposes of Article 22(2) commences from the completion of such search and seizure and only from the time of arrest recorded by the arresting authority is not only unsustainable in law but is entirely unconstitutional.” (Para 43)

The 24-hour limit is not an automatic licence to detain

A further important aspect of the judgment concerns Section 58 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which corresponds to Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court identified two distinct safeguards under Section 58. First, a person cannot be detained by the police without a warrant for more than 24 hours, excluding the necessary journey time, without being produced before a Magistrate. Second, even within that period, detention must not exceed what is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.

The second requirement is particularly significant. The Court clarified that the 24-hour period should not be understood as an automatic entitlement for investigating agencies to detain a person for the entire duration. A person may be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours and yet have been detained for longer than was reasonable.

In such circumstances, the Magistrate is not required to authorise further detention merely because the outer time limit has not been breached. The Magistrate must independently examine the circumstances and may decline to authorise remand if the detention was unreasonable.

“Therefore, Section 57 CrPC (58 BNSS) mandates two limitations: firstly, the constitutional limitation of 24 hours; and secondly, within that 24 hours, the detention should not exceed what is considered to be a reasonable period in the facts of that case. This additional but salutary limitation should be borne in mind not only by the detaining authorities but also by the magistrates considering remand. In a given case, even though technically there may not be any breach of the 24 hours timeline, yet if the magistrate is satisfied that detention was for a period longer than what was reasonable, he or she may decline remand.” (Para 60)

The Court also placed a specific responsibility on Magistrates to ascertain and record the actual date and time at which the person’s liberty was curtailed. They cannot mechanically rely on the time of formal arrest recorded by the investigating agency. They must examine when the person was actually brought under official control, calculate the 24-hour period from that point and assess whether the detention was reasonable.

This direction strengthens the remand process as a substantive safeguard against arbitrary detention, rather than allowing it to become a procedural exercise in which the investigating agency’s account is accepted without scrutiny.

Connecting delayed formal arrest with the risk of custodial violence

The Court’s reasoning is rooted in the wider constitutional concern surrounding custodial violence and the abuse of investigative powers. It referred to earlier decisions, including Khatri v. State of Bihar, D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal and Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljeet Singh, to underline the importance of timely judicial oversight and safeguards against custodial abuse.

The Court recognised that the period between the actual deprivation of liberty and the formal recording of arrest can be particularly vulnerable to misuse. If investigating agencies are permitted to postpone the formal recording of arrest, individuals may remain under their control without the immediate protection that Article 22(2) is intended to provide. The judgment thus treats the 24-hour requirement as more than a procedural deadline. It is a constitutional mechanism intended to ensure that executive power over an individual’s liberty is brought under judicial scrutiny at the earliest opportunity.

This is particularly relevant in the Indian context, where allegations of custodial violence, coercive interrogation and unlawful detention have repeatedly raised concerns about the exercise of police and investigative powers. The ruling strengthens the legal basis for challenging practices in which a person’s actual detention is obscured by the terminology of questioning, enquiry or investigative custody.

Article 21 cannot be lightly subordinated to restrictive provisions under special laws

The judgment also contains important observations on the relationship between fundamental rights under Article 21 and the restrictive bail conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Tripura High Court had relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora (2026), which considered the relationship between the right to speedy trial and the restrictions imposed by Section 37. In that case, the Supreme Court had set aside a grant of bail where the High Court had not recorded satisfaction regarding the statutory twin conditions.

In Sujit Das, the Bench expressed reservations about the observations in Sukhwinder Singh suggesting that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot, solely on the ground of delay, override that provision.

The Court reiterated that Article 21 protects fundamental rights that lie at the core of constitutional jurisprudence and cannot be lightly restricted, even under special statutes. It referred to decisions including Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ankur Chadha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, among others, to support the proposition that violations of Article 21 may require the rigours of Section 37 or comparable statutory restrictions to give way.

The Bench noted that it could be argued that the relevant observations in Sukhwinder Singh were per incuriam in view of the three-Judge Bench decision in K.A. Najeeb. However, it expressly refrained from making a final pronouncement because Sukhwinder Singh was also a decision of a coordinate Bench. It further clarified that Article 22(2) had not been an issue before the Bench in that case.

“We have our reservation on the aforesaid observations made by the Bench. First and foremost, the rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India are not only constitutional rights. These are fundamental rights. Right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 are at the core of our constitutional jurisprudence. These fundamental rights cannot be tinkered with so lightly, not even under the special statutes.” (Para 49)

These observations are important for future litigation concerning prolonged pre-trial detention and restrictive bail provisions. However, they should not be read as overruling Sukhwinder Singh or as finally settling the relationship between Article 21 and Section 37. The Court’s binding ruling in Sujit Das concerns the commencement of the 24-hour period under Article 22(2), the reasonableness of detention under Section 58 BNSS and the responsibility of Magistrates to scrutinise the actual period of custody.

A significant safeguard, but its enforcement will depend on judicial scrutiny

The human rights significance of the judgment lies in its recognition that constitutional protection must follow the actual experience of deprivation of liberty. A person cannot be kept under the control of the state while the state decides when to formally acknowledge that person’s arrest.

This approach is important for people detained during investigations under special legislation, where extensive powers of search, seizure and interrogation can create situations in which the distinction between questioning and custody becomes contested. By focusing on the actual restriction of liberty, the Court has provided a basis for challenging informal detention and attempts to delay judicial oversight.

The ruling also strengthens the role of Magistrates. Its insistence that they record the actual time of detention and independently assess reasonableness can help prevent routine remand orders from legitimising detention that has already violated constitutional or statutory safeguards.

At the same time, the judgment’s practical impact will depend on how these requirements are implemented. Determining the exact moment at which liberty was curtailed may involve factual disputes. Investigating agencies may contend that a person was merely asked to cooperate, was present voluntarily or was not prevented from leaving. The Court’s test will therefore require Magistrates to examine the surrounding circumstances rather than rely on labels or formal records.

Similarly, the requirement that detention be reasonable within 24 hours leaves room for fact-specific judicial assessment. The judgment establishes the principle, but its effectiveness will depend on Magistrates recording reasons and scrutinising the circumstances of detention instead of treating the 24-hour limit as a routine period available to investigating agencies.

Implications for future litigation and human rights advocacy

The ruling provides an important basis for challenging unlawful detention, delayed formal arrests and remand orders that fail to account for the actual period during which an individual was under state control. In bail proceedings, particularly those arising under the NDPS Act, defence lawyers can rely on the judgment where the available facts indicate that an accused person was intercepted, restrained or otherwise prevented from leaving before the formal arrest was recorded. The relevant records may include interception and seizure documents, CCTV footage, station or office registers, statements of witnesses, interrogation records and the arrest memo itself. These can help establish the point at which liberty was effectively curtailed and whether production before the Magistrate took place within the constitutionally permitted period.

The judgment may also be relevant in habeas corpus petitions and proceedings challenging unlawful detention, particularly where investigating authorities deny that a person has been arrested despite exercising effective control over their movements. Its reasoning can be invoked to argue that constitutional safeguards cannot be postponed through the use of alternative descriptions such as questioning, enquiry or temporary investigative detention.

For Magistrates, the judgment provides a clear direction to examine the actual circumstances of detention at the remand stage. For lawyers and human rights organisations, it offers a basis to seek greater transparency in arrest records, challenge unexplained gaps between interception and formal arrest, and demand accountability where individuals are kept in custody without timely judicial scrutiny.

It may also inform advocacy for stronger institutional safeguards against custodial violence, including effective implementation of existing arrest and detention requirements, preservation of relevant records and meaningful compliance with judicial directions concerning custodial accountability.

The Supreme Court’s directions

Applying its interpretation to the facts, the Court found that the appellants’ liberty had been curtailed when they were intercepted at approximately 2 pm on September 29, 2025. They were therefore required to be produced before a Magistrate by 2 pm on September 30, excluding only the necessary journey time. Their production at 4.45 pm on September 30 meant that they had been produced 2 hours and 45 minutes beyond the constitutional deadline. The Court held that their continued detention beyond 2 pm on September 30 was illegal and unconstitutional.

The Court also found the unexplained interval of approximately 18 hours between the completion of the search and seizure at 5 pm on September 29 and the formal recording of arrest the following morning to be unreasonable under Section 58 of the BNSS.

The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the Tripura High Court’s order dated April 29, 2026. It directed that the appellants be produced before the jurisdictional Special Court within a maximum period of seven days from the date of the judgment, after which they were to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the Special Court considered appropriate. The Court also directed that the judgment be circulated to the Directors General of Police of all States and Union Territories, the Registrars General of the High Courts and the Directors of State Judicial Academies.

The complete judgment may be read below:

 

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Bombay High Court orders ₹5 lakh compensation for man illegally arrested, slams police-developer collusion

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UP & Bihar: Tranches of arms & explosives recovered over the Diwali weekend https://sabrangindia.in/up-bihar-tranches-of-arms-explosives-recovered-over-the-diwali-weekend/ Mon, 09 Nov 2026 11:56:20 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=50026 The seizure of 19,250 live cartridges from Koilawar police thane near the Kulhadiya Toll Plaza, Bihar over the weekend (Lokmat News, November 5) was connected to another serious incident wherein the Haryana STF seized 25,000 cartridges from two cars being smuggled to UP and Bihar (Hindustan Times, November 3) and even arrested five UP residents. […]

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The seizure of 19,250 live cartridges from Koilawar police thane near the Kulhadiya Toll Plaza, Bihar over the weekend (Lokmat News, November 5) was connected to another serious incident wherein the Haryana STF seized 25,000 cartridges from two cars being smuggled to UP and Bihar (Hindustan Times, November 3) and even arrested five UP residents. In a third incident, ironically over the Diwali weekend, also involving explosives, had the UP Police arresting two men and seizing nearly 199 kg of gelatin explosives, 100 fuses, seven bundles of red wire and 2.945 kg of powder from a fleeing Bolero vehicle in Chitrakoot district (Reports in Dainik Bhaskar and Amar Ujala, November 5). 


The seizure of 19,250 live cartridges from Koilawar police thane near the Kulhadiya Toll Plaza has drawn strong political reactions with Tejasvi Yadav, leader of the opposition raising serious questions over the accused’s alleged involvement with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The Lokmat News reported this seizure even as the incident erupted into a political controversy with questions on motives behind the possession and transportation of thousands and thousands of such live cartridges and dangerous explosives over the Diwali weekend arose.

So far, nothing in the publicly disclosed official accounts reveal any such clear organisational link.

In fact, it is on November 2, when a joint task force of the Bihar STF and the Bhojpur District police apprehended and stopped an SUV at the Toll Plaza, and on searching it unearthed these 19,250 live cartridges and one “desi” pistol. Three persons have been arrested in this connection, and they reportedly hail from Muzaffarpur: Laltu Kumar (38), Saras Kumar (27) and Chandan Tiwari (26) from Siwan and are part of an international arms ammunition network. Sections of the BNSS and Arms act have been added in the charges against them. The connection or alleged connection with the RSS surfaced later, according to Lokmat News, their older photographs in the RSS’ uniform started circulating. It is through this seizure and investigation that 25,000 live cartridge seizure by the Haryana STF near Jhajjar was unearthed.

Meanwhile, a team of Haryana police special task force (STF) seized a consignment of 25000 live cartridges that was being smuggled to Uttar Pradesh and Bihar and arrested five suspects from two cars near Rohad toll plaza on Bahadurgarh-Rohtak highway in Jhajjar on Tuesday. The arrested suspects were Afifuddin alias Munna Khan, 49, Asim Rais, 33, Sablu Khan, 32, Arbaz Ali, 27 and Zeenat, 33. All five are residents of different localities in Uttar Pradesh’s Budaun. Eight mobile phones and two cars were also seized from them, STF officials said.

In the third weekend incident involving seizure of explosives, Uttar Pradesh Police have arrested two men and seized nearly 199 kg of gelatin explosives, 100 fuses, seven bundles of red wire and 2.945 kg of powder from a fleeing Bolero vehicle in Chitrakoot district, according reports in Dainik Bhaskar and Amar Ujala published on November 5. News reports published over the weekend and today, Monday November 9 have reported that a leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and his close associate have been arrested in Uttar Pradesh’s Chitrakoot district after local police allegedly recovered nearly 200 kg of explosive material from their vehicle near the Madhya Pradesh border. The arrest has resulted in a storm within political circles; however, predictably, the BJP itself has so far maintained a stony silence over the incident. Hari Gopal Mishra is the BJP leader who was arrested while his associate is Pappu Tiwari. Both men are residents of Bhouri village under the Raipura police station area of Chitrakoot.

The reported political background of Hari Gopal Mishra has drawn attention following the seizure. According to Amar Ujala, he had contested a Zila Panchayat election with BJP backing.

In the highway seizure in Jajjhar, Haryana authorities have revealed to the media that Munna owns an ancestral Badaun Gun House in the Civil Lines area of Badaun and had procured the consignment from Vijay Goel, who runs Mehak Gun House in Sirsa, Haryana, which he has been running since 1999.  The Haryana STF said Vijay has also been arrested and was quizzed to ascertain his role in the interstate smuggling network, which is suspected to be running for the last three years.

Waseem Akram, superintendent of police, Haryana STF, said that 24400 cartridges of 7.65mm (.32 bore) used in regular small handguns and .315 bore used in rifles were seized from a Tata Harrier, while another batch of 600 cartridges (.315 bore) were seized from a Hyundai Aura.

“The 7.65mm cartridges are used in illegal country-made pistols manufactured in Bihar’s Munger, West Bengal and Eastern UP, while the rifle bore cartridges are used in breach-load illegal pistols manufactured in these areas for which the smuggling was taking place,” Akram said.

Akram said Munna was the kingpin of the smuggling racket running due to continuous cartridge stock pilferage from the gun houses in Haryana, UP and other places. Shamsher Dahiya, deputy superintendent of police, STF, said the entire consignment was manufactured in an ammunition factory in Pune’s Khadki, as the marking ‘KF’ was engraved on all the cartridges. “The two cars were intercepted near a roadside eatery, Triveni Dhaba, which is located right opposite the toll plaza after we had received a tip-off from Bihar police STF,” he added. Some controversy has erupted over a photograph showing the accused posing in uniforms of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

Photographs showing Bihar-based accused Chandan Tiwari and his brother Abhishek Tiwari wearing the uniform of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) were reported in a section of the digital media. Another image reportedly showing them posing with a local MLA from Muzaffarpur has also surfaced. The photographs have prompted questions about the alleged political and organisational associations of the accused. However, the images alone do not establish that the RSS, as an organisation, was involved in the arms smuggling network.

Questions over Ammunition manufactured in government factories

Another aspect of the investigation concerns reports that some of the seized cartridges were manufactured in government-owned ordnance factories. If confirmed, the reported origin of the ammunition raises questions about how it entered the alleged illegal supply chain and whether it was diverted through licensed dealers or other intermediaries.

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has reportedly joined the investigation. It is expected to examine the origin of the ammunition, the supply chain and the possible involvement of other individuals. According to media reports, the investigation has also brought renewed attention to the name of Jalan Shop, which reportedly surfaced in an earlier arms smuggling case in Bihar. Reports in that case alleged that an individual associated with the shop supplied nearly 100 pistols to different parts of Bihar using forged arms licences. The accused was reportedly wanted by the NIA and remains absconding.

Investigators have yet to establish whether the current ammunition network has any connection with that case or other previously investigated arms trafficking operations. The agencies are now attempting to trace the intended recipients of the seized cartridges and identify the ultimate buyers. They are also examining whether the ammunition was meant for organised criminal groups or other illegal networks.

Explosives seized in Chitrakoot

There are differing accounts regarding the intended use of the seized materials from the third incident.

According to reports, the accused told investigators that the explosives were being transported from Majhgawan in Madhya Pradesh for digging a well in a rocky area. Police reportedly said the materials were of the type used for breaking rocks in stone quarries.

However, another Amar Ujala report stated that the accused had told police that the materials were intended for making firecrackers. Investigators are examining the source, destination and intended use of the explosives. Police have registered a case against the two accused under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The Bolero used to transport the materials has also been seized.  Following the recovery, police took both men into custody and informed Chitrakoot Superintendent of Police Arun Kumar Singh, who subsequently reached the spot. The accused, along with the seized explosives, were taken to the police station for questioning. Both men were produced before a court and sent to judicial custody.

Investigators are examining the supply chain, the source of the explosives in Madhya Pradesh, their intended recipients and whether other individuals were involved in the transportation or distribution of the materials.

It was while the police from the Markundi police station were conducting a routine checking operation in their jurisdiction on the night of November 3 when they spotted a Bolero approaching. However, suspiciously, when the police signalled the Bolero vehicle to stop, its occupants allegedly attempted to flee. Thereafter, the police intercepted the vehicle after cordoning off the area.

When police personnel asked the two occupants to step out and allow the vehicle to be searched, Mishra reportedly identified himself as a BJP leader and attempted to use his political influence to avoid the search. However, the police proceeded with the inspection and recovered a large quantity of explosive material from the vehicle.

The seized material included 199 kg of gelatin sticks, 100 red-coloured fuses, seven bundles of red wire and 2.945 kg of explosive powder. It was on November 4, Superintendent of Police Arun Kumar Singh held a press conference and presented the two arrested men before journalists, as reported by Dainik Bhaskar and Amar Ujala.

The SP confirmed that Hari Gopal Mishra was associated with the BJP and had contested the Zila Panchayat member election on the party’s ticket. He had also served as a Zila Panchayat member. The second accused, Pappu Tiwari, was identified as his associate.

According to the SP, the two men were apprehended near the Uttar Pradesh–Madhya Pradesh border with approximately two quintals of explosive material. The police are investigating where the explosives were procured, where they were being transported and what they were intended to be used for. Investigators are also examining whether other individuals or organised groups were involved in the case.

The police are further probing the possible purchase and sale of the explosives; the network of people associated with their supply and whether the accused possessed the mandatory licences and documents for storing and transporting such material.

The SP said that the complete details would emerge only after the investigation was concluded. He also observed that the recovery of such a large quantity of explosives raised serious concerns, as the material could potentially have been used to carry out a major incident.

BJP silent, yet to respond

The arrest of a person identified by the police as a former BJP-backed Zila Panchayat member, along with the recovery of such a huge quantity of explosives, has caused considerable embarrassment for the party. The BJP has not issued any public statement on the matter so far.

The incident has also triggered political questions about the source, illegal procurement and intended use of the explosives. However, the allegations concerning any wider political or organisational involvement remain unsubstantiated and will have to be established through the police investigation.

Related:

Seven Explosives Recovered from Temple, Possible Links with RSS Management

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Assam: Gauhati HC quashes NSA detention of activist Pranab Doley https://sabrangindia.in/assam-gauhati-hc-quashes-nsa-detention-of-activist-pranab-doley/ Fri, 06 Nov 2026 12:11:20 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=50006 Doley was arrested in July this year for a protest against a hotel project near Kaziranga, and had been booked under the nefarious National Security Act (NSA) after a court granted him bail; Forum for Social Harmony, AMSU-AIKMS and BAA accuse the Assam government of criminalising land rights activism

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A division bench of the Gauhati High Court on Friday, November 6, quashed the detention, under the National Security Act (NSA) of activist Pranab Doley, announced advocate Dipesh Agrawala, one of the lawyers who represented him. The Act allows for long periods of detention without trial up to a year.

A copy of the judgement is not yet available.

Doley was arrested on July 12, days after he took part in a protest against a hotel project at Ingle Pathar, a village adjoining the Kaziranga National Park in Assam. Predictably, the police had alleged that he “unlawfully trespassed into the site of the Tea Tribes Museum and thereafter trespassed into the nearby ATDC [Assam Tourism Development Corporation] Hyatt project at Ingle Pathar with deadly weapons” during the protest. Doley, is the convenor of the Greater Kaziranga Land and Human Rights Protection Committee (GKLHRPC) and a leading face of the agitation against a proposed luxury hotel project near Kaziranga National Park.

On July 29, a sessions court in Golaghat granted bail to Doley, stating that the investigating officer had already recorded the statements of key witnesses and that there was no possibility of the accused concealing or tampering with the evidence.

However, the very next day, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in the state detained Doley under the National Security Act, alleging that he had carried out “suspicious foreign transactions from doubtful sources” in violation of the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act. Shockingly, this means that he was not released from jail, despite the bail order.

In August, the Congress had alleged that the Assam government invoking the Act against Doley was part of a “growing pattern” of the BJP “weaponising extraordinary laws to silence dissent”. Party leader Jairam Ramesh had described the state government’s allegations against Doley as “vague and speculative”.

Citing detentions of at least two other persons under the Act in Uttar Pradesh in April, the Opposition MP claimed that this was a familiar script followed by the Narendra Modi government.

At the time of the arrest itself, three organisations have issued strongly worded statements condemning the arrest of prominent Assam land rights activist Pranab Doley, describing the police action as an attempt to suppress democratic dissent and intimidate communities resisting corporate-backed projects in and around Kaziranga. In separate statements released on July 12, the Forum for Social Harmony, the Asom Mojuri Shramik Union (AMSU) and All India Kisan Mazdoor Sabha (AIKMS), and the Bhumi Adhikar Andolan (BAA) alleged that Doley’s arrest is part of an intensifying pattern of criminalising indigenous rights defenders, farmers and people’s movements challenging land acquisition, displacement and the expansion of corporate interests in ecologically sensitive areas. While each statement approaches the issue from a distinct perspective, all three organisations unequivocally demand Doley’s immediate and unconditional release, withdrawal of what they describe as false and politically motivated criminal cases, and an end to the alleged use of police powers to stifle democratic protest.

The statements were issued hours after the Assam Police detained Doley in Guwahati on July 12 in connection with a criminal case registered at Bokakhat Police Station.

Forum for Social Harmony calls arrest an attack on democratic rights

The Forum for Social Harmony characterised Doley’s arrest as “an attack on democratic rights”, alleging that the Assam government had deployed the police machinery to suppress a legitimate people’s movement centred on land rights, livelihood protection and environmental justice. The organisation said the arrest was deeply alarming because it followed a prolonged and peaceful campaign by local farmers, indigenous communities and several people’s organisations opposing the proposed luxury hotel project at Engle (Inglay) Pathar in Kaziranga.

According to the Forum, the government’s response has not been to engage with the concerns raised by affected communities but to repeatedly invoke criminal law against movement leaders. It alleged that the filing of one criminal case after another reflects a “dangerous trend” of shrinking democratic space, where constitutionally protected rights to dissent and freedom of expression are increasingly curtailed through criminal prosecution and police action.


Related:

‘Attack on democratic rights’: Rights groups denounce Pranab Doley’s arrest

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Kerala High Court’s Observations on Protest in Educational Institutions Unacceptable & Restrictive: NAJAR https://sabrangindia.in/kerala-high-courts-observations-on-protest-in-educational-institutions-unacceptable-restrictive-najar/ Thu, 05 Nov 2026 12:51:35 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=49988 The National Alliance for Justice, Accountability & Rights (NAJAR) have urged the Kerala High Court to reconsider its position on the right of all, including students, to peaceful protest

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The National Alliance for Justice, Accountability and Rights (NAJAR), a collective of lawyers, law students, and legal professionals from across India, has in a statement issued today, decried the recent Kerala High Court’s reiteration that dharnas, hunger strikes and satyagraha “have no place in a constitutional democracy, much less in academic institutions.” NAJAR has emphasised that non-violent dharnas (sit-ins) are democratic and lawful mechanisms for accountability when institutional remedies fail. In fact, various judgements of courts across the country have upheld this constitutional right as part of Article 19. The collective has urged the High Court to reconsider its position and uphold the constitutional right to peaceful protest of all citizens and students.

A brief background on the facts and legal proceedings:

Two days ago, on November 3, 2026, a Division Bench (DB) comprising Justices Anil K. Narendran and Muralee Krishna S., in Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit v Archana P.S. & Ors (W.A. 2276/2026), set aside a single judge’s interim order. The interim order had directed the university to accept the fees of 16 suspended students of the Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit (Kalady, Ernakulam, Kerala) and let them appear for their exams. The appeal before the Division Bench (DB) was decided on grounds of pleadings and interim relief. In doing so, the DB quoted, and gave fresh life to, the 2017 observations in Dr Antony Thomas v V.M. Muhammed Rafique, to say that students engaging in such protest in an educational institution are liable to be expelled or rusticated.

The university has alleged that both obstruction and assault took place on August 13, 2026. Students on their part have disputed this, and an investigation is ongoing. NAJAR has stated that it takes no position on disputed facts and does not condone violence, if it has happened. But the issue of whether violence took place and whether peaceful protests have a place in a campus are entirely different questions, and the two must not be inter-twined. NAJAR believes that presenting non-violent campus protest as inherently ‘anti-democratic’ confuses peaceful agitation (for better facilities) or student rights with unlawful disruption and the same cannot be accepted.

Peaceful Protest in Academic Spaces is a Constitutional Right:

Article 19 (1) (a) and (b) under the Indian Constitution guarantee freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. Nothing in the Constitution excludes dharna or satyagraha as forms of peaceful protest, and nothing suspends these rights when a citizen is a student or when the place is a university campus or academic institution. The Supreme Court has recognised peaceful protest as part of these freedoms, including in in the famed Ramlila Maidan Incident (2012), Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India (2018) and Amit Sahni v Commissioner of Police (2020).

Invoking Dr. Ambedkar to restrain peaceful protest is unfair:

On November 3, 2026; the Division Bench repeated the following observations of the Court in Dr. Antony Thomas v. V.M. Muhammed Rafique and others:

“Political activities like dharna, hunger strikes and other practices like Satyagraha have no place in a constitutional democracy, much less in academic institutions. Anyone indulging in the said activities in an educational institution would make himself liable to be expelled and/or rusticated. Educational Institutions are meant for imparting education and not politics. By their political ambition the political parties cannot hold to ransom the educational institution or the right of the civilized students to receive education.”

These observations apparently stem from Dr B.R. Ambedkar’s “Grammar of Anarchy”, wherein he had stressed that, where there are constitutional remedies available, there is no justification in adopting unconstitutional methods. However, says NAJAR, to misquote Dr. Ambedkar in such a skewed fashion, particularly in the context of student politics is nothing more than a futile attempt at stretching the clock of constitutionalism over institutional suppression. The whole ideation is problematic in manifold ways.

First, the above quoted passage is conditional. It says unconstitutional methods lack justification where constitutional methods are open. The relevant question is whether constitutional channels were actually open to these students, and the Court actually has not examined it on merit. When university authorities act arbitrarily, constitutional avenues inside the campus stand effectively shut. In such situations, peaceful protest is not a breakdown of law; it is the only remaining constitutional recourse to invoke administrative accountability.

Second, Dr. Ambedkar’s call to rely on constitutional remedies alone has to be read with the shift in his personal and political ideology pre and post adoption of the Constitution. The fact that in the pre-independence era, the people had to rely on both violent and non-violent means of protest against the colonial oppressors doesn’t vitiate the political reality of today, which many a times demand lawful means of protests including Satyagraha and dharna. In fact, more often it is the constitutional institutions that compel the citizens to adopt such means. Quoting Babasaheb, who himself led the Mahad Satyagraha in 1927, to justify a blanket ban on satyagrahas is selective. Equating non-violent protest with criminality distorts the original intention and warning.

Satyagraha and the role of student movements in India today:

Satyagraha was one of the methods of mass resistance during India’s freedom movement. It is difficult to call it ‘alien’ to constitutional democracy when this method, popularised by Gandhi himself, helped create one. Student movements, likewise, have shaped campuses in Kerala and the country, from the freedom struggle to later movements for rights and institutional reform. Back then, students boycotted colonial institutions and joined the Non-Cooperation and Quit India movements. In recent years, students have challenged sexist hostel curfews and caste discrimination on campus. After the NTA cancelled the NEET-UG exam amid paper leak allegations, students across the country peacefully took to the streets, following which Mr. Dharmendra Pradhan, former Union Education Minister, had to resign.

These movements are not ‘distractions’ from or ‘disruptions’ in education. They are how students and youth demand answers and accountability from educational institutions. To say that educational institutions are meant for imparting education and not politics is either political illiteracy or a much despicable attempt to isolate students from critical thinking and democratic expression.

NAJAR Re-affirms Right to Peaceful Organising and Protest:

NAJAR has emphasised that it believes that all students across campuses and learning spaces must have lawful channels to raise grievances, and institutions should answer reasonable grievances, rather than discipline or crack down on those who raise them. De-politicizing campuses strips students of their ability to question injustice and understand, reform social structures.

Belonging to a particular political ideology or refusing to tender an apology, or relying on matters yet to be evidentially ascertained, cannot be the reasons to shun protesting students from placing their reasonable grievances for institutional reforms, in a constitutionally democratic manner. Protesting peacefully does not make the students ‘less civilized’ or ‘unruly’.

Rather restricting the right to peaceful protest is a highly dubious attempt of subverting the progressive, democratic civic spaces in a state like Kerala, which is what it is today, thanks to democratic resistance, protests and the constitutional fights spearheaded by student and citizen movements!

Hence, the collective has also called upon the Sree Sankaracharya University to complete the enquiry promptly and fairly, in accordance with natural justice and proportionality. NAJAR has also urged that the 2017 observations of the High Court not be relied upon currently by the Kerala High Court to punish peaceful protests. Campus dissent must not be criminalised or treated as a threat to education.

Related:

Jamia’s Answer to Student Protest: Online exams, hostel closures and police detentions

Maharashtra: After backlash, govt. moves to withdraw FIRs against student protesters but questions remain

Campuses in Revolt: How the UGC Equity Stay and Criminalised Dissent Have Ignited Student Protests Across India

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Goa SIR: Bombay High Court orders ECI to restore names of six voters deleted from final electoral roll https://sabrangindia.in/goa-sir-bombay-high-court-orders-eci-to-restore-names-of-six-voters-deleted-from-final-electoral-roll/ Thu, 05 Nov 2026 12:37:11 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=49979 The Bombay High Court (Goa Bench) directed the Election Commission to restore the names of six family members within 10 days, questioning why voters who had shifted residence were compelled to submit enumeration forms containing declarations about their previous addresses

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The Bombay High Court’s Goa bench on November 5 directed the Election Commission of India (ECI) to restore the names of six members of a family whose names were deleted from the final electoral roll during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) in Goa.

A division bench of Justices Valmiki Menezes and Amit Jamsandekar allowed the petitions challenging the deletion of their names and the rejection of their Form 8 applications, which are used by existing voters to update their residential addresses.

The court directed the Booth Level Officer (BLO) of the Santacruz Assembly constituency in Goa to include the petitioners’ names within 10 days, after verifying their residence.

As reported by LiveLaw, the bench said, “We allow the petition… We have rejected the contention of the ECI that the hearing in the present plea be deferred as the issue of SIR is pending before the Supreme Court…. This is not pertaining to SIR… We therefore ordered the BLO of Santacruz Constituency (in Goa) to add the names of the petitioners within a period of 10 days from today.”

The court also refused the ECI’s request to stay the operation of its order for two weeks.

Court questions requirement to submit enumeration forms

The dispute arose after the petitioners, members of the Salgaonkar family, approached the court stating that their names had been omitted from the electoral roll despite submitting Form 8 applications seeking changes to their residential addresses.

The ECI argued that under the SIR guidelines, voters were required to submit a pre-filled enumeration form along with Form 8. Since the petitioners had not submitted the enumeration forms, they were asked to file Form 6, which is meant for fresh inclusion in the electoral roll.

The bench questioned this requirement, pointing out that the pre-filled enumeration form contained a declaration that the elector continued to reside at the address recorded in the existing electoral roll.

Questioning how voters who had shifted residence could be compelled to make such a declaration, Justice Menezes observed:

“If a voter comes to you with Form 8, saying he has changed his address you just cannot tell that person that look your name isn’t included in the draft roll now you will have to fill in Form 6 (inclusion of new voter). Your enumeration form, basically has a declaration that a person continues to live at the address as mentioned in the existing voters list. But consider, if someone has changed their residence, can you compel the person to make a false declaration by submitting that pre-filled enumeration? Why can’t that person simply give a Form 8 because anyway, his name is there in the existing list he just wants to get his address changed.. Why compel enumeration form?”

The bench had also questioned why an existing elector seeking an address correction should be required to apply as a new voter.

Court flags risk of excluding eligible voters

During the hearings, the bench questioned the ECI’s approach of rejecting Form 8 applications instead of keeping them pending for verification. It also raised concerns about the consequences of compelling relocated voters to submit declarations that no longer reflected their actual residential status.

As reported by Bar and Bench, the court flagged a “catch-22 situation” in which voters who had shifted residence faced rejection of their Form 8 applications and were instead directed to submit Form 6, potentially creating further difficulties in establishing their electoral registration.

The ECI, represented by Senior Advocate Ashutosh Kumbhakoni, argued that the draft SIR roll was prepared afresh (de novo) on the basis of newly collected enumeration forms. According to the ECI, voters whose names did not appear in the draft roll could not use Form 8 to modify an existing entry and were required to apply afresh through Form 6 during the claims and objections period.

The court, however, allowed the petitions and directed restoration of the six names. It also rejected the ECI’s request to defer the proceedings until the Supreme Court decides the broader challenges to the SIR process.

The detailed written order is awaited.

 

Related

ECI affidavit says SIR decisions were unanimous, but questions over two commissioners’ objections remain

UP voter lists: Software manipulates Voter’s names, Pilibhit investigation finds 10,470 irregular entries

Who controls access to voter records? ECINet audit raises fresh questions

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‘We will challenge notices in Court’: IFF’s statement on legal notice over ‘defaming’ RSS https://sabrangindia.in/we-will-challenge-notices-in-court-iffs-statement-on-legal-notice-over-defaming-rss/ Wed, 04 Nov 2026 08:40:58 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=49948 The Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) details a legal notice issued on behalf of the RSS over its documentation of censorship in India, and the police action that followed, raising concerns over freedom of expression

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Internet Freedom Foundation

“A police force has made itself the enforcement arm of a private legal notice,” the IFF said in its statement condemning the police action.

The following complete text is a statement issued by the Internet Freedom Foundation detailing how it was issued a legal notice on behalf of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh along with other organisations documenting censorship in India, and the police action that followed.

The Delhi Police has asked X to remove the Internet Freedom Foundation’s account, six of its posts, the accounts of SFLC and @geoblockedindia, and posts by 16 other users, on the ground that they defame the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

The posts document and comment on a legal notice sent in the RSS’s name to IFF, SFLC and @geoblockedindia, which demanded that the three-stop criticising and documenting government blocking orders. IFF received copies of the two police notices from X on the morning of 3 November 2026.

IFF has called on the Delhi Police to withdraw both notices. If they are not withdrawn, IFF will challenge them in court.

What happened thus far

On October 29, 2026 at 9:54 PM, IFF, SFLC and the operator of @geoblockedindia received a two-page “legal notice” said to be issued on behalf of the RSS. It asked the three to stop opposing the government’s blocking directions, stop documenting restricted content, stop posting details of geo-blocked posts, and confirm in writing within seven days that they would comply. It was signed by an unnamed “Authorised Signatory”. Several RSS office-bearers have since said on X that the notice is not authentic.

IFF replied to the notice, wrote to the RSS at its official address asking whether it had authorised it, and published both the notice and its reply just the next day, on October 30. Undeterred by whether or not the notice was authentic, on October 31, 2026 at 8:06 PM, the Special Commissioner of Police (Crime), Delhi Police, filed an “Illegal Content Report” with X (reference LD-321926). It listed two posts: IFF’s post of October 30 on the notice, and SFLC post of the same day. The stated reason was that the posts are “defamatory towards the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) under Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023”. The boxes for “safety/security”, “defamation” and “other” were ticked. The fields for the nature of the court order and court order details were left empty. The desired action was “Remove/withhold content”.

There is more. On November 1, 2026, a Sunday, a second notice arrived in the RSS’s name. It said the matter had been handed to the Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad, that complaints had been filed in several states, and that requests had been made to block IFF’s X account and suspend the organisations. The Delhi Police had made its first request to X the previous evening. IFF did not know this until X told it on 3 November.

On November 2, 2026 at 8:51 AM, the Special Commissioner of Police (Crime) filed a second notice with X (reference LD-322956). It lists 40 URLs. Thirty-seven are posts. Three are the entire accounts of @internetfreedom, @SFLCin and @geoblockedindia. This time the boxes for “Hate speech”, “defamation”, “safety/security”, “enforcement of court order” and “other” were all ticked. The court order fields were again left empty. The stated reason reads: “The posts constitute defamation and illegal content under Section 356 BNS. Under Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021, read with Section 79(3)(b) IT Act, lawful notices require action within 3 hours.”

The 16 other users are @ProdctiveUseful, @PanjwaniManoj, @jidge_, @RatanSharda55, @baxiabhishek, @SchrdingersDbag, @ashleshbiradar, @seemay, @NasirHussainINC, @Being_creat_ive, @AjoyDharmavaram, @othlaw, @_ananyaaa, @AimPoojaind, @incorigibleBhai and @rraoind.

Their posts, as far as IFF can tell, comment on the notice or on the notice about it. X forwarded both notices to IFF on 3 November 2026, at 8:47 AM and 10:03 AM, saying it was doing so “in the interest of transparency” and that IFF may wish to seek legal counsel and challenge the request in court. X’s emails do not say that it has acted on the requests.

The Delhi Police has not written to IFF, and no court has been approached, as far as the reports disclose. SFLC and @geoblockedindia have separately reported notifications from X about requests from the Uttar Pradesh Police, the Telangana Police and the Delhi Police’s Cyber Crime unit, one of them against the whole of the @geoblockedindia account.

IFF’s position

IFF has unequivocally condemned this legal action. A police force has made itself the enforcement arm of a private legal notice whose authenticity the organisation it names has not confirmed, and whose demand was that three organisations stop documenting censorship.

The notices would deliver exactly what the notice asked for as they would also remove the accounts of the three groups in India that keep public records of what is blocked, and of who ordered it. The posts in question are about a legal notice sent to us. They quote it, criticise how it was drafted, and say that we will carry on with our work.

A person who receives a threat is entitled to publish it and answer it and that is not defamation of the sender. In the three weeks before the first notice, IFF assisted 86 people whose accounts were suspended or whose posts were withheld in India. SFLC’s Free Speech Tracker recorded about 268 content restrictions and 83 account restrictions in the first days 29 of October. @geoblockedindia publishes the orders behind such blocks when platforms disclose them. None of this is unlawful.

Documenting censorship and challenging it in court is what the Constitution expects of citizens. IFF will not delete the posts. If the Delhi Police does not withdraw the notices, we will challenge them in court.

Why the reports are unlawful

Defamation is not a police matter. Section 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is a non-cognisable and bailable offence. Under Section 222 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, no court can take cognizance of it except on a complaint by the person aggrieved.

Under Section 174 of the BNSS, the police cannot investigate a non-cognisable offence without an order of a Magistrate. The Special Commissioner of Police (Crime) is not the person aggrieved. The notices disclose no complaint by the RSS and no order of any Magistrate. Whether a statement is defamatory is for a court to decide after hearing its author, with the defences of truth, fair comment and good faith available to that author.

In Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221, the Supreme Court upheld criminal defamation on the strength of these safeguards alone. A police officer who asks a platform to remove speech as defamatory has decided the question himself, without a complainant, a court or a hearing. The posts are protected comment. Exceptions 1 to 3 to Section 356(1) protect the truth published for the public good, opinion on the public conduct of public servants, and opinion on the conduct of any person touching a public question. The posts publish a notice that was sent to us and give our opinion of it. The RSS, if it sent the notice, chose to enter a public question. If it did not, the posts defame no one.

Further, Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d) do not permit this. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, the Supreme Court read down Section 79(3)(b) so that an intermediary acquires “actual knowledge” only through a court order, or a notification from the appropriate government or its agency that unlawful acts relatable to Article 19(2) are being committed. The court said that it would be difficult for intermediaries to judge the legitimacy of the millions of requests they receive, and that the burden must not be placed on them. Rule 3(1)(d), as amended in November 2025 and February 2026, now requires the intimation to come from an officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary or Deputy Inspector General, to be reasoned, and to specify the legal basis and the nature of the unlawful act, subject to a monthly review by a Secretary-level officer. The three-hour window the notice invokes applies to a lawful order that meets these conditions. A web form that ticks “hate speech” and “enforcement of court order” while leaving the court order fields blank, and that gives one sentence of reasons for 40 URLs, is not such an order.

The notices by the Delhi Police are also disproportionate. They seek to remove three accounts in their entirety, with years of posts, over six, four and eleven posts respectively. They sweep in 16 third parties whose only connection is that they commented on a public controversy. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637, the Supreme Court held that any restriction on speech must be necessary, proportionate and the least restrictive measure available, and that orders restricting speech must be published and reasoned. Removing an organisation’s entire account for criticising a legal notice fails each of these tests.

The effect is to silence documentation of censorship and providing legal aid to Indian internet users. The accounts named are those that record blocking orders in India. The notice asked them to stop. A takedown request that accomplishes the demand of an anonymous private notice is not law enforcement. It is the use of state power for a private end, which Article 14 forbids.

Demands put forward by the IFF

  1. To the Delhi Police: Withdraw reports LD-321926 and LD-322956 and confirm the withdrawal in writing to X and to IFF.
  2. To the Delhi Police: Disclose the complaint on which the Special Commissioner of Police (Crime) acted, the authority under which the reports were filed, and whether any order of a Magistrate under Section 174 BNSS exists. Disclose every request made to any platform in this matter, including those made by the Cyber Crime unit against @geoblockedindia.
  3. To X: Do not act on the reports. If any content is withheld in India, tell the affected user before acting, give them the full request, and name the legal basis. Publish both reports to the Lumen database, as the reporting form itself contemplates.
  4. To the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and the Ministry of Home Affairs: Have the Secretary-level review required by Rule 3(1)(d) examine these intimations, and tell police forces that Rule 3(1)(d) is not a remedy for defamation, which the law reserves to the person aggrieved and to the courts.
  5. To the RSS: State publicly whether it authorised either notice or any complaint to the police. If it did not, say so to the Delhi Police. If the notices are not withdrawn, IFF will challenge them in court. We will continue to document blocking orders, to publish them, and to provide legal assistance to anyone whose account or post is withheld in India. Nothing in these notices changes that.

 

Related:

Extension of internet bans, suspension of social media accounts: state action on farmers’ protest focuses on suppression of voices

Judges differ on challenge against IT amendments of 2023, right to freedom of speech & expression hangs in balance

Broadcasting Bill adverse to freedom of speech & freedom of press: EGI

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SC: Article 142, Mass Amnesties, and the Panchayatisation of the Rule of Law https://sabrangindia.in/sc-article-142-mass-amnesties-and-the-panchayatisation-of-the-rule-of-law/ Tue, 03 Nov 2026 04:59:37 +0000 https://sabrangindia.in/?p=49942 Within a month of youth-led protests in Delhi and at least half a dozen other locations, the Supreme Court’s September 1 Order invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to quash criminal cases registered across at least five states. This examines the limitations of this ad hoc jurisprudence, arguing that while protection from abusive state prosecution is welcome, linking it to the cancellation of the September 5 march sets a troubling precedent. Constitutional scrutiny demanded a rigorous examination of alleged executive and police overreach, including blanket prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the BNSS and the shutdown of metro stations and internet services. Instead, the alleged excesses of Delhi and other police forces remain unadjudicated.

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The Paradox of Ad-Hoc Benevolence

In constitutional jurisprudence, few distinctions are as crucial, or as frequently conflated, as the line separating the substantive protection of civil liberties from the procedural integrity of the rule of law. When state authorities deploy the machinery of criminal law to target citizens engaging in public protests, registering widespread First Information Reports (FIRs), executing indiscriminate detentions, and imposing coercive measures, the vindication of fundamental freedoms under Articles 19(1)(b) and 21 of the Indian Constitution is an urgent judicial duty. Yet, how a court achieves that protection determines whether its decision operates as a durable triumph of constitutional governance or as an act of unstructured, transactional equity.

The Supreme Court’s order of September 1, 2026, quashing over a hundred FIRs filed across multiple states during the student exam-irregularity protests, presents precisely this constitutional paradox. At first blush, the order appears to be an act of judicial benevolence since it relieves thousands of young student-protesters from the crushing burden of ongoing criminal prosecutions. However, a closer examination reveals that this relief was not achieved through judicial adjudication based in constitutional principle. Instead, it was delivered as the judicial rubber-stamping of a negotiated compromise between the executive branch and a protest organisation.

By invoking its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to extinguish criminal proceedings en masse as part of a bilateral settlement, where the quashing of FIRs was effectively exchanged for the withdrawal of a planned protest march, the Supreme Court shifted its role from an independent court of record to an informal arbitral forum. In doing so, the Court’s methodology closely mirrored the traditional logic of a panchayat, an institution that prioritizes ad-hoc compromise, transactional peace-making. While protecting citizens from abusive state prosecution is unquestionably good, accomplishing it through judicial discretion en masse represents a subtle but dangerous denigration of the rule of law.

Relief as an Executive-Judicial Settlement

The legal proceedings surrounding the July 2026 student protests examination malpractices illustrate the operational mechanisms of this model. Following widespread demonstrations across Delhi, Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, and Maharashtra, law enforcement agencies-initiated dozens of FIRs naming thousands of participants. The pattern was remarkably similar, a stenograph-ed pattern of behaviour that reflected close, cross border communications between different state police! In response, litigations were brought before the Supreme Court, challenging the proportionality of state force, the use of metallic pellet guns, biometric surveillance, and arbitrary detentions.

None of the original writ petitions prayed for a blanket judicial extinction of all criminal cases across the country without trial. Rather, they sought constitutional accountability, judicial scrutiny of police brutality, guidelines on crowd control, and the enforcement of personal liberty under Article 21. On August 18, 2026, the Supreme Court took a step toward structured adjudication by constituting a High-Powered Enquiry Committee, chaired by a retired Supreme Court judge, to investigate police conduct, preserve drone and CCTV footage, and evaluate the legality of blanket prohibitory orders.

Later, the apex court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution. When the protest leadership agreed to withdraw a major national march scheduled for September 5, and in return, the state governments ‘consciously decided’ not to pursue the FIRs. On September 1, 2026, period and Court quashed 129 specified FIRs across five states, closing all unlisted FIRs nationwide arising from the same protest period, and recording the protest group’s formal withdrawal of its demonstration.

Why Procedure is Liberty’s Shield

To understand why this disposition degrades the rule of law, one must examine the architecture of criminal procedure. Criminal law is intrinsically individualised. An FIR is an assertion that a specific individual committed a specific statutory offence at a specific time and place. The statutory scheme for extinguishing criminal proceedings, whether through police final reports, executive withdrawal of prosecution under Section 360 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), or judicial quashing under Section 528 BNSS (formerly Section 482 CrPC), requires judicial evaluation of specific material.

When a High Court or the Supreme Court exercises its inherent power to quash an FIR, the well-established legal standard requires the Court to ask whether taking the allegations in the FIR at face value, does a prima facie criminal offence exist, or is the prosecution demonstrably malicious and an abuse of legal process? This inquiry is the essential mechanism through which the judiciary holds the executive accountable for illegal criminalisation.

In the September 1 order, this entire statutory and analytical framework was bypassed. The Supreme Court quashed 129 FIRs, which encompassed disparate charges ranging from mild unlawful assembly and road blockades to serious allegations of rioting, destruction of public property, and attempted murder, in a single, wholesale decree. The Court did not evaluate whether the allegations were legally unsustainable or factually fabricated. By replacing judicial scrutiny with executive acquiescence, the Court failed to make a finding that the state’s mass registration of FIRs was unlawful. Consequently, the protesters were administratively spared prosecution as an act of state grace, rather than legally vindicated as citizens exercising a fundamental constitutional right.

The Arbitrary ‘Antecedents’ Exception

The risks of abandoning statutory procedure become even more transparent when examining the exceptions carved out within the order itself. While granting blanket immunity to the majority of protesters, Paragraph 7 of the Court’s order excluded approximately 2,873 individuals. These individuals were denied relief and subjected to fresh criminal investigation solely because state police affidavits asserted that they had ‘serious criminal antecedents’ according to national police databases and were ‘prima facie present’ at protest sites.

This carve-out demonstrates the problematic layering of uncanalised discretion. One is that Indian criminal law contains no statutory principle authorising the judicial exclusion of individuals from general legal remedies based merely on ‘antecedents.’ In criminal jurisprudence, an FIR relates to a specific alleged act, not a person’s prior history. Second, the list of 2,873 excluded individuals was compiled using automated facial recognition technology matched against police databases, an unverified process that the Court accepted without independent judicial verification or procedural testing. And then, If the mass filing of FIRs against peaceful assembly was an abuse of state power warranting Article 142 intervention, on what legal principle does prior criminal history deprive a citizen of protection against an admitted abuse of state power?

Discretion inevitably breeds further discretion. Having constructed an extraordinary amnesty unmoored from code procedure, the Court was forced to construct an equally arbitrary threshold to limit that amnesty, relying on unverified executive data to divide citizens into protected and unprotected classes.

Evasion of Constitutional Duty

Perhaps the most defenceless aspect of the September 1 order is its explicit concluding direction: that the invocation of Article 142 was based on ‘peculiar facts and circumstances’ and ‘shall not be treated as a binding precedent.’ In recent years, the practice of issuing sweeping orders while simultaneously stripping them of precedential value under Article 141 has emerged as a frequent judicial technique. From a constitutional perspective, this practice is deeply problematic.

The primary obligation of an apex constitutional court is to declare generalisable legal principles that bind lower courts, discipline executive power, and guide future adjudication. The rule of law requires that like cases be decided alike. When a court decides a dispute, applies legal standards, and then declares that its ruling cannot be cited by any other citizen in any other court, it effaces the decision’s standing as law. It transforms the judgment from a rule of general application into a one-time privilege conferred upon specific litigants.

This non-precedent mechanism severely harms civil liberties jurisprudence. A student protester in a distant trial court facing an identical, fabricated FIR cannot cite the Supreme Court’s order as a legal standard. Trial courts and High Courts remain bound by rigid procedural rules, while the Supreme Court reserves to itself the exclusive power to randomly grant extraordinary, ad-hoc relief. Instead of diffusing liberty-protective legal standards throughout the judicial pyramid, the Court centralises power within its own hall, creating a regime where fundamental rights are accessible not as of legal right, but as a matter of top-tier judicial audience and transaction.

Ad-Hoc Compromise vs. The Rule of Law

It is in this structural departure from legal principle that the resemblance to a panchayat becomes unmistakable. In traditional Indian legal theory and sociology, a village panchayat operates on principles fundamentally distinct from a constitutional court of record. A panchayat does not adjudicate rights according to pre-existing, neutral, written laws, nor is it bound by strict procedural rules or formal evidence. Its primary objective is transactional dispute resolution: ‘buying peace,’ brokering compromises between powerful factions, and restoring social harmony through ad-hoc equity.

While informal compromise has a legitimate place in customary community spaces or private civil mediation, it is the antithesis of constitutional adjudication. A constitutional court exists to enforce jus (principled justice), and not merely to secure social peace at the expense of legal standards. The Supreme Court conditioning the quashing of unlawful prosecutions on a political party agreeing to call off a protest march is the Court adopting the precise logic of the panchayat. It treats fundamental freedoms, such as the right to peaceably assemble under Article 19 (1) (b), not as non-negotiable constitutional guarantees, but as bargaining chips to be traded away in exchange for executive leniency.

This approach creates severe long-term institutional risks. It signals to the executive that mass criminalization is an effective strategy; the state can file thousands of baseless FIRs against peaceful dissenters, safe in the knowledge that if public pressure escalates, the Supreme Court will facilitate a negotiated settlement without ever holding police officers accountable or declaring the state’s actions illegal. Conversely, it signals to citizens that relief from state coercion depends on organizational bargaining power rather than constitutional entitlement.

Emergency judicial relief brings immediate comfort to citizens facing state coercion. When the Supreme Court uses Article 142 to clear criminal cases against peaceful protesters, individual lives are saved from endless prosecution. Problems emerge when that relief depends on political bargaining. Trading criminal dismissals for cancelled rallies produces informal settlements. Declaring these orders without precedential value removes their legal weight. The Court assumes the role of a village panchayat, brokering temporary peace between unequal sides.

The consequences of this approach appeared during the October demonstrations against the Chief Election Commissioner. In September, the Court wiped away FIRs from student protests while leaving foundational legal questions unresolved. The bench did not evaluate whether police could issue blanket prohibitory notices under Section 163 of the BNSS or close transit networks. By treating the September quashing as an isolated compromise, the Court allowed law enforcement to retain unchecked statutory authority.

When citizens gathered again in October, authorities deployed their usual tactics. Officials shut metro stations and stopped incoming trains. Police also detained working lawyers on their way to court. Lacking prior legal standards, the bench convened emergency Sunday sittings to hear contempt petitions. Justices issued oral warnings that regulation cannot equal total prohibition while ordering police to remove restrictive notices from around court gates.

Had the Court articulated binding constitutional boundaries in September, executive agencies would have faced clear limits. Setting prospective rules constrains state authority and protects public assembly across future disputes. Settling individual cases through transactional orders creates administrative convenience today while guaranteeing repeated overreach tomorrow.

Structural Remedies

The critique of the CJP order is not to suggest that the Supreme Court should have allowed thousands of innocent students to be dragged through decades of oppressive trials. Rather, it demonstrates that a truly liberty-preserving court must protect citizens by developing and applying legal principles, rather than resorting to ad-hoc, non-precedential amnesties.

In landmark constitutional jurisprudence ranging from Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner (1962) to Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998), the Supreme Court established that Article 142 cannot be used to supplant statutory frameworks or override fundamental rights. To genuinely protect civil liberties against state overreach, the Court must deploy structural remedies grounded in Public Law. The Court should formally evaluate mass FIRs against the standards of Article 19 (1) (b) and Article 19 (3), explicitly ruling that the routine criminalization of peaceful assembly is unconstitutional and illegal. Under the doctrine established in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997), the Court should impose direct compensatory damages on state authorities for malicious prosecution and illegal detention, creating a genuine deterrent against police abuse. By declaring clear, generalizable legal standards under Article 141, the Supreme Court empowers trial courts and High Courts across India to swiftly quash abusive FIRs at the threshold, ensuring equal protection for all citizens.

The protection of civil liberties and the preservation of the rule of law are not opposing values; they are mutually dependent. A judicial order that delivers immediate relief by sacrificing procedural rigor and precedential integrity provides only a fleeting, fragile sanctuary. True constitutional justice demands that the Supreme Court remain an uncompromising court of law protecting the citizen not through the informal compromise of a panchayat, but through the enduring, equalizing power of constitutional principle.

(The author is a legal researcher with the organisation)

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